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## PART 52

January to March 1943



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CONFIDENTIAL.

**FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING  
EASTERN AFFAIRS**

PART 52.—JANUARY TO MARCH 1943.

**CHAPTER I.—IRAQ.**

[J 125/2/16]

No. 1.

*Sir M. Lampson to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 7, 1943.)*

(No. 1204.)

Sir,

*Cairo, December 16, 1942.*

WITH reference to paragraph 5 of my telegram No. 2576 of the 13th November, 1942, recording the allusion in Nahas Pasha's speech at the Saadist Club on the 13th November to the establishment of a bureau for intellectual co-operation between Egypt and Iraq, I have the honour to report that the project of this bureau was no doubt inspired by Taha Hussein, the Technical Adviser to the Egyptian Ministry of Education.

2. Discussions which have taken place in Cairo between the Ministry of Education and the Iraqi Legation during the last few months have led to the establishment in the Ministry of Education here of a bureau composed of the Minister of Education and the Under-Secretary of State for Education on the Egyptian side, and the Iraqi Minister (or Chargé d'Affaires) and one other Iraqi, not yet appointed. The task of the bureau is, among other things, stated to be the drafting of proposals for a Treaty of Cultural Co-operation which would be signed by Egypt and Iraq in the first place and would be open to other Arab countries subject to the approval of the two principal parties.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, His Majesty's Minister at Beirut and the High Commissioner for Palestine.

I have, &c.

MILES W. LAMPSON.

[E 279/103/93]

No. 2.

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 13.)*

(No. 37.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, January 13, 1943.*

PRIME Minister informed me this morning that decision of the Iraqi Government to declare war on the Axis Powers and to adhere to 26-Power Pact, will be announced on Saturday morning, 16th January, state of war to begin at midnight local time on that date. No announcement should be made in London before 1100 hours Greenwich Mean Time on 16th January. Text of Government's decision with summary of explanatory memorandum and suggestions on publicity measures are being telegraphed urgently in Empax series.

2. Prime Minister explained that all Iraqi diplomatic and consular representatives abroad are being warned of what is impending and decision will also be communicated to the Swiss Consul here as local protector of Axis interests.



[E 279/103/93]

No. 3.

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 13.)*

(No. 38.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, January 13, 1943.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I expressed to Nuri my surprise that he was acting with such precipitancy as I feared that he had not allowed sufficient time for preparation [? group omitted: ? of] public opinion. His Excellency replied that by 16th January his press campaign would have lasted a week and apart from this he was entirely confident that his policy would be approved by the great majority of the people. I urged him to lose no time in warning Mutesarifs what was afoot. I am myself issuing a directive to political advisory staff.

2. When I sounded him on the subject of his proposed letter promising vigorous action in the economic field, the Prime Minister explained at considerable length his reluctance to take any step which might enable either enemy or local critics to allege that Iraq's entry into the war had been subject to any conditions [group undecipherable: ? whatsoever]. He went on to say that I could, however, assure you that it was definitely the policy of the Iraqi Government to deal with the economic problem and also to assist limitrophe territories to the best of their ability. He reminded me that he had committed himself to this effect on more than one occasion and I got the impression that he would be prepared to do so again. In reply to these excuses, I pointed out that the whole object of the proposed letter was to make it clear beyond any possible misunderstanding that the undertaking recorded in the exchange of notes about belligerency not involving any wider obligations than those already assumed under the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, in no way affects Iraq's determination to co-operate to the fullest extent in the Allied economic effort. The Prime Minister had not previously considered the desirability of bridging this possible gap but the most he would promise was to confer with the Minister of Finance and let me know the result.

3. I reminded the Prime Minister that Axis reprisals might occur and the possibility of air raids could not be ignored. Nuri was inclined to pooh-poo this danger, but agreed that Air Officer Commanding should take such precautionary measures as might in the latter's view be necessary. The Air Officer Commanding having asked me a day or two ago for advance warning of zero hour, Air Headquarters have been notified accordingly.

[E 368/103/93]

No. 4.

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 18.)*

(No. 64.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, January 17, 1943.*

THERE is nothing very striking to report in the way of local reactions to Iraq's entry into the war. When legislature reassembled on 16th January after recess, only some 44 Deputies out of 115 took their seats and [? group omitted: ? it] was therefore a thin house that applauded the Prime Minister's announcement. High percentage of absentees may be attributed partly to normal post-holiday slackness and partly to the fact that reassembly of Parliament coincided with the ninth day of Muharren, which is strictly observed by all Shiah elements. Probably, only in a very few cases did Deputies keep away from motives of opposition to Nuri's policy. Little of note was said in the few speeches that followed the announcement. Possibly the most interesting pronouncement was made by Abdul Wahab Mahmoud, Deputy for Basra, who, while welcoming particularly renewed interest of United States in international affairs, expressed his regret that no less than 120 elected representatives of the American people should have supported the idea of handing Palestine over to the Jews. Tewfik Suwaidi (who is in a most disgruntled mood, complaining that he has been insulted by the suggestion that he should serve abroad as a diplomatic representative under his dentist, present Minister for Foreign Affairs) enquired whether any assurances had been obtained limiting Iraq's commitments to her treaty obligations and was told by the Prime Minister that there would be a later opportunity to debate the whole question of Iraqi belligerency. Other speakers followed the general line of last week's preparatory propaganda.

2. Public seems to have taken the news very calmly and I have not heard of any demonstrations either pro or con. Crowds listening to special broadcasts outside coffee-shops seemed rather glum, but the weather was overcast and there [? group omitted: ? was] even a rain which always seems to depress the people.

3. I think it may be said that in general the news was well received but without any enthusiasm. No reports are yet to hand for Liwas.

[J 490/2/16]

No. 5.

*Sir M. Lampson to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 29.)*

(No. 1.)

Sir,

*Cairo, January 2, 1943.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1204 of the 16th December, 1942, regarding the establishment of an office for cultural co-operation between Egypt and Iraq, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a decision issued by the Ministry of Education setting forth the duties and composition of that office.

2. The office is to arrange the exchange of information in matters of education, to consider the exchange of students and teachers and to make necessary preparations for conferences. It will also undertake the execution of a cultural treaty which, it is stated, the two Governments intend to conclude as soon as possible.

3. Each Ministry of Education will delegate two representatives to the office, which will meet under the presidency of the local Minister of Education in either Cairo or Bagdad in February each year. Subject to the approval of the two principal parties, other Arab Governments may be represented in the office.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives in Bagdad, Jerusalem and Beirut.

I have, &amp;c.

MILES W. LAMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 5.

*Ministerial Decision No. 5623, dated August 27, 1942, for the Establishment of an Office for Cultural Co-operation between Egypt and Iraq.*

*Ministry of Education, Minister's Office.*

THE Minister of Education, after consideration of the decision of the Council of Ministers, dated the 18th July, 1942, has made the following decision:—

## ARTICLE I.

An office will be established for cultural co-operation between the Egyptian and the Iraqi Ministries of Education. Its objects would include proposals for all that would lead to complete co-operation in cultural and educational matters of interest to both countries, particularly the following:—

1. To keep both Ministries informed of all developments and changes in both countries with regard to questions of education and instruction, including any new regulations, laws and curricula as well as scholastic books; and the reasons for such developments.

2. To consider the advantages of exchanging students and teachers, and the conditions of secondment of the latter for long or short periods, and any relevant details.

3. To discuss the advantage of exchanging books, publications and other scholastic materials.

4. To make preparations for any future cultural and educational conferences.

## ARTICLE II.

The office will meet either in Cairo or at Bagdad under the presidency of the Minister of Education or his appointed representative. It will be composed of the president and four members, i.e., two representatives from each Ministry.

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## ARTICLE III.

The office will meet in February each year, and may hold other extraordinary meetings if found necessary.

## ARTICLE IV.

The said office will form the practical instrument for the execution of the Cultural Treaty, which the two Governments intend to conclude at the earliest possible date.

## ARTICLE V.

Other Arab Governments may be represented in the said office if they so desire and if the Ministries of Education in Egypt and Iraq approve.

## ARTICLE VI.

The technical adviser to the Ministry of Education is entrusted with the execution of this decision.

[E 946/489/93]

No. 6.

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 16.)*

(No. 24.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, January 22, 1943.*

SINCE Mr. Thompson's despatch No. 345 of the 25th November the political life of the country has been undisturbed and my chief concern, and that of the Iraqi Government, has been with economic matters. I summarise below the major steps taken in the hope of controlling high prices and maintaining supplies of cheap bread and flour in the towns. They show something of the Minister of Finance's desire, under pressure from me, to be energetic and realistic, but the results which he has so far achieved have not done much to encourage belief in the effectiveness of such methods in this country. To be reasonable, however, the critic of the efforts of the Iraqi Administration to solve its war-time economic problems should not forget that in Iraq the situation is no worse, indeed in many ways it is better, than in other Middle Eastern countries. From Turkey, where much vigour and ruthlessness is apparently being applied to the solution of economic difficulties, pathetic appeals are being sent to Iraq for parcels of food, and in a recent official report on India, where there is an administration of almost legendary efficiency, I saw it stated that "the serious economic situation throughout the country is unrelieved."

2. In the middle of December the Government, whose subserviency to powerful agricultural vested interests is one of the regrettable features of the present situation, made a further concession to wheat holders by authorising the purchase of grain at the fixed prices in the villages instead of at the collection centres, thus saving the growers considerable transport costs. At the same time it was announced that all stocks not registered with the authorities by the 15th January would be liable to confiscation. This step and the meaningless threat attached to it unfortunately led to no substantial increase in the Government's stocks of wheat. Nevertheless, the authorities have continued somehow to maintain fairly adequate supplies of flour to feed the towns. In Bagdad crowds of poor people are sometimes to be seen clamouring for bread outside the bakers' shops, but in Mosul, Kirkuk and Basra the people seem to have had less cause for complaint.

3. On the 4th January the Minister of Finance commandeered half of all the barley in the taxation centres of eight of the fourteen provinces of Iraq against a payment of I.D. 15 a ton (I.D. 16 in Basra). His objects were to stop speculation in barley and to secure adequate supplies for the sale of barley flour to the poor and for mixing with wheat for cheap bread. I do not yet know how great a quantity of barley the Government have thus secured for distribution, but it certainly did not exceed 15,000 tons and their action has in no way decreased speculation, nor has it reduced prices in the open market. It so happened that, at the time when the Government laid hands on the barley in the taxation centres, there was much of this grain there which had already been bought, but not carried away, by the U.K.C.C. Half of this quantity was requisitioned by the Government, and I have not yet been able to persuade the Minister of Finance, who, to do him justice, was ignorant of its existence at the

time when he issued his order, to release it. Discussions on this vexatious topic continue.

4. On the 16th December the Ministry of Finance brought under official control the three woollen cloth mills in Bagdad, and concluded arrangements with the owners whereby they would manufacture two qualities of cloth to be sold at fixed prices of 600 fils per 500 grammes for the first quality, and 500 fils per 500 grammes for the second quality. Work on this cloth began on the 3rd January. No exact figures are yet available, but the maximum output of these plants is probably about 250,000 square metres yearly. A few days later the Bagdad soap factory was similarly taken over. It seems to be the official ambition to distribute the entire output of this factory at a low price to Government employees of the lower grades.

5. Early in the New Year, perturbed by the increasing tendency of Saleh Jabr to lay all the economic trials and tribulations of the country at the doors of the British forces, I arranged an informal discussion on economic questions between the Minister of Finance, the Commander-in-chief and myself. The Minister had been nursing as a particular grievance, for which there was some justification, the idea that the army were imposing too great a strain on the transport and supplies of the country, but he was well pleased with the sympathetic and helpful attitude of the Commander-in-chief, who promised the following help:—

- (a) To reduce from 800 to 600 the "ceiling" of Iraqi lorries used for military haulage.
- (b) To supply tyres and parts to keep civilian motor vehicles on the road, provided that their use for essential work was ensured by official control.
- (c) To explore the possibility of enabling U.K.C.C. vehicles to assist in transporting cereals for the Iraqi Government whenever military exigencies permit.

6. On the 16th January, on the first day of the reassembling of Parliament after a six weeks' adjournment, the Prime Minister informed the Chamber that, in accordance with a resolution passed on the 12th November, the Government were arranging for Iraq to adhere to the Declaration of the United Nations made at Washington on the 2nd January, 1942, and explained that, as this adherence made it necessary for Iraq to declare war, the Regent had issued a Royal Iradah proclaiming the existence of a state of war between Iraq and the Axis Powers as from midnight on the 16th-17th January. The events and discussions that led up to this development have been fully reported by telegraph and need not be repeated here. Little of note was said in the few speeches that followed the Prime Minister's announcement, and most speakers approved of Iraq's declaring war in order that she and all the Arabs should enjoy to the full the benefits of the Atlantic Charter, but neither Nuri Pasha nor anyone else indulged in any eloquence on the contribution Iraq could make to hasten the Allied victory. Indeed, one might conclude from their published statements that the Government do not consider themselves under any obligation to do more than abide by the terms of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. It will be my endeavour to explode this comfortable theory if it really exists. The public both in the capital and the provinces received the news with a calm that was near to indifference. I understand that many people, not knowing the subtle distinction between breaking off diplomatic relations and declaring war, had imagined that Iraq was already a belligerent and regarded the declaration of war as little more than an administrative formality having little practical effect.

7. On the other hand, the Prime Minister, who ever since the war began has been hoping for a new adventure which would consummate the achievements of the Arab Revolt of the war of 1914-18, did his best to turn the occasion to the advantage of the Arab cause. The propaganda with which he prepared the way for the declaration of war brought into prominence the third provision of the Atlantic Charter, with special reference to Syria and Palestine, and stressed the point that the Charter stipulated that all countries should enjoy a fair share of the raw materials of the world. These things and many others could, it was indicated, all be gained by signing the Washington Declaration. In his reply to Mr. Churchill's message welcoming Iraq as a co-belligerent Nuri Pasha found another opportunity to harp on the same key, and declared that the Arab countries which had not yet received their liberty still looked to Great Britain to fulfil the promises made to the Arabs over 25 years ago and reaffirmed in the Atlantic Charter.

[25648]



8. This reply was sent off without being shown to me, but so soon as I saw it I told the Prime Minister how untimely and tactless it was that at this solemn moment of Iraq's history he should have dwelt in his reply to Mr. Churchill not on what contribution Iraq could make to help the United Nations, but on what she expected to receive at their hands. Nuri Pasha prepared a somewhat similar message for the Regent to telegraph to His Majesty The King, but fortunately His Royal Highness sent his Principal Secretary to show me the draft, and I told him plainly that I thought a repetition of Nuri Pasha's inappropriate importunity would make a singularly bad effect in London.

9. In late November echoes of the world-wide celebrations held on the 2nd November, 1942, to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Balfour Declaration began to be heard in Iraq. On the 1st December a Bagdad newspaper published a leading article drawing attention to some of the speeches made on that occasion, and declaring that, by reaffirming Zionist aspirations in Palestine and challenging the provisions of the British statement of policy on Palestine made in May 1939, the Jews had broken the truce, which the Arabs had tacitly observed since the outbreak of the present war. The article also gave warning that the Arabs could not continue to keep this truce if the Jews insisted on taking advantage of every opportunity that the war gave them to steal a march on the Arabs.

10. On the 10th December the Prime Minister informed me of the receipt of a telegram from the Iraqi Minister in Washington, reporting that Mr. Hoover and certain other prominent persons had addressed a letter to the *New York Times* advocating that the Jews should be permitted to form a Zionist army. Later the Minister for Foreign Affairs asked the American Minister to obtain the full facts from Washington. The State Department's reply, received just after Christmas, showed that the so-called article had only been an open petition in the form of a paid advertisement inserted by private sponsors, and in no way an official expression of any policy of the United States Government. Nuri Pasha, nevertheless, was disposed to see in this advertisement, and in statements made by Mr. Wendell Willkie and other politicians, an indication of the strong support to Zionism given by American public opinion, and when he was in Cairo at the end of the year he discussed with Nahas Pasha the idea of addressing a request to the United States Government to discourage their prominent men from making public statements of this kind, which indisposed the Arabs at a moment when their leaders were shepherding them into the Allied fold. About the same time Nuri Pasha also communicated to Ibn Saud a proposal that the latter should join with the Iraqi Government in drawing His Majesty's Government's attention to the intensification of Jewish efforts to establish a Jewish Government in Palestine and in requesting them to take steps to check this activity. According to Ibn Saud, Nuri Pasha stated that he was confident that the Egyptian Government would be ready to join in the *démarche* if asked to do so.

11. The high cost of living, irregularities in distribution of bread and flour, and the hardship which these things entail for the poor have been taken up as themes for propaganda by the Iraqi Communists. It is clear that left wing elements in this country are gaining strength both in numbers and influence, and that they are profiting from the immunities which they have so far enjoyed as anti-Nazis to develop propaganda to an extent which has not hitherto been permitted. There is now a well-established and popular left wing daily newspaper, which makes a feature of news and articles favourable to Russia, a monthly magazine mostly filled with articles on the achievements of the Soviet Government, and an illicit and somewhat irregularly published periodical which is the organ of the extreme group. Cyclostyled handbills are distributed from time to time in the big cities, and Communist favours, ties and badges, are sometimes worn by the more youthful and enthusiastic supporters of the movement. All this is very disagreeable to the rather reactionary politicians who govern Iraq, and I do not think it will be long before they resort to some form of repressive action.

12. The efforts of the local Communists are much helped by the recent successes of the Russian armies and the eulogies lavished on them by the broadcasting stations of the Allied Nations. Though they now make common cause with Allied propaganda in attacks on the Axis Governments, the Iraqi Communists include many men who are by no means well disposed towards Great Britain, and there is a significant tendency in their propaganda to insist on the importance of opening up diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government, to belittle the Allied help given to Russia and to stress the point that the Communists are as determined as any other Arab political group to carry on the struggle for full independence of all Arab countries. I have the impression that the Prime

Minister especially is already wondering a trifle uneasily what Soviet post-war policy towards Persia, Iraq and the Gulf is likely to be, and it is rumoured, I do not know with what truth, that on this subject views are being secretly exchanged between the Chancelleries of Angora, Bagdad and Tehran. May I venture in this connexion to remind you, Sir, of the final sentence of paragraph 2 of Mr. Thompson's telegram No. 1120 of the 6th November last.

13. The committee set up to examine the records of all interned persons presented their report to the Government early in December. Out of a total of 310 persons they recommend thirty-seven for release. Of these, twelve were men whose offences should, in the opinion of the committee, have been dealt with under the criminal code or the T.C.C.D.R.; thirty were men of no consequence who had, the committee judged, already been sufficiently punished, and seven were offenders whose release was under conditions which would prevent them doing harm. The report was adopted by the Government without amendment except for the deletion of two names from the third category mentioned above and action was taken accordingly by the Ministry of the Interior. The five persons released conditionally have been sent to live at Qalat Salih in Amara. I have made it abundantly plain to the Regent, Nuri Pasha, and the Minister of the Interior, that there is no justification for these gestures of appeasement, and on the 20th January the Prime Minister assured me he would not favour any further releases before June, when we could review the position together. Great pressure will, however, continue to be exerted on the Administration to liberate detainees, and I am far from sanguine about the Minister's ability to resist the importunities of powerful supporters, friends or relatives.

14. The Regent left Iraq for Egypt on the 17th December, accompanied by the Prime Minister, to visit the battlefield of the Western Desert. They both returned on the 2nd January much impressed by what they had seen and delighted with the kindness and courtesy shown to them by the Commander-in-chief. During his stay in Cairo, Nuri Pasha found several opportunities to encourage hopes that closer union and collaboration would be achieved by Arab countries after the war.

15. Professor Mohammed Sadiq Johar, a senior official of the Egyptian Education Service, arrived in Bagdad on the 14th January to take up the post of Director-General in the Ministry of Education. The late co-directors-general, Dr. Sami Showkat and Dr. Fadhil Jamali, have been appointed respectively Director-General of Health and Social Affairs and counsellor at the Iraqi Legation in Washington. Their departure from the Ministry of Education was long overdue and is greatly to be welcomed. The Government have not yet decided what powers to give to Sadiq Johar, and no doubt there will be many delays and hesitations in giving effect to Professor Hamley's reforms, which, however, have been agreed in principle by the Cabinet.

16. Early in the New Year the Iraqi Minister at Angora reported that the Turkish court to which the Iraqi demand for the extradition of Salahuddin Sabbagh had been referred had ruled that sufficient evidence had not been put forward to justify his surrender. The Prime Minister was much annoyed by this decision and holding that the action of the Turkish court has rendered it valueless he is considering the possibility of cancelling the special clause of the Turkish-Iraqi Extradition Treaty, which makes attempts against the heads of the State an extraditable offence.

17. In 1938 the Persian Government closed Iraqi schools in Khuzistan. Since then sporadic efforts have been made by the Iraqi Government to persuade the Persian Government to allow the schools to be reopened, but without success. On the 17th November, 1942, at the instance of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Cabinet decided to retaliate by closing Persian schools in Iraq. It seems that unduly precipitate action was taken on this resolution. Police were sent to the Persian schools and informed the headmasters that they must close their schools within 24 hours. The Persian Minister at once protested to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and gained from him a month's respite for further negotiations. The Persian Minister argues that in Persia the Government closed all foreign schools, not only Iraqi schools, whereas the Iraqi Government are discriminating in an unfriendly manner by only ordering the closing of Persian schools. To this the Iraqis reply that there are no other schools in Iraq maintained by a foreign Government. My latest information is that the Persian Government is yielding and that the matter is likely to be settled in a manner favourable to Iraq.

18. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Angora, Cairo, Tehran, Jedda and Beirut, the Minister of State at Cairo,



His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan, the Governor-General of India, the Commander-in-Chief, India, General Headquarters, Middle East, the Combined Middle East Intelligence Centre, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Political Agent at Koweit and to His Majesty's consular officers at Basra and Mosul.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

[E 944/103/93]

No. 7.

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 16.)*

(No. 13.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him herewith a copy of an exchange of notes between His Majesty's Ambassador and the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the proposed declaration by Iraq of a state of war against the Axis.

*Bagdad, January 13, 1943.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 7.

*The Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir K. Cornwallis.*

*Ministry for Foreign Affairs,  
Political Department, Western Section,  
Bagdad, January 13, 1943.*

(Translation.)

Your Excellency the Ambassador,

IN accordance with the provisions of article 1 of the Treaty of Alliance concluded between Iraq and Great Britain in June 1930, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Iraqi Government have under consideration a resolution declaring a state of war between Iraq and all the Axis States and a formal adherence by the Iraqi Government to the Declaration of the United Nations made at Washington on the 2nd January, 1942.

2. Before taking this step, however, the Iraqi Government would be glad if your Excellency would confirm that adherence to the above-mentioned declaration will not involve Iraq in any wider obligations than those which she has already assumed under article 4 of the Treaty of Alliance of 1930.

I take this opportunity to renew to your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration and esteem.

ABDUL ILLAH HAFIDH.

Enclosure 2 in No. 7.

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Your Excellency,

*Bagdad, January 13, 1943.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note of to-day's date concerning the resolution which the Iraqi Government have under consideration for a declaration of a state of war between Iraq and all the Axis Powers and the formal adherence by the Iraqi Government to the Declaration of the United Nations made at Washington on the 2nd January, 1942, and in reply thereto to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government have ascertained that the United States Government would regard the furnishing by Iraq to the United Nations of all facilities and assistance in their power, including the use of aerodromes, ports, rivers, railways and means of communication in Iraq, as constituting material assistance and contributions against the common enemies and consequently as qualifying Iraq for adherence to the Declaration of the United Nations. On these grounds I am therefore authorised by His Majesty's Principal

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to confirm the view of the Iraqi Government that Iraq, after having declared a state of war against the Axis Powers, would not by her accession to the declaration incur any wider obligations than those which she has already assumed under the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance.

I avail, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

[E 1029/103/93]

No. 8.

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 19.)*

(No. 15.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, January 17, 1943.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to my telegrams Nos. 15 and 17, Empax, of the 13th and 14th January and to transmit to you herewith translations of the resolution of the Council of Ministers and of the Prime Minister's explanatory memorandum covering the entry of Iraq into war against Germany, Italy and Japan and her application to accede to the United Nations Pact.

2. Nuri Pasha's memorandum has already been fully reported by telegraph and further comment upon it seems unnecessary. As regards the ministerial resolution, however, I would invite your attention to the fact that the published version differs from the original retained in the State archives through the omission of the proviso contained in article 1 recording that Iraq, in declaring war against the three Axis Powers, "shall not be liable to any obligations other than those contained in the Treaty of Alliance between Iraq and Great Britain signed on the 30th June, 1930." I understand that there was considerable argument in the Cabinet over this reservation, the retention of which was opposed by Nuri Pasha and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. However, they finally had to bow to the will of a majority of their colleagues, who insisted that the terms of the resolution should dovetail with the notes exchanged between Abdul Illah Hafidh and myself on the 13th January and copied to you in my despatch No. 13 of that date. When I raised the issue myself with the Prime Minister his Excellency evinced a marked reluctance to return to the charge against his cautious colleagues. In the circumstances, and having regard to the terms of the exchange of notes, I did not consider that any useful purpose would be served by attempting to press the matter.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Deputy Minister of State at Cairo.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 8.

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

*Resolution adopted by the Council of Ministers at their Fourth Meeting assembled at 12 noon on January 11, 1943.*

THE Council of Ministers met under the presidency of his Excellency Sayid Nuri Said, Prime Minister and Acting Minister of Defence, the following members being present :—

His Excellency Sayid Abdul Ilah Hafidh, Minister for Foreign Affairs.  
His Excellency Sayid Tahsin al Askari, Minister of Interior.  
His Excellency Sayid Salih Jabr, Minister of Finance.  
His Excellency Sayid Daoud al Haidari, Minister of Justice.  
His Excellency Sayid Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, Minister of Communications and Works.  
His Excellency Sayid Tahsin Ali, Minister of Education.  
His Excellency Sayid Salman al Barrak, Minister of Economics.  
His Excellency Sayid Abdul Razzaq al Uzri, Minister of Social Affairs.

The Council considered the proposal signed by the majority of Deputies which the Chamber decided to refer to the Government and which was forwarded



to the office of the Prime Minister by the President of the Chamber of Deputies under his letter No. 69 dated the 12th November, 1942.

The Council also considered a memorandum submitted by the Prime Minister, No. 125, dated the 11th January, 1943.

In view of the hostile attitude which has been adopted for a long time by the Axis Powers against Iraq and of the continued activities through their agents for the destruction of the legitimate Iraqi Government and of the pressure brought to bear on the Iraq Parliament (as revealed in the Parliamentary resolution adopted by both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate on the 11th November, 1941, and the 15th November, 1941, respectively), and in view of the openly hostile action taken by them during May 1941; and in view of the persistence of the Axis Powers in their hostile attitude from then to the present time by the attacks directed against Iraq and her interests through their broadcasting stations; and in view of their continued efforts to create differences and dissensions between the various communities of Iraq, with the object of endangering public security and public order by spreading false rumours and lying news through their broadcasting stations as well as by all other means available to them;

And in view of the fact that the Broadcasting authorities of the Axis Powers openly and unceasingly use abusive expressions which are intended to impair the dignity of the Royal Family and so undermine the loyalty of the Iraqi people; and also in view of the fact that the Axis Powers encouraged those persons who defied the law and attempted to overthrow the constitutional system of their country and have, after the escape of these persons from Iraq, harboured and maintained them;

And whereas the interests of Iraq in particular and of the Arab peoples in general make it imperative that Iraq should adhere to the Declaration of the United Nations signed at Washington on the 2nd January, 1942, which was based on the Atlantic Charter signed by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the 14th August, 1941; and this in view of the lofty principles embodied in the said document, guaranteeing to all nations, small or great, their liberties and independence as well as their integrity;

After the perusal of article 26 (8) of the Organic Law, the Council passed the following resolution:—

- (i) Iraq shall be deemed to be in a state of war with the three Axis Powers, provided that Iraq shall not be liable to any obligations other than those contained in the Treaty of Alliance between Iraq and Great Britain signed on the 30th June, 1930.
- (ii) Iraq shall adhere to the Declaration of the United Nations signed in Washington on the 2nd January, 1942.
- (iii) The Ministry for Foreign Affairs shall take any action necessary to give effect to this resolution.

Enclosure 2 in No. 8.

*Memorandum, January 11, 1943.*

THE principal foundations upon which any democratic State should stand may be outlined as follows:—

- (a) A definite system of government, determining the basic institutions and powers of the State concerned and ensuring her progress towards the realisation of her own ideals, the establishment of justice therein and the development of her vital resources in the political, administrative, constructive, economic, social and other fields. Such a system is usually ensured by an organic law which stipulates that the conduct of the affairs of the State shall be under the supervision of a Parliament whose designation and composition vary with different States.
- (b) A head, whom the people entrusts with the supreme leadership of the country and who is invested with powers enabling him to direct the policy of the State and control the proper functioning of the machine thereof in accordance with its Constitution and the laws derived therefrom.

- (c) A force, composed of all the various armed services, to safeguard the integrity of the State and defend the country against any internal or external menaces. In the present age such a force is, as a general rule, supported by international relationships, which ensure the safety of the State and which are reinforced by treaties and pacts, whereby the State is linked with certain other States to whom it is drawn closer by common interests and conformity of aims. Recently, such international relationship has become very important not only in the case of small and new States but also in the case of great Powers, no matter how large and powerful they may be, such as the Allied and the Axis Powers which have been interrelated with a network of treaties all of which aim at safeguarding the existence and ensuring the safety and interest of the State concerned. One must look forward to the gradual expansion of these international relationships as, owing to the increased complexity and development of international interests due to modern inventions, it is quite impossible for any single State to live isolated from the rest of the world.

Any impairment in the above foundations in any State will inevitably threaten the very existence of that State and harm her in proportion to the extent of the defect.

2. If the modern history of Iraq is carefully examined it will appear that the young Iraqi State was only founded after the last Great War, i.e., the war of 1914-18. Iraq at once commenced to consolidate gradually her three foundations, beginning with entrusting the sovereignty of the nation to the hands of the late King Faisal I, the founder of modern Iraq and restorer of her ancient glory. Then followed the enactment of her organic law, the raising of her armed forces, the delimitation of her frontiers, the conclusion of the Treaty of Alliance between Iraq and Great Britain whose interests coincided with the independence of Iraq, and finally her admission to the League of Nations and adherence to the Covenant thereof.

For her existence and stability during that period Iraq was only indebted, next to God, to the efforts of her loyal sons, to the Great House of Hashim and to the British Government, who deemed it to be in her own interest to support the wishes of the people of Iraq. As a matter of fact not one of all the great and the small countries of the world, including those who call themselves now the Axis Powers, agreed to recognise the independence of Iraq except only through the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty which was approved and welcomed by all Arab countries. Even all the leading personalities of Egypt, foremost among them the Egyptian Wafd party, were unanimous in recommending the conclusion of a treaty of alliance by Egypt with Great Britain on the same lines.

3. It is extremely regrettable that soon after the Iraqi State had been founded and stabilised fate should make her suffer the tragic loss of her great leader and founder, King Faisal I, just at the beginning of her new life. Eventually, she had to face many difficulties and was threatened with innumerable dangers, whereby elements of weakness crept into her Constitution. As soon as the policy of aggression began to assert itself a few years ago by the acts of certain ambitious States, the representatives of some of those Powers were allowed to seize every opportunity for aggravating that state of weakness in Iraq by getting into touch with certain evil elements in the country, such as selfish and adventurous persons, and encouraging their dangerous activities. The result was that the wicked intentions of those Powers towards Iraq, in particular, and the Arab countries, in general, were a proved fact beyond all doubts in spite of their pretended sympathy for the Arab cause as expressed through their protégés, mouthpieces and sycophants. In this way those Powers were able to take advantage of the weak points in Iraq, to encourage the agents of destruction and to widen the sphere of their action, thus striking heavy blows against the very basis of the three foundations upon which she rests.

If, in fact, the agents, who have placed themselves at the disposal of those foreign Powers who are eager to devour their country, were asked to state what made them serve those Powers, they would be unable to justify their shameful conduct which most dangerously threatened the very existence and vital interests of their country.

4. Even before the present war certain aggressive Powers began to carry out their abominable policy by resorting to force and invaded some countries with their armed forces. The extent of their aggression steadily increased and finally led to a declaration of war between the Axis Powers, on the one side,



and Great Britain and her Allies, on the other. The war has since so spread that it has attained its present degree of magnitude.

The right policy that should have been adopted by all States—particularly those that are small and recently created—was to denounce and resist any aggressive policy pursued by any bullying Power. Had all the States of the world combined, before the outbreak of the present war, and agreed that each one would join in opposing any armed aggression even if the State attacked was a distant one unconnected with them by special ties or interests, we should not have recently witnessed one State after another losing their independence and becoming victims of aggression, with all the sufferings and evils entailed thereby. Events have proved that to be indifferent to aggression is to encourage it and to allow it to expand and spread until in time it attains its climax.

The Axis Powers, who did so much harm to Iraq by encouraging and nourishing the elements of weakness therein, have gradually put into execution their aggressive plans and have succeeded in widening the scope of their plans so that a large number of countries, such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Siam, and even some parts of China, Russia, and the possessions of the United States, are now groaning under the oppressive yoke of Axis occupation. There is clear evidence of the threat of an early extension of armed aggression to other States and countries at the first opportunity, and among those threatened are the Iraq State and other Arab countries where the Axis Powers have indulged in secret and open intrigue and propaganda for some years past.

Undoubtedly, most of the loyal leaders in those countries now regret their failure to resist the policy of aggression in its initial stages and realise the folly of their once cherished belief that they could save their countries from aggression by being indifferent to the aggressive acts which, as onlookers, they saw being committed in detail against other States.

Had all the victims adopted at the outset the wise policy of each country promptly resisting aggression as it occurred to the full extent of her capacity, the outlook of the present world war would have now been quite a different one and, perhaps, the leaders and promoters of this aggressive policy would not have put it into effect.

5. The policy of armed aggression met with a great success at the beginning of the war and brought destruction upon all the countries which the powers of evil were able to enter.

In 1940 the Axis victories attained their climax and began to threaten materially the whole world with the evils of subjugation and destruction.

The policy of treachery and destruction adopted by the Axis Powers caused a shock of terror and anxiety unprecedented in the annals of history. The world then turned towards heaven, searching for a ray of hope to enlighten the dark future. During those hard times and before the United States entered the war, Mr. Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt met and announced on the 14th August, 1941, the "Atlantic Charter," by which they expressed the common principles underlying the policy of their respective countries for the guarantee of a happy future when peace, co-operation and confidence will replace doubt, suspicion and rivalry amongst the peoples of the world.

The Charter consists of eight articles, of which the second and third ones specially concern us. They read:—

*Second.*—They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.

*Third.*—They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live, and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

These two articles enlighten the path along which the Arab cause is advancing. They contain the cures for its complications and sound principles for the solution of its problems, as well as the means for the attainment of its ideals. Undoubtedly, these principles will continue to be valid as long as the American people have unanimously resolved to take part in world affairs under Mr. Roosevelt's leadership for the benefit of the American people as well as for that of the whole world.

The most important factor in shattering the belief of men in international justice and shaking the spirit of mutual confidence among nations after the last world war was undoubtedly the withdrawal of the Government of the United

States from the field of European politics and their refusal to support the ideals which they had themselves promulgated and undertaken to ensure.

This negative attitude of the American Government gave a free hand to the other victorious States, who were bound to one another with pledges from which it was not easy for them to be released. This led to certain difficulties and serious consequences in which, unfortunately, some of the Arab countries had a share.

The return of the United States to the policy of participation in world politics will help to remove many of the difficulties that may arise from previous international pledges—especially any secret ones—and will ensure international justice according to the provisions of the Atlantic Charter. It is most unlikely that the Government of the United States will abstain from associating itself with general international affairs at the end of the present war, for they have already witnessed with their own eyes the misfortunes and calamities which befell the world as a result of their withdrawal from participation in world affairs after the last war, as well as the horrors and sufferings of the present struggle, which surpass anything that occurred in any previous war.

6. After the aggravation of the Axis aggression and the entry of the United States into the war, delegates from twenty-six States, representing the inhabitants of more than two-thirds of the whole civilised world, met in Washington and published the Declaration of the United Nations which confirms the principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter and which aims at defeating the policy of aggression. In this declaration they have left the door open for all the nations who may or will help or contribute materially in the common struggle to adhere to it.

7. It is evident that it is in the vital interest of Iraq (being a State bound by the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance, as well as by the Covenant of the League of Nations, and being intent upon carrying out her international obligations with all candour and sincerity) to support any policy which tends to ensure the freedom of peoples and resist aggression, especially when it is realised that in the forefront of the States which back this policy stands the country which has already proved by her action her friendly attitude to Iraq and shown that her interests do accord with Iraq's independence. On the other hand, the object of the States who have adopted the policy of aggression has always been to obliterate the political existence of Iraq and encourage every movement started by Iraq's enemies in and out of this country.

It was the duty of Iraq to stand by the side of her Ally, Great Britain, and her Allies ever since the declaration of this war. But she was unable to do so owing to her being engaged in combating Axis intrigues.

The most obvious evidence which proves the wicked intentions of those Powers towards Iraq is what they have done, and are still doing, in spreading false rumours and in intriguing against this country, and in continuing their attacks directed by their broadcasting stations against the noble House of Hashim and abusing every person who may be legitimately in power in Iraq. By all this they hoped to persuade Iraq to disavow her legal pledges as stipulated in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance. This is so while the Axis Powers themselves have only recognised our existence and independence through and as a result of this treaty of alliance with Great Britain.

The wicked intentions of the Axis were most evident during the notorious rebellion of May 1941, which they not only organised and provided the necessary funds for, but also actively supported. Moreover, the Axis Powers endeavoured to provide arms and funds to the leaders of that rebellion in order to maintain it and aggravate its damaging results, which severely injured our country and imperilled its very existence.

The Axis officials proved the real interest of their Governments in the affairs of Iraq upon their arrival in this country in the course of that notorious rebellion. The first thing they did was to loot at once whatever Iraqi products they could lay their hands on and send large quantities of these to their countries.

The Axis Powers were not content with the loss and damage they had done to life and property. They are now harbouring a number of the leaders of that rebellion and their followers who escaped from justice, and are forcing them to engage in propaganda against their country in order to obtain the means of subsistence.

All these activities are positively hostile in character. Every evidence indicates that such acts are only a cloak covering preparations for armed hostile action which the Axis will not hesitate to direct against Iraq whenever an opportunity arises. What the Axis have done to Iraq they also did, and are still doing, to all the other Arab countries whom they aim at enslaving, as everybody knows.



8. It is obvious from the above that the Axis Powers have been aiming at the destruction of Iraq as a State; for years they have exerted unceasing efforts to achieve this. Ever since the outbreak of war they have been openly hostile in their attitude towards this country, and have actually most dangerously threatened its existence. Had it not been for the mercy of God, Iraq would have now been subjected to all those forms of looting, persecution and bondage which are being endured by the countries who have passed under the Axis yoke.

The majority of the Chamber of Deputies expressed their desire that Iraq should adhere to the Atlantic Charter (*vide* President of the Chamber's letter No. 69, dated the 12th November, 1942). The adherence of Iraq to the Declaration of the United Nations will enable her to stand formally side by side with the United Nations who are struggling for the principles of freedom and justice. Moreover, such adherence will greatly assist Iraq to attain her national ideals and objectives, in her internal as well as external policies, which have been announced on several occasions and which have in view the welfare of Iraq and that of the Arab countries which are struggling to obtain their freedom and independence. Moreover, the liabilities to be borne by this country as a result of the adherence to the said Declaration are, under no circumstances, expected to be other than those for which she had pledged herself under the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations.

As it is in the interest of Iraq to rely upon the Atlantic Charter and adhere to the Declaration of the United Nations, the Government have taken the necessary steps for the declaration of a state of war between Iraq and the Axis Powers, as well as for the adherence of Iraq to that Declaration, relying on the help and support of Almighty God.

[E 1031/103/93]

No. 9.

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 19.)*

(No. 17.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of a *note verbale*, dated the 16th January, 1943, from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs—Declaration of war on Axis Powers.

*Bagdad, January 18, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 9.

*Note verbale.*

THE Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, Bagdad, and have the honour to inform them that a decision has been taken by the Iraqi Government bringing about a state of war between Iraq and the three Axis Powers, with effect from the midnight of the 16th/17th January, 1943.

The Ministry avail themselves, &c.

*Bagdad, January 16, 1943.*

[E 1202/103/93]

No. 10.

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 1.)*

(No. 25.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Bagdad telegram No. 40 of the 13th January, 1943, has the honour to enclose a note of the 23rd January, 1943, from Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs: Iraqi declaration of war.

*Bagdad, February 3, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 10.

*Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Embassy, Bagdad.*

THE Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, Bagdad, and, in continuation of the Ministry's note dated the 16th January, 1943, have the honour to forward herewith copy of the note embodying the decision of the Iraqi Government that a state of war exists between Iraq and the three Axis Powers.

*Bagdad, January 23, 1943.*

*Bagdad, January 16, 1943.*

The Government of Germany having interfered, in every way and in the most open manner, in the internal affairs of Iraq and having instigated and promoted open rebellion against the constitutional Government of Iraq, has continued, openly and without cessation, her acts of hostility towards Iraq by the publication through her broadcasting stations of false rumours and lying news, of vile slanders against the ruling family and of direct incitements to disaffection and dissension.

In consequence of these facts the Iraqi Government declares that Iraq considers herself as being in a state of war with Germany as from midnight of the 16th–17th January, 1943.

And whereas the Government of Italy, in partnership with the Government of Germany, has been guilty of the same acts of interference in Iraq's internal affairs and of severe provocation toward Iraq right up to the present time, the Government of Iraq declares that Iraq considers herself as being in a state of war with Italy as from midnight of the 16th–17th January, 1943.

And whereas the Government of Japan flagrantly violated the rules of neutrality by assisting the Governments of Germany and Italy in their interference in the internal affairs of Iraq and has since openly joined them in their acts of provocation against Iraq, the Government of Iraq declares Iraq to be in a state of war with Japan as from midnight of the 16th–17th January, 1943.

ABDUL ILAH HAFIDH,

*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of Iraq.*

[E 1667/489/93]

No. 11.

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 23.)*

(No. 65.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, February 21, 1943.*

IN accordance with the instructions contained in Viscount Halifax's despatch of the 4th November, 1939, I have the honour to submit the following review of the chief events in Iraq during 1942, which is the work of Mr. John Chaplin, second secretary at this embassy:—

2. After the storms of 1941 it is pleasant to be able to record that the surface of the political waters during 1942 was ruffled only by periodic breezes and occasional sharper squalls. There were anxious moments when it seemed that the Prime Minister's leaky craft might founder, but in the event it came safely through the year. It would be tedious to chronicle all the many changes in the crew or the reasons—often personal and trivial—which led to them. Apart from the trial and execution of the rebel leaders, to which I shall refer more fully below, there were no further really dangerous waters to be negotiated. These once safely navigated (with but a single casualty), the subsequent recurrent Cabinet crises illustrated the inability of Iraqi public men to put their country, even in the hour of danger, before personal animosities, private gain, family ties or sectarian interests. They showed up, too, the lamentable dearth of able, honest administrators considered eligible for Cabinet rank. General Nuri-al-Said began the year with a Cabinet of two capable men, Saleh Jabr and Ali Mumtaz, and five mediocrities; at the end of the year Saleh Jabr and one of the original mediocrities, Tahsin Ali (under notice of transfer to the post of Rais of the Royal Diwan), alone remained, and five different mediocrities were neglecting or mis-managing the affairs of their departments. The Prime Minister endeavoured on



more than one occasion to recruit Ibrahim Kemal and Taufiq Suwaidi, the two outstanding men among ex-Ministers; but the former still nursed an apparently implacable grudge, while the latter formulated unacceptable conditions, patently designed to secure himself a position from which he could intrigue against the Prime Minister and eventually oust him from office. Inevitably, therefore, the main burden of administration rested throughout the year on the shoulders of General Nuri and Saleh Jabr, the latter first as Minister of the Interior and subsequently as Minister of Finance in the new Cabinet formed by the same Prime Minister after the resignation of the old in early October.

3. During the first half of the year the main preoccupation of the Government was with the aftermath of the events of May 1941. In the penultimate paragraph of my review for 1941 I anticipated that General Nuri would continue his efforts to restore a healthier atmosphere. With the vast improvement in the military situation and the presence of a considerable body of British troops in Iraq, the possibility of organised trouble has virtually vanished, and it is now right to give the Prime Minister his due for the resolution which he showed in darker days. On the 8th January the court-martial which had been set up to try *in absentia* Rashid Ali and his associates delivered judgment, whereby Rashid Ali, Ali Mahmud-al-Shaikh Ali, Yunus Sabawi and three out of the four members of the "Golden Square" were sentenced to be hanged, the ex-Chief of General Staff, Amin Zaki, to life imprisonment and three others to different terms; the hearing of the charges against the fourth member of the Golden Square and a number of others was postponed on the ground that the accused had wished to give themselves up for trial, but had been prevented from doing so. Following upon this verdict the Prime Minister approached me to secure the surrender of those of the accused who had been apprehended in Persia on the entry of the British forces. After careful consideration, I came to the conclusion that, on balance, compliance with a formal request (which was duly forthcoming with the backing of the Cabinet as a whole) would be advisable in so far at least as those already convicted were concerned. It seemed to me that the desirability of enabling the Government to give effect to its declared policy of resolution outweighed the risks both of a re-trial resulting in acquittals or derisory sentences and of the return of the men in question leading to internal disorders. I recommended to you accordingly and arrangements were duly made for the return to Iraq of those who had been sentenced *in absentia*. Meanwhile, Japanese successes in the Far East had given the signal for a dangerous recrudescence of subversive activities, which at the beginning of the year had seemed to have been checked; the authorities, however, reacted with energy, rounding up a gang of Palestinian and Iraqi terrorists on the 5th February and arresting later in the month for internment at Fao twenty-five serving or pensioned army officers and twenty civilians. Steps were also taken to tighten up conditions of internment, and the help of the British military authorities was invoked to assist in the preparation of a new camp at Amara.

4. On the 13th March the former Colonels Fahmi Said and Mahmud Salman of the Golden Square, the ex-Chief of the General Staff, Amin Zaki Sulaiman, with Ali Mahmud-al-Shaikh Ali, Yunus Sabawi and Sadiq Shanshal were brought back to Basra and handed over into Iraqi military custody. Their re-trial in person before court-martial began on the 18th March and proved a long-drawn-out affair. Fortunately, the Prime Minister had obtained from his Cabinet colleagues satisfactory assurances of their determination to see things through. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Damalaji, did indeed absent himself from public business on a plea of illness when the Regent refused to accept his resignation, and Tahsin Ali showed signs of wavering. Nevertheless, the expected volume of pressure in favour of this or that prisoner or all did not materialise; rather, as the trial proceeded and public interest was stimulated by press reports of the hearings, opinion in general hardened against the accused. The unanimous verdict of the court, eventually delivered on the 4th May, condemned Fahmi Said, Mahmud Salman and Yunus Sabawi to death; Ali Mahmud-al-Shaikh Ali to seven years' and Amin Zaki to five years' imprisonment. The death sentences were executed in the early hours of the following day. Sadiq Shanshal, whom the tribunal acquitted, was at once rearrested and interned. This issue, which provoked no violent reaction and, indeed, met with a wide measure of approval, produced an undoubted salutary effect and will, it may be hoped, tend in future to deter unscrupulous politicians and ambitious officers from attempting to overthrow the constitutional order. It should be recorded that, after the conclusion of the trial, the Iraqi Government half-heartedly renewed from time to time, but did not press, their request for the delivery to them of those rebels in the custody

of His Majesty's Government whose original trial had, as recorded above, been postponed. One of them—Naji Suwaidi, Minister of Finance in Rashid Ali's Administration and brother of Taufiq Suwaidi—died in internment in Southern Rhodesia during August. The others remain as potential foci of embarrassment in times to come.

5. Meanwhile, our security authorities had been engaged in preparing a list of the most dangerous characters still at liberty. On the 22nd May I presented this list, containing seventy-five names, to the Minister of the Interior and urged the internment of the men in question. Immediate results were not forthcoming, but I maintained constant pressure; Rommel's advance in Egypt probably hastened the eventual decision, for with the grave deterioration in the military situation the dangers of fifth-column activity became correspondingly more acute. Eventually, on the 5th July, thirty-five suspects were rounded up and sent to the internment camp at Amara, followed a few days later by further trouble-makers from the Mosul district. This action of the Minister of the Interior, though not quite as extensive as had been hoped, nevertheless, exerted a steadying influence at a difficult time and checked pro-Axis activities and propaganda which had been tending to revive. It also all but caused the disruption of the Cabinet, who had not been taken into the confidence of General Nuri and Saleh Jabr over the proposed arrests; the Minister of Finance, Ali Mumtaz, was particularly aggrieved—he was concurrently quarrelling with the Minister of the Interior over supply matters—and was only with the greatest difficulty persuaded to withdraw his resignation. Prior consultation with the full Cabinet would inevitably have resulted in immunity for a number of dangerous men, protected by this Minister or that, and it is well that the Prime Minister would concede no more than that the Cabinet should be informed of arrests which had been decided just before they were carried out. He was also fully prepared, should the German threat to the Middle East develop further, to proceed to a wide range of additional arrests in order to neutralise such potential fifth column as still remained. A number of additional single internments did, in fact, take place, but, with the 8th Army's stand at Alamein and the holding of the German drive in the Caucasus, the likelihood of military operations taking place in or near Iraq receded and with it the demonstrable necessity for severer security measures. The Prime Minister, indeed, began to play with ideas of clemency, for which there was no justification to be found even in the admittedly striking turn in the course of the war; true, the great mass of waverers in Iraq came finally to the conclusion in November and December that the United Nations would be victorious, the risk of a pro-Axis upheaval vanished and pro-Axis propagandists no longer had an eager and uncritical hearing, but releases from internment could only serve to promote clandestine subversive and anti-British activities. In mid-November he engineered a demand in the Senate for the release of political prisoners. Saleh Jabr, Minister of Finance in Nuri's second Cabinet, energetically defended the action he had taken as Minister of the Interior, but the Prime Minister weakened so far as to appoint a committee of three to review all the cases. As a result, out of 311 internees, thirty were released against personal security for future good behaviour and a further five were transferred to *résidence forcée* at Qalat Saleh. The releases thus ordered are not likely in themselves to disturb internal tranquility, but the Prime Minister had been left in no doubt of the view of His Majesty's Government that the time is quite unsuited—especially when vigorous action against hoarders and profiteers is an urgent need—to the development of a policy of appeasement.

6. If the general internal situation can be regarded as having been satisfactory throughout the year, the cleaning of all the Augean stables which the Government had inherited did not proceed with equal determination and celerity. The Prime Minister, as Minister of Defence, continued to lend his personal attention to the purging of the army. He professes in the main to be satisfied with the results, and it is certainly true that the senior officers have shown themselves friendly and co-operative in their dealings with the British military authorities; at the same time reports of the continued prevalence of anti-British tendencies and activities, particularly among the junior officers, have been so circumstantial and so persistent that it is impossible to discount them wholly. The Minister of Justice, for one, considers the army to be still completely unreliable and is reported to have advised the Regent that it should be disbanded and replaced by a gendarmerie force under the Ministry of the Interior. For myself, I think that no little progress has in fact been made, though much doubtless remains to be accomplished. In the field of education Professor Hamley, after many delays and hesitations, eventually accepted the post of technical expert in the Ministry of



Education with a mission to reorganise the whole educational system of Iraq. He found himself thwarted at almost every turn by Dr. Sami Shaukat and, more particularly, by Dr. Fadhil Jamali, the two joint Directors-General, who, despite their black record, were maintained in office, the former by his friendship with the Prime Minister, the latter by Shia influence. Eventually, General Nuri was forced to the conclusion that they must go and, after lengthy and sometimes acrimonious negotiations with the Egyptian Government, succeeded in obtaining the loan of Sadiq Jowhar to be advisory head of the department; the arrival of the latter was awaited at the end of the year. In other administrations, too, there is still much room for improvement. The Directorate-General of Jails is a glaring example, about which I have spoken to the Prime Minister on more than one occasion. The courts, where magistrates are far too prone to acquit, or inflict derisory sentences on offenders deserving of exemplary punishment, are another.

7. All this will take determination, time and patience to remedy. Unfortunately, the Prime Minister, forceful and quick to action though he can be in an emergency, is prone to relax among his dreams so soon as the emergency is over and is also temperamentally averse from grappling with the mass of administrative problems which still clamour for solution, and which his colleagues—Saleh Jabr apart—are too incompetent or too indolent to tackle. With enough and more than enough to occupy him at home, he tended increasingly through 1942 to turn his thoughts to external policy. The signature at Washington of the United Nations' Declaration on the 2nd January caught his imagination at once, and he began to toy with the idea of Iraqi adherence and a declaration of war on the Axis Powers. Nor did the rejection by King Abdul Aziz of the suggestion of His Majesty's Government that Saudi Arabia should take such action influence him against this course, from which he was convinced that Iraq stood much to gain. Pending the trial of the rebels and later during the British retreat in the Western Desert the scheme was shelved, but with the turn in the development of the war was promptly resuscitated. On the 12th November the Chamber of Deputies voted by a two-thirds majority a resolution calling on the Government to adhere to the declaration. The resolution had been inspired by General Nuri, who, fortified by this "parliamentary pressure," went on to seek the approval of His Majesty's Government for the step in contemplation. He had already in March obtained an assurance that belligerency would not involve Iraq in any further commitments than those which she was already discharging under the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, namely, the provision of facilities in Iraqi territory; and that the extension of these facilities to the United Nations would qualify her for adherence to the declaration. The initiative could hardly be discouraged (though Iraqi belligerency would entail no military advantage for the Allies), and at the close of the year the formal means of giving effect to it were under consideration, while the Prime Minister had set in motion a preparatory propaganda campaign.

8. The highest ethical motives did not underlie General Nuri's yearnings after war with the Axis Powers. Convinced of the ultimate defeat of the latter, his aim was to secure the most advantageous position for Iraq and the Iraqi Government at the kill. There was no substantial immediate advantage to be reaped after the United States Government had extended Lend-Lease to Iraq on the 2nd May, but his eyes have always easily wandered in search of wider horizons. *Il faut cultiver notre jardin* is not a political philosophy which appeals to him, and increasingly through the latter part of the year he reverted to his old preoccupation of "Arab aspirations." When Mr. Churchill passed over Iraq in August without making a halt General Nuri, who was much hurt, no doubt felt that an opportunity had been missed, but he did not fail, in acknowledging Mr. Churchill's subsequent telegram of regret at not having been able to break his journey, to allude to "the hope of the realisation of Arab aspirations for unity" as being bound up with the victory of the United Nations. The visit, in mid-September, of Mr. Wendell Willkie, as the personal representative of President Roosevelt, provided a further opportunity for expatiating on the same theme in a speech of welcome. Mr. Willkie did not in his reply touch specifically on Arab problems, but his generalisations regarding the rights of small nations and a reference to the Atlantic Charter were hailed as proofs of his sympathy. He was also the recipient of a memorandum drawn up by Muhammad-al-Sadr, President of the Senate, and the ex-Prime Ministers Jamil Madfai and Taufiq-al-Suwaiddi, which consisted mainly of a criticism of French imperialistic designs in Syria.

9. Subsequently the Prime Minister continued, both in season and out of season, to allude to these topics. At one time in the autumn he was also toying with a grandiose scheme for a pro-democratic bloc under British aegis, to include

Turkey, Persia, Iraq and the mandated territories of the Levant; this was not publicly mooted and seems, for the time at least, to have been shelved. The Regent's speech from the throne at the opening of Parliament, however, contained an explicit reiteration of hopes for Arab unity and emancipation. Finally, the propaganda campaign initiated in November to prepare public opinion for a declaration of war had as one of its main themes the idea that Iraq would, by participating, acquire a position enabling her to safeguard and further Arab interests as a whole. In contrast to all these high-sounding pronouncements were the actual steps taken during the year to achieve closer co-operation in the Arab world. A modest proposal put forward by the Bagdad Chamber of Commerce to engage in discussions with other Chambers of Commerce to facilitate inter-territorial trade and transport and to set up a central bureau for the collection and dissemination of information languished and died in the files of the Ministry of Economics. In the cultural field, however, some progress was achieved with the formation in Cairo of an Anglo-Iraqi Bureau for Cultural Co-operation, whose first task was to draft a cultural treaty between the two countries; this would be open to subsequent adherence by other Arab countries. On the political side attention was in general focussed on the problems of Syria and the Lebanon, whose Governments remained unrecognised by Iraq throughout the year. Palestine was less to the fore, though the reassertion of Zionist claims in connexion with the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Balfour Declaration provoked natural reactions in Iraq as elsewhere in the Arab world. The Bagdad press went no further than to reproduce (no doubt with official encouragement) an article from a Transjordan newspaper, in which the Jews were accused of breaking the truce voluntarily observed by the Arabs since the outbreak of war. General Nuri was nevertheless undoubtedly worried by what he regarded as the undue growth of Jewish influence and propaganda, more particularly in the United States. When in Egypt, at the end of December, he discussed the question with the Egyptian Prime Minister with a view to a joint approach to the United States Government; to King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud he was also suggesting a *démarche* to His Majesty's Government to restrain the agitation for a Jewish Government in Palestine.

10. In the concluding paragraph of my review for last year I drew attention to the increasing gravity of the economic situation. During 1942 it outweighed in importance all other problems, though this was only intermittently realised by the Iraqi Government themselves. Our military disbursements grew from month to month and, in the absence of any measures for absorbing surplus purchasing power, the currency circulation increased from I.D. 11 million to almost I.D. 22 million in the year. Simultaneously imports into Iraq were further curtailed, with the result that prices continued to mount at an accelerating rate—not only those of commodities in short supply, but even more markedly of land and local products. Hoarding and speculation proceeded unabated, thus forcing prices far higher than purely legitimate demand could have done and causing a phenomenal increase in the cost of living. For the lower classes this was certainly doubled during the year. Real hardship was caused to those in receipt of fixed incomes, but labour, on the other hand (particularly skilled), was able to obtain substantially higher wages, for the demand from the British military authorities exceeded the available supply. The cultivators, except in the north, where considerable distress prevailed, benefited from the inflated prices commanded by local produce of every description; landowners, merchants and contractors waxed prosperous as never before. The majority of the population, then, was not seriously affected by the inflationary tendencies, and discontent in regard to prices (as opposed to shortages and maldistribution) was little in evidence. Add to this the continued buoyancy of the State revenues, which permitted the grant of two substantial high cost-of-living allowances to Government employees, and it will be seen that there was small incentive for the Iraqi Government to embark on the comprehensive and drastic measures required to remedy the situation. In effect, too, the dinar being linked to sterling, the British taxpayer was shouldering the main burden by paying for goods and services prices out of all relation to world levels, while Iraq was rapidly being transformed from a debtor into a creditor nation. Some endeavours were made, as recorded in the following paragraph, to regulate supply questions, and eventually, after many representations on my part, the Government came also to realise that something must be done to deal with the fundamental problem of draining off the surplus purchasing power in the hands of the public. A committee was accordingly appointed and reported to the Minister of Finance in November. Their recommendations covered practically all the resolutions of



the anti-inflation conference convened by the Minister of State in September and were still under study at the end of the year, the natural reaction of Ministers being to put in the forefront those which entailed assistance from His Majesty's Government (e.g., the provision of dollars for investment purposes, increased imports, &c.) and to pass over such uncomfortable suggestions as increased taxation. It may, nevertheless, be hoped that the committee's labours will not have been entirely in vain, and it may be noted that a proposal for an internal loan was under urgent examination by a committee at the end of the year. Apart from official action—or rather inaction—some progress was made with encouraging the purchase by Iraqi investors of securities on the London Stock Exchange, while arrangements were also put in hand for the supply of diamonds to the local market through the U.K.C.C.

11. In the field of supply rather more activity was shown, though the results achieved left much to be desired. On the administrative side the old Central Supplies Committee, under the Ministry of Economics, was reorganised in February under the Ministry of Finance by elimination of the non-official members and reduction to eight experienced officials, of whom three were British. This was followed in March by legislation conferring extensive powers on the Minister of Finance to regulate the economic life of the country. The difficulties of organising an efficient Department of Supply and ingrained reluctance to interfere with vested interests, particularly the landowners, meant, however, that these powers were far from fully employed. The price of wheat had been fixed early in January at prices ranging from about 25 dinars a ton downwards, but before the new harvest the Government encountered insuperable difficulties in buying enough at controlled prices to maintain supplies of flour in the large towns, and His Majesty's Government had to come to their assistance with substantial imports. After the harvest the levying of the produce tax in kind helped to assure urban supplies, if somewhat precariously, and although the price of wheat on the black market rose in some areas to unprecedented levels, bread of a kind at official prices continued to be available. Barley, millet and rice, of which the harvests were excellent, commanded even more exorbitant prices than wheat, partly owing to purchases for export, but largely thanks to hoarding and speculation. Stocks of sugar held by merchants were taken over by the Government in March and rationing was later introduced on the basis of 1 kg. per head per month at a price of 85 fils, which meant a profit of over 100 per cent. for the Treasury. Motor tyres were similarly taken over and their sale at fixed prices made subject to licence. Licensing was also introduced in respect of a few other imported commodities (constructional steel, &c.) which were not to any extent determining factors of the cost of living. Finally, late in the year the new Minister of Finance, Saleh Jabr, who on the whole is less inclined than his predecessors to spare vested interests, ordered the seizure of the three woollen cloth mills in Bagdad and later of a soap factory, with the aim of providing these commodities at a reasonable price to Government employees. In general, however, the Government only scratched the surface of the problem during 1942, and, as I have continually impressed upon them, far more sweeping, vigorous and ruthless action is required. It is unfortunate in the circumstances that executive authority in the Supply Department should not have been entrusted to British officials. With an excellent harvest in prospect, Iraq has more to do than assure the subsistence of her own people; it is essential that she should make available substantial amounts to relieve the needs of neighbouring countries. To this double task the Prime Minister has paid much lip-service. It remains to be seen whether it will be successfully discharged.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

[E 1763/1763/93]

No. 12.

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 87.)

Sir,

Bagdad, March 12, 1943.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of an official notification that was published in the newspapers on the 22nd February summoning all Iraqis living in enemy or enemy-occupied territory to return to Iraq. A few days later there appeared, as a sequel, a list of seventy persons who were, in particular, warned that proceedings would be taken against them if

they failed to return within two months from the date of the publication of the notification.

2. No provision has, as you will see, been made to exempt people who are involuntarily detained in enemy or enemy-occupied territory, such as, for example, the many Iraqis who were in Shanghai at the time of the Japanese occupation, nor does it appear that withdrawal to neutral territory is permitted as an alternative to immediate return to Iraq. Rigidly applied this notification would inflict penalties on many innocent persons who have been caught by the tide of war in Europe or Asia and who are now for a variety of reasons quite unable to return to this country; indeed, the names of some such people, including a young girl student in Belgium and the delegate of the Chaldean Patriarch at the Vatican, are included in the list which I have mentioned above.

3. The Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me, however, that although the notification has been drawn up in comprehensive terms the Government's purpose is only to prosecute well-known renegades, such as Yunis Bahri, Thabit Abdul Nur and others, including a number of students and junior officers who fled the country after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebel Government, and who are now in Europe working for the Axis; and that no action will, in fact, be taken against people who are in enemy or enemy-occupied territory for legitimate reasons.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister of State, Cairo, to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Jedda, Jersusalem, Beirut and Tehran, and to the Governor-General of India.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

Enclosure in No. 12.

NOTIFICATION.

*Official Communiqué.*

IRAQ has declared the existence of a state of war between herself and the Axis Powers, and the news has been broadcast to the whole world by the Bagdad Radio Studio and by Allied and enemy State broadcasting stations. Accordingly, having regard to international procedure, Iraq is regarded as enemy of the Axis Powers, and every Iraqi resident outside Iraq is deemed to be aware of this fact.

The continued residence of an Iraqi national in the territories of enemy Powers while aware of the existence of this state of war and failure on his part to return to his country is considered a breach of loyalty towards his Government and his people and as co-operation with the enemy against his homeland; while rendering assistance to the enemy is considered a punishable offence under Chapter XII of the Bagdad Penal Code.

Whereas the Martial Administration Ordinance permits the trial of individuals in default of appearance, and as clause 11 of the ordinance deems such and similar offences as being within the jurisdiction of the Military Tribunal, we therefore call upon all Iraqi nationals found ex-Iraq to comply with the following:—

- (1) To refrain from rendering any assistance or aid in any form, to any of the Axis Powers, whether by acting in the interest of such Power or against the interests of Iraq or her Allies.
- (2) Absolutely to refrain from conducting any financial or economic dealing with the Axis Powers.
- (3) All Iraqis found within the territories of the Axis Powers or territories occupied by the said Powers shall return to Iraq within two months of the date of publication of this communiqué.

Any Iraqi national acting in contravention of the provisions of this communiqué shall be punished in accordance with the Penal Code, with due regard to the provisions of the legal procedure regulation, by having attachment placed to his property. Moreover, he shall be tried in default under the Martial Administration Ordinance and the supplement thereto.



## CHAPTER II.—PERSIA.

## (A) Miscellaneous.

[E 111/48/34]

No. 13.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 6, 1943.)*

(No. 419.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 9, 1942.

IN my telegram No. 1531 of the 4th December I had the honour to inform you that the Food Agreement between the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and Persia was signed at the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 4th December, 1942, by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the United States Minister and myself.

2. I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the following documents:—

- (a) One signed copy of the original English text of the agreement.
- (b) One signed copy of the original Persian text (') of the agreement.
- (c) Three copies of (a) above.
- (d) A certified copy of each of the following documents:—
  - (i) A note handed to the Persian Government notifying them of the intention of His Majesty's Government, in conjunction with the Government of the United States, to arrange the importation of 25,000 tons of wheat into Persia as soon as possible. A note in identical terms was handed to the Persian Government by the United States Minister. The original(') and translation of Persian Government's reply are also enclosed.
  - (ii) A note notifying the Persian Government that in the event of the Government of Soviet Russia adhering to the Food Agreement a new text would be necessary. A note in identical terms was handed to the Persian Government by the United States Minister. The original(') and translation of the Persian Government's reply are also enclosed.
  - (iii) A note stating, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, that the terms of the Food Agreement do not diminish the obligations already undertaken by His Majesty's Government under article VII of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance dated the 29th January, 1942. The original(') and translation of the Persian Government's reply are also enclosed.
- (e) Three additional copies of each of the notes referred to in (d) above.
- (f) The original Persian text(') of a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs affirming that the undertakings of the Persian Government in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the Preamble to the Food Agreement relate to, and are restricted to, the provisions of that agreement. A similar note has been sent to the United States Legation.
- (g) Three copies of the translation of the letter referred to at (f).
- (h) A certified copy of a note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs accepting this interpretation of the agreement.
- (i) Three additional copies of the letter referred to in (h).

3. I have sent copies of this despatch and of the appropriate enclosures to His Majesty's Ambassador at Kuibyshev, the Minister of State, the Office of the Minister of State in Bagdad and the Government of India.

I have, &amp;c.

R. W. BULLARD.

(') The original Persian texts have not been reproduced.

Enclosure 1 in No. 13.

*Food Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom, the Government of the United States and the Imperial Iranian Government.*

THE Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of the United States and the Imperial Iranian Government:

Considering that the responsibility of feeding the people of Iran rests primarily on the Imperial Iranian Government, but that it is desirable, inasmuch as war conditions may bring economic distress to the people of Iran and inasmuch as it is the general policy of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to safeguard the economic existence of the peoples of the Middle East against such distress, to take all possible steps to ensure the supply of cereals (wheat together with barley, rice and other adulterants) for the bread supply of the people of Iran until the gathering of the harvest in 1943, and

Having regard to the undertaking given by the Imperial Iranian Government to carry out—

- (a) All measures recommended by the United States Adviser to the Ministry of Food, including measures to prevent hoarding and the introduction of rationing of food-stuffs, and
- (b) All recommendations of the Road Transport Committee which are certified to be essential for the regulation of the means of road transport in Iran by the majority vote of the following three members of that committee, namely, the chairman appointed by the Imperial Iranian Government, and the members designated by the United States and British Ministers at Tehran respectively,

Have agreed as follows:—

## ARTICLE I.

If the Iranian Minister of Food, with the concurrence of the United States Adviser, and the United States and British Ministers at Tehran decide, by a majority vote, that they are satisfied that all practicable steps have been taken by the Imperial Iranian Government under their undertakings referred to above, and that, nevertheless, the supply of cereals within Iran for the bread supply of the people of Iran is insufficient to cover the minimum needs of the population of Iran for the current year ending with the gathering of the 1943 harvest, the Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom will take all steps within the full limit of their powers to ensure that supplies of cereals will be brought to Iran from other sources sufficient to make up the deficiency.

## ARTICLE II.

The Imperial Iranian Government are responsible—

- (a) For the distribution of cereals within Iran;
- (b) For ensuring that a deficiency in one area is met by supplies from another area in Iran when the total supply of cereals within Iran is sufficient for the needs of the population of the country as a whole; and
- (c) For the distribution to necessitous areas of any supplies brought into Iran from other sources in fulfilment of the undertakings of the other two Governments in article I above.

Recognising that the capacity of the Imperial Iranian Government to discharge its above-mentioned responsibilities is limited by the means of transport at its disposal, the Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom will take all steps, within the full limit of their powers, to ensure that the means of transport at the disposal of the Imperial Iranian Government shall be sufficient, if put to the best possible use, for the proper distribution of these cereals.

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised to this effect by their respective Governments, have signed the present agreement and have affixed their seals.

[25648]

c 4



Done at Tehran, this fourth day of December, 1942, in triplicate, in English and in Persian, both texts being equally authentic.

On behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

(Signed) R. W. BULLARD,

*His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Iran.*

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America:

(Signed) LOUIS G. DREYFUS, JNR.,

*Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Iran of the United States of America.*

On behalf of the Imperial Iranian Government:

(Signed) M. SAED,

*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Imperial Iranian Government.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 13.

*Sir R. Bullard to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Your Excellency,

*Tehran, December 4, 1942.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, in fulfilment of their undertakings under the Food Agreement signed to-day, the Government of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom are now making arrangements to import jointly into Iran as soon as possible 25,000 tons of wheat.

I avail, &c.

R. W. BULLARD,

*Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir R. Bullard.*

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note dated the 4th December, 1942, stating that, in fulfilment of their undertakings under the Food Agreement signed to-day, His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States of America are now making arrangements to import jointly into Iran as soon as possible 25,000 tons of wheat.

I avail, &c.

MUHAMMAD SA'ED.

Enclosure 3 in No. 13.

*Sir R. Bullard to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Your Excellency,

*Tehran, December 4, 1942.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that if the Government of the U.S.S.R. should wish to participate in the Food Agreement, a fresh text of the agreement will be drawn up in the name of the Soviet Government as well as of the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Imperial Iranian Government. This amended text will take the place of the present text of the agreement.

I avail, &c.

R. W. BULLARD,

*Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir R. Bullard.*

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note dated the 4th December, 1942, stating that if the Government of the U.S.S.R. should wish to participate in the Food Agreement a fresh text of the agreement will be drawn up in the name of the Soviet Government as well as of the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern

Ireland and the Imperial Iranian Government, and that this amended text will take the place of the present agreement.

I avail, &c.

MUHAMMAD SA'ED.

Enclosure 4 in No. 13.

*Sir R. Bullard to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Your Excellency,

*Tehran, December 4, 1942.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government do not regard the terms of the Food Agreement signed to-day on behalf of the Governments of the United States of America and of the United Kingdom and of the Imperial Iranian Government, as in any way diminishing the obligations undertaken by His Majesty's Government in article VII of the Treaty of Alliance between Iran, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, signed on the 29th January, 1942.

I avail, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir R. Bullard.*

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

*December 4, 1942.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note dated the 4th December, 1942, stating that His Britannic Majesty's Government do not regard the terms of the Food Agreement signed to-day on behalf of the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the United States of America and of the Imperial Iranian Government as in any way diminishing the obligations undertaken by His Majesty's Government in article VII of the Treaty of Alliance between Iran, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, signed on the 29th January, 1942.

I avail, &c.

MUHAMMAD SA'ED.

Enclosure 5 in No. 13.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir R. Bullard.*

(Translation.)

M. le Ministre,

*December 4, 1942.*

WITH reference to the agreement signed this day between the Government of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America and the Imperial Iranian Government, I have the honour to confirm the understanding reached between the signatories at the time of signature of the said agreement that the two undertakings which the Imperial Iranian Government have accepted under sections A and B of the preamble of the agreement of to-day's date relate only to and are restricted to the provisions of the said agreement.

I avail, &c.

MUHAMMAD SA'ED.

*Sir R. Bullard to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Your Excellency,

*Tehran, December 5, 1942.*

IN your Excellency's note No. 2414 of the 13th Azar 1321 (4th December, 1942) your Excellency was so good as to communicate to me the following:—

"With reference to the agreement signed this day between the Government of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America and the Imperial Iranian Government, I have the honour to confirm the understanding reached between the signatories at the time of signature of the said agreement that the two undertakings which the Imperial Iranian Government have accepted under sections A and B of the preamble of the agreement of to-day's date relate only to and are restricted to the provisions of the said agreement."

2. I have the honour on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to confirm the above-mentioned understanding.

I avail, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.



Consul Wright to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 7, 1943.)

(No. 4.)

Sir,

Trebizond, December 5, 1942.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a short article that I have recently written concerning Trebizond and the Persian transit trade.

2. I have compiled this article largely with the help of the archives of this consulate, which date back to 1830, though from 1880 onwards I have drawn only from the Annual Series of Diplomatic and Consular Reports printed by the Stationery Office.

I have, &c.

D. A. H. WRIGHT.

Enclosure in No. 14.

*Trebizond and the Persian Transit Trade.*

FROM time immemorial Trebizond has been the terminal port of one of the main caravan routes leading from the Black Sea across high mountain ranges and bleak plateaux by way of Erzerum and Bayazit under the shadow of Mount Ararat to Tabriz in Northern Persia. Xenophon, in his retreat from Mesopotamia with his 10,000, had followed this route in 402 B.C., and had pitched his camp within a few hundred yards of the spot where the modern motor road from Persia reaches the coast at Trebizond, a site which to this day is known as "Kampos." Later Trapezus (Trebizond) flourished as the principal port of the Roman province of Pontus, and there are still visible the half-submerged breakwaters of a harbour which the Emperor Hadrian is said to have constructed in the 1st century A.D. But its Golden Age was during the Middle Ages from 1204 to 1461, under the rule of the Comneni, who had fled after the capture of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusaders and founded the independent Empire of Trebizond. Genoese and Venetian merchants, making use of the caravan route to Persia, once more turned Trebizond into a busy emporium for the exchange of merchandise between East and West; their trade brought wealth and renown to the Imperial city which, with its conquest by the Turks in 1461, soon decayed and ceased to be of importance in this trade.

By the Treaty of Adrianople of 1830 Turkey opened her Black Sea ports to the shipping of foreign nations, and it is no coincidence that in the same year the Foreign Office sent out to Trebizond from London a certain Mr. James Brant as first British Vice-Consul with the object, as Brant himself wrote, of "the making of Trebizond a depot for the Persian trade."

Mr. Brant was not the first foreign representative to establish himself in Trebizond. The French, who had always shown an interest in Turkey and the Levant, had appointed a "commissioner" there in 1798, and by 1830 there was a Sardinian and probably one or two other consuls in the town, which at that time had a population of about 25,000, some 17,000 of whom were Moslems and the remainder Greeks (about 5,000, relics of Imperial days), Armenians (about 2,000, who were said to have settled there after the break-up of the Armenian Kingdom in the 11th century), and a few "Franks" (i.e., Europeans). The trade of the town was almost entirely in the hands of the Greeks and Armenians, but, owing to the prohibition on foreign shipping using Turkish ports, the manufacturers of newly industrialised England and those European countries which were following in her wake made little use of the short caravan route to Persia in their search for markets. Most of the trade to and from Persia went by the longer Georgian route from Redout Kale (north of Poti) through Tiflis in the Caucasus to Tabriz, a route which was distasteful to the British Government in view of the political and commercial rivalry which then existed between England and Russia. The British Government saw in the opening of the Turkish Black Sea ports an opportunity of using the shortest route to Persia, which had

the additional advantage that it ran entirely through friendly Turkish territory. Hence the despatch from London of Mr. Brant.

Brant, who, though vice-consul, was permitted to trade on his own account, appears to have been a man of considerable energy and enterprise, and it is no exaggeration to say that his initial efforts largely contributed to the dominating position acquired by Trebizond in the transit trade by the middle of the 19th century. Almost immediately after his arrival we find him writing long and frequent despatches to the Foreign Office and the embassy at Constantinople extolling the advantages of the Trebizond route, dispelling doubts about the safety of the Trebizond anchorage, urging the necessity of concluding a commercial treaty with the Shah of Persia and obtaining a grant of £500 to allow him to visit Tabriz and Tehran. He entered into contact with the merchants of Tabriz in an attempt to persuade them to use the Trebizond instead of the Caucasian route, and barely nine months after his arrival in Trebizond he reported to Constantinople: "I have lately received a communication from the native merchants of Tabreez expressing a great desire to open a trade with this place, and, as I conceive such a disposition very worthy of encouragement, it were desirable to meet their views in every possible way . . . the Persian merchants say that they would transfer the whole trade they now carry on with Tiflis to Trebizond if they could find all the goods they require (i.e., return loads for their caravans). They are so much vexed by the Russian authorities that they are quite disgusted with the Russian trade, and nothing but necessity induces them to continue it."

Persian merchants and British manufacturers alike were quick to appreciate the advantages of the Trebizond route to Northern Persia, which was nearly 200 miles shorter than the Tiflis route; this meant that pack horses and mules, with their average daily march of 15 miles, could do the journey from Trebizond to Tabriz in thirty to thirty-five days, a saving of ten or more days on the Caucasian route. At the same time the Russian authorities began to place difficulties in the way of transit through Georgia, so that by the end of 1832 Mr. Consul Brant was able to report to his Government that the Persian trade through Trebizond of British goods (mostly textiles from Manchester) was steadily increasing, and as proof of his contention that the town was rapidly developing in commercial importance he mentioned that the French Vice-Consulate had been raised to a consulate, that Sweden and Denmark had opened consulates and that the Shah had appointed a Persian commercial agent, all in the year 1832. In view of this development he urged the opening of a British Consulate at Erzerum, half-way on the road to Tabriz, as "it is indispensable that there should be a Consular Establishment at Erzerum to complete the plan of extending our commercial relations with Persia." In 1836 Brant himself was sent to Erzerum as vice-consul, and his business partner, a Mr. Stevens, was appointed consul at Trebizond. In the same year a definite agreement regarding the transit trade was signed between the British Government and the Shah, to whom King William IV sent a small personal gift of 2,000 muskets, no doubt in the expectation that they would be used to guard the security of the caravan routes.

The transit trade through Trebizond developed surprisingly quickly and almost without interruption, except for the Crimean War years, from 1830 until the middle of the 1860's. The advent of the steamship no doubt contributed to this development. The first steamship to visit Trebizond was a British one, the steamship *Essex*, in May 1836. Later in the same year another British steamer, the *Crescent*, began a regular service between Trebizond and Constantinople, and in the following year the Austrian Danubian Steam Navigation Company started a similar service. The *Crescent* was sold to the Austrians in 1838, after which British steamers only called at irregular intervals, until, in 1845, the P. and O. Company opened a direct service between Southampton and Trebizond, which was, however, discontinued in 1858, owing to the difficulty of finding return cargoes and inability to compete with the heavily-subsidised French and Russian lines which had been started in 1857 and 1858 respectively.

The transit imports for Persia carried by these steamers consisted almost entirely of manufactured goods, about two-thirds of which were cotton goods from Manchester, the remainder coming from the manufacturing countries of Europe; "colonials" (sugar and tea) were also an important item, tea from India via London and sugar from England, France and Austria. Exports from Persia were invariably in much smaller volume than imports, and consisted principally of "tumbeki" (a special tobacco smoked in narghile pipes and used mainly in Turkey), silks (for France), shawls, carpets, gall-nuts, dried fruits, wax, and wool and cotton.



After the Crimean War Russia began to take an interest in reviving the transit trade through Georgia, a step which had been impractical so long as the turbulent Caucasian tribes remained unsubdued, and from about 1858 onwards Russian competition became increasingly menacing for Trebizond, whose very life-blood as commercial centre was at stake. In March 1857 Mr. Consul Stevens reported to his ambassador at Constantinople: "From all I learn it is evident that Russia will ere long make an effort to deprive Trebizond of its chief importance by taking from it its transit trade with Persia. This alone can be avoided by the Turkish Government's making at least a carriage-road to Erzurum." It was known that the Russians were developing Poti as a town and port, and there were persistent rumours that a railway was to be built from Poti to Baku, on the Caspian Sea, with a branch line to the Persian frontier. The Russians were doing their best to capture the carrying trade of the Black Sea, and in August 1859 the Russian Steam Navigation Company, whose ships had started to call regularly at Trebizond the previous year, issued a circular stating that it would in future forward goods for Persia via Poti at a fixed rate which was considerably less than the fluctuating rates of Trebizond caravans. In 1862 work was begun on the Poti-Tiflis Railway, and in 1864 the Russian Government abolished the customs tariff on transit goods.

If Turkey was to meet the challenge of a Trans-Caucasian Railway it was clear, as Mr. Stevens had pointed out, that a carriage-road would have to be constructed at least to Erzurum. As far back as 1850 a party of Dalmatian engineers had been entrusted with the task of building such a road, and in September of that year, in the presence of Ismail Pasha, the Minister of Public Works, and all the foreign consuls, the first stones were laid with great ceremony, but as neither survey nor estimates had been made before the work was begun it was soon found that the engineering difficulties would be so formidable and the cost so enormous that it was decided to abandon the work after little more than two miles of paving had been laid along the Boztepe ridge above the Değirmen River.

The construction of a carriage-road was no easy task, for high mountain ranges rise, as it were, straight out of the sea on this part of the coast. Caravan drivers from Trebizond used three alternative routes to cross these mountains—in summer there were two tracks, which crossed the main mountain range by difficult, exposed passes, one of over 8,000 ft. and the other of over 10,000 ft., which were quite impractical in winter, when a longer but better protected route was followed, crossing the mountains by the 6,660-ft. Zigana Pass, and then travelling via Ardassa (the modern Torul) and Gümüşane, with its abandoned silver mines, to Bayburt, where the summer tracks met and were followed across the bleak plateau of Armenia (as it was then known) to Erzurum. Another track across the mountains ran from Sürmene on the coast some 21 miles east of Trebizond to Bayburt, following the comparatively easy and well-protected Kara Dere valley and crossing the main ridge by a sheltered 8,000-ft. pass, which was rarely impassable in winter. The distance by this track from Sürmene to Bayburt was 56 miles, compared with 121 miles from Trebizond to Bayburt by the winter track via Gümüşane; therefore, in deciding to make a carriage-road to Erzurum there was, from an engineering point of view, every advantage to be gained by selecting the Sürmene route, which had the additional advantage that the anchorage at Sürmene was infinitely better than at Trebizond. However, no consideration was paid to this easier and shorter route, owing, apparently, to an *idée fixe* that the road must start from Trebizond, so that, when in 1864 it was finally decided to resume the work of the Dalmatian engineers, the winter track through Gümüşane was selected for development as a carriage-road.

Two years after the laying of the first rail on the new line from Poti to Tiflis a party of French engineers under a M. Thuvenin, who had recently built the Syrian road from Damascus to Beirut, arrived in Trebizond and immediately set about surveying the proposed new road; the survey work appears to have been efficient and the line followed, with occasional exceptions, was well chosen, and has, in the main, been followed by the modern motor-road. Instead of taking the road up the steep Boztepe hill behind Trebizond and so along the ridge followed by the Dalmatians, the French took their road along the coast to the east of the town and then blasted a way up the left bank of the Değirmen, this new and more practical line joining the old track some 8 miles from Trebizond. Occasionally other than engineering considerations seem to have influenced the inevitably tortuous line of the road—it was, for instance, well known that Yerköprü and Hamsiköy, two villages on the northern side of the Zigana Pass, had each offered large sums to induce the engineers to divert the road through their particular village: Hamsiköy was a prosperous Greek village, and was able to offer £800,

double the sum offered by its poorer Turkish rival, and so the road, even to this day, still passes by Hamsiköy. But there was constant friction between the French engineers and their Turkish workmen, together with some trouble over native women, which led to the murder of two of the engineers in 1867, and in the following spring the Turkish Government dismissed all the French and entrusted their work to Turkish military engineers.

The road was completed in 1872, the same year that saw the opening of the Poti-Tiflis Railway. Already there had been a marked falling-off in the transit trade through Trebizond as the following figures taken from the annual trade reports of Mr. Brant and his successors show:—

Year.	Transit Imports through Trebizond. Tons.	Transit Exports through Trebizond. Tons.
1830	610	Not known
1833	960	240
1840	2,300	1,010
1850	5,170	1,960
1858	8,020	2,800
1859	7,410	2,840
1860	7,500	3,460
1866	3,100	2,150
1867	2,790	2,060
1868	3,420	2,630
1869	4,400	2,100
1870	4,050	3,530
1871	3,630	3,170
1872	3,670	2,750

It was estimated that Poti had captured more than half the Persian transit trade by 1872, though after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 it is probable that some of this trade was diverted from the Black Sea to the Persian Gulf. Trebizond merchants engaged in the transit trade began to transfer their businesses to Poti; Germany reduced her consulate at Trebizond to a vice-consulate in 1872 (and closed it four years later), and established a consulate at Tiflis with the openly avowed aim of forestalling England and France in capturing the Persian trade which the Germans, like everyone else, thought would now pass entirely through Russia. The British Consul regretfully reported that very few wealthy "Franks" remained in Trebizond and that the Greeks were gradually migrating to Russia.

If Trebizond was to compete successfully with Poti it was clear that determined efforts would have to be made to attract trade by abolishing the vexatious customs and quarantine formalities which accompanied any transit by way of Trebizond. Whereas in Russia all transit was free after 1864, in Turkey a 2 per cent. duty was levied (reduced from 6 per cent. in 1858), and it was only after repeated petitions addressed to the Porte and to the foreign consulates by Trebizond merchants that the duty was reduced to 1 per cent. in 1869 and finally abolished four years later. Besides the duty there were other senseless formalities, in particular the double examination of all goods at both Trebizond and Erzurum, leading to delay and the breaking open of carefully packed bales. There was an attempt to remedy this in 1873, when it was decreed that only 10 per cent. of any one consignment was liable to be opened for inspection; at the same time a system of lead sealing was introduced which it was hoped would obviate the second examination at Erzurum. However, the lead seals in their turn brought fresh difficulties as the Kurdish tribesmen who infested the caravan route discovered that they could be melted to make excellent bullets, so that by the time the caravans reached Erzurum (a ten-day journey) most of the seals had been stolen—to the confusion of the customs officials, who usually insisted on opening all the sealless bales.

But apart from the quarantine difficulties and customs formalities, if Trebizond was to compete with the Trans-Caucasian Railway, it was of paramount importance that full advantage should be taken of the new carriage road to Erzurum. There is no better illustration of the ineptitude and apathy of the Porte than the history of this road after its completion in 1872, nor is there any better illustration of the fact that in those days it was far easier to build a new road in Turkey than to repair an old one. This road passed through difficult and high mountain country exposed to winter storms and avalanches, spring floods and landslides, and, unless kept under constant supervision and



repair, it would inevitably become impassable, yet absolutely no provision was made for any such maintenance work. In January 1873, less than a year after its completion, the British Consul reported that the road had "fallen into such a state of repair as to be almost impassable"; in fact, no serious repair work was undertaken until 1894, by which time its condition had long made it virtually impracticable for the clumsy four-wheeled "fourgons" drawn by four horses and able to carry about 1½ tons, which had been imported from the Caucasus by a few optimistic traders. One enterprising merchant, a Swiss named Hochstrasser, proposed to the Turkish authorities that he be granted a twenty-five-year concession to run a wheeled transport company for the conveyance of goods between Trebizond and Erzerum; he offered to pay £2,000 a year for the concession subject to the Turkish Government keeping the road in a fit state for wheeled traffic, but this the Porte was unwilling to do, so M. Hochstrasser's idea, which might have meant so much to Trebizond, was shelved and the road was allowed to fall to pieces. It was in such a chronic state that during the Turco-Russian war (1877-78) arms and munitions for the beleaguered troops in Erzerum were reshipped from Trebizond to Sürmene and transported from there by the Kara Dere track—a melancholy epitaph on the work of the military engineers who had laboured so hard to build the road from Trebizond to the very important military centre at Erzerum.

But as the figures already quoted show, despite a heavy decline in the middle sixties, Trebizond still continued to handle a fair volume of the transit trade, and even in 1878, when Russian forces occupied Erzerum, over 4,500 tons of transit goods were carried by the Trebizond route. The reason for the continued use of the Trebizond road, despite its disadvantages, is to be found partly in the slowness with which the conservative East changes the habits of a lifetime, in the tenacity of Trebizond merchants and pack-animal owners who feared to be put out of business, in the natural preference of Tabriz merchants for the Turkish route because it passed through Moslem territory, but, above all, in the difficulties which the Russian Government began to place in the way of transit through her own territory once she had succeeded in drawing the bulk of it away from Trebizond. The sudden tightening up of Russian customs regulations was primarily designed to check contraband, but was also influenced by Russian industrialists who wanted protection for their own manufactures. Finally, in 1883, a year after the completion of the railway extension from Tiflis to Baku and five years after the Russian acquisition of Batum (a far better port than Poti), the Russian Government decreed that for a period of five years no merchandise of any sort was to be imported through the Caucasus for Persia. This decree, with the help of which Russian manufacturers hoped to capture the Persian market, was described by the British Consul as "the luckiest event which could have happened for the future prosperity of the districts of the vilayets of Trebizond and Erzerum." Allah had indeed been merciful—in the shape of the Tsar—at a time when the future of Trebizond looked blacker than it had ever done before.

Trade began to return to Trebizond, though it never again reached the high-water mark of 1860. From 1883 to 1906, despite the extension of the Caucasian railway to Julfa on the Persian frontier and the development of Batum as a port, the annual imports through Trebizond for Persia averaged 5,600 tons, and exports from Persia for the same period averaged 1,620 tons annually. Between 1907 and the Great War there was a sharp fall in the transit figures through Trebizond, which can probably be explained by the increasingly disturbed political situation in both Turkey and Persia and the diminution of commerce in the Black Sea as a result of the three wars in which Turkey was engaged between 1911 and 1913. During the Great War both Trebizond and Erzerum were occupied by the Russians and the transit trade came to a standstill, but as it had done after the Crimean and the Turco-Russian wars, so after the Great War, it quickly returned to Trebizond. Between 1921 and 1927 over 4,000 tons of European goods were imported each year into Persia through Trebizond—a remarkable achievement, as Turkey was going through an internal political upheaval during these years (in the course of which all the Greeks and Armenians left Trebizond), though it must also be remembered that the situation in revolutionary Russia and rebellious Caucasia made the Georgian route virtually impossible.

History is always inclined to repeat itself and the post-Great War struggle between Turkey and Russia for the transit trade to Northern Persia bears many parallels with their struggle after the Crimean War. After both wars Turkey held a predominant position in the trade; after both wars we find Russia successfully diverting a large part of it—after the Crimean War by offering improved

transport and customs facilities, after the Great War by the conclusion of a commercial treaty with Persia in 1927 expressly designed to foster the transit trade through Russia except in those goods in which she herself was interested as producer; after both wars we find the Turkish Government finally awakening to the loss of her transit trade and tardily deciding on measures to stop the rot; in both periods the action decided on is the same—the construction of a carriage road, though this time the carriages are driven by the internal-combustion engine.

Beyond this point the parallel does not hold good. The construction of the new road, which was begun in 1931, has been pushed forward with a vigour which may be regarded as symbolic of the new Turkey that emerged under Kemal Atatürk: and the Transit Yolu, as this road which stretches to the Persian frontier is called, with its easy gradients, its wide turns and macadam surface, compares favourably with other mountain roads in Europe. Profiting by the lessons learnt from the history of the earlier road, adequate provision has been made to keep it in perfect repair, so that every 12 miles or so there have been constructed neat little "maintenance huts" as permanent quarters for a body of workmen whose job it is to keep their stretch of road in good condition and to clear with the least possible delay the inevitable landslides and snowdrifts of spring and winter. Nowadays, owing to the efficiency and almost super-human endurance of these men, the road between Trebizond and Erzerum is rarely closed for more than a few hours even after the worst winter storms. However, it has not yet been possible to provide the means of keeping the road open during winter on the high-exposed plateau between Erzerum and the frontier, so that from mid-December until the end of April the transit traffic comes to a standstill, except for occasional consignments which may be sent on from Erzerum by sleigh or pack-horse. In order to protect peasants and other travellers who may be caught by the sudden winter blizzards that sometimes rage for days on end, refuge shelters, where a bell is kept tolling during storms to guide travellers through the blinding snow, have been built on the seven main passes across the mountains. The highest of these three passes are the Tahor (9,020 ft.), the Kop (7,960 ft.), and the Zigana (6,665 ft.). At one notorious danger-point on the northern face of the Zigana mountain a shed has been built to carry avalanches across the road to crash harmlessly down the mountain side—an idea which had first been suggested to the Porte in 1884 by a German engineer named Klause, who had also suggested the establishment of maintenance gangs and the planting of trees on the bare mountains in order to prevent landslides.

There is no record of when the first motor car travelled over this ancient caravan route. Just before the Great War the French Société des Entreprises was entrusted by the Porte with the task of making the road fit for motor traffic, and the Russians, who occupied the whole road during 1916 and 1917, completed this work, so that it is probably correct to say that the first car to cross the Zigana Pass did so in 1917. The road quickly fell into disrepair after the withdrawal of the Russian army, but there was a certain amount of motor traffic along it throughout the 1920s. The opening of the modern Transit Yolu may be said to date from June 1937, when the State Transit Company was inaugurated by the Turkish Government to carry passengers and freight from Trebizond to the Persian frontier. There is irony in the fact that most of the steam-rollers which were used to construct this motor-way had been left behind by the Russians in 1917.

The 4-ton Chevrolet and Dodge lorries which now cover the 548 miles between Trebizond and Tabriz in three days have ousted the camel who took a minimum of thirty days to do the same journey, and the twenty-nine Hans or caravanserais which each marked the end of one day's stage on the winter track now mostly lie in ruins. The last camel to be seen in Trebizond was during the winter of 1936. Contrary to popular belief, the camel's life on the caravan route to Tabriz was comparatively short. Until the completion of the "chaussée" in 1872, both the winter and summer tracks were considered too rough for them, so that horses, mules and donkeys were used to carry merchandise. Camels were first introduced during the Turco-Russian War owing to the shortage of other pack animals which had all been requisitioned by the military authorities, and after the war they continued to be used owing to a shortage of horses and mules which had been killed during the fighting or died through lack of fodder, so that by 1884 there were said to be over 5,000 camels engaged in the transit traffic as against 400 horses and mules.

But though the camel has disappeared, life along the road to Persia has changed little in the last hundred years. Strings of pack-horses and asses with bright blue beads round their necks to ward off the "nazar" or evil eye, are still used in large numbers on this road which in spring and autumn is alive



with flocks of sheep and goats going or returning from their summer grazing grounds in the mountains. The creaking of the solid-wheeled ox carts is the same as it always was and on the high treeless plateau beyond Bayburt "tezzek" (dried cattle dung) is still the only fuel used during the long bitter winter. The squat, flat-roofed peasant huts of mud have not been affected by modern developments in architectural design. In the fields by the road-side it is still the women, with their faces all shrouded from the gaze of man, who do most of the hard manual work. The old peasant, squatting over his little glass of tea in the road-side café will, if he asks the time of day, expect to be told how many hours it is before sunset, for he does not understand the intricacies of the 24-hour day which he contemptuously refers to as time "a la franga." And although the volume of the Persian trade through Trebizond has declined much since the palmy days of the 19th century, its nature has remained much as it was then. Imports from the West have continued to consist almost entirely of manufactured goods, among which textiles predominate, though England has gradually lost her lion's share in this trade and of tea and sugar; exports from Persia are the same as they were throughout the 19th century—tumbeki and carpets, wool and cotton, gum and dried fruits.

With the German attack on Russia in June 1941 and the subsequent Anglo-Russian occupation of Persia, the transit trade through both the Caucasus and Trebizond came to an abrupt standstill, to the discomfort of the Germans who had been using both these routes to elude the British blockade and, in particular, to get much-needed Persian cotton safely to Germany. Inevitably, one looks ahead to the day when these two routes will again be open to normal trade and asks oneself whether Trebizond will be able to compete successfully with the Russian route and whether the expectations of those who hoped to make the Transit Yolu a great artery of trade between East and West will be realised.

Though the Trebizond route is shorter in distance, goods sent from Batumi to Tabriz by rail take very little longer than the three or four days required by lorries from Trebizond. Therefore, regarding the element of time as more or less the same and assuming that other factors remain equal, the choice of route will largely depend on relative freight costs. Since 1927 it has been cheaper to send goods through Russia, but if elsewhere road has been able to compete successfully with rail there does not appear to be any reason why it should not do so in this case. The formation of a well-organised transport company (the State Transit Company has only succeeded in attracting passenger traffic) to replace the present system of unorganised private owner-drivers who have monopolised the trade; the adoption of a fixed competitive freight tariff; proper advertisement of the advantages of the route in those countries interested in the Persian trade; the abolition of all vexatious customs formalities and the appointment at Trebizond and Gürcübulak on the Persian frontier of first-class customs officials whose aim should be to expedite the transit of merchandise with the least possible delay—all these are measures which might be adopted by the Turkish Government to the advantage of Trebizond, though until a proper harbour is built and until the means have been found of keeping open in winter the road between Erzerum and the frontier the Russian route will probably continue to be more attractive to the regular trader providing that Russian shipping and customs formalities do not cause unnecessary delay.

Since the beginning of the century there have been repeated rumours that a railway was to be constructed from Trebizond to the Persian frontier and many false hopes have been raised. It has been frequently reported in semi-official publications, that before the Great War, Trebizond handled annually between 60,000 and 40,000 tons of Persian transit goods, and it is believed by some that a railroad would once again attract this volume of trade through Trebizond. In actual fact, reliable statistics show that, even during its most prosperous year, before Russian competition became serious and before the opening of the Suez Canal, the total volume of transit trade through Trebizond never exceeded 11,000 tons annually; it is hard to see that this figure will ever be reached again in view of the attractions of the Batumi route, and fairly recent development of the Khanekin-Bagdad-Beirut route and the improvement during the present war of communications between the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. Such being the case, from an economic point of view, there can be no justification for the enormous expense that would be involved in building a railway from Trebizond to the frontier, especially as plans are almost completed for linking the Black Sea port of Samsun by rail with the Persian frontier. This line, which will pass through Van and Mush before joining the existing Samsun-Sivas line

at Malatya, may prove a powerful factor in attracting transit trade from Bulgarian and Roumanian ports to Turkey, though it will be at the expense of Trebizond and its ancient caravan route.

D. A. H. WRIGHT.

*Trebizond, November 1942.*

*Figures showing Annual Persian Transit Imports and Exports through Trebizond.*

THE following figures have been taken from the trade reports submitted to the Foreign Office each year by His Majesty's Consul at Trebizond. In the absence of official statistics, which did not become available until 1909, they cannot be regarded as entirely accurate, though there is no doubt that no more accurate figures than these are in existence.

The consular reports from 1830 until 1882 give only the number of packages involved; I have therefore converted these to tons at the equivalent of 1 package = 1½ cwt. for the period 1830-81. In 1882, as a result of the introduction of camels as the principal pack animal, packages were increased in weight, and I have converted at 2 cwt. for this year. From 1883 weights, as well as the number of packages, are given in the trade reports.

For the period 1920-41 statistics have been obtained from semi-official sources.

Year.	Transit Imports for Persia.		Transit Exports from Persia.	
	Packages.	Weight, tons.	Packages.	Weight, tons.
1830	7,000	612	No figures available.	
1831	4,730	417 <sup>(1)</sup>	No figures available.	
1832	9,180	804	No figures available.	
1833	10,946	958	2,785	244
1834	11,659	1,020	4,927	431
1835	19,327	1,691	No figures available.	
1836	27,039	2,366	19,793	1,732
1837	20,661	1,808	16,804	1,470
1838	28,146	2,463	17,429	1,525
1839	20,931	1,831	8,750	765
1840	26,334	2,304	11,561	1,011
1841	29,892	2,607	18,102	1,584
1842	32,248	2,822	13,618	1,192
1843	34,690	3,035	15,879	1,389
1844	36,945	3,232	18,529	1,621
1845	42,724	3,738	19,756	1,729
1846	44,377	3,882	12,660	1,108
1847	43,134	3,774 <sup>(2)</sup>	14,015	1,226
1848	53,368	4,670	7,258	635
1849	54,659	4,782	21,878	1,919
1850	59,129	5,173	22,390	1,959
1851	59,003	5,163	14,756	1,292
1852	49,911	4,367	17,116	1,497
1853	39,705	3,474	24,846	2,174
1854 <sup>(3)</sup>	43,716	3,825	12,070	1,056
1855 <sup>(3)</sup>	No figures available.		No figures available.	
1856	53,890	4,715	26,984	2,361
1857	No figures available.		No figures available.	
1858	91,708	8,024	31,982	2,798
1859	84,654	7,407	32,431	2,838
1860	85,731	7,501	39,532	3,459
1861-65	No figures available.		No figures available.	
1866	35,430	3,100	24,571	2,150
1867	31,888	2,790	23,544	2,060
1868	39,118	3,423	30,104	2,634
1869	50,241	4,396	24,090	2,103
1870	46,300	4,051	40,311	3,527
1871	41,452	3,627	33,945	3,170
1872	41,900	3,666	31,423	2,750
1873	43,897	3,841	24,000	2,100
1874	53,955	4,721	23,983	2,068
1875	51,314	4,490	24,556	2,148
1876	47,938	4,195	21,348	1,868
1877 <sup>(4)</sup>	33,120	2,898	24,345	2,130

<sup>(1)</sup> Decline due to cholera and plague in Persia.

<sup>(2)</sup> English cotton only. Complete figures not available.

<sup>(3)</sup> Crimean War.

<sup>(4)</sup> Turco-Russian War.



Year.	Transit Imports for Persia.		Transit Exports from Persia.	
	Packages.	Weight, tons.	Packages.	Weight, tons.
1878 <sup>(*)</sup>	35,370	3,095	16,581	1,451
1879	42,887	3,753	14,646	1,282
1880	44,552	3,898	13,169	1,152
1881	32,774	2,808	16,233	1,420
1882 <sup>(*)</sup>	37,663	3,766	18,244	1,824
1883	45,514	4,656	22,396	2,411
1884	63,083	6,520	22,822	2,433
1885	...	6,617	...	1,710
1886	...	7,550	...	1,868
1887	...	5,468	...	1,901
1888	...	5,300	...	1,983
1889	...	5,898	...	2,259
1890	...	7,308	...	2,805
1891	...	6,330	...	2,650
1892	...	5,622	...	1,516 <sup>(*)</sup>
1893	...	5,213	...	763 <sup>(*)</sup>
1894	...	5,180	...	693
1895	...	6,105	...	682
1896	...	5,478	...	720
1897	...	5,231	...	738
1898	...	5,280	...	1,250
1899	...	5,143	...	1,538
1900	...	4,496	...	1,775
1901	...	5,598	...	1,905
1902	33,790	4,848	...	2,330
1903	34,706	4,919	...	1,287
1904	28,351	4,514	...	750
1905	...	5,635	...	874
1906	43,414	5,644	...	2,106 <sup>(*)</sup>
1907	26,629	3,288	...	1,087
1908	...	1,045	...	107
1909 <sup>(*)</sup>	...	987	...	39
1910 <sup>(*)</sup>	19,640	2,700	No figures available.	
1911 <sup>(*)</sup>	22,632	3,112	No figures available.	
1912 <sup>(*)</sup>	15,158	2,084	No figures available.	
1913-19	No figures available.		No figures available.	
1920	...	525	...	350
1921	...	4,050	...	520
1922	...	4,060	...	1,700
1923	...	4,340	...	1,920
1924	...	4,400	...	2,050
1925	...	5,600	...	2,060
1926	...	4,100	...	670
1927	...	4,380	...	530
1928 <sup>(10)</sup>	...	1,650	...	490
1929	...	1,580	...	430
1930	...	1,240	...	210
1931	...	880	...	170
1932	...	830	...	150
1933	...	700	...	900
1934	...	410	...	10
1935	...	620	...	160
1936	...	291	...	179
1937	...	390	...	198
1938	...	1,287	...	351
1939	...	Not obtainable.	...	Not obtainable.
1940	...	Not obtainable.	...	680
1941	...	Not obtainable.	...	966
1942 <sup>(11)</sup>	...	Nil.	...	Nil.

(\*) Turco-Russian War.

(\*) Weight of packages increased from 1½ to 2 cwt.

(\*) Heavy decline in "Tümbeki" as result of establishment of tobacco monopoly in Turkey.

(\*) Increase in carpets and raisins.

(\*) Official figures commence.

(\*) Number of packages only available. I have converted these to tons at the equivalent of 1 package = 2½ cwt., which was the average weight of a package from 1902.

(10) Decline result of Russo-Persian Transit Agreement of October 1927.

(11) German attack on Russia in June 1941 and Anglo-Russian occupation of Persia in August 1941 brings transit trade to standstill.

[E 239/239/34]

No. 15.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 12, 1943.)

(No. 434.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 21, 1942.

IN paragraph 27 of my despatch No. 314 of the 22nd September I ventured, when reviewing the events of the preceding weeks, to express a cautious optimism as to the outlook of the Allies in Persia. This forecast has been falsified by subsequent events: these have included a financial crisis, a food crisis and a political and constitutional crisis—all of which have been fraught with difficulties for the Allies and particularly for His Majesty's Government.

#### The Financial Crisis.

2. The Anglo-Persian Financial Agreement of the 26th May, 1942, purports to ensure the automatic provision of rials for the needs of the British military authorities. Unfortunately, these needs could not be met without a considerable expansion of the note issue, and the power to control the note issue rested with the Majlis—a collection of persons entirely unfitted by character and training for so delicate a task. The dissolution of the Majlis, which was at first contemplated by the Qawam, would have solved this difficulty, but the Prime Minister was driven back in a course less satisfactory both to him and to the Allies, viz., to attempt to secure legal authority for an increase in the note issue large enough to cover for many months to come both the needs of the Allies and the requirements of the Persian Government. The introduction of a Bill providing for an increase of 2,000 million rials led, however, to such an outcry in the press and the Majlis about the inevitable rise in prices which must result (obliging merchants and retailers raised the prices at once to illustrate the economic law invoked) that the Government decided not to proceed with the Bill: all they could do was to push through a Bill for 500 million rials without mention of the needs of the Allies. At this moment British needs were at least as great as they had ever been; American requirements in rials were increasing rapidly and the Russians also were making demands.

3. The Prime Minister having failed in an attempt to secure from the Majlis special powers which would have enabled him to issue currency notes as required, it was evident that a major effort would have to be made to settle this question once for all. Hitherto His Majesty's Government had had to struggle with the issue unaided: the Russians had secured their rials by various doubtful devices, which had hitherto sufficed for their small needs; the Americans had been able to exchange dollars so long as there were rials, obtained by British efforts, to be bought. Had the United States and Soviet Governments had financial agreements similar to ours, there would have been no trouble: faced by a united demand for rials from all three of the Allies, the Majlis would have given in. The Prime Minister pointed this out to the American Minister on the only occasion when the latter gave serious help to His Majesty's Minister. His Majesty's Minister warned the Soviet Ambassador frequently about the risk to which aid to Russia was exposed by the attitude of the Majlis on the currency question and by the obvious lack of a united Allied front, and Mr. Eden made very strong representations to M. Maisky as to the need for Soviet co-operation with His Majesty's Legation in Tehran. At the last moment, when the military till was empty and arrangements had been made that in the last resort the Banque Mellié should be occupied by British troops and new note forms in stock seized, the Soviet Ambassador decided to help. At his suggestion he and His Majesty's Minister visited the President of the Majlis and recited a long catalogue of the occasions on which the Majlis had blocked or delayed measures essential to the Allied war effort and asked him to let the Deputies know that the Allies had drawn their own conclusions from these acts. Hearing of this message, knowing perhaps that some military preparations were afoot, and realising from the Allied victories on all fronts that the hope, or the fear, that the Germans would come to Persia was baseless, the Deputies rushed to declare their affection for the Allied cause, and at a midnight session the power to control the note issue was transferred from the Majlis to a statutory Persian commission on which the American financial adviser is to serve when he arrives. This arrangement is satisfactory, and there has been no trouble in obtaining rials since. Two small financial concessions were made by His Majesty's Government in return: settlements will be made every three instead of every six months, and the



percentage of the sterling balance which will be turned into gold has been raised from 40 per cent. to 60 per cent. His Majesty's Government had also, however, to promise to help to make up on certain conditions any real deficit in wheat and transport.

#### *The Prime Minister's Position.*

4. The Qawam's courage and firmness, though remarkable in a Persian, were not equal to the difficult situation which began to develop the moment he came into power. He would have liked to get rid of the Majlis from the beginning, but the Soviet Government were against this step, and some members of his Cabinet were not entirely with him, preferring to keep the Majlis as a screen between the Government and the Allies. The Prime Minister came into active conflict with the Majlis almost at once by what the Deputies considered his off-hand treatment of them over the Conscription Bill and, although the dispute was patched up, an impression remained that the Qawam was inclined to be dictatorial. He incurred strong criticism—much of it justified—for some of the appointments he made, and he was the object of attack from both press and Deputies on the score of high prices, food shortage and shortage of transport and of consumer's goods—subjects on which the Allies also came in for violent attacks. To meet these attacks, the Prime Minister tried, on the one hand, to secure concessions from the Allies as a condition of the issue of more rial notes, and, on the other, to devise a means whereby the power of the Majlis to delay and block public business might be limited. The financial concessions granted by His Majesty's Government have been mentioned. In addition the Prime Minister also demanded that Great Britain and/or the United States should supply Persia with 25,000 tons of wheat. The reasonable resistance of His Majesty's Government to this demand, which was formulated in particular by the Minister of State when he was here, was undermined by the discovery that the Russians proposed to feed their troops in Persia from local grain to a much greater extent than hitherto, and in the end an agreement was concluded which will be dealt with in a later paragraph.

5. The Prime Minister's attempt to limit the powers of the Majlis was a failure: he wanted full powers on certain subjects until about next August, but the Deputies, fearing that this would enable the Qawam to control the next general election, greeted the proposal with a howl of fury. Taken aback by the uproar, the Prime Minister first whittled his proposal down and then allowed it to be referred to a commission where no one took any notice of it. In the course of this controversy it was found that the Shah, far from backing his Prime Minister and trying to moderate the factious criticism of the Deputies, rather encouraged the Deputies for fear lest the Majlis should disappear and he should be left face to face with an uncontrolled Qawam. This opposition between the Prime Minister and the Shah was another facet of the conflict which arose when the Qawam took office, and, instead of following the usual custom of appointing to the Ministry of War a general who would be under the thumb of the Chief of Staff, kept the Ministry of War for himself, and, moreover, maintained that the Chief of Staff ought to report to him and not to the Shah.

6. The frivolous Deputies began to discuss a change of Government, but had no serious candidate to put forward as Prime Minister. A few irresponsibles proposed that the Qawam should be replaced by Soheily, the man who had contributed largely to the food crisis by his inactivity during the harvest period and whom the Majlis had driven out ignominiously a few months before. After the warning given to the President of the Majlis by the British and Russian representatives, the Deputies attacked the Prime Minister more furiously than ever: they had to give in on the question of currency, but they took revenge on the Prime Minister by alleging that it was through him that the Allies had obtained their distorted view of that patriotic, disinterested and always pro-Ally Assembly. Not only the Deputies but the Shah also gave too little weight to the fact that the British, Soviet and United States representatives openly stated that the Qawam had worked with the Allies, that they saw no likelihood of securing a better Prime Minister, and that in any case changes of Government every few months were ruinous to public business, both Persian and Allied.

#### *The Tehran Riots.*

7. Opposition to the Qawam culminated on the 8th and 9th December in an attempt to unseat him by disorders in the streets. The exact causes of the phenomena are under investigation by a special commission, and, as the most

diverse explanations are given, we may await its finding. What is certain is that both police and army displayed, until it was too late, an amazing benevolence towards the disorderly crowds, not merely the students who made a vague demonstration at the Majlis, but the mob which looted sugar depots and shops and eventually plundered the Prime Minister's house and destroyed all his possessions.

8. Throughout the day the Shah seems to have been calling upon the Prime Minister to resign—even after he had told His Majesty's Minister, who saw him in the afternoon, that he agreed to the retention of the Qawam provided that he made certain changes in his Cabinet and got rid of certain men round him who are generally agreed to be corrupt. Those who think that the disorders were not displeasing to the Shah have some evidence on their side. There is no doubt that in an interview with about a dozen Deputies, whom he had summoned the day before the trouble, he spoke in favour of a revolution from above—to obviate a revolution from below which he professed to fear. Moreover, General Jahanbani of the Shah's military Cabinet, who called on the Soviet Ambassador while the disorders were in progress to ask him in the Shah's name what he thought of the position, also asked the ambassador how he would view it if the Shah and the generals took public affairs in hand for a while, and, although the Shah subsequently alleged that this latter question was thrown off by General Jahanbani on his own account in the course of the casual conversation, this explanation does not ring true or agree with the evidence. The Shah has, in fact, come out of the affair very badly. In taking sides so openly and so violently against a Prime Minister who was supported by the British, United States and Soviet representatives, without consulting them, he has shown a surprising lack of political wisdom: while his attempt to effect a military *coup d'Etat* illustrates his dangerous passion for playing at soldiers. It is true that he has throughout quoted democracy and his oath to preserve the Constitution as justifying his support of the Majlis against the Prime Minister; but he announced his readiness to dismiss the Majlis if a Government satisfactory to himself was formed and they continued to give trouble, while his alliance with the military suggested that he had in mind nothing particularly democratic, but some form of autocracy resting on the army. It is quite possible that he is genuinely sceptical of the old gang of some fifteen families who between them furnish nearly all the material of every Government, and regards himself as the philosopher-king, destined to bring justice and prosperity to the Persian people; but his youth, his inexperience and his blindness to the faults of the army, make him unfitted for this rôle, while if those faults are reparable the untruthfulness and the talent for weak intrigue which have come to light during the crisis are likely to be more lasting. For the moment he professes to regret having made a mistake and to be prepared to support the Qawam, but he used the strongest pressure to make the Prime Minister consent to the reopening of the Majlis, and he shows no sign of giving up his claim to be the active Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Credit must, however, be given to him in one respect: he suggested two possible Ministers whose admittance to the Government in the place of two men of no great value would strengthen it, viz., Muhsin Rais and Mutamedî. The new Minister for War, Sipahbod Ahmadi, will also strengthen the Government—possibly too much for the Shah's liking. He will certainly want to control the General Staff, and, as he is a man of determined character and courage, a conflict is bound to arise.

9. In view of the apparent inability of the Persian Government and army to maintain order, I thought it well to arrange for British troops to come to Tehran from Qum, only three hours away. The arrival of a battalion of the Seaforth Highlanders on the 9th December certainly had a calming effect, and their bearing and turn-out have made a generally favourable impression. Indeed I have not heard any criticism from any quarter. The Soviet Ambassador was officially informed of this arrival and asked whether Soviet troops would also be sent; he replied that there were none to spare.

10. For the moment the Prime Minister is established, but his revised Cabinet is not yet published, and much as we hoped that the Majlis would be given a prolonged holiday—"for repairs"—would have been a reasonable pretext, since some slight change was done to it during the disorders—the Majlis was reopened on the 20th December. Meanwhile, a determined effort has been made by interested parties to show that the Prime Minister himself was responsible for the disorders. The events of recent weeks have shown that the Government and Sovereign of Persia must, in the end, do what the Allies want; but it has yet to be seen whether we can prevent the victimisation of a Government for acting in accordance with our wishes.



### Security Questions.

10A. Of the suspects at Sultanabad, eight have been released: the rest remain in detention, the interrogation having established that there was good ground for their being detained. Very late in the day a Persian commissioner and two senior Persian judges arrived. They have given no trouble at all, either in wishing to sway the verdict, or in being unduly critical of the conditions of detention. The search for Germans, and for Persian suspects whom the Persian police professed to be unable to find, has gone on: one German living in Tehran has been caught, and life has been made very risky for a number of other suspects.

11. In December it became essential to get rid of General Zahidi, General Officer Commanding, Isfahan, who had sabotaged wheat collection, made civil Government impossible, shown indifference if not hostility when Vice-Consul Harris and Dr. Griffiths were murdered, dealt with and harboured German agents, and encouraged Nasir Qashgai and even supplied him with arms. This was at the moment when the Qawam Government seemed to be weakest, and the Prime Minister, who even at the best would have been afraid to touch so prominent an officer, would certainly have been unable to arrest him then, so it was decided that Zahidi should be taken by the British military authorities. The arrest was entrusted to Captain Fitzroy Maclean, M.P., who, acting *fortiter* as a parachutist, but *suaviter* as an ex-secretary of embassy, effected it with brilliant ease. The Prime Minister and the Shah were both informed of Zahidi's arrest as soon as possible and of the reasons for it. Both asked whether we could not have mentioned it beforehand, and received the explanation that it was desired not to embarrass them. The Shah said that he would have such people punished severely, even by death; but neither expressed the least surprise at the catalogue given above of the offences of which Zahidi is believed by us to be guilty. It is alleged in some quarters that the arrest of Zahidi by the British authorities has administered a severe blow to the morale of the Persian army, but this allegation comes in all probability from men who must know our real grounds for action and who have very uneasy consciences themselves.

### The Food Situation.

12. The arrival of Mr. Sheridan, the American Food Adviser, at the end of September, although it took place three months too late for any effective control of the 1942 harvest to be organised, has profoundly altered the situation. Shortly before his arrival, M. Farrukh was appointed Minister of Food in supersession of M. Ardalan. The newly-constituted Food Ministry was in the curious position of having no one among its senior officials with any direct knowledge of Persian wheat problems, but Mr. Sheridan, who is a man of great energy and drive, though apt to leap to hasty and ill-considered conclusions, was undaunted. He was unwilling to adopt the suggestion that he should discuss the situation with M. Bader, ex-Minister of Finance, before reaching any conclusions, but accepted instead the advice of Mr. Kahn, Economic Adviser to the Minister of State, who happened to be on a visit to Tehran and who urged that it was anomalous to try to maintain an official price of 1,400 to 1,800 rials (£11 to £14) against a price of £25 to £35 elsewhere in the Middle East—an argument which ignores the fact that the Indian price continues to be about £12 per ton. The unanimous opinion of a meeting of British officials with local knowledge, who were invited to meet Mr. Sheridan at the legation to discuss the situation, was unable to deter him from accepting Mr. Kahn's advice, and the official price of wheat throughout the country was raised to 3,000 (and in some areas 3,500) rials a ton.

13. Parallel with the financial negotiations, though not officially linked with them, there were conversations about the food supply. In October the Prime Minister telegraphed to Mr. Churchill and the Shah to His Majesty The King, asking to be supplied with 25,000 tons of wheat and 150 lorries. Similar telegrams were sent to the United States. To ask for wheat when their own harvest was only just beginning to come in, and for transport, when they had delayed seven weeks to accept the Anglo-American proposals for a Road Transport Board and were still displaying little energy in making a complete survey of existing transport, seemed highly unreasonable; but evidence began to come to light, suggesting that the shortage of transport was perhaps rather greater than had at first been supposed, while a sudden demand by the Soviet Government for 5,000 tons of wheat, 15,000 tons of barley (in addition to 6,000 tons alleged to be outstanding on a previous clearing arrangement) and 30,000 tons of rice compelled His Majesty's Government to reconsider the matter. Eventually the Persian Government succeeded in concluding an agreement, which was signed

after many delays on the 4th December, by which they recognised that the primary responsibility for feeding the Persian people is theirs, and that they must take all possible steps to that end, including the utilisation to the best advantage of the internal transport at their disposal, while the British and United States Governments for their part undertake both to do their best to make up any deficit in bread cereals which, nevertheless, occurs, and also to ensure that the transport at the disposal of the Persian Government, if put to the proper use, shall be sufficient for the distribution of such cereals. It has been made clear to the Soviet Government and to the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran that the replacement from overseas of bread cereals purchased in Persia for the Russian forces will necessarily interfere to some extent with the carriage of goods and war material to Russia.

14. The internal wheat situation has already been separately described in my monthly reports. Briefly the position is that wheat collections in the provinces have continued to be most unsatisfactory. Other contributing causes, besides the economic earthquake caused by the sudden doubling of the official price, are: the failure to take any proper steps to put the new policy into effect, the traditional unwillingness of provincial authorities to co-operate with the Central Government, the reluctance of the Central Government to take any action against landowners and other hoarders of wheat, and, in Azerbaijan, the principal wheat-growing area, the paralysis resulting from fear of Russian intentions and their repeated interference with attempts to export food-stuffs out of the province through their zone of occupation.

15. The Soviet Government has now officially promised to assist in the transportation of grain from the north, and their local representatives have agreed to this being done, but obstruction still continues. Wheat for Khorassan has been held up at the Russian railhead at Shahrud, and interference at Kazvin has been so consistent that wheat from Hamadan and other western districts has to come by the long route via Arak, thus wasting badly-needed motor transport and adding to the congestion of north-bound traffic on the railway. Until the last few days no wheat had come in from Azerbaijan; the local Government has done nothing to collect wheat in centres from which it could be easily transported to Tehran (or alternatively seized by the Russians), and winter is now upon us, making transport in many districts impossible. The Persian Minister for Food has himself gone to Tabriz to try to relieve the situation, and British army lorries are carrying back loads of wheat from Azerbaijan southwards.

16. Meanwhile Tehran has consumed practically all the stocks available in the vicinity, has nearly exhausted the possible surplus from Arak, the only surplus area free from fear of Russian interference, and has been several times on the verge of starvation. The promise of the Allies to import 25,000 tons of wheat cannot begin to be effective for two months or more. The army is lending 1,500 tons of flour from its own stocks and efforts are being made to rush up from Basra 3,500 tons of barley promised from Iraq in September and October but only now in sight, and rice is beginning to come in from the north; but the task of the American Food Adviser, whose energies are almost entirely absorbed in the problem of Tehran's bread supply, will not be an enviable one for the next three months.

### Polish Refugees.

17. The unfortunate deterioration of the currency and food situation in Persia has made the Persians regard the Polish refugees who are here with growing disfavour. In Tehran there are still 19,000 and it is calculated that this is an addition of about 8 per cent. to those inhabitants of Tehran who have a European standard of feeding. In order to ease the pressure of Polish buying on prices and supplies of food-stuffs, a scale of rationing has now been agreed with the Poles themselves, the representatives of Merra, the American Red Cross and the Persian authorities, including Mr. Sheridan, the American Adviser to the Ministry of Food, and it is hoped that this will serve to take some of the sting out of Persian criticisms, though there is a movement to increase the intended rations slightly on the ground that it is insufficient to maintain in health people debilitated by two and a half years of malnutrition. Meanwhile an ever-increasing number of British and American personnel is coming here and there are growing difficulties in finding winter accommodation for the Polish refugees.

I have explained in my telegrams how necessary it is from every point of view that the refugees should be moved on as soon as possible—I note that my anxieties are shared by the Minister of State and the Commander-in-chief,



Persia-Iraq Command. A special problem is presented by some 900 Polish Jews, nearly all of them children, who have permission to go to Palestine, where every care awaits them, but cannot go there because the Iraqi Government, very sensitive on the question of the Zionist policy, will not give them transit visas.

#### *Military Interests.*

18. Owing to the dilatoriness of the Persian administration we have had to take direct action in taking over a number of telegraph lines essential for military communications between Tehran and Bagdad, and Malayer and Andimeshk. I informed the Prime Minister on the 19th September that it was an urgent military necessity to take over these lines in accordance with article 3 (2) (b) of the Treaty of Alliance. In spite of direct representations to the Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones, and of conversations with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the subject, no progress was made for the two months during which diplomatic correspondence continued. On the 18th November I informed the Prime Minister that I was unable to ask the British military authorities to postpone any longer the assumption of the essential facilities in question and that the military authorities would proceed to take over these lines. Other lines are available for civil use on the same routes and the line from Tehran to Bagdad has, as a matter of fact, only been in use intermittently for the last six months, and then only for short periods, owing to the inefficiency of the Persian administration.

19. The Persian Government have since informed me of their understanding of the importance of the question and of their regret at the delay—and also at the unilateral action taken. I have not heard of any local incidents having been caused by what we have done.

20. In the case of Mahrabad aerodrome, near Tehran, we were more fortunate. Although it was the last aerodrome near Tehran at the free disposal of the Persian Air Force, we were able to arrange for it to be handed over to the R.A.F. in return for assistance to the Persian Air Force in training their pilots, helping them to effect their transfer to Isfahan, and so on. We are greatly indebted to Group Captain Greenlaw, Air Attaché to this Legation, for his skilful handling of these negotiations.

21. We have also succeeded in arranging for a special military governor to be appointed to Abadan Island. Owing to its enormous strategic importance, security and administrative problems require special treatment at Abadan; the new governor, Colonel Natemi, will be assisted by a British adviser, and will have special powers to control persons entering and leaving the area. At the same time the British military authorities will supplement the pay of the police, which is so low that they are quite unreliable, by giving them food rations and it is hoped that this, with a recent increase in the British Military Security Establishment at Abadan, will improve the situation radically. It is expected that it will soon be possible for fire-fighting training by British subjects to be made compulsory in the oil industry areas.

22. In September it was suggested to the Persian Government that they should follow the example of the Iraqi Government in arranging for premises required by the British military authorities to be requisitioned by the Persian authorities who would make the necessary agreement with the owners. After a delay of two months a reply was received, stating that the law did not provide for such an arrangement and that to try to obtain such a law from the Majlis would meet with difficulty. It was just at this moment that the Majlis, scared by the British and Soviet representations and by the Allied victories, were revealing wells of pro-Allied feeling which had hitherto remained hidden and His Majesty's Legation called attention to this satisfactory phenomenon and suggested that on the contrary the Majlis would presumably be delighted to show such a mark of enthusiasm for the Allied cause, the more so as it would tend to keep down rents. The quarrel between the Prime Minister and the Majlis was then at its height, so that no legislation in the sense required was to be hoped for and His Majesty's Legation had to inform the Prime Minister that he must not be surprised if the British military authorities in Sultanabad were compelled, in the last resort, to take premises required by them for essential purposes. The Prime Minister asked whether we could not tell him what premises we needed, so that he might see what could be done. His Majesty's Minister said that he would ask for a list but he gave no undertaking that action would be delayed while the list was considered. Within the last few days the billeting situation has become acute in Tehran also. Fortunately, the Prime Minister feels that his position is stronger and he has promised His Majesty's Minister to obtain from the Majlis under the Double

Urgency rule a Rent Restriction Act which will benefit all tenants and will include provisions for requisitioning premises required by the Allied forces. He agreed that if the British forces were compelled to enter into possession, before the passing of the proposed Act, of any of the premises for which they are at present negotiating, they might do so on handing over to the owner a written undertaking to pay rent on the scale to be fixed either under the projected Rent Restriction Act or by arbitration. The American Legation are equally interested in this matter, and propose to press the Prime Minister to present the Bill before the Majlis without delay.

23. In two or three other cases the Prime Minister has taken advantage of the lull after the storm of the 8th December to give favourable decisions on questions which had been the subject of inconclusive discussion for some time. In particular it is now agreed that the Persian customs authorities on the Iraqi border will not interfere with lorries carrying goods for the British army; to prevent smuggling, such lorries will be searched by the British military authorities, who will then furnish a certificate which will serve as a pass for the purpose of the Persian customs. There still remains the problem of finding the means to compensate the Persian Treasury for any loss of customs dues resulting from the presence of British forces in Persia, *e.g.*, where goods which would normally have been exported and paid export dues are being consumed in Persia or exported to Iraq as military stores and thereby escaping customs inspection.

#### *American Interests.*

24. Preparations are being made to increase enormously the American participation in aid to Russia. From present calculations it seems that soon there will be five times as many Americans working on railway and road transport and ports as there are British employed at present. This should increase the volume of material delivered to Russia through Persia. On the other hand, the presence of so large a number of highly-paid foreigners increases the competition for local produce and will tend to raise prices still further. An unusual security problem is presented by the scheme to run frequent American motor convoys up and down the Bushire-Shiraz road by night as well as by day. It has been laid down that none of the Americans in Persia are to be combatant troops, and that security for this road (as elsewhere in Persia) is to be ensured by the British military authorities, who naturally do not wish to employ valuable combatant troops to guard communications: the question thus becomes mainly political.

25. The closest co-operation is maintained with the American Legation and the American advisers to the various departments—supplies, gendarmerie and police. As the United States share in the war effort in Persia increases, more and more American experts are attached to the American Legation, and all the help and information that His Majesty's Legation can afford is placed at their disposal. The Americans appear to be gratified by the proposal of His Majesty's Minister, which has been acted upon, that, in addition to the British, American and Persian members of the Road Transport Board, a second American, Mr. Kidd, as Lease-Lend representative, shall always be present at the meetings.

26. The Persian Government are pleased at the greater share which the United States is taking in this country, as they consider it an additional guarantee of their independence and integrity; but before agreeing to the replacement of the British staff on the railway by Americans they wish to have the written assent of the British and Russian representatives in Tehran. Ours has been given; the Soviet Ambassador, though glad to hear of the speeding-up of aid to Russia, which the advent of large numbers of Americans is to secure, is awaiting instructions from Moscow before giving any assurance on this subject.

#### *Soviet Interests.*

27. Soviet consular officials at Kermanshah have visited tribal areas and apparently given ingratiating messages to various chiefs. In Azerbaijan the Soviet authorities have shown some suspicion of British intentions, but on the other hand they appear, probably because the danger of a German invasion of Persia has receded, to have thrown over the Kurds, who are thus left with no friends. The standing instructions to the Soviet authorities in Persia are, they say, not to interfere in the internal affairs of Persia, but this does not prevent their blocking the appointment to a Cabinet post of M. Taddayyun, whom the Prime Minister much wishes to appoint, putting the strongest pressure (including refusal to allow wheat supplies to pass from the Russian zone to Tehran) in order to secure grain and other food supplies from the Persian



Government, or squeezing the Persian Government to sign two highly disadvantageous agreements—one financial, the other about the use of the armament factories. The last-minute help from the Soviet Ambassador undoubtedly contributed largely to the solution of the currency crisis—a crisis which would not have arisen if the Soviet Government had adopted the same financial policy as ourselves from the beginning. The Soviet authorities now need to obtain large sums in rials from the Government, but they are apparently unwilling to offer the terms embodied in our financial agreement, but have put forward a draft which, though wrapped up in the form of a clearing agreement, in fact binds Persia to give unlimited rial credits to Russia, subject to a six-monthly settlement by which the balance due to Persia would be paid in Moscow: (1) as to 40 per cent. in gold, which could be transferred to Persia, but at the risk of the Persian Government; and (2) as to the rest in dollars, which would in practice be frozen until after the war, since they could only be spent in America, and then only if the Persian Government had no other dollars at its disposal. The Soviet Government are also pressing the Persian Government to sign a contract for the operation of the Persian armament factories. After a year of somewhat dog-in-the-manger policy towards His Majesty's Government they want to get the factories into full production by the middle of 1943. The Persian Government are very reluctant to sign, as they consider (with some reason) that the terms are very onerous, and fear that the inevitable influx of Soviet specialists, and possibly workmen, will have a disturbing political influence. It appears that the Persian Government are to pay the expenses—salaries and wages, cost of extra machinery provided by the Soviet Government, &c., while the Soviet Government will pay for the arms delivered (less specified deductions for any delay) in rials obtained, presumably, under the proposed financial agreement. His Majesty's Minister communicated to the Soviet Ambassador information obtained about subversive movements affecting Russian as well as British interests. It was hoped that the Soviet authorities might be induced to arrest an important Persian suspect hostile to them at the time of the arrest of General Zahidi. But although the Soviet Ambassador seemed gratified to secure the valuable information conveyed to him, he has received no instructions from his Government about the suggested arrest, and we have, therefore, been obliged, as usual, to act alone.

#### Internal Affairs.

28. The whole of Persia is suffering from the paralysis which political crises in the capital always spread throughout the country. The Kermanshah area in particular has suffered, and it has so far proved impossible to secure a Governor-General who would be likely to instil energy into the Administration. It is in Fars, however, that the effect of weakness in the Central Government has been most clearly shown. Puffed up by flattery from German agents and also, there is good reason to believe, by encouragement from General Zahidi, Nasir Khan tried to secure recognition by the Persian Government as head of all the Qashgai—a fantastic claim. The Prime Minister has consistently resisted this claim and, indeed, has refused to discuss matters unless Nasir comes to Tehran, where his life would be protected by a Government guarantee and his claims would be discussed. The Governor-General and the G.O.C., Fars, Prince Firouz, for long refused on various pretexts to take action against Nasir, and then tried to disarm the Qashgai on their migration south, with no result but disgrace to Persian arms and the loss of sixty rifles and three machine guns. If the situation is better now it is not due to the Persian army, but to the series of shocks administered to Nasir by the Allied victories, the discovery, which must be obvious to him, of some of his intrigues with the Axis, and the arrest and removal of Zahidi. Nasir is still manoeuvring to secure the best possible terms from the Persian Government, but each message suggests a slight weakening of his position.

29. The Persians lament the danger from Russia, but there is no indication whatsoever that any of them realise that the best defence is a good Administration and a contented people. Corruption is almost universal: *bon Iranien vole de race*. Of the American advisers struggling in this morass, Mr. Sheridan, in the Ministry of Food, puts his faith in one rogue after another, while Colonel Schwarzkopf (gendarmierie) and Mr. Timmerman (police) have no contracts and therefore no power. The most urgently needed advisers, Dr. Millspaugh and his eight assistants, who are to work for the Ministry of Finance, are still awaited. It is a fairly safe prophecy that the Americans will be tolerated during the war, as a bait for lease-lend and a defence against Russia

and Great Britain, but that after the war their struggle with the vanity, jealousy and corruption of Persian officialdom will be very fierce.

30. General Ridley, of the United States Army, who has been engaged on drawing up a scheme for the reorganisation of the Persian army, has his proposals now ready for presentation to the Shah. As far as they are known to me they are sound and reasonable. They entail the provision of certain equipment, notably transport and means of communication, and a considerable increase in the military budget to cover essential increases in pay and improvements in conditions for officers and men. Such an increase is an inevitable first step in any reform, since the present rates of pay of officers make dishonesty a necessity. It is moral reform more than reorganisation that is required in the Persian army.

31. It lacks an ideal and an incentive; it is rent by political intrigue and rotten with corruption. Schemes of reorganisation will effect little unless an adequately staffed American mission has the executive authority to ensure the moral reform. A mission with such powers will find both support and opposition in the Persian army. The Shah, anxious that his control of and influence in the army should be in no way restricted and shutting his eyes to the prevalent abuses, is, according to my present information, averse from giving to the officers of an American mission the wide powers without which they can achieve little. I shall miss no opportunity of endeavouring to persuade him to do so, as it is presumably in our interests that endeavours should be made to render the Persian army capable at least of maintaining internal security, of protecting our lines of communication and of giving that physical support which is essential to any Government in Persia. The main cause of its present inefficiency is its lack of the right spirit.

#### Road Transport.

32. There is now operating in Persia a system of Allied control of all kinds of road transport and, in particular, of motor transport. For the last two months an informal committee, consisting of Persian, British and American members, has been working on the compilation of regulations governing road transport and on preparing the ground for the constitution of a more formal road transport board with full Allied representation. Having formulated the text of the regulations considered necessary, the English text of which was sent to the Foreign Office under cover of my despatch No. 421 E. of the 10th December, this committee dissolved itself to make way for a new board, which has now been set up by the Governments concerned, with a Persian chairman, two American representatives (one a member of the American Legation and the other the Lease-Lend representative), one British representative and one Russian representative. In addition, the board has the right to co-opt as required other persons connected with civilian road transport.

33. The Road Transport Board has already held a number of meetings and is considering certain important matters requiring more or less immediate settlement. It is now in a position, it is hoped, to exert effective control of existing civil transport facilities in Persia. It is too early to say whether this control will be completely effective, but it should, in any case, bring about an improvement in the situation. The Road Transport Board has direct control over the activities of the Persian Government Road Transport Department (Edareh Barbari Rah), which is a section of the Ministry of Supply. This department is directly responsible for operating the vehicles contracted to the Persian Government, and will also be responsible for the vehicles to be allocated to Persia under the Middle East civilian quota. It also controls the distribution of Persian Government tyres and of certain motor vehicle spare parts in short supply, such as batteries, sparking plugs and electric wiring.

34. The Edareh Barbari Rah has a British director, who attends the weekly meetings of the Road Transport Board. The latter thus indirectly controls already a large part of the transport working for the Persian Government, and this control will apply soon to all transport in the possession of the Persian Government and to all lorries in private ownership.

35. Arrangements have been made with General Headquarters, Paic, for the use of back-loading facilities in U.K.C.C. transport carrying supplies to Russia for essential Persian civil requirements. It is hoped in this way to make the utmost use of all transport facilities available, whether in the service of the U.K.C.C. or of the Persian Government, for essential civil needs; and the Road Transport Board will maintain constant touch with the D.Q.M.G. (Movements), Tehran, to maintain the efficient use of these facilities. It is hoped, however, that



when the Persian Government builds up its own fleet of lorries the calls on the U.K.C.C. for help in providing transport will be correspondingly reduced. At present it is necessary for the latter to provide transport which often conflicts with the needs of supplies to Russia. The more the Persian Government can do for itself, the less this service will be interrupted. Similarly, it is most necessary that the Persian Government should have its own stocks of tyres and spare parts with which to maintain the vehicles under its control, and it is hoped that arrangements now being made by the M.E.S.C. and the agreement of General Headquarters, Paic, to return a number of tyres consigned to the Persian Government requisitioned earlier in the year will before long result in the Persian Government having at least the minimum of tyres and spares necessary for this purpose.

#### Conclusion.

36. The disorders of the 8th December have cleared the air somewhat. Those who troubled the waters, or tried to fish in them, have been taken somewhat aback by the courage shown by the Qawam and the support accorded to him by the Allies, while the Qawam, apparently grateful for this support, has settled two or three questions which had been discussed fruitlessly for some time, and has made on the Tehran wireless the first strongly pro-Ally speech made by a Persian since the occupation. But it must not be concluded that the danger is over. The Shah has been humiliated, and the fact that it is his own fault does not make it any easier to bear; nor will the army cease their attempt to remain outside the competence of the Ministry of War and under the nominal orders of a Shah whom they in fact influence strongly if they do not actually control him. The Deputies have been brought to order for the moment, but, like most Persians, they are incurably light-minded, and they will always prefer the intoxication of irresponsible criticism to more useful labour on urgent unspectacular reforms. The press is closed down for the moment, except for a Government sheet, and the Government have not yet decided what to do with the newspapers—factious and irresponsible at the best, and, at the worst, organs of almost open blackmail. The prospects of the Allies in Persia are brighter as a result of the victories in North Africa and Russia; but the food problem, the problem of the rise in prices which the growing expenditure in currency is bound to accentuate, and the confusion which seems likely to characterise the period of transfer of railways and other means of aid to Russia from British to American hands will occupy our minds and energies for the next few months, when we are not busy with one of the frequent and harmful political crises which the Persians regard with such childish equanimity.

37. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister of State; to Minbranch, Bagdad; to the General Officer Commanding, Paiforce; to His Majesty's Ambassador at Kuibyshev; and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 564/1/34]

No. 16.

*Mr. Eden to Mr. Baggallay (Moscow).*

(No. 38.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 25, 1943.*

THE Soviet Ambassador raised the currency position in Persia when he came to see me this afternoon. He said that the Persian Ministers had been complaining to the Soviet Ambassador of our heavy currency demands.

2. I said that I knew nothing of this, though I had heard of complaints of the Russian demands. Our currency demands were, of course, already catered for by the Financial Agreement which we had made with the Persian Government. The Ambassador seemed somewhat taken aback at this information, and I undertook to send him a full written reply stating our position. In the meanwhile I suggested to his Excellency that it might well be that the Persians were at their time-honoured game of playing our two countries off against each other.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

[E 1017/7/34]

No. 17.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 19.)*

(No. 23. Confidential.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Six-Monthly Political Situation Report by His Majesty's Consulate-General, Meshed.

*Tehran, January 18, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 17.

*Consul-General Skrine to Sir R. Bullard.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Meshed, January 5, 1943.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith my political appreciation report for East Persia for the half-year ending December 1942.

2. A copy of this despatch is being forwarded to the External Affairs Department of the Government of India under printed letter No. 7.

I have, &c.

C. P. SKRINE.

Sub-Enclosure in No. 17.

(Confidential.)

*Six-Monthly Political Situation Report.*

THE dominating feature of the period under review was the catastrophic fall in the value of the rial measured in commodities. The cost of living at Meshed, which in June 1942 had already risen 200 per cent. compared with 1936, by December stood at 620 per cent. Several different factors contributed to this disquieting state of affairs:—

- (1) The poor harvests of 1940 and 1941, resulting partly from climatic causes, partly from short sowings due to insecurity and official rapacity.
- (2) Hoarding and profiteering, not only in wheat, but in other local products and in imported commodities, the supply of which was short owing to war conditions.
- (3) Lack of confidence in the stability of the currency, due partly to fear of invasion and the overthrow of the present régime, partly to memories of the collapse of the rouble and other currencies after the last war.
- (4) The plethora of money caused by the Allied Governments' huge purchases of supplies and payments for services, which increased the purchasing power of all classes except the lowest and necessitated a steady increase in the note issue.

Axis Fifth Column and "whispering campaigns" undoubtedly exploited (1) and (2) and contributed largely to (3). The result was increasing distress among the masses, both in the towns and in the villages, combined with the steady enrichment of those classes, official, land-owning and mercantile, who had the handling of commodities in bulk. The odium for this state of affairs was, as usual, cleverly fastened upon the shoulders of the Jews, the Russians, the British, the Poles, anybody but the Persians themselves.

Chief among the officials who benefited were those of the Finance and Economic (now Food) Departments, who collected taxes and customs dues and controlled the collection and distribution of grain, cloth, sugar and tea. In collusion with the less scrupulous landowners, merchants and industrialists they created artificial scarcities, manipulated prices, and indulged on a large scale the national passion for speculation and profiteering. Other notable beneficiaries of the administrative system developed under the late Shah were the officers of the army, gendarmerie and police. These are the Praetorian Guard of the bureaucracy, and they pay themselves liberally for the protection they afford.



Credit must be given to certain high officials, including the Governor-General, Agha Ali Mansour, for their attempts to improve the standards of administration and reduce corruption. Agha Mansour worked extremely hard, in spite of poor health, and it was undoubtedly due mainly to his firmness and foresight that major disturbances were avoided. The Farmandari of Meshed continued to be held by Agha Ali Rukni, a friendly but weak and timid scion of the Qajar clan. Among the heads of departments Agha Fiuzat, Director of Education, was notable for his high principles and careful supervision of the educational establishments of Meshed, which include a teachers' training college, a technical college and two high schools.

Distress in the rural areas was reflected in, and partly caused by, the prevalence of raiding by bands of marauders, some of whom came from across the border, but the majority from the wilder mountain regions of North-West and South-East Khorasan. In September there was a recrudescence of raiding on the Meshed-Turbat-i-Haidari section of the Bahidan Road, which had been reasonably safe since the defeat of Saulat-us-Saltaneh's rebels in February, and there were several serious incidents involving lorries of the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation. Under pressure from His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General the strength of the gendarmerie was increased and some local bad characters rounded up, but raiding continued, and it became necessary to close the dangerous sections of the road to all traffic after dark. Meanwhile, among the hill villages the gendarmerie, while making a show of waging ceaseless war against the raiders who blackmail and loot the villagers, continued to act in collusion with the outlaws and share their booty.

In the towns the chief preoccupation, as stated above, was the ruinous increase in the cost of living. In spite of the good harvest in June and July and the existence of ample food supplies, even allowing for the quantities sent to Tehran (see below), the working classes were as under-nourished and ill-clad as ever owing to the fact that the rise in wages did not keep pace with that of prices. There was, it is true, no actual shortage of bread, but the poor quality of the adulterated product sold to the lower classes at the controlled price of 6 rials per Tabrizi *man* of 3 kilog. caused much indigestion and consequent discontent. At the same time, unlimited quantities of wheat seemed to be available for the baking of fine bread and cakes for the middle and upper classes, who had more money to burn than they had had since the last war and, in spite of the exorbitant prices of which they complained, scrambled for everything that came on the market. The price of "free" bread rose during the half-year from 8 to 18 rials per Tabrizi *man* or from 1s. 4d. to 2s. 10d. per pound.

Collections by the Economic (now Food) Department of wheat, barley and other food-stuffs during the half-year amounted to 19,500 tons, of which some 12,000 are alleged to have been consumed in Meshed and certain smaller towns and 4,000 sent to Tehran, mostly on U.K.C.C. lorries. 2,500 tons of barley have also been supplied to the Russian Government by the local administration. Under orders from the Food Adviser at Tehran, the local representative of the Food Ministry, a notoriously corrupt official called Dehimi, is pressing on with the collection of food-stuffs, both for despatch to Tehran and for the sustenance of the towns. He promises to collect another 7,500 tons, of which 5,500 are earmarked for the capital, in addition to what has already been sent. It is better not to enquire too closely into the methods by which he and his associates, the chief hoarders, propose to produce these quantities and the rates at which they intend to remunerate themselves.

The demands of Tehran on the surplus wheat of Khorasan accentuated the prevailing discontent and gave an outlet to strong regionalism in the local press and in private conversation. Agitators had no difficulty in persuading the public that Khorasan is being squeezed dry to feed a vast influx of Poles, British and other foreigners at the capital. A "secret" society calling itself the Hizb-i-Paika-i-Milli (National War party) came into existence in August on the first anniversary of the Anglo-Russian occupation, and conducted throughout the rest of the year a whispering campaign against the Persian bureaucracy and the Allied nations who supported them. It occasionally came out with strongly-worded leaflets abusing particular officials, until the events of the 8th December at Tehran frightened the local administration and brought their wrath upon the head of the Hizb. The leaflets ceased to appear, and the secretary came running round to His Majesty's Consul-General for Allied support! Freedom of speech is a plant of delicate growth in Persia.

In striking contrast with the prevailing discontent and wretchedness in the north, the people of Birjand and the Qainat, a more barren and arid region than

Khorasan proper, cultivated their lands in comparative contentment and prosperity. This was chiefly due to their respect for and confidence in Sarkar Amir Mohamed Ibrahim Khan Alem, formerly entitled Shaukat-ul-Mulk, hereditary *grand seigneur* of the district. The Shaukat signalled his return to Birjand in January 1942, after seven years' absence enforced by the late Shah, by emptying his own wheat *ambars* to feed the towns. Thenceforward his main preoccupation was to collect and distribute the scanty food supplies of the district fairly and to obtain further stocks from Zabul and India. This region was the only one in East Persia in which the landowners and peasants gave up their grain willingly at the old official price to feed the towns, simply because they were paid in full and knew that the grain would not be sold on the black market. Needless to say, the Shaukat did not allow the Economic Department officials to have anything to do with either the collection or the distribution of wheat in his area.

Relations between the consular establishments, the Imperial Bank of Iran, the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation and the numerous British military officers working in the area, on the one side, and Persian officials and non-officials, on the other, were on the whole excellent. Little anti-foreignism was noticeable, except perhaps among the more bigoted mullas. The Governor-General from the outset actively discouraged anti-ally talk and intrigue, and Meshed "society" followed his lead in exchanging hospitalities with His Majesty's Consul-General and other members of the British community. The American missionaries continued to carry on their medical and other benevolent work with tact and skill, and to be a valuable asset to the Allied cause. On the whole, the anti-British feeling which was widespread at the beginning of the year, was much less in evidence during its second half, even before the war news began to get better. The policy of the Public Relations Bureau, Tehran, and the Central Publicity Office, New Delhi, has undoubtedly borne fruit: even if not more than a small proportion of the seed falls upon good ground, the mere fact that we are obviously trying to cultivate the goodwill of Persians and study their tastes has a soothing effect upon Persian vanity. Particularly successful ventures in social approach during the period under review were the institution of the British reading-room on the Khiaban-i-Pehlevi, the semi-public presentation of 100 grammes of gold leaf from the Government of India to the Shrine, and the Victory Cup football tournament, in which six school and club teams competed in sixteen matches for a challenge cup and medals presented by His Majesty's Consul-General.

General M. Maximoff was Soviet Consul-General until 23rd November, when he was transferred to the Embassy at Tehran, to be replaced by General V. Kozloff towards the end of December. The cordial relations between the British and Soviet Consulates-General, which marked the first half of the year, continued throughout the second. There is no doubt that the will to co-operate was there, but seldom the power. Official, and even social, relations seemed to be dictated from above. How many of the difficulties experienced in dealing with the Russians are due to inefficient co-operation between their diplomatic service and the Red Army, and how many to the well-known Russian method of psychological sabotage, is difficult to say. The tightening up of Russian military control on the roads leading into Khorasan from Ashkabad, Shahrud, and Herat gave much trouble, and British officers travelling on duty were frequently held up for longer or shorter periods by Red Army sentries. These difficulties have not yet been removed.

The behaviour of the Russian troops and relations between the Soviet Consulate-General and Persian officials continued excellent. The Russians have greatly increased their propaganda activities in Meshed, and there is no doubt that this, combined with their forbearance and discipline, has brought them many adherents. But Khorasan, as a whole, dislikes and fears them as much as ever. The Persians, who are born snobs, despise the Russians for their shabbiness and apparent poverty. Moreover, rightly or wrongly, they are convinced that the Soviet Government is going to keep its hold on Khorasan indefinitely. It is admitted that the annexation of the province to the U.S.S.R. would probably free the peasantry from the domination of oppressive and corrupt officials, yet the peasantry are as opposed to it as anyone else. The reason for this is the fear of collectivisation and of a repetition of the events of 1935 in Uzbekistan.

January 5, 1943.

C. P. SKRINE.



[E 1316/1/34]

No. 18.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 8.)*

(No. 31.)

Sir,

*Tehran, January 26, 1943.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Supplementary Financial Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Imperial Persian Government (of which the text was approved in your telegram No. 1542 of 1942) was signed at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs and by myself at noon on the 25th January, 1943.

2. I have the honour to forward to you herewith the following documents:—

- (a) The signature copy of the English text of the agreement.
- (b) The signature copy of the Persian text.
- (c) Two certified copies of the English text.
- (d) Three additional copies of the English text.

3. The Imperial Government has been informed that His Majesty's Government will be unable to deliver any further quantities of gold under the terms of the two Financial Agreements until after both agreements have been ratified by the Majlis. I expect that ratification will take place shortly.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch (together with a copy of the English text of the agreement) to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Bagdad, Cairo and Kuibyshev; to the Minister of State, Cairo; to the Office of the Minister of State in Bagdad; and to the Government of India.

I have, &amp;c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 18.

*Financial (Supplementary) Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Imperial Persian Government.*

THE Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Imperial Persian Government;

Having in mind the provisions of the Financial Agreement entered into between the two Governments on the 26th May, 1942 (hereinafter referred to as "the Main Agreement"); and

Desiring further to facilitate financial transactions between Persia and countries within the sterling area;

Have appointed plenipotentiaries to conclude an agreement for the purpose;

Who, being duly authorised by their respective Governments, have agreed as follows:—

## ARTICLE 1.

The following amendments shall be made in the text of the Main Agreement:—

- (a) In article 10, in the phrase "40 per cent. shall be convertible into gold," the words "60 per cent." shall be substituted for the words "40 per cent." wherever the said phrase occurs.
- (b) In paragraph (2) of article 10, and in paragraph (2) of article 15, the word "quarter" shall be substituted for the word "half-year" wherever the last-mentioned word occurs.
- (c) In article 8 the words "the total of the balances so established" shall be substituted for the words "the total visible balances so established."

## ARTICLE 2.

Article 10 of the Main Agreement shall be deemed always to have had effect as though the provisions of paragraph (a) of article 1 of this agreement had applied from the date of commencement of the Main Agreement.

In witness whereof the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed the present agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Tehran, in duplicate, on the 25th day of January, 1943, in English and Persian, both texts being equally authentic.

On behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

R. W. BULLARD,  
*His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister  
Plenipotentiary in Persia.*

On behalf of the Imperial Persian Government:

M. SAED,  
*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Imperial  
Persian Government.*

[E 1775/38/34]

No. 19.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 27.)*

(No. 80.)

Sir,

*Tehran, February 25, 1943.*

THE vote of confidence in the new Prime Minister, M. Soheily, and his Cabinet on the 21st February affords a convenient opportunity for reviewing the main outlines of the recent Cabinet crisis which has formed the subject of a series of recent telegrams ending with my telegram No. 198 of the 21st February last. I summarise below the principal political events which have happened since Qawam es Sultaneh's position began to become difficult, in the middle of January last.

2. Since the disorders of the 8th December, 1942, it became increasingly evident that relations between the Shah and Qawam es Sultaneh were going from bad to worse. The Shah appeared determined to direct and control the army, and to interpret literally the constitutional principle that he was the Commander-in-Chief of his forces. The Prime Minister, on the other hand, was determined to assert and establish the principle of ministerial responsibility for all Ministries, especially the Ministry of War, and he had not long previously announced his intention to ask for full powers from the Majlis, enabling him to assume personal responsibility for the current business of the country. That proposal, however, provoked strong opposition not only from the Majlis but from the Court and it was not followed up. It was clear that such political manoeuvring for power caused great inefficiency and a general slowing down of the administrative machine. Throughout this time my Soviet and American colleagues and I supported the Prime Minister, and I endeavoured to effect a reconciliation between Qawam es Sultaneh and the Court.

3. I had reason to hope on the 19th January that a reconciliation had indeed taken place and that the Prime Minister would introduce new blood into his Cabinet at the instigation of the Shah. Two days later he introduced to the Majlis the following new Ministers: Jawad Ameri at the Ministry of Justice (instead of the Interior); Farajullah Bahramy at the Ministry of the Interior; Muhsin Rais at the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs; Ali Mutamedi at the Ministry of Communications; and Nasrullah Intizam at the Ministry of Health. He also announced that Allahyar Saleh would become Minister of Finance on his return to Persia from the United States. At the same time the Prime Minister tabled a Bill establishing a Ministry of Labour and National Economy, to which Dr. Musharraf Naficy was to be appointed. The Majlis did not receive this announcement with enthusiasm and Qawam was well advised not to put the new Cabinet to the vote. The Majlis Deputies showed surprising opposition to Dr. Naficy and the new Ministry of Labour and National Economy never came into existence. Of the new Ministers three (Rais, Mutamedi and Intizam) were regarded as the Shah's men, and were in consequence looked on with some suspicion by many of the Majlis Deputies. The remaining members of the Cabinet continued in their posts.

4. There followed an uneasy period of a few days during which the new Ministers (with the exception of Dr. Naficy) began to take over their duties, while the Majlis Deputies showed their usual obstructiveness—some being suspicious of the new men, others disappointed that none of the Deputies had been appointed



to ministerial rank. The Prime Minister thereupon introduced a Bill designed to abrogate the law of the 22nd Tir, 1306, that no Deputy could be appointed a Minister without resigning and waiting for three months, but that attempt to buy over the Majlis merely succeeded in raising acute jealousy between rival Deputies who longed for ministerial rank, and the Bill was soon referred to a commission and shelved. The well-known politician Tadayyun expressed the opinion that the country was heading for chaos, and needed a strong hand to assume real power, put the Majlis and the Shah in their proper places and tackle urgent problems such as the stabilisation of prices and the supply of bread, instead of struggling with political intrigues.

5. Meanwhile the new Minister of the Interior, Farajullah Bahramy, was the cause of a fresh crisis between the Prime Minister and the Shah. On the 2nd February he had taken two of the new American advisers to an audience with the Shah. On coming out of the room, he found the Prime Minister waiting for him in a furious temper. Qawam es Sultaneh reproved him sharply for going direct to the Shah without informing his chief, and told the Minister that he should resign. Bahramy replied very impertinently, saying he would not resign: it was for the Prime Minister to resign. The Prime Minister then went to the Shah and offered to resign if Farajullah Bahramy did not, but the Shah refused to accept the resignation of either. The net result was to increase the coolness which had existed for so long between the Shah and the Qawam, and it was evident that the Court hoped that the Prime Minister would soon fall and be replaced by Sa'ed, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. A further cause of friction arose out of a remark made to the Shah by the Minister-designate for Portugal (Javad Sineki) during his farewell audience: Sineki had suggested to the Shah that His Majesty should take a direct and personal interest in appointments made to foreign posts: this reached the ears of the Prime Minister, who, according to the Court, twisted the story round and made it appear that the Shah was once more endeavouring to interfere in the administration of the country.

6. Meanwhile the Majlis, on the 4th February, endeavoured by a snatch-vote to make the appointment of head of the National Bank dependent on the vote of the Majlis, the effect of which would be to remove from the post Abul Hassan Ebtehaj, who had only recently been selected for that position by the Qawam—an appointment which was regarded as extremely suitable by almost all responsible persons in Tehran. As Ebtehaj, although intensely nationalistic, is believed to be friendly to us, the action of the Majlis was to some extent an attack on us, as well as on the Prime Minister. The Shah spoke once more of dismissing the Majlis, provided that he could obtain a Prime Minister whom he could trust, and sounded me on the subject of the return of Taqi-Zadeh and of the appointment of Ali Mansour to the post of Prime Minister if Taqi-Zadeh could not come. My Soviet colleague and I endeavoured to settle the quarrel between Qawam and the Minister of the Interior, without success.

7. On the 7th February the Prime Minister succeeded in obtaining a vote of confidence of 65 votes to 42 from the Majlis. This somewhat surprising result was secured partly by the Prime Minister's acceptance of the Bill concerning the head of the National Bank, and partly by political manipulation and promises of favours to the Majlis Deputies. Qawam was always inclined to regard success in political manoeuvre as more important than good administration: on the other hand, since he was opposed by the Shah and had little support from the people, it was natural that he should try to win over the Majlis. He made a long speech in the Majlis on the 10th February which amounted to an emphatic assertion of the Prime Minister's duty of administering the affairs of the country without interference by the Shah. He continued to press for the adoption of his Bill to enable Deputies to become Cabinet Ministers without a three months' wait. To support his plea he quoted article 32 of the Annex to the Constitution, which reads: "If a Deputy applies for a post in any Government organism, his parliamentary functions thereby lapse, and he can only take part in the business of the Majlis if he resigns the post in question and is re-elected for some electoral constituency." This article, argued the Prime Minister, had hitherto been held to include candidates for positions in the Cabinet, whereas he maintained that it meant only civil service posts. He stated in the course of his speech that the laws passed during the late despotic régime had not been in accordance with the spirit of democracy and that the next Legislature might do well to revise even the Constitution. His appeal had little effect on the Deputies, while the Shah professed to detect the most sinister designs in the reference to a revision of the Constitution. The Prime Minister went on with his attempts to complete his Cabinet, and hoped on the 11th February to persuade Soheily, Hikmat and Bader

to join the Government. On the following day, however, they refused his proposal, and the weary Prime Minister attributed their refusal to Court intrigues. The Soviet Ambassador did his best to help the Qawam, and even sent a message to Tadayyun to the effect that the Soviet Government no longer had any objection to his joining the Government.

8. On the 13th February, I understand, the Majlis Deputies selected one of their number named I'tibar to inform the Prime Minister that he no longer had any majority in the Majlis, and Qawam resigned.

9. As the result of a secret vote of the Majlis, it became evident that Soheily was the favourite candidate of the Deputies; he obtained 72 votes against 18 for Sa'ed, and a deputation waited on the Shah to inform him of that fact. The Shah informed them that he would have preferred Sa'ed, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as Prime Minister, and asked them to think it over, but this had no effect. On the 15th February Soheily formed a Government and he introduced it to the Majlis two days later, the members being as follows:—

His Excellency M. Ali Soheily: Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior.

His Excellency M. Muhammad Sa'ed Maraghai: Minister for Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency M. Sayyid Muhammad Tadayyun: Minister of State.

His Excellency M. Hussein Sami'i: Minister of State.

His Excellency M. Amanullah Ardalan: Minister of Health.

His Excellency M. Ali Asghar Hikmat: Minister of Justice.

His Excellency M. Mahmud Bader: Minister of Commerce, Industry and Mines.

His Excellency M. Andul Hussein Hajhir: Minister of Roads.

His Excellency Marshal Amir Ahmadi: Minister for War.

His Excellency M. Ali Akbar Siassi: Minister of Education.

His Excellency M. Nasrullah Intizam: Minister of Posts and Telegraphs.

His Excellency M. Allahyar Saleh: Minister of Finance.

He obtained a vote of confidence by a large majority on the 21st February.

10. Qawam retired to his estates at Lahijan and has been subjected to a torrent of abuse and calumny ever since he left office. His principal assailants have been newspaper editors whose papers he suppressed after the disorders of the 8th December. Demands that he should be brought to trial are combined with hints that proof has been found that he himself was responsible for the December disorders. These critics are careful not to remind their readers that the army and the police made no serious effort to stop the disorders until they had continued for some hours, and none whatever to prevent the Prime Minister's house from being looted.

11. It is difficult to imagine that the new Cabinet of Soheily can last longer than a few months, and it is disappointing to find that the Government of Qawam es Sultaneh, who showed himself to be a man of energy, authority and courage (the last quality especially was shown in his firm treatment of the disorders of December), should last not much longer than six months. It may be urged against him that he was old-fashioned, that he tried to do too much himself without reference to his Ministers, and that he made certain very unwise and unsuitable appointments. On the other hand, he was the first Prime Minister to come out definitely on the side of the Allies; he made some very good appointments of promising young men (for instance, A. H. Ebtehaj at the National Bank, Manuchehr Eghbal at the Ministry of Health, Dr. Siassi at the Ministry of Education and Hajhir at the Ministry of Industry). At the end, however, he lost his grip to some extent and failed to accomplish any successful political manipulations, and, having lost the support of both Majlis and Court, he had no choice but to resign.

12. The prolonged crisis which I have described appears to have no significance as far as either internal or external policy are concerned, though the new Prime Minister has been shown to be a less forceful man than his predecessor and is unlikely to show much firmness in handling the Majlis or the press. In spite of all our representations, both Qawam and Soheily have failed disastrously in the past to force landlords and hoarders to disgorge their grain and to provide bread for the people, and, were it not for the pressure of the American advisers, the outlook would be as hopeless as it was this time last year. The fact is that since Reza Shah left the government of Persia has been in the hands of a relatively small clique of persons who carry on a class government in their own



interest. Many people, including the Shah, fear that at some future time the present state of affairs, if it continues, may lead to some popular outburst, in which the whole régime may be swept away; and some people even suggest that the Soviets support the present régime for that reason. I doubt if we have to look for anything so Machiavellian at present; the fact is that the autocratic methods of Shah Reza discouraged the entry of capable and honest young men into administrative and political life, and it may be several years before new personalities are trained to fill the vacuum which Shah Reza created.

13. It is my hope that the appointment of American advisers may hasten this process. Meanwhile, it is encouraging that, whatever fears there may be as to the Shah's alleged autocratic tendencies, and however blind his trust in men if they are only military officers, his suggestions for Cabinet appointments have hitherto been good ones.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister of State at Cairo, to Minbranch, P.A.I.C., the Government of India, and to His Majesty's Ambassador at Kuibyshev.

I have, &c.  
R. W. BULLARD.

#### (B) Tehran Intelligence Summaries.

[E 110/110/34]

No. 20.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 6, 1943.)*

(No. 418.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 49 for the period of the 2nd to 8th December, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, December 8, 1942.*

Enclosure in No. 20.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 49 for the Period  
December 2-8, 1942.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

AS is usual when the early fall of the Government is expected, paralysis is affecting the Administration. The Prime Minister is devoting most of his time to endeavouring to placate leaders of Majlis parties and individual Deputies, with doubtful success. Inside and outside the Majlis there is considerable hostility to him, and there are many who are determined to bring about his downfall. A reconstitution of Government which would introduce certain leaders of Majlis parties into the Cabinet is under consideration, but it is as yet doubtful whether that will re-establish the Prime Minister. The situation is approaching a climax where either the Prime Minister or the Majlis must go.

2. The new members whom the Prime Minister is thinking of introducing into his Cabinet are the Deputy Sheikh Ali Dashti (M.A. 75; F.O. 59), a noisy demagogue, now one of his most violent opponents; Murteza Quli Bayat (M.A. 65; F.O. 50), a Vice-President of the Majlis; Tadayyun (M.A. 288; F.O. 207), Minister of Education in Ferughi's Cabinet. It is doubtful whether any of these will be willing to serve under the present Prime Minister. They are all candidates for his post.

##### *Economic.*

3. An agreement has been signed whereby the British and American Governments undertake to supply Persia's deficiencies in wheat until the next harvest subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions. These are that the Persian

Government will put into effect all proposals made by the American adviser to the Ministry of Food for the prevention of hoarding, and the introduction of rationing, and also all proposals made by the Joint Road Transport Board for the control of transport. If, after the application of these measures, the Minister of Food, the American Adviser to that Ministry, and the American and British Ministers agree that the amount of wheat available in Persia is insufficient for the minimum needs of the population until the next harvest, then the British and American Governments will, within the limits of their powers, import sufficient wheat to make up the deficit. The Persian Government is responsible for the distribution of the existing stocks of wheat in Persia, making up deficits in one area from surpluses in another, as long as stocks are available. The British and American Governments undertake to assist, within the limits of their powers, with transport for the distribution of wheat, provided that they are satisfied that available transport is being used to the best advantage.

In a letter attached to the agreement the British and American Ministers undertake to arrange for the import of 25,000 tons of wheat with the least possible delay.

At a press conference the Prime Minister stated that he estimated that the deficit of wheat before the next harvest would be 130,000 tons. This is reliably considered to be a considerable over-estimate.

4. On the whole, the wheat situation shows little improvement. The increase in the official buying price has not produced notably greater supplies. The purchase of wheat on Government account is now being effected by special agents of the Ministry of Food and no longer by officials of the Economic Department of the Ministry of Finance. In a few cases action has been taken against hoarders. A warning has been published in the press that it is intended to apply the Anti-Hoarding Law with full rigour. Mr. Timmerman, the American adviser to the police, has been charged with the application of the law.

5. Tehran has for some days had insufficient bread to feed its population. Supplies of wheat expected from Shahrud have been detained by Russian troops in spite of the transporting lorries having been provided with the form of pass agreed upon with the Russian authorities. Bread rationing is to be introduced on the 22nd December and a census for the purpose of issuing ration cards is to take place during this week. This may ensure a more equitable distribution of available supplies. The ration is to be 800 grammes for a working man, 200 grammes for a child, 400 grammes for others.

6. The American Adviser to the Ministry of Food at a recent press conference said that 65 per cent. of the needs of the Allied forces in food were imported. Previously one of the principal causes of high prices had been competition between contractors and agents buying for the British forces. This had now been eliminated, as it had been agreed that British troops would purchase their requirements through the Ministry of Food and its agencies. Only food-stuffs surplus to the needs of the Persian nation would be bought. Prices of food-stuffs had dropped 15 to 20 per cent. in the last ten days. He also announced that anyone holding more than 5 tons of wheat would be treated as a hoarder and that 20 per cent. of the value of discovered hoards would be paid to the informer.

7. The Council of Ministers has issued a decree raising the wages of factory workers. The minimum wage is now to be double that of 1941, and factories must supply staple commodities to workers and their dependants at the prices prevailing before September 1941.

8. The Majlis has sanctioned a credit of 43 million rials to the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Mines to allow of increased prices being paid for sugar-beet.

##### *Air-Raid Precautions.*

9. The Government has at last dared to call the attention of the public to the need for air-raid precautions. In a statement to the press it is said that an inter-departmental commission has for some time been studying the needs of the situation and has drawn up certain regulations and instructions which will shortly be communicated to the public.

##### *Communications.*

10. The press announces the inauguration on the 6th December of regular air postal services between Persia and Russia. The frequency of these services is not mentioned.

[25648]

E 3



*Persian Forces.**Appointments—Military.*

- 11.—(i) Naib Sarhang Samadi to command the Mechanised Brigade *vice* Sartip Baharmast.  
(ii) Sartip Baharmast to be Director of Artillery Instruction.

*Internal Security.**Fars.*

12. There are no further developments as regards Nasir Qashgai. He is now probably waiting to see if the Government will fall before deciding on his future action. Meanwhile, plans are being made by the Persian General Staff for operations against him by four columns, moving on Firuzabad from Jahrum and Kavar, and on Farrashband from Kazarun and Lar. Reinforcements of a battalion each are to be sent from the Isfahan and Kerman Divisions. The execution of these plans depends on the provision of transport, which is not at present available from Persian sources.

*Lurestan.*

13. The area of the railway between Dorud and Mazu continues to be disturbed. Officers from the gendarmerie and the Persian General Staff are being sent to the affected area to define the respective responsibilities of the gendarmerie and the army. Since the separation of the gendarmerie from military control co-operation between the two forces has been very weak and each takes a limited view of its responsibility for internal security.

*Khuzestan.*

14. His Majesty's Consul-General has succeeded in arranging truces between certain Arab tribes to last for a period of four months and in extracting oaths that existing tribal differences will be settled by negotiation before the end of that period. The local Persian military commander has agreed to recommend to the Persian Government that a commission should be appointed to settle the rights of the Beni Turuf to certain lands.

*Russian Affairs.*

15. The Soviet authorities are pressing the Persian Government to sign the contract for the manufacture of arms which was reported in Summary No. 45/42, paragraph 11. The Persian Government is hesitating, firstly, because it fears that it would lead to Russian control not only of their factories but of the sources of raw materials required. The contract stipulates that the Persian Government will supply to the factories the necessary raw material available in Persia, which includes wood, coal, copper, sulphur, lead. Secondly, because the Russians insist on paying in rials. Thirdly, because it doubts its own ability to fulfil the contract; penalties for default are heavy, and failure on the part of the Persian Government would probably lead to the Russians taking control themselves.

*Chinese Affairs.*

16. Mr. Othman K. H. Koo, representing the Muhammadans of China, has arrived in Tehran.

*Tehran, December 8, 1942.*

[E 244/110/34]

No. 21.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 12, 1943.)*

(No. 439.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 51 for the period the 16th to the 22nd December, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, December 22, 1942.*

Enclosure in No. 21.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 51 for the Period  
December 16 to 22, 1942.*

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

THANKS largely to firm action by the Military Governor, Tehran has calmed down and public confidence is to a large extent restored. No papers have been allowed to appear, except the Government news-sheet, and the Majlis remained closed until Sunday, the 20th December. In certain political circles the Prime Minister's position has been strengthened as a result of the courage and firmness he is reputed to have shown in the face of the hostile demonstration. The knowledge that he is supported by the Allies and may therefore remain in power for some time has probably induced some of his former opponents to seek his favour as it has for the time being instilled the need for caution into his inveterate enemies. In a broadcast, of which details are given below, he committed himself to loyal co-operation with the Allies more definitely than any Prime Minister has hitherto dared to do. This will undoubtedly concentrate against him the hostility of the many anti-Ally elements, but if he can keep the population fed he has a reasonable hope of increasing the number of his supporters. His position is weak in that at present not only can he not count on the support of the army, but must reckon with active, if underground, opposition from some of its leaders.

2. The Prime Minister, in a broadcast to the nation, claimed that his Government had faithfully endeavoured to follow the programme he had laid down when he took office—the restoration and maintenance of order, the provision of food supplies and the preservation of Persia's interests in the faithful execution of existing treaties and loyal co-operation with the Allies. The identification of Persia's interests with the Allies was a step in the right direction and had already had good results. There was on the part of the Government no lack of patriotism and devotion to duty, and on the part of the Allies no lack of respect for the freedom and integrity of Persia. Moreover, the Allies were doing everything possible to supply the country's needs in food and transport; the British army had given great assistance by providing wheat from their reserves for Tehran's bread supply. He said that 156 persons had been arrested in connexion with the recent riots, those responsible would be punished and if more blood were to flow no harm would be done. Compensation would be paid to those who had suffered damage. In the action that was taken by the Government, he said, they had the benevolent sympathy of the Shah.

3. There is reason to believe that the Shah is by no means reconciled to the continuance in power of Qavam-es-Sultaneh, and that he is still far from having confidence in the Prime Minister. He insisted, against the latter's judgment, that the Majlis should reopen on Sunday, the 20th December. The meeting was uneventful; the Deputies appeared to be in chastened mood, and the Prime Minister's address, which was moderate and non-provocative, was listened to with attention by the Deputies and without hostile comment. The only members of the Cabinet present besides the Prime Minister were the two Ministers without portfolio. No announcement has yet been made as to the new composition of the Cabinet.

4. Reports from the provinces show that neither the riots in Tehran nor the arrest of General Zahidi have had much effect on local opinion, which is concerned mostly with considerations of food and the general rise in the cost of living.

*Economic.*

5. Wheat from British army reserves has been reaching Tehran in sufficient quantities to maintain the daily supply, but beyond the 1,500 tons to come from that source supplies are uncertain. There is a surplus of wheat and barley, estimated at 50,000 tons, available in Azerbaijan, but its arrival depends on transport being available for its collection and on Russian goodwill. Snow is likely soon to make the work of collection more difficult, and the future bread supply of Tehran cannot be considered as anything but precarious.

6. Ration cards for bread were issued to all the inhabitants of Tehran on Friday, the 18th December.

[25648]

E 4



7. The ration of sugar per head has been fixed for the next two months at 400 grammes of hard and 300 grammes of soft, and of tea at 25 grammes of imported and 25 grammes of locally grown tea.

8. In order to encourage the production of cotton the Ministry of Agriculture has increased the price of cotton by approximately 120 per cent. in comparison with last year's prices.

#### *Persian Forces.*

9. General Ridley has now presented his proposals for the reorganisation of the Persian army to the Shah. He is not suggesting any great changes in fighting troops, but is proposing the organisation of communication, transport, supply and medical units, which are now practically non-existent; the temporary disbandment of most of the 105-mm. and 150-mm. artillery units and of the Mechanised Brigade; and the distribution of the available pack artillery (sixty-six guns) among the divisions. The strength he proposes is as follows:—

7 divisions of about 5,000 each	...	...	...	35,000
3 divisions of about 6,000 each	...	...	...	18,000
Total fighting strength				53,000
Recruits in depots, about	...	...	...	15,000
Staffs, training schools, services and civilians paid from Army Budget	...	...	...	18,000
Total paid from Army Budget				86,000

He has come to the inevitable conclusion that the first step in any reform is to increase the pay of officers, since present rates of pay are far short of the minimum necessary for an honest livelihood. The increases he proposes would raise the Army Budget to 130 million toman.

10. It is now possible to form some estimate of the effect on the Persian army of the arrest of General Zahidi. While few regret his disappearance or doubt that there were good reasons for his removal, the arrest by British troops of a Persian officer is generally resented by other officers. It is regarded as a blow to the already low prestige of the Persian officer, and is consequently deprecated by those whose aim it is to improve the morale of the army. No real improvement in morale can, however, be effected without the removal of corrupt and intriguing officers of the type of General Zahidi, and the good effect is likely considerably to outweigh the ill-effects of any temporary resentment.

11. The press announces that Sipahbod Amir Ahmadi, the present Military Governor of Tehran (see Summary No. 50/42, paragraph 4), is to be appointed Minister for War. This may lead to a tussle between the Ministry of War and the General Staff. Not only are Amir Ahmadi and the Chief of the General Staff rivals and mutually antagonistic, but the constitutional issue of the relation of the Ministry of War to the General Staff is likely to come to a head, for Amir Ahmadi, though he cares nothing for constitutions, being a commanding and ambitious man, is unlikely to resist the temptation of trying to establish his personal authority over the army. His appointment as Minister for War has been not only approved but encouraged by the Shah, with what object is not yet clear.

#### *Appointments—Military.*

12.—(i) Sartip Hassan Arfa (M.A. 37; F.O. 30) to be Deputy Chief of the General Staff *vice* Sartip Abdullah Hidayet.

(ii) Sartip Muhammad Nakchevan to be Commander of the Isfahan Division. (Not to be confused with Sarlashkar Muhammad Nakchevan.)

(iii) Sartip Pourzand, Commander of the Azerbaijan Division, has been recalled at the request of the Russians.

(iv) Sipahbod Amir Ahmadi (M.A. 23; F.O. 16) has been awarded the Order of Humayun, 1st Class.

(v) Sartip Tajbaksh has been relieved of his command of the 5th (South-Eastern) Division.

#### *Internal Security.*

##### *Fars.*

13. Nasir Qashgai's brother, Khosrow (see Summary No. 48/42, paragraph 13), has returned to Shiraz with a message from Nasir to the effect that he (Nasir) is now ready to come to Tehran if he is given a guarantee of life and property by both the British and Persian Governments, and that he is, moreover, ready to live in any place indicated by the British, provided he is allowed to take his family and is guaranteed one-tenth of the revenue he claims. His brother (Khosrow), he said, was prepared to go to Tehran to discuss a settlement. The Prime Minister replied that Nasir must come to Tehran himself under a guarantee of life, when the question of his properties would be sympathetically discussed. His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz was also authorised to assure Nasir that no action would be taken against his life by any British authority for anything that was past. The arrest of General Zahidi and the departure of the Deputy Nowbakht from Shiraz, both supporters on whom Nasir relied, combined with the new lease of life given to Qavam-es-Sultaneh's Government, have possibly persuaded Nasir that he must now make the best terms he can. Meanwhile, the Qashgai tribes and Fars generally are quiet.

##### *Azerbaijan.*

14. His Majesty's Consul-General reports fighting between groups of Kurds in South-Western Azerbaijan, and in Tabriz an excited atmosphere due to the exhaustion of official stocks of sugar, the high cost of living and fear that Azerbaijan may be denuded of wheat to feed Tehran.

#### *British Affairs.*

15. A battalion of British troops arrived in Tehran the day after the riots broke out. It came primarily to protect British military interests, but its prompt arrival was interpreted as an indication of British intention to support the Prime Minister and his Government and it did much to restore confidence in the public. Since it was clearly not in the capital for purposes of coercing the Government, its presence has been little resented and has been welcomed by many. It has created a very good impression.

*Tehran, December 22, 1942.*

[E 459/110/34]

No. 22.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 22, 1943.)*

(No. 448.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 52 of the 29th December, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, December 29, 1942.*

Enclosure in No. 22.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 52 for the period December 23 to 29, 1942.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

1. THE Prime Minister has maintained and perhaps slightly strengthened his position. Certain Deputies are attempting to make their own inclusion in the Cabinet a condition of the support of their followers. No changes in the Cabinet have yet been announced other than the appointment of Sipahbod Amir Ahmadi to the Ministry for War (see Summary No. 51/42, paragraph 12 (iv)). One of the Deputies has given notice of his intention to interpellate the Government on the matters of food supplies, the disorders of the 8th December, and certain other questions. The interpellation is to be taken on the 29th December.



*Press.*

2. No paper except the Government News Sheet has been allowed to appear since the 8th December. An amendment to the existing Press Law was passed by the Majlis which says that applicants for permission to publish papers must satisfy the Supreme Educational Council of their financial resources and academic and moral qualifications, so giving the Government the power to refuse a licence to an undesirable person. The amendment also specifies particular punishments for transgressions of the laws of libel.

*Economic.*

3. For the time being the bread supply of Tehran is assured. In addition to 1,500 tons of flour from British army reserves and 3,500 tons of wheat from Iraq, now reaching Tehran in regular quantities, about 140 tons of wheat a day are also arriving from other areas. But supplies from the north, in spite of Russian promises of assistance, are uncertain. For example, a number of U.K.C.C. lorries which had backloaded with wheat for the Persian Government from Tabriz, were stopped by Russian troops at Mianeh and forced to unload. Supplies in sight from local sources are likely to run out in 7-8 weeks' time. Supplies from abroad are unlikely, as at present scheduled, to arrive in sufficient quantities to provide Tehran's monthly requirements of 7,500 tons. Lack of transport continues to handicap the collection of local supplies.

4. There is much discontent in Tehran with the smallness of the bread ration—400 grammes—allowed for those not classified as workers, and in spite of the Allies' promises to make good the wheat deficit the public remains apprehensive. With the object of preventing the illicit adulteration by the bakers of wheat issued to them by Government it has been decided that all bread shall be baked in a central bakery under municipal control and that bakers' shops shall be used for the retailing of bread only.

5. The retail price of rationed sugar has been fixed as follows:—

	<i>Per kilo.</i>
	<i>Rials.</i>
American soft sugar ... ..	44
Indian soft sugar ... ..	42.9
Foreign lump sugar ... ..	48.4
Locally made lump sugar ... ..	46.2

*Transport.*

6. The already critical transport situation has been complicated by a Russian demand for 1,000 civilian lorries to be contracted to the Soviet Transportation Directorate. These are required for the carriage of lease-lend supplies to Russia from railheads in Persia, and the demand is necessitated by the reduction of the amount of Russian military transport in Persia owing to much of it having been sent to the front. The number of lorries required by the Russians can only be obtained at a heavy cost to Persian civil transport requirements, and even then only if tyres are provided. It is understood that about 1,000 tyres are to be supplied to the Russians from British military reserves.

*Appointments—Civil.*

7. Hussein Ala (M.A. II; F.O. 7), to be Minister of the Court.

*Persian Forces.**Police.*

8. To compensate for the high cost of living an extra allowance of 90 rials a month has been sanctioned for the police force to the 21st March, 1943, when the situation will be reviewed.

9. Mr. Timmerman, the American Adviser to the Persian Police, has as yet achieved but little. He is waiting to see whether the Persian Government will give him the executive powers for which he asks and without which, he says, he will not stay.

*Gendarmerie.*

10. Colonel Schwarzkopf, the American Adviser to the Gendarmerie, has likewise effected nothing concrete. He has travelled widely to investigate existing conditions and has made plans for the reorganisation of the force and the improvement of conditions of service. An essential reform is the provision of rations to

gendarmerie posts, which now have to feed themselves as best they can from the nearest village, often some miles away. As their pay is entirely inadequate to buy sufficient food at the present high prices, they are forced to dishonest practices, and as food is scarce more time is spent in obtaining it than in their duties. For the distribution of rations to gendarmerie posts transport is required, which is not available.

*Appointments—Military.*

11.—(i) Sartip Muhammad Hussein Amidi, to be Military Governor of Tehran, *vice* Sipahbod Amir Ahmadi, appointed Minister for War.

(ii) Sartip Zarrabi, to command the 5th (South-Western) Division, *vice* Sartip Tajbaksh, relieved.

*Internal Security.**Fars.*

12. Fars remains generally quiet. Nasir Qashgai is still angling for terms. The Prime Minister has agreed to send to him and his brother, Khosrow, a written guarantee of life and a promise of fair treatment as regards their lands. His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz has also been authorised to give written assurance to Nasir and Khosrow that British authorities will respect their lives and property provided they conform to certain conditions regarding their place of future residence.

*Kerman.*

13. On the 1st December a convoy of empty lorries on the Kerman-Bandar Abbas road was attacked in the Guhra Pass by a band under Ali Muhammad Ali of Yaz Siyah. Of six gendarmes travelling in a lorry, three were killed and two wounded. Their rifles were carried off by the robbers.

*Khuzestan.*

14. The road between Behbahan and Gach Saran, which at this time of the year is liable to be unsafe on account of Boir Ahmadi raids, has been free from incident since the strengthening of the Persian forces in that area. But between Gach Saran and Ganaweh'an A.I.O.C. lorry was held up by alleged Boir Ahmadi robbers, and a telephone house, 27 miles from Gach Saran, was raided and the occupants beaten and robbed.

*British Interests.*

15. Mr. Slater, the Australian Minister designate to Russia, has arrived in Tehran *en route* to Russia.

16. Persian labour working for the British and American authorities in Khuzestan has for some time past been issued with wheat imported by British authorities. During the latter half of November the number so fed amounted to 25,216 daily.

*Russian Interests.*

17. The Soviet Consul in Kermanshah has recently been showing an interest in Southern Kurdistan and members of the consulate have been touring the villages up to the Iraqi border. They have met several chiefs and appear to be interested in British policy towards the Kurds and Kurdish sentiments towards the Russians.

Tehran, December 29, 1942.

[E 552/110/34]

No. 23.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 18.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 2 for the period of the 7th to the 12th January, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, January 12, 1943.



(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 2 for the Period January 7-12, 1943.**Persian Affairs.**Political.*

HOSTILITY to the Prime Minister is still strong although its expression takes no very active form, nor has any rival candidate appeared who can claim any appreciable measure of popular support. The Prime Minister is accused of being more concerned to reward his friends than to consider the interests of the State in the appointments he makes, and of cherishing ambitions of dictatorship, but much of the enmity felt towards him arises from the belief that he is being maintained in power by the Allies against the wishes of the people. The Shah remains suspicious and distrustful, still determined to resist any attempt on the part of the Government to establish any degree of constitutional authority over the army which would limit the right he arrogates to himself of giving orders to the army without consulting the Minister for War.

2. The Shah was given a very enthusiastic reception by a crowd of about 10,000 spectators at a football match between British and Persian teams in Tehran, which might indicate that attempts that have recently been made to represent him as the champion of youth have not been without success.

*Economic.*

3. A Supplementary Budget Law was passed on the 26th November, which gives additional credits to certain Ministries and administrations amounting to over 27 million rials. Among these the most important are extra credits to the Ministry of Agriculture for irrigation projects of 9,800,000 rials, to the Ministry of Education of 9 million rials, to the Ministry of Health for Fars, Kerman and the Gulf ports of 2 million rials, and to the Central Police Administration for 500 additional police of 1,500,000 rials.

4. The wheat situation not only in Tehran but also in Khuzestan is extremely critical. Tehran is on very short rations and such bread as is issued is largely adulterated with barley and other matter. A complete failure of supply was avoided only by the issue of another 200 tons from British military sources and the arrival of about 1,000 tons from Azerbaijan. The prospects of any considerable quantities of wheat being allowed by the Russians to leave Azerbaijan are not good as difficulties are being experienced, owing to opposition by landowners and villagers, in collecting the amount of grain promised to the Russians—5,000 tons of wheat and 15,000 tons of barley. Two thousand tons of wheat are available in Khorassan for movement to Tehran, and there are certain other quantities available in the districts of Hamadan and Kurdistan, but here there are difficulties of transport owing to snow-bound roads. These are the only quantities in view for the feeding of Tehran, and Mr. Sheridan, the American Food Adviser, is already asking for 20,000 tons of wheat in addition to the 25,000 tons promised.

*Transport.*

5. A Road Transport Board, composed of British, American and Persian representatives, has now been formed to control the use of civilian motor transport in Persia and the distribution of tyres and spare parts with a view to ensuring on the one hand that Persia has sufficient transport for essential needs, and on the other that motor transport is not wasted on unessential tasks.

*Press.*

6. Licences have been issued to four daily papers to recommence publication.

*Appointments—Civil.*

- 7.—(i) Assad Bahadur (M.A. 44), to be Controller of the Household at the Court.  
 (ii) Ibrahim Zand, to be Director of the Royal Palaces.  
 (iii) Amanullah Ardalan, to be managing director of the Mortgage Bank.  
 (iv) Muhammad Ali Majd, Farmandar of Resht, to be Ustandar of the 1st Ustan.  
 (v) Ahmad Mushaikh, Inspector in the Ministry of the Interior, to be Farmandar of Zinjan.  
 (vi) Ahmad Salahi, Farmandar of Qum, to be Farmandar of Kermanshah and Deputy Ustandar of the 5th Ustan.

*Persian Forces.**Police.*

8. Eight police officers of the rank of lieutenant-colonel and above have been placed on the retired list. The following appointments have been made:—

- (i) Colonel Sharif, to be head of the Information Bureau.
- (ii) Colonel Arta, to be head of the Inspection Department.
- (iii) Lieutenant-Colonel Turij Amin, to be acting head of the Prisons Department.
- (iv) Lieutenant-Colonel Hisam Vaziri, to be head of the Staff Department.
- (v) Lieutenant-Colonel Jahangiri, to be assistant commandant of the Central Police Station.

*Army.*

9. Certain of General Ridley's proposals for the reform of the army have been approved by the Shah, notably the establishment of recruit training depots at the headquarters of all divisions, and of supply depots independent of formation commanders; the temporary disbandment of field artillery units, with the exception of one regiment for Tehran, and the formation from the animals released of pack and draught transport units; and the immediate institution of a motor driving school in Tehran. General Ridley says he is well satisfied with the co-operation he is receiving from the Chief of the General Staff and other Persian officers. It remains to be seen whether he will be equally satisfied when it comes to the execution of his plans.

General Ridley's position is still indefinite. He has, in fact, as yet no official position at all, and it seems that he is in no hurry to force an issue on this point.

10. A new Bill to amend the Conscription Law has been laid before the Majlis. The text has not yet been made public. A previous Bill for this purpose led to a crisis between the Prime Minister and the Deputies and was withdrawn (see Summary No. 39/42, paragraph 1).

*Internal Security.**Fars.*

11. Qashgai tribesmen, reported as a strong band, principally of the Farsimadan sub-tribe, on the 6th January raided the Bushire-Shiraz road at the top of the Pir-i-Zan Pass and looted a lorry carrying sugar and piece-goods. Seven gendarmes, returning to their post on this lorry, are reported to have had a fight with the raiders, killed six of them and had five casualties themselves. The same band attacked road labourers on the following day, killing one man. Whether this raid was instigated by Nazir Qashgai or not is not yet known, but it would not be inconsistent with Qashgai bravado deliberately to raid the road shortly after the passage of British military reconnoitring parties. Two of these have recently been up and down the Bushire-Shiraz road. Nasir was recently reported to be at Khunj on the extreme southern limit of the Qashgai summer quarters, and his brother Khosrow at Kazvin, a little further north. Both these places are far from the winter quarters of the main sub-tribes. General Shahbakhte is due to leave Tehran in a few days to take command of the Fars Division.

12. The measures necessary to improve security on the road from Bushire to Isfahan have recently been investigated in detail by representatives of His Majesty's Legation and of General Headquarters, Persia and Iraq Force. Unless British forces are to undertake protection of convoys on this road, steps will have to be taken to improve the efficiency of the Persian forces.

*Azerbaijan.*

13. Unconfirmed reports have been received of disturbances by peasants as a protest against the delivery of grain to the Russians and the transfer of grain to Tehran.

14. A small Persian force has been sent to Miandoab. As was reported in Summary No. 47/42, paragraph 9, the Russians had agreed to the despatch of Persian troops to Mahabad (Sauj Bulagh) to keep order among the Kurds. They have since been pressing for the despatch of these troops and the move to Miandoab may be a step in that direction.

*British Interests.*

15. The battalion of British infantry which moved to Tehran at the time of the riot (see Summary No. 51/42, paragraph 15) has now been withdrawn.



*American Interests.*

16. The arrival of numbers of American troops in Persia, some of whom are armed though they may not be classed as combatant troops, and who, since they do not strictly form part of the British forces, cannot claim the right to be in Persia by virtue of the treaty, has prompted the Persian Government again to suggest that the United States should join the Tripartite Alliance to legalise the position of these troops.

17. German radio anti-Ally propaganda in Persia has been levelled mainly against American activities in Persia and alleged American intentions to control Persia's internal affairs to her own advantage.

*Russian Affairs.*

18. Russian officials continue to take a very active interest in American activities in Persia, particularly those of the advisers to Persian forces. There is some evidence indicating that they do not view with favour the possibility of American control of the army. There are reports that they are initiating propaganda against it and, according to the Minister of War, they are encouraging the Chief of the General Staff in his opposition to American executive control. This last statement, although the truth of it is not improbable, should be accepted with reserve.

19. In Summary No. 52/42, paragraph 17, it was reported that Russian officials in the Kermanshah district were showing interest in British policy towards the Kurds. British policy towards the Arabs in Khuzestan and British and American activities in South-Western Persia have also been investigated by Soviet consular officials. The Soviet Embassy has now asked for facilities for a mission of twelve members, headed by Professor Pavlovsky, who is a genuine expert in malarial research, to make a scientific survey in South-Western Persia, travelling via Hamadan, Khorramabad, Andimeshk, Abadan, Bushire, Shiraz, Isfahan, with permission to take photographs of scientific interest. The object of the survey is said to be to investigate bacterial diseases that might affect Russian personnel who may have cause to be in that area. The journey is expected to last 45 days.

Tehran, January 12, 1943.

[E 864/110/34]

No. 24.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 33.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 4 for the period of the 21st to the 26th January, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, January 27, 1943.

Enclosure in No. 24.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 4 for the Period  
January 21–26, 1943.

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

THE Prime Minister has presented the following Cabinet to the Majlis:—

- (i) Minister without Portfolio: Ebrahim Hakimi.
- (ii) War: Sipahbod Amir Ahmedi.
- (iii) Education: Ali Akbar Siassi.
- (iv) Industry and Commerce: Abdul Hussein Hajhir.
- (v) Agriculture: Ahmad Adl.
- (vi) Food: Mehdi Farrukh.
- (vii) Foreign Affairs: Muhammad Said.
- (viii) Justice: Jawad Ameri (F.O. 20; M.A. 15).
- (ix) Finance: Allehyar Saleh (F.O. 184; M.A. 253).
- (x) Interior: Farajullah Bahrami (Dabir A'zam) (F.O. 46; M.A. 58).
- (xi) Posts and Telegraphs: Muhsin Rais (F.O. 172; M.A. 239).
- (xii) Roads and Communications: Ali Motamedji (F.O. 137; M.A. 175).
- (xiii) Health: Nasrullah Intezam (F.O. 92; M.A. 121).

Numbers (i) to (vii) held the same posts in the previous Cabinet. Numbers (xi), (xii) and (xiii) are the Shah's nominees. They are relatively young men with a reputation for honesty and without previous Cabinet experience. It is to be hoped that their inclusion will lead to better co-operation between the Shah and the Prime Minister. Allehyar Saleh has recently been economic adviser to the Persian Legation in Washington and his appointment to the Ministry of Finance is believed to be due to suggestion by Dr. Millspaugh. The reappointment of Mehdi Farrukh as Minister for Food is surprising, as he had violent disagreement with Mr. Sheridan, the adviser to the Ministry for Food.

2. The Prime Minister has tabled a Bill for the establishment of a new Ministry of Labour and National Economy. This Ministry is to co-ordinate all national economic activities, to provide for the welfare of the working and peasant classes, to find work for the unemployed, and to initiate measures to prevent the rise in the cost of living. It is probable that this Bill will meet with criticism in the Majlis on the grounds that its functions are really the functions of the Cabinet. It is not improbable that its formation was suggested, if not urged, by the Shah, who has lately been concerned with the miserable plight of the lower classes and has been preaching reform from above as the only alternative to revolution from below. He and others fear that the influence of Soviet ideals, which are commanding increasing respect and attention, may, however little communism may appeal, incite the lower classes to abandon their long-suffering patience. Conditions arising from the war have greatly increased the contrast between the rich and the poor. On the one hand, large fortunes are being made by contractors and land-owners, on the other, scarcity and ever-rising prices increase the discontent of the many.

3. The Minister designated for the Ministry referred to in the preceding paragraph is Dr. Musharraf Nafisi (F.O. 142; M.A. 190). It is known that he is well thought of by the Shah, who probably nominated him for this post. He was Minister of Finance in a previous Cabinet and earned some public odium for stabilising the rial-sterling exchange at 140.

4. The declaration of war by Iraq occasioned little audible comment in Tehran. It is generally supposed that there is some secret agreement with Great Britain which guarantees to Iraq some reward. Discreet feelers are, however, now being put out towards His Majesty's Legation to ascertain what reactions would be to suggestions that Persia should follow Iraq's lead.

*Economic.*

5. The Government has tabled a Bill for the regulation of sowing of crops for the next three years. This Bill would empower the Ministry of Agriculture to specify what crops are to be sown in each administrative district, according to the needs of the country in food and raw materials. Agricultural commissions would be formed in each district to ensure that sowing was in accordance with plans.

6. In paragraph 4 of Summary No. 3/43 it was estimated that, taking into consideration 25,000 tons which the Allies have promised to import and estimated available surpluses in areas other than those in the Russian-occupied zone, 26,000 tons of cereals would be required to make good the deficit up to the next harvest. Indications are that very little will be allowed to leave the Russian zone, and it is now estimated that 7,100 tons of wheat and 16,500 tons of barley will have to be imported from abroad. This is on the assumption that bread will contain 60 per cent. of wheat and 40 per cent. of adulterants.

7. A decree of the Council of Ministers frees the import of cotton to Persia. The import is limited to cotton grown in Russia, Egypt, India and Iraq. The crop of local-grown cotton is insufficient to keep the spinning factories fully employed.

8. Military courts in Tehran have recently imposed sentences for seven cases of infringement of the Anti-Hoarding Law of fines ranging from 10,000 to 5,000 rials and of imprisonment from forty days to two months.

*Press.*

9. A total of thirteen newspapers have now been given licences to publish in Tehran. Before the general suppression of the Tehran press over forty were appearing.

*Appointments—Civil.*

- 10.—(i) Hussein Misbah, to be Farmandar of Bandar Abbas.
- (ii) Dr. Nakhai, to be private secretary to the Prime Minister.



(iii) Dr. Ali Amini (F.O. 14; M.A. 19), to be head of the Persian Economic Delegation in Washington.

(iv) Dr. Sajjadi (F.O. 183), to be Under-Secretary of State in the Prime Minister's office.

#### Persian Forces.

##### Appointments—Military.

11.—(i) Sarhang Humayun, to command Persian forces in Khuzestan (shortly to be formed as a division).

(ii) Sarhang Muzafferi, to command the Khorramabad Brigade.

(iii) Sarhang Khalatbari, to be Military Governor of Bakhtiari.

#### Internal Security.

##### Fars.

12. No further incidents have been reported since the raid on the Bushire-Shiraz road by the Farsimadan reported in Summary No. 2/43, paragraph 11. General Firuz has stated that he intends to make an early move on Firuzabad, this presumably to forestall General Shabbakhte's assumption of responsibility. Reports say that Nasir Qashgai has already agreed to make no more than a token opposition to this operation. Nasir himself was last reported far from Firuzabad.

##### Azerbaijan.

13. Further reports have been received of the lawlessness of Jalali Kurds in the vicinity of Maku.

#### British Affairs.

14. An aircraft carrying four Persian officers, who were going on a visit to Iraq and Egypt as the guests of the Air Officer Commanding in Iraq and Persia; the air attaché to His Majesty's Legation, Group Captain Greenlaw, and the Director of the Public Relations Bureau, Mr. Childs, was lost soon after leaving Tehran on the 18th January. For several days following bad weather and severe snow-storms hampered search and it was not until the evening of the 24th January that a reliable report was received that the aircraft had been found about 100 miles west of Tehran, crashed in the mountains, and that all the occupants had been killed. The Persian officers were General Ibrahim Arfa, Colonel Qahrimani, Majors Afkhami and Shaibani: the last three of the Persian Air Force.

#### Russian Affairs.

15. The Persian Government recently sent notes to His Majesty's Legation and the Soviet Embassy regarding the provision of shelters for people who might have to be evacuated from the air-raid target area of the railway station and its workshops. The counsellor of the Soviet Embassy visited the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and said that the Soviet authorities considered that discussion of air-raid precautions at this stage was a reflection on the Red Army.

#### Polish Affairs.

16. The following is a statement of Poles in Persia on the 17th January:—

Civilian Poles—				
In Tehran—	Men.	Women.	Children.	Total.
Camps ...	1,412	7,041	5,005	13,458
Sick in camps ...	50	169	319	538
Sick in hospital	139	362	370	871
Hospital staff ...	107	278	...	385
In Isfahan ...	33	381	2,043	2,457
In Ahwaz ...	440	1,795	1,543	3,778
In Meshed ...	4	20	180	204
	2,185	10,046	9,460	21,691
Military Poles in Tehran—				
Officers ...	...	89	These figures do not include about 200 officers on the non-active list domiciled in Tehran.	
Other ranks ...	...	1,070		
A.T.S. ...	...	395		
		1,554		

#### Enemy Nationals.

17. The following enemy nationals are being interned or repatriated:—

	Interned.	Repatriated.
Italians ...	87	11
Hungarians ...	25	15
Bulgarians ...	126	20

The following will for various reasons remain in Persia for the present:—

Italians ...	48 men, women and children.
Bulgarians ...	42 men, women and children.
Hungarians ...	180 men, women and children.
German and Austrian Jews	149 men, women and children.
Roumanians ...	A small number.

Tehran, January 26, 1943.

[E 970/110/34]

No. 25.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 40.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of Intelligence Summary No. 5, the 27th January to the 2nd February, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, February 2, 1943.

Enclosure in No. 25.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 5 for the period January 27 to February 2, 1943.

#### Persian Affairs.

##### Political.

THE new Cabinet has been received generally without enthusiasm or criticism. The introduction of new blood is welcomed, but the people are far more concerned with the worsening economic situation, and by their handling of that the new Cabinet will be judged.

2. The paper *Keyhan*, which has in the past been, and may still be, subsidised by the Shah, recently published an article which stressed that Persia was now suffering some of the evils of war without hope of being compensated when peace was signed. The general trend of the article was a vague suggestion that Persia should now join the United Nations. The press generally has refrained from comment on Iraq's declaration of war, and there is no indication of any public enthusiasm for similar action by Persia.

##### Economic.

3. The food situation in almost all parts of Persia, except the Soviet-occupied zone, is causing the greatest anxiety. In Tehran the bread is so adulterated as to be almost uneatable and no bread at all is obtainable in the suburbs. The temper of the poor is approaching an outbreak. No grain can be expected from Azerbaijan, at least for some time to come, as the transport available is only barely sufficient to keep Tabriz supplied and at the same time to maintain deliveries to the Russians in accordance with the agreement made that they should have 20,000 tons of grain. In Shiraz and Kerman local stocks are fast being exhausted and no surpluses of wheat are available in other parts to make up the deficit.

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4. The Council of Ministers has published a decree prohibiting entirely the export of raisins, walnuts, dates, peanuts, macaroni, tinned fish, meat and vegetables. Other dried fruits and nuts, oil-seeds, pork and lard may only be exported against the import of other food-stuffs or cotton and woollen goods.

#### *Transport.*

5. The Road Transport Department has announced that the rates per ton-kilometre for transport by lorries under its control vary from 2 rials for a complete lorry load to 4 rials for smaller consignments. The movement of goods is permissible only through the agency of the Road Transport Department.

6. A head-on railway collision occurred on the 10th January on the southern section of the line, operated by the Americans, which resulted in the death of fourteen and injury to thirty-six British, Americans and Indians.

#### *Court.*

7. The Shah was represented at the funeral of the British officers and other ranks killed in the aeroplane accident (see Summary No. 4/43, paragraph 14) by the Master of Ceremonies, the Controller of the Household and Major-General Jahanbani.

8. The Queen Mother and the Shah's two sisters, Princesses Ashraf and Shams, left by air on the 27th January for a visit to Cairo.

#### *Appointments—Civil.*

9. Muhsin Qaragozlou (F.O. 162; M.A. 227), to be Master of Ceremonies at the Court.

#### *Persian Forces.*

10. A Bill has been laid before the Majlis for an additional credit for the Army Budget of 60 million rials for the expenses of units newly formed within the last five months. These include the brigades in Eastern and Western Azerbaijan, a regiment for Mahabad, brigades (still only in skeleton) in Khorassan and extra units to form the nucleus of a new brigade in Behbahan.

#### *Appointments—Military.*

11. Sarhang Darudian, to command the Khwash (Baluchistan) Regiment of Gendarmerie.

#### *Internal Security.*

#### *Azerbaijan.*

12. His Majesty's Consul-General, in an analysis of the Kurdish situation in Western Azerbaijan, states that, in his opinion, the Russians are not now giving the Kurds any encouragement as against the Persians, but that they are definitely not encouraging the Persians to disarm the Kurds or to reimpose authority on them by force. They appear to be endeavouring to hold the balance between the Persians and the Kurds and to be using their influence to maintain order. The Kurds are disillusioned and suffering from reaction from previous hopes of Russian support and from economic difficulties. The leaders are maybe realising that they cannot control the tribes nor secure unity of aim. The opportunity seems favourable for a just and reasonable settlement by the Persian Government, but it is doubtful whether they have the capacity to seize it.

#### *Fars.*

13. It is reported that Elias Khan, one of the more important chiefs of the Kashguli tribe of the Qashgai, has left the entourage of Nasir Khan and returned to his own tribe, who are in their winter quarters south-west of the Mamassani lands. If this is true it may be significant, as Elias was the most important of the Qashgai Khans in constant and close contact with Nasir.

14. Some nervousness has been shown by Mamassani chiefs as a result of visits to their country of British reconnaissance patrols. The Mamassani have on the whole hitherto remained aloof from Nasir's intrigues. They have, however, uneasy consciences because they are in possession of a number of Persian army rifles which they are reluctant to surrender. Nervousness might conceivably induce them to make common cause with Nasir if he decided actively to oppose the Government.

#### *Khuzestan.*

15. The disarming of the Arabs (see Summary No. 3/43, paragraph 14) is proceeding without disturbance if slowly. 320 rifles had been surrendered by the end of January.

#### *American Affairs.*

16. Dr. Milspaugh, Adviser to the Ministry of Finance, has arrived in Tehran.

17. A Bill has been laid before the Majlis for the engagement of another American Adviser for the Ministry of Food (Mr. Hutchins).

*Tehran, February 2, 1943.*

[E 1018/110/34]

No. 26.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 19.)*

(No. 26.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 3 for the period of the 13th to the 20th January, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, January 20, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 26.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 3 for the Period January 13-20, 1943.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

#### *Political.*

THERE is as yet no noticeable change in the political situation, nor any indication that the Prime Minister has increased his popularity. In the first issues of the papers recently permitted to appear (see Summary No. 2, 1943, paragraph 6) he was attacked for having suppressed the press. He has as yet announced no changes in the Cabinet, although Mehdi Farrukh, the Minister of Food, has resigned. The bread supply of the capital continues to absorb much of the attention of the Government, and the mutual distrust between the Shah and the Prime Minister is a further handicap on the conduct of business. A recent report, however, says that after a lengthy conversation between the two, relations have improved. It is to be feared that it is not likely to be anything but an uneasy association for the Shah appears to have decided to adopt the rôle of the apostle of social reform and the champion of the oppressed against the class represented by the Prime Minister.

2. The Shah has again expressed his desire for a military alliance with the Allies. He considers that if the country were committed to that extent pro-Axis intrigue would to a large extent disappear and the morale of the army would be greatly improved. The declaration of war by Iraq is likely to increase his enthusiasm for his idea. Public reactions to the Iraqi action are not yet apparent. Some Persian officers consider that Iraq has stolen a march on Persia and that Persia should not hesitate to follow the lead. The general public will, however, probably feel that the German armies are still too close to Persia.

3. There has been much talk in Tehran recently among Persians of a German attack on Turkey. It is being suggested that the Germans are deliberately shortening their line in Russia with a view to withdrawing troops for this operation.

#### *Economic.*

4. It has been estimated, as reliably as available statistics will allow, that about 66,000 tons of grain, in addition to the quantities now in Government stores, are required to feed the country up to the next harvest. Of this, Great



Britain and America have undertaken to import 25,000 tons; 15,000 tons are believed to be available from areas having a surplus, other than those in the Russian zone, leaving a deficit of 26,000 tons. It is estimated that Azerbaijan could provide 15,000 tons of wheat and the Caspian provinces 20,000 tons of rice if the Russians would allow its export and the Persian authorities were efficient enough and energetic enough to collect it. Meanwhile, Tehran still lives from day to day, Khuzestan cannot feed its population, and His Majesty's Consuls at Shiraz and Kerman report that available stocks are almost exhausted and that supplies will shortly be necessary from outside the province. It is estimated that Fars requires 4,000 tons to last out until the next harvest.

#### *Transport.*

5. The Persian Government Road Transport Department now controls about 500 contracted lorries. This number does not include fifty lease-lend lorries recently arrived for delivery to the Persian Government. Of these twenty-five are immediately to be allotted for urgent anti-locust measures.

#### *Appointments—Civil.*

6.—(i) Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, to be Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Health.

(ii) Ali Motamedi (M.A. 175; F.O. 137), to be head of the Protocol Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

(iii) Ali Asghar Kaivan, to be Persian Consul at Bagdad.

(iv) Hussein Zinjani, to be Persian Consul at Basra.

(v) Hussein Quli I'tisam, to be first secretary to the Persian Consulate-General at Baku.

(vi) Ahmad Zahir, to be secretary at the Persian Embassy, Angora.

(vii) Rukn-ud-Din Ashtiyani, to be secretary at the Persian Consulate-General at Jerusalem.

#### *Persian Forces.*

#### *Army.*

7. The Shah recently stated to the British Military Attaché that he was now following constitutional practice in his command of the army. All orders requiring his approval were now brought up to him by the Minister for War, and no order by himself was legal unless signed by the Minister. This is the form without the substance, for in practice the Shah and the Chief of the General Staff decide what is desirable before the latter submits proposals to the Minister for War. The Shah still clings to his personal control of the army.

8. The strength of the force reported in Summary No. 2, 1943, paragraph 14, to have been sent to Miandoab is about 600.

9. General Ridley has proposed that the gendarmerie, while retaining its separate identity, should be retransferred to the control of the Ministry for War. His reasons are:—

(i) That since the present tasks of the army and the gendarmerie are the same, viz., the restoration of security, division of responsibility leads to inefficiency.

(ii) That in present circumstances the gendarmerie requires the close support of the army, and that this is more likely to be achieved if both forces are under the same control.

(iii) That a pooling of resources of officers, arms, transport and supply facilities will lead to economy.

The question is now being discussed. The Shah supports General Ridley's proposal; the Prime Minister does not at present favour it, nor, it is believed, does Colonel Schwarzkopf, the American adviser to the gendarmerie.

#### *Police.*

10. A Bill has been laid before the Majlis to authorise the establishment of a college for the training of officers for the police with the object of endeavouring to improve the standard of police officers.

#### *Internal Security.*

#### *Fars.*

11. There are no further developments in the situation in Fars. It is now publicly known that General Shahbakhte is to be charged with the responsibility for security in the province. He is now in Tehran receiving instructions from the

Government, and he is expected to leave for Shiraz in about a week's time. He is making it a condition of his acceptance of the responsibility that he is given certain reinforcements and transport. The reinforcements have been promised, but the question of transport has not been solved, as the Persian War Office has none available. His instructions from the Government are understood to be that he is to bring Nasir Qashgai to heel by force if necessary. It is probable that he will be given control of security measures affecting the Bakhtiari and Kuhgalu tribes as well as those of Fars.

#### *Isfahan.*

12. There is some uneasiness among the Bakhtiari; Abdul Qasim, one of the two chiefs placed in unofficial authority by General Zahidi (see Summary No. 40/42, paragraph 11), has taken fright at the latter's arrest and with his armed following has gone to the Janeki country, refusing all invitations, although accompanied by assurances of immunity, to visit the Governor-General at Isfahan. It is rumoured that he intends to create trouble. The other of General Zahidi's puppet khans, Manuchir, is now in Isfahan.

#### *Kuh-i-Galu.*

13. The Kuhgalu chiefs (see Summary No. 12/42, paragraph 16) have recently been attempting to take out insurances. Abdullah Zarghampur, of the Boir Ahmadi, has sent his stepbrother to Behbahan; Farajullah, of the Bahmai, has been making advances to British authorities; Malik Mansur, of Basht, son of Bibi Khanum, chieftainess of the Bavir, and a representative of Hussein Quli, of the Rustam section of the Mamassani, have been to Shiraz to assure His Majesty's Consul of their desire to serve the British cause. The Bavir profess to be in fear of hostile action against them by the Boir Ahmadi and the Qashquli.

#### *Khuzestan.*

14. A Persian force has moved out against the Arabs (see Summary No. 48/42, paragraph 12), and the officer commanding in Khuzestan, Colonel Humayun, summoned the sheikhs of some half a dozen tribes and demanded the surrender of their arms. The sheikhs promised to hand them over by the 17th January.

#### *Kermanshah.*

15. The driver of an empty U.K.C.C. lorry was shot dead in daylight between Kerind and Qasr-i-Shirin some days ago. Details have not yet been received. As was inevitable, it is now being suggested that this incident was put up by General Shahbakhte to demonstrate that security in this province deteriorated with his withdrawal. That may be the explanation. If so, other disturbances may be expected.

#### *Kerman.*

16. His Majesty's Consul reports that the Bandar Abbas-Kerman road is insecure and that numerous robberies have occurred. These appear to be genuine robberies for the sake of loot and to have no political significance. Hussein Khan Buchakchi, against whom operations were begun in September 1942 (see Summary No. 36/42, paragraph 18) which led to no result, and who is reported to have harboured Germans for a time, has been quiet of late.

#### *Azerbaijan.*

17. The Persian War Office has a report, as yet unconfirmed from other sources, that the Jalali Kurds are threatening to loot Maku.

#### *Khorassan.*

18. An increase of raiding from Afghanistan is expected to result from the poverty and lack of food prevailing in Western Afghanistan. Several raids have already been reported.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

#### *Anglo-Russian Relations.*

19. Soviet officials continue to show curiosity and suspicion about American and British activities in Persia. The Soviet Military Attaché recently asked a number of questions about road and aerodrome construction by the British military authorities and about British troop movements in East Persia, and



seemed sceptical when informed that they were all connected with the improvement of the supply routes to Russia and of British communications necessary to protect them. The staff of the Soviet Consulate in Kermanshah now consists of fifteen persons, and their interest in British relations with the Persian Kurds has not slackened. The general impression gained is that the Soviet is suspicious that British activities are not concerned solely with the prosecution of the war, but have post-war objectives.

20. In spite of the fact that they are very short of motor transport, the Soviet authorities refuse to allow U.K.C.C. lorries carrying goods from Zahedan for Russia to run through to the railway at Askhabad, but insist on goods being off-loaded at the frontier or at Meshed.

#### Officials.

21. Major-General Gaidoukov has arrived in Tabriz and has taken over command of Soviet troops in North-Western Persia.

22. M. Rassandine has taken up the post of Soviet Consul in Isfahan.

#### American Interests.

23. General Connolly, commanding the United States Persia Command, has now established his headquarters in Tehran.

Tehran, January 20, 1943.

[E 1220/110/34]

No. 27.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 52.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 6 for the period of the 2nd to the 9th February, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, February 10, 1943.

Enclosure in No. 27.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 6 for the Period February 2 to 9, 1943.

#### Persian Affairs.

##### Political.

THE newly reconstructed Cabinet had a short life. A dispute occurred between the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior, Farajullah Bahrami, and the latter refused to resign when called upon to do so by the Prime Minister. The Shah refused to order his resignation or to accept the Prime Minister's. The latter then called upon his Ministers to resign and ten of them did so. For some days there was much intrigue among the Deputies of the Majlis by both the Prime Minister and Court circles, but, in spite of the hostility generally felt by the Deputies towards the Prime Minister, he succeeded in getting a vote of confidence by 65 votes to 42. Following this, the rebellious Minister of the Interior resigned, and the Government now consists of the Prime Minister and the Ministers for War, Finance and Health.

2. The root of these troubles lies in the absence of confidence between the Prime Minister and the Court. The Minister of the Interior was the Shah's nominee, and it was the Prime Minister's objection to his having direct access to the Shah that led to the dispute between them. The aim of the Court appears to be to have a subservient Prime Minister. The Majlis wavers between its dislike of the Prime Minister and its fear of the re-establishment of a Royal autocracy. The explanation of the vote of confidence given to Qavam-es-Sultaneh may be the lack of any substitute generally acceptable to the Majlis.

3. A strong campaign has been launched in some papers in favour of the return to Persia of Sayyid Zia-ed-Din Tabatabai (F.O. 206; M.A. 286), who has been in exile for over twenty years. It does not appear to have yet evoked much popular enthusiasm. It is doubtful whether his return to power would be welcome to either the Russians or the Shah. The former regard him as too pro-British, an accusation which his supporters are now trying to refute. The Shah fears that he might wish to revenge himself for his (the Shah's) father's having driven him out of Persia after they had collaborated together to bring about the *coup d'Etat* of 1921.

#### Economic.

4. Reports have been received from the provinces of the extent of autumn sowings. They show that, except in the neighbourhood of Khorramshahr, in Lurestan and Kerman Provinces they have been up to or above normal on irrigated lands and slightly below normal in some areas on unirrigated lands.

5. Discontent increases in Tehran with the very poor quality of bread being issued and its shortage. Prices of food-stuffs continue to rise in a very steep curve and the people are approaching a state of desperation where riots may occur. Minor riots have already occurred at Shiraz and Isfahan.

6. Comment is sometimes made nowadays, even by senior American officials, contrasting, very unfavourably to the British, conditions in the Russian-occupied zone with those prevailing in the remainder of Persia. In the former, owing to the restrictions imposed by the Russians on export to other parts of Persia, food is plentiful and prices are low. An attempt to purchase sheep in the Northern Provinces, where they are plentiful and relatively cheap, for British forces was resented and blocked by the Russians. To advertise the advantages of the poorer classes living in the Russian zone is deliberate Russian policy. Stories are in circulation of Russian troops having prevented British purchasing agents from removing food-stuffs from the Northern Provinces out of consideration for the needs of the local people.

7. A company to be called the National Joint Stock Commercial Corporation (Shirkat Sehami Bazargani Melli) is to be formed with a capital of 120 million rials for the purpose of import and export trade. One-third of the capital is to be subscribed by the Tehran Chamber of Commerce.

#### Press.

8. Licences to publish have now been issued to fifteen more papers in Tehran, making a total of twenty-eight.

#### Appointments—Civil.

9. Zand Nispor, to be Farmandar of Qum.

#### Persian Forces.

##### Army.

10. Of the cadets admitted to the Military School at the annual intake in September, 588 have now passed the four months' period of probation. These include a certain number who will pass to the reserve after a short period with a unit.

The distribution is as follows:—

Infantry	...	231	Aviation	...	53
Cavalry	...	77	Medical	...	20
Engineers	...	43	Administrative	...	22
Signals	...	25	Unallotted	...	117

11. Persian troops in Khuzestan have now been formed into a division of two brigades, with headquarters at Ahwaz and Behbahan. Sarhang Humayun is to command the division.

12. The brigades at Kermanshah and Khorramabad are to be formed into a division, with headquarters at Kermanshah, commanded by Sartip Zarrabi.

13. The brigade organisation is to be abolished in the Persian army wherever divisional headquarters can exercise direct command of units.

#### Appointments—Military.

14.—(i) Sartip Muhammad Hussein Amidi (M.A. 16 (a)), to command the 2nd (Tehran) Division.

(ii) Sarlashkar Farajullah Agevli (F.O. 25; M.A. 6), to be Military Governor of Tehran.



*Internal Security.**Fars.*

15. The situation remains quiet. General Shahbakhte has left Tehran for Shiraz. He has been appointed Governor-General of Fars and Commander-in-Chief of Persian Forces in Khuzestan, Isfahan and Fars. He has been directed to devote himself in the first place to the re-establishment of Government authority in Fars, to the elimination of the influence of Nasir Qashgai; the apprehension of Germans, and security of the Bushire-Shiraz road. He is later to turn his attention to the Kuh-i-Galu, particularly the Boir Ahmadi tribes and the Bakhtiari.

16. Nasir Qashgai is now reported to be at Dehram, some 30 miles south-west of Firuzabad, and to have some Germans there with him.

17. It is reliably reported that during the past fourteen months 488 highway robbers have been apprehended in the Fars Province.

*Khuzestan.*

18. The number of rifles surrendered by the Arabs (see Summary No. 5/43, paragraph 15) now amounts to 479. Of these approximately two-fifths are being returned on licence for their own protection. So far only the smaller section of the Arabs are affected. The disarmament of the Beni Turuf is a more serious matter.

*Kermanshah.*

19. The operations for the disarmament of the Khalkhanis, referred to in Summary No. 1/43, paragraph 7, make slow progress. The Political Agent at Kermanshah estimates that about 160 rifles had been collected up to the end of January.

*Western Azerbaijan.*

20. The Soviet Consul-General in Tabriz recently informed His Majesty's Consul-General that two Kurds whose names he gave as Muhammadi Ali Oglu and Ali Mustafa Oglu of Shahr Bazarlu, claiming to be representatives of a Kurdish Committee at Sulumaniyeh, had approached Russian officials with an offer to furnish some thousands of Kurdish fighting men to assist the Russians. The Kurds, they said, were discontented with British policy. According to the Soviet Consul-General the Soviet representatives replied that Russia did not require the services of the Kurds.

21. The Soviet authorities have reported to the Persian Government that a Russian officer has been killed by Kurds at Maku, where for some time the Jalali Kurds have been threatening trouble. Discussions are now proceeding between Soviet and Persian representatives as to the steps that should be taken to maintain order.

*Russian Affairs.*

22. The Soviet authorities are now objecting to issuing any passes to British military personnel to visit the Russian zone unless they are satisfied that the purpose of the journey is directly concerned with the furtherance of supplies to Russia. Russian suspicions of British military activities in this country have already been mentioned in previous Summaries.

*Tehran, February 9, 1943.*

[E 1395/110/34]

No. 28.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 10.)*

(No. 85.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 9 for the period the 24th February to 2nd March, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, March 3, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 28.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 9 for the period February 24 to March 2, 1943.*

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

THE name of the Minister of Finance, Allahyar Saleh, was omitted from the list of the Cabinet given in paragraph 1 of Summary No. 8/43.

2. The shortage of bread in the country in general and the capital in particular overshadows all other questions in the deliberations of the Government. Hectored and lectured by the press and the Deputies on the need for immediate and drastic action to bring down prices and to secure wheat from hoarders and Allies, the Prime Minister, with no definite plan as to how either object is to be achieved, finds himself in need of all the qualities of suppleness for which he is famous. The press and the Deputies are in truculent mood. Questions have been asked in Parliament about the arrest of General Zahidi and the press has publicised an alleged assault by a British officer on a Persian official.

3. Anti-British feeling, as distinct from pro-Axis or anti-Ally, has been much in evidence. In addition to famine conditions, a shortage of kerosene oil for some days past has affected a large number of the poor of Tehran and has aroused much bitterness against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and against the British, who are believed to control the means of transport. That Persian people have to go short of their own oil is a useful and effective theme for hostile propaganda, which has not failed to make use of it. The resulting increased unpopularity of the British among the lower classes is a matter of some concern to those Persians who have been seeing in closer collaboration with the British the only defence against the spread of Russian influence. They, too, blame the British for failing to remedy, if not for having brought about, the hardships which are driving the people towards revolution.

4. According to the daily reports of the Persian police the Tudeh party, to which reference was made in Summary No. 7/43, paragraph 3, has recently been showing greatly increased activity. New cells are being formed, Socialist literature is being distributed and propaganda with an extreme Left tendency is being disseminated. Whether inspired by this or other sources, there is nowadays among the poorer classes much favourable comment on Soviet ideas and practice, accompanied very often by disparaging comparison with British imperialism. Stories, without any foundation, of chivalrous Russian soldiers intervening to protect Persians, often women, from lawless British soldiers are in favour. Publicity of the economic assistance given by the British to Persia is openly derided. Closed bakeries and oil shops have more effect than any poster. Against this must, however, be set the good effect on the few of the charitable work being done by Anglo-Persian relief committees which have been set up in most provincial capitals.

5. In an effort to limit dishonesty, the Ministry of Finance, inspired by Dr. Milspagh, has issued orders that no purchases on Government account and no sales of Government stores are to be made by other Ministries without previous sanction of the Ministry of Finance. The Department of Supply is to be reorganised, and when this has been done all purchases on Government account will be made by that department.

*Press.*

6. The press is concerned mainly with the internal economic situation. Strongly worded articles have appeared stressing the obligation of the British and the Americans to provide the wheat for whose deficiency, it is hinted or sometimes plainly stated, they are to blame. Attacks continue to be made openly on Mr. Sheridan, on the Road Transport Department, on its British adviser and covertly on all American advisers.

*Internal Security.**Fars.*

7. General Shahbakhte has not yet taken any active measures against Nasir Qashgai. He is awaiting the arrival of transport, which has been promised by General Headquarters, Persia and Iraq Force, and further reinforcements. Meanwhile, the main roads are undisturbed and the lawless elements of the



province are lying low. Nasir Qashgai has telegraphed to the Parliament to the effect that in view of the guarantees that had been given to him he was at a loss to understand the military preparations of which he had news and that he would no longer accept any responsibility for the good behaviour of the Qashgai. A strong effort is being made by Nasir's friends in Tehran and in Fars to persuade the new Government to stay Shahbakhte's hand and to reopen conciliatory negotiations with Nasir. Among these friends are landowners in Fars who have, in return for their support, secured some immunity for their properties from Qashgai depredations and who are doubtful whether any Government will last long enough or be sufficiently determined in a consistent policy to establish Government control throughout Fars.

8. Sixty-two Government rifles that had been issued by a previous commander of the troops in Fars to the Baseri tribe of the Khamseh Federation for their protection against the Qashgai have been recovered by the Persian forces.

#### *Kuh-i-Galu.*

9. A band of Boir Ahmadi brigands have during the past month been active in the Gach Saran-Behbahan road. Travellers have been held up, gendarmerie posts attacked and villages looted.

#### *Khorassan.*

10. Some anxiety is felt regarding the security of the Zahidan-Meshed road, as it is developed for the transport of supplies to Russia. The convoys on this road will be a tempting bait for raiders from Afghanistan, who are unlikely to be restrained by Afghan officials. The Persian security forces are handicapped by lack of mobility.

#### *Western Azerbaijan.*

11. That the substitution of Kurdish autonomy for Persian Government administration is not always an unmixed blessing is shown by conditions in Mahabad. When Persian administration broke down in Western Azerbaijan at the time of the Russian invasion and Persian forces disintegrated, the inhabitants donned Kurdish dress and openly rejoiced in their imagined liberty. To-day they are in sorry plight. Trade conditions, already bad, have been aggravated by insecurity, while prices of food-stuffs are very high because considerable quantities have been sold over the western border. His Majesty's Consul-General in Azerbaijan considers that a moderate display of statesmanship by the Persian Government would win back to loyalty a number of the inhabitants more interested in security than in the profits of insecurity.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

12. Professor Pavlovsky's expedition (see Summary No. 2/43, paragraph 19) to South-West Persia has now returned to Tehran. It was accompanied throughout by a British officer. It engaged in no objectionable activities, but the members showed interest in a wide range of subjects, social, economic and topographical.

13. During the first half of February 1,357 tons of supplies for Russia were carried over the Zahidan-Meshed route.

14. From both Meshed and Tabriz come reports of a slight deterioration in the previous very high standard of discipline of Russian troops that had contributed much to the respect that was beginning to be felt by all except the upper classes for the Russian system.

*Tehran, March 2, 1943.*

[E 1533/110/34]

No. 29.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 17.)*

(No. 63. Secret.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 7 for the period the 10th to 16th February, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, February 16, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 29.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 7 for the Period February 10-16, 1943.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

AFTER a week of discreditable political intrigue Kawam-es-Sultaneh resigned. In spite of the vote of confidence given to him by the Parliament he was unable to form a Government. He obtained that vote by means that added nothing to his credit. In the hope of securing the support of certain Deputies who aspired to Cabinet rank, he tabled a Bill to abrogate the fundamental law that no Deputy may become a Minister, and to placate others he announced his agreement with a Bill tabled by a majority of Deputies to establish Majlis control over the appointment of the Governor of the National Bank, a proposal to which Dr. Milspaugh, the American financial adviser, had taken exception. After obtaining his vote of confidence, Kawam-es-Sultaneh announced that in view of Dr. Milspaugh's objection (of which he had been aware all along) he had changed his mind. He further antagonised the already hostile court by suggesting in a speech to the Majlis that, in order to strengthen the authority of Parliament and to establish the sovereignty of the people, changes should be made in the Constitution. In the end Kawam-es-Sultaneh found himself with practically no active supporter except the Soviet Ambassador. Considering that he has enjoyed strong Allied support throughout his tenure of office, and considering his reputation and experience, the record of his Government has been very disappointing. The blame for its failure must not be laid entirely on the shoulders of the Prime Minister. His legitimate intention to establish Cabinet control over the army brought him into conflict with the Shah and the Chief of the General Staff, and they and other interested persons made play with the irresponsible obstructiveness of a venal Majlis to undermine his position. His Government did, in fact, fail to take any effective action against hoarders and speculators, to check rising prices, or to prevent excessive inflation. It is true that it co-operated with the British in the matter of extra issues of currency and to some extent in the arrest and detention of suspects, but it leaves to its successor a critical economic situation, an Administration which has, if anything, grown more lax and corrupt, and the task of establishing in the provinces the authority of the Central Government, whose prestige is now lower than ever. It was well known that he enjoyed Allied support, and his fall may diminish the moral value of that support to future Governments.

2. His successor is to be his predecessor, Soheily, who was forced to resign some seven months ago after a short tenure of office during which he established an impressive record of ineptitude and corruption. He has again been selected by the Majlis by a considerable majority over other candidates. The Shah, as was known to the Majlis, wished Said, until lately Minister for Foreign Affairs, to become Prime Minister. It is considered unlikely that Soheily will be able to form a stable Government or to check the growing discontent.

3. There is increasing talk among the lower classes of the advantages of living in the Russian zone or, indeed, under a Russian régime. The Tudeh, the People's party, which gets discreet Soviet encouragement, is increasing in numbers and influence and has recently ventured to come out in open support of the Soviet in the hitherto strongly anti-Russian town of Tabriz. The upper classes grow more concerned about these signs. Moreover, the impressive demonstration of Russia's strength and the elimination of Germany as a possible saviour have aroused considerable anxiety as to the position Soviet Russia will occupy in post-war Asia. The result is a growing desire in certain circles for closer collaboration with Great Britain and at the same time resentment that Great Britain does not make it easier to feed the hungry poor without diminishing the comforts of the propertied classes. That Persia should declare war on the Axis is now being more widely advocated.

##### *Economic.*

4. The estimates given in Summary No. 4/43, paragraph 6, of the amount of grain that will have to be imported to make up the deficit until the next harvest have been found to be too low. The amount of barley required is now estimated to be 31,000 tons instead of 16,500 tons. The first shipments of imported grain are expected in February.



*Appointments—Civil.*

- 5.—(i) Mustafa Quli Khosrovi, to be Farmandar of Gurgan.
- (ii) Dr. Kissabi, to be Farmandar of Bushire.
- (iii) Javad Seneki, Persian Minister designate to Portugal, has died at Cairo.

*Persian Forces.*

6. Notices have been issued by the Ministry for War calling up conscripts of the 1924 class.

7. A battalion from the Tehran Division has been sent to Shiraz to relieve a battalion which is composed mostly of conscripts due for discharge.

*Internal Security.*

8. There have been no serious disturbances of the peace, but throughout the provinces administration is lax and petty robbery is rife. British military stores suffer, and the theft of telegraph and telephone wire is a particular nuisance.

*Russian Affairs.*

9. The Soviet Vice-Consul at Isfahan and two Russian military officers recently visited Anarak, presumably with a view to investigating the copper mines in which the Russians are now interested in view of their contract with the Persian Government for the manufacture of ammunition.

10. According to the Minister for War the Soviet Ambassador in a recent conversation made no secret of his disapproval of the introduction of American advisers into Persian administrations, particularly the army and gendarmerie. If Persia needed foreign advisers at all, he asked, why were Americans chosen? Was not the Soviet Union the best administered State in the world?

11. Supplies are again flowing into Russia by the Zahidan-Meshed route. During December 794 tons were delivered, and in January, up to the 22nd, 811 tons. The commodities were mostly jute, gunnies and tea.

*Egyptian Affairs.*

12. Abdul Latif Talaat Pasha has arrived in Tehran as Egyptian Ambassador.

*Turkish Affairs.*

13. A Turkish Mission, composed of a general officer and five professors and doctors, has passed through Tehran on its way to Kabul.

*Tehran, February 16, 1943.*

[E 1734/110/34]

No. 30.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 25.)*

(No. 76.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 8 for the period of 17th to 23rd February, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, February 23, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 30.

(Secret).

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 8 for the Period February 17-23, 1943.*

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

1. The new Cabinet is composed as follows:—

Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior—Ali Soheily (F.O. 203, M.A. 283).

War—Sipahbod Amir Ahmadi.

Commerce and Industry—Mahmud Bader (F.O. 41, M.A. 51).

Communications—Abdul Hussein Hajhir (F.O. 80, M.A. 104).

Justice—Ali Asghar Hikmat (F.O. 85).

Foreign Affairs—Muhammad Said (F.O. 182, M.A. 252).

Education—Ali Akbar Siassi.

Posts and Telegraphs—Nasrullah Intizam (F.O. 92, M.A. 121).

Health—Amanullah Ardalan (F.O. 27, M.A. 33).

Food—Not yet appointed.

Agriculture—Not yet appointed.

Without Portfolio—Seyid Muhammad Tadayyun (F.O. 207, M.A. 288); Hussein Sami'i (F.O. 185, M.A. 254).

With the exception of the Prime Minister, the Ministers are probably as good a selection as can be made in present circumstances.

2. The programme of the Cabinet has been announced as the supply of food, the stabilisation of prices, the improvement of the welfare of peasants, workers and Government employees, and co-operation with Great Britain, America and the U.S.S.R. The Government received a vote of confidence on the 21st February by 89 votes to nil, but previous to this there had been a stormy session in which some Deputies were in rebellious mood. Attacks were made on Mr. Sheridan, the American Adviser to the Ministry of Food, and on Mr. Birkle, the British Adviser to the Road Transport Department. The right of American troops to be in Persia was challenged, since America was not a party to the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance. The Prime Minister stated that the American Government had agreed to make an agreement to regularise the position of their troops.

*Economic.*

3. Tehran is on the verge of starvation. The daily death rate has trebled. A complete breakdown of bread supplies has been averted more by luck than management, and the bread issued is almost uneatable. In Sultanabad, wheat supplies are at the point of exhaustion. In Meshed there has been an influx to the town of hungry villagers, causing a shortage of Government bread supplies and demonstrations against the authorities for having failed to issue tea, sugar and cloth rations for the past month. In Maragheh (in Azerbaijan) there have been disorders, instigated by the landlords to embarrass the endeavours of the American representative of the Ministry of Food to collect wheat for the Russians and for Tehran.

4. For some unexplained reason there has been a fall in the prices of certain commodities, notably rice, butter and some piece-goods.

*Public Opinion.*

5. The fall of Rostov and the Kharkov has had a powerful effect on public opinion, and pro-Axis sympathisers are little in evidence. But the further the war recedes from Persia the more does public interest concentrate on the internal situation and on post-war possibilities. Public opinion on these matters is confused and unconstructive, and based mainly on personal interests.

*Persian Forces.**Gendarmerie.*

6. Colonel Schwarzkopf's estimate of the gendarmerie required in Persia is:—

A central headquarters.

An air force of 9 flights of 3 machines each.

A motorised force } To be distributed among the districts.

A mounted force }

8 district headquarters.

21 regiments, each of 101 officers and 1,594 other ranks.



The total strength comes to more than 40,000 officers and men, over 600 motor vehicles and over 400 motor cycles. A force on this scale in addition to the army is not only unnecessary, but far beyond the financial capacity of the Persian Government.

#### *Army.*

7. The successful campaign in North Africa has aroused some interest among Persian officers in the British forces. A number of them has expressed a desire to visit the Libyan battlefields, and the Commandant of the Staff College is angling for an invitation for his senior term—some twenty officers. The Shah and the Chief of the General Staff have both said that they hope Persian officers will be invited to England while the war lasts. Apparently a good impression has been made by the reports of the Persian Military Attaché in London. There is also an increasing enthusiasm to learn English at the Cadet School and the Staff College, and many applications have been received from Persian officers to attend the English classes being organised in Tehran by the British Council.

#### *Internal Security.*

##### *Khuzestan.*

8. Up to the 14th February 565 rifles had been collected by the Persian forces from the minor Arab tribes without opposition. It seems probable that force will have to be used against the Khasraj Abdullah sub-tribe, who had not responded to invitations to surrender their arms.

*Tehran, February 23, 1943.*

[E 1778/110/34]

No. 31.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 27.)*

(No. 92.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 10, the 3rd to 9th March, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, March 9, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 31.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 10 for the Period  
March 3-9, 1943.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political*

THE Government has been making endeavours to secure the co-operation of the Majlis. With the object of associating the Deputies with the Government in devising measures to deal with the urgent problems of the day, notably food supply, the control of prices and the welfare of the lower classes, separate committees are to be formed for each of these problems composed of Deputies, who are to be chosen by the Majlis, and Ministers.

2. The press has been taking advantage of an unbridled freedom to attack the Allies in a number of vehemently outspoken articles. Scarcity, high prices, inflation, lack of transport are all due to heavy consumption by the Allies, to their large demands for currency and their monopoly of the means of transport. Persia should have resisted to the last man. Annihilation in battle against the Allies would have been better than slow annihilation by starvation. Persia had fulfilled her undertakings under the treaty in placing her roads, her railways, her harbours and communications at the disposal of the Allies. The Allies had not kept their promises regarding economic assistance and were callously letting Persia starve to death. The articles are usually so worded as to make it clear that, of the Allies, Great Britain is the real criminal. Where anti-British sentiments were formerly to a large extent merely a fashion, they are now

founded on what is widely believed to be a genuine grievance, and Nazi sympathisers have the pleasure of saying: "I told you so." In addition to the deliberate exacerbation of popular resentment against Great Britain, there is in some papers a campaign against the propertied classes and hardly veiled incitement to revolution.

3. While there is at present little love for Great Britain, there is an increasing number of Persians of the propertied classes and the *intelligentsia* who from fear of Russian post-war policy would be glad to seek British support. The motive in most cases may be selfish, but not in all. In the present atmosphere, however, an open expression of belief in the virtue of closer association with Great Britain and Persia requires more courage than is usually to be found.

#### *Economic.*

4. The bread situation in Tehran has very slightly eased, but the condition of the people in the poorer quarters of the town is really bad. Deaths from starvation are not uncommon and malnutrition is increasing the death-rate from disease. In many of the towns failure of the bread supply is being staved off only by the strenuous endeavours of the consular liaison officers. The Ministry of Food and its American adviser are still being heavily criticised and attacked, and it required some courage on the part of the veteran politician, Tadayyun, hitherto Minister without Portfolio, to accept the Ministry of Food.

5. The Ministry of Agriculture has been given a credit of 10,200,000 rials to finance spring sowings.

6. The Majlis has, after much discussion and uninformed criticism, passed a Bill authorising the exchange of gold coins now held as a backing for the note issue for gold in bars of equal weight. The gold bars will be provided by His Majesty's Government and the gold coins will be sold by the banks at the highest obtainable price in rials, which will be credited to His Majesty's Government's account in Persia. It is hoped that the gold coins will be hoarded and that the effect will be to absorb some of the present purchasing power of the country.

#### *Appointments—Civil.*

7.—(i) Seyyid Muhammad Tadayyun (M.A. 288; F.O. 207), hitherto Minister without Portfolio, to be Minister of Food Supply.

(ii) Hashim Sahba, from Director-General, to be Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Finance.

(iii) General Ismail Shafahi (M.A. 261; F.O. 190) to be Under-Secretary of State (Technical) in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and also Director of the Munitions and Chemical Factories of that Ministry.

#### *Persian Forces.*

8. The munitions factories, which were previously controlled by the Ministry for War, have since the signature of the contract with the Russians (see Summary No. 49/42, paragraph 15) been taken over by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

#### *Appointments—Military.*

9.—(i) Sartip Ali Akbar Siahpush (M.A. 279) to command 6th (Fars) Division, *vice* Sartip Mohd. Hussein Firouz (M.A. 94; F.O. 75) vacated.

(ii) Sartip Assadullah Gulshayan, from command of 12th (Kermanshah) Brigade, to be Second-in-Command of 6th (Fars) Division.

(iii) Sarhang Davalu to command 12th (Kermanshah) Brigade.

(iv) Sarhang Hussein Atapur, Persian Military Attaché in London, to be Sartip.

#### *Internal Security.*

##### *Fars.*

10. Active efforts are still being made to induce the Government to refrain from military operations against Masir Qashgai. General Shabbakhti is not yet able to act, as the transport promised him has not yet arrived. His inactivity is to some extent allaying the healthy fears aroused on his appointment that his arrival in Shiraz would be followed by swift action, and is raising the hope that the intrigues of Nasir's supporters are being effective. But Nasir himself is in some perturbation, and it is reported that he is finding no great willingness among the tribes to rally to his support. Meanwhile, the roads remain undisturbed.



*Khuzestan.*

11. To the end of February 715 rifles had been surrendered by the Arabs. The Khasraj Abdullah (see Summary No. 8/43, paragraph 8), with the exception of one-third, made their submission on the appearance of the Persian forces. The recalcitrant third, after a brush with the Persian forces, withdrew, leaving their families in the hands of the Persian troops. Operations against the Beni Turuf have not yet begun.

*Russian Affairs.*

12. The Tudeh party in Khorassan and Azerbaijan is now publishing propaganda on conventional Communist lines. The peasants are being incited to unite to oppose exploitation by the landlords and demonstrations of sympathy with Russia are being organised.

13. His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed reports that 2,000 Soviet troops with some tanks have left Meshed for Askhabad, and that 200 railway technicians have recently passed through Kuchan on their way to the railway at Shahrud.

*Tehran, March 9, 1943.*

## CHAPTER III.—SAUDI ARABIA.

[E 140/69/25]

No. 32.

*Mr. Stowhewer-Bird to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 7, 1943.)*

(No. 52.)

Sir,

*Jedda, December 13, 1942.*

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith an account drawn up by Mr. Wall of the five interviews which King Abdul Aziz granted me during his stay in Jedda.

2. I have asked Mr. Wall to reproduce as closely as possible the King's own words, as in this way a far clearer picture can be formed of the spirit and the wisdom of this truly great man.

3. King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud's present most friendly attitude is due in large measure to his genuine appreciation of the generous and helpful attitude of His Majesty's Government in these most difficult times. Owing to the serious drop in his two sources of revenue, pilgrimage and oil, he has found himself with a revenue of approximately 10 per cent. of his expenditure. Export restrictions imposed by all countries surrounding him and the scarcity of shipping space has rendered the supplying of his country with sufficient food, motor transport and other necessities a most difficult question. His Majesty has genuinely appreciated the efforts which have been made to solve this problem, more vital to this than to surrounding countries, as Saudi Arabia, which grows practically no food and has no industries, is dependent on imports for its existence.

4. The King's policy is based on the firm conviction that the interests of the Arab world lie in the victory of the Allied nations and in a continuation of, and, indeed, an increase in, British influence in the Near East. As will be seen from the accompanying record, His Majesty does not believe in a union of existing Arab States, each of whom, he says, has its own characteristics. What he hopes for is, that all Arab States, whilst remaining independent of one another, will be united by the common bond of friendship and closest co-operation with the British. Times have changed and weak States cannot stand alone, and unless the Arab States look to Britain for protection against external aggression and to act as intermediary in their disputes one with another they will inevitably fall under some foreign domination.

5. The King's statement, that we do not need to do any propaganda as he himself is our best and most effective propagandist, is literally true. The King has consistently, from the outbreak of war, backed the Allies to win, grieved over their set-backs and rejoiced in their successes. Three examples will serve to illustrate his attitude. When France fell, he sent me a personal message expressing grief at the difficulties which the British would now have to face but assuring me of his full confidence in a final British victory. When H.M.S. *Hood* was lost and certain of his counsellors suggested that even on sea the British were being beaten, he bade them have patience for a few days, and when the *Bismarck* was sunk these same counsellors were made to stand up and clap. His religious advisers, the Ulema of Nejd, criticised him for his distress over General Rommel's advance into Egypt, saying, that he, a Moslem, was endangering his health and reducing himself to a mental state, which was causing him to neglect his duty, over a quarrel between unbelievers. His Majesty berated his critics most soundly, pointing out at the end of his lecture on the reasons for his policy, that his friends, the British, were certainly Christians and not Moslems but that, were it not for their generosity and help and their success in keeping Rommel out of Egypt, they, the Ulema, would have no food in their bellies and no clothes on their backs.

6. Ibn Saud's views on the present position of Germany are interesting and picturesque. He likens Hitler to a man who has stuffed himself with much and varied food (the countries of Europe) in the belief that he will derive great strength from his meals. But he has swallowed, not nourishing food, but a number of vipers and scorpions, and whilst these tear at his vitals, the lions, Britain, America and Russia, attack him.

7. In one of our interviews, at which the resident Middle East Supply Centre representative and the recently appointed British transport adviser attended, Ibn Saud showed great understanding of the difficulties which faced His Majesty's Government in their endeavour to keep Saudi Arabia supplied with even their



minimum requirements in food and especially transport. His Majesty felt, however, that he must stress the vital necessity for keeping his transport system in proper working order as on it depended not only the feeding of the population in outlying districts but the maintenance of public security throughout his vast territory.

8. I cannot close this, my last report from Jedda, without acknowledging my debt to Mr. Wall whose knowledge of the language and sympathetic insight have contributed so greatly to the atmosphere of friendship and perfect understanding which has always obtained at my interviews with King Abdul Aziz.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch with its enclosure to His Majesty's Minister of State, Cairo, the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department, His Majesty's Ambassador, Cairo, His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad, the High Commissioner for Palestine, the Governor of Aden, His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, His Majesty's Minister, Beirut, and the Honourable the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 32.

*Memorandum of Conversations between His Majesty King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud and His Majesty's Minister at Jedda, December 6-10, 1942.*

HIS Majesty, contrary to his usual practice, came to Jedda before the pilgrimage this year. He arrived early in the morning of the 5th December, and received the members of the Diplomatic Corps the same morning, each mission being received separately, as has been done since the outbreak of war.

His Majesty's Minister accompanied by his staff was received at 10.45 A.M. The conversation was confined entirely to formal compliments and lasted only ten minutes. His Majesty was suffering from a slight cold which had given him a sore throat and made his voice somewhat husky.

A private interview was arranged for His Majesty's Minister at the King's request every morning while he was in Jedda. "Even though there may be no business to discuss," said the King, "I love talking." On one occasion, when His Majesty's Minister had expressed a fear that he had taken up a good deal of His Majesty's time, the King replied: "We have no business except with you, we came to Jedda this time just to talk to you."

His Majesty's Minister was accompanied by Mr. Wall as interpreter. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin was present at all the interviews, and the Amir Feisal at most of them. One interview at which questions of supply were discussed was attended by Hamad-al-Suleiman, Deputy Minister of Finance, and Najib Salha, of the Ministry of Finance, who has been specially appointed to deal with supply matters. Lieutenant-Colonel Griffin, resident representative of the Middle East Supply Centre, and Major Shoosmith, the transport adviser, were also present at this meeting. The Amir Mansur, Ibn Saud's seventh son (by his favourite wife, Umm Tallal, whom he had brought to Jedda with some of her smaller children), was present at one interview. Sir John Dashwood attended one interview.

The interviews took place in the main reception room of the palace: a vast and windy hall with the furniture so arranged that it is almost impossible to hear anything spoken except by the person on your immediate left or right. The King sat in the middle chair of a row placed across one end of the room, with His Majesty's Minister on his right and the Amir Feisal, Yusuf Yasin and the others a good way down one side of the room, just within, or perhaps just out of, hearing. When it was necessary for any of them to join in the conversation they could only do so by coming forward and squatting on the carpet in front of the King. (There was no loss of dignity in this, for the King and his people have carried the manners of the tent into their palaces.)

Before conversation began the crowd of armed and richly garbed bodyguard was waved away through various doors and windows by a slight gesture of the King's hand.

Ibn Saud talks fast and says a great deal. He has a strong Nejd accent, but in talking politics to foreigners he uses a fairly pure vocabulary, only lapsing into phrases of dialect when he warms to his subject. He has little tricks of speech—the Arabic equivalents of "listen!" and "don't you see?"—with which

he sprinkles every sentence. He gives to some ordinary Arabic words a peculiar and personal meaning: for example, "Al Hukoomah"—the Government—means in his speech, *the* Government, i.e., the British; and once a long and heated misunderstanding was only cleared up when it was found that the word "Meezaniyah," by which everyone else understood "budget," meant to him any kind of inventory or list. He knows no foreign language, and his pronunciation of foreign names is no more than approximate. His mind is richly stored with fables, proverbs and tales of Arab history, with which, and, of course, verses of the Koran, he illustrates his points.

His Majesty's Minister first of all told the King that he had been transferred on temporary duty to Morocco. "This is sad and unexpected news," Ibn Saud said. "I don't want to lose you. Let me telegraph to the Government and ask them to let you stay."

His Majesty's Minister explained the reasons that had led His Majesty's Government to their decision.

"I know," was the reply, "that they are only transferring you because of your experience over there, but we benefit as much from your being here as the Government hope to do from your being in Morocco. In all these difficult times it has been a great comfort to me to know that you were here in Jedda working day and night for us; it has been as if the Government itself were sitting here in our country."

His Majesty's Minister assured him that His Majesty's Government had given every consideration to His Majesty's interests in taking their decision, and that the old policy of firm friendship would not be changed. He left behind him a staff who had followed all developments with him.

"True," said the King. "But our happy company will not be complete without you. You are one of us, and it's in the interests of the Government as well as our own that you should be here binding us together in our friendship." (He made the Arab gesture of linking his two forefingers.) "I am glad you're going to London; that will be good for us. But when you leave London I want you to come back here."

His Majesty's Minister asked if there were any particular matters or points of view which His Majesty might wish him to raise in London.

"You know everything we have to tell the Government as well as we do," said the King. "There is nothing that matters to this country and its sons that you have not as much at heart as they have."

The King reverted at every interview to the subject of His Majesty's Minister's departure. One morning he had called in his little sons, Nawwaf and Tallal, and one of his daughters, Mudhawi, a child of 2. He took the little girl on his knees, and as His Majesty's Minister took her hand, said to her: "Qooli me tarooh, abadan ma tarooh"—"Tell him not to go, not to go at all."

He spoke also, with a freedom from reserve noteworthy even in the familiar atmosphere that is usual in his interviews with His Majesty's Minister, of his "family's" regret at the parting, "family" here meaning Umm Tallal, who had entertained His Majesty's Minister's wife and daughter at Riyadh earlier in the year, and who received them again in Jedda during this visit of the King.

His Majesty's Minister referred to the two major problems with which he had been concerned: finance and supplies, together with the related question of motor transport. He repeated what he had said in many previous talks: that His Majesty's Government would give all the help they could, and that if supplies were not always forthcoming just when needed, the reason was not an unwillingness to help on anyone's part, but the fact that neither the supplies nor the ships to carry them could be found always when they were wanted.

The King replied: "I understand that perfectly. No one knows better than I how generously the Government have responded to our appeals. I am deeply grateful and wish to say so on all occasions. I know, too, that military needs must come before all others. If you carry rice to this country, perhaps you have to leave behind a tank that ought to be sent to Africa. That's the main thing—to beat the Axis. That's in our interest, as I'm always saying. But you know my habit: I like to tell the Government just how we are placed here in this country; to tell them everything and leave it to them, who know the general situation better than I, to do what they think is best for them and for us."

"But the hungry man doesn't always understand. We are hungry and there are hungrier folk behind us," as they say. This is a wide country. In our far-off parts, by the borders of Iraq and Transjordan, there are people starving. Then there is the question of money. Both here in the Hejaz and on the eastern side nothing comes in. With the new arrangements that we have made for getting



supplies of food-stuffs, customs receipts have dwindled away. The demands on me increase. I have to give great sums in charity. All day and every day beggars are at my door and petitions pour in from great and small, all saying the same thing: 'I'm hungry, I want, I want, I want. . . .'. On this visit to the Hejaz I have found the money I brought with me for charity not enough. I have purposely left Ibn Suleiman (the Minister of Finance) behind in Nejd for a time so that I can stave off the clamorous by telling them to wait until Ibn Suleiman comes. I have insisted on the strictest economy in my own family and have not allowed any of them to come with me to Mecca this time unless they could pay their own way.

"I know the Government realise my difficulty and I believe they realise how much it is in their interest that this country should be at peace and cause no trouble at this difficult time. This is God's Holy Land; the eyes and hearts of all the Moslems turn towards it. It is as little in your interest as it is in ours that some of the ill-disposed among the Arabs—or some of that other family you know about (*i.e.*, the Hashimites)—should be given an opening to make trouble here or spread hostile propaganda about us in the world.

"Then motor cars; they are vital to this country for two reasons: one, we must distribute food to every part of the kingdom. I have won this land and I am responsible for every part of it. They look to me from far and near and I must feed them. Second, we must have cars to maintain law and order. What do you think has enabled me to hold the unruly and factious in check, to pursue and punish the evil-doer, to make the law felt in every remote region of the land? The help of God, and after that the motor car. If I had no cars to carry my patrols, do you think there would be peace and order from end to end of the land as there is now?"

The subject of propaganda was raised by His Majesty's Minister asking whether His Majesty would object to the B.B.C. broadcasting a message of congratulation from Lord Athlone on the anniversary of His Majesty's accession. The message would refer to His Majesty's loyalty and friendship for Great Britain.

"That," replied the King with great emphasis, "that's what I'm always broadcasting to my people!" (The Arabic word for "broadcast" has the same wide significance as the biblical English "publish.") "As I said to Yusuf about the cinema: they (*i.e.*, the British) don't need to do any propaganda here. I am their chief propagandist; I am their fifth column!" (The legation had recently erected a cinema projector on an open balcony of the Chancery—the only place available—and someone had represented to the King that the great and enthusiastic crowd that assembled in the street to watch was contrary to good morals.)

His Majesty's Minister began to explain about the cinema, but the King, smiling broadly, stopped him: "As for the cinema, we have closed that door!" (meaning that the matter was satisfactorily settled). "But, as for propaganda, day and night in every 'majlis' from of old I have told the Arabs that I am your friend, and told them why. Listen! The reason is twofold." The King resettled himself in his chair and tucked his stockinged feet under him in still a different position. "We are people of religion. Nothing comes before that. If religion forbade me to be a friend of the British, I and my country and people would perish sooner than take their hand. But the very opposite is true, and for two reasons: first, Islam commands us to keep our word. I pledged myself in friendship to you long ago. I shall keep that pledge. If not, I am ruined in this world and the next. Second, the Koran, our Book, commands me to believe that the British are the friends of the Arabs. Listen! 'Alif Lam Mim. Ghulibat ir Rum fi adna 'lardi . . . !'" (His Majesty quoted Surat Al Rum, Koran, chapter 30, v. 1, explaining the famous prophecy that the Byzantines would rise again after their defeat by the pagan Persians and win a great victory, whereat the Moslems would rejoice, as indicating the victory of the British and their Allies over the tyrannous and anti-religious power of the Axis.)

"On that day the faithful shall rejoice," repeated the King. "Secondly, there is the good of my country. How often have I said to my people: 'How long do you think I should last if the Government were driven out of the East?' And over and above our material interest, what binds us to the Government is the 'air dealing and honourable treatment we have always had from them. There are two kinds of relationships between countries: the relationship of fear—fear of the subjected for the conqueror—and the relationship based on mutual interest and co-operation. That is the relationship between you and us. Who else would have treated us as you have? We were talking the other day and someone said:

'If the Axis said to us: Come to us and we will treat you just like the people of Berlin and Rome, and if at the same time the Government said to us: Come to us; we cannot treat you like the people of London, but we will treat you like the people of our colonies, which should we choose?' I say the latter, of course. It's as clear as the sun. How have those two rogues 'Hitler' and 'Mussolini' treated their own people in Berlin and Rome? They have slaughtered them and tortured them most barbarously. But the Government treat the people of their colonies just like the sons of England. Look at India. A land of kings. Do you think anyone else, Arab or foreigner, who might have conquered India would have left those kings to enjoy their rights and privileges? No; they would have overthrown and despoiled them."

A reference to the decision of Safi-el-Din-el-Senussi not to come on pilgrimage and stay in the Hejaz made the King chuckle: "That's not a decision of the Senussi. It is the mercy of God, who strengthened the British to defeat the Germans at Al Alamein."

Much time at each interview was spent in discussing the war news and the general situation. Ibn Saud expressed admiration for America's war effort. "President Roosevelt is a man like your Prime Minister, and it is to the world's good fortune that there are two such men in such close agreement at this time. Nations are valued by their leaders. A thousand lions led by a fox are nothing; a thousand foxes led by a lion are an army. These leaders are different from that 'Hitler'; they rule by consent, not by terror, and they have won the admiration and support of their nations because they have never feared to tell the truth. They and their Governments will last because they seek to do right. We believe profoundly that the works of evil cannot endure."

"Hitler and Mussolini have chosen a path that can only lead to disaster. Mussolini—but what is Mussolini? Mr. Churchill spoke a word about him that pleased me: he called him a jackal. They have made grave mistakes. Hitler made two: first when he failed to invade England after the French were defeated. We were sorely grieved and afraid at that time, for we knew there was no army in England to withstand them. But the mercy of God is evident. Hitler erred and you did not neglect his error. Then he erred in attacking Russia; first, because that gave you a breathing space, and, second, because he had not reckoned the Russian resistance rightly. Nor had anyone—it is a wonder of this war.

"Hitler now is like a man who has swallowed all manner of serpents, vipers and scorpions, all alive and furiously biting in his belly, then while he is struggling with this internal attack he is set upon by lions. The serpents and scorpions are those countries, Poland and Czecho—what-d'ye-call-it; the lions are you and Russia and America. What shall he do? Try and overcome the convulsions within him or defend himself from the lions outside? If God will, he will be torn apart both ways.

"People talk about a second front. I say the British will not open a second front in Europe. Those places, Belgium and Holland, are well guarded. The fighting man looks for an opening. There was a time when I thought you might try and capture or destroy the French fleet in that place in France where it lay, and from there go on to invade France. Then again I often said you ought to take the Maghrib (*i.e.*, French North Africa). Now you've done it. There's your second front. Once drive the Germans out of there and you have the Axis in the grip of your hand. And we and the Arabs and all Moslems will rejoice on that day."

At an interview at which Sir John Dashwood was present the talk turned on the misstatements and lies of German propaganda.

Sir John Dashwood quoted the reference in a recent German broadcast to "Rommel's advance westwards." This delighted the King.

"What Arab believes the German wireless now? We have heard them sink the same ship three times over. Lies return upon the head of their disseminator. As the Iraqi proverb says, 'Untruth is a mount will take you forth but will not bring you home again.'"

His Majesty was asked what future he foresaw for the Arab States after the war.

"There is neither victory nor defeat save as God wills," replied the King. "He exalts whom He will and casts down whom He will. But after our submission to that primal truth we believe most firmly that a happy future for the Arabs depends on a British victory and that that victory is sure. It is a vast subject, but I will try and show you briefly the reasoning that has led me to hold this view.



"Men ask: 'What do the Arabs think? What do the Arabs want? What will the Arabs do?' We have to say what the Arabs are, what are their qualities.

"The Arabs have two characteristics: their Islam and their 'Arabiyah' ('Arabism'—their racial and national feeling). But to be an Arab is not enough. There are still too many primitive and ignorant people among the Arabs for them to form themselves into a great united nation. There remains their Islam: that is something capable of being a basis on which to found a nation. That is if it be true Islam uncorrupted by ignorance and innovation.

"States may have one of two foundations: either strict and undeviating religion, the exact fulfilment of God's law on earth, or a wise Constitution respected and observed by all the people of the State. No Arab country to-day has either of these.

"The history of the Arabs has been a tale of struggling for unity and power. They have been ruled by a series of dynasties who all sought to weld them into one empire and to strengthen their hold over them, from the days of Bani Ummayya and Abbas down to the Turks. The Turks were the last to rule an Arab Empire. They kept it together and kept the Arabs in subjection to them by three means: unceasing propaganda for the Turkish Khalifate—Sultan Abdul Hamid used to spend 7 million a year on propaganda, and his 'du'at' (secret political missionaries) were sent to the ends of the realm; flattery and bribery—they pinned a medal on a noble Arab's chest and dazzled him with it until he could see nothing else; the deliberate keeping of the mass of the Arab people in ignorance and poverty so that they were too brutalised and spiritless to rise against them. Then there came the great war, and the Arabs stirred and rose, filled with the hope of throwing off the Turkish domination. For the first time for many hundreds of years independence again seemed possible. They fell under the rule of Britain and France. You know what I think about British rule—that I sincerely believe that it has been for the worldly good of the Arabs. As for the French rule—you know what I think about the French. But the Arabs had tasted freedom and now they want to feed full on it.

"In statesmanship there are two guiding principles: one is service of country, property and person. The statesman in this is a merchant. Whether he is serving his country or his estate or himself he is making bargains, buying cheap and selling dear. That is natural. Self-interest must always be one of the main motives of human action. The other principle is 'sharaf' (honour and integrity). Earthly success is unpredictable. Man's powers vary in different times and circumstances in inexplicable ways. At one time a man may seek to jump over that low table there and not be able to and be forced to draw back defeated. At another time he may leap over the mountain tops. Among the vicissitudes of fortune and the strange chances of opportunity there is only one sure thing: to be true to one's own ideals. The man of integrity will retire in defeat unconquered, though fate may seem to have vanquished him yet he will be master of his fate because he has retained unimpaired his will to do right; he will watch the changes of circumstances and use every opportunity to advance in some measure the ideals he holds. Such a man will wade through dangers and undertake enterprises which others, who look only to immediate profit, view with fear and foreboding, because he knows the end he seeks is good.

"Until the statesmen of the Arab world understand these two principles and act on them there can be no independence for the Arabs. I don't see many men in Iraq, in Egypt, in Syria who are acting on them. They do not understand their countries' interest—not even their own. Look at Rashid Ali: the course I warned him against might well have led to his country's ruin. Let that pass—he cared not for his country's interest; you would have thought he might have cared for his own. No their chairs of office are dearer to them than their countries.

"We have talked about Palestine. I, an Arab, tell you that the Arabs created the Palestine problem. Who but the Arabs called their conferences, raised their clamour and preached and prated about Palestine? And who were these Arabs? They were three types: The man who sought to make a wordly reputation for himself and win fame in men's mouths; the adventurer who had no stake either in Palestine or in Syria; and the greedy man who sought merely to enrich himself.

"Let the Arabs of each Arab country look to the improvement of their own country first. There is so much they could do still undone. Let them develop their own agriculture and industry, make themselves prosperous and strong and happy. Then let them use their natural ties of blood and kinship to bind themselves more closely one with another. It can be done—though it will take a long time—by treaties, by friendly understanding, by recognition of mutual interests.

Look at America: at first America was a collection of weak and separate States. But each State strove to improve itself. It developed its own resources and became strong and prosperous, then put out its hand to its brother States and gradually united with them, until to-day America has become the greatest State on earth. So may the Arabs achieve union, if they will be honest and patient, for it will take a long time.

"The world is not, as some Arabs seem to think, an aeroplane or a motor car to be steered in the particular direction they want by the turn of the wheel. Worldly chances are incalculable; destiny will not accommodate itself to our desires. Who knows what the face of the world will be like after this war? What new systems will be brought to life, what mighty States become no more than dust blown down the wind? We only know that it will be changed and a return to that state we were in before impossible. How vain were the hopes of those who held their conferences after the Great War seeking to return to the political and financial systems of before that war.

"But of the Arabs in that new world we can now state two things with certainty: First, the two basic principles of national interest and integrity that I have mentioned will still hold good, and it is on those that the Arabs must base the policy with which they face the new conditions. If they neglect those they will achieve nothing. Second, the Arabs, united or not, cannot stand alone. Where are their aeroplanes, their submarines, their destroyers? They must rely on the friendship, help and protection of some Great Power.

"There are Governments besides the Government. Some of the others would gladly oust the Government from its place in the East. These enemies of ours, the Axis—and especially the Germans—are strong, no doubt. Strong enough to have made many Arabs look to them as the champions of Arab freedom and independence. But I tell you that, if Germany came to the Arabs offering them the moon in one hand and the sun in the other, to accept their gifts would bring nothing but ruin and disaster upon the Arabs.

"The Arabs have known the British Government for a long time now. The association has undergone many trials. Both sides have had much to complain of. But after it all, one truth emerges ever clearer: our interests are inevitably bound up together. No one but the Government can help and protect the Arabs, and if that help fail us we are lost. The Government is a tree well rooted and we are the leaves on its branches. If that tree is felled, shall we not wither and perish even before its roots?

"In conclusion, I will mention three things that have written the lesson clearly. Three things in this war; two of them happened, one was averted.

"First, the German occupation of Europe. We have seen what they have done in Holland and Belgium and those places. Can the Arabs imagine that the Germans love them better than they love the people of Belgium?

"Second, the revolt in Iraq. The leaders of Iraq, ignoring both their loyalty to their word and their own interest, plunged their country into the worst possible dilemma. Had the Germans succeeded in remaining in Iraq but four months Iraq would have been utterly ruined. The British would have treated the Iraqis as traitors and enemies, and the Germans would have had but one object—to attack the British, and would have slaughtered every Iraqi who hindered them.

"Third, the threatened invasion of Egypt. The Arabs saw the key to the Arab world within the grasp of the Axis, and the battle of Al Alamein showed them that no one stood between them and that disaster but the British Government.

"There is the truth: history has written it as clear as the sun. Our trust is in God and after that in the Government. This war at all times has proved it, and at no time more than when the Government seemed weakest and nearest to defeat. Now you have great Allies, America and Russia, with millions and with men. No one can now doubt that the Allies have overwhelming power and the issue is not now in doubt. But one thing alone brought this mighty alliance into being: one thing alone stirred America to action and convinced her that the cause was not lost. That was when you in your island, with all your Allies broken, stood firm against the world. But for that stand I think neither Russia nor America would have been inspired to fight, the arms of freedom would have been everywhere cast away, and in that general ruin what hope of Arab independence could survive?

His Majesty's Minister had a final interview with Ibn Saud at Al Shumaisi, 51 kilom. from Jedda on the road to Mecca, on Sunday, the 13th December.

His Majesty's Minister delivered Mr. Eden's message about his transfer (Foreign Office telegram No. 304), and the conversation that followed was almost



entirely personal. A small camp had been pitched, and after the sunset prayer His Majesty's Minister was entertained at dinner by His Majesty. Abdullah-al-Suleiman, Minister of Finance; Hamad-al-Suleiman, Yusuf Yasin and Najib Salha were also present. After the meal Ibn Saud himself anointed His Majesty's Minister's hand with his own perfume—a powerful mixture of attar of roses and musk. "I follow in the footsteps of the prophet," remarked the King, "and three things I love: perfume, women and prayer."

His Majesty's Minister took his final leave of Ibn Saud at 7.30 P.M.

[E 583/583/25]

No. 33.

*Mr. Wikeley to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 28.)*

(No. 2.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him the annual report on the heads of foreign missions in Jedda.

Jedda, January 9, 1943.

Enclosure in No. 33.

*Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Jedda, January 1943.*

*France.*

M. P. A. Ballereau was transferred to Jedda as Minister in November 1938 after eight years as consul-general in Singapore. He began his career in Morocco, where he spent many years, and later he was chargé d'affaires at Tehran.

Until the fall of France was anxious to co-operate with the British Legation, and was embarrassingly loud-mouthed in his propaganda and his attacks on suspected defeatists. Since July 1940 has shown open approval of the Vichy Government's policy of loyal collaboration with Germany, in whom he states lies France's hope of regeneration. Generals de Gaulle and Catroux are, he loudly proclaims, traitors who will be shot after the war. The Amir Feisal's view that he is mentally unbalanced is generally shared.

M. Ballereau is 61 years of age. (Written in 1941.)

M. Ballereau has now almost faded out of the life of Jedda. He is never seen, has very few contacts, and only occasionally leaves his house for a walk or a drive at dusk.

*Fighting France.*

M. Roger Maigret has returned to Jedda as "Délégué" of Fighting France. He was chargé d'affaires and later French Minister in Jedda from 1929 to 1938 (see report for 1937). He is being accorded by the Saudi Arabian Government, as a personal courtesy, all or nearly all the privileges of the head of a Foreign Mission.

It is difficult to see what useful rôle can be played by a representative of Fighting France in this country at present. France, whether Fighting or not, has lost any prestige she ever had here, and Ibn Saud has described the Fighting French as "just another slice from the same old loaf."

M. Maigret professes to be a firm adherent of the Allied cause, and it is believed that he was one of the first in Syria to rally to de Gaulle. His mentality, however, is revealed by the fact that he considers that any representative of France in Jedda, even an admittedly incompetent and shifty M. Ballereau with his declared hostility to the Allies, is better than none.

As far as is known M. Maigret holds no communication with his Vichy colleague.

*Iraq.*

Jamil Pasha Ar-Rawi was transferred to Kabul in 1941 and the legation has since been in the hands of two successive chargés d'affaires. The present incumbent is a pleasant and well-mannered young man called Hashem Khalil, who speaks good English and who gives every evidence of being well-disposed to us.

His substantive rank in the Iraqi Foreign Service is that of vice-consul, and he is rather too young for the responsibilities of his present post.

It is stated that Jamil Pasha is to return to Jedda in the near future as Minister.

*Italy.*

The Italian Legation closed down in the spring of 1942 for lack of funds.

*Netherlands.*

Daniel van der Meulen has, owing to the internment in Holland of the titular chargé d'affaires, Dr. Dingemans, returned to Jedda, where from 1926 to 1931 he was consul and later chargé d'affaires. He had just been promoted Resident in the Dutch Colonial Service and is merely seconded for the duration of the war. He is an authority on the Arabic language and customs, and speaks good English and French. He is a most loyal supporter of the Allied cause. His wife, who is said to have some Javanese blood, has great charm of manner and is most helpful in counteracting her husband's occasional tendency to pessimism. Four of their children are in Holland. (Written in 1941.)

M. van der Meulen made a trip to the Yemen by land in the summer of 1942. In his opinion his trip did much to counteract Axis propaganda in the Yemen and served to show the Yemenis that the Netherlands was still a power in the world.

*Turkey.*

M. Saadullah Goren, appointed Turkish Chargé d'Affaires in 1938, never returned from his leave in 1941, and it is thought that he has retired.

One of the secretaries became chargé d'affaires after M. Goren left until the new Minister, Nizamettin Ayashli, arrived in Jedda and presented his credentials on the 2nd August, 1942.

M. Ayashli is an improvement on his predecessor. He is more civilised, has better manners and speaks excellent French. He is most amiable and professes pro-Allied sentiments. In this he may be influenced by the experience of his brother, who, he states, had to visit Germany recently to liquidate his business there and, in the process, lost 11 kilog. in weight in a few weeks owing to lack of proper food.

M. Ayashli is married and his wife is in Jedda, but I have not yet met her.

M. Ayashli's task includes the care of German and Italian interests in Saudi Arabia, and this, as long as there are several hundred Italian and some German internees in the country, will tend to render difficult his relations with the Saudi Arabian Government.

*Representatives accredited also to other Governments.*

*Afghanistan.*

Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq-al-Mujaddidi, is also Minister to Egypt and resides in Cairo. He came to Mecca on pilgrimage at the end of 1942, but was not seen by his Christian colleagues.

*Egypt.*

Bahrawi Bey has been transferred to a post in the Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and has been succeeded by Mohammed Hosni Omar, who is also Minister to Iraq. He has not yet presented his credentials and nothing is known of him in Jedda.

The Egyptian Legation is in the charge of Abdul Hamid Monir Bey, a most friendly and helpful colleague, who co-operates willingly over such questions as the pilgrimage.

*Persia.*

Ali Akbar Bahman, Minister to Saudi Arabia and Ambassador to Egypt, terminated his mission in both countries on an unspecified date in 1942, and, as far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, no successor appears to have been appointed yet.

*United States.*

Mr. Alexander Kirk presented his credentials to the King at Riyadh on the 11th May, 1942. The visit to Saudi Arabia was, literally, a flying one and lasted only a few days.



Mr. Kirk visited Jedda in December 1942 for some days.

Mr. Kirk, who is also, of course, Minister to Egypt, was most friendly during his few days stay in Jedda, but as he resides permanently in Cairo his colleagues here know little about him.

A welcome addition to the Diplomatic Corps in Jedda was the establishment on the 1st May, 1942, of a permanent American Legation in the charge of Mr. James S. Moose (Junior), who was previously second secretary at Tehran.

Mr. Moose, while he is in theory just a member of Mr. Kirk's staff, in fact acts as the head of a mission with the rank of chargé d'affaires. He is a most agreeable and co-operative colleague and appears to get on well with the Saudi Arabs. He is married, but his wife and family are in America.

[E 1102/1102/25]

No. 34.

*Mr. Wikeley to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 24.)*

(No. 8.)

Sir,

*Jedda, January 27, 1943.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my annual summary of events in Saudi Arabia during the year 1942.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister of State in Cairo and the Middle East Intelligence Centre.

I have, &c.

T. WIKELEY.

Enclosure in No. 34.

*Annual Summary of Events in Saudi Arabia during 1942.*

IBN SAUD'S despotic yet kindly hand has guided his country through yet another year. Time treats the King gently. His mind remains keen, his statesmanship is unimpaired and his warm humanity grows greater with the passing years. He continues to wield absolute control over his people and country.

2. Throughout 1942 the King continued his unfaltering support of His Majesty's Government and the Allied cause. It is true that he refused to declare war on the Axis when sounded on this point by His Majesty's Minister at Riyadh in February, but his refusal arose from his conviction that both the interests of his country and of His Majesty's Government were best served by his remaining neutral. He argued that his influence in the Arab and Moslem world, and therefore his utility to His Majesty's Government, could not but be diminished were he openly to take sides with us. If he declared war, people would say he had lost his independence and had become just a puppet in His Majesty's Government's hands. He also felt that, as guardian of the holy places of Islam, he could not expose the Holy Land to the risks and horrors of war. His Majesty's Government saw the force of these arguments and did not press the matter further.

3. Ibn Saud's decision appears, so far, to have been the right one. His influence in the Arab lands beyond his frontiers is as great as ever (and, indeed, greater since our victories in North Africa have vindicated his policy), and that influence has consistently been used on our behalf. He has repeatedly advised Arab leaders, particularly in Syria, not to embarrass His Majesty's Government when they have their hands full elsewhere, and he is always telling them that only by British advice and assistance can the Arabs hope for liberty and a decent life in future.

4. In many other ways Ibn Saud's loyalty to His Majesty's Government has been manifest throughout the year. He has frequently communicated to us information regarding the situation in Europe and elsewhere obtained from his agents abroad; he has given us two machines of his tiny air force in the hope that they would be useful for carrying passengers and mails; in the summer when the position was most critical in Egypt he ungrudgingly allowed the Middle East Command to take over without payment seventy-five cars and lorries for which he had paid and which he required most urgently himself; he has agreed to British and American aircraft crossing Saudi Arabia from the Middle East to the Persian Gulf provided they keep clear of the Hejaz and its holy places and of the more thickly populated parts of Nejd; his sorrow at our defeat in Libya in the summer

was only equalled by his joy at our subsequent victories; and, finally, he has taken no important move without consulting His Majesty's Government at every point. Indeed, Britain in all her long history can seldom have had such loyal support from a foreign Power either in adversity or in success.

5. There is, of course, another side to the picture. Ibn Saud continues to receive enormous benefits from his Majesty's Government, and it is doubtful whether, without our help, his ramshackle kingdom could have withstood the results of the disintegrating forces released by the war. A country inhabited for the most part by wandering tribes of ignorant and fanatical Bedouin; a country with no financial reserves, with little agriculture, without exports, industries or shipping; a country hampered to a large extent by traditional ways of life and religion from adapting itself to the exigencies of a modern world at war; such a country can only weather the storm if taken in tow by a Power much greater than itself. That Power has been, and could only have been, Britain. His Majesty's Government, who carry so many other burdens, shouldered the burden of Saudi Arabia in 1941, and their help since then has been expressed in the only two things which matter at present: money and food.

6. Our subsidy to Saudi Arabia in 1942 reached the figure of approximately £3 million, part of which took the form of minting Saudi Arabian riyals in an attempt to solve the perennial problem of currency shortage, and part of which was expressed in supplies of food, &c. With this help Ibn Saud was able to keep the country going, though at a reduced tempo; official salaries were paid (more or less), tribesmen, reduced to misery by prolonged drought, were assisted and merchants purchased food and other goods from abroad. The currency situation, however, is endlessly and, often fantastically, complicated. Riyals pour into the country and then disappear. Some find their way to Bahrein, Koweit and even Iraq, but it is clear that every riyal not needed to purchase immediate necessities is buried or otherwise hoarded. There is therefore always a cry for more and more riyals to pay the salaries of Government employees and to keep ordinary commercial and financial transactions going. In an attempt to solve these financial problems, Sir F. Rugman, Financial Secretary in the Sudan Government, visited Jedda twice during the year. He and His Majesty's Minister had lengthy, exhaustive and exhausting discussions with Ibn Saud's advisers, none of whom have, naturally, any conception of modern financial methods. Suggestion after suggestion was turned down on grounds of religion or policy. Indian silver rupees cannot be used concurrently with riyals because of the Prophet Mohammed's injunction that objects of the same substance may not be exchanged unless they have the same intrinsic value. Maria Theresa dollars are unacceptable for reasons of policy. A note issue meets with all sorts of difficulties, but it is to be hoped they will not prove insuperable, as this seems to be the only permanent solution.

7. The solution of financial and currency difficulties is, of course, not enough in itself. Even if there is money to pay for them, food and other supplies have to be found and transported, and it is due entirely to the generous and unceasing efforts of the Government of India and the Middle East Supply Centre and to the co-operation of British authorities in the Persian Gulf that a sufficiency of supplies reached Saudi Arabia during 1942. At the end of the year the outlook was darkened by the prospect that India, needing all her stocks for her own enormous population, would be unable to continue supplying this country. It is likely, in consequence, that 1943 will be the worst year that Saudi Arabia has had to face so far. A Middle East Supply Centre representative, in the person of Lieut.-Colonel A. G. Griffin, was permanently established in Jedda in the autumn, and it is hoped that his presence on the spot will go far to overcome the many and complicated supply problems of Saudi Arabia. A British "transport adviser" was sent to Jedda at the end of the year and three military mechanics were to follow with a mobile workshop in the hope that they will be able to organise Saudi Arabian transport on rational lines and, by effecting repairs and eliminating part at least of the huge wastage that has been going on, reduce to a minimum Saudi Arabian demands for vehicles, tyres, spare parts, &c.

8. The problems arising from the war, finance and supplies overshadowed everything else in 1942, but the following items of general interest are worthy of record:—

9. The Italian Legation in Jedda was closed in February and the Italian Minister and his staff, together with the few Italian residents of Jedda, left the country for Italy via Iraq and Turkey. There are now no Axis representatives in Saudi Arabia, unless the Vichy Minister, who still drags on a useless and uninspiring existence here, can be classed in this category.



10. A Fighting French *délégation* has been established in Jedda and, infinitely more welcome, a permanent United States Legation was opened here on the 1st May.

11. The Italian and German internees are still in Jedda, though a party of Italian civilians, at their own request, were allowed to leave in small boats in July. Most of them were picked up by the Royal Navy, but some reached the Yemen and a few eventually returned to Jedda, where they were again interned. The Turkish Government has undertaken to arrange an exchange of Italian internees at Jedda for an equal number of British seamen in Italian hands. His Majesty's Government have agreed, but no reply had been received from Italy by the end of the year.

12. Ibn Saud's recognition of the independence of Syria at the end of 1941 raised a protest from the Iraqi Government early in 1942. The Iraqis considered that Ibn Saud should have consulted them before taking such a step, but Ibn Saud replied that he was merely following the lead given by His Majesty's Government and that, consequently, there was no need for such consultation. Relations with Iraq were also slightly troubled by the holding up on the Iraq frontier of a Saudi Arabian diplomatic bag. Ibn Saud was angry at what he considered to be a personal affront, but he was eventually appeased by a letter of apology.

13. A proposal for the exchange of diplomatic representatives between Syria and Saudi Arabia had produced no tangible result by the end of the year.

14. The three agreements with Koweit (Treaty of Friendship, Extradition Treaty and Trade Agreement) were signed on the 20th April. Ratifications had not been exchanged by the end of the year, but as both parties have been carrying out the terms of the agreements for some years past, this does not matter much.

15. The B.O.A.C. started an air service between Jedda, Port Sudan, Asmara and Egypt in May and this has been most useful.

16. The 1942 pilgrimage, which came at the end of the year, was much more successful than could have been expected. Egyptians, enriched no doubt by the huge sums spent in Egypt by the British forces, came in much larger numbers than usual, the total being in the region of 13,000. There were also about 5,000 Palestinians, Transjordanians and Syrians, and some pilgrims came from Iraq and Persia. There were also about 7,000 Sudanese and West Africans. The Government of India decided that, in view of the danger to pilgrim ships from Axis submarines in the Indian Ocean, the Indian pilgrimage should be cancelled. Axis propaganda would no doubt have made great use of this, but Ibn Saud cut the ground from under their feet by stating, and by allowing the B.B.C. to broadcast his opinion, that the Government of India had acted rightly. The King followed this up at the annual banquet given to prominent pilgrims in Mecca by an energetic speech, in which His Majesty's Government came in for a great deal of praise for their unceasing care and consideration for Moslem pilgrims. Reports which are beginning to come in show that this speech had a very beneficial effect on the audience and on others to whom the King's words have by now been carried.

17. Lord Moyne, the Acting Minister of State in Cairo, visited Jedda at the end of December and was given several audiences by the King.

18. His Majesty's Minister left Jedda, on temporary transfer to Morocco, on the 15th December.

19. Mr. Alexander Kirk, United States Minister to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, presented his credentials to the King at Riyadh in May. He also paid a short visit to Jedda in December.

## CHAPTER IV.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.

[E 313/27/89]

No. 35.

*Weekly Political Summary No. 41: Syria and the Lebanon, January 13, 1943.—*  
(Received February 5.)

(Secret.)

*General.*

THE political agitation of the last few weeks, during which the differences between the Syrian President and Prime Minister had brought the machinery of government almost to a standstill, culminated in the reconstruction of the Syrian Government on the 9th January, when the President nominated Jamil Bey Ulshi as Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior to replace Husni Bey Barazi, effecting two minor Cabinet changes at the same time. The new Prime Minister has no political following and is reported to be disliked by the Nationalists. It is not yet possible to assess public reactions to his appointment, but it does not appear to have aroused any active disapproval. In a statement to the press he has declared that he will conduct an energetic campaign against profiteers, and the measure of his success will undoubtedly be the extent to which this promise is kept and his ability to induce his own President and Cabinet to accept certain unpopular changes relating to the method of feeding the Damascus population, which are absolutely necessary in the interests of economy.

Further increases in the price of gold are reported from Damascus and Aleppo, due, it is believed, partly to large clandestine purchases from Persia, and also to a growing lack of confidence in Syrian paper currency. As commodity prices almost invariably increase with the price of gold, the already high cost of living may therefore be expected to rise still further.

Speculation regarding the possibility of early elections is now widespread, and is causing a ferment of intrigue amongst political leaders, who fear that they may be taken unawares.

*Wheat.*

The dismissal of Husni Barazi is likely to have serious repercussions on the wheat plan. Although the new Prime Minister has temporarily taken over the presidency of the Wheat Board, it is most undesirable that such an important post should continue to be subject to day-to-day political influences. The Syrian Government is therefore being invited to nominate a new president of the board, who, in order that he may have the necessary authority, should be of ministerial rank.

The recent increase in cereal collections has not been maintained, but it is hoped that the policy of arrests which is being vigorously pursued may shortly bring about an improvement. Sheikh Mohammed al Faraj, of the Wulda tribe of Jezireh, has been deported for refusing to deliver the quota of wheat imposed on his villages, and similar action will shortly be taken against other notables unless they comply with the demands of the O.C.P. within a specified time-limit.

Proposals are being studied for the distribution of cereals in Damascus to be controlled by the O.C.P. By this means it will be possible to check the extravagances caused by the Syrian President's demagogic attitude, and it is estimated that a daily saving of 25 tons of grain will be effected. In addition, the discontent prevailing in other towns over the preferential treatment in the matter of ravitaillement hitherto shown by the Government to the population of Damascus would be removed. As, however, the measures envisaged entail the reduction of the daily ration from 500 grammes of bread per head to 330 grammes of flour for the poor and 300 for the near poor, it is anticipated that there will be serious opposition to the scheme at the outset, although these figures have been accepted for some time now in Aleppo. Steps are therefore being taken in advance to deal with any outbreak of public disorder.

*Syria: Damascus.*

The circumstances surrounding the reconstruction of the Syrian Cabinet are a trifle obscure. Though Husni Barazi himself denies it, there is every reason to suppose that he had sent in his resignation, or at the least that he had offered verbally to resign, some weeks earlier, actuated in all probability by the belief



that General Catroux, then in Damascus, was about to secure his dismissal. It also seems clear that the initiative in effecting the eventual change came from the Cabinet rather than from the President. The latter, urged thereto by some of the Cabinet, seems to have called upon Husni Bey's four principal supporters to resign as a necessary prelude to the Prime Minister's own withdrawal. These four at first demurred and sought counsel of Husni Bey, who declared that he, for his part, would not resign, whatever happened. He appears to have believed at this stage that he could bluff things through with his trump-card of "British protection," despite the fact (denied by him) that he had brought this situation about by his own earlier action. The four supporters, however, who may or may not have been in a position to save their chief by standing firm, did not do so. Instead, they agreed to continue in their existing posts under Jamil Ulshi.

Apart from the change of Prime Ministers, therefore, the new Cabinet is the same as the old, with two exceptions: the Amir Mustafa Shehabi has become Minister of Finance, replacing Faiz Khuri in this capacity, and Ragheb Kekhia has retired, his post of Minister of Justice being taken over by Munir Abbas in addition to the Ministry of Public Works, which he held before. Ragheb Kekhia's departure is important only in that he was the sole representative of Aleppo, which has always resented Damascene preponderance in the Cabinet. He is not, however, popular in Aleppo, and derives his influence solely from the fact that he is related by marriage to the head of the powerful Jabri family. The Amir Mustafa Shehabi, who has taken no part in public life since he held a minor Cabinet post in 1936, has a reputation for honesty, but apparently no great competence in financial matters. In politics he is a Nationalist of the milder sort.

#### *Aleppo.*

There has been no special political activity. Local reactions to changes in the Syrian Government are not yet known. There are reports that Shukri Quwatli may visit Aleppo in the near future to endeavour to settle some of the differences at present existing among the more extreme local Nationalists, which were, if anything, increased by a recent visit of Hashim Atassi with the same end in view.

There have been minor strikes among textile workers for much-needed increases in wages, but no serious incidents are reported.

#### *Homs and Hama.*

The news of the changes in the Syrian Government has aroused little interest in the area, where the attention of the population is at present absorbed by the contest which is proceeding between local landowners and the O.C.P. The arrest and removal to Damascus of Haj Atef Atassi, the leading Moslem of Homs, has made a considerable impression upon other notables, who are anxiously waiting to see whether the Atassi family will pay the quantities of cereals demanded by the O.C.P. in order to save Haj Atef from exile. So far, however, there has been no marked increase in the quantity of cereals collected in this area.

There have been small strikes in Homs, but no incidents are reported, as in each case the strikers' demands were promptly acceded to.

The President of the Municipality of Hama has again offered his resignation. He has been asked by the Mohafez to reconsider his decision, but has refused to do so, alleging as the reason for his action the insupportable interference of Nejid Agha Barazi in municipal affairs.

Doctors and chemists who have returned to Hama from the medical conference at Alexandria report that they were much impressed by the low prices, strictly according to tariff, prevailing in Egypt, quinine being an outstanding example. The benefit derived from British influence was greatly admired, and many delegates made substantial purchases of medical supplies.

#### *Jebel Druze.*

The opponents of the Atrash family have abandoned their publicly declared intention of sending a deputation to Damascus to submit their grievances to the Government, and have confined themselves for the present to drawing up a telegram addressed to the Cabinet. Meanwhile, the Atrash, alarmed at the growing opposition to their power, have held a meeting at Soueida to compose their family differences with a view to presenting a united front to their opponents. All the important members of the family, including Soltan Pasha and the Emir Hassan, were present, but it is not known what decisions were reached.

The administrative inefficiency and the general lack of authority inevitably resulting from this unsatisfactory state of affairs are reflected in minor brawls,

which, while not immediately connected with political questions, are always liable to be fanned by one or other of the two factions into serious disorders. In addition, the finances of the Jebel are in a chaotic state, and it will not be possible to balance the 1943 budget unless outside assistance is forthcoming.

#### *Alaouite Territory.*

There have been demonstrations in Lattakia, provoked by the failure of the Ravitaillement to distribute the January issue of cereals. Clashes have occurred between the population and the gendarmerie, who attempted to overawe the crowd by firing into the air. This situation appears to have been brought about by the maladministration of the Mohafez, who had insisted upon keeping the distribution of cereals in his own hands. The matter is being investigated further.

#### *Euphrates and Jezireh.*

Considerable interest has been aroused by the replacement of the Free French Délégué Adjoint, Colonel Brosset. His successor, Lieutenant-Colonel Alessandri, is well known to General Collet, and is believed to have a considerable knowledge of Syrian affairs. In a speech made at a dinner-party given by the Municipality of Deir ez Zor in honour of the outgoing délégué adjoint, Colonel Alessandri declared that he would work for the complete and final independence of Syria and the liberation of France.

As a result of the census and registration of household stocks of grain carried out recently in Deir ez Zor and Kamichlié by the Free French Délégué at the instigation of the O.C.P., it has been possible to reduce very considerably the quantities of cereals issued by O.C.P. headquarters to the local Ravitaillement, and at the same time to achieve an efficiency of distribution which the Syrian officials had shown themselves to be totally incapable of attaining.

In view of the very low level to which wheat collections in the Jezireh have fallen, especially in the area occupied by the Wulda, fines of rifles are being imposed on villages which fail to sell their grain. So far, about 200, mostly old weapons, have been handed in without incident, and it has been announced that they may be redeemed at the rate of one rifle for every  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton of grain received.

#### *Tribal.*

The winter migration of the nomadic tribes is now complete. Following the recent rains, there is an abundance of pasturage in the tribes' winter quarters, and it is not expected that they will migrate beyond the boundaries of Syria unless unforeseen circumstances should make this necessary. They are believed to have adequate supplies of grain, and it is significant that certain of them who complained some months ago that they were short of cereals, and who were in consequence allotted quantities of wheat and barley by the O.C.P., have not yet taken delivery of the total amounts which were made available.

The murder of an Agaidat notable by a Jubbour tribesman, following a quarrel over an old boundary dispute, has caused the rallying in strength of the two tribes, and at first seemed likely to lead to serious fighting. The prompt arrival of Free French troops, however, prevented an immediate clash; although the tension is not yet completely relieved, numbers of the tribesmen have been disarmed, and endeavours are being made to arrange a tribal meeting to settle the affair.

The balance of £S. 15,000 of the indemnity due to the Wulda, in settlement of the Feda'an-Wulda dispute which took place early last year, has now been handed over. It will be recalled that, though the money was made available in September last, payment was withheld pending an improvement in the relations then existing between the two tribes.

#### *The Lebanon.*

The elimination of Husni Barazi has disquieted the Lebanese Prime Minister, who seems to consider that the British authorities, having failed to protect the former, would similarly let him down if his position were assailed by the President or the French. He complains bitterly of the systematic opposition shown to him by his ministerial colleagues (except the Minister for Foreign Affairs), and singles out the Minister of the Interior as chief obstructionist. His relations with the President, however, have temporarily improved. It is almost impossible to predict what impulsive act Sami Bey Solh will commit next; but it is hoped that moderating counsels which have been given to him will prevent him from taking any step (such as the dismissal of Moussa Bey Nammour) which would be liable to disintegrate his Ministry at the present time.



Election talk has now spread to all areas of the Lebanon, and in Beirut at least speculation has far outrun fact as regards the imminence of elections and the methods to be employed for their supervision. The political groups headed by Emile Eddé and Béchara el Khoury have got together and produced a scheme by which they would divide between them the portfolios in the provisional Government which they have assumed will be nominated to run the elections. Their assumption that they are the only two parties to be considered in this respect is not, however, shared by the many prominent politicians, especially Moslems, who owe allegiance to neither group, and their scheme, if adopted, would by no means meet with universal approval.

After the failure of their negotiations with the Government in respect of the arrears of war profits tax, the Merchants' Association have withdrawn into an attitude of obstructive non-co-operation with the Government and are likely to make trouble if the Government, in its efforts to collect the tax, assesses their members at what they consider to be an unduly high figure.

[E 423/27/89]

No. 36.

*Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 21.)*

(No. 53.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Beirut, January 20, 1943.*

REACTIONS to the death of Syrian President have not yet crystallised. In some Nationalist circles it is felt to render co-operation easier with Syrian Government, but the new Prime Minister is generally disliked and Nationalists as a whole will probably decide to remain aloof pending a decision regarding the elections. (See also my telegram No. 48 to Foreign Office, repeated as No. 29 to Minister of State.)

2. New plan for feeding Damascus population will shortly be put into force.
3. Instigators of recent demonstrations in Lattakia have been arrested and the town is now quiet.
4. Reactions to Iraqi declaration of war are generally favourable.

[E 615/27/89]

No. 37.

*Weekly Political Summary No. 43, Syria and the Lebanon, January 27, 1943.—*  
(Received February 12.)

(Secret.)

THE death of Sheikh Taj-ed-Din inevitably caused a ferment of political speculation and intrigue. It also removed the chief instrument through which the Free French had worked in their control of Syrian politics. Although Jamil Ulshi, the new Syrian Prime Minister, is thought to be largely amenable to French influence, the result was, therefore, a tendency on the part of the Cabinet to get out of hand.

As already reported, the new Cabinet's first act had been to issue a decree whereby it assumed "until the resumption of parliamentary life" the powers formerly vested in the President, its object being to prevent the French from nominating a successor to Sheikh Taj-ed-Din. A few days later, however, Jamil Ulshi presented the Cabinet with a decree arrogating these presidential powers to himself. The Cabinet, led by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, objected to this, and eventually produced by way of an alternative solution a resolution to the effect that in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Constitution (which, however, was not in force) general elections would be held, at a date and in a manner to be decided in consultation with the Allied authorities, in order to elect a new President. The main purpose of this resolution was clearly to forestall a French announcement to the same effect, and thus to gain as much last-minute credit as possible for a political development which the Syrian Government had fought against as long as there seemed any chance of success.

The publication of this resolution was, however, deferred pending consultation with the British and French authorities. It was made clear that no support would be forthcoming for it on the British side, and General Collet succeeded in persuading the Prime Minister to suspend it pending General Catroux's return. Shortly afterwards (on the 24th January) M. Helleu issued a communiqué on behalf of the French National Committee in London, announcing that the committee, "being determined to reinforce Syrian and Lebanese independence,

and considering, after consultation with the British Government, that the evolution of the military situation was such as to permit the restoration of a constitutional régime," had authorised General Catroux on his return to take all the necessary steps with this end in view "after consultation with the Syrian and Lebanese Governments and with the principal local personalities."

The Syrian Government, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs in particular, were much upset at what they imagined to be a French move designed solely to forestall them. They were at first inclined to dispute the title of the French to restore the Constitution, and threatened half-heartedly to issue their own resolution in proof that the idea had been their own, or even to prevent by force the sale of newspapers carrying the French communiqué. Eventually, however, they were induced to accept the situation.

A very similar crisis was occurring simultaneously in the Lebanon, where the President and Prime Minister, feeling elections to be inevitable, and doubtless aware of the Syrian Government's intentions, had presented M. Helleu with a decree announcing the restoration of constitutional life under the Lebanese Government's own auspices. M. Helleu reacted strongly, and although the Government were at first inclined to ignore his veto, they were dissuaded by His Majesty's Legation from a course of action which would have brought about a serious conflict with the French.

On the 26th January the Lebanese President attempted to persuade Sami Bey Solh to resign with his Cabinet on the grounds that it was necessary in the national interest to forestall French action in the matter of restoring the Constitution and dealing with the question of elections. He intimated that he had no intention of resigning himself, and would, on the contrary, appoint a neutral Government to see the elections through. Sami Bey Solh replied that he would not resign unless the President did so too; and in this attitude he was supported by the rest of the Cabinet, who took the sensible line that they would relinquish office if requested to do so by the Allied authorities, but not otherwise. On being consulted by Sami Bey, His Majesty's Minister indicated his provisional approval of this attitude pending consultation with the French. M. Helleu, who was found to have been consulted subsequently by the Prime Minister, informed His Majesty's Minister that he fully concurred. It is fairly clear, therefore, that the whole manoeuvre was a desperate bid by M. Naccache to remain in office.

The general reactions of the Levant populations to the Iraqi declaration of war on the Axis were, as already reported, favourable. Recent reports show, however, that the Nationalists, particularly in Northern Syria, have been inclined to criticise the Iraqis for having burnt their boats and laid themselves open to Axis reprisals. Such criticism does not augur well for the future attitude of the National bloc should it come to power as a result of elections.

In connexion with the tentative suggestion made by the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that his Government should follow the Iraqi lead with a similar declaration of war, it has been pointed out to him that the Levant States are already technically at war with the Axis in view of the continuance in law of their mandatory status, and that while His Majesty's Government might welcome at a later stage a parliamentary resolution affirming the solidarity of the Syrian people and Government with the Allies, far more importance will be attached by us to concrete evidence of the Syrian Government's desire to co-operate in such practical matters as the Wheat Plan.

Further evidence that the Syrian Government is out of hand has been provided by the publication of a decree whereby Jamil Ulshi has nominated himself as president of the Wheat Board and Hikmat Horaki, the notoriously corrupt and unsatisfactory Minister of Ravitaillement, as his deputy in that capacity. This was done without consulting either the Free French authorities or the Higher Wheat Committee, consisting of His Majesty's Minister and General Catroux or his substitute. After consultation with M. Helleu it has been decided to treat the president's self-nomination as subject to confirmation by the Higher Committee should it be found desirable, and the subsidiary nomination as unacceptable and a dead letter.

The Syrian Ministry of Justice, which since the formation of the new Government has been in the hands of Munir Abbas, who is also Minister of Public Works, has now been given to a young lawyer, Assad Korani. The new Minister is a protégé of Khalil Mudarres, the Nationalist leader who was recently reported as having declined to accept office as Prime Minister under Sheikh Taj-ed-Din; and the fact that he is an Aleppine should remove any resentment which may have been felt by his district at the departure of Ragheb Kekhia, the Minister of Justice in the last Cabinet.



*Jebel Druze.*

The situation in the Jebel has been improved by an outward reconciliation which has taken place between the Atrash and the Free French, celebrated at a dinner-party given by the Mohafez at which the Free French délégué, the Emir Hassan and other Atrash notables and the British Political Officer were present. The reactions of the opposition families have not yet made themselves felt.

The death of the Syrian President and the Iraqi declaration of war have aroused little comment.

*Alaouite Territory.*

No detailed reports have been received from this area.

*Euphrates and Jezireh.*

There has been no political activity of importance to report. There is growing dissatisfaction at the Government's apathy in the face of the ever-rising cost of living, which is causing considerable hardship amongst wage-earners.

The Mohafez of the Jezireh has expressed to the Political Officer his strong disapproval of what he terms the failure of the Free French authorities to co-operate with the local Administration, citing several instances in which he accuses the French of having acted independently and arbitrarily.

The work of replacing the iron pipes recently removed from the Assyrian settlement at Tell Tamer (reference Summary No. 24 of the 16th September) is proceeding satisfactorily. Although some sixty to seventy Assyrians are being employed on this task, it has recently been held up on two or three occasions by their refusal to turn out to work for quite petty reasons.

A meeting of local tribal sheikhs was recently held at Hassatche, at which the Political Officer outlined the conditions governing the employment of labour on road construction. Intertribal boundaries were defined and accepted by the sheikhs, who declared themselves to be willing to co-operate. As it is proposed to employ direct labour without the intervention of contractors, the question of payment of royalties for stone will not arise.

[E 719/27/89]

No. 38.

*Weekly Political Summary No. 44, Syria and the Lebanon, February 3, 1943.—*  
(Received February 17.)

*General.*

THE announcement of an early return to constitutional life has aroused intense political activity throughout the country. Political parties are busy marshalling their forces for the coming struggle and intriguing for French or British support. Nationalist circles are seeking to convey the impression that their return to power would be favoured by the British authorities, and the rumours to this effect which they have spread have alarmed the more moderate politicians who, in addition, fear that election campaigns may revive old party feuds which would split the country. Government circles are anxiously awaiting the return of General Catroux in order that the consultations promised in the French communiqué may begin. It would seem that they are now resigned to the inevitable, although the Lebanese President has made another feeble attempt to gain British support.

The fall of Tripoli has had a heartening effect, especially in Syria, where many refugees from Italian North Africa have found shelter and where the virtual end of Italian domination over the Arabs means more than the Russian victories at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus, although these, too, have given satisfaction.

*Wheat.*

Throughout the week the weather has everywhere been bad and the Lebanon is now cut off by snow and floods from Damascus and Southern Syria. Despite these adverse factors cereal purchases have fallen by only 50 tons a day, and of the total amount of grain bought wheat has formed 35 per cent. (See last week's Summary.)

The reduction of the ration in Damascus, which has so far produced no reported reactions, took place on the 1st February. Up to that date the lists of the poor, which should have been passed to the O.C.P. by the Syrian Government prior to the reduction being made, had not been received.

*Syria-Damascus.*

In order to decide on their programme and also with a view to repairing some of the cracks in the party fabric, the Nationalists have held a conference in Damascus. It is understood that the delegates were by no means unanimous in their views and there is no indication that the dissensions which exist within the party are likely to disappear. Before the conference began Shukri Quwatli visited His Majesty's Consul and suggested that the 1936 Parliament, which was suspended in 1939 by the French High Commissioner, should be recalled by the present Government, with Hashem Bey Atassi as President of the Republic, for the purpose of nominating a Government of Affairs to conduct elections. Parliament would then immediately be dissolved and the President would resign. Apparently this idea was approved by the Congress, as subsequently Adnan Atassi, the son of Hashem Bey, also visited His Majesty's Consul and made similar proposals. It seems certain that the Nationalists expect that this manoeuvre, if accepted by the Allied authorities, would place them in a position where their superior organisation would enable them to secure a majority at the elections.

The Syrian Prime Minister has made a declaration to the press reaffirming the intention of the Government to control prices and rents. He also stated that if called upon to conduct elections the Government would see that they were fairly carried out. With reference to the Iraqi declaration of war and suggestions which had been made that Syria should follow suit, he pointed out that Syria, under the French mandate, had been *de facto* at war with Germany since 1939, had come under the terms of the armistice in 1940, and was again *de facto* at war after the Allied occupation in 1941. There was, therefore, he concluded, nothing further the Government could usefully do now, since they had already shown, by word and deed, their support for the Allied cause. When parliamentary life was resumed, he continued, the new Parliament could declare war formally on the Axis as Iraq had done.

The Minister of Finance also made a declaration dealing with the subject of the funds of common interest. He pointed out that owing to the diminution of revenue during the war, the annual yield of the funds of common interest had fallen from about £S. 40 million to £S. 11 million. On the other hand, however, expenditure had diminished since the French troops were no longer paid from this source. This, he said, had left funds available for public works, such as the irrigation schemes in the Khabour at Homs and in the Hauran.

*Frontier.*

Despite the fact that both Turkey and Iraq have prohibited the export of sheep, some 50,000 to 70,000 animals have crossed the frontier into the Jezireh. The officials on the border are apparently closing their eyes both to this traffic and to the immigration into Syria in recent months of Kurds and Christians who have been ruined by the Turkish capital levy. Further, it is estimated that the contraband traffic in wheat from Syria to Turkey has already amounted to between 5,000 and 10,000 tons.

*The Lebanon.*

President Naccache is reported still to be insisting on the desirability of the resignation of the present Government, but it would seem that the only result of his precipitate step will be to widen the breach between himself and Sami Solh and to unify the other Ministers in support of the latter.

Nevertheless, the position of the Prime Minister has been seriously deteriorating of late. The Christian clergy are solidly opposed to his alleged pro-Moslem policy, and the Maronite Patriarch is reported to have sent a message to the President supporting his attempt to eliminate Sami Solh. The powerful commercial community of Beirut has been alienated by the Government's attitude on the War Profits Tax, even though, in anticipation of elections, no serious effort is now being made to collect it. A large proportion of the Lebanese Moslems are also turning against Sami Solh, partly on account of the hostility displayed towards him by other leaders of this chronically disunited community and partly on the more legitimate grounds that he has failed to protect Moslem interests. Many Christians not under the influence of their religious chiefs are also beginning actively to oppose the Government in a manner which is habitual in the Lebanon when any Government has been in power more than a few months. Its disappearance in preparation for elections, if and when they take place, will therefore be generally welcomed, however unsatisfactory may be the body replacing it.

[25648]



Electioneering is in full swing in both North and South Lebanon, where the various candidates are jockeying for position and forming and unforming groups. In the Bekaa, where the feudal system is more strongly in force, the names of the candidates can be seen in advance and there are thus less grounds for political intrigue; the population, deprived of any chance of making their wishes felt against the weight of family influence, tend to oppose the whole principle of the re-establishment of parliamentary life on the grounds that it is expensive, corrupt and totally ineffective.

[E 845/27/89]

No. 39.

*Weekly Political Summary No. 45: Syria and the Lebanon, February 10, 1943.—*  
(Received February 26.)

*General.*

INTENSE political activity continues, but there have been no further developments of importance in the situation. Until the return of General Catroux and the announcement of the date of elections and the manner in which they are to be held, political parties and individuals are unable to do more than prepare tentative programmes.

There are indications that the Free French have begun to woo the Nationalists by holding out hopes of a favourable post-war treaty with Syria. It is probable that the Nationalists, whose recent conference at Damascus was clearly a failure, are by no means intransigent regarding their decision to demand the recall of the 1936 Parliament, and that, realising their weakness as a party, they would be prepared to make a show of collaboration with the French in order to gain power, although they might later refuse to sign a treaty except on their own terms.

There is also considerable agitation for the restoration of a monarchy. In this connexion the names of the Regent of Iraq and the Emir Abdullah of Transjordan are most commonly heard.

There have been strikes and demonstrations in Damascus and Aleppo, ostensibly as a protest against slight increases in the price of flour and bread. In Aleppo they have not been serious, but in Damascus a student was shot in circumstances which are not yet clear. The ringleaders are being arrested and the worst of them will be deported.

Mr. Churchill's visit to Adana has aroused great interest and there is considerable speculation as to the possibility of Turkey's entry into the war on the side of the Allies. In Northern Syria there is alarm lest the price of Turkish co-operation should be the cession of Aleppo and the Jezireh to Turkey after the war.

*Wheat.*

Weather conditions are still hampering the collection of cereals, and the Lebanese Ravitaillement service is being stocked from Syria whenever road conditions allow of transport through the mountains. To alleviate the difficulties caused by the lack of transport, fifty 3-ton lorries are being acquired. The total quantity of cereals collected up to the 5th February amounted to 178,484 tons towards a target figure of 260,000 tons.

*Syria: Damascus.*

Great excitement prevails and all parties are holding meetings and taking up position. There have, however, been no major political developments since the Nationalist Congress reported last week, which aroused no popular enthusiasm, was poorly attended and seems to have achieved nothing.

It has not yet been possible to bring into force the new scheme for feeding the Damascus population which was outlined in Summary No. 42 of the 20th January, owing to the dilatoriness of the municipality in completing the necessary lists of the poor, but these lists are now at last ready and the scheme is about to be put into force. Meanwhile, the price of bread sold to the middle class has been raised by 10 piastres per kilogram, so as to bring it into line with that prevailing elsewhere throughout the country.

This increase was made the pretext for closing the shops and for demonstrations by students, women and small boys, which, although at first not serious, have now taken on a graver aspect following the death of a student who was shot in circumstances which have not yet been elucidated. The Syrian Prime Minister,

at the request of the Allied authorities, has publicly condemned the instigators of the strike and announced that the ringleaders will be arrested and the worst offenders deported. This action will be taken under the existing arrangements for dealing with offences against the wheat scheme.

It seems probable that, although the demonstrations have been ostensibly directed against wheat policy, they are due to the weakness and unpopularity of the present Government and have been encouraged by merchants dissatisfied with the Government's attempts to enforce the recently enacted income tax laws.

*The Lebanon.*

The Lebanese President and Prime Minister have now staged a reconciliation scene designed to impress public opinion with their solidarity, in the hope that this will assist towards their maintenance in power during the election period. Off stage, however, their relations remain bad, and each speaks freely of the impossibility of co-operating with the other.

The tempo of electioneering has slightly quickened throughout the Lebanon, and the French Conseillers at Sidon and Tripoli are taking an increasingly open part in the formation of electoral lists composed of persons whom they deem amenable to French pressure or influence. All British authorities in touch with the public are receiving numerous visits and deputations enquiring what action the British authorities will take; the impression that there will be rival British and French lists of candidates will be difficult to dissipate.

A Moslem ceremony took place in Tripoli on the 31st January in commemoration of the death of Dr. Bissar, a prominent Moslem leader. The Prime Minister attended, and took the opportunity to make a further attempt, which seems to have been unsuccessful, to reconcile the two Moslem leaders of Tripoli, Abdul Hamid Kerami and Rashid Mekkadem, in support of himself. It had been intended to use the occasion to hold a Nationalist *bloc* meeting, but snowbound roads prevented more than a few of the lesser Syrian Moslems from attending.

The Adana Conference has produced the usual crop of rumours, mostly to the effect that Turkey will shortly either enter the war on the side of the Allies or allow them facilities for launching an attack on the Dodecanese.

[E 1011/27/89]

No. 40.

*Weekly Political Summary, No. 46, Syria and Lebanon, February 17, 1943.—*  
(Received in the Foreign Office, March 15.)

(Secret.)

*General.*

THERE have been minor strikes of shops in Aleppo, Homs and Hama, ostensibly as a protest against the new Syrian rents law, but no disorders have occurred, and it is clear that the firm attitude adopted at the outset by the Allied authorities towards the disturbances in Damascus restrained malcontents elsewhere.

Unfortunately, the deterrent effect of this initial show of firmness has now been lost, as the Free French Délégué in Damascus, acting apparently in collusion with the Syrian Prime Minister and Minister for Social Affairs, has released almost all the persons who were arrested for fomenting the disorders. This action, which was taken without the concurrence of the British authorities, despite the fact that, at General Collet's own urgent request, they had been associated in the original announcement regarding the arrests, appears to have been dictated by considerations of personal prestige and by a desire to please the Nationalists, with whom there now seems to be little doubt that the French have come to an agreement over elections. Although there is no evidence to show that the demonstrations were the work of any one faction, there is some reason to believe that they were at least countenanced by the Nationalists, by whom this ill-judged act of clemency can only be regarded as an encouragement to sponsor further disturbances whenever it suits their purpose to do so.

*Wheat.*

With an improvement in the weather, cereal collections have increased, and in the past week some 1,700 tons of grain were bought, of which well over 50 per cent. was wheat.

Nevertheless, the failure of the Syrian Government to collect the quantity of grain promised, the reluctance of the population to declare its stocks and the



incompetence of the Ravitaillement services have created a position where the stocks in hand are not able to bear the demands being made upon them, and measures are therefore envisaged for a reduction in the rations of all but the very poor.

#### *Syria: Damascus.*

The disturbances reported in the last summary continued with varying intensity throughout the week, but petered out upon the arrest of sixteen of the ringleaders. The shops have now reopened and the town is more or less quiet, but it cannot be said that the situation has returned to normal.

It was incorrectly stated in last week's summary that the announcement regarding the arrest and punishment of the ringleaders had been made by the Prime Minister. This announcement, made in the name of the Allies, had been approved by the French and British authorities in Beirut on the understanding that it would be given out by Jamil Ulshi, but, in fact, he declined to associate himself with it; and General Collet, who had failed to make this clear either to the British or to the French in Beirut, read out the announcement himself to a hastily assembled audience of journalists and merchants.

The Syrian Cabinet displayed an even greater lack of courage and firmness than the Prime Minister. At the height of the demonstrations the Minister for Foreign Affairs admitted to the Political Officer that, if the Cabinet had been consulted, it would have refused to sanction the measures which were the ostensible cause of the strike, and he even went so far as to express the wish that the British military authorities should take over the Syrian security services "as the French had done on similar occasions in the past." He also talked of getting rid of the Prime Minister on the grounds of his failure to consult the Cabinet more fully. It was made plain to Faiz Bey that, in the view of the British authorities, the attitude adopted by himself and his colleagues constituted a damaging admission of incompetence, and that any Prime Minister who might be called in to replace Jamil Ulshi would immediately be faced with the same task, and would have to go if he shirked it.

Notwithstanding these necessary admonitions, however, it seems that the Prime Minister, frightened by the attitude of his Cabinet, and Munir Ajlani, the Minister for Social Affairs, eventually promised the heads of certain quarters of the town that, if the latter would use their influence to prevent a renewal of disorders, the majority of the arrested persons would be released. This promise was, of course, entirely unwarranted in view of the fact that the arrests had been made in the name of the Allied authorities, and doubly so since the Prime Minister had declined even to make the announcement of the arrests on their behalf, excusing himself on the ground that security was an Allied responsibility. It was, however, endorsed by General Collet, who, without waiting for the concurrence of the British authorities, proceeded to release all but three of the arrested persons. This discourteous and injudicious action on the part of the délégué at Damascus, which is not the first of its kind, has been the subject of a strong protest to M. Hellen, who himself seems to have been misinformed as to the nature of General Collet's proposal and entirely agrees that the latter's action was unwarrantable.

The Syrian Government has granted a pension of £S. 400 a month to the widow of the late Sheikh Taj ed-Din, who is said to have died a poor man despite the accusations of venality levelled against him during his life-time. A similar award has been made, without any justification, to Hashim Bey Atassi, the Nationalist ex-President of the Republic.

#### *The Lebanon.*

There are indications that the electioneering activities of French officials and the absence of any overt British reaction, are producing a wave of depression amongst the population, who begin to feel that the presence of the British authorities will not suffice to bring any reality or liberty into the elections. The following extract from this week's report from the Political Officer at Zahlé may be taken as typical of the feelings of the majority of Lebanese not immediately interested in the prospect of office:—

"No one fully believes in the independence of the Lebanon, and no one believes that the elections will be free. It is seldom suggested that such and such an individual will find his way to Parliament because of his known policy or his known faith and aspirations for his country. They almost all expect French or British support, and do not discount the possibility of American interference as well. Hundreds of years of foreign domination have killed any

feeling that the Lebanon can be allowed to stand on its own feet, and the conviction that the Allies will in practice fight for its body is deep-rooted. Not believing in the altruism of foreign Powers or in their own country as a national unity, individuals are frankly pursuing their own selfish aims, and it will take many years of political education and development to alter them."

The activities of the Lebanese Government's Anti-Profiteering and Anti-Hoarding Department are being pursued with commendable energy, thanks to the co-operation of two good officials in the positions of head of the department and judge of the special tribunal formed to try such cases. So far the department has made no spectacular hauls nor inflicted any spectacular punishments, but the number of cases dealt with is steadily increasing, and not all the persons convicted are insignificant. The department has now secured the right to close offending shops by administrative action. Furthermore, a sufficient measure of justice seems to have been done to obviate any large-scale opposition to the work of the department.

Pending the arrival of General Catroux and the announcement of the election arrangements, the Lebanese Government seem now to be chiefly concerned to take no action liable to jeopardise their position or compromise their personal popularity; in particular, no serious effort is being made to enforce the collection of the War Profits Tax. The individual ministers continue to bicker in private.

The usual exaggerated optimism about the news from Russia is evident amongst the population, who talk freely of an early end to the war. Nervousness regarding the possibility of a German diversionary attack on this country through Turkey has diminished, though the absence of an official communiqué on the recent railway accidents has given rise to a crop of rumours regarding parachutists and sabotage.

[E 1130/27/89]

No. 41.

*Weekly Political Summary No. 47, Syria and the Lebanon, February 24, 1943.—*  
(Received in the Foreign Office March 20.)

(Secret.)

#### *General.*

THERE are no important political developments to report. General Catroux returned to Beirut on the 19th February and has begun his consultations with Lebanese personalities, but nothing concrete has yet emerged.

He is alleged by President Naccache to have consulted him regarding the recall of the old Lebanese Chamber, but in conversation with His Majesty's Minister, although he mentioned the subject, he showed no sign of having seriously contemplated such a step.

General Catroux proposes to visit Damascus for discussions with the Syrian Government before proceeding any further with election plans. He envisages the appointments of interim "Governments of affairs" to see the elections through, and has undertaken to consult with the British authorities on the choice of personalities for these Governments.

The activities of the Communist party have been intensified in the last few weeks under the stimulus of Russian victories, and public meetings have recently been held by the party in Beirut, Aleppo and Hama, at which unexceptionable declarations of support for the Allies and of praise for Russian prowess have been made. The party appears to derive its support mainly from the lower middle-classes and to be inspired more by admiration of what the Soviet Union have accomplished than by any particular understanding of Communist ideals and the desire to promote them in this country. Its expressed intention to improve the lot of the working classes is likewise translated into a vague hope of improving their material condition rather than into a demand for the delegation of greater political power to them.

#### *Wheat.*

The improvement in the collection of cereals reported in last week's Summary has been maintained. A meeting was held in Damascus on the 17th February between representatives of the Syrian Government and the Allied authorities to discuss the settlement of the Government's debt to the O.C.P. The meeting was inconclusive, owing to the evasiveness of the Syrian representatives, and it was



therefore necessary for the Higher Wheat Committee (consisting of the Délégué Général and His Majesty's Minister) to address a strongly-worded note to the Government, insisting on an early settlement.

It is reported from the Homs area that, as a result of the recent increase in the price of cereals sold to the rich, fewer of this class are availing themselves of the issue made by the Ravitaillement, as wheat can be bought more cheaply on the black market. Up to the 18th February only 370 out of a total of 15,000 of the "rich" class had drawn their issue for the month, and it is anticipated that next month, when flour will be issued, there will be a still greater number of persons, possibly including some of the poor, who will not take the Ravitaillement issue because they dislike the quality of the flour and prefer to make pure wheat bread from grain bought on the black market or already in their possession. This will have the excellent effect of bringing out for consumption stocks of cereals which otherwise would have remained hidden.

#### *Syria: Damascus.*

There has been no renewal of the recent disorders and the town is calm. It now appears that M. Helleu was misinformed by the Free French authorities in Damascus as to the number of persons still under detention for complicity in the recent disturbances (see last week's Summary): these total nineteen, not three, as he was told. Most of them, however, are of little importance. Arrangements are being made for the deportation of three of the worst offenders.

There has not yet been time for the population's reactions to General Catroux' return to make themselves felt.

The press has announced the early creation of a "Co-operative" for civil servants, past and present, and their dependents. According to newspaper estimates, some 33,000 persons would benefit directly by this project which, if realised, would, in addition, have a beneficial effect on prices generally by withdrawing the purchasing power of a large body of consumers from the ordinary market.

The appointment of plain clothes inspectors to circulate in the bazaars and enforce existing price control regulations has also been announced.

#### *The Lebanon.*

The return of General Catroux on the 19th February, and the consultations with prominent politicians in which he has since engaged, have given rise to every sort of speculation and rumour regarding the electoral régime which the Allied authorities intend to set up in this country. General Catroux is alleged by President Naccache to have consulted him regarding the advisability of recalling the 1939 Lebanese Chamber as a preparation for the elections, but to have been strongly discouraged from doing so on the grounds that this Chamber was elected as the result of a particularly unscrupulous piece of bargaining between the then High Commissioner and two Lebanese politicians. If any such suggestion was, in fact, made by General Catroux—which is doubtful in view of the line which he has taken with His Majesty's Minister since his return—it is probable that the President was less concerned with the suitability of the old Chamber than with the reflection that its recall would result in his own elimination. Sélim Tacla and Habib Abi-Chahla, who some time ago endeavoured to promote the formation of a coalition between the parties of Émile Eddé and Beshara el-Khoury for the purpose of forming a provisional Government to run the elections, have also been interviewed together by General Catroux, and seem confident that they at least will become members of this Government.

Some excitement has been caused in Lebanese political circles by a report in the Egyptian newspaper *Ahram* of an interview given by General Catroux in Cairo, in which he is alleged to have expatiated on the continuance of France's mandatory status in the Levant States and of the necessity of preserving France's privileged position here in any final settlement of the political régime in these States. These declarations, whether or not authentic, have combined with various statements attributed to French officials recently, to the effect that General Catroux has received full authority in London to arrange political matters in these countries by himself, still further to discourage the numerous elements who still hope for a diminution of French influence.

[E 1300/27/89]

No. 42.

*Weekly Political Summary No. 48, Syria and the Lebanon, March 3, 1943.—*  
(Received in the Foreign Office March 16.)

(Secret.)

#### *General.*

THE fear of Jewish infiltration into Syria, which is constantly being excited by Axis propaganda, has been aroused in acute form by a statement which has appeared in the Damascus press that decrees have been issued by the Syrian Government authorising certain specific transactions in land and property in favour of a number of Palestinian and French nationals. As a result there have been demonstrations in Aleppo, where the shops were closed, and strikes of students in Homs and Hama, but no serious disturbances have yet occurred. It is hoped that the communiqué which has now been published by the Syrian Government, assuring the population that existing legislation governing the transfer of property to foreigners provides adequate safeguards, will calm public opinion. The precise circumstances in which these lands and properties were transferred are being further investigated.

Considerable excitement has also been caused by garbled accounts of a statement made by General Catroux to the Cairo newspaper *El Ahrām*. In this statement the Délégué promised that the elections would be free, but laid it down as a condition of the grant of this and other liberties that France's historic rights in the Levant must be respected. The French censorship having unwisely suppressed the article, various inaccurate accounts of it were circulated. General Catroux was alleged, for example, to have said that the elections would be conducted in the spirit of the mandate, and that as a condition of the return to constitutional life the various parties would have to promise to conclude a treaty by which respect for France's traditional rights in the country would be guaranteed. The Free French made matters worse by denying that General Catroux had referred to the mandate in this interview. He did in fact say—or at any rate he was reported by the *Ahrām* as saying—that France was ready to "follow to the very end the path of freedom and sincerity in the spirit of the mandate with which he was charged and of her traditional principles."

On the other hand, a report in the same Cairo paper of Mr. Eden's statement in the House of Commons on Arab federation, has caused great satisfaction in Nationalist circles.

#### *Wheat.*

The quantity of cereals bought during the week was well below average and it is now clear that there must soon be a reduction both in rations and in the percentage of wheat used in flour-making. The position is receiving the urgent attention of the Higher Committee of the O.C.P. and the Syrian Prime Minister, who has been informed of the situation, has been told quite plainly that there must be a reduction in the quantity of cereals consumed in Damascus.

#### *Syria-Damascus.*

Since his arrival in Damascus General Catroux has had interviews with members of the Cabinet and other prominent politicians, including a number of Nationalist leaders. No doubt these last, and in particular Shukri Quwatli, advocated the recall of the 1936 Assembly, that being the agreed policy of the Nationalist *bloc*; and rumours are circulated in Damascus that General Catroux himself is inclined to favour this solution (despite the fact that he had shown no signs of doing so in his earlier conversations with the British authorities). The public is therefore strengthened in its belief that the French and Nationalists have come to an agreement on the basis of French support for the *bloc* and Nationalist agreement to a Franco-Syrian treaty. It is argued that to enter into such an agreement with the French the *bloc* must be acutely aware of its weakness in the country as a whole.

The political atmosphere is still very uneasy, and scandalous and obscene notices directed against the Prime Minister and against the Government's bread policy have been posted up in the town, and especially in the Tajhiz school. It is clear that the promoters of the recent disorders are still smarting under their defeat and are only waiting for a suitable opportunity to renew their activities.

The 25th anniversary of the formation of the Red Army was celebrated in Damascus by a combined meeting of the "Anti-Fascist League" and the



"Friends of the Soviets," which was attended by a large and enthusiastic audience. The speeches praised the successes of, and the conditions of service in, the Russian army, and refuted the criticisms usually levelled against the Soviet régime.

#### *The Lebanon.*

As a result of strong rumours which began to circulate in Beirut soon after General Catroux's return, to the effect that he was considering either recalling the 1939 Lebanese Chamber or replacing the present Government with another nominated ministry, the Lebanese President and Prime Minister both came to the conclusion that their own positions were in imminent danger. The former's reaction was particularly strong, as he has for some months been harbouring feelings of resentment against General Catroux for various alleged slights. At the instigation of Camille Chamour, the President and Prime Minister accordingly got together and drafted a letter which the former sent to General Catroux, with a copy to His Majesty's Minister, protesting against the General's consultations with certain "interested politicians," and arguing that the 1939 Chamber should under no circumstances be recalled in view of the corrupt fashion in which it had been elected. In conversation, President Naccache has been taking the line that, as President of a country declared independent, he cannot be forced to resign, and will not do so. It is, however, uncertain how long his courage will sustain him in opposition to General Catroux. Moreover, he and the Prime Minister omitted to consult the other ministers before making their protest, probably through fear that they would not be supported, and the Minister of the Interior, who is exceedingly prudent by nature, has already given indications that he will not, in fact, support them. Messages were, as usual in these cases, sent to the British authorities, asking whether they would endorse the Government's independent attitude; the only reply that could be returned was that the British attitude must be reserved until it became clear what the French proposed. It is, in fact, impossible to judge whether the effects of a stand by the present Government in this matter, and their consequent retention of office, would be desirable, until it is known what alternative solution General Catroux finally proposes.

The publication by the Lebanese Government on the 25th February of their 1943 budget, amounting to nearly £8.22 million, has given rise to local comment on the absolute necessity of reinstituting parliamentary control over finance when such comparatively large sums are involved, coupled with criticisms of the Government's alleged squandering of public money on political appointments. It is generally realised that both the War Profits Tax and the National Lottery, as expected, have so far been complete failures as revenue-raising devices.

There has been a lull in electioneering pending the announcement of electoral arrangements, and reports, possibly emanating from French sources, have been circulating in the provinces to the effect that the elections may be put off until the autumn in order to avoid unnecessary excitement during the difficult pre-harvest period.

[E 1708/27/89]

No. 43.

*Weekly Political Summary No. 49 for Syria and the Lebanon, March 10, 1943.*

#### *General.*

NO final decision has yet been reached by General Catroux on the question of elections in Syria. He has been under strong pressure from the Nationalist *bloc* to adopt their programme for the recall of the 1936 Chamber under Hashim Atassi, and has evidently been contemplating, and actually discussing with Shukri Quwatli, a bargain whereby the Nationalists would be brought to power by the French in exchange for an undertaking to conclude thereafter a treaty on the lines of the abortive agreement of 1936. It is not altogether clear how far Shukri Quwatli has committed himself to this dubious deal, the fulfilment of his side of which would certainly make him and his party intensely unpopular with the Syrian population as a whole. He is known to have considered, as one possible solution, accepting power on these conditions and later declining to carry out his side of the bargain on the grounds that the Parliament which he represented was proving recalcitrant. However that may be, strong representations have been made to General Catroux by His Majesty's Minister against any

such pre-election deal, the ultimate effect of which would be most prejudicial to the French themselves; and it is hoped that, as a result of this advice, the plan has now been dropped.

As regards the Lebanon, General Catroux's present intention is to induce President Naccache to resign and to nominate in his stead a small interim Government under either M. Boulos, the weak but relatively honest Minister for Foreign Affairs, or Dr. Ayoub Tabet, a non-party Protestant of considerable integrity and force of character, who has, however, proved difficult to work with in the past. Either of these two solutions would be acceptable. General Catroux seems fully aware of the undesirability of the present system, under which one-third of the Lebanese Chamber is nominated by the President. The problem is, however, complicated by the fact that this system is an integral part of the existing Lebanese Constitution, which it is the avowed intention of the French to bring back into force. He is taking further advice on the possibility of specifically suppressing this undesirable feature of the Constitution at the moment when he announces the restoration of constitutional life. An alternative solution which has been put to him is the creation of a constituent assembly with legislative powers and restricted to a two-year term of office, which would in due course submit a suitably modified Constitution to the verdict of popular suffrage.

#### *Wheat.*

During the past week there has been a slight increase in the quantity of cereals bought. The position, however, still remains unsatisfactory, and further rationing, as foreshadowed in last week's Summary, is now imperative.

The transport situation has been eased by the arrival of the fifty trucks referred to in Summary No. 45 of the 10th February, together with a further fifty of the same type.

#### *Damascus.*

The political excitement provoked by General Catroux's recent visit has now somewhat subsided, although uneasiness prevails within the Government and certain Ministers are reported to be contemplating resignation in order to avoid dismissal at a later stage, when an interim Government is appointed to conduct the elections. So far, however, General Catroux has not made his intentions known, and the general population has concluded that no immediate changes in administration are to be expected.

Apart from a small meeting of protest in the lycée on the 27th February, the question of the sale of land in Syria to foreigners has not provoked in Damascus the trouble that it has caused elsewhere. The press has published various articles on the subject, culminating in an article in *Les Échos*, reprinted in most Arabic papers, which warned the public that the present law prohibiting land sales to foreigners left too much to the discretion of the Government. The Government has, indeed, by decrees dated the 17th February, permitted land transfers to foreigners. None of these have, however, been Jews or Europeans, despite statements to the contrary which have, significantly, appeared in the French press.

#### *Aleppo.*

General Catroux, accompanied by two senior French liaison officers from North Africa, visited Aleppo on the 3rd March and interviewed Nationalist ex-Ministers and certain Deputies, whom he sounded on the subject of the recall of the last Parliament. According to reliable reports only three of those whom he approached were in favour of such a step. The majority of the Nationalists of Aleppo are moderates who do not acknowledge the leadership of Shukri Quwatli and disapprove of his programme.

#### *Homs and Hama.*

General Catroux visited Homs during the week and had discussions with Hashim Bek Atassi, Mazhar Pasha Raslan and the Syrian Orthodox Patriarch. The latter is reported to have urged the removal of Faiz-el-Khoury from the Government on the grounds that he is universally disliked and by no means represents the Christians. It is reported that Hashim Bek and Mazhar Pasha, in accordance with the agreed policy of that section of the National *Bloc* which follows Shukri Quwatli, demanded the recall of the 1936 Assembly, and that Mazhar pointed out the possibility of many Communists being returned if elections were held at the present time, which, he urged, might prevent the *bloc* from co-operating fully with the French.



*Jebel Druze.*

The Syrian Prime Minister, accompanied by the Emir Hassan el Atrash and Bahij bey el Khatib, visited the Jebel on the 4th March, ostensibly to discuss administrative questions and to inspect the working of the O.C.P. It is reported unofficially that he has agreed to make the police, the gendarmerie and the Department of Posts and Telegraphs the responsibility of the Syrian Government, and thus enable the Druzes to put their finances in order at some cost to their semi-autonomous status.

During the lunch given by the Emir Hassan, the Prime Minister and Bahij Khatib made some outspoken remarks on Syrian internal affairs. The former declared that none of the Mediterranean countries was suited to parliamentary Government, and added that he would view with alarm a return to constitutional life. Bahij bey stated that, for the time being at any rate, Syria would be best governed by Mohafazat Councils.

Little interest is being shown locally in the forthcoming elections; and while it is confidently expected that the French will put forward candidates of their own choosing, they have so far shown no signs of doing so.

*The Lebanon.*

General Catroux sent a firm reply to the Lebanese President's protest against his consultations and rumoured intentions on the subject of election arrangements (see last week's Summary). He pointed out that the French mandate was still juridically in force and that the responsibility of determining in what manner constitutional life should be resumed in the Lebanon was his, so that it was necessary for him to inform himself, by direct contact with all sections of opinion, of the views of the Lebanese in this matter. He therefore rejected the protest and declined discussion until he had made up his mind on the course to be pursued.

In this letter General Catroux was at pains to emphasise that he would have preferred not to mention his rights under the mandate, and only did so because his position had been directly challenged. Nevertheless, its tone so agitated President Naccache that he contemplated immediate resignation, and suggested to his Ministry that they also might resign as a protest. He found them, however, disinclined to this course, and most of them counselled him against resigning himself. Riadh-es-Solh, who was closely in touch with him, also strongly advised him against resignation, on the grounds that this would merely facilitate the accomplishment of what he mistakenly conceived to be General Catroux's design of recalling the 1939 Lebanese Chamber. After a somewhat cold interview with the general, the President decided to take no action. The situation thus remains unchanged for the present.

The impression that the 1939 Chamber will, in fact, be recalled has been widely disseminated in Beirut and has caused dissatisfaction amongst all not immediately interested: even some of its Deputies are said to have objected to the idea. It is believed that the report is unfounded.

[E 1823/18/89]

No. 44.

*Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 29.)*

(No. 12.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Beirut presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and, with reference to Foreign Office telegram No. 10 of the 5th January to this legation, has the honour to transmit to him a copy of a memorandum for onward transmission to His Majesty's Treasury, dated the 1st March, 1943: *Intérêts Communs Funds.*

*Beirut, March 11, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 44.

*Memorandum to His Majesty's Treasury from Mr. W. W. Lawson on the Intérêts Communs Funds.*

FOREIGN OFFICE telegram No. 10 of the 5th January to His Majesty's Minister, Beirut, stated that the Treasury had expressed a wish to hear my views on the question of the proposed Financial Committee, as well as to have a concrete proposal regarding the *Intérêts Communs*, bearing in mind the danger of His Majesty's Government becoming involved in any financial responsibility for civil administration of the States as a result of any alterations.

2. It would appear to me that the budgetary position of the States has not always been understood, nor has the proportion of the revenue handled by the *Délégation Générale* in the *Intérêts Communs* budget compared to the total revenue of these territories been properly appreciated. I propose, therefore, to set out the figures of all civil revenue collected in the territories, with some explanations of where the revenue comes from. Both Syria and the Lebanon have their own civil budget; the *Intérêts Communs* funds are the budget of the French *Délégation Générale*. All three budgets are published yearly, giving very full details of estimated receipts and expenditure. The final figures of the *Intérêts Communs* revenue collected, and expenditure made, are published a year after the closure of the fiscal year. That is to say that the final figures of 1941 are published along with the 1943 budget figures.

Following these figures I shall give a résumé of the negotiations that have taken place on the handing over of the *Intérêts Communs* funds since General Catroux, in Cairo in May 1942, promised that he would ask the States to submit their proposals.

3. *Estimated* receipts of the three budgets for the last four years were as follows:—

	Syria.	Lebanon.	<i>Intérêts Communs.</i>
1940 ... ..	11,884,000	6,510,000	10,173,000
1941 ... ..	13,603,000	6,635,000	5,180,000
1942 ... ..	22,000,000	12,504,000	8,573,000
1943 ... ..	33,000,000 (approx.)	21,000,000 (approx.)	11,078,000

*Final* figures of revenue collected are not published by the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, but for the *Intérêts Communs* budget it is known that—

£S.

8,928,000 were collected in 1940, and

7,655,000 were collected in 1941.

The final revenue figures collected by the *Intérêts Communs* funds in 1942 have not yet been published, but total revenue exceeded the estimates as there is now a surplus of about £S. 4 million available for distribution to the States this year. The estimated revenue of the *Intérêts Communs* funds for 1943 is composed of—

	£S.
Revenue from customs receipts ... ..	8,830,000
Revenue from Tripoli topping plant ... ..	2,000,000
Public works (car permits, &c.) ... ..	150,000
Sundries ... ..	98,000

Expenditure is budgeted for among the various public departments as follows:—

	£S.
Customs ... ..	2,736,000
Programme of works (irrigation, &c.) ... ..	2,500,000
Office of Works ... ..	1,198,000
A.R.P. ... ..	1,087,000
Reserve for adjusting cost-of-living allowance ... ..	750,000
News and Radio Services ... ..	539,000
Public Works Department ... ..	390,000
Administrative staff attached to the States ... ..	339,000
Economic Department ... ..	296,000
Financial Department ... ..	260,000
Unforeseen expenses ... ..	150,000



4. Indirect and direct taxation are the principal sources of income of the two States, accounting for about 75 per cent. of their total revenue. The remainder is composed of sundry items such as revenue from bank-note issue, taxes on import and export licences, and post office revenue. Direct taxation includes taxes on land and buildings, and a head tax on domestic animals. A small tax on salaries and rents exists in Syria, but none of this nature in the Lebanon. Indirect taxation, which is much more important than direct taxation, comes mainly from the tobacco monopoly and from a tax on petrol and other inflammable fuels. Substantial income was received by both States in 1942 from the profits of their Supply Departments, notably from sales of sugar.

5. Customs receipts figure in the Intérêts Communs budget to-day for about 80 per cent. of the total revenue, and at £S. 8,830,000 this item is by far the largest single item of revenue in all the three budgets. In pre-war days the customs receipts represented 95 per cent. and upwards of the Intérêts Communs revenue.

The problem from the financial angle now becomes clearer. The total revenue of the three civil budgets for 1943 is estimated at £S. 65 million (or £7½ million sterling), of which the Intérêts Communs budget amounts to £S. 11 million or only 16 per cent. of the total. It should be emphasised that the States support no military expenditure at present, and that they have no public debt. In peace time the expenditure on the local troops (Troupes Spéciales) was a charge on the Intérêts Communs budget, i.e., to the States themselves. To-day they are paid from the advances made by His Majesty's Treasury to the National Committee on account of French military expenditure.

6. Following General Catroux's request to submit proposals concerning the Intérêts Communs funds, the two Governments jointly prepared a memorandum setting out their views, which may be summarised as follows:—

(a) The departments administered by the Délégation Générale and financed by the Intérêts Communs funds to be divided into two categories:—

*First Category.*—Departments which could be maintained indefinitely under the joint administration of the States, such as Customs Department, Economic Department, Department for Protection of Industrial Property, &c.

*Second Category.*—The departments for which each Government could immediately assure its own administration: Powder Department, Public Works Department, Archaeological Department, A.R.P., Sûreté Générale (C.I.D.), &c.

(b) The Customs Department would be controlled by a Joint Board of Administration of three members from each State. The States would form a single zone within which merchandise would circulate freely.

(c) The control of the concessionary companies would continue to be exercised in common for a period of one year, during which time an agreement would be reached between the two Governments for the separate control of the companies. During this period the Joint Customs Board would act as controller.

(d) For the departments concerned with foreign trade, as well as those concerned with the administration of communications having a direct relation with defence, the two Governments would agree to admit the principle of collaboration of delegates of the Supreme Command during the war.

(e) Revenue from the departments jointly administered would be set aside in the first case to cover expenditure of the departments concerned. The remainder would be divided between the two Governments on the basis of 40 per cent. each, while 20 per cent. would be reserved for disposal according to the decision of the Joint Board.

(f) Staff arrangements are also foreseen.

7. No action was taken on these proposals for some time. On the 12th September, 1942, the Lebanese Government and the Syrian Government addressed letters in identical terms to the Délégué Général, referring to a conversation with General Catroux during which the Intérêts Communs problem was discussed. They confirmed the point of view expressed in their previous memorandum on the future status of the customs; agreed to submit the Press Office to the censorship of a delegate of the military authority; intimated that they proposed to appoint a controller to each of the concessionary companies and a representative to the management of the railway.

General Catroux replied by letter on the 30th September. He observed that the transfer of the Intérêts Communs funds could not take place immediately as it would inevitably cause confusion in the administration of the country, which must be avoided in war time. There was the question of security to be considered, which necessitated the maintenance of certain departments under the full control of the Délégué Général, as well as the question of the international status of the Levant States. Certain countries had not recognised the independence of the States, and the Délégué Général felt responsible to these countries for the obligations and responsibilities contracted by France in the name of the Levant States. In any case, the Treaty of 1936 foresaw a probationary period of three years before the handing over would become effective. He was ready to make certain concessions at once, but insisted that the present personnel of all departments should remain at their posts, except in certain agreed cases. The concessions were:—

(a) Transfer of the Powder Department on the condition that licences would only be delivered by the local Governments after visa of the Sûreté Générale.

(b) The Protection of Industrial Property Department could not be transferred because of the international character of the laws relating to such property. He would accept the appointment of a delegate of the local Government to this department.

(c) Post and Telegraph Department: The local Governments would have the right to supervise the recruitment and promotion of local personnel, except for the more important posts, which would still require the sanction of the Inspector-General.

The issue of postage stamps would be the prerogative of the local Governments, but their design would require the approval of the Délégué Général.

(d) Archaeological Department: The States would have the right of controlling transactions on antiquities and of recovering taxes on this commerce, but the Délégué Général would continue to supervise the export of antiquities for the duration of the war.

(e) Concessionary companies: The financial control of the Compagnie des Eaux de Beyrouth would be handed over to the Lebanese Government when a solution was found to the question of the financial equilibrium of the company, at present under discussion, and when war-time necessities permitted the requisition order on the company to be lifted.

(f) Customs: Various arrangements concerning the recruitment of local staff would be made.

The fixing of customs tariffs must be reserved for the Délégué Général owing to war-time necessities, but the participation of the local Governments would be assured by the creation of a Mixed Co-ordinating Fiscal Committee, which would include representatives of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. The committee would be consulted on all questions relating to customs tariffs.

(g) The Department of Public Works, added General Catroux, was since February 1942 placed at the disposal of the local Governments, and on conditions agreed upon between them and the Délégué Général.

8. A vast gulf separates the proposals of the two parties. The proposal of the States is tantamount to a demand for the complete suppression of the organisation of the Délégation Générale, without a probationary period, and means the complete handing over of all the civil side of the financial, economic, customs and postal control. It would also mean that over 200 French personnel which at present constitute the key staff of the departments administered under the Intérêts Communs funds would find themselves without occupation, except for a few who might be engaged by the States and a few who would be kept on as advisers.

On the other hand, General Catroux's counter-proposals do not go very far towards meeting the aspirations of the local Governments. The proposed formation of a mixed committee to sit on questions of customs tariffs gives satisfaction as far as the control of the collection of practically all the revenue of the Intérêts Communs budget is concerned. Satisfaction is also offered for the recruitment of staff in the Customs and Post Office Departments. But the weakness of the counter-proposals from the States' point of view lies in the fact that no provision is made for a supervision of expenditure.

9. No steps seem to have been taken since the end of September to reconcile the two view-points. This is regrettable as the basis of a settlement might have



been found in a scaling down of the proposals on both sides as they appear to have been put forward as maximum demands.

General Catroux's counter-proposals mention a probationary period, and the States might have used this phrase as an argument to obtain the fixing of a definite time-limit for the handing over of the *Intérêts Communs* funds, during which period their representatives should have been attached to the key positions of all departments of the *Délégation Générale* and consulted on the control of budget expenditure. Valuable experience would thus have been gained preparatory to their assuming full responsibility for the administration of all their affairs. General Catroux could scarcely object to these measures, which would adequately protect the interests of the States during the probationary period, as his counter-proposals raise no objection to the principle of a transfer of the *Intérêts Communs* funds, but only to their transfer in war time. This latter difficulty could be overcome, if the fixed time-limit expired during the war, by providing for the creation of a control committee duly authorised to supervise all operations in which the Allies are vitally interested. Control of foreign trade and control of foreign exchange are the principal ones which concern directly the Treasury.

10. I am not prepared at this stage to submit more concrete proposals, as I feel that, although the total sum involved in the transfer (*i.e.*, £1,250,000) is relatively small, the whole problem is complex, involving, apart from technical and control difficulties, important political issues. This feature is, in my opinion, the predominant factor of the problem. Perhaps the result of the forthcoming elections will have some bearing on the position.

W. W. LAWSON.

Beirut, March 1, 1943.

[E 1589/27/89]

No. 45.

*Weekly Political Summary No. 50, Syria and the Lebanon, March 17, 1943.—*  
(Received in Foreign Office, March 31.)

General.

IN his difficult task of devising an acceptable procedure for the reintroduction of constitutional life in the two States, General Catroux has been hampered by three things: first, the attitude of the Lebanese President, who disputes his right to do so, and has of late been showing something of the dangerous courage of a demented sheep; second, the strong pressure exerted by the Nationalists, who dispute his right so long as he declines to exercise it to their advantage; and, third, his own unwise determination to commit the Nationalists in advance to the conclusion of a treaty with the French. These things have led him to contemplate, in respect of both States, courses of action which would not be conducive to the freedom of elections. He told His Majesty's Minister on the 15th March that, exasperated by the conduct of President Naccache, he was envisaging the creation of an interim Government under Peshara el Khouri—feeling, presumably, that it was only with the support of a powerful party leader that he could hope to get M. Naccache out of the saddle. It was, however, represented to him that no Government under a politician such as Beshara el Khouri could pass as neutral; and it is hoped that he has now reverted to his former and much sounder idea of an interim Government under the leadership of M. Philippe Boulos, the present Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is weak enough to be generally acceptable. As an alternative to M. Boulos, he has suggested Selim Tacla, but the latter, though in some respects not a bad choice, has lately become too closely associated with Beshara el Khouri to pass as a non-party man. Dr. Ayoub Tabet is now, according to General Catroux, ruled out by the fact that he is a candidate for the presidency.

The intransigence of the Lebanese President has also caused General Catroux to doubt his own power to restore the Constitution in a modified form, suppressing those clauses of it which prescribe the nomination by the President of one-third of the Deputies. He has nevertheless been strongly urged to do so, on the grounds that, if his right to restore the Constitution is admitted at all, he is clearly entitled to introduce a modification which would be welcomed as a progressive step by the population as a whole. It has further been pointed out to him that, whereas such action on his part would not debar the elected Parliament from immediately reintroducing the clauses in question should they think fit to do so, his failure to take it would perpetuate these clauses, owing to the fact that the Constitution can only be altered by a vote of at least

three-quarters of the Chamber—a majority which could never be achieved in face of the natural disinclination of the nominated third to accept its own extinction. As a less desirable alternative, he has been urged to arrange for the holding of elections for a constituent assembly, which would function for a period limited to two years and then submit an amended Constitution to the test of popular suffrage.

General Catroux's numerous talks with Syrian Nationalists, combined with his hankering for a Franco-Syrian treaty, have apparently convinced him of the necessity of accepting some part at least of the *bloc's* desiderata. Although it is more than doubtful whether the Nationalists are right in asserting that the 1936 Chamber is still in a state of merely suspended animation, he proposes to meet their demands to the extent of recalling that Chamber under the presidency of Hashem Atassi, on condition that it should dissolve itself after not more than two sessions and approve the formation of a "moderate" interim Government to control the elections, which would be held after the lapse of three months. Unfortunately, however, he proposes to make his offer to the Nationalists subject to two conditions: first, that they should accept in a secret agreement the principle of his proclamation of Syrian independence (which specifically foreshadowed the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian treaty), and second, that they should vote in principle for the creation of a Senate by the elected Parliament. And to induce them to accept these conditions he has drawn up a tentative list of personalities for an interim Government which might, indeed, be described as "moderate" but cannot by any stretch of the imagination be described as neutral, since eight out of nine are either members of the *bloc* or active sympathisers.

It is not clear how far General Catroux has gone in his endeavours to clinch this dubious bargain with the Nationalists, but it is known that while he was last in Damascus on the 13th and 14th March two intermediaries were successively despatched to Hashem Atassi to Homs. The General has, however, shown a welcome disposition to keep His Majesty's Minister informed of developments and to consult him. The latter has signified his agreement, as a matter of practical expediency, with the proposal to recall the 1936 Chamber for a "token" period only, but has pointed out the grave objections to an un-neutral interim Government of the type suggested, and has further endeavoured to dissuade General Catroux from attempting to impose on the Nationalists either of the two conditions referred to above. As regards the question of the treaty, the British view is that the Parliament destined to come to power as a result of free elections neither could nor should be committed in advance, and that any attempt on the part of the French to do so, especially by means of a secret agreement, would sooner or later have most undesirable repercussions from which the French themselves would be the first to suffer. The question of a Senate is less important, but it is felt that the creation of such a body would not be desirable in a country which lacks experience of parliamentary Government and is already far too prone to accept as inevitable a system of administration by subterranean intrigue.

It is not yet certain how far General Catroux is prepared to accept the British advice on these points, but he will have to reach a final decision in the very near future, since his presence is urgently needed in North Africa.

There has been a sudden and steep rise in the price of gold, which may be expected to react adversely on the already strained economic situation. As a first step towards checking the frenzied speculation, to which this increase in gold prices is due, the bourses in Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo, which have degenerated into little more than gambling dens, have been closed, and all forward transactions in gold and loans against gold have been forbidden. In addition, a committee has been set up to revise the rules under which the bourses operate and to form a market for transacting business in the shares of some twenty local companies. As the prices of other commodities, especially textiles, have undergone similar and even more violent fluctuations, and the measures taken by the local Governments to check the constant rise in prices have proved completely ineffective, plans are being studied for the absorption of the surplus funds held by the public and for a vigorous campaign of price control.

Wheat.

Total purchases during the past week have remained steady.

In order to reduce the present extravagant consumption of cereals in Damascus and to bring that city more nearly into line with Aleppo and other Syrian towns, a new system of distribution have been devised, and will be put



into force with the approval of the Syrian Government as soon as the issue of ration cards, which commenced on the 12th March, has been completed. The new plan provides for the distribution of bread instead of flour, and the daily ration is slightly reduced to 450 grammes for the poor and 400 grammes for the rich. The introduction of his measure is expected to result in a saving of 750 tons of cereals per month.

The Allied authorities' demand for the payment of the Syrian Government's debt to the *O.C.P.*, referred to in Summary No. 47 of the 24th February, met with no response, and the Government has therefore been informed that the following steps will be taken immediately to liquidate the debt which has accumulated and to prevent a deficit arising in the future:—

- (a) The Syrian Government's share of the surplus of the funds of common interest for 1942 will be appropriated.
- (b) The Bank of Syria will be authorised to issue notes to the value of £S. 3 million on behalf of the Government and the Wheat Board will receive a credit for this amount.
- (c) Should the Syrian Government fail to pay over a sum of £S. 3 million from its Treasury reserves by the 15th March, the proceeds of the Tobacco Monopoly will be transferred to the *O.C.P.*
- (d) The Wheat Board will at once assume responsibility for the milling and baking of cereals and their distribution against cash payments.
- (e) The Syrian Government is required to constitute a fortnightly deposit to cover approximately the deficit resulting from its policy of bread for the poor, while awaiting the preparation of final invoices.

The first failure on the part of the Government to make this provision will result in the *O.C.P.* taking over the sugar monopoly and using the profits from that commodity to cover the deficit, in addition to assuming control of the arrangements for supplying bread to the poor.

#### *Syria-Damascus.*

General Catroux's delay in announcing his intentions regarding the return to constitutional life is giving rise to many contradictory rumours. Those who oppose the Nationalists assert that this procrastination is due to the difficulty which General Catroux is encountering in his negotiations with the Nationalist leaders for an agreement committing them to the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian treaty. Amongst certain opponents of the *bloc* there is considerable agitation in favour of the restoration of a monarchy. The Nationalists themselves are clearly aware of their weakness, and are seeking the support of other political groups which have hitherto been hostile to them. The Government is uneasy, the Prime Minister is fearful for his position, and both the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Youth and Propaganda (who is a bitter opponent of the Nationalist *bloc*) are contemplating resignation. The result is that administration is even more inefficient than usual.

The Lebanese President's unexpected challenge of General Catroux's right to decide the manner in which constitutional life is to be resumed has caused considerable comment and speculation as to whether the Syrian Government may possibly adopt the same attitude.

The introduction of the new scheme for feeding the Damascus population, described above under "Wheat," has given rise to all kinds of wild rumours and has provoked some unrest, but there have not yet been any important demonstrations, and it is expected that the new arrangements will be accepted without serious difficulty unless political agitators interfere. Steps are, however, being taken to deal with any disorder which may occur. Unfortunately, the introduction of this scheme has coincided with a phenomenal rise in the price of gold, which is likely to be followed by a further increase in the already high cost of living.

Jamil Madfai, a former Prime Minister of Iraq, arrived in Damascus on the 6th March and stayed for several days. He is reported to have confined his contacts to the Shukri Quwatli group of Nationalists; and in a conversation with His Majesty's Minister at Beirut he showed that he was in full sympathy with the aspirations and programme of this section of the party.

#### *The Lebanon.*

General Catroux's decision regarding election arrangements in the Lebanon is still awaited, and speculation on their nature is still widespread and conflicting in character. The belief is growing that the 1939 Chamber will not be recalled

as a result of British objections to this procedure, and the assertions of the followers of Emile Eddé and Béchara el-Khoury that these two parties will divide the new Government between them now carry less conviction.

Meantime the main interest centres on what is regarded as the firm stand taken by President Naccache against General Catroux's claim to arrange the Lebanese political situation by himself. The President has so far maintained his position, and has been freely stating that he will under no circumstances resign his office at General Catroux's behest; and the unexpected firmness of his attitude has not only aroused the somewhat grudging admiration of all elements not directly opposed to him, but has encouraged his vacillating Prime Minister to take the position assigned to him. The rest of the Ministry are more anxious not to commit themselves, but are likewise making a show of solidarity until the moment when a head-on clash with General Catroux becomes inevitable. The immediate followers of Messrs. Eddé and Khoury, who see the promise of early office and of control of the elections receding, are, however, continuing to sneer at the President, maintaining with some truth that he showed himself subservient to the French until the moment when his own tenure of office was in danger.

A number of meetings have been held during the past week by various politically-minded groups of Lebanese for the purpose of expressing support for the President in his alleged stand for Lebanese independent rights against French attempts to maintain a mandatory hegemony; prominent amongst these are the Najjadé party and certain Moslems headed by the Lebanese mufti.

On the 15th March the Lebanese Prime Minister once more made a formal demand to General Catroux for the handing over of the *intérêts communs* on the grounds that, Lebanese independence having now been recognised by all the Allied members of the League of Nations, nothing should now stand in the way of the handing over to the Lebanese Government of the powers formerly exercised by the mandatory authority. The basis of this argument is unfortunately untrue, and it is not to be supposed that this belated attempt to profit from President Naccache's present antagonism to General Catroux will meet with any more success than heretofore. It is, however, clear that the French authorities will be forced sooner or later to make a determined stand if the present Lebanese Government is to be put back into its normal state of malleability.

The chemists of Beirut, having received no reply to their strong protest to General Catroux regarding the terms of the recent decree governing the import and distribution of pharmaceutical products, are again contemplating a strike to enforce their protests. Action has been taken on the British side with a view to securing the modification of certain of the clauses of this decree, notably as regards the participation of British and local representatives; but pending reference to Cairo little progress has been made in this direction.

Demands for the issue of monthly rations of flour have now been received from the inhabitants of the wheat-producing district of Akkar, in the North Lebanon, on the grounds that the wheat produced there is the property of the large landowners and has been sold either to the *O.C.P.* or on the black market, so that it is not available to the population.

#### *Press and Propaganda.*

The Free French censorship at Damascus continues to suppress articles connected with Mr. Eden's statement in the House of Commons regarding the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the problem of Arab federation.

All the Lebanese newspapers reported visits by various delegations to the Lebanese President in order to discuss the present political situation, but there has been no comment on these or on General Catroux's further consultations. Syrian and Lebanese press comment is unanimously opposed to the return of the suspended Chambers, some of the more outspoken articles in this sense being censored. On the anniversary of the proclamation of the Emir Faisal as King of Syria, *Alef Ba* published two articles strongly recommending a monarchy for Syria. The suggestion was strongly criticised by another Damascus paper, *Le Matin*.

The Beirut press continued to complain bitterly against the delays and irregularities in flour distributions and against the particularly bad quality of the ration distributed for February. It has also asked the Government to take drastic measures against the "unparalleled and unexpected" rise in gold prices. (The gold pound sterling was quoted at £S. 55 at one period during the afternoon of the 13th.)



## CHAPTER V.—GENERAL.

[E 425/425/65]

No. 46.

*Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 22, 1943.)*

(No. 423.)

Sir,

*Angora, December 31, 1942.*

AS you are aware, the Saadabad Pact, which was signed on the 8th July, 1937, between Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and Iraq, contained a clause by which it would be considered automatically extended for five years if none of the signatories denounced it before the 25th December, 1942. As it has not, in fact, been so denounced it remains in force until the 25th June, 1948.

2. M. F. R. Atay, the chief leader writer of the semi-official *Ulus*, drew attention to this fact in a leading article on the 26th December. He expressed the opinion that, as in 1937 so to-day, the four signatory States were serving the cause of peace and defending their freedom and independence, and he hoped that the friendship between them would be a useful factor in the post-war world.

3. The extension of the validity of the pact has otherwise aroused little interest in the Turkish press.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Baghdad, Tehran and Kabul.

I have, &amp;c.

(For the Ambassador),

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

[E 1196/506/65]

No. 47.

*Office of the Minister of State to Foreign Office.—(Received March 1.)*

Sir,

*Cairo, February 11, 1943.*

WITH reference to Minister of State's telegram No. 193 of the 30th January regarding the letter addressed to the Minister of State by the Prime Minister of Iraq, with which was enclosed a "Note on the Arab Cause, with Suggestions for the Solution of its Problems," I am directed by the Minister to transmit to you herewith a copy of this communication.

2. In view of the statements in the opening paragraphs of the letter, Mr. Casey regards the letter as a private and not as an official communication.

3. Copies of the letter and its enclosure are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo, His Majesty's Minister at Beirut and the High Commissioner for Palestine.

I am, &amp;c.

H. L. d'A. HOPKINSON.

Enclosure in No. 47.

*Office of the Prime Minister to the Minister of State.*

My dear Mr. Casey,

*Bagdad, January 14, 1943.*

AFTER our conversation about the future of the Arab States I decided to follow your advice and write a memorandum on the subject showing my personal interpretation of the problems facing us and putting forward my suggestions for their solution. The attached note has been prepared by me in my personal capacity, and although I know that several of my colleagues and other Iraqi leaders have similar views, yet I do not wish it to be regarded in any way as a statement of the Iraqi Government's policy.

As you are very busy these days and cannot be expected to read up the details of pledges and promises made twenty-four years ago, and all the discussions that have taken place since, I have tried to give as briefly as possible a summary of what has happened since the end of the last war. While my reading of the past differences between the Arabs and the British and the French is perhaps not unnaturally coloured, I have for the purpose of this note treated the subject as objectively as I can.

In view of the recent activities of Zionist organisations in England and America I feel that some declaration should be made by Great Britain and the United States regarding the future of the Arab territories which formerly formed part of the Ottoman Empire. The *Palestine Post* on the 2nd November, 1942, gave prominence to a report of a public demonstration held in London on the 1st November under the auspices of the Zionist Federation. Messages of sympathy were sent by a number of prominent persons who are entitled to their own views, but we were surprised that two serving Secretaries of State sent messages of sympathy. The Zionist Federation has always declared that by a national home in Palestine they mean an independent Jewish State and sympathy with Zionism implies support of their policy of creating such a State in Palestine, although the British Government has frequently and categorically declared that that is not her policy.

In Iraq we are not allowing news of this kind to be published, as we do not want Arab feeling to be inflamed against the Jews and the British. But, if the Zionists and their sympathisers are allowed to continue their propaganda, it will be very difficult for Arab leaders to restrain Arab journalists and politicians from initiating counter-propaganda in the Arab States. Unfortunately, in England and America, friends of the Arab cause have always experienced great difficulty in securing publicity for their views, and now in war time the position is worse owing to the shortage of newspaper space. Moreover, the terrible persecution which the Jews are suffering in Germany, Italy and occupied Europe naturally evokes sympathy for Jews generally and anybody who writes or speaks against Zionism is in danger of being regarded as condoning these persecutions.

Some time ago there was an agitation by the Zionists to create a Jewish army in Palestine and elsewhere to fight against the Axis. The British Government refused to be persuaded. But taking advantage of the present disclosures of Jewish massacres in Poland and Germany, the Zionists are again pressing for a Jewish army and have succeeded in enlisting very strong support for it in the United States.

A Jewish army unconnected with Palestine is no concern of the Arabs in Palestine or of the Arab States. But will the Zionists be content with a Jewish army divorced from the Jewish National Home or Zion (Palestine)? If there is any intention of recruiting such an army in Palestine or using it in Palestine or neighbouring Arab countries, the Arabs are bound to consider that the intention is to force the Allied Nations to accept the Zionist demand for a Jewish State, and that this army's ultimate purpose will be to fight the Arabs for the possession of Palestine. As you know, some Jews are boasting that already in Palestine they have the nucleus of an army with stores of rifles, machine guns and grenades. I am inclined to disbelieve this, but if such claims continue to be made they will cause further alarm to the Arabs there.

Dr. Chaim Weizmann, the Zionist leader, in an article in *Foreign Affairs*, an American quarterly, for January 1942, again urges the creating of a Jewish State in Palestine, and writes as if it is bound to be established after this war. From 1919 to 1922 he expressed the same views; then, when he realised the strength of Arab opposition to these claims, he modified them. Now he has revived them. I feel that if the United Nations made a definite pronouncement now to the effect that they will not support the creating of a Jewish State in Palestine, but adhere to the policy laid down in the White Paper of 1939, the Zionists would make protests, of course, but would accept the decision as final. They believe that it is possible, in the course of a great struggle such as the present war, to exact promises which would not be made in time of peace. So their extreme claims should be refused categorically now. At the same time, if you agree with my suggestion, it would be possible for the United Nations to guarantee the future of the Jewish National Home as it exists at present in Palestine with all the possibilities of its normal semi-autonomous development within the fabric of a greater Syria and an Arab League.

I invite your consideration of these matters as I am of opinion that, unless both the Zionists and their British and American sympathisers cease their propaganda during the war, the Arabs will start their own propaganda and that the Axis Powers will seize the opportunity, so presented, to create bad blood between Great Britain and the Arabs of the Near and Middle East.

Yours sincerely,

NOURY SAID.



*Note on the Arab Cause, with Suggestion for the Solution of its Problem.*

THE Arab peoples can be divided into two main groups: (1) those living in Africa, and (2) those living in Syria, in Palestine, in Iraq and in the Arabian peninsula.

Although in the second group the Arabs of the Arabian peninsula can be generally distinguished from those of Syria, Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan, yet linguistically, culturally, economically, the Arabs of those former Ottoman provinces are one people. In spite of the fact that during the past twenty years they have been divided into several different States and that diverse laws have been introduced into these States, yet, owing to the improvement in communications and education, they are culturally as close together as they have been for centuries. (This sameness particularly applies to the Ottoman territories lying on the south-eastern coast of the Mediterranean. Syria formed one compact Arab area, of which Palestine, the Lebanon and Transjordan were parts not distinguishable from each other nor from the present truncated State of Syria.) These areas, including Iraq, were all part of the territories of the Ottoman Empire, no international boundaries divided them, the form of administration was the same, and the same law applied. The habits and customs of the inhabitants in these areas were the same, whether they were Muslim or Christian, as, indeed, were their food and their general outlook.

Although in Syria and Palestine considerable numbers of Christians are to be found, they are mainly Arab in origin, and their customs, their language, their way of life are much the same as those of their Moslem neighbours. In the past the Christian denominations have frequently been more hostile towards each other than towards the Moslems, who treated all denominations alike.

The only Christian community which had a special position was that of the Maronites. In 1864, following disturbances between the Maronites and the Druzes of the Lebanon, this province was "placed under a privileged régime based on a large measure of autonomy which allowed the Maronites to have their own system of local government under a Christian Governor." This special form of administration rested on an international guarantee.

As under the old Ottoman Empire there existed various "Milletts" with special rights, the idea of semi-autonomous communities within the State is familiar to all Arabs of the succession States and generally accepted as a fair and sensible policy. This privileged régime of the Maronites deserves careful study, as it can be the model for a semi-autonomous Jewish province in Palestine, as will be explained later.

These Arabs of the Near and Middle East have for nearly a century been struggling to secure their natural right to independence, so that they may be able to unite; to recreate their ancient glory and to progress in the path of civilisation in freedom and peace. But, so far, political factors, external rather than internal, have obstructed their way and stood between them and their legitimate goal.

When the Arabs lost their independence several centuries ago, some of their countries fell to the Ottoman Empire and others were later seized by European countries and treated as colonies. Yet all this did not destroy the idea of independence in the Arab mind. Although Arab aspirations were suppressed for many years, the desire for independence eventually revived, stronger and mightier than ever.

In the Ottoman Empire Arabs as Moslems were regarded as partners of the Turks. They shared with the Turks both rights and responsibilities without any racial distinctions. The higher appointments in the State, whether military or civil, were open to the Arabs; they were represented in both the Upper and the Lower Houses of the Ottoman Parliament. Many Arabs became Prime Ministers. Sheikhs al Islam, generals and Walis, and Arabs were always to be found in all ranks of the State services.

When the decline of the Ottoman Empire began and the Party of Union and Progress started the Pan-Turkish Movement, the Arabs preferred to separate from that Empire; they launched a campaign for the defence of their rights, thereby paving the way for the independence of their countries.

At the beginning of the first Great War in 1914 the Arabs realised that a gloomy future awaited them owing to the sinister behaviour of the Party of Union and Progress, which had thrown itself into the arms of the Germans and joined them in the war against the Allies. So King Husain bin 'Ali (who was then the Sharif and Prince of Mecca) approached Great Britain, who definitely pledged herself to secure for the Arabs their independence. Relying on those

promises, King Husain proclaimed in 1916 the separation of the Arabs from the Ottoman Empire and joined the Allies, who were then pressing through the most critical and dangerous stage of the war. The Arabs in all their countries welcomed the step taken by King Husain and supported him, in the hope that they would find in the pledges of the Allies the realisation of their national aspirations. In consequence, Arabs in Turkish territory were subjected to indescribable persecution and atrocities. But they fought the Turks on the side of the Allies and shared in the conquest of Palestine and Syria.

In spite of the doubts raised in their minds when the Turks made public the terms of the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement and when the Balfour Declaration was published, the Arabs continued to trust in the repeated pledges given by Great Britain to King Husain and to the Arabs of Syria and Iraq generally, in various proclamations, that "the future government of these territories should be based on the principle of the consent of the governed." This confidence became a certainty in Arab minds when, in his famous Fourteen Points, President Wilson laid down that: "The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be secured a sure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development."

But the Arabs were gravely disappointed after the war, which ended with victory for the Allies, with whom they had joined and with whom they had fought, relying on their pledges to secure Arab independence. At the Peace Conference the Arabs realised that their victorious Allies had gone back on their promises. In fact, the treatment which the Arabs received from their Allies was worse than that accorded to the vanquished, who were not placed under any form of tutelage. The Allies divided the Arab territory amongst themselves according to secret treaties granting themselves mandates over these regions, in spite of the strong protests of all Arab leaders. These mandates were harder for the Arabs to bear than the old Ottoman rule. The mandatory system broke up the Arab territories into a number of separate administrations and was an arrangement which, if persisted in, would destroy Arab unity for ever. Iraq was placed under Great Britain, as was Southern Syria, and Northern Syria was handed over to France. Only the Arab States of the Arabian Peninsula were allowed complete independence.

During the last twenty years the Arabs have tried in every way to attract the attention of the civilised world to the wrong that has been done to them; they have constantly endeavoured to persuade world opinion of the justice of their cause and have struggled incessantly to obtain their independence. This mandatory system adopted by the Allies of the last Great War was obnoxious to the freedom-loving Arabs, who resent any form of tutelage. It has been the cause of all the disturbances, rebellions, boycotts and ill-will which have existed in these Arab countries and which still threaten their peace.

*Iraq.*

Iraq had been a mandated territory till 1932, when, by the exertions of her own people and aided by the British Government, she obtained her independence and was admitted to the League of Nations in the same year. Ever since her independence, Iraq has been chiefly interested in her own affairs, following the path of development and advancement which can be seen in all the fields of her activities. She is bound to Great Britain by the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930 under the terms of which both States co-operate with complete understanding to the mutual benefit of both parties.

Iraq is not merely a neighbour of other Arab countries, she is closely connected to them by the strongest linguistic, racial, religious, cultural, economical and other ties. In addition, Iraq shares with her neighbouring Arab countries the ideal of Arab unity which it is ultimately hoped will be realised. Without such union the Arabs will never be able to have their proper place in the world and regain their past glory, of which they are so rightly proud.

Iraqis believe that such an Arab union can only be effected by securing true independence for all Arab countries, which, in the course of time, will make their choice as to the nature of the union which suits them best and fully guarantees their interests. These considerations have made Iraqis always respond to happenings in the neighbouring sister Arab countries and take an intense interest in them. Whatever happens in Syria or Palestine has some repercussion in Iraq. Although for centuries the Jews enjoyed complete liberty in Iraq and lived on excellent terms with their Moslem neighbours, yet violent anti-Jewish feeling has been aroused by the events in Palestine. This hostility has been



fanned by German radio propaganda. As a result, in 1941, when an interregnum existed in Iraq and the forces of law and order were out of hand the mob looted the peaceful non-Zionist Jews of Bagdad and murdered a number of them. For this reason responsible statesmen in the Arab States where large Jewish communities are residing are always apprehensive of the effect in their own countries of what happens in Palestine. This also applies to all that occurs in the non-independent Arab regions.

*Northern Syria:* the present mandated territories of Syria and the Lebanon.

This was the most advanced of all the Arab provinces. The Syrians were the first to begin the Arab National Movement for independence. American and French universities and schools have been propagating learning and ideas of freedom among Arabs in Syria for over eighty years. In consequence Syria not only has a very numerous highly educated and cultured class of lawyers, doctors and arts graduates, but has a population with a highly-developed political spirit.

In spite of the fact that Syria and the Lebanon are not less civilised than many European countries, the unsound mandatory system which has been imposed upon them has impoverished them and created dissension among their peoples, leading to frequent disturbances and disorder. The Syrian Arabs have seized every opportunity to win true independence and even sacrificed their desire for unity in order to obtain it. They made agreements with the French for their country to be divided into two States—the Lebanon and Syria. Unfortunately they have been informed by a recent official announcement that, after about twenty-five years of waiting for freedom, their countries are still to remain part of the French Empire. At the time of this declaration the French were lying under the yoke of nazism, and their Governments, both central and colonial, were supporting the Nazis wholeheartedly. The Arabs cannot believe that this decision will be upheld by the United Nations.

*Southern Syria:* now divided into two mandated territories as Palestine and Transjordan.

The rivalry of Britain and France has separated these two countries, which are British mandated territories, from Syria, of which they form an integral part. Transjordan enjoys a form of autonomy under the rule of His Royal Highness Prince Abdullah, son of King Husain, but is as anxious to obtain full independence as any of the other Arab countries.

Of all the various problems facing the Arab countries, that of Palestine is the most difficult and calls for most serious attention, because the policy hitherto followed has resulted in obvious injustice to its original inhabitants, the Arabs, who still constitute two-thirds of the population. The Arabs of Palestine want to live independent in their own country, but the Zionist policy aims at wresting the land from the hands of its legitimate owners in order to transform it into a Jewish State. The Arabs do not hate the Jews, but they abhor the Zionist policy, which aims at the annexation of their country. The Zionist Movement is backed by unlimited funds, powerful institutions and political parties, as well as by distinguished personalities of great influence in Great Britain and America, while the Arabs of Palestine can only rely on the justice of their cause and their own exertions. Although the Arabs of Palestine have the moral support of Arabs in all neighbouring countries, these countries have been powerless to help them, materially or militarily, owing to their alliances in force or contemplated with Great Britain or France. Moreover, the Arab States want a peaceful settlement by agreement not by force.

The Arabs from the very beginning believed that the pledges that Great Britain gave to the late King Husain (both when he was Sharif of Mecca and later when he was King of the Hejaz) included Palestine, Transjordan and most of Syria. The declaration stated:—

"That, subject to certain modifications (which excluded Mersin, Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo), Great Britain is prepared to recognise and uphold the independence of the Arabs in all the regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the Sharif of Mecca."

The British Government has never seriously challenged the Arab contention that Palestine was included in this pledge conveyed through Sir Henry McMahon in 1915. (The full text of the correspondence is attached to this note.)

The Balfour Declaration was made subsequent to this definite pledge, and, when its contents alarmed the Arabs, the British Government sent a special envoy, Commander Hogarth, to set the doubts of King Husain at rest. King Husain

was assured that "Jewish settlement in Palestine would only be allowed in so far as would be consistent with the political and economic freedom of the Arab population."

While the terms of the Palestine Mandate give special rights to the Jewish Agency and Jewish settlers in Palestine, it nowhere lays down that the Jews are to have a Jewish State in Palestine. (The Arabs, of course, have never accepted the mandate as legal or binding on them, and in the mandate they are not even mentioned by name.) In successive Statements of Policy, published as White Papers, His Majesty's Government has in 1922, 1930 and 1939 declared that: "It is not part of British policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State."

When Great Britain accepted the mandate for Palestine, her first concern was to facilitate the creation of a Jewish National Home by assisting the Jewish Agency and other Jews to purchase land and arrange the peaceful transfer of the Arab cultivators of such land. She also endeavoured to secure Arab goodwill for the Jewish National Home. The mandatory was also occupied in establishing efficient administration and essential public services.

So for many years she made no serious effort to carry out the duty imposed upon her of assisting the inhabitants of Palestine to advance towards self-government. Unfortunately, when she eventually did consider how best to execute this part of her task, Arab fears of ultimate Jewish dominance and hostility to the mandate had become so intense that it was impossible to secure their co-operation in any proposed legislative or other assembly which might have paved the way for self-government.

In 1937 Mr. Ormsby-Gore, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, told the Permanent Mandates Commission in the clearest possible terms "that, in the absence of a radical change in the political relations, it would not be possible to carry on (the government of Palestine) except by methods of continuous military repression. The fact was that in Palestine the vast majority of the population was hostile to the mandatory Power and to the mandate. The loyalty of the Arabs was not directed towards Great Britain, the mandatory Power, but to the Arab race and the Arab ideal." At this meeting the Secretary of State reiterated this view: "The mandatory told the Mandates Commission—as it would tell the Council later—that they were convinced of the necessity of political changes"; and again: "It was his definite opinion that, once the Arabs of Palestine (fired as they were with political hostility both to the mandatory Power and to the Jews) were given self-government, it would be to their interest to maintain security."

As a result His Majesty's Government recommended the partition of Palestine into three States—a Jewish State, an Arab State and a British-mandated area.

Upon careful examination by a special Boundary Commission the partition of Palestine into separate States was found to be impractical. But this commission did not examine the possibility of creating a Jewish enclave or enclaves, with special rights on the Maronite model, inside a Palestinian State or a greater Arab State which would include Syria and Transjordan. The creating of two or more completely independent States out of the small territories of Palestine would have involved the creation of complex artificial boundaries with numerous pockets of Jews in the Arab State and *vice versa*, it would have meant the creation of at least one international corridor and possibly more. But if all Palestine were included in one Syrian State, the boundaries of the Jewish enclaves would be administrative boundaries only. The Jewish areas might consist of a number of qadhas or even nahiyas in which the Jews would enjoy special rights: alternatively, by arrangement with all parties a definite consolidated area could be assigned to the Jews for semi-autonomous administration, and Arabs settled within it would have to accept to live under the special régime or could be found land elsewhere.

However, the partition of Palestine into two independent States and a mandated area, which had pleased nobody, was declared impossible, and the final policy of Great Britain was made public in 1939 after the Palestine Conference had broken down.

In the latest White Paper of 1939 His Majesty's Government declared that—

- "(1) The objective of His Majesty's Government is the establishment within ten years of an independent Palestine State in treaty relations with Great Britain . . .
- "(2) The independent State should be one in which Arabs and Jews share in government in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of each community are safeguarded."



The White Paper of 1939, in effect, limited the Jewish National Home in Palestine to the Jewish communities then resident in Palestine, plus 75,000 Jews who were to be allowed to settle in Palestine during the five years 1939-44. This meant that the Jews in Palestine would in 1944 constitute about a third of the population and that they would remain a permanent minority. His Majesty's Government therefore considered that by 1944 her pledge in the Balfour Declaration would have been fulfilled and a Jewish National Home established in Palestine. All that remained was to establish self-government in Palestine in such a way as would best safeguard the rights of the Jews who had settled in Palestine under the terms of the Balfour Declaration. The detailed proposals put forward by His Majesty's Government to reach this objective do not affect the underlying basis of the statement of policy: that Palestine had to be given self-government as soon as possible and that the Jews should be a permanent minority in this new State. The conference which met in London for the consideration of the Palestine question in 1939 was the first occasion on which the Arab States were recognised by His Majesty's Government as being mutually interested in the settlement of the Palestine problem. The conference included delegates representing Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Transjordan and Iraq, who were invited because their States were interested in the future of Palestine, it being an Arab territory and its administration and future development a matter of common concern to all Arabs.

In Arab eyes this invitation marked a return by Great Britain to the spirit of her old pledges to King Husain which regarded all Arabs in the old Ottoman Empire as one community united by one ideal. This is my first justification for raising these issues and making my suggestions at this time.

It has to be admitted that conditions in all these Arab countries have remained unsettled ever since the end of the last Great War. Numerous rebellions have broken out causing much bloodshed and devastation in many parts of these Arab lands. Apart from this, the most law-abiding inhabitants of those countries have always been the victims of worry and anxiety about their own future and that of their compatriots during all these long years. In Palestine and Syria even the non-rebellious Arabs feel that they have not been allowed to develop their full civil and political rights. They have had no confidence in the ability of the mandatory régime to provide a permanent peaceful form of government. They have had to live in territory too often subject to disorder to enable them to consider the future and prepare for it.

As soon as the present war broke out the Axis Powers did not lose a moment in looking for weak points in the Allied position in the Arab countries and promptly exploited any weaknesses they were able to discover. Elements of disorder and anarchy in all Arab countries were actively and unscrupulously supported, with the result that both the Arabs and the United Nations suffered severely.

In spite of previous disillusionments the Arabs have welcomed the Atlantic Charter with satisfaction, because they consider it a guarantee for the realisation of their national aspirations which will be united in the way they choose of their own free will.

We feel that the British Government regards the Arabs' claims with sympathy and that they are ready to solve the problem of the Arab countries in the same satisfactory manner as they solved those of Iraq. If they succeed in putting these sympathetic intentions into effect, the present chaotic state of the Arab countries will come to an end to the benefit of the interests of Great Britain as well as to the Arab countries themselves.

We realise that the British Government has not a free hand in dealing with these problems, because their action is subject to the concurrence of their Allies. But now that the United States are co-operating so fully with Great Britain the hands of the latter are freer and we feel that it will be possible for her to reconsider her whole policy towards all Arabs.

All Arabs and particularly those of the Near and Middle East have, deep down in their hearts, the feeling that they are "members one of another." Their "nationalism" springs from the Moslem feeling of brotherhood enjoined on them by the Prophet Muhammad in his last public speech. It differs therefore from a great deal of European nationalism and patriotism. Although Arabs are naturally attached to their native land, their nationalism is not confined by boundaries. It is an aspiration to restore the great tolerant civilisation of the early Caliphate.

We therefore believe that any policy which satisfies the legitimate political rights and aspirations of the Arabs will restore peace to the Arab countries and that such peace and contentment will be of invaluable service in promoting the

interests of the United Nations in this grave period of war. Moreover, such a policy will put an end to the Axis intrigues in the Arab countries and stop the flood of Axis propaganda which finds there a most fertile soil for sowing its evil seeds, owing to the discontent of the Arabs with their present situation and their anxiety about their future.

The events of the past few years have revealed the weakness of very small States. It is generally assumed that after the war the peace settlement will endeavour to group the smaller States together in some form of regional leagues or alliances which can be sufficiently powerful to protect all the members from aggression. While I realise that many years must elapse before the Arab States can stand completely alone, yet, even their allies among the Great Powers will probably demand that they make a greater contribution to their own defence services. Therefore the old idea of creating an independent Palestine and an independent Lebanon and Syria must be abandoned and a new solution considered.

Great Britain and France have repeatedly declared that they agree to the future independence of each of these parts of historical Syria. If independence is admitted to be the right of the peoples living in these areas, they must, *ipso facto*, have the right to coalesce in a unitary State or join together in a league or confederation. If experience has proved that very small States cannot adequately defend themselves and that they constitute a danger to their neighbours and to the peace of the world, then union or federation can justly be imposed on them if these separate States really form one community, linguistically, culturally and economically.

Paragraph 4 of article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations reads as follows:—

"Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development when their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. . . ."

Doubts have been expressed at various times as to whether Palestine came within the ambit of this paragraph. But Mr. Malcolm MacDonald told the Mandate Commission of the League of Nations in 1939 that "the Arabs of Palestine could not be regarded as so utterly different from the Arabs of Iraq or Syria that rights which clearly belonged to the latter under paragraph 4 should be completely denied to their fellow-Arabs in Palestine."

This statement goes to the root of the whole problem. The Arab contention is that all the Moslems, Christians, Jews and Druzes who occupy the Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan and Palestine are one community not differing very greatly from the inhabitants of Iraq. In 1918 this community was better educated than the Iraqis and more acquainted with and tolerant of modern, centralised, bureaucratic administration.

The Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations decided in June 1939 that the proposal of His Majesty's Government to set up in Palestine an Arab State in which the Jews would form a minority was contrary to the interpretation which had always been placed upon the Palestine Mandate. In commenting on this decision His Majesty's Government pointed out that it had been found impracticable to form both an independent Arab State and an independent Jewish State in Palestine but that "one of the possibilities which the mandatory Power had in view is the establishment of a federal constitution."

Now Palestine is a very small territory with a population of less than 2 million souls. To create federal constitution for such a small country would be difficult and cumbersome. But if Palestine reverts to its proper place as part of the historical Syria it should be possible to create for Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan either a unitary State or a federal constitution which would work efficiently.

If the Palestinian Arabs could be reunited with the Arabs of Syria and Transjordan they would not be so apprehensive of Jewish expansion, and the Jewish communities now in Palestine would feel safer and more settled. They could be allowed a considerable degree of local autonomy under some form of international guarantee, if that is considered necessary.

In the very protracted and frank discussions which took place between Mr. Malcolm MacDonald and the Permanent Mandates Commission in June 1939 the point was raised again and again that there must be a spirit of evolution in the consideration of specific pledges and promises. While in no way denying



the validity of the various pledges and promises given by His Majesty Government to various communities, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald felt that these pledges and promises had to be reinterpreted from time to time in the light of the development, both political and economic, that had occurred in Palestine since the pledges were first given.

Such reconsideration is, indeed, specifically provided for in article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations which lays down that:—

“The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.”

This is another justification for recommending the re-examination of the whole position of the Arab States of the Near and Middle East.

In Iraq, whose population in 1918 was more backward politically and educationally than that of Syria and Palestine, it has been shown that an independent native State can function with the minimum of advice and support from its ally.

In Saudi Arabia, His Majesty Ibn Saud has shown that an Arab ruler can maintain peace and order over nomad Bedouin occupying vast stretches of desert and over settled Arabs in towns and oasis and considerably develop their resources. The discovery of oil in Arab countries has given them economic resources and revenue not hitherto available. Iraq needs an outlet to the Mediterranean for its oil and other products. Palestine, which is being rapidly industrialised, needs markets for its products and oil fuel for its factories.

These are facts which have to be taken into account and which justify a re-examination of the pledges given by His Majesty's Government, some of which were embodied in the mandates of the League of Nations. These present factors call for a new policy altogether, which will settle permanently the future of the inhabitants of the Near and Middle East.

My proposals which follow are based on the close relations which already exist between Iraq and all the Arabs of historic Syria. The States of the Arabian peninsula, although so near to us in language, custom and religion, have a different economy. Egypt has a larger population than the Succession States and has her own problems in the Sudan and elsewhere.

I have therefore assumed that these States will not at first be inclined to join an Arab Federation or League, though, if such a union succeeded between Iraq and Syria, there is every likelihood that they would in time wish to join it.

But from the very beginning I anticipate that such a League, even if limited to Iraq and Syria, would facilitate joint consultation between, and action by, all Arab States whether within the League or not. Many of our problems are the same; we are all part of one civilisation; we generally think along the same lines and we are all animated by the same ideals of freedom of conscience, liberty of speech, equality before the law and the basic brotherhood of mankind.

#### Conclusion.

In my view the only fair solution, and indeed the only hope of securing permanent peace, contentment and progress in these Arab areas is for the United Nations to declare now:—

- (1) That Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan shall be reunited into one State.
- (2) That the form of government of this State, whether monarchical or republican, whether unitary or federal, shall be decided by the peoples of this country themselves.
- (3) That there shall be created an Arab League to which Iraq and Syria will adhere at once and which can be joined by the other Arab States at will.
- (4) That this Arab League shall have a permanent council nominated by the member States, and presided over by one of the rulers of the States, who shall be chosen in a manner acceptable to the States concerned.
- (5) The Arab League Council shall be responsible for the following:—
  - (a) Defence.
  - (b) Foreign affairs.
  - (c) Currency.
  - (d) Communications.
  - (e) Customs.
  - (f) Protection of minority rights.

- (6) The Jews in Palestine shall be given semi-autonomy. They shall have the right to their own rural and urban district administration, including schools, health institutes and police, subject to general supervision by the Syrian State.
- (7) Jerusalem shall be a city to which members of all religions shall have free access for pilgrimage and worship and a special commission composed of representatives of the three theocratic religions shall be set up to ensure this.
- (8) That, if they demand it, the Maronites in the Lebanon shall be granted a privileged régime, such as they possessed during the last years of the Ottoman Empire. This special régime, like those to be set up in paragraphs 6 and 7 above, shall rest on an International Guarantee.

If it is possible in the manner suggested above to create a Confederation of Arab States, including Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Transjordan at the beginning, to which other Arab States may later adhere, then a great many of the difficulties which have faced Great Britain and France in the Near East during the past two decades will disappear. The Arabs of Palestine at present fear that they will become a minority in a Jewish State, and therefore bitterly oppose the grant of special rights to the Jews, but this hostility would be allayed if Palestine became part of a large strong Arab State. The Jews could establish their National Home in those parts of Palestine where they are now the majority with a greater feeling of security, because there would be more goodwill on the part of their Arab neighbours, and as a semi-autonomous community in a much larger State their economic opportunities would increase.

The British Empire is not founded on negations, but on positive ideals. Free institutions and free co-operation give it a living force of tremendous strength. Upon this foundation of free co-operation a true union of many diverse peoples and countries has been formed, depending less upon stipulations and statistics and more upon the nobler and more permanent principles which are written on the heart and conscience of man. If an opportunity is given to the Arab peoples to establish such a free co-operation among themselves they will be prepared to deal generously with all the Jews living in their midst, whether in Palestine or elsewhere. Conditions and guarantees there must be, but let them not constitute a dead hand, lest they become a dead letter, as so many minority provisions in European Constitutions became during the past twenty years.

If my proposals meet with favour they will require a careful examination, so that the appropriate steps are taken at the right time and in the right order. Obviously, the union of the various parts of historic Syria must come first. It may at first take the form of a federation of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan, each State continuing its own local administration, leaving defence, foreign relations, currency and customs to the Central Government. On the other hand, it may be found possible to unite Syria at once, making provision for the Jewish enclaves and the Jerusalem administration at the same time. Steps should be taken at once to define these enclaves, and for this purpose it would be necessary to prepare an accurate ethnographical map of Palestine, showing the number of Arabs and Jews in each nahya and town, also a map on the same scale showing the land under cultivation and the land which can be cultivated intensely in the future. An enquiry should also be made as to the number of Jews who have settled in Palestine since the outbreak of the war in September 1939.

To secure Arab union sacrifices of sovereignty and vested interests may have to be made. Similar sacrifices have been made in the British Dominions and can be equally demanded from Arab leaders.

I have throughout assumed that as France before the war declared that she was prepared to grant independence to Syria and the Lebanon she will not be allowed by the United Nations to repudiate her offers, nor to obstruct any federation of Arab States by insisting on old privileges or antiquated rights.

[E 1440/784/65]

No. 48.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Hoskins's Mission to the Middle East, and his Views on the Danger of Zionist-Arab Disturbances in Palestine.*

(Secret.)

ON the 1st September, 1942, the United States Ambassador left with Mr. Eden an aide-memoire stating that United States Joint Chiefs of Staff had for some time been giving special consideration to the situation in the Middle East, and felt that every possible effort, both political and military, must be made



to hold this vital region. The aide-memoire recorded the view that the United States holds a fortunate position in the Middle East, where its prestige and influence are high, and went on to make certain proposals to profit from the widespread goodwill which the United States Government believed to exist as a result of a century of American missionary, educational and philanthropic efforts. One of these proposals was the immediate despatch of an American military and economic mission, part of whose task would be to endeavour to make the most of existing goodwill towards the United States in order to gain more active support from the peoples of the Middle East for a United Nations victory. The proposed head of this American mission would be Lieutenant-Colonel Harold B. Hoskins, the vice-president of the Board of Trustees of the American University at Beirut, who had been working in the State Department for the past eighteen months.

Colonel Hoskins arrived in Cairo on the 23rd November on a mission of investigation. Amongst other things he had a roving commission to report to Mr. Sumner Welles on political matters. He spent the next three months touring the Middle Eastern countries, where he received all facilities from British authorities.

On his return to Cairo he gave to the Minister of State a paraphrase of a telegram which he had sent to Washington on the Palestine situation (enclosure 1). From this it will be seen that Colonel Hoskins was greatly exercised about the possibility of an imminent outbreak of violence in Palestine between the Zionists and the Arabs, which might lead to Jewish-Arab clashes in other parts of the Middle East. Moreover, in order to acquaint American public opinion with the facts of the Palestine question, he suggested that groups of Arab and Jewish moderates should visit the United States. On this point the Minister of State has given him no encouragement. Mr. Casey's view is that, although a visit of a party of Arab notables might evoke interest and, indeed, sympathy in the United States, it would inevitably be jammed as far as possible by the Zionist organisations, and would lead to an intensification of Zionist propaganda both during the visit and after its departure. Our embassy at Washington agree with this view, which, in their opinion, applies equally to a visit by Jewish moderates.

In a letter of the 19th January to the High Commissioner for Palestine (enclosure 2), Mr. Casey asked for Sir Harold MacMichael's opinion on Colonel Hoskins's view that an early outbreak of serious trouble might take place between the Jews and the Arabs. In his reply of the 23rd January (enclosure 3), the High Commissioner states his view that such an outbreak is improbable in the near future, but may later be inevitable if the present dangerous tendencies are not checked. For this purpose the High Commissioner suggests a restatement on the part of His Majesty's Government of clause 4 in the Palestine White Paper of 1939, which states:—

"His Majesty's Government, therefore, now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State. They would, indeed, regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the mandate, as well as to the assurances which have been given to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab population of Palestine should be made the subjects of a Jewish State against their will."

*Foreign Office, March 31, 1943.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 48.

*Message sent by Lieutenant-Colonel Hoskins to Washington regarding Palestine.*

IT is realised that in venturing to comment on the complex Arab-Jewish question one is getting into deep and troubled waters, but the situation is one which must be grappled with, since a bloody conflict is in the making if the matter is allowed to drift, the effect of which will be felt not only in Palestine, but in the whole Arab world, as well as causing domestic repercussions in the United States and Britain.

2. Present indications are that, unless preventive measures are taken, fighting may break out in Palestine between Zionists and Arabs before end of war, possibly even this spring, and lead in turn to Arab-Jew clashes in other parts of Near East. This view is shared by some British officials, although most

do not regard situation as so immediately serious. Practically all, however, foresee recrudescence of Arab-Jewish conflict shortly after termination of hostilities.

3. Jewish Agency spokesmen remain adamant in demands for Palestine as Jewish national State, regardless of Arab opposition, and even seem inclined to goad Palestine Arabs into breaking present war-time truce, in the evident belief that Jews can count on support of public opinion in Britain and United States, and also that the increased number of Jews in Palestine and arms available to them give confidence that they could hold own against Arabs in country. Measures taken by Hagana, secret Jewish military organisation, to obtain arms are no secret.

4. Arabs fear propaganda for Zionist State will result in *fait accompli* before end of war, and this is providing fertile field for Axis propagandists.

5. Any serious Arab-Jewish difficulty in Palestine would also arouse opposition in neighbouring Arab States, with which Jews could not cope, and it is to meet this danger that the Jews are counting on British or Anglo-American military support. Axis fully appreciate situation and would endeavour to stir up difficulty at time when it would most effectively interfere with active operations elsewhere.

6. In order to reduce present tension and obviate open clash a brief statement by the United States, or, even better, a joint Anglo-American declaration, ruling out Allied military support of extreme positions of either Zionists or Arabs would be helpful.

7. In addition to such a statement the following suggestions are made:—

In order to acquaint American public opinion with fact that there are two sides to the Palestine question, and that Palestine is not an area where several million Jews from Europe can be installed after war and immediately find land and livelihood, a carefully-chosen group of four to six moderate Arab nationalists, including Amir Abdullah of the Transjordan, might be permitted to visit the United States in more or less the same way that visits to the United States of Kings of Greece and Yugoslavia served useful purposes. Although Abdullah is not the perfect choice, he would seem to be best available, and entourage should include Arab nationalists representing various religious faiths from Transjordan, Palestine, Syria and Lebanon. Such representatives should be type ready to face problem of half-million Jews in Palestine who cannot be removed any more than Arabs. Such men are available. Furthermore, there are certain Jewish moderates in Palestine, such as Dr. Magnes, Miss Henrietta Szold, of the Youth Immigration Bureau, and Mr. Ben-Tor, leader of one wing of Jewish Labour movement, who might also be allowed to visit the United States in order to present their case. Their views might be well received by many American Jews who, while favouring idea of national home in Palestine, do not favour extreme Zionism as advocated by the Jewish Agency.

8. The views of these Arab and Jewish moderates should also find a receptive audience among various Christian groups in the United States, particularly if it were made clear that American support of either of the extreme Arab or Jewish demands would, judging by British experience, commit the United States to use of military force and loss of lives of American soldiers.

9. These ideas have been discussed with various American and British officials, who seemed sufficiently sympathetic to justify their presentation, and further and more specific details can be furnished if required.

Enclosure 2 in No. 48.

*Mr. Casey to Sir H. MacMichael.*

(Secret.)

My dear MacMichael,

*January 19, 1943.*

ONE of my first visitors since my return here has been Colonel Hoskins, who is now in Cairo, after having completed his tour of various Middle Eastern countries. He has obviously accumulated a good deal of interesting and useful information. The point on which he lays the greatest emphasis, however, and which, frankly, has surprised me a good deal, is the risk, in his view, of an early outbreak of serious trouble between the Jews and the Arabs, possibly even this spring.

His opinion, as a result of talks with Jewish leaders and with Arab notables both in Palestine and neighbouring countries, is that the Jewish Agency is



deliberately trying to goad the Arabs into hostile action against the Jews, which, in the first place, would put the Arabs in the wrong in the eyes of the world; and, secondly, with which the Jewish Agency, with supplies of arms and trained personnel, are confident that they themselves could effectively deal.

His intention is to report his views to the State Department by telegram, and possibly follow this up by a visit to Washington. He has several ideas in his head as to how to dispel the ignorance in the United States on the Zionist question and build up a body of informed American opinion in favour of a middle course and act as a damper on the extremists. I believe that he has discussed these ideas with you, and we are taking a look at them and will, of course, consult you before endorsing any of his recommendations. Meanwhile, however, I should like to have your opinion as soon as possible on his main thesis—that is to say, the imminence of an outbreak of violence.

I am, &c.

R. G. CASEY.

Enclosure 3 in No. 48.

*Sir H. MacMichael to Mr. Casey.*

*Government House,*

*Jerusalem, January 23, 1943.*

My dear Minister,

I WAS glad to get your letter of the 19th January, evoked by the views expressed to you by Colonel Hoskins, and to have the opportunity of answering your question as to the validity of his main thesis—the imminence of an outbreak of violence in Palestine.

2. I am no prophet, and all I can do is to attempt an assessment of probabilities as I see them. My own view is that an early outbreak of serious trouble between Jews and Arabs is improbable, but that it is inevitable when the "cease fire" sounds (if not when peace terms are definitely in the air), unless the extravagant ardour of the Jewish official bodies is meanwhile quenched. The issue lies with them and with the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards them.

3. I agree with Hoskins that the Jews would be glad to see the Arabs goaded into turbulence, but maybe they underrate the political astuteness of the Arabs, who, apart from being well-intentioned towards us, have no intention of falling into that trap while the war is still on and while, in consequence, their action could be misrepresented as fifth columnism. On the other hand, though the Arab "leaders" (so-called, but they are of no weight) are aware of the pitfall, there is always the outside chance that the rank and file may, under stress of feelings roused, or by the emergence of some demagogue, get out of control and behave rashly.

4. I have said that the Jews "would be glad to see . . ."; that is not quite the same as saying with Hoskins that they are "deliberately trying to goad . . .". It is difficult to see which is the truth. My impression is that some of the Jews are "deliberately trying . . .", but that the attitude of the agency (i.e., of the Jewish Government, and therefore of the great majority) is one which might be summarised thus: "We are determined to have Palestine; we shall conduct our affairs exactly as though Palestine was ours; we shall inculcate this frame of mind into our people until they are united as one man under the stimulus of this great ideal; we shall train them and arm them to ensure that it cannot fail of realisation. If the Arabs do not like it, what of that? If they rise in revolt—well, so much the better for us, for their name will be mud; we can defend ourselves against them in Palestine, without (or preferably with) the aid of British troops, and His Majesty's Government will prevent the neighbouring States from lending their aid. His Majesty's Government will never send troops to repress long-suffering Jewry in the hour of their deliverance."

5. This policy of driving ahead, regardless of consequences, is being pursued, in spite of the misgivings and warnings of more moderate elements, and it is illustrated by the present methods of intimidation and blackmail which they are applying to their own people in the matter of recruitment for the army (I am sending you a copy of a telegram which I am sending to the Secretary of State on this subject). They are also giving currency to an insidious falsehood that the anti-Semitic Palestine Government is itself instigating the Arabs to resentment.

6. If you ask me what can be done to check these dangerous tendencies at the present time, my answer would be that things have gone so far that the danger cannot now be altogether removed, but that it could be minimised by a restatement on the part of His Majesty's Government of that clause (4) in the white paper of 1939 which states: " . . . His Majesty's Government therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State. They would, indeed, regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the mandate, as well as to the assurances which have been given to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab population of Palestine should be made the subjects of a Jewish State against their will."

7. That, restated, would remove all *real* Arab apprehensions (I take little count of anything additional which their tin-pot politicians might demand). It would, on the other hand, infuriate the agency and their dupes (though it would be welcomed by the moderate groups even if few of them have the courage to say so openly); but I cannot believe that the agency are any more anxious than the Arabs to besmirch their good name by causing violent trouble in war time, and the ground would be cut from under the feet of the extremists.

8. For the rest, we here can but deal firmly with any breach of law or regulation, and we shall do so; but we see the clouds gathering, and feel that it needs a pronouncement from on high to lighten them.

Yours sincerely,

H. A. MacMICHAEL.

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(16428)

## Further Correspondence

respecting

# EASTERN AFFAIRS

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## CONFIDENTIAL.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING  
EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 53.—APRIL TO JUNE 1943.

## CHAPTER I.—AFGHANISTAN.

[E 2233/86/97]

No. 1.

Sir F. Wylie to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 1. Confidential.)

Kabul, January 15, 1943.

Sir,  
WITH reference to Viscount Halifax's circular despatch, dated the 4th November, 1939, I have the honour to forward as an enclosure to this despatch a political review of Afghanistan during the year 1942.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch, with enclosure, to the Secretary of State for India and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.  
F. V. WYLIE.

Enclosure in No. 1.

## Political Review for 1942.

IT is the general opinion among informed observers that, with certain known exceptions, the present Government in Afghanistan would like to see the Allied Nations winning the war. It is not to be thought, however, that this is out of any necessary feeling of goodwill for the Allied cause as such. The desire is based almost entirely on self-interest. A German victory would, of course, mean the elimination of the Russian threat from the north perhaps for many years to come. That would be so far good. It would also, however, in all probability entail the disappearance of British power in the East. In the subsequent reconstruction in Asia, what would happen to Afghanistan and its present—after all usurping—rulers? As a pawn the Germans and Italians may not think much of ex-King Amanullah. So far, however, they owe little to the present virtual dictator of Afghanistan—His Royal Highness Sardar Mohammed Hashim Khan.

2. But an Allied victory, too, is not without its dangers. Victory for Bolshevik Russia, for instance, will mean that the threat to the northern borders of Afghanistan will renew itself in an even more insistent form than has been the case in the past, while if India after the war is granted the virtual independence which has been promised to her the old balance between England and Russia, upon which the independence of Afghanistan in the last resort depends, will be a thing of the past. It is a choice of evils, therefore, with the balance hardly inclining to the side of the Allies. But they must not only win. They must also fight the last battle as far away as possible from Afghanistan. Otherwise the worst that could happen from an Axis victory may fall to the country anyway.

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3. The year 1941 closed with the Russian armies most surprisingly on the offensive against the German invaders, while to the East the Japanese had just entered upon the series of startling successes which were presently to culminate in the fall of Singapore and in the occupation of practically all Burma. The Afghan Government were not unduly alarmed at these Japanese successes. The whole breadth of India still lay between them and the scenes of active operations. They had never thought much of the Japanese anyway, and America and England must presently gather their strength and restore the situation. The Russian resistance to the Germans was, of course, surprising, but the winter offensives were probably a mere flash in the pan. With the spring the Germans would surely attack again and ultimately must win. The Libyan campaign, on the other hand, was a side-show. British bombing of German centres of production again, while no doubt it had some nuisance value, would never by itself win the war. In the West, therefore, the balance seemed still to be definitely in favour of the Axis. In the East one could wait and see. For the Afghan Government the old policy of rigid neutrality, in great things as in small, was in any case still the wise and, indeed, the only possible line.

4. In the spring the news from India tended to be disquieting. April saw the arrival of the Cripps Mission with the offer of practical independence when the war was over. It has been the conventional view that, while sober Afghan opinion appreciates the advantages of ordered administration in India under the aegis of the British Crown and the consequent balance which the presence of the British in India provides against Russia, a powerful element looks to the elimination of British influence in India solely as an opportunity to recover the lost Afghan provinces, as also an outlet to the sea via the port of Karachi. But there is more in it than this. Afghans are orientals, and there seems little doubt but that the younger educated elements in Afghanistan at any rate sympathise very thoroughly with India's national aspirations, and would welcome the end of Western domination in the whole Indian sub-continent. To what extent these elements are identical with the so-called Republican party in Afghanistan itself it is impossible to say with certainty. That they share the sentiments of the irredentist section already mentioned may, however, be taken for granted. In the spring of 1942, however, responsible people—including the Prime Minister—were more concerned with the question how an India which was apparently divided both within itself and against its Government would face up to a Japanese invasion if such should materialise. Would the Indian army fight? Would the civil population co-operate with the British Administration, or would it go over to the invaders? Thoughts like these contributed to the general anxiety presently to be much increased by the events of the months which followed.

5. In May came the Axis offensive in Libya, culminating in the fall of Tobruk and the withdrawal of the British Eighth Army within the Egyptian frontier. This serious reverse, coupled with the fall of Sebastopol, encouraged Afghan doubts about the Allied chances of winning the war in Europe. And there was worse to come. The German successes in South Russia during July and August, the serious disturbances in India and the lack of any countervailing Allied success in other war theatres seem to have genuinely shaken the Afghan Government, including the Prime Minister himself. Rumours became current to the effect that the Government, in order to reinsure against an Allied defeat and always remembering that ex-King Amanullah was in Rome, had proffered secret co-operation to the Axis, *e.g.*, in the supply of information about conditions in India, Persia and what not. So prevalent did these rumours become that in September His Majesty's Minister, acting on instructions from His Majesty's Government, sought an interview with the Prime Minister, and reminded him that His Majesty's Government were relying upon the Afghan Government to respect the assurance he had given them in 1941, *viz.*, that, provided that the country was not invaded by armed forces, the Afghan attitude would not be allowed to be a cause of embarrassment to the British Government during the course of the war. The Prime Minister in reply asserted that he had not changed his policy, but he made the assertion with less than his usual emphasis and specific undertakings about the future were noticeably wanting.

6. There the question was left, however, for the time being and probably wisely so. For the autumn brought startling changes in the war situation. The Allied landings in North Africa, the spectacular victory of the British Eighth Army in Libya, the German failure to capture Stalingrad and the firm handling by the Government of India of the Congress disturbances in that country, all combined to induce a somewhat giddy swing-over in Afghan opinion among all classes of the population about the ultimate outcome of the war. Towards the

end of the year the somewhat wild expectations engendered by the events of the autumn had, it is true, given way to a more subdued outlook, though the Russian offensives in November and December still encouraged the feeling that the Axis Powers were, after all, going to lose the war in Europe. For the time being, therefore it seems safe to assume that, to whatever extent the Afghan Government may have committed themselves in the way of reinsurance with Germany, the process will at the least be kept in bounds and if the war in the spring of 1943 should turn away definitely from the Caucasus it is likely that the Afghan Government will do their best to extricate themselves from their commitments and resume their rôle of careful, if somewhat frightened, spectators of events. The term "reinsurance" used above is, of course, something of a euphemism as applied to secret co-operation with our enemies, even if this secret co-operation is for the moment confined only to the intelligence side. If the war does *not* swing away from the Caucasus in the spring of 1943, and if the threat of German penetration into Central Asia becomes intensified, then it is clear that a highly delicate situation might possibly arise in Kabul. For we have it on no less authority than Herr Hitler himself how debilitating for any Government such secret subservience can become, and we can trust the Germans to exploit this debilitating process to the limit, with results which might be highly embarrassing to the Allied cause in general and to the effective defence of the western approaches to India in particular.

7. The above then was the state of affairs when the year ended. And if the Prime Minister was secretly "reinsuring" with the Axis it must in fairness be admitted that he also fulfilled in certain important respects the pledge he had given to the British Government in 1941. In the matter of the Indian frontier, for instance, no sort of evidence has come to light that he made any attempt to take advantage of the internal and external preoccupations of the Government of India in order, *e.g.*, to intrigue with the frontier tribes. Not only this, but as a result, it is believed, of information supplied by the Government of India a number of persons were arrested in May and June who were known to be intriguing with the Axis legations in Kabul. The Axis legations themselves, on the other hand, were kept under the strictest possible supervision and, although it seems necessary to assume that they must be indulging in underground activities damaging to the Allies, no evidence that really dangerous plans of this nature were afoot came to light at any time during the course of the year.

8. Internally, the year was one of unbroken peace. From time to time reports were heard of sporadic cases of violent crime in the eastern and southern provinces, but, as in 1941, no serious challenge to the authority of the Government developed from any quarter. There were the usual rumours of dissensions among the members of the Royal Family and in particular the King was said to be chafing under the continued close tutelage of his uncles. Too much attention need not perhaps be paid to these rumours in a village capital like Kabul, where the inhabitants have little in the way of amusement to distract them apart from gossip.

9. The above is not to say, however, that the Government is without difficulties—pressing difficulties. Prices of all primary commodities have risen very high and will in all probability rise higher yet. There is so far probably no real shortage of food-stuffs in the country, but, as in India, hoarding is an acute problem. It is understood that large reserves of wheat have been laid in by the Government, particularly in Kabul. This has, however, been done at the cost of considerable discontent in the countryside, and if any internal danger threatens the Administration in the coming years—which are likely to be increasingly critical—it may be expected first of all on the economic side. In the towns the shortage of consumption goods is still not critical, largely due to the forethought with which the Government of India have done their best, at considerable cost to their own limited resources, to ensure to Afghanistan supplies, *e.g.*, of petrol, piece-goods, sugar, &c., sufficient to prevent such acute shortages developing as might lead to widespread popular discontent endangering the stability of the Administration.

10. The quarrels with the Afghan Government over British publicity which were mentioned in last year's review are now happily ended. This very desirable result has been achieved for the most part by the abatement of a number of our earlier and—let us admit it—somewhat brash experiments in the difficult art of propaganda. At the moment British propaganda material is entering the country without let of any sort. The quantity is considered to be sufficient to meet the needs of an excessively backward country and it reaches, in addition, those classes



who are most likely to be influenced by a proper presentation of the British case. That, it is felt, is satisfactory enough for the time being at any rate.

11. The main purpose of His Majesty's Government in Afghanistan during the war is to ensure, if it can be done, that conditions in the country shall not increase British military commitments or threaten the security of the north-west frontier of India. To this end they have continued to support the present Prime Minister in his efforts to maintain stability in the country, and they are content with his declared policy of maintaining a strict neutrality for the same reason. After more than three years of war it is possible to affirm that this main purpose has so far been successfully achieved. From the outbreak of war up to the present time the north-west frontier of India has been reasonably quiet and the Indian Government has been compelled to undertake no major military commitments in that quarter. If, as seems possible, the war should now recede from the Caucasus, it is permissible to hope that the same good fortune may attend British policy in Afghanistan till hostilities finally cease. But there will be anxieties. The Government is not popular, economic tension may be expected to increase, and as the war moves increasingly in favour of the Allies the dissident elements in the country, at present overawed by the scale of world events, may attempt to embarrass or possibly even overthrow a régime which has not so far succeeded in attracting any real loyalty from the people. During the period just ahead, therefore—a period which will continue for some time after the war itself is over—the careful and considerate handling of British policy—particularly, perhaps, on the economic side—will be a matter of very real importance both to Afghanistan itself and to India.

[E 3432/1757/G]

No. 2.

*Mr. Eden to Viscount Halifax (Washington).*

(No. 659.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, 11th June, 1943.*

THE United States Ambassador came to see me this afternoon, when I handed him a copy of the attached aide-mémoire on the subject of recent instructions sent to the United States Minister at Kabul.

2. The Ambassador read this and remarked that he thought it a very fair and restrained statement of the position. He made it quite plain that for his part he was not in sympathy with his Government's action. I think we can be sure that he will support our representations strongly.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

Enclosure in No. 2.

*Aide-Mémoire.*

1. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Soviet Government have for some time been seriously concerned about the subversive activities of a number of Axis agents in Afghanistan. As the two Governments have proof positive that the activities of these agents are organised and financed by the Axis Legations in Kabul, and are directly prejudicial to their respective interests, they recently decided to request the Afghan Government to control these agents and also to suggest at the same time that they should reduce the staffs of the Axis Legations.

2. Sir F. Wylie handed to the Prime Minister on the 27th May a list of thirty-six Afghan subjects known beyond doubt to be engaged in a subversive plot to damage British interests, together with a list of Axis agents in both Kabul and in the north who are engaged in a similar plot to damage Soviet interests. It was realised that a demand for the prompt arrest of all the persons on the British list would be extremely embarrassing to the Afghan Government. His Majesty's Government therefore demanded the immediate arrest and imprisonment of only three and they left it to the Afghan Prime Minister to decide how best the remainder could be brought under sufficient control to make it

impossible for them to act as intermediaries between the Axis Legations and hostile elements on the frontier, including the Faqir of Ipi. If the Afghan Prime Minister expressed reluctance to agree, but only in that event, Sir F. Wylie was instructed to say that refusal to comply with our wishes would force us to consider our course of action with the Soviet Government. Further, our strong advice was that the Prime Minister, in his own interests and working in his own time and in his own way, should take steps at once to reduce the staffs of all three Axis Legations, which in any case had no genuine diplomatic work to do. The Prime Minister was also requested to ensure that the Axis Legations should be prevented from obtaining large quantities of extra Afghan exchange to finance subversive elements.

3. The Soviet Government have made parallel representations as regards the plot to disturb security on the Soviet-Afghan frontier.

4. These representations, which were carefully concerted with the Soviet Government, were based on the imperative necessity of safeguarding security on the frontiers both of India and of the Soviet Union. As the threat to the security of these frontiers did not appear to affect the interests of the United States of America, His Majesty's Government did not seek the support of the United States Government for their representations to the Afghan Government, though as between Allies His Majesty's Minister at Kabul was authorised to inform his United States colleague of the substance of his instructions.

5. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government were surprised to learn that the United States Minister at Kabul had been instructed that if further representations were made he should make to the Afghan Government a communication which could not fail to encourage them to refuse the entirely reasonable requests which His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government have made. In view of their special responsibilities in Afghanistan as a neighbour of India, His Majesty's Government would naturally have expected to be consulted before any such *démarche* was decided upon. Notwithstanding the instructions given to Mr. Engert, His Majesty's Government are happy to note that the United States Government appear to regard the activities of Axis agents on the Indian and Russian borders as prejudicial to United States as well as to British and Soviet interests, and would, it is officially stated, be glad to see the Axis Legations in Kabul drastically reduced as to staffs or, still better, closed.

6. It seems possible that the instructions which have been sent to the United States Minister at Kabul were based on a misapprehension. The advice offered to the Afghan Government for the reduction of the staffs of the Axis Legations has not been tendered in the form of a demand and it should be clearly understood that, though His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government would naturally have to discuss their future course of action if the Afghan Government should refuse the requests which have been made to them, His Majesty's Government have no present intention of asking them to expel the Axis Legations from Kabul. His Majesty's Government are fully aware of the internal difficulties with which the Afghan Government has to contend and it is solely for this reason that they have made such very moderate requests and as regards the Axis Legations have confined their action to advising the Afghan Government in their own interests to reduce their staffs.

7. Moreover, the State Department may not be aware that since his interview with the Prime Minister on the 27th May, Sir F. Wylie has also discussed this question with the Minister for Foreign Affairs (at the latter's request) on the 30th May. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was most friendly, informed Sir F. Wylie that the three arrests which we had demanded would be made; that immediate steps were being taken to control the other persons engaged in intrigues with our tribesmen; that the sale of Afghani exchange to the Axis Legations would be effectively controlled and that our advice regarding the Legation staffs was under consideration.

8. His Majesty's Government, therefore, have good reason to hope that this matter will be settled satisfactorily as the result of the negotiations now in progress. On the other hand, if the United States Minister in Kabul acts on the instructions which have been sent to him, the only effect will be to convince the Afghan Government that, far from agreeing in principle with the Anglo-Soviet requests, the United States Government entirely disapproves of them and the Afghan Government may very well draw the conclusion that the United States Government is prepared to support them if they should decide to refuse. This can hardly fail to precipitate the situation which the United States Government,



His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government alike desire to avoid, namely, a refusal by the Afghan Government to take measures which are essential if security on the frontiers of Afghanistan with both India and the Soviet Union is not to be disturbed.

9. As the United States Government is not directly concerned with this question of security it may be doubted whether the Afghan Government would expect the United States Government to express its views on this matter; or again whether the latter would incur Afghan hostility unless they dissociate themselves from the Anglo-Soviet approach, especially as the negotiations are proceeding quite satisfactorily. In the circumstances, His Majesty's Government entertain the very strong hope that the United States Government will refrain from a *démarche* which could not fail to prejudice representations essential for the British and Soviet war effort and that fresh instructions may be issued as a matter of urgency to the United States Minister at Kabul.

Foreign Office, 11th June, 1943.

## CHAPTER II.—IRAQ.

[E 2239/489/93]

No. 3.

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 111.)

Sir,

Bagdad, March 28, 1943.

IN my despatch No. 24 of the 22nd January, I reported Iraq's formal declaration of war on the Axis Powers and her adhesion to the declaration of the United Nations made at Washington on the 2nd January, 1942. This action seems to have caused noticeable heartburning to neighbouring Governments. Egypt, Syria, Persia and Saudi Arabia all hurriedly took stock of their respective positions in relation to this event and, though their reactions varied with their individual circumstances, all apparently felt that Iraq had cleverly stolen a march on them.

2. In Iraq itself, the first tangible fruits of the declaration were a conditional offer of a small armed force to help Great Britain and a praise-worthy effort to give more effective co-operation in providing grain supplies for other countries in the Middle East. On the 8th February the Prime Minister called on me to offer to send a force of a maximum strength of one mixed brigade to Turkey, if the war should come there, and to detail a second brigade for duty as garrison troops in Palestine or Syria. As I reported at the time, I do not believe that service abroad would be well received by either the Iraqi army or the public, and the political objections to the sending of Iraqi troops to Palestine or Syria are grave and obvious. I accordingly welcomed your instructions to tell the Prime Minister that, though His Majesty's Government were grateful for this offer, they had come to the conclusion that the best help that the Iraqi army could give was to continue to co-operate in the protection of military communications in their own country. Nuri Pasha took this decision in good part, though he maintained, as was only to be expected, that I was at fault in thinking that service outside Iraq would be unpopular.

3. Although Nuri Pasha would not commit himself publicly at the time of Iraq's declaration of war to help neighbouring countries in respect of cereals, I made full use of the new situation in pressing home both on him and the Minister of Finance that it was the duty of the Iraqi Government now that they were belligerents to take energetic and determined action in order to provide the barley so sorely needed in Persia and Turkey. After constant representations a notification was eventually published on the 13th January fixing prices and establishing Government control over all sales of barley. The notification was the Government's first important endeavour to co-operate more fully on the economic front and represented a major step towards proper control of cereals and stabilisation of cereal prices. The main points were—

- (a) In the liwas of Bagdad, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Muntafiq, Kut, Diyala, Amara and Dulaim the Government required all persons to surrender any stocks of barley which they held in excess of their own requirements for food.
- (b) The prices fixed were I.D. 19 a ton for grain declared up to the 28th February; I.D. 17 a ton for later declaration up to the 15th March and I.D. 15 a ton for stocks registered from the 15th March to the 31st March. Unregistered barley found after the 31st March to be confiscated with a nominal payment not to exceed I.D. 10 a ton.

Even after the Cabinet had agreed to the measures which it embodies for the control of barley, the publication of the notification was unexpectedly held up at the last moment owing to the annoyance caused to the Minister of Finance by some remarks made by the Prime Minister during a debate in the Senate on the Government's economic policy. The Prime Minister admitted that the Government's action had so far been inadequate and unsuccessful, but promised better measures in the near future. Salih Jabr felt that these remarks implied a criticism of his own work as Minister of Finance and left the meeting determined to resign. So soon as I learnt of this contretemps I saw both Ministers separately and spoke to each of the folly of breaking up the Cabinet at this juncture. The Prime Minister protested that his admission was unavoidable and that he had



intended no criticism of Salih Jabr's work. But Salih Jabr was aggrieved and upset and disposed to entertain the worst suspicions. I was able, nevertheless, to persuade them to meet each other and eventually a reconciliation was effected. This was the last and most threatening of the many hitches which had impeded the desired action and the notification was thereafter signed by Salih Jabr and brought into operation. Up to the present nearly 50,000 tons of barley have been registered, and of this quantity the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation have already purchased about 25,000 tons for export. While the amount the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation are likely to obtain from the total quantity now available will enable deliveries to be made to Turkey and Persia on a fairly satisfactory scale for about two months, the deficiencies in those two countries, especially the second, are so great that it is essential that the Iraqi Government should embark on more forceful and effective action to unearth further substantial quantities of barley known to exist in Iraq. I shall continue to exert all possible pressure to secure such action and have arranged for the Political Advisory staff to co-operate with and spur on the local administration in their efforts to locate and obtain possession of more barley.

4. Of less immediate importance but of considerable potential consequence is the new "Law for the Regulation of the Economic Life of the Country" now before Parliament. This supersedes the original law enacted in 1942 and places the direction of economic policy and supplies in the hands of a Cabinet Committee of three members with the Prime Minister as chairman. It will also permit the transfer of the control of grains and most local produce from Finance to Interior where a new department, largely under the influence of the British advisers, will be set up. This new legislation will certainly cause a considerable, and possibly angry, flutter in the parliamentary dovescotes, and I shall be pleasantly surprised if it escapes serious mutilation at the hands of reactionary believers in the out-worn theories of *laissez-faire*.

5. Transport has already been placed under the executive control of Colonel Le Blanc, an energetic officer of wide experience. I welcome this appointment for two main reasons. Firstly, Colonel Le Blanc should be invaluable in bringing about much-needed organisation of Iraqi road transport. Secondly, since this officer was selected for his present post by the late Commander-in-Chief, Persia/Iraq Force, his presence will be a comfort to General Headquarters, who, prior to his arrival, were not unnaturally reluctant to release to the Iraqi authorities valuable material, such as tyres, &c., which, though consigned to this country on civilian account, they feared might be misused in one form or another. Iraqi irritation over delays in securing possession of such equipment, and over the military use of some 40 per cent. of available civil transport vehicles, threatened at one moment to give rise to political complications. I should perhaps add here that the Prime Minister and others have also displayed a certain sensitiveness over the extent of British military participation in the control and operation of the Iraqi State Railways, with the result that from time to time I feel obliged to use my good offices in consultation with the commander-in-chief, to prevent occasional ruffled waters being seriously disturbed by angry squalls. If I mention these matters it is merely to illustrate the constant watchfulness that is necessary to ensure that minor difficulties do not deteriorate into major complexities.

6. A further development in the Government's economic policy was the setting up, early in the new year, of a committee "to examine the question of making grants of certain commodities to deserving classes of the people." The committee's report which has recently come into my hands, recommends the distribution at low prices of soap, vegetable oil, rice and cloth to officials, policemen and all regular Government employees. Considerable quantities of soap have in fact already been distributed as well as 8,000 metres of cloth. Special plans are being studied for the distribution of essential commodities on a wider scale. Notwithstanding these activities, the Administration continue to be much criticised for the slowness with which they are grasping the economic nettle, and for their continued subservience to powerful agricultural and mercantile vested interests. The fact is that the Prime Minister with his head full of Pan-Arab dreams, is reluctant to offend any potential political "friends."

7. While I have been engaged in bringing the Iraqi Government to the point of making available part of the surplus produce of the country for export to needy neighbours, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance have not ceased to press for more active help from His Majesty's Government. Their most urgent demands have concerned a gold backing for a national loan, to be raised to reduce the steadily increasing amount of currency in circulation, the

release of more civil transport from British army use, the reduction of the number of sheep consumed by our forces, the provision of lease-lend agricultural machinery and the supply to the Government, instead of to merchants, of piece-goods, soap, matches, coffee and tea for controlled distribution. I have reported separately on all these questions and it is unnecessary for me to deal with them in detail here. It will suffice to record that the visit to Bagdad in early March of Sir Arthur Rucker and Mr. Lloyd from the Minister of State's office in Cairo and the talks which they had with Nuri Pasha and Salih Jabr encouraged the Iraqi Government to believe that we were doing our best for them and in fact led to practical help being given in several ways. There remain, however, several demands which have not yet been met, and provided that the Iraqi Government continue to give their co-operation in plans to satisfy our urgent grain requirements it will, in my opinion, be well for us to deal with these demands sympathetically. It must frankly be confessed that the popularity of the Middle East Supply Centre has lately waned in this country where it is hard for local politicians and others to appreciate the difficulty of persuading other countries to co-operate in easing Iraq's burdens unless it is clearly in their own interest. Moreover, Iraqi opinion cannot see why the Middle East Supply Centre should worry over such problems as the dhow traffic in the Persian Gulf, for there is naturally little sympathy for the theory that all available supplies should be equally distributed to Middle Eastern territories. As, in fact, there is small hope of establishing effective control over the dhows, I have advised that to avoid unnecessary forfeiture of goodwill, the notion should be dropped.

8. A political feature of the first quarter of the current year has been the revival of Arab nationalist activity. Beginning with a negative reaction to ebullient Zionism, it later developed into a positive endeavour to find a means of laying the foundations of Arab unity. Towards the end of January, Nuri Pasha addressed a long memorandum to the Minister of State at Cairo on the subject of Arab national affairs. It began with a renewed protest against current Zionist claims and propaganda, went on to review the history of Syria, Palestine and Iraq since the last war, and concluded with a recommendation that the United Nations should immediately declare the federation of Syria, the Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan into one State, and promote the formation of an Arab Union to which this Greater Syria and Iraq should adhere at once and others join at will. The Prime Minister printed and sent copies of this memorandum to the Viceroy of India, the Dominions Prime Ministers and a number of English gentlemen in public life who have in some way officially or unofficially been associated with one or other of the Arab countries. The Prime Minister also acquainted King Ibn Saud, through the Saudi Legation in Bagdad, and the Amir Abdullah (by personal letter) with the essential features of his proposals. Having himself thus made an effort to direct and stimulate interest in Arab federation, Nuri Pasha naturally warmly welcomed your statement in the House of Commons reiterating the assurance first given at the Mansion House in May 1941 that His Majesty's Government would regard with sympathy any movement among the Arabs to promote economic, cultural or political unity. Your remark that the initiative must clearly come from the Arabs themselves spurred him, moreover, to further action, and he arranged for Jamil Madfai, a former Prime Minister and veteran of the Arab movement, to visit Syria and Transjordan discreetly to consult political leaders and to seek agreement with them on a common policy. Before he left Bagdad, Jamil Madfai told me that he and his friends had been much encouraged by your statement and felt that the Arab leaders should at once begin the serious study of the problem of Arab federation. He assured me that I could rely on his entire discretion. He knew that the realisation of Arab hopes depended on the support of His Majesty's Government, and he wished to avoid any action likely to embarrass us.

9. According to the information given to me by Nuri Pasha, Arab leaders in Palestine have also been moved by your promise of British sympathy to consider how they can help to produce an agreed plan for the closer integration of the divided Arab countries, and both they and the Amir Abdullah of Transjordan appear to have been thinking of gathering together a congress or conference to discuss details. Meanwhile, Tahsin Askari, Minister of the Interior, and Tahsin Ali, Minister of Education, have been busy arranging for the opening in Bagdad of a branch of the Arab Union Society (Nadi al Ittihad al Arabi) recently founded in Egypt. The declared objects of the society include work for a closer co-operation between all Arab countries and the defence of the rights of the Arab world. Experience has made me suspicious of societies of this kind, and I have reminded the Prime Minister of the harm done by the Muthanna Club, and have urged that



the branch or branches opened in Iraq should be kept under the closest supervision. The committee of the society was elected a few days ago. The majority of the members are men of moderate views and the zealots of the Muthanna have been excluded.

10. Security continues everywhere to be good, and pro-Axis propaganda is not at present a factor of importance in the political life of the country. The Prime Minister has discussed with me his desire to bring to trial in Iraq the surviving persons who were charged before the military court set up in January 1942 to deal with the organisers of the *coup d'Etat* of April 1941. I told his Excellency that before I could recommend His Majesty's Government to send these persons back to Iraq from Southern Rhodesia, I should need to be assured that all his colleagues agreed with his wish to have them tried. There is, I hear, a difference of opinion on this matter among members of the Cabinet, and the Prime Minister seems to have dropped his proposal, at any rate for the time being.

11. On the 22nd February an official notification was published in the newspapers summoning all Iraqis living in enemy or enemy-occupied territory to return within two months to Iraq, and threatening those who failed to do so with trial *in absentia* by court-martial. No exemptions were provided for persons who were detained against their wishes or unable to find the means of returning to their homes, but the Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that the Government's purpose is only to prosecute well-known renegades, such as the Berlin broadcaster, Yunis Bahri, and a number of young officers and students who fled to Europe through Turkey after the collapse of Rashid Ali's Administration in 1941.

12. Apart from the declaration of war, little of importance has occurred in Iraq's foreign affairs since the beginning of the year, but there are two events which should perhaps be recorded. M. Kadlec, who has recently been appointed Czechoslovak Minister at Tehran, spent several days in Bagdad early in March *en route* to his post. He approached the Iraqi Government with a view to obtaining their official recognition of the Czechoslovak Government and their agreement to his appointment as Minister here. It appears probable that both proposals will be accepted. Secondly, in early March the Government regularised the position of the American and Polish forces in Iraq by obtaining the consent of Parliament to a law granting to all Allied forces which are duly constituted in Iraq the same judicial immunities and privileges as those already enjoyed by the British forces.

13. The excitements of nationalist politics and of turbulent economics have of late heavily eclipsed the affairs of the Ministry of Education which a short time ago occupied so much attention. Nevertheless, some progress has been made towards reform since the two discredited Directors-General, Dr. Sami Shaukat and Dr. Fadhil Jamali, were relieved of their appointments. Other changes have also been made among the senior officials of the Ministry and the way has now been opened for a further advance in the desired direction. Whether it will be achieved is a moot question, as unhappily Sadek Gohar, the new Egyptian expert at the Ministry of Education, is proving very difficult to work with and is becoming extremely unpopular in Iraqi circles. It is regrettable, too, that Professor Hamley, whose health has of late been indifferent, appears determined to leave for the United Kingdom as soon as possible after the termination of his contract in April.

14. The winter now ended has, climatically-speaking, been very pleasant and (what is more important) endowed with a bountiful rainfall. The prospects for the coming harvest, provided we are spared unforeseen pests or disease, are excellent. Taken by and large, this country, notwithstanding its economic difficulties, is remarkably blessed in comparison with its immediate neighbours, with many of its inhabitants enjoying considerable prosperity. All this was reflected in the demeanour of the crowds who recently celebrated the birthday of the Prophet on a cool day of brilliant spring sunshine.

15. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Angora, Cairo, Tehran, Jedda and Beirut, the Minister at State at Cairo, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan, the Governor-General of India, the Commander-in-Chief, India, General Headquarters, Middle East, the Combined Middle East Intelligence Centre, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Political Agent at Koweit and to His Majesty's consular officers at Basra and Mosul.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

[E 2755/489/93]

No. 4.

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 13th May.)*

(No. 143.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of a memorandum by Sir K. Cornwallis, dated the 26th April, 1943, for the Middle East War Council: The Present Situation in Iraq.

*Bagdad, 26th April, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 4.

#### THE PRESENT SITUATION IN IRAQ.

*Memorandum by Sir Kinahan Cornwallis for the Middle East War Council.*

RELATIONS between Great Britain and Iraq are established on the provisions of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930 and the Iraqi Government are at present carrying out satisfactorily their wartime obligations towards His Majesty's Government under article 4 of this treaty. With the co-operation of the Iraqi Government Axis propaganda has been virtually eliminated and all persons whose activities were seriously prejudicial to harmonious relations between Great Britain and Iraq have been interned or have fled the country. In January 1943 the Iraqi Government, entirely on their own initiative, declared war on the Axis Powers and signed the declaration of the United Nations. Since then the Cabinet have been making a sincere, if not always very effective, effort to improve the country's economic contribution to the common war effort. Current relations with His Majesty's Government may therefore justifiably be called good. Internally the situation is tranquil, though there is a certain effervescence of youth, which tends at the moment to show a somewhat "red" tinge. These two outstanding features of the present political situation, good relations with His Majesty's Government and internal tranquillity, which are in such contrast with the hatred and strife of April and May 1941, are attributable to three main factors, the turn of the tide of the war in our favour, the presence of strong British forces, and the comparative calm of the contemporary political situation in Palestine and Syria.

#### *Iraq and Arab Union.*

Since her earliest days Iraq has always been strongly represented in the van of the pan-Arab movement, and her people have never failed to take a close and deeply sentimental interest in the political fortunes of her closest Arab neighbours—Palestine and Syria. The disturbances in Palestine in the late thirties diverted attention from ideas of Arab unity and federation to the more urgent issue of the fate of Palestine and her Arab population, and the outbreak of war with Germany again, for a time, put into the background thoughts of rebuilding the Arab empire of the past. Recently, however, faith in the ultimate victory of the United Nations and confidence in the Atlantic Charter have brought about a revival of activity directed towards a closer union of the now divided Arab States and peoples. The statement made by Mr. Eden in the House of Commons on the 25th February of this year reaffirming the sympathy of His Majesty's Government with any movement among the Arabs to promote economic, cultural or political unity has, moreover, acted as a spur to the political leaders who are now seeking to formulate a scheme which will be able to command general approval.

The protagonists of the pan-Arab movement in Iraq are the veterans of the Arab revolt of the war of 1914-18. They have no declared programme, but there is small doubt that their ultimate objective is the inclusion of all the Arab peoples in both Africa and Asia in a single Arab State. They appreciate, however, that this can only be achieved gradually by stages, and their immediate aim is to help Syria and Palestine to win independence as a necessary preliminary to their union with Iraq. They see that neither Iraq nor Syria nor Palestine is strong enough to dispense with the support of a Great Power, but they hope that when united in a political and economic unit these countries will be able to stand alone without the invidious support of a foreign alliance and the concomitant limitation



of their national sovereignty. Though they are ready to accept schemes for closer cultural and economic co-operation between these countries as helpful preliminaries, such expedients will not deter them from continuing to work for the earliest possible implementation of measures which will enable Palestine, Syria and Iraq to devote their united strength to the Arab cause. These pan-Arab leaders enjoy considerable support among their contemporaries and generally among the Sunni Arabs of the country. Most of them are now well disposed towards ourselves and, in spite of many disappointments in the past, subscribe to the principle that Arab aspirations can only be achieved through close and friendly co-operation with Great Britain. The Shiah, who number more than half the Arab population of the country, are, however, showing little enthusiasm for the federation idea. For some time they have been absorbed in the task of winning political equality with the Sunnis, and they foresee that if Iraq is at all closely federated with the other Arab States, they may again recede into the status of a politically impotent religious minority. The half million Kurds are another important element in the country, indifferent, and to a small extent opposed, to pan-Arab ideals, and even among the Sunni Arabs a number of the younger men interested in politics take the view that federation should be postponed until many fundamental social and economic reforms have been carried out within Iraq itself.

The leaders of the federation movement have not up to the present shown much sign of being discouraged by the negative attitude of the elements mentioned above, but the outcome of the recent *pourparlers* of Jamil Madfai and Tahsin al Askari with political leaders in Syria and Egypt has evidently proved disappointing to them. It is not yet clear what further steps they will now decide to take, but they are not likely to let the matter drop for long. A branch of the Arab Union Club founded by Fuad Abbaza Pasha of Egypt has recently been established in Bagdad, but it is as yet too early to judge whether it will play an active part in Arab politics.

#### *Iraq and Syria.*

It has already been mentioned that Iraqis have for long taken an interest in Syria's struggle for independence. When British forces entered the country in 1941, there were hopes that Syria would rapidly be set on the path already trodden by Iraq. Disappointment and irritation followed with the creation of the Taj ud Din Government, and what appeared to be the reluctance of the Free French authorities to restore the Constitution, and the opportunity of Mr. Wendell Willkie's visit to Bagdad in September 1942 was taken to submit to him a memorandum signed by two ex-Prime Ministers and the President of the Senate, urging the intervention of the United States to secure for Syria her legitimate rights. A pointed reference to Syria's struggle for independence was also made in Nuri Pasha's reply to the message which Mr. Churchill sent to him on the occasion of Iraq's declaration of war on the Axis. Political developments since the death of the late President have, however, given considerable satisfaction to political circles in Iraq and there is now less anxiety about Syria's future prospects.

#### *Palestine.*

Iraq's interest in Palestine has been even deeper than her interest in Syria and, since the end of the last war, whenever there have been political disturbances in Palestine, strong reactions in favour of the Palestine Arabs have been evident in Iraq.

At the beginning of the present war the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem and a large number of his most determined followers were in Iraq. Their anti-British propaganda among the people and their intrigues with the remaining diplomatic representatives of the Axis Powers were a serious menace to our position, and were to a noteworthy degree the cause of Rashid Ali's open defiance of his Majesty's Government in May 1941. Since the restoration of a constitutional and friendly Government, in deference to Iraq's alliance with Great Britain, a tacit truce has been observed in agitation about Palestine, but towards the end of 1942 news of Jewish arming in Palestine and of Zionist propaganda in America caused fears to be felt in this country that the Zionist Jews were taking advantage of this Arab quiescence to strengthen their own position. During a visit to Cairo in December 1942, the Prime Minister discussed with Nahas Pasha the idea of addressing a request to the United States Government to dissuade their prominent citizens from making public statements favourable to militant and extreme Zionism, and also

endeavoured to induce King Abdul Aziz al Saud to take parallel action. In March 1943 the Iraqi Government communicated a memorandum to His Majesty's Government in which concern was expressed at the increase of Zionist propaganda in Great Britain and the United States, and added that the Iraqi Government could not overlook the possible effect of such propaganda in Iraq, where the people were deeply interested in the Palestine question. His Majesty's Government, in their reply, drew attention to the answer given by the then Secretary of State for the Colonies to a question by Lord Davies in the House of Lords on the 6th May, 1942, in the following words: "While I would make it clear that there has been no change in the policy of His Majesty's Government with regard to Palestine, the noble Lord may rest assured that His Majesty's Government will not enter into commitments regarding the future of that country without prior consultation with those including both Arabs and Jews whom they may judge to be concerned." The reply added that the policy reaffirmed in that statement remained that of His Majesty's Government. This reply appears to have been accepted.

The general attitude of Iraqi Arabs towards the Palestine question is that they are resigned to the policy of the Palestine White Paper of 1939 and regard it as the declared and accepted policy of His Majesty's Government. They look forward to the early implementation of its constitutional provisions, and many hope that this having been done the way will be clear for Palestine to enter into closer political, cultural and economic relations with her neighbours. Any material whittling away of the safeguards provided for the Arabs in the White Paper, and especially any relaxation of its restrictions on Jewish immigration, would be regarded as a serious breach of faith and would provoke dangerous reactions in this country, where our politico-strategic interests are likely in the difficult post-war years to assume even greater importance than they do to-day. In particular, the large Jewish community would be in jeopardy.

The Iraqi Prime Minister has set out his personal views on the future of Palestine and Syria and on the Federation of the Arab States in a lengthy memorandum which he addressed in January last to the Minister of State at Cairo. It began with a renewed protest against current Zionist claims and propaganda, went on to review the recent history of Syria and Palestine, and concluded with a recommendation that the United Nations should immediately declare the federation of Syria, the Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan into one State and promote the formation of an Arab Union, to which this Greater Syria and Iraq should adhere at once and other Arab States join at will.

26th April, 1943.

[E 2914/50/93]

No. 5.

*Mr. Eden to Sir A. Clark Kerr (Moscow).*

(No. 215.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, May 18, 1943.*

THE Soviet Ambassador asked to see me this afternoon, when he said that he had a minor matter to mention. Some time ago two Russian deserters had escaped into Iraq. There they had been tried for murder and his Excellency understood that they had been convicted and condemned to death. From the information that the Soviet Government had at their disposal they were inclined to think that the men were not in fact guilty of murder though they had been guilty of desertion, in respect of which they were punishable. If it were possible, the Soviet Government would like the men to be handed over to them, their sentence to death having first been remitted.

2. I said that I had no knowledge of the circumstances, but that I would naturally look into the question. The Ambassador said that his Government would be grateful if we could use our influence in the sense in which he had suggested. The men, his Government felt sure, had not deserved death and were now truly sorry for their desertion.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.



*Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 22.)*

(No. 148.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, April 30, 1943.*

I HAVE had the honour in recent months to acquaint you from time to time with the principal events in the field of education in Iraq following the engagement of Professor Hamley as technical adviser. Now that the latter, after a year's stay, is on the point of leaving the country, it is appropriate to review his achievements.

2. It is difficult to over-estimate the ultimate influence, for good or evil, of educational policy upon the life of a nation, and it would be proper to ascribe to the conduct of the schools and colleges of Iraq a large share of responsibility for an atmosphere favourable to such events as those of May 1941. It was abundantly plain after those events—if it had not been before—that no stability could be hoped for without a radical reform of the aims, administration and methods of public instruction in this country. Protracted efforts were required before such reform could be put in hand. General Nuri-al-Said, after becoming Prime Minister, appeared, indeed, to appreciate the need for action, but strong influences were at work to prevent any fundamental changes. Professor Hamley (recognised as the most suitable expert to call in) on his side, having in 1941 spent some time in Iraq, was understandably reluctant to return; he was rightly adamant in refusing to do so on conditions which would have virtually denied him any say in the formulation of educational policy. Such conditions were, in fact, proposed to him as a result of the intrigues of those who feared his coming. The latter were, however, eventually overridden by the Prime Minister, who gave Professor Hamley the mission of investigating conditions and of elaborating a scheme of reorganisation, in which tasks he promised him his full support.

3. In June 1942 Professor Hamley presented to the Minister of Education, Tahsin Ali, a memorandum setting out his main conclusions. A copy of this document was enclosed in my despatch No. 227 of the 15th August, 1942. Tahsin Ali did not even discuss with the professor the recommendations which it contained; he appears simply to have sent the report on to the Prime Minister with critical comments by Dr. Fadhil Jamali, then Director-General of Instruction. None the less, General Nuri subsequently informed Professor Hamley that he approved the report and would put the main proposals into effect as soon as possible. One of these proposals was the fusion of the two Directorates-General of Education and Instruction in the Ministry. It was agreed that neither existing director-general should remain, but the Prime Minister could not accept any of Professor Hamley's suggestions for their replacement by an Iraqi, and it was decided to obtain the services of an Egyptian. You will recall that interminable delays and difficulties attended the negotiations with the Egyptian Government, and that the candidate finally accepted by the Iraqi Government, Sadiq Jawhar, did not reach Bagdad until early this year. Meanwhile the implementation of the reforms was held up, and it was not until the 7th January last that Professor Hamley was invited to explain his scheme of reorganisation to the Council of Ministers. The council approved, and the professor was asked to draw up a new regulation for the Ministry of Education, which was promulgated in its final form on the 4th February last.

4. The main features of the reform appear from this regulation, of which a copy is enclosed.<sup>(1)</sup> They are a reorganisation of the central machinery of administration, the decentralisation of control, and the constitution of a Board of Education independent of the Ministry. As to the first, a single director-general is responsible, under the minister, for the entire administration and the execution of policy, the routine work of internal administration being supervised by an assistant. As to the second, increased powers have been delegated to the Directors of Education in each of the fourteen Liwas, which again are grouped into five areas (northern, north-eastern, central, Euphrates and southern) under area directors, who are at the same time Liwa directors, but senior to their other colleagues. The Board of Education, which constitutes the third main innovation, is principally an advisory body, which will concern itself with broad educational policies and with assessing the general progress of education throughout the country. In addition to the Minister of Education, the director-general and assistant director-general, it is to include representatives of other Ministries

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

and also four non-official persons known to be interested in education, appointed for two years at a time. By the institution of this board it is hoped to secure continuity of educational policy and to render it less subject to the caprice of individual ministers or directors-general. Parallel to the board on a lower level are Area Education Councils in the provinces.

5. With the appointments of the Board of Education early this month all these changes have now been carried out. The particular appointments to the principal posts in the Ministry of Education and in the provinces were made in consultation with Professor Hamley, and, despite the inevitable compromises, may be considered on the whole satisfactory. Unfortunately Sadiq Jawhar, who has been given the rank of acting director-general, has proved a disappointment. Though intelligent, careful and honest, he is obstructive and unduly rigid and lacks the right temperament to handle his staff. If, in due course, he can be replaced by a more suitable incumbent, it will be all to the good.

6. If the new regulation is the visual memorial to Professor Hamley's labours, it represents but a small part of what he has done both inside and outside the Ministry of Education. On the one hand, he has worked among those who shape policy to secure a reorientation of Iraqi education to adapt it to the needs of the country with special emphasis on rural schools and on technical training (including especially in agriculture). On the other hand, he has sought by personal contact with both teachers and taught to instil a new conception of the bases and ultimate aims of education. Progress in the former direction will inevitably be slow of realisation, but the professor leaves behind him a number of valuable memoranda, culminating in a "Statement of Policy" drafted for the use of the new Board of Education. It is perhaps in infusing a new meaning and a new enthusiasm into education—a field in which his talents and personality receive their fullest scope—that Professor Hamley has been most obviously and strikingly successful. He was responsible last year for the organisation during the holidays of a "Summer School of Citizenship" for some 600 boys, the actual running of which was wisely left in the hands of the Iraqi teachers. This was the most spectacular of such activities, but in many other ways, and not least by his personal concern for the individual, he has created the conception of an education designed not so much to enable the pupil to acquire parrot-wise the contents of set text-books as to fit him or her to take a useful and decent place in society. In this side of his work particularly, as in many other ways, Mrs. Hamley has been of great assistance to him.

7. Professor Hamley has had no easy row to hoe. Entrenched in the Ministry of Education he found two of the most dangerous men in Iraq, Dr. Sami Shawkat, Director-General of Education, and Dr. Fadhil Jamali, Director-General of Instruction—the former an honest, unprogressive bigoted Arab nationalist with a strong admiration for German educational methods, the latter an intelligent plausible and utterly unscrupulous self-seeker. Both enjoyed powerful protection, and, although the Prime Minister admitted that both must go, it was not until mid-January last that they were finally ousted. For nine months, therefore, they remained to hamper Professor Hamley's efforts. Dr. Shawkat's frank opposition could be met and beaten down. Dr. Jamali's more subtle methods of agreeing with Professor Hamley to his face and intriguing against him behind his back were less easy to counter, more especially as he held the ear of that brainless toper, Tahsin Ali, who somehow still hangs on as minister. No politician was ever more inappropriately placed. Professor Hamley's minutes and memoranda were passed by the minister to Dr. Jamali for comment; officials and teachers who showed too much disposition to co-operate with the Professor found themselves transferred or otherwise unfavourably noticed; and in many other directions the malign influence of the doctor made itself felt. At times Professor Hamley was near despair, but with encouragement from the Prime Minister and myself he struggled on, and eventually Dr. Jamali was ordered to proceed to Washington as counsellor to the legation there. He has, however, been granted leave before he starts, and my information is that he is continuing his campaign against the reforms; outside the ministry he is no longer so dangerous, but his influence, particularly in Shi'ah circles, is considerable, and it will be no small relief to see him leave the country, assuming he ever does so.

8. It is a pity, if comprehensible, that Professor Hamley, despite all inducements, did not feel able to stay longer in Iraq. Nevertheless, in the year that he has been here he has, under adverse conditions, accomplished much. To do so he has not spared himself, and I should like here to pay tribute both to him and to Mrs. Hamley for their untiring efforts in the cause of sound education in Iraq.



9. It is too early to appreciate the permanent effect of Professor Hamley's reforms. The new framework is the solution which, as a technical expert, he has devised to meet Iraqi conditions; and, as such, it will no doubt prove its worth. Yet it will be of little value, if it is not inspired by that spirit which Professor Hamley has striven to inculcate: if those who form and execute educational policy do not keep before them the high ideals which he has set: if teaching relapses into a monotonous burdening of unwilling memories with unwanted knowledge. These are very real dangers, against which I fear the present Acting Director-General will fight but half-heartedly. It therefore becomes the more important that we should do all we can—in our own interests, as in those of Iraq—to ensure that the candle which has been lit shall not be snuffed out. We have created many problems for ourselves in different lands by confusing education with book-learning, by turning out bad clerks instead of good husband-men, disgruntled lawyer-politicians instead of doctors and technicians. "Education" of this type has found all-too-ready acceptance in the Orient, where academic learning has always been invested with an aura of the near-divine and the dignity of labour has been nothing but an impertinent oxymoron. Now, however, for good or evil, contact with the West is dethroning the pandit, and the youth of Iraq, as the youth of other countries, is searching for something better. As things have been, "the democracies," as exemplified by ourselves, have held little of attraction; if we cannot do better, we must not be surprised to find the dynamic appeal of "communism" taking hold of the imaginations of those who so lately succumbed to the analogous lure of "fascist" slogans. Professor Hamley has laid the foundations of an educational system which should guide youthful aspirations into constructive channels. In the development and maintenance of such a system we can, and by every means must, assist—through the British teachers in Iraqi employ, through the British Council and by all other possible help and advice. I am convinced that in this lies our best hope of seeing grow up in Iraq a responsible body of men and women alive to and capable of directing the destinies of their country, not hostile to ourselves nor susceptible to those extravagant enthusiasms which feed so readily on frustration and irritation with the out-of-date. As I have pointed out in other connexions, we have too long been identified with the obscurantist forces here. If we are to maintain and improve our position, we must win the understanding, the sympathy and the support of youth.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister of State at Cairo, to the Government of India, and to His Majesty's Consular Officers in Iraq.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

### CHAPTER III.—PALESTINE.

[E 3424/87/31]

No. 7.

*Mr. Eden to Viscount Halifax (Washington).*

(No. 658.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, 11th June, 1943.*

WHEN the United States Ambassador came to see me this afternoon he left with me the attached letter and suggested statement by the United Nations regarding Palestine. The Ambassador added that his instructions were that his Government would have no objection to the "issuance" of a joint statement or similar and concurrent separate statements by His Majesty's Government and the United States Government, if His Majesty's Government preferred this.

2. I said that while I would, of course, consider the United States Government's proposal, I did not at first sight believe that it could serve any useful purpose. It was true that there was a certain amount of tension in Palestine, but quite apart from other considerations I was doubtful whether we should do any good by drawing attention to it in this way. I noticed that in his covering letter the Ambassador said that "Zionist political agitation in the United States and elsewhere has, moreover, already caused alarm and political reactions in the Arab countries which in turn result in a still higher pitch of Zionist activity." Certainly this was true. Indeed, it was a matter upon which I had thought of approaching the United States Government at an earlier date, but it was certainly not one which lay within the competence of His Majesty's Government to control.

3. The Ambassador made no attempt to champion the proposal with any warmth and was clearly not surprised when I showed coldness towards it.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

Enclosure in No. 7.

*Mr. Winant to Mr. Eden.*

*Embassy of the United States of America.*

*10th June, 1943.*

Dear Mr. Eden,

I HAVE just received a telegram from the Department of State requesting me to inform you that my Government is deeply concerned over Arab-Jewish tension in Palestine. The Department mentions that reliable information made available to our representatives in Palestine and neighbouring areas, principally by British official sources, is to the effect that both Arabs and Jews are well armed and confident, and that each side is simply awaiting what it considers to be suitable provocation before resorting to force in furtherance or defence of its supposed interests.

The Department points out that the serious effects which such an eventuality would produce upon the population of vast areas vital to the military effort require, of course, no elaboration. Zionist political agitation in the United States and elsewhere has, moreover, already caused alarm and political reactions in the Arab countries which, in turn, result in a still higher pitch of Zionist activity. A spiral of increasing tension has thus been created which feeds on itself and, in the Department's view, disastrous results might well occur in the immediate future unless tension is abated. It would appear, in any event, that the considerable amount of attention and energy which is being devoted to the Palestine question is causing serious distraction from the war effort.

It appears to my Government, which hopes that the British Government will agree, that the time has come to deal effectively with the situation. The Department suggests to that end the issuance of a statement, which I enclose, designed to postpone for the duration of the war a decision on the Palestine question. The Department believes the suggested statement is in harmony with declared British policy, and its text has the approval of the President.

The Department points out that the statement has been drafted for issuance by the United Nations. It feels there are definite disadvantages as well as advantages in having a statement on this question by all the United Nations, and



for this and other obvious and essential reasons it therefore seeks the views of the British Government before taking the matter up in any other quarter.

Among the disadvantages mentioned by the Department are the length of time which would be necessary to consult the other United Nations; the possibility that one or more might not feel in a position to subscribe to this statement; and the fact that some of them have presumably little interest in the Palestine question. A statement by the United Nations would, on the other hand, have great weight.

Taking things all around the Department is prepared to consider whether issuance of the statement (with changes in text to take account of the fact that it would not be issued by the United Nations) might not be preferable on the part of a smaller group of countries, such as Great Britain, Soviet Russia, China and the United States.

I would be very grateful to receive the British Government's views on this matter for transmission to Washington.

Sincerely,  
JOHN G. WINANT.

Sub-enclosure.

*Suggested Statement by the United Nations regarding Palestine.*

THE United Nations, having in mind the terms of their declaration of the 1st January, 1942, are agreed that, while public discussions on controversial international questions are in general desirable, in order to promote an informed public opinion and clarification of the issues involved, it is undesirable that special viewpoints should be pressed while the war is in progress to such an extent as to create undue anxiety among United Nations and other friendly Governments and peoples.

In this connexion, the United Nations have taken note of public discussions and activities of a political nature relating to Palestine and consider that it would be helpful to the war effort if these were to cease. As is the case of other territorial problems, it is not, in their view, essential that a settlement of the Palestine question be achieved prior to the conclusion of the war. Nevertheless, if the interested Arabs and Jews can reach a friendly understanding through their own efforts before the end of the war, such a development would be highly desirable. In any case, no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

CHAPTER IV.—PERSIA.

A. Miscellaneous.

[E 2168/80/34]

No. 8.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 15.)*

(No. 119.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General, Tabriz, to Tehran, No. 16 of the 19th March, 1943.

*Tehran, March 24, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 8.

*Consul-General Urquhart to Sir R. Bullard.*

(No. 16. Secret.)

*Tabriz, March 19, 1943.*

Sir,

I AM told that exaggerated rumours are in circulation in Tehran about the situation here. I have the honour, therefore, to submit the following review:—

2. The weather, abnormally mild for the greater part of the winter, has been severe since the 23rd February. It has prevented the free movement of grain and created a genuine food crisis in Tabriz and other towns. Tempers have become brittle all round, nerves frayed. The weather has also interrupted communication with Tehran. The Governor-General complains that he has had no useful guidance from the Central Government from the beginning of February, first on account of the political crisis and then because of the storm of the 23rd February, which blew down hundreds of telegraph poles. Only this week have telegrams begun to come in, but I know from my own reception of your telegrams that they are arriving mutilated, out of sequence and with gaps still to be filled. Now to-day the lines are down again.

3. The Governor-General's position is shaky. Not only has he had no support from Tehran, but, as he told me to-day with some emotion, the Government has sent spies to Tabriz to investigate reports that he has been showing revolutionary tendencies, possibly lending himself to plots to separate Azerbaijan from the rest of Persia. According to him, these suspicions are based in part on his attitude towards the Left-wing agitators whose recent activity I have reported to you. The Government seems to think that he has encouraged them, whereas he claims that, with the Russians on one hand ready to label him Fascist if he uses repression, and the Government on the other ready to suspect him of Communist sympathies if he allows freedom, he has steered a middle course, firmly requiring the agitators to keep within the law, but at the same time allowing them due freedom of speech, confident that their talk about anti-fascism will evoke no response from the population of Tabriz (see paragraph 35 of my diary No. 4 of 1943). The Government, he went on, is suspicious of him also because of the action taken against the landlords here. That action has been far less severe or comprehensive than Mr. Vivian would have liked, but, nevertheless, it has alarmed the landlords and they have apparently started an agitation in Tehran. Thus, while Mr. Vivian, my American colleague, and I have been reporting that the Governor-General, himself a local landlord, has been protecting his fellow landlords, they, on the other hand, have apparently accused him of taking the part of the proletariat against them. The Governor-General's defence is that he has again tried to steer a middle course.

4. The Governor-General's quarrel with the Chief of the Municipality (see paragraph 45 of my diary No. 5 of 1943), his use of physical violence and his subsequent repentance have weakened his position in the eyes of the people generally. His quarrel also with Mr. Vivian has lessened respect for his authority. It was common knowledge in the bazaars that each was recommending removal of the other, while all the time no apparent progress was being made toward bringing in wheat. As regards the Russians, the Governor-General has undoubtedly sought their favour, but he has failed to produce wheat and barley



for them, and I cannot believe that they now feel grateful to him. Finally, as regards the Kurds, he has recently made efforts to conciliate certain of the leaders, but in this matter the Russians are against him, and against him too is his own record in Western Azerbaijan in the time of Reza Shah. As I have reported in my diary, his harshness and exactions are well remembered and the Kurds of North-Western Azerbaijan have promised to put a bullet in him should he venture that way.

5. The Governor-General, therefore, can claim little in the way of achievement in his three months of office here. He seems, indeed, to be overwhelmed by the complexities and difficulties of his post, to possess an aptitude for intrigue rather than for action and leadership. Latterly he has become nervous and precipitate; but I think it wide of the truth to suggest that he is entirely a tool in Russian hands, or that he has thought to separate Azerbaijan from the rest of Persia.

6. *The Russian Attitude.*—The salient facts at this moment are that—

- (a) The Russians are in immediate need of wheat and barley.
- (b) Their local officials have the task of getting it, without overtly interfering with the local administration, and despite hoarding and the claims of the local population.
- (c) They want to secure the grain without incurring blame for any shortage of local needs.
- (d) They approve the local political adventurers who have been preaching that the food shortage here is caused by Fascist hoarders, but they must have been disappointed with the reception given to this argument.
- (e) They may even, judging by reports from Tehran, have decided to avoid blame by trying to pin it on the British and Americans and they intensely resent remarks, attributed to Mr. Vivian and the American Consul, that the situation cannot be cured unless the contract to supply the Russians is broken.
- (f) They are distrustful of the presence here of Americans in Mr. Vivian's position.
- (g) They are in a bitter, resentful mood anyway, most disappointed by their recent set-backs on the southern front and ready for a quarrel; moreover, it is possible that local Russian officials need scapegoats to excuse to Moscow their inability to secure grain, and this may help to explain their protests to Washington against Mr. Vivian and Mr. Kuniholm.

7. *Mr. Vivian's Position.*—Mr. Vivian's mission has failed. Probably it was doomed to failure from the outset. He took over a department corrupt in all its branches, with all its members interested only to cover up their dishonesties. Without knowledge of the language, he was in the hands of his interpreters, and they broadcast most intimate discussions. Lacking political sense, he failed to secure the support of any one of the competing interests. He gave wheat and barley to the Russians, not enough to satisfy them, but enough to bring Tabriz to its present shortage. He leaves on the 21st instant for Tehran at the suggestion of the Russians, who require him to go there to have his permit to reside renewed. I shall be surprised if they allow him to return. Alternatively, I question whether he will want to return to a thankless and probably now hopeless task, in view of the animosities which have developed.

8. *Mr. Kuniholm's Position.*—The Soviet authorities have, for the second time, protested against Mr. Kuniholm's utterances. In fairness to him it should be said that it would have required uncommon discretion and tact to avoid their hostility while loyally supporting Mr. Vivian. Mr. Kuniholm is not discreet or tactful, although he is able, well-informed and energetic. He has never concealed his distrust of the Russians; he has found satisfaction in letting it be known that he and Mr. Vivian were proposing the removal of the Governor-General: he has freely stated his view that the grain contract with the Russians must be broken. Mr. Vivian himself has said to me that he suspected him of indiscretion. It seems that he is leaving with Mr. Vivian on the 21st for good.

9. *The Landlords' Attitude.*—The war and the weakness of the Tehran Government offered an opportunity to evade the monopoly and get high prices for wheat. The landlords found the officials willing to accept bribes, and in the result about one-third of the proper amount was delivered to the Government; then the landlords, having paid their bribes and obtained their receipts, either sold the grain to speculators or buried it themselves. Under Mr. Vivian's pressure many landlords here have protested that they did deliver all they undertook to deliver to the Government, that they have no wheat wherewith to meet the revised demand made on them. This is true in many cases; some are known

to have bought back, at high prices, some of the grain which they sold earlier. Others who have grain concealed protest just as loudly that they have none. All, whether residing here or in Tehran, unite in clamour lest this threat to their profits should succeed, and they will parade all the familiar bogies—bolshevism, revolution, separatism—in order to create a diversion.

10. *The Attitude of the General Public.*—Apart from a demonstration on the 17th instant when the doors of the Governorate were broken in, the crowd have been quiet on the whole. One reason is that many more people than in normal years seem to have made provision for just this situation. They all protest, of course, at the shortage, but there seems to be little danger of such immediate starvation as would ensue in Tehran, provided always that the shortage does not persist too long.

11. The public knows well that its officials are corrupt, that much wheat has been hoarded, but that the Russians have received some thousands of tons of wheat which would have saved the situation now, had it remained in Persian hands.

12. *The Future.*—What of the next harvest? Is it to be left to landlords to hide, to speculators and hoarders? Will the Russians maintain their present prohibition on the movement of grain to the south? Will the Finance Department be allowed to accept bribes and under-estimate the crops again?

13. We may perhaps rely on Dr. Millspaugh to prevent the Government from abusing our goodwill this year as they did last with schemes which they had no intention or power to implement. Otherwise we are faced with much the same set of difficulties as have baffled us hitherto—dishonest officials, hoarders, speculators, keen buyers from Iraq and Turkey, paucity of transport. The Germans may not this year get near enough to Azerbaijan to inspire non-co-operation in Persians, but, on the other hand, Russian needs are sharper than they were a year ago.

14. In the matter of wheat we have been playing Martha to the Russian Mary. We have toiled for Russia's good, while she sat back and criticised. I am glad to see signs that we may adopt a more hard-headed attitude; if the Russians intend to retain in Azerbaijan, whether for their own purposes or for propaganda, wheat which would normally go from this granary to other parts of the country, then surely they must be given to understand that wheat must be imported from overseas.

15. Again, I venture to suggest the necessity to bring to Persia a greater provision of basic goods, such as sugar, tea, cotton goods. It seems unlikely that the Persians can succeed in securing the crop by compulsion, and that only by persuasion can it be brought into the market. Clearly more money, paper money at that, is no sufficient inducement; there must be goods behind the money for which the landlord and the peasant can exchange money. At present the supply of such goods is inadequate and there are too many people going about with pocketfuls of notes.

16. If I am right in my impression that the present congestion at the railway station here is likely to increase as more lorries come on the road, and if it be true that the Russians cannot produce more rail transport than they are at present using, then the case for reducing somewhat the inflow of supplies for Russia and for increasing the volume of supplies for Persia seems all the stronger.

I have, &c.

R. W. URQUHART.

[E 2248/80/34]

No. 9.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.*—(Received 19th April.)  
(No. 126.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch from the consul-general at Tabriz, No. 17, enclosing a report on Consul Ogden's recent visit to Rezaieh.

Tehran, 30th March, 1943.



Enclosure in No. 9.

*Consul-General Urquhart to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).*

(No. 17.)

Sir,

Tabriz, 20th March, 1943.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith Mr. Vice-Consul Ogden's report on his recent visit to Rezaieh.

2. Mr. Ogden had to endure discomfort in making the journey by rail and lake steamer, more particularly at this season, but in my opinion the visit was well worth while. I propose that it should be repeated towards the end of April so that we may this year have the benefit of reliable information about any Kurdish raids which may take place.

3. Mr. Ogden's report reveals a picture only too familiar. The fertile garden which stretches along the western shore of Lake Urmia lies open and inviting to the hungry mountain Kurds. The Persians want to re-establish their gendarme posts and to make them strong; but the Russians will neither agree to the numbers of posts which the Persians want, nor will they allow sufficient strength of men at the points of which they approve. So these weak groups are either chased away or wiped out by the Kurds, who are clearly as determined this year as they were last that the gendarmes shall not again be re-established in their midst.

4. The Turkish Consul appointed to Rezaieh has not yet taken up his post, and the vice-consul remains in charge. That is a pity. He is dangerous, being prone to exaggerate and embellish. That will have to be borne in mind if he is still in charge when the raiding season begins.

5. The Turkish Vice-Consul's health propaganda may perhaps be as politically innocent as Miss Palmer-Smith's recently-established infant welfare scheme in Rezaieh, or our own medical and other relief activities in the British zone of occupation.

6. My final comment is that the Russians seem still to be marking time in Western Azerbaijan, working still to a formula of military precautions. I see no sign of evolution in their policy. There is no apparent attempt to modify its rigidity in face of local developments, and no sign of interest from Moscow.

I have, &amp;c.

R. W. URQUHART.

Sub-Enclosure.

Memorandum.

I LEFT Tabriz on the 26th February by train for Rezaieh. The train left at 11 A.M. and arrived in Sherif Khaneh at 3 P.M. after stops of half an hour at Sofian and twenty minutes at Ziba. At Sherif Khaneh I was invited by Mr. Sattarzadeh, the head of the Navigation Department, to spend the time until the departure of the boat at his house. Mr. Sattarzadeh, who studied engineering from 1924 to 1929 at the London Polytechnic, speaks good English and also French and Russian. He gave me a considerable amount of information regarding the boat services on the lake and of the material under his supervision. The details are set out in an appendix to this memorandum. Sherif Khaneh, situated at the north-eastern end of Lake Urmia, is a small hamlet separated from the lake by a wide stretch of grey slime, which makes the whole area smell like a sewage farm. It is also a notoriously bad area for malaria. It boasts two doctors, but during the summer months a very high proportion, sometimes more than 50 per cent., of the workmen employed in the repair shops are continuously laid up. The boat left at 10 P.M. and, despite a strong north-westerly blizzard, made a rapid crossing, arriving at Gulma Khaneh, the port for Rezaieh, shortly after 2 A.M. From there the journey was completed in a droschke, arriving at Rezaieh at 5.30 A.M.

2. On Monday, the 1st March, I paid official calls on the Farmandar, the officer commanding the Persian troops, and the Soviet Consul and the Turkish Vice-Consul. These visits were returned in the afternoon and the following day. I subsequently called on the commandant of gendarmerie, the chief of police, and, at his own invitation, on the Assyrian bishop. As a counter-balance to this

last visit I also called on the Mujtahid, the head of the Moslem religious community.

3. *Food Situation.*—As everywhere else the situation leaves much to be desired. Wheat is short owing to the activities of the Kurds last year and to hoarding by land-owners and speculators. In the middle of February the position became so acute that there were fears of rioting. Colonel Mahin, then the Officer Commanding Persian Troops, and the Soviet Consul, together visited the bazaars and promised an improvement in the bread situation. The following day wheat was produced and the immediate danger averted, but the Government stocks in the town remain very low. According to the Farmandar the price of wheat has risen in the market during the past twelve months from 200 tomans a ton to over 1,000 tomans. During the first two weeks of March there was a tendency for the price to fall, and the current price is about 950 tomans a ton. The Farmandar still maintains that there are no considerable stocks hoarded in Rezaieh itself, but says that the Kurds undoubtedly have large stores remaining after their pillaging of last year, even taking into account the quantities they smuggled into Iraq. They are now sending occasional small quantities into Rezaieh to be sold at the present high market prices. The prices of other food-stuffs are generally the same as in Tabriz, exceptions being eggs, which are 16 shahis each as against 20 in Tabriz, and chickens, which are 15 to 20 rials as against 30 to 40.

The first attempts at rationing proved a lamentable failure. Sugar was to be rationed from December and ration cards were issued. It was then discovered that the number of people to draw rations greatly exceeded the population of Rezaieh. Corrupt minor officials had, for a consideration, been adding imaginary names to family ration-cards. As a result the cards were withdrawn and up to the present no sugar has been issued. If and when a new scheme is evolved, it seems most unlikely that back rations for the past months will be issued. If not issued, it would be interesting to know whether Government stocks of sugar have been sent to Rezaieh for this period and what has become of them. I have mentioned this point to Mr. Vivian since my return as possibly being worthy of investigation. As regards the cheap Government bread, there were complaints from the Assyrian community that the Moslem community were receiving preferential treatment. There is nothing new in this and it is not serious, although it is certainly true. The Farmandar has promised Father Franssen, of the Catholic Mission, that he will supply cheap bread to all necessitous Christian families of all denominations according to a list to be drawn up by Father Franssen and vouched for by him.

4. *Hoarding.*—The anti-hoarding laws, and particularly the clause by which those who denounce hoarders are entitled to a reward equal to 20 per cent. of the hoarded grain, have not been publicised in Rezaieh. The Assyrian bishop thinks that if the law were known many would come forward with information and large stocks, hidden in the countryside, would be revealed. He thinks, however, that it would be useless if the information had to be revealed to Persian Government officials.

5. *Spring Sowings.*—These are everywhere in the Rezaieh area above the average and, with the heavy snowfall this winter, should produce bumper harvests. Forty tons of rice seedlings promised by the Persian Government are anxiously awaited. This rice, at present at Mianeh, should, with the help being given by British military convoys to transport it to Tabriz, get to Rezaieh in time for sowing. Harvest prospects will, however, depend to a very great extent on the Kurdish situation.

6. *Kurds and Security.*—There is every reason to believe that the Kurds are arming as hard as they can. They are purchasing rifles at exorbitant prices, frequently paying with the grain that they pillaged last year. Throughout Western Azerbaijan there seems to be a great fear amongst the cultivators that the events of last year will be repeated. Nothing has yet been done or said to alleviate this fear, and recent incidents (detailed later) have not helped to improve the situation. The answer lies with the Russians. The Persians sit back and, when things go wrong, just say "Non mea culpa." The Russians retaliate with the fiction that it is not their affair. But this mutual "washing of hands" will not solve the problem. I feel, after my contacts with both Russian and Persian officials in Rezaieh, that the Russians came into this country without any policy whatsoever, and that they have got themselves into a pretty sorry mess. Their first idea was that the Persians would be of no help to them and that the Kurds, being violently anti-Persian, might; so they tried to make friends with the Kurds, even going to the length of rearming them. Because things went well in the



Caucasus for the Russians, the Kurds have been naturally strongly pro-Russian. But if the Germans had succeeded in breaking through the Caucasus to Persia, I am sure the Russians would have found their own arms turned against them by the same Kurds, who would have seen vistas of great plunder opened to them. However, having made these overtures to the Kurds the Russians now find themselves saddled with a rather tiresome and embarrassing friend. M. Maximoff, the Soviet Consul in Rezaieh, seems to appreciate the necessity for settled conditions in Western Azerbaijan and the production this year of the highest possible quantity of food-stuffs. He has on several occasions helped the Persian authorities to keep the Kurds in order, and there is little doubt that the moral effect on the Kurds of M. Maximoff's associating himself with the Persians is very great. Though the Russians have obviously no intention of giving the Persians a free hand (which may be the reason why they have acquired the reputation of being the "protectors" of the Kurds), I do not think that they are doing other than discourage the Kurds from causing trouble. The Turkish Vice-Consul in Rezaieh thinks otherwise, and spoke darkly of the activities of two Kurdish-speaking Russians, whose names, he said, were Yusofov and Jafarov, and who are, according to him, constantly out amongst the Kurds. He added that he doubted whether the Soviet Consul himself was kept properly informed of their doings. Whilst the possibility of the Russians having some dark plot up their sleeves cannot be completely disregarded, it seems at least equally probable that these agents are no more sinister than our own political officers in Iraqi Kurdistan, and that their task is to keep the Russian authorities informed as to what the Kurds are up to. However, the Russians also have their fair share of suspicions against us as is shown by their action in arresting a peaceful Kurdish inhabitant of Rezaieh, one Mehmet Sadiq by name, and expelling him from the Russian-occupied zone. The suspicion that he was a "British agent" seems to have derived from the facts that he is the son of an Iraqi Kurd, is well-educated and, amongst his accomplishments, counts a good knowledge of English.

The Turkish Vice-Consul is still very exercised over the continued raids by armed Kurds across the Turkish frontier. He says that one of the Turkish Governors in the frontier zone has written to him to say that the people are rapidly losing patience and that, unless the raids stop, there is danger that they will get out of hand and start retaliatory raids into Persian territory. He (the vice-consul) is not concerned with the fate of the Kurds, nor particularly with the effect of such raids on the relations between Turkey and Persia, but he is afraid that, if armed bands of Turks do cross the frontier, they may quite easily come into conflict with Soviet troops, a happening to be avoided at all costs. He told me, finally, that the Turkish forces on the frontier are to be considerably strengthened in the spring. It is to be hoped that the Russians are told of any such move and the reasons which have made it necessary, or they will almost certainly suspect some ulterior motive. During the latest raid into Turkish territory the Kurds got away with more than 1,000 sheep. The Russians have recovered some 200 of them and handed them over to the Turkish Vice-Consul, but, although they have been supplied with the names of the raiders, they say they cannot arrest them. The Turk takes the view that it is a case of "will not" rather than "can not."

The Turkish Vice-Consul is busy also arranging for the repatriation, when weather conditions permit, of some fifteen Turkish families, comprising about eighty persons in all, who have been in Azerbaijan for many years, but who now are reluctant to return to their villages for fear of the Kurds. I feel that the Turkish Vice-Consul is inclined to over-emphasise the gravity of the local situation, but I think, in fairness to him, that it must be admitted that anyone living in Rezaieh for any length of time will inevitably tend to view affairs of parochial interest as of international importance. Nashaat Bey is certainly an energetic person, and I was told by an outside observer that when the former Turkish Consul was in Rezaieh he was the "wagon" and Nashaat Bey the "locomotive." He certainly bullies the Farmandar, as I myself witnessed, but gets nowhere by such tactics. He despises the Persians for their corruptness and dilatoriness, and told me that after the war there will have to be a return to capitulations. I imagine that this is only his personal opinion, and I hope he has not expressed himself so freely to his Soviet colleague. It was Nashaat Bey who told me the story, which he said he had had at first hand, of a Persian officer who was in command of a defence line during the Russian advance into Western Azerbaijan. The line consisted of two parallel trenches, the second some considerable distance behind the first. The officer charges his men 10 rials for

places in the second trench. When the Russians arrived the officer was, of course, well on the way to Tehran. He obviously has all the makings of a general.

Apart from the problem of Kurdish incursions into Turkey, there were two incidents of importance which occurred during my stay in Rezaieh. On the 21st February a clash occurred between gendarmes and Ibrahim Bek Shikak's Kurds, when the gendarmes were ambushed on the main Shahpur-Rezaieh road at a point where the mountains come down almost to Lake Urmia. Three gendarmes and three Kurds were killed. Colonel Mahin, the Commanding Officer Persian Forces in Rezaieh, and the Soviet Consul went together to see Ibrahim Beg Shikak, who professed complete ignorance of the affair. Nothing further has been done, but the participation of the Russian Consul at the interview is generally regarded as having been sufficient to give Ibrahim Beg an unpleasant shock. The history of this incident goes back much further. Some time ago a certain Zero, an Iraqi Herki of no importance, came over to Persia and occupied the village of Kukiya, belonging to Colonel Afshar, a retired Persian officer, now believed to be in Tehran. Zero ingratiated himself with the Russians and was allowed to remain. He then brought over some of his tribe from Iraq and assumed the title of "Beg." No Persian gendarmerie post was established in his area, where he ruled like a little king. Ibrahim Beg Shikak had also been free of gendarmes and there had been no banditry or robbery in his little domain. When, therefore, the Persians wished to establish a post in his area—incidentally merely a sort of half-way house, as their two nearest posts were too far apart—Ibrahim Beg had a fit of jealousy and decided that he was not going to be treated less favourably than the upstart Zero. Immediately, minor robberies occurred on the road where, before the arrival of the gendarmes, perfect peace and security had existed. This culminated in the serious clash on the 21st February.

The second incident occurred on Sunday, the 6th March, when Kurds and Assyrians of Nazlu village (the Assyrians of this area have a very bad name even amongst their co-religionists) together attacked a newly established gendarmerie post held only by two gendarmes. The head of the village is a certain Hassan Hinari, a notorious bad-hat, and the leader of the attacking gang was his nephew. Of the two gendarmes, one was wounded and the other surrendered. The Kurds were about to leave the wounded man in the snow when he protested and said that it was their duty to take care of their prisoners; whereupon they put him up against a wall and shot him in cold blood. A relief force of gendarmerie was driven back by the Kurds and lost two men. On the 7th March the officer commanding the Persian troops in Rezaieh, accompanied by the chief of the gendarmerie, the Soviet Consul and several Russian officers, went to Nazlu. Several Kurds were arrested but subsequently released. The Soviet Consul is said to have told them that they have got to have the gendarmerie post whether they like it or not and that any further disturbances will be severely dealt with. The situation is now said to be "normal."

In the mountains to the south-west of Rezaieh Nuri Beg still rules the roost. Recently the Persians wished to establish a gendarmerie post in Ushnuabad, but Nuri Beg sent some of his armed Kurds down to prevent it and, without bloodshed, was successful, and the project has been shelved. Nuri Beg is also said to have three Armenians working for him at his headquarters in Anbi village, manufacturing cartridges and grenades.

Another incident, without political importance, occurred a few weeks ago in the village of Babarud, where a young Armenian of bad repute started a collection amongst Armenians for a tank for the Soviet army! At one house he refused 16 tomans and demanded 20 as a minimum. Whilst he was insulting the owner of the house the latter's son arrived and tried to drive the collector away with the help of a pitchfork; whereupon the Armenian pulled out a revolver and shot the son dead. He then made off into the mountains. The Russian Consul is reported to have given orders that the murderer is to be caught and brought to justice.

To resume, the general opinion is that the Kurds will not repeat their depredations of last year if the Russians show that they will not stand for it. As the Russians in the person of M. Maximoff, have recently been showing a firmer front towards the Kurds, there is less apprehension than might otherwise have been evoked by the clashes between the Kurds and the Persian gendarmerie. But, looking further ahead, the Christian community in Rezaieh fears that, if the Russians ever leave the area before the Persians are sufficiently strong to ensure public security, the Kurds, turning the tables on history, will "come down like the wolf on the fold."



The only original suggestion which I heard as a way out of the present *impasse* came from Commandant Kemal, the Chief of the Persian gendarmerie. He said that the best solution would be for the present Anglo-Russo-Persian treaty to be scrapped and for Persia to declare war on the Axis, thus becoming an active instead of a passive ally. The Russians, he thought, could then have no objection to the Persian army in Western Azerbaijan being strengthened sufficiently to be able to deal with the Kurds. He added that many Persian army officers were of his opinion. This may be true, but if so I suspect that it is the success of the Russian offensive and a desire to be on the right side of the fence that has brought about this change of heart. The Russians might be expected to receive such a suggestion a little coldly.

7. *Propaganda*.—Our propaganda is extremely popular. I took with me a large sack of material for our agent in Rezaieh. The whole consignment was sold out within twenty-four hours. Russian propaganda does not appear to exist. The Russians seem to approve of our objective propaganda, but to be a little bit jealous, perhaps because they have not themselves got an organisation equally efficient. We need to walk warily and, above all, to keep the Russians well informed of what we do and of what we intend to do in this sphere. I told the Soviet Consul about our cinema van, and said I hoped it would be coming to Western Azerbaijan in the spring. He professed it to be a good idea, and said he had asked for the same thing, but that he had only been able to get the loan of a single military cinema van for one brief tour (this was presumably the van which borrowed several of our news-reels).

Whilst the Russians seem to be doing nothing in the way of propaganda, I was rather surprised to find that the Turkish Vice-Consul is going in for it in quite a large way. We are doing it as a war-time necessity, and the Russians would be equally entitled to put their point of view on the subject of the evils of the Nazi and Fascist régimes; but the Turks, as neutrals, have not the same legitimate excuse, and I fear that Nashaat Beg's enthusiasm may get him into difficulties with both the Persians and the Russians. His latest idea is to send sets of coloured diagrams explaining how to combat malaria, tuberculosis, &c., all in Turkish, to the local hospital and to local doctors. There is no doubt a very great need for such instruction, but, coming from the Turkish Consulate, it is likely to be sadly misinterpreted by the Persians and, which is more important, by the Russians.

8. *Local Politics*.—The situation in Rezaieh appears to be neither better nor worse since the departure of the Ustandar. The bringing of Rezaieh under the control of the Ustandar in Tabriz has been met with complete indifference amongst the population. The only remark I heard on the subject was to the effect that there was now one less to dip into the till. Meanwhile, Dr. Marzeban, who returned to Tehran in December in the official car, has not so far sent the car back to Rezaieh, with the result that the Farmandar has to do without.

The Rezaieh Municipality is extremely slack. The roads are in an appalling state and there are no signs of any improvements anywhere. The taxes appear to go to keeping a few minor officials in idleness. The head of the municipality is a certain Hussein Mustashari, a rich landowner, who was formerly the head of the Public Instruction Department. He deserted his post during the Russian occupation and now spends his time smoking opium.

The present Director of Public Instruction, M. Muayzi, has caused a certain amount of resentment amongst the fathers of Rezaieh on account of his habit of running after the pupils of the girls' schools. It is rumoured that he is shortly going to be replaced as director by the Farmandar's son.

9. *Persian Army*.—The commanding officer, Colonel Mahin, whose tact and *savoir faire* have enabled him to get on with everybody, not excluding the Kurds, has been transferred, and he left Rezaieh whilst I was there. His departure is regretted by all, and fears have been expressed that his successor, Colonel Beylari Beg, will not wield the same soothing influence. This remains to be seen, but the new commanding officer does not give the impression of being as energetic nor as diplomatic as Colonel Mahin. Colonel Beylari Beg has just been transferred from Khoi and is not pleased with the move. He speaks French and is personally agreeable. The junior Persian officers have not acquired much of a reputation. They are corrupt and insolent. According to Father Franssen, this is because they are recruited from the secondary schools and are nearly always the boys who have been too lazy or who are mentally incapable of passing their examinations. The officers and *n.c.o.s.* are responsible for the lack of any real *esprit de corps* in the local garrison.

10. *Soviet Army*.—I found everywhere the highest praise for Soviet discipline—frequently followed by comparisons extremely derogatory to the Persian army. There is, however, no sign of any attempt to fraternise with the local inhabitants, nor do the Soviet officers appear to have any contact with Persian or foreign officials.

F. C. OGDEN.

*British Consulate-General, Tabriz.*

## Appendix.

### *Rail and Boat Service between Tabriz and Rezaieh.*

#### *Tabriz-Rezaieh.*

*Rail*.—Depart Tabriz, Tuesdays and Fridays, 11 A.M., arrive Sherif Khaneh 3 P.M.

*Boat*.—Depart Sherif Khaneh, Tuesdays and Fridays, 8 P.M., arrive Rezaieh 6 A.M.

#### *Rezaieh-Tabriz.*

*Boat*.—Depart Gulma Khaneh, Sundays and Thursdays, 8 P.M., arrive Sherif Khaneh 6 A.M.

*Rail*.—Depart Sherif Khaneh, Mondays and Fridays, 6 P.M., arrive Tabriz, 11 P.M.

The above times for the lake crossings are approximate, as the time taken may vary between four-and-a-half and nine hours according to whether the tug used is large or small.

The boat service on Lake Urmia is run with barges which are towed by tugs. The Navigation Department of the Persian railways has its offices and workshops at Sherif Khaneh and the present director has recently started a small brass foundry in the workshops which enables many jobs to be done on the spot which previously had to be sent in to Tabriz. The Lake service is run by six tugs, all pre-Great War. There are two large tugs (the *Pahlevi* and the *Shahpur*), each of 220 h.p., three medium tugs of 80 h.p., and one small tug of 35 h.p. There are eight large flat-bottomed barges each capable of carrying some 150 passengers. Accommodation on the barges is very dirty and primitive and is not suitable for Europeans, especially in winter, when it is not possible to remain on deck in the open. If either of the two large tugs is making the journey it is sometimes possible to arrange to have the use of a single small cabin behind the wheelhouse on the tug.

Until the Russian occupation there was a weekly round-the-lake service connecting up with Maragheh and Mahabad. This service has been discontinued by the Russians and the only service now operating for civilian traffic is the bi-weekly service between Sherif Khaneh and Gulma Khaneh (for Rezaieh). The Russians very frequently use the boats for military traffic between Sherif Khaneh and Shahpur.

For a period of ten years the level of the lake fell regularly, probably as the result of earthquake action, with the result that the jetty at Sherif Khaneh had to be lengthened. Its present length is 1,200 metres. The main jetty is of earth and will carry a train. The extension is of wood and is equipped with hand-trolleys on rails for the transport of heavy goods to the boats. There are no cranes.

[E 2450/239/34]

No. 10.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.*—(Received 29th April, 1943.)

(No. 121.)

Sir,

*Tehran, 26th March, 1943.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 160, enclosing the Annual Political Report for 1941, of the 26th May, 1942, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a brief review of the principal events of 1942 so far as they affected our relations with Persia.



2. I am indebted to Mr. Hankey for the body of the report, but valuable contributions have been made by Mr. Holman, Mr. Squire, Major-General Fraser, Military Attaché, Mr. Trott, Oriental Secretary and Mr. Cumberbatch.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch and its enclosure to His Majesty's Minister of State at Cairo and to His Excellency the Viceroy of India.

I have, &c.,

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 10.

*Report on Political Events of 1942.*

*The Treaty of Alliance.*

THE Anglo Soviet Persian Treaty of Alliance was signed on the 29th January, after a lengthy debate in the Majlis and endless attempts at procrastination and amendment by the Deputies and the Persian Government.

2. For convenience of reference the following very brief summary of the treaty may be given here. Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. jointly and severally undertook (article I) "to respect the territorial integrity, the sovereignty and the political independence of Persia," and (article III (1)) "to defend Persia by all means at their command from all aggression." . . . Persia undertook (article III (2) (a)) to co-operate with the Allied Powers in every way possible in order that they may be able to fulfil this undertaking; and (by article III (2) (b)) to give the Allies, for certain military purposes, the "unrestricted right to use, maintain, guard and, in case of military necessity, control . . . all the means of communication throughout Persia; to assist in obtaining material and recruiting labour, and to establish a censorship.

3. Article IV (1) stated that the Allied Powers could maintain on Persian territory land, sea and air forces, but it was specifically stated that their presence did not constitute a military occupation, and would disturb as little as possible the administration and economic life of Persia.

4. Under article V, the Allied forces were to be withdrawn from Persian territory not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her Associates had ceased.

5. Under article VII the Allied Powers undertook jointly "to use their best endeavours to safeguard the economic existence of the Persian people against the privations and difficulties" resulting from the war.

6. It is safe to say that both sides were disappointed with the carrying out of the treaty. The Persian Government showed no realisation of shipping and economic difficulties in the rest of the world, and tried repeatedly to interpret article VII as binding the Allies to supply huge quantities of lorries, motor tyres, spare parts, cereals and other commodities. The Allies, on their part, had to complain that they met with very little co-operation from the Persian Government and authorities, who made practically no effort to meet the grave internal difficulties resulting from the war, and demanded the Allies' assistance at every turn. On numerous occasions the Allies were unable to get even their most essential military requirements without the application of the strongest diplomatic pressure and, once or twice, a virtual threat of force.

7. Allied defeats in the South Pacific in the spring and in Africa in the summer contributed to this state of affairs, but it was all too obvious that procrastination and obstruction, even to the most reasonable demands, are second nature to the Persian and are unlikely to be abolished by any treaty.

*Anglo-Persian Relations.*

8. As will be seen from subsequent paragraphs, the war forced His Majesty's Legation and the British Military Authorities to interest themselves closely in almost every sphere of Persian administration, owing to the necessity for developing and protecting Persia's means of communication to bring supplies to Russia, and also owing to the compelling need for saving shipping space. No less than 4,000 miles of road were built, or repaired and maintained by British engineers all over Persia; no fewer than twenty-nine modern aerodromes, many with cement runways, were constructed or were under construction; a large road transport organisation was built up by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, and a constant stream of modern lorries poured across the desolate passes of Persia carrying arms and supplies to Russia. The Trans-Iranian Railway was taken over by the Allies; North of Tehran it was under Russian, South of Tehran

under British control. The tonnage carried on the railway was increased beyond recognition; a new branch-line was built, connecting Khorramshahr and Ahwaz and to the port of Tanouma. The military authorities employed on roads and aerodromes alone about 70,000 Persian labourers and thus became one of the largest employers of labour in the whole country. The need for protecting these lines of communication led us into some queer fields; we were forced to take an interest in tribal policy to secure peace in districts adjoining vital roads and railways; we were obliged to interfere frequently and radically in the local administration which often showed itself incapable of facing war problems; we were obliged to ask for special security measures to be taken by the Persian Government to deal with suspects.

9. The compelling need to save shipping also forced us into a considerable degree of interference in local affairs. How this led us into largely controlling road transport in Persia and into exercising a considerable influence on Persian agriculture, and how a Combined Supplies Committee was set up by which the foreign trade of Persia was virtually planned and controlled by English and American experts working under the Middle East Supply Centre in Cairo, will be seen from the following paragraphs.

10. While our influence in Persia grew enormously as the year proceeded, it cannot be said that our popularity grew with it. After the Allied defeats in the Far East and South Pacific, in Africa and in South Russia, during the spring and summer, it was natural that many Persians should hesitate to throw in their lot with us, or identify themselves with the Allied cause. The Allied victories in Africa and still more in Russia in the autumn largely convinced Persians, however, that the Allies would win the war. But there was another reason for our lack of success with the Persian public. The measures we had to urge on the Persian Government were not, for the most part, popular ones. The ruling classes of landowners and merchants found us opposed to their hoarding and speculation, and objected to the necessary measures of rationalisation and control, especially of transport and of food and other commodities, which were essential if Persia was to face the problems of the times successfully. The mass of the Persian people, who should have benefitted by these measures, either were too apathetic to care, or only blamed us for the gross corruption and inefficiency which characterised their application. For years it has been the practice to blame the British for all Persian troubles and shortcomings. We were blamed by the public for all Reza Shah's extortions; for all the food and transport shortages. Did the British supply food to Tehran from the British zone even to the extent of some local shortages there? That was their fault. Did the Russians refuse to supply wheat to Tehran? The man in the bazaar merely whispered how much better conditions were in the Russian zone.

11. This attitude of the Persian people presents a problem of which our extensive and many-sided propaganda, started all over Persia during the year by the Public Relations Bureau of this legation, has so far only been able to touch the fringe—I doubt whether any economic concessions which it was in our power to make would have made any difference to it, and although we shall do our very best to undermine it, I fear we must expect it to persist and to colour Persian policy to some extent for years to come. Meanwhile, the corrupt upper class, while it still criticises us, will still come to us for protection against bolshevism, of which it lives in terror—and small wonder, seeing how ruthlessly it exploits the people.

12. Only a relatively short time has elapsed, however, since we and the Russians jointly invaded Persian territory. The problems which have since assailed Persia would have brought difficulties in any country, however well organised, and we cannot be surprised that they have dismayed the Persian people and affected Anglo-Persian relations adversely. There was a time when we used to wonder whether in the end we might not have to take over the country and run it ourselves, superhuman as the task would have been. We have, however, succeeded in establishing a series of Persian Governments which have carried out the Treaty of Alliance for the most part, and have done most of what we had to ask, and at the end of the year Qawam-es-Sultaneh even made a clear declaration of his Government's support for the Allied cause, thus giving a much-needed lead to the Persian people. In retrospect, I think that, in spite of our high hopes, we should have been lucky, in the conditions which obtain in this chaotic country, if we had got much more than we actually did get. Fundamentally, we have no demands to make on Persia, and our interest is to see Persia strong and independent and friendly. This is the fundamental truth that we have, somehow, to make the Persian people believe.



13. Visits by a number of important British personalities during the year helped to impress the Persian Government and keep their spirits up during the difficult times of the summer. His Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester visited Tehran in May. Mr. Winston Churchill, accompanied by many leading military and air personalities, passed through Tehran on his way to and from Moscow in August. Both visits were outstanding successes. Mr. R. G. Casey, Minister of State in Cairo, visited Tehran in October and was able to take stock of the most difficult and complicated food and financial problems in person.

14. Mr. R. C. Harris, British Vice-Consul at Isfahan, Dr. Griffiths and his son were murdered by tribesmen while on tour in the Dorud area on the 3rd August. We did not feel that the Persian Government could be held fully responsible, as the area was an unruly one where the Persian Government's writ had never run, and we, therefore, did not present a claim for compensation. We, however, demanded the infliction of a fine on the tribe responsible, the apprehension of the murderers and the removal of Colonel Ferouhar and (subsequently) General Tajbakhsh, the Persian army officers most closely concerned, for their ineffectiveness in recovering the bodies and directing the enquiries. Colonel Ferouhar was suspected of worse than ineffectiveness and, indeed, there is some reason to believe that the murder was not entirely free from the influence of enemy agents. Tajbakhsh and Ferouhar were removed after much delay, but the Persian Government replied, as regards the apprehension of the murderers, that the whole tribe had disappeared into the mountains. Local enquiries were still in progress at the end of the year.

15. British soldiers were brought to Tehran to ensure protection of British interests during the Tehran riots of the 7th and 8th December. Their arrival had an excellent effect. Unfortunately, three men were killed when the Persian army opened fire on a crowd in which their truck had broken down. At our request the Persian Government agreed to pay £500 compensation to the family of each of them. The Russian Embassy was informed in advance of the arrival of our troops, but no Russian troops were brought to Tehran.

#### *British Military Interests.*

16. The tasks of the Commander-in-chief, Persia and Iraq area, may be summarised as being, firstly, to ensure the security of the oil installations in South Persia, and, secondly, to assist the carrying of supplies to Russia across Persia in every way possible.

17. The oilfields and refineries, particularly at Abadan, have a peculiar importance for the war both in Africa and in India, since it was the only large-scale source of oil supply within the reach of the Middle East.

18. Special security measures were taken at Abadan, and at the end of the year His Majesty's Legation arranged for a special military governor to be appointed in Abadan Island, with powers to control persons entering and leaving the area. He was to be assisted by a British adviser. At the same time, the pay of the police, which is so low that they are usually quite unreliable, was to be supplemented by giving them food rations. Arrangements were also being made at the end of the year for fire-fighting training by British subjects to be made compulsory in the oil industry area.

19. There were no serious incidents with British troops in Persia, though a number of claims were made by the Persian Government for persons being run over by lorries, &c. Much trouble occurred over the frontier and police control of lorries operating on behalf of the military authorities, especially Persian lorries working under contract. In December, it was arranged that British detachments should be posted on the frontier on the main roads to prevent smuggling in such lorries, and the Persian Government gave instructions to the customs and police posts to refrain from stopping lorries which carried a certificate endorsed by the military check-posts to the effect that they were carrying military goods. It is hoped that this arrangement will eliminate further difficulties.

20. Some difficulty was also caused by military purchases of commodities. The Persians had, for instance, for years past exported potatoes and the British military authorities were anxious to buy 10,000 tons. The Persian Government, however, procrastinated about giving the necessary permits. Most of the quantity was bought by the military authorities and exported from Persia without permits, the only alternative being to use shipping to bring potatoes from overseas.

21. Much difficulty was also made over a request by the British military authorities to take over, as an urgent operational necessity, in view of the

approach of the Germans to the Caucasus, certain telegraph lines between Tehran and Baghdad, and between Malayer and Andimeshk. The request, made in September, was based on article III (2) (b) of the Tripartite Treaty. In November the lines were taken over by the British military authorities for the operation of special apparatus, although the necessary permission had not been given. Only a mild protest was made by the Persian Government.

22. Some difficulty also arose with the Russian authorities over Calehmurgheh aerodrome near Tehran. Although the R.A.F. had installed special direction-finding apparatus and were building an enormous runway there, the Russians established their troops at the aerodrome and made difficulties about the R.A.F. personnel using their apparatus. They made it clear that they intended to take it over entirely. After long negotiations, an agreement was come to on the 30th June between the R.A.F. and the Soviet authorities as regards the use of all the aerodromes in the Tehran area. It was agreed that the Soviet Air Force would have administrative control of the Calehmurgheh aerodrome and the Royal Air Force of the aerodromes at Doshan-Tappeh and Mehrabad. All aerodromes were to be used by both parties. No further difficulties arose about the R.A.F. using Calehmurgheh.

23. Special arrangements had to be made for the R.A.F. to take over Mehrabad aerodrome, which was the last aerodrome in the Tehran area in the full possession of the Persian Air Force. The R.A.F., who had specially close relations with the Persian Air Force, arranged special facilities to assist their transfer to Isfahan and Kerman. Mehrabad was taken over by the R.A.F. towards the end of the year.

24. We were somewhat concerned at the entire absence of A.R.P. in Persia. In spite of frequent representations by His Majesty's Minister, nothing whatever was done to provide even the most elementary A.R.P. system in Tehran, though in the oil area the oil company had its own A.R.P. system. The Persian Government took the view that an attack on Tehran was unlikely in spite of the military objectives which it contained, and that the population would be gravely frightened by any preparations that were made. They were encouraged in this view by the Russians, who were unwilling to admit that there was the smallest danger of the Germans being able to bomb Tehran. A German aeroplane dropped leaflets over Pahlevi in September and this, combined with the serious military situation in the Caucasus, induced the Persian Government to make the initial preparations for establishing an A.R.P. system with the assistance of a P.A.D. Officer from G.H.Q., Paiforce, who visited Tehran several times in the autumn. At the end of the year arrangements were being made for Persian officers to train in A.R.P. in Egypt and requests by the Persian Government for transport and equipment for A.R.P. purposes were under consideration.

#### *Relations with India.*

25. Relations with India were uneventful throughout the year. The Nokkundi railway was extended to Zahidan and a supply route to Russia and China was opened via Meshed for goods brought from India. Trade between India and Persia was thus affected even on the land route by the over-riding need to send the maximum possible supplies to Russia.

26. There was some correspondence with the Persian Government about communications with Bahrain, which is only mentioned as it showed that the Persian Government maintained their territorial claim to the island.

27. An incident occurred at Khorramshahr, on the 20th December, when the quarters of a number of Indian employees of the A.I.O.C. were looted by a Persian crowd.

#### *Rupture of Relations with Japan and the April Crisis.*

28. In spite of the signature of the treaty, the situation of the Allies in Persia continued to be most unsatisfactory in the early part of the year. Our requests on many important questions remained unmet and enemy propaganda continued to flourish up and down the country. Many of the difficulties which we experienced were traceable to the activities of the Japanese Legation, who were actively distributing enemy propaganda and also money among the Persians. The rupture of relations between Persia and Japan accordingly became one of our primary objectives on which progress in every other sphere seemed to depend. The Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty could not be quoted in support of our representations to the Persian Government owing to the fact that Japan was still in diplomatic relations with Russia. It was, however, urged upon the Persian Government that the closing of the Japanese Legation



could reasonably be expected as an earnest of goodwill amongst Allies; that it would not harm Persian interests in Japan, or Japanese interests in Persia—both of which, to all practical intents and purposes, were non-existent; that the continued presence of the Japanese Legation here could serve no useful purpose as all bag and cypher communication facilities had been denied them and that the Japanese Legation was, in fact, nothing more than a centre from which military intelligence reports were sent to the enemy (they were known to have a secret wireless transmitter).

29. In spite of long and repeated representations, begun early in February, no progress could be achieved with this question for about two months. It was necessary to use every possible form of inducement and pressure. The United States Government were persuaded to make the grant of lease-lend facilities for the Persian Government and the provision of expert advisers dependent on the rupture of relations with Japan. The Soviet Government agreed to inform the Persian Government that they had no objection to their breaking off relations with Japan. His Majesty's Legation communicated to the Persian authorities evidence collected from secret and other sources to prove that the Japanese Legation were indulging in undiplomatic and subversive activities; finally, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Prime Minister and the Shah himself were warned in categorical terms that the situation would seriously deteriorate unless early satisfaction were given.

30. Every conceivable prevarication was indulged in by the Persian Government to keep the Japanese Legation, which they presumably regarded as their last policy of reinsurance with the Axis Powers. The patience of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom was eventually exhausted. In the middle of April the Soviet Government was informed that we had decided to concentrate troops outside Tehran and to occupy the capital if necessary and enforce the closing of the Japanese Legation.

31. It was arranged that Sir Reader Bullard would then demand an immediate audience with the Shah and insist on the rupture of relations with Japan. The Soviet Ambassador was told that, if British forces were eventually obliged to occupy Tehran, and if the situation should so develop as to render other measures necessary, the Soviet Government might wish to be associated in the occupation of the capital. His Majesty's Government would welcome such a decision. The Persian Government, however, sensing, no doubt, that His Majesty's Government had made up their minds to take forceful action, finally gave up the unequal struggle, and on the 12th April instructed the Japanese Minister to leave Persia with his staff in one week. Eventually the Legation left Tehran on the 23rd April.

32. Meanwhile, there existed other acute causes for dissatisfaction with the Persian Government. (a) It was proving increasingly difficult to obtain sufficient rial currency in exchange for sterling to finance the expenditure of the British military authorities on road, rail and aerodrome developments in Persia. The statutory limit of the note issue had been reached, and the Persian Government were unwilling or unable to persuade the Majlis to increase it. Yet clearly the work of developing communications with Russia had to proceed; (b) no effective measures had been taken by the Persian Government to stop Axis propaganda or even to make it illegal; (c) for weeks His Majesty's Legation had been demanding, without success, the internment of the six most notorious Persian pro-Axis propagandists. It appeared to His Majesty's Minister desirable to clear the air by insisting at once that all these eminently reasonable desiderata should be met and should be included in representations to the Shah, backed by the threat of force, and that, if possible, similar action should be taken by the Russians. It was decided that His Majesty's Minister should seek the audience with the Shah, but that, if satisfaction had been obtained over the departure of the Japanese Legation by then, less drastic representations should be made.

33. The audience eventually took place on the 22nd April. It was apparent that the movement of Russian and British troops which had taken place and the warnings which had previously been delivered had been reported to His Majesty, who was evidently aware of the possibility of strongest action by His Majesty's Government. The Shah expressed the keenest desire for the settlement of the currency question (the subsequent negotiations led eventually to the signature of the Anglo-Persian Financial Agreement on the 26th May, which met our needs fully so far as the purchase of rials was concerned). Further, as the result of repeated and insistent representations, a proclamation, making enemy propaganda illegal, had been issued and published in the press that very morning. Similarly, satisfaction had also been given the same day over the arrest of most of the six

Axis supporters; it was, therefore, unnecessary for His Majesty's Minister to utter any direct threat.

33A. This crisis cleared the air, and for some weeks we secured many of our desiderata without great difficulty, though we continued to have much trouble over Axis supporters and sympathisers.

#### *Security questions.*

34. Throughout the year the question of the rounding up of Persian Fifth-Columnists and Germans in view of their potential danger to British interests and security has been regarded by the legation as one of supreme importance. After consultation with the Foreign Office, a list of seven prominent and active Persian pro-Axis supporters against whom sufficient evidence was forthcoming was submitted, at the end of February, to the Persian Government with the request that these suspects should be detained under Persian police supervision in Eastern Persia. In spite of the necessary assurances from the Persian Government, it was soon learned that three of the suspects were still at large. In view of this clear demonstration of bad faith, His Majesty's Legation demanded the immediate arrest of six of the suspects and their delivery to the British military authorities for safe keeping. As the seventh suspect, Atabai, was a brother-in-law of the Shah, it was thought desirable that he should simply be detained in Eastern Persia under police supervision. After considerable hesitation, five of the suspects were handed over at the end of April for detention at Kermanshah, the sixth, Vaziri by name, escaped from Persian police supervision and, despite constant representations, was still at large at the end of the year. It was not until the middle of July, when a fresh recrudescence of Axis activity broke out, that a further list of eighteen suspects was handed to the Prime Minister with a request for their arrest and delivery to the British military authorities. The Prime Minister handed over a small number of Germans and Persian suspects already in the hands of the Persian police and agreed that he would deliver to His Majesty's Legation eleven of the eighteen suspects, but M. Soheily fell from office before action could be taken.

35. In view of the difficulties of the past, it was decided, when Qawam-es-Sultaneh became Prime Minister, to try to establish an agreed procedure to obviate our having to haggle for each suspect or group of suspects. Accordingly, a new list of forty-five names was drawn up, consisting entirely of names of persons implicated in the evidence given by Germans or Persians already in British custody. It was communicated to the Prime Minister, who was prompt to secure the arrest of nearly all the persons on the list, but held out for the detention of the Persian nationals at Tehran. After the failure of an appeal by the Prime Minister direct to London, an agreement was finally worked out whereby suspects should be detained at Sultanabad and not sent to Ahwaz or elsewhere and the Persian authorities should participate both in the interrogation and in the supervision of the suspects. In practice this procedure has worked out extremely well, in spite of the difficulties with which we were faced throughout the negotiations owing to the lack of support from the United States and Soviet representatives.

36. In the interests of security, proposals were submitted in November to the Foreign Office by His Majesty's Legation in agreement with General Wilson for the arrest of General Zahidi, Colonel Ferouhar, M. Nobakht and General Kupal on general grounds of persistent and dangerous hostility to the Allied cause. In view of their importance it was clear that it would be futile to request the Persian authorities to effect their arrest, and it was, therefore, suggested that the British military authorities should take the necessary measures themselves. It was finally agreed by all concerned that we should concentrate first on General Zahidi, as being the most dangerous of the four persons concerned, and defer action against the others, in order to see first the effect produced by the arrest of General Zahidi. All necessary measures were accordingly taken by the British military and General Zahidi was arrested without the use of force in his house at Isfahan on the 6th December and immediately removed from the country. As the arrest coincided with the riots at Tehran, it passed almost unnoticed. Both the Shah and the Prime Minister mentioned the matter to His Majesty's Minister and seemed rather aggrieved that they had not been warned of our intentions in advance. The Shah expressed the view that, if he had been told, he would at once have had General Zahidi arrested. They were both informed in reply that any previous notification would have been very awkward for the Persian Government and that it was accordingly



thought better that the British military authorities should take full responsibility. As regards the other three suspects, no decision had been taken before the end of the year.

#### *The Supply of Food-stuffs.*

37. Since the upheaval of August 1941 no effort had been made to collect any appreciable amount of the Government share of the 1941 wheat crop, which was required for the feeding of the towns, and early in the year it became apparent that the equitable distribution of the wheat available in the country and of that imported from abroad was beyond the power of the Persian Government. Consular officers were therefore directed to include the supervision of wheat distribution in so far as it might be possible within the scope of their activities; but by April it was realised that if further imports were to be avoided far more drastic intervention on our part would be required. The Government were urged both verbally and in writing to take timely steps to secure their full share of the coming harvest by all means in their power, including raising the price from the previous low level of £8 a ton, and announcing the new price in good time. They were clearly informed that until this had been done they could expect no help in the way of shipments of wheat from abroad. The advice fell on deaf ears, and it was not until July, when the harvest in the south was already gathered, that as a result of continued pressure from the legation, an average price of 1,500 rials (about £12) a ton was at last announced. By this time the black market price had already risen considerably beyond this figure and the concession was too late.

38. In order further to stimulate the Persian Government to activity, especially in the provinces, where their authority was weak, the consular liaison officers' scheme was introduced by which British officers, borrowed mainly in the first instance from the army and subsequently from Burma, were posted to the principal districts, not only to ascertain the real extent of the surplus on which the Government should be required to lay its hand, but also to do what they could to keep the local officials up to their work. The scheme met with varying success in the different provinces. In Khuzistan it was a complete failure and had to be abandoned owing to the refusal of the Government even to try and cope with the situation, and in Kermanshah it has met with little success; but in other areas it has been of real use, stimulating the lazy and encouraging the timorous to do their duty.

39. Numerous representations by His Majesty's Minister led to the passing of two anti-hoarding laws during the spring and summer, the second of which virtually gave the Government full powers to deal with hoarders. But by no amount of representations did we ever succeed in getting effective action taken against hoarders. The Government was unwilling either to force landowners to sell at the official price or to pay them the price they demanded. Nor was any effective action taken by the Persian Government to prevent smuggling into Iraq. Regardless of the difficult shipping situation, they requested the sending of large supplies of cereals and made representations both in London and in Washington on the subject.

40. Successive changes in government made the observance and enforcement of any settled food policy an impossibility, and little progress was made in this direction until the arrival of Mr. Sheridan, the American adviser to the Ministry of Food, at the end of September. Faced with an almost impossible task, and handicapped by an erratic and obstinate Minister, and his own ignorance of the country and having no senior member of his staff with any knowledge whatsoever of the problem with which he had to deal, Mr. Sheridan set to work undaunted, but with perhaps more energy than discretion. He more than doubled the official price offered for wheat without taking any steps to provide the funds or the administrative machinery for payment of the new price; transferred and dismissed officials right and left, only to find that the new men on whom he relied were little improvement on the old, and embarked on all sorts of experiments, few of which were carried through. The result was continued chaos and, though by feverish efforts at the last minute, the capital was kept supplied with bread, Mr. Sheridan never succeeded in securing more than three or four days' reserve in the silo.

41. Extensive demands made on the Persian Government by the Russians for food-stuffs, including 5,000 tons of wheat, 15,000 tons of barley and 30,000 tons of rice, did not help matters, and in the late autumn the prospect became so bad that His Majesty's Government and the United States Government together had to promise to import into Persia, as soon as possible, 25,000 tons of wheat to

replace what the Russians were purchasing. The greatest difficulty was caused by the fact that the Russians were apparently not prepared to allow wheat to be sent to the capital from Azerbaijan and Khorassan, which were the obvious sources of supply, though the Soviet Ambassador in London stated that his Government had given permission for 35,000 tons of wheat to be sent. This made it difficult or impossible to plan Tehran's wheat supply in advance, and furnished the Persian authorities with an admirable excuse for their inactivity elsewhere.

42. Anxiety over the food situation was the predominant feeling in Tehran throughout the autumn, and the problem of the supply of cereals became an important factor in the negotiations regarding the supply of rials and other questions affecting Allied interests. The discussions on cereals culminated in the Food Agreement, signed in Tehran by His Majesty's Minister, the United States Minister and the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 4th December, 1942. By this agreement the United Kingdom and the United States Government undertook to ensure, within the full limit of their powers, that supplies of cereals were brought to Persia to make up any unavoidable deficiency up to the harvest of 1943, provided that the Persian Government carried out all the measures recommended by the American food adviser, Mr. Sheridan, including measures to prevent hoarding and the introduction of rationing, as well as the recommendations of the Road Transport Committee. It was at the same time provided that the Persian Government were responsible for the internal distribution of cereals and for ensuring that a deficiency in one area was met by a surplus from another. The United States and the British Governments undertook, so far as possible, to ensure that the means of transport at the disposal of the Persian Government were sufficient, if put to the best possible use, for the proper distribution of these cereals.

43. The Soviet Government were invited to participate in the Food Agreement, but replied that, in view of their own food difficulties, they did not propose to do so.

44. Unfortunately, delivery of even the first consignment of the promised 25,000 tons of wheat had to wait in shipments from North American ports and, when the bread supply of Tehran failed completely in the first week of December, the situation was only saved by advancing flour from British army stocks. Altogether 1,500 tons of flour were made available to the Persian Government in this way and further supplies of cereals were forthcoming in the form of 3,500 tons of Iraqi barley.

45. In order to increase the production of wheat and barley in Khuzistan, one of the main deficit areas, and to ensure a measure of long-term improvement in the general food situation, negotiations were set on foot in the course of the summer to acquire for His Majesty's Government or for a British organisation under Allied auspices the lease of certain Persian State farms at Hamidieh and Ahudasht, to the north-west of Ahwaz, which, although fertile, were then exploited to little or no purpose by an organisation known as the Khuzistan Agricultural Society. These negotiations failed, but the Persian Government did consent to the society being managed by a British director. The services of Lieut.-Colonel E. W. C. Noel were obtained from India; he was given a free hand to run these farms, subject only to the financial control of the Domains Department of the Persian Ministry of Finance. Five hundred tons of wheat seed were imported from India on loan from the British army and the first year's crop is expected to amount to some 3,500 tons. For the second year it is hoped to sow some 2,000 tons and the project should eventually provide a considerable proportion of the wheat requirements of Khuzistan.

46. Meanwhile, everything possible is being done to increase the area sown in 1943. It has been agreed with the Persian Ministry of Agriculture that local committees shall be set up with the co-operation of local British and Persian Government officials and the principal landowners to investigate every possibility of coping with these and other problems. A systematic study, by regions, will be made of seed requirements in order to arrange, if necessary, for imports of seed in good time for the spring sowing.

47. In retrospect it may be said that while we were disappointed at the ineffectiveness of the Persian Government in facing their food problem, our efforts were not entirely wasted. We shall have imported for the year 1942-43 only about half what we had to import for the year 1941-42 and of the half, 20,000 is to replace the 5,000 tons of wheat and 15,000 tons of barley which the Persian Government undertook to supply to the Soviet authorities. This result is attributable to the unremitting efforts of Mr. Sheridan, of this legation and of the consular liaison officers.



*Commercial and Economic Questions.*

48. Persia was profoundly affected by the limitation of sea-borne imports owing to the war and, at the same time we were anxious to ensure that proper use was made of local supplies and resources so as to save shipping space and also to reserve the northward lift on the roads and on the Trans-Iranian Railway for supplies going to Russia.

49. In March, Persia was included among the countries covered by the activities of the Middle East Supply Centre, and a Combined Supplies Committee was set up in Tehran, comprising British and American representatives, to deal with all problems relating to civil supplies. At the request of this committee, the Persian Government introduced an import licensing system in July, as a result of which imports became gradually confined only to essential goods. About 26,000 tons of goods were licensed for import from the beginning of this control until the end of the year. Shipping recommendations and information relating to essential imports are sent to the Middle East Supply Centre in Cairo so that Persia's current and future needs may be co-ordinated with Middle East Supply Centre planning for all the countries of the Middle East under its control. During this period, also, investigations were carried out under the supervision of the Combined Supplies Committee into means of saving shipping by the development of Persian industries and natural resources in order to supply as much of Persia's needs as possible at home. For this reason and to make available supplies of material in world short supply, the local production of the following has been increased: copper, lead, chromium, antimony, sulphur, borax, sodium compounds, refractory materials, manganese ore, alum and coal.

49A. The Combined Supplies Committee is now the supervising committee of a number of sub-committees specialising in specific problems or commodity groups. At the end of the year the latter comprised an Agricultural Advisory Committee, an Import Control Committee, a Mining and Chemical Development Committee and a Medical Advisory Committee. All these are co-operating actively with the Persian authorities concerned and reporting and making recommendations to the Combined Supplies Committee.

50. Transport questions provided much material for controversy throughout the year. Reza Shah having largely succeeded in abolishing the camel, Persia is dependent on motor transport for the distribution of numerous commodities, especially food-stuffs, on which the economic existence of the country depends. Imports of lorries and tyres were, however, drastically cut down in view of Allied war needs and, in addition, the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation and the Russian Transport organisation contracted a considerable number of Persian lorries to carry supplies to Russia. Unfortunately, the Persian Government were reluctant to take effective steps to rationalise their road transport system. During the summer the U.K.C.C. endeavoured to effect a certain rationalisation of it, but the Persian Government enlisted American sympathy by complaining of attempts at a monopoly. Eventually much combined Allied pressure was exerted: it ended in the formation of a Road Transport Board, with Persian, British, American and Russian participation, which has been working for the last two months. It has instituted a control of road transport, particularly of lorry transport. It controls the activities of the Persian Government Road Transport Department (the head of which is Mr. C. Birkle, formerly head of the Transport Department of the U.K.C.C. in Persia). The department, which is a section of the Ministry of Supply, had built up, by the end of the year, a fleet of contracted vehicles which were being used for the transport of wheat, oil, rice and other commodities essential to the civil life of the country. The resources at the disposal of the Board and the Persian Government are, however, greatly below their minimum requirements; even the carriage of food-stuffs leaves much to be desired, and other urgent needs, such as transport for the campaign against locusts, for the Khuzistan wheat cultivation scheme, &c., are in danger of being starved.

51. The Persian Government demanded the importation of large quantities of motor transport during the year, and in the autumn it was agreed to supply them with fifty lorries a month out of civil allocations to the Middle East. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the United States Government accepted a limited obligation to supply essential quantities of motor transport to Persia under the Food Agreement signed on the 4th December in Tehran (see in this connexion the section on the supply of food-stuffs).

52. Timber supplies for the British army, including railway sleepers, which come mainly from the Russian-occupied zone, have been obtained only with great difficulty, owing to the mass of formalities with which the Persian Government

surrounded the issue of permits and the execution of their forestry regulations and to the constant squeezing of the contractors working for the British army by local racketeers. Strong action has had to be taken to obtain co-operation from the Persian Government, and the situation has not been made easier by the refusal of the Russians to lend assistance. The position is still by no means satisfactory.

53. The efforts of this legation and other British organisations to increase economic activity in Persia have been consistently retarded and obstructed by the lack of energy and co-operation of the Persians, particularly of Government servants. Before the recent Allied victories this was due to a great extent to pro-Axis sympathies; but after these successes the normal inertia of the people of this country has become the chief obstacle to progress. This can be countered effectively only by introducing more and more Allied advisers and experts of different kinds.

54. Financial questions caused much anxiety throughout the year. A full report on our financial relations with Persia during the year 1942 was sent to you under cover of my despatch No. 91, dated the 9th March, 1943, and no detailed account is therefore given of them here.

55. The handling of the food supply problems and of economic and financial problems generally was rendered much more difficult by the chaotic parliamentary and governmental system with its division of responsibility and kaleidoscopic changes.

*Internal Political Situation.*

56. The 13th Majlis continued to sit throughout the year without being dissolved, in spite of the questionable basis of the 1941 elections, in which all the candidates were merely the nominees of Reza Shah. Apart from that fundamental flaw, the Majlis, on several occasions throughout the year, showed little desire either to let the Government carry out reasonable reforms, such as the anti-hoarding measures, or to co-operate with the Allies. However, the desire of most of the foreign legations, of the Shah and of the Prime Minister to see the obstructive assembly dissolved never came to fruition; at the last moment of a crisis it was always found either that the Russians would not quite commit themselves, or that the Prime Minister could not summon up enough courage to take the decisive step of announcing a dissolution, or that the Majlis passed the measure in question and then lay back and patted themselves on the back for that proof of loyalty and friendliness to the Allies.

57. Before summarising the principal events of the year in the political sphere, two general tendencies may be recorded. The first was a tendency to refer all matters of delicacy and importance to secret sessions of the Majlis, ostensibly in order to test the feeling of the Majlis in the matter, or to enable the Government to put their point of view before the Majlis Deputies in circumstances which gave more latitude for frank expressions of opinion than in public sessions. This tendency was first noticed in Foroughi's Cabinet; a secret session on the 3rd March was the beginning of the downfall of that Cabinet and the rise of Soheily. Similarly, such important questions as the Currency Bills and the expulsion of the Japanese Legation were first debated in secret sessions. The fact that announcements in the press revealed most of the proceedings of these secret sessions did not prevent Prime Ministers from frequently resorting to the expedient; in fact, Soheily hoped, in vain, that by that means he could bend the Majlis to his will on all controversial matters.

58. The second general tendency is the increase in the personal power of the Shah. Guided by self-seeking courtiers secure from public criticism, the young Shah, throughout the year, gradually but steadily took a more direct interest in current affairs. Not only did he assume the powers and authority of an executive head of the army, but he cultivated relations with certain Deputies of the Majlis, subsidised certain newspapers, and did his best to secure the resignation of Qawam-es-Saltaneh during the critical times of the riots of the 8th and 9th December, 1942, in spite of the direct advice to the contrary of His Majesty's Minister. He criticised the conduct of the highly respected Foroughi as Minister of Court, and was thought to have brought about the fall of Soheily's Cabinet in July by refusing the support of the army in the event of popular disorders. It was perhaps inevitable that at times when the Government of the country was in a state of chaos the Shah should wish to influence it, but his interventions were not always wise, and it gave rise to fears that he might cherish absolutist ambitions like his father. The Shah's attitude to the Allies was, however, most friendly throughout the year, and there were indications that he would have liked Persia to enter the war on the Allied side.



59. It will be convenient to describe the Cabinet changes and the Majlis developments under three heads:—

- (1) Foroughi's Cabinet, which fell in March;
- (2) Soheily's, which lasted till July; and
- (3) Qawam-es-Saltaneh's, which began in August and was still in power at the end of the year.

60.—(1) The most important business of Foroughi's Cabinet was the passing of the Tripartite Treaty. The first reading passed the Majlis early in January and the second reading, after a great deal of argument, on the 26th January, and signature took place three days later. Other matters dealt with by the Majlis were: A Bill authorising the payment of increased pensions to the dependants of Persian soldiers killed in the fighting of the previous August; a Bill preventing hoarding and profiteering; a Bill regulating the disposal of the lands of the ex-Shah. Early in February, however, criticisms of the Cabinet began to appear in the press and in the Majlis, partly owing to dissatisfaction with the Government's methods of dealing with economic and administrative problems, and partly owing to intrigues on behalf of rival candidates for ministerial rank. The four possible candidates for the post of Prime Minister were Taqizadeh, Tadayyun, Qawam-es-Saltaneh (Ahmed Qawam), and Seyyid Zia. Apart from that, the Minister of the Interior, Marshal Amir Ahmedi, came in for most of the criticism. Finally, all the members of the Cabinet placed their resignations in the hands of the Prime Minister on the 26th February, and on the 2nd March Foroughi presented a new team of Ministers, which lasted only a few hours; it included Soheily as Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kazemi at the Interior, and Hajhir at the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. There followed a period of crisis and intrigue: the Deputies seemed determined to block all Foroughi's appointments without making any constructive suggestions of their own. In an effort to placate them, the weary Prime Minister tried the novel expedient of selecting fourteen Deputies by lot to advise him as to the formation of his Cabinet: that came to nothing, and he resigned. Qawam appears to have been sent for by the Shah, but His Majesty finally called on Soheily, who by a series of manipulations secured an almost unanimous vote of confidence in a secret session of the Majlis, and announced his Cabinet in a public session on the 9th March.

61.—(2) Soheily's Cabinet consisted of himself as Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of the Interior, Jehanbani as Minister of War, Mahmoud Bader as Minister of Finance, Mustafa Adl as Minister of Education, Azudi as Minister of Communications, Ahv as Minister of Justice, Hikmat as Minister of Health, Hajhir as Minister of Commerce and Industry, Ahmed Hussain Adl as Minister of Agriculture, and Fazlollah Bahramy as Minister of Posts and Telegraphs. The new Prime Minister's programme was a satisfactory catalogue of good intentions: observance of existing treaties was one of the first points; laws were to be revised: the army strengthened: the budget balanced, and food supplies secured. The Prime Minister's remarks about the serious food situation had one unfortunate effect—a number of persons of the upper classes took precautions to lay in a considerable stock of flour and other food-stuffs against the coming scarcity; a course of action which sent prices up further still and made the Government's task in the following spring more difficult. The Majlis passed a Bill against hoarding on the 18th March, and regulations arising therefrom were published in May. Three major issues then came into prominence: the closing of the Japanese Legation, the arrest of certain Axis agents whose activities we had discovered, and currency questions, especially the supply of notes sufficient to tide over the increased demand caused by inflated prices and the Allies' war expenditure. The device of a secret session was used to square the Majlis about the Japanese, vague promises were given us about the Axis agents, and the currency question was temporarily solved by the issue of 700 million new notes. The Government then attempted to solve the food problem by obtaining full powers to deal with problems of food distribution, by acquiring and distributing food themselves. A Bill amending the existing conscription law was brought before the Majlis, but was eventually returned by the Majlis for revision. Muhammed Sa'ed Maraghai returned from Russia to be Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 23rd June, and, to the surprise of most observers, Mehdi Farrukh was appointed Minister of the Interior on the 2nd July. Opposition to Soheily was by this time growing apace: Tadayyun and Qawam-es-Saltaneh were very active in opposition, ugly stories of the Prime Minister's venality and nepotism

were circulating, and the Adalat party, led by Dashti and Farajollah Bahramy, did their best to unseat Soheily and replace him by Qawam-es-Saltaneh. Serious discussions were at this time taking place between His Majesty's Minister and the Soviet about the advisability of dissolving the Majlis altogether, but the Soviet Ambassador finally expressed the opinion that the moment was not opportune. The Soheily Government finally resigned on the 30th July, and three days later the Majlis voted for Qawam-es-Saltaneh.

62.—(3) Qawam-es-Saltaneh started well by taking a firm line with the press: he appeared to have more authority and courage than either of his two immediate predecessors: and he was evidently anxious to work with the Allies and remain in office. His programme was short: he stood for the observance of treaties, for internal security, and for ensuring the supply of food and medicines for the whole nation. His Cabinet contained two elder statesmen without portfolio in an advisory capacity, Hakim-ul-Mulk and Mustashar-ed-Douleh: Sa'ed remained at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Azudi and Hajhir at their respective posts. Finance was left vacant, pending an answer from Taqizadeh, in London: Kasemi had the Ministry of the Interior till the 22nd August, when he took over the Ministry of Finance, Javad Ameri becoming Minister of the Interior. Dr. Siassi was Minister of Education: Hamid Sayyah, Minister of Posts and Telegraphs; Baha-ul-Mulk, Minister of Justice; Dr. Amin-ul-Mulk, Minister of Health; and Adl remained at the Ministry of Agriculture. The new Prime Minister himself took over the difficult post of Minister of War, thereby involving himself in a dispute with the Chief of the General Staff and with the Shah himself, which developed into a struggle for control of the Ministry and finally led to Qawam's downfall. The new Prime Minister showed a helpful and firm attitude in the question of the handing over of certain suspects whom he had reason to believe were supporters of the Axis, and he finally talked the Majlis into having them transferred to Sultanabad for detailed interrogation by a mixed body of investigators. A Bill, increasing still further the note issue, was passed on the 12th September, just avoiding, in the nick of time, a major financial crisis. These issues were, however, only settled to our moderate satisfaction after the Prime Minister had been squarely informed that we should judge the sincerity of his Government by the way in which it dealt with these questions, and after a direct warning also to the Shah. Subsequently, a declaration of support for the Allies was made. Inspectors were appointed in order to remedy and prevent abuses and irregularities by Government officials, and broadcasts by Qawam about the Government's resolve to govern energetically in co-operation with the Allies were well received. At the end of September Qawam appointed Farrukh as Minister of Food: an unfortunate appointment as the new Minister was scatter-brained and temperamental. Majlis opposition obliged the Prime Minister to withdraw the Conscription Bill for further study; and the resignation of the Chief of the General Staff, Morteza Yazdan-Panah, although not accepted, was a further mark of the growing dissatisfaction with which Qawam had to contend. It must be confessed that certain appointments made by Qawam were most unwise and exposed him to accusations of favouritism and nepotism; Kazemi soon resigned, after behaving most disloyally to his chief; soaring prices exacerbated popular discontent, and the latent fear of the Deputies that the Prime Minister might dissolve the Majlis altogether inclined them to oppose the Government in various ways. In November the Prime Minister, not without justification, came to the conclusion that it would be appropriate to ask the Majlis to give him full powers to cope with the very difficult situation. This proposal evoked the most violent opposition from the Majlis, who seemed to see in it a scheme to make Qawam an uncontrolled dictator who would be able to dissolve the Majlis and manage the next election as it best suited him. At a stormy secret session on the 19th November the Majlis showed determined and violent opposition to the Prime Minister, although they declared themselves in favour of the Allies and ready to provide them with whatever currency they needed. The dispute between Qawam and the Shah was brought to a climax by an outbreak of looting and rioting in the streets of Tehran on the 8th and 9th December; the Shah behaved unwisely, and did his best to order the Prime Minister to resign, in spite of having agreed with His Majesty's Minister that he was to stay in office. The firm stand taken by Qawam during this crisis created a very good impression on this legation, but it was not long before Qawam's efforts to please the Deputies caused him new difficulties, and at the end of the year the harassed head of the Government was endeavouring to find new members for his Cabinet who might be acceptable both to the Shah and the Deputies.



63. Generally speaking, the successive Persian Governments showed themselves weak, vacillating, corrupt and quite unable to cope unaided with the difficult tasks of the times. It was impossible to get them to consider any serious measures to protect the people against war-time hardship or against the exploitation by the landlords and merchants. Taking a long view it seems almost impossible that the present state of affairs can continue indefinitely, and many people, including the Shah, according to some indications, consider that a more radical type of Government will have to be found if revolutionary tendencies are to be avoided. But the people of Persia are ill-informed, politically unconscious and appear to be almost infinitely long-suffering.

#### *Persian Army.*

64. During the year the Persian forces have not contributed greatly to the welfare or stability of the country. Although there has been no serious interference with the lines of communication used by the Allies, there has been a progressive weakening of the authority of the Central Government in the provinces and particularly in tribal areas, due, in part, to its own lack of policy, but also to the unwillingness of Persian commanders to risk a conflict with the rearméd tribes and to a newly-discovered conscientious objection to fratricidal warfare. None of the several Governments that have attempted to hold power succeeded in establishing more than a semblance of control over the army, reluctant to abandon its freedom from ministerial control, or to admit that it should become the servant of the country whose master it had been for so long. In this attitude it has been supported by the Shah, who, doubtful of the popular enthusiasm for the dynasty, has jealously resented any limitation of the personal control of the army which he claims is his prerogative by virtue of his constitutional position as commander-in-chief. It is clearly his desire that the army should look to him rather than to the Government, and he is more concerned that it should be attached to his person than that it should enforce the Government's authority.

65. Although popular hostility has moderated as a result of greater discretion shown by senior officers in their methods of acquisition and a less obvious arrogance on the part of junior officers, the army remains unpopular with the general public and appears to them to give a poor return for its heavy cost. Some, though little, progress was made in the elimination of corruption, but corruption must remain endemic until officers are paid a living wage. There was little improvement in morale. Pro-German sentiments and the intrigues of German agents and sympathisers produced a feeling of uncertainty and mutual distrust and a reluctance to display any cordial desire to co-operate in furthering the interests of the Allies. Allied successes in Russia and Africa have considerably reduced the influence of pro-German elements; respect for the Allies is growing, but the army remains without ideal and without inspiring purpose. The ideal of reforming itself and of restoring law and order in the country does not yet make sufficient appeal.

66. A reorganisation to suit its limited rôle of maintaining internal security was initiated in February. The full scheme allowed for eight divisions (seven of three brigades and one of two brigades) and an independent brigade at Isfahan. Each brigade was to consist of one regiment of infantry, one squadron of cavalry, and three batteries of artillery. The total paper strength of this reorganised army was 86,000, but its actual strength has been considerably less than this figure. The organisation is not yet complete, partly owing to normal Persian inefficiency and partly to the reluctance of the Russians to allow Persian troops in the areas occupied by Soviet troops.

67. A new scheme has now been prepared by General Ridley of the United States army, who arrived in Tehran in October, nominally as adviser to the Intendent-General's Department of the Persian War Office, but he is in fact the adviser to the Ministry of War without official position. He proposes ten divisions totalling 53,000 fighting men. Recruits, staffs, services and training establishments bring this total to 86,000. His proposals do not greatly affect the organisation of combatant units except that he recommends the temporary disbandment of nearly all of the field artillery. He is more concerned with improving the system of recruit training, the organisation of communication, transport, supply and medical units which do not now exist, and the increase of pay and allowances to officers to an extent that will make honesty at least possible. An increase of nearly 100 per cent. in the army budget will be required to pay for this unprecedented condition.

68. Motor transport is essential to the successful operation of General Ridley's scheme. The almost complete lack of transport has served as a ready

excuse for the inactivity of the Persian forces during the past year. Two hundred lorries are understood to have been despatched from America at the request of General Ridley. He is optimistic that, given suitable equipment, the Persian army can, with American guidance, be transformed into a force capable of being of value to the Allies, at least in the preservation of order and protection of the lines of communication. This must depend on there being an adequate number of American officers and on their being given some degree of authority. For this there is both opposition and support within the army. The Shah wavers between the hope that American advisers might produce large quantities of equipment and his fear that American officers with authority might tend to strengthen the control of the Cabinet over the army and limit his own direct control. It is believed that this question has not yet been fully discussed between General Ridley and the Persian Government.

#### *Gendarmerie.*

69. Since its separation from the Ministry for War in September 1941 and its return to the Ministry of the Interior, the gendarmerie has suffered all the misfortunes of orphanage. Its administration has been neglected and in its operations it has not often had that support from the army which was the essence of its effectiveness in the time of Reza Shah. It is grossly underpaid, its detachments are badly housed and almost unfed except for what they can beg or steal. Consequently, its numbers and its morale are low. The miserable conditions offered attract few volunteer recruits and its numbers are maintained only by drafting to it unwilling conscripts from the army. Owing to its almost complete lack of transport and means of communication its effectiveness in protecting communications is very limited. The arrival of three American officers as advisers has done very little to improve the state of affairs. They have blinded themselves to the urgent needs of the immediate present by fixing their eyes on a beautiful but quite impractical, ideal organisation, which would only be justified if the army were to be abolished. Given the support of the army the task required from the gendarmerie is not heavy. What is immediately required is an improvement in the conditions of service and some means of mobility and communication.

#### *Persian Air Force.*

70. The strength of the Imperial Persian air force at the end of 1942 was 2,012 officers, n.c.o.s and enlisted men. The flying personnel consisted of 54 officer pilots, 88 sergeant pilots, 67 officer observers. There were 201 aircraft held on charge, of which 123 were serviceable and 78 unserviceable. Of the serviceable aircraft, forty-two machines were of trainer type and the remainder either obsolete or obsolescent. The lack of modern aircraft, the shortage of fuel, oil and spare parts, and the limited number of aerodromes and landing grounds left to the Persian air force rule it out of consideration as a fighting force. After the British and Russian air forces had occupied the permanent stations, workshops and aerodromes considered necessary for their possible future operations, and Polish refugees had been quartered in certain training establishments, the accommodation available for the Persian air force was very limited. The offer made by the Air Officer Commanding, Iraq and Persia, in return for the handing over of Mehrabad aerodrome, near Tehran, to erect hangars at British expense at Isfahan, whither one regiment of the Persian air force had been sent, was well received and did something to soothe ruffled feelings, but even when these hangars have been erected the Persian air force will still suffer considerable inconvenience from lack of cover for their aircraft. In spite of this, relations between the Royal Air Force and the Persian air force have been remarkably good. This is due largely to the personality of the late air attaché, Group Captain R. R. Greenlaw, and to the obvious desire of the air force authorities to co-operate as far as the demands of their own operational requirements allowed. Assistance, though limited in scope, is being given in flying training and in instruction in meteorology. Good relations have been established at the aircraft factory at Doshan Tappeh, where the Persian staff and workmen work happily under R.A.F. supervision. The factory has been fully occupied on major repairs to aircraft, both Persian and British, and the manufacture of spare parts for the R.A.F.

#### *Tribal Policy.*

71. The tribal situation in Persia gave much cause for anxiety at the beginning of the year. Reza Shah had committed many injustices against



leading personalities among the tribes, and his ruthlessness and centralising policy, and suppression of any form of local autonomy had created great discontent, but at least he had preserved order. The Persian Government appeared unfortunately too weak and vacillating either to remedy the injustices or to keep the tribes effectively in order. Early in the year there were a number of local minor disorders, and it was feared that if they spread, they might affect our lines of communications. In Gach Saran, in the oil area, for instance, the situation was so serious that a battalion of British troops had to be sent to preserve order. The Persian army, on whom the duty of preserving internal security falls, seemed only just, if at all, capable of dealing with the general situation. It was greatly demoralised after the defeat of 1941, and so lacking in transport that no operations against the tribes could be undertaken on any considerable scale. Feeling in the army was, at the same time, not friendly to the Allies and we could not have full confidence in its attitude in all circumstances. In these conditions some concession to tribal feeling seemed essential. As the result of strong pressure by His Majesty's Minister, the Prime Minister made a declaration on the 31st March before the Majlis, stating that the Iranian Government was firmly resolved to compensate tribal individuals for genuine injustices and announced the formation of a commission to investigate and rectify injustices without delay. The declaration concluded by repeating the Government's intention to preserve order and internal security. The commission was in due course set up, and if the Minister of Justice in Qavam-es-Saltaneh's Cabinet has been as helpful as his predecessor, many cases would have been settled. His Majesty's Legation co-operated with the Ministry of Justice in facilitating land claims and other complaints by tribal leaders during the year. A brief outline of events in the principal tribal areas is given in the succeeding paragraphs.

#### *Bakhtiari.*

72. The incipient dissidence on the part of Abul Qasim Khan early in the year was satisfactorily settled in May, when he submitted to the Persian Government. Subsequently, General Zahidi, the General Officer Commanding Persian troops of the Isfahan area, nominated Abul Qasim Khan and another Bakhtiari chief to be official representative of the Persian army in Chahar-Mahal. This arrangement proved most unsatisfactory as the khans held up food supplies for Isfahan in order to sell them on the black market, and began to rob the population in the old way. After the elimination of General Zahidi in December, Abul Qasim Khan ceased to enjoy the blessing of the local authorities and at the end of the year the appointment of a regular military governor for the Bakhtiari was under consideration.

73. The grievances of the principal Bakhtiari khans were really three-fold. They wanted to be allowed to repurchase their oil shares, to recover the lands taken from them by Reza Shah, and to secure the appointment of a Bakhtiari as Governor. The return of the oil shares was difficult to arrange for technical reasons and was not welcome to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. In spite of a certain amount of pressure by His Majesty's Legation, not much was done by the Persian Government towards the settlement of land claims, and at the end of the year it seemed clear that until a new Minister of Justice was installed, no progress would be made. As regards the third desiderata, the khans chosen by General Zahidi were anything but a success as will be seen from the preceding paragraph.

74. It is only fair to say, in conclusion, that it is doubtful whether the interests of the tribesmen coincide with those of the oppressed khans. British prestige was high with the Bakhtiari, who were, however, disappointed that we were not able to do more for them.

#### *Fars.*

75. Early in March it became clear that trouble was brewing in the Qashgai country. There were rumours of an understanding between Qashgai, Bakhtiari and Boir Ahmadi leaders, and of Germans being harboured in those regions. Nasir Khan, the principal dissident Qashgai leader, was invited by the Persian Government to come to Shiraz to discuss the question of his land claims. He, however, refused and moved further into tribal territory.

76. The Persian troops in Fars were too demoralised to be able to take action against Nasir Khan, and there was also a notable lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Governor-General and General Officer Commanding in Shiraz, Prince Firous. Negotiations with Nasir Khan continued throughout the summer

without making any headway. The situation at Fars was closely affected by the military situation and, although it is a matter of conjecture, it seems probable that the intention of those elements in Fars who opposed any action against Nasir was that, in the event of a German victory in the Caucasus, they would have handed over the Government of Fars to him as the preserver of local law and order on behalf of the Germans. Nasir Khan was generally known to be in contact with the Germans and to be harbouring German agents, and those elements in Tehran and in the South of Persia who did not favour the Allied cause, used their influence to ensure that no action should be taken against him, notwithstanding the representations made by His Majesty's Minister to the Persian Government. The situation was more disquieting since the road from Bushire to Shiraz passed near the Qashgai territory and any serious disorder in the area would have affected the delivery of supplies to Russia by this route.

77. At the end of September Prince Firous and His Majesty's Consul came to Tehran, where conferences were held with His Majesty's Legation and the Persian authorities to decide what should be done. The general conclusion that was reached by the Persian Government was that, pending a clarification of the position, steps should be taken to prevent Nasir Khan from increasing his authority. It was suggested to them that this could best be done by making suitable arrangements with the leaders of the sub-tribes and by re-establishing the authority of the Government in the Firuzabad area, an operation that appeared to be within the capacity of their forces.

78. While Prince Firous was still in Tehran, his subordinates in Fars posted troops on the migration route of the Qashgai tribesmen on their way to their winter quarters and attempted to disarm them with inadequate forces. A Persian detachment was ignominiously disarmed. Nothing effective was done by the Persian authorities either to reoccupy Firuzabad or to diminish Nasir's authority. However, the German defeats in Africa and in Russia, and the evidence that the British authorities took a serious view of the situation in Fars made Nasir Khan put some water in his wine, and towards the end of the year somewhat desultory negotiations for his submission, involving a guarantee of his life and property by His Majesty's Government, were in progress. Meanwhile, serious arrangements were being made, with the assistance of the British military authorities and of the American gendarmerie adviser, to ensure the security of the Bushire-Shiraz-Isfahan road, which, however, was only the scene of isolated robberies during the year.

#### *Khuzistan.*

79. Lawlessness among the Khu-i-Galu tribes caused some anxiety for the safety of A.I.O.C. installations in the Behbahan-Gach Saran area. Little confidence was felt in the ability of the Persian forces to maintain order, and in March, in order to reassure the employees of the company, a battalion of British troops was sent to the area. Later in the year a joint examination of the security measures of the area was made by officers detailed by the Persian Ministry for War and the Tenth Army and as a result of their recommendations the local Persian forces were increased. This has improved security but has not entirely prevented tiresome incidents.

80. The Arabs have, on the whole, been reasonably well behaved. Numbers of them have found employment with the British forces, and the tribes generally, in the hope of obtaining British support against the Persian Government, have been pro-British in sentiment. Certain lawless elements were, however, unable to refrain from raiding their peaceful neighbours, and in the autumn, with a show of force, the disarmament of these sections was undertaken by the Persian army. That it has been proceeding without bloodshed is largely due to the moderating influence of Colonel Macann, His Majesty's Consul-General at Ahwaz, on both Arabs and Persians.

#### *Kurdistan.*

80a. The Persian army suffered a reverse in February when a detachment of troops, occupying Saqqiz, were dispersed and the town sacked by Kurdish tribesmen. The Persian army re-took Saqqiz in April, and negotiations were opened with the rebel Kurds by Marshal Shahbakhti, Persian General Officer Commanding at Kermanshah. As a result of representations by His Majesty's Minister, special publicity was given in Kurdistan to the Prime Minister's declaration of the 31st March about the remedying of grievances, and leaflets were even dropped from the air. The Governor-General of Kermanshah, Amir-i-Kull, a local landowner, also toured the area with a view to remedying



discontents. Hama Rashid, the principal Kurdish rebel, did not himself formally submit to the Persian Government, but his brother was made chief of the gendarmerie and various other members of his family received Government posts. The situation was quiet in South Kurdistan for the rest of the year.

81. Northern Kurdistan and the Kurdish parts of Azerbaijan were largely within the zone where Russian troops were stationed, and Soviet policy towards the Kurds was the subject of considerable speculation throughout the year.

82. Early in the year, it was reported that the Kurdish notables who visited Baku at the end of 1941 had found considerable encouragement in the Soviet authorities towards their nationalist aspirations. Colour was lent to this allegation by the fact that the Soviets were objecting to the presence of Persian troops in Western Azerbaijan, and prevented them from reinforcing the gendarmerie there. To all intents and purposes the Persian Government lost control in Western Azerbaijan.

83. Early in May a serious incident occurred at Rezaieh, when the depleted forces of the Persian gendarmerie attempted to disarm some Kurds entering the town. A considerable number of Kurds surrounded the town, pillaged the adjacent villages and attacked and disarmed the gendarmerie posts. A great number of people fled from Azerbaijan and official complaints were made by the Persian Government to the Soviet Government and to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that they were prevented by the Soviet authorities from preserving order inside Persia. There is little doubt, however, that the Persian Government exaggerated the disorders in order to put the Soviet authorities in the wrong and to support their demand to be allowed to send troops to Azerbaijan. Subsequently, some Persian troops and gendarmerie were sent, with Soviet permission, to Azerbaijan, but the Persians complained that their forces in Rezaieh were virtually kept prisoner by the Russian authorities.

84. The objectives of the Russian authorities in behaving with such indulgence towards the Kurds have never been quite clear, but it seems probable that they were anxious to have friendly tribes on the frontier between Azerbaijan and Turkey in the event of the military situation in the Caucasus deteriorating. The Soviet authorities were undoubtedly themselves shocked and surprised by the excesses which the Kurds committed.

84A. The influence of the Soviets with the Kurds was thereafter used to promote order. In July, a hundred Kurdish chiefs were invited to visit the Governor-General of Western Azerbaijan, and were exhorted by him and by the Soviet Consul-General to behave as good citizens. In August, the Soviet authorities called the Kurdish leaders together at Ushnu, warned them against creating trouble and threatened to take their own measures to suppress any disorders which occurred. They also made efforts to bring about a truce among the warring inter-tribal elements, and arranged for Umar Khan of the Shekak tribe to be recognised as the Chief of the Kurds. Certain Kurdish leaders thereafter began to go about with a national flag of their own, and the whole episode aroused the greatest misgiving on the part of the Persian Government, who feared that an attempt was being made by the Russians to encourage separatist aspirations, though in point of fact it seems certain that Russia, as a result of the *détente* in her relations with Turkey, had now no further interest in encouraging the Kurds. At the end of the year the situation amongst the Kurds was most uncertain, control on the Turkish and Iraqi frontier, so essential to prevent the harvest being smuggled away, was absolutely non-existent, and adventurous elements among the tribes were producing a state of unrest throughout the Kurdish tribal areas, which were still entirely out of the Persian Government's control.

#### *Russian Interests.*

85. Russian policy in Persia has very largely remained an enigma. The Persians, who are fundamentally terrified of the Russians and feared the worst after the occupation, have on the whole been surprised that they have not had to suffer very much from them. During most of the year, moreover, Russian policy seemed to be more or less of a hand-to-mouth nature, owing, no doubt, to the fearful problems which the German drive in South Russia set them.

85A. In the first part of the year under review, however, the Persians continued to make complaints of active Russian interference, particularly in the north. In particular they made strong representations to the Soviet Government in March and April, protesting against the alleged propagandist activities of the Soviet Vice-Consulate at Rezaieh, which was stated to have invited the population

to register for Soviet nationality. They also complained that separatist tendencies were being encouraged, contrary to the treaty, by an organisation called "The Workers' Party," which was under Soviet auspices. It is only fair to say that these complaints were not repeated later on in the year. The Persian Government also complained because they were not granted permission to send more troops to Azerbaijan.

86. The Rezaieh incident, in May, and the policy of the Soviet authorities towards the Kurds are described in the section of this report dealing with Kurdistan, and it need only be stated here that the effect of the encouragement which the Soviet authorities gave to a Kurdish movement for unity on Persia's relations with the Soviet Union was to strengthen the Persian belief that the Russians had ultimate designs themselves on Azerbaijan, notwithstanding the provisions of the treaty.

87. Nevertheless, the official Russian policy seemed, generally speaking (and with notable exceptions), to be one of non-interference in the general affairs of Persia and, regardless of what one would have thought were their own war interests, they carried this policy to such lengths as seriously to embarrass the work of this legation in ensuring the security of communications with Russia and in assisting in the carriage of supplies northwards. There are several major instances of this. Thus virtually no assistance could be obtained from the Russians in security matters; they would not back up our requests for the arrest of known fifth-columnists, though their security authorities co-operated with ours, to some extent, in exchanging information, and on one or two occasions we were helped to secure the removal of suspects from the Russian zone. The Soviet authorities were completely unhelpful in food questions, either in backing up our attempts to secure proper control of hoarding, or to ensure the purchase of the necessary quantities from the harvest to feed the towns, and they made difficulties about releasing food from their zone in order to feed Tehran, or even to inform us adequately of what quantities they proposed to take away from Persia. It was made clear to the Soviet Government that, while we would not, of course, wish to object to their supplying their own needs from Persia, this might mean that supplies, in replacement of those taken away, would have to be brought from overseas and transported, in Persia, by rail and that this would necessarily displace a certain quantity of war supplies destined for Russia. Perhaps it was to escape this inconvenient dilemma that the Russians hid their hand. His Majesty's Government made representations to the Russian Ambassador in London in November, and were informed officially that permission had been given for 35,000 tons of cereals to be brought from Azerbaijan to Tehran; but hardly any cereals ever came and the Soviet Government gave so little help to the Persian Government to purchase the necessary quantities for this purpose (indeed, they did everything possible to hamper the work of Mr. Sheridan's representatives in Tabriz) that even the town of Tabriz went short of food in an area renowned for its plenty. This prevaricatory and oriental attitude on the part of the Russians made it extremely difficult to co-operate with them at all on the food question.

88. Although the carriage of supplies to Russia depended on the execution of a huge public works programme, on roads, ports and railways, for which large sums of rials were required by the British military authorities, the Soviet Embassy gave us practically no assistance whatsoever in our representations to the Persian Government about the financial questions which arose. At the end of August the financial and political situation was most difficult, and the supineness of the Soviet Embassy was such that His Majesty's Minister had to ask the Foreign Office to make representations to the Soviet Ambassador in London to ask that the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires should receive sufficient discretion to be able to act with us strongly and promptly in case of necessity. Only in November when it was made clear to the Soviet Ambassador that any further delay or failure to settle the financial question would inevitably mean either complete stoppage of supplies to Russia, or direct military action by His Majesty's forces to ensure compliance with their minimum requirements, did the Soviet Ambassador join His Majesty's Minister in calling personally on the President of the Majlis and explaining that the Deputies could not indefinitely continue to hold up the Allied war effort.

89. Soviet policy as regards their own needs of rials was dealt with in the enclosure to my despatch No. 91 of the 9th March. Negotiations for a Persian-Soviet financial agreement were still in progress at the end of the year. Possibly their shortage of rials explains a good deal of Soviet policy; for instance, it was doubly important for them to keep food-stuffs inside their zone and to maintain



prices at a low level, if they wished to buy food-stuffs themselves without expending a large amount of local currency. Nevertheless, it was undoubtedly convenient for the Russians politically that they should be able to point to a state of plenty in their zone, while we were contributing food-stuffs from our zone to Tehran to the extent of causing some local shortages in places like Kermanshah, Hamadan and Sultanabad. Far from crediting the British with making unselfish efforts on behalf of the capital's food supply, the people of Tehran were at the end of the year whispering how much better things were under Soviet rule.

90. The Russians gave some support to the Tudeh party in internal affairs, and this, combined with a fair amount of radicalism, which began to spread in Persia on account of the appalling corruption and inefficiency of the Government, gave rise to a belief, or at any rate a fear, towards the end of the year, that the Russians were playing a very deep waiting game and were aiming at honey-combing the country and eventually securing control of it by a Left-wing movement. This fear was sedulously fostered by the landowners and *bourgeoisie*, but it is only fair to say that there was little evidence to support it.

91. The Soviets opened a number of consulates in 1942; early in the year they asked for permission to open consulates-general at Tabriz and Meshed, consulates at Resht, Gorgan and Kerman, vice-consulates at Rezaieh, Maku, Nowshahr and Bandar-Shah, and consular agencies at Bandar-Shahpur and Bajgiran. The Persian Government made counter-proposals, based on reciprocity, but received nothing in reply but a declaration of sympathy for the principle of the extension of Persian consular work in Soviet Russia—but not during the war; but when the Soviet Ambassador presented a list of officials the Persian Government felt obliged to issue exequaturs.

92. The Soviets subsequently opened consular posts at Isfahan and Ahwaz. Relations between our consulates and the Soviet consulates were friendly and we assisted them in their war propaganda on many occasions.

93. The Soviet Consul at Kermanshah showed more activity than his colleagues elsewhere, and his staff travelled through tribal areas in Kurdistan. On one occasion members of the staff of the Soviet Consulate at Kermanshah spoke indiscreetly and subversively to an Indian military officer in the area, and representations were made on the subject by the Foreign Office to the Soviet Government; the latter, however, denied that there was any truth in this allegation.

94. Throughout the year there were endless difficulties about the grant of passes for British military and civilian personnel who had to go into the Soviet zone on business, *e.g.*, in connexion with the supply of timber, on survey work, or for other purposes, and passes were frequently refused or delayed in most inconvenient circumstances and without any adequate reason. Frequently representations to the Soviet Embassy seemed to effect little improvement in this state of affairs, and in general it must be said that with few exceptions the Russians treated all foreigners, British and Americans included, very much like enemy aliens, notwithstanding all efforts that were made to get on better terms with them, and notwithstanding the very liberal policy we pursued in granting all Russian applications for passes to visit South Persia immediately on application. On one occasion the British officers superintending the making of the road to Tabriz were all given notices to quit, and there were many difficulties between the Russian and American authorities for the same reason. The British military authorities were, it must be said, sometimes guilty of trespassing in the Soviet zone, of which they were most anxious to obtain information as a possible battlefield where they might have to operate. In June a British mechanised column, on reconnaissance, entered the Soviet zone without previous notice north of Mahabad.

95. The Royal Air Force also had many difficulties with the Russian authorities about the Qaleh-Murghah aerodrome. A description of the incident and agreement reached will be found in the section on military interests.

96. Many of the difficulties mentioned above seemed to come from the N.K.V.D., and it is only fair to say that quite friendly relations were established between senior British and Russian officers. General Korolev, the principal Russian transportation officer, was friendly throughout the year, and General Sir E. P. Quinan, General Officer Commanding, Tenth Army, and Air Vice-Marshal de Crespigny, Air Officer Commanding, Persia and Iraq, both visited the Russian General Officer Commanding in Tabriz and established friendly relations with him, though no return visit took place, and the Russian authorities gave away little enough about reconnaissance of the Soviet zone.

97. The Russians did not seem to welcome the arrival of American advisers in Persia, and there is some evidence that at the end of the year, when they began pursuing a more active policy as the fortunes of war changed, they spoke to several Persian Ministers against the principle of having American advisers. They demurred somewhat to the suggestion that the Americans were going to take over control of the southern section of the Trans-Iranian Railway, and at the end of the year had still not expressed their formal approval of it.

98. It seems possible that the Soviet Government were worried at the huge increase of American and British influence in Persia, both in the Central Government and in the provinces, and that they may have feared that we were ourselves playing a "deep waiting game," and were going to profit by their war embarrassment and absence from the scene and were steadily getting Persia into our pocket. I can only say that nothing more could have been done than was done to draw the Russians into co-operation with us in all we did, and if they did not co-operate and play their part it was entirely their own doing and was, indeed, extremely embarrassing to us.

99. The Soviet authorities had priority, as between the Allies, in developing the arms factories in Persia. Nothing was done about this during the year, in spite of our representations on the subject, but at the end of the year negotiations were in progress between the Persian Government and the Soviet Government, who were trying to induce the Persian Government to sign a most onerous contract. The Persians doubted their capacity to fulfil the proposed contract, and feared that failure on their part to do so would lead to direct control and exploitation by the Russians not only of the arms factories, but also of the mineral and other resources on which they depended.

#### *American Interests.*

100. A very great increase of American participation in developments in Persia occurred during the year. Many public works of military interest in the South of Persia were constructed by American engineers, and at the end of the year the operation of the southern section of the Trans-Iranian Railway was slowly being transferred from British to American personnel. Increased American participation in road transport was also expected. American advisers were functioning or were expected to start work in all important branches of the administration.

101. There were advantages both from the Persian and from the Allied point of view in closer co-operation between the Persian and United States Governments. Owing to the inability of the Persian Administration to cope with the formidable problems resulting from the war, the appointment of foreign advisers to various Ministries became essential. We should have been unable, owing to the strain of war, to produce the necessary number of first-class advisers ourselves, and, if we had done so, Russian suspicions might well have been aroused. Moreover, the Persians were afraid of the citizens of neighbouring powers, always suspecting ulterior intentions. The Americans represented for them the virtues of the Anglo-Saxon nations without any of the disadvantages. In the course of the summer and autumn, a number of American advisers were engaged to deal with food and supply questions (Mr. Sheridan), the gendarmerie (Colonel Schwarzkopf) and the police (Mr. Timmerman). An American adviser on irrigation was already engaged in the employ of the Ministry of Agriculture. A financial mission under Dr. A. C. Millspaugh was expected at the end of the year. General Greely became adviser to the Intendant-General's Department of the Persian Ministry of War; he was subsequently succeeded by General Ridley. There was much discussion during the year as to the need for an American Military Mission. His Majesty's Legation was in favour of this, but various objections were raised and the project did not materialise.

102. The American Legation was represented on the Civil Supplies Committee and the Road Transport Board, and the United States Government was a party to the Food Agreement signed in November.

103. The Lease-Lend system was promised to Persia during the year; the possible grant of this concession by the United States Government was one of the principal inducements to the Persian Government to expel the Japanese Legation in April, but the Persians were most disappointed that, owing to shipping difficulties, they will derive so little benefit from it.

104. The American Legation did not always take the same view of Allied requirements as did His Majesty's Legation and co-operation was often rendered difficult by the somewhat tortuous character of the American Minister, whom the Persians frequently tried to influence against us. The American Legation



effectively wrecked an attempt made to rationalise Persian road transport through the U.K.C.C. in the summer, owing to their fear of any sort of monopoly, and the United States Government made representations in London regarding our arrest of General Zahidi in November. Mr. Dreyfus generally avoided supporting our representations on questions of general importance to the Allies and left His Majesty's Minister to bear the whole burden of unpopular representations to the Persian Government. Fortunately his staff was most friendly and helpful, but if more co-operation had been forthcoming from the American Minister in pressing the Persian Government to take the measures which were essential to solve the urgent problems of the year, much less trouble would have been experienced and, incidentally, we should not have had to bear all the odium of them. This might have had an appreciable effect on our relations with Persia. Mr. Bullitt visited Tehran in January; Mr. Harriman passed through with Mr. Churchill on his way to and from Moscow in August. Mr. Wendel Willkie visited Tehran in September.

105. The United States Government was invited by the Persian Government to adhere to the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty of Alliance in autumn with a view to regularising the position of the United States forces in Persia. The question of the best means of doing this was still under consideration at the end of the year.

#### *Polish Interests.*

106. Large numbers of Poles, carried off into the interior of Russia when Poland was overrun, were liberated by the Russians in the course of the year and were sent out through Persia. The first Polish evacuation in April included 33,000 soldiers and 10,000 civilians. The latter were evacuated in the autumn to East Africa. The second evacuation included 43,000 soldiers and 25,000 civilians. In spite of efforts to evacuate the civilians out of Persia, where their presence was undesirable, both from a military point of view and on account of the difficulties of feeding such a considerable increase of the European population, there were at the end of the year still about 22,000 Poles in Persia.

107. His Majesty's Minister undertook that the Poles should not be a burden on Persian economy and special imports of wheat and sugar, tea and cloth were arranged for their needs. The Middle East Refugee Relief Administration established an organisation in Tehran to superintend and co-ordinate arrangements for the refugees under Colonel A. Ross. In spite of these arrangements, the presence of the Polish refugees was a complicating factor in the delicate economic and food position in Tehran, for which the Allies received most of the blame.

#### *French Interests.*

108. In January M. Coiffard, the Vichy French Chargé d'Affaires, wrote a hasty and ill-conceived letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the implications of the proposed Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty and sent copies to the press. He accused the Persian Government of misleading the Persian people and of acting against their wishes. This gave the Allies an excuse they were waiting for to get rid of M. Coiffard, whose activities were most detrimental to our interests; he was informed by the Persian Government that he was *persona non grata* and left Tehran at the end of January.

109. Free French interests were in the hands of Professor André Godard, who was appointed Delegate of General de Gaulle at the end of February. Professor Godard was officially recognised by the Persian Government as the representative of the Free French National Committee in June; although his name does not appear on the diplomatic list, he exercises virtually all the functions of a Minister Plenipotentiary. Relations with the Free (later "Fighting") French were cordial throughout the year.

#### *Czech Interests.*

110. The Persian Government recognised the Czechoslovak Government in June and the Czechoslovak Legation was formally opened on the 24th June by General Ingr, the Czechoslovak Minister of Defence, with Dr. Frantisek Bachtik as chargé d'affaires.

[E 2453/239/34]

No. 11.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 29.)*

(No. 139.)

Sir,

*Tehran, March 6, 1943.*

THE period since my despatch No. 434 of 21st December last has been marked by a serious deterioration in the food situation, which is only now beginning to be surmounted as a result of deliveries of grain under the M.E.S.C. programme and of the improvement in communications caused by the arrival of Lease/Lend lorries and the activities of the Allied Road Transport Board.

2. Prices have continued to soar, and to enable Dr. Millspaugh, the newly-arrived American Administrator-General of Persian Finances, to deal with the increasingly dangerous situation, a Bill has been submitted to the Majlis by the Government. It is expected, however, to meet with bitter opposition from vested interests. The increase in economic distress, which in this country is always ascribed to British inefficiency or machinations, has naturally had a deplorable effect on our popularity here, and public opinion has been strongly influenced by the fulminations of the press at our expense. M. Soheily, who succeeded Qawames-Sultaneh as Prime Minister in February last, has failed to deal firmly with the press, preferring the policy of persuasion, which has met with little or no success. On the other hand, there are indications that he intends to introduce a measure of social reform and to take action, by means of the special powers proposed for Dr. Millspaugh, to check the rise in the cost of living.

#### *Food Situation.*

3. The cereals situation has been dominated by a chronic shortage of supplies in Tehran itself, lasting well into March. Azerbaijan delivered scarcely any wheat to Tehran, and Khorassan much less than was expected, and thus made the Food Administration almost entirely dependent on imported supplies long before the arrival of the first wheat to be shipped from North America under the Food Agreement, and by the time the first of this wheat reached Tehran some 5,000 tons of wheat had had to be advanced to the Persian Government from the Persian Gulf pool. Unprecedented cold weather and more than one crash or mishap on the railway, interrupting the movement of wheat from the South for days at a time, together with the blocking of the roads by snow, which interfered with deliveries of barley from Iraq, combined to keep Tehran on the brink of starvation. Some 1,200 tons of wheat and barley were released by the Russians from the Gurgan area, south-east of the Caspian, but the truth of a statement made by the Russians in London in February, to the effect that Tehran was being provided with foodstuffs entirely from the Northern Provinces of Persia, was anything but apparent in Tehran. On the contrary, the Persians themselves realised how dependent on imported supplies they had become, and proceeded to accuse the Allies in the press of starving them by delaying, or even holding back altogether, the promised 25,000 tons of imported wheat. These attacks we had to counter in public statements, showing that we had more than fulfilled our obligations by supplying grain in advance of actual shipments under the Food Agreement, and pointing out that the Persians, too, had obligations, namely, to assist their Government in collecting grain inside the country.

4. This, for the most part, they failed to do. In the provinces our consular liaison officers, armed at last by Mr. Sheridan, after repeated representations on our part, with a somewhat piecemeal authority for dealing with hoarders, for revising, where necessary, the amount of landlords' undertakings to deliver grain to the Government and for hiring animal transport, continued to fight the unequal battle against hoarding landlords and dishonest bakers, and each provincial area contrived to eke out its own precarious existence, not without occasional temporary shortages.

5. The question of the eventual requirements of imported grain for the deficit areas of the South, to enable them to carry on till the next harvest, was the subject of discussions in January and February between Mr. Sheridan and the British and United States Legations. The discussions also covered the calculation of the amount of imported grain required for Tehran itself. The final conclusion was that, in addition to the 25,000 tons of wheat already promised, 5,000 tons of wheat and some 16,000 tons of barley or millet flour would need to be imported, and these additional amounts and more have now been incorporated in the M.E.S.C. programme for the provision of cereals for the Persian Gulf area.

[26155]



It is hoped to supply barley or millet from Iraq: shipments have already been made direct to southern ports and deliveries to Tehran by road, via Khanaqin, have also begun.

6. Engrossed almost daily with the problem of finding the flour for the next day's bread, and with the further preoccupation of bringing into operation a central bakery for Tehran in the teeth of the bakers' opposition, Mr. Sheridan has had little or no time to give to the problem of securing a better deal both for his own Government and the Allies next year by securing the maximum possible collections from the expected bumper grain crop this summer. It will be one of our tasks in the coming months to see that he is better equipped than he was last year with the two main weapons of money and transport, without which the present Government monopoly of the sale and purchase of wheat can only prove once more, in the absence of the means of compulsion, a useless and expensive folly.

#### *Transport.*

7. The organisation of the Persian Government Road Transport Department under the control of the Allied Road Transport Board and the provision during the last few months of over 150 Lease/Lend lorries should have brought some relief to the difficult civil transport situation. This has not been as effective as might have been expected, owing to the failure of the general public in this country, and the lorry owners in particular, to help to make the new organisation a success. Like every other measure passed for the good of the whole community, which hinders the enrichment of a particular section of the population, the control of transport has met with bitter opposition, even from more responsible quarters in the Majlis and the Administration. As a consequence, the fleet of contracted vehicles formed by the Road Transport Department has partly been lost; and many vehicles that might be doing useful work are either working for their own account or lying idle in garages. It has, therefore, been impossible to fulfil the transport programme for cereals (barley and millet) from the Iraqi frontier to Tehran, and many difficulties have hindered the work of collecting cereals in the Tabriz district. Without the Lend/Lease vehicles the situation would have been very serious indeed. The Road Transport Department have also been starved of funds by the Government, and as a consequence have often been unable to pay their contractors. In spite of these difficulties, great progress has been made in introducing some order into civil road transport, and clearly strong support must continue to be given by the British and American Legations to the Road Transport Board and the Road Transport Department, which can be said to be the only barrier between organisation and chaos where civil road transport is concerned. The Russian Delegate attended only one meeting of the Board, probably because the Russians want to remain free from its regulations.

8. The situation has not been helped by the failure of the railway to bring its quota of civil supplies to Tehran. Owing to an increase in supplies to Russia and to interruptions of the service caused by breakdowns and accidents, oil supplies, in particular, have been reduced. Many factories in Tehran and Isfahan had to reduce their activity, some to shut down temporarily, and much hardship was caused to the civil population by lack of kerosene. While the oil position has now improved, supplies are still insufficient to meet all requirements. Cereal supplies from Ahwaz, however, are coming up the line satisfactorily.

9. The transfer of control of the operation of the Trans-Iranian Railway from the British to the American military authorities was completed on the 1st April, and the United States Government are preparing to regularise the position of their troops in Persia by the conclusion of a treaty similar to the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty of 1942.

#### *Financial Position.*

10. Since the last review of the financial position in Persia little has been done to combat inflation. The various remedies recommended by the Anti-Inflation Committee in Cairo have been placed before the Persian Government authorities on numerous occasions, but little, if anything, has been achieved. With the arrival of Dr. A. G. Millspaugh, the American Financial Adviser, the situation began to be handled with more vigour, and the Majlis are now debating a Bill (as will be shown in detail in a subsequent paragraph of this despatch) to invest him with comparatively wide powers to control prices, reorganise the system of taxation, &c., which, if rigidly enforced, should go a long way towards placing the country on a more stable economic footing.

11. In order to absorb to some degree a portion of the existing surplus purchasing power, a scheme was suggested by the Financial Counsellor to His Majesty's Legation, whereby His Majesty's Government would exchange the equivalent in gold bullion for a quantity of gold coins at present held by the National Bank of Iran as part cover for the note-issue, and sell the coins in the open market, with a reserve price of £12 an ounce. This sale of gold, which has been sanctioned by all parties concerned, should have a beneficial effect on prices, in so far as it is hoarded. It had been suggested from other quarters that the scheme might be extended to other Middle East countries, but in view of the probability that the sale of gold within the Sterling Area might promote a variety of undesirable contingencies which His Majesty's Government would not be prepared to meet, the experiment is to be tried only in Persia, and here to a limited extent. The proposal is to put on the market gold to the equivalent of 100,000 gold sovereigns; should the experiment prove successful, a further 200,000 gold sovereigns may be forthcoming.

12. It was suggested by Dr. Millspaugh early in the year that gold should be used instead of sterling to finance the war expenditure of His Majesty's Government in Persia. He contended that the sale of gold would relieve pressure for future increases in the note-issue, and thus prevent a further decline in the purchasing power of the rial; and that the high bazaar price of gold would actually relieve the sterling expenditure of His Majesty's Government. It was held by His Majesty's Government, however, that, broadly speaking, war expenditure in Persia could only be financed by the issue of rial currency, and this at the rate of exchange laid down by the Financial Agreement. Also, *inter alia*, that the implications of this proposal in relation to our financial relations with neighbouring territories must be of obvious concern to His Majesty's Government, whose stocks of gold are not unlimited.

13. The anomalous position whereby His Majesty's Government was the only one of the three Allied Powers in Persia to have a Financial Agreement with the Persian Government has now been altered by the conclusion recently of a Soviet-Persian Financial Agreement, and the proposal of the signature of a similar agreement between the Persian Government and the Government of the United States. The Soviet Agreement, as foreshadowed in paragraph 27 of my despatch No. 434 of the 21st December, 1942, is in less generous terms than our own, but the United States Government have agreed, in their draft, to furnish Persia with dollars against all rials required by the United States, and to exchange these dollars for gold. This may lead to pressure on us to increase our undertaking to provide gold under Article IX of our agreement. Some misgivings were also created by the inclusion in the American draft agreement of a clause which accepted the principle of a variation in the rial/dollar rate of exchange; and these two factors were seized on by the Majlis Commission then discussing a Bill to ratify our Financial Agreements, as a pretext to defer the question of ratification pending a pronouncement by His Majesty's Government as to their intentions as to the convertibility of gold under our agreement and to the rate of exchange. Subsequently we were informed by the United States Treasury that the provision regarding the rate of exchange is common form in all United States stabilisation fund agreements, and that it was not the intention of the United States Government to vary the rate of exchange without prior consultation with His Majesty's Government.

14. The currency situation continues to cause anxiety. An order for the printing of notes to the value of 1,500 million rials is being carried out by De la Rue in London. These notes are scheduled to be delivered to Tehran in varying consignments by the end of July 1943. At the present rate of Allied war expenditure this sum will have been practically exhausted by that time, and the note reserve will have reached the dangerously low level of about 200 million rials—appreciably less than one month's Allied requirements. A further order of 2,400 million rials has accordingly been placed in London to meet the requirements for the period the 1st August, 1943, to the 31st March, 1944, *i.e.*, eight months at 300 million rials a month.

#### *M. Soheily's Government.*

15. In my despatch No. 80 of the 25th February, I gave some account of the events which finally led to the re-assumption of power by M. Soheily. The new Cabinet is probably as good a team as can be found in present circumstances, and the recent appointment of M. Tadayyon, previously Minister without Portfolio, to be Minister of Food Supply, has added to its strength. The Prime Minister



has sought to reinforce his influence with the Majlis by the formation of a body of fourteen Deputies who will meet the Cabinet periodically and maintain contact between the Government and the Chamber. The Government have shown courage in asking the Majlis to grant very wide powers to Dr. Millspaugh for the control of prices, and have inevitably encountered opposition. The proposed powers would give Dr. Millspaugh control of everything concerning the purchase of merchandise, other than food-stuffs, including importation, transport, warehousing and distribution. He would wield all the powers conferred on the Government under the anti-hoarding law and other legislation for the control of internal and external trade. He would be empowered to require returns of existing stocks, to issue licences for the manufacture and sale of goods, to confiscate stocks with compensation to owners, and in general to do all that he considered necessary to stabilise prices and ensure fair distribution. Finally, he would have power to make regulations having the force of law. The measure is naturally being attacked by the hoarders and profiteers, and some sections of the press have condemned it as being inimical to Persian national independence. Food-stuffs have been excluded from the purview of the Bill as falling within Mr. Sheridan's province, but legislation has been introduced to prevent the forward buying of crops by speculators.

16. A few days ago M. Soheily delivered a New Year broadcast, in which he exhorted his compatriots to make sacrifices in the interest of final victory, and to co-operate with him in realising, under war-time conditions, a greater measure of social justice. He outlined a ten-point programme, which included not only measures for the control of prices and the elimination of hoarding, but also "the establishment of justice and equality in the distribution of wealth; improvement of conditions for Government employees, peasants and working classes by means of insurance and compensation schemes; the development of public health and medical facilities and effective primary education throughout the country." It remains to be seen how far M. Soheily can be trusted to pursue these ideals. But his message is certainly a step towards the reforms of which Persia is so sorely in need. In this he has the full support of the Shah. The huge fortunes which have been amassed during the past year by the few, and the acute economic distress of the masses, which is now aggravated by a typhus epidemic, have undoubtedly produced a situation in which the existing régime feels itself threatened. On the one hand, the Tudeh party has greatly increased its activity, with the formation of new cells and the dissemination of Socialist propaganda on a wide scale. On the other hand, there is a definite movement, although not strong at present, to bring back Seyyid Zia-ed-Din Tabatabai from Palestine. A number of Deputies have recently travelled through Palestine, ostensibly for their health, but possibly with the intention of seeing Seyyid Zia. An active propaganda is being carried on, representing him as the only man who can save Persia, and his supporters maintain that the time will be ripe for his return this month if the Shah's suspicions can be allayed. Court circles make no secret of their fear that Seyyid Zia might put an end to the Pahlavi dynasty or, at all events, greatly curtail the influence of the Crown.

17. In this situation the Government is not optimistic about the approaching general election, and the Prime Minister is considering whether he would not do well to postpone it until after the war. He is putting off a decision on the grounds that the Soviet Embassy might object to postponement. The probability that elections will be held this year faces His Majesty's Legation with a delicate problem. It is natural to suppose that the Soviet authorities will use their influence in their zone to secure the election of candidates more or less subservient to their views, and the question arises how we can counterbalance this by influencing the elections ourselves in other parts of Persia without giving cause for complaint to our Soviet Allies or cause for misunderstanding to the Americans. With your approval I have instructed His Majesty's consular officers to watch the situation closely and to study ways of supporting and encouraging candidates from among the younger and more progressive elements who have some public spirit and are ready to sponsor a real programme of reform as opposed to an extremist policy.

#### *Soviet Interests.*

18. During the period under review the Russians have shown particular interest in that part of Persia outside their zone, as well as increasing suspicion of British and American policy. For instance, a scientific expedition, consisting of twelve persons and headed by Lieutenant-General Professor Pavlovsky, an expert on malaria, has toured South-Eastern Persia accompanied by a British

liaison officer. The Soviet military attaché, evidently acting under instructions, has asked a number of questions about road and aerodrome construction by the British army and our troop movements in Eastern Persia. Anglo-Soviet relations here are none too easy at the best of times, but the situation has not been rendered easier by the attitude of the Soviet Embassy in refusing to issue passes for British military personnel to visit their zone, unless they are satisfied that their journey is directly concerned with the furtherance of aid to Russia. Further, they have resisted our proposal to station a liaison officer with the Soviet forces to reside in Tabriz, and have only agreed that we may send one officer and a number of other ranks to Tabriz to deal with the work arising out of U.K.C.C. and British military convoys. Soviet-American relations in Persia are passing through a difficult phase. Permission has been refused for the Americans to build standard accommodation for lorry drivers along the road to Tabriz and, in consequence, the Americans have refused to send the convoys and are dumping supplies at Qazvin. An American stationed at Tabriz as Mr. Sheridan's representative has been requested to return to Tehran to get his residence permit renewed, and it is understood that representations have been made at Washington regarding the alleged anti-Soviet attitude of the American Consul at Tabriz. Both these officials are now in Tehran and are unlikely to return to their posts. It is also clear that the Soviet authorities are suspicious and jealous of the presence of the American advisers. Recently the Soviet Ambassador asked the Prime Minister why Persia wanted to hand over her affairs to foreigners "after twenty years"; and the Minister of War alleges that the ambassador asked him why, if foreign advisers were necessary, the Persian Government did not engage Soviet advisers, as the Soviet Union was the best administered country in the world. It may not be fanciful to suppose that the Russians are fomenting opposition to the Millspaugh Bill not only because of their objection to the American influence, but also because, as I indicated in my despatch No. 80 of the 25th February, they may, for their own reasons, prefer the continuance of the existing disorder.

#### *The Press.*

19. The press, non-existent at the beginning of the year as a result of the ban imposed after the 8th December, has been allowed to reappear subject to the approval of the editors and owners by a committee of control. The control has unfortunately been slack and inefficient and the capital has now been inundated with about forty newspapers. Frequently articles have appeared laying all the economic evils of Persia at the door of the Allies, and worded in several cases so as to impute most of the blame to His Majesty's Government. In many cases I have been obliged to make the strongest representations to the Prime Minister against these unwarranted attacks and criticisms, but the latter, who has shown firmness and courage in launching his programmes of reform, has displayed deplorable weakness in dealing with the press. One of the most scurrilous papers has, however, been suppressed at my request. Another of which I complained has also been suppressed, though in this case it had also offended the Shah by suggesting that the troubles of the 8th December were instigated by the Court. M. Soheily has undertaken to suppress any other which may in future attack the Allies, and to issue no more licences. He has also had an editor arrested for a personal attack on His Majesty's Minister.

20. Unfortunately the anti-British tone of the press reflects only too faithfully the trend which public opinion has taken during the trials and privations of the past winter. In my telegram No. 232 of the 1st March I drew attention to the dangerous situation which has arisen, in which we are compared unfavourably with the Russians because, owing to natural causes and our desire to send all possible help to Russia, conditions in the Russian zone are generally better than they are elsewhere in Persia.

21. In this situation our task during the next few months must be to increase our contribution to the welfare of the Persian people to the greatest extent consistent with the provision of necessary supplies to Russia. The principal element in the promotion of their welfare can only be internal reform and reorganisation of the trade in, and distribution of, essential goods. In this sphere we must clearly give all possible support and encouragement to the Government's programme, more especially in regard to the Millspaugh Bill.

22. For the rest, much has already been done in providing supplies of grain and reorganising transport, and we are considering measures for increasing supplies of consumers' goods, particularly from India, and the allocation of additional tonnage for civil supplies on the Trans-Iranian Railway. Special attention must be paid to the question of oil, the shortage of which has lately



done us immense harm and provided a fertile theme for pro-Axis propagandists. We must likewise be ready to give the Ministry of Food all possible help in the collection of the harvest. Our relief work in Persia must be continued and developed, and I am trying to work out a scheme for the establishment of dispensaries in Tehran, possibly with the assistance of medical personnel from Paiforce and India. All these activities must be thoroughly publicised, and it is obvious that the present situation calls for the most intense effort on the part of all concerned. At the moment of writing the British military authorities have provided the best kind of propaganda by offering a 1,000-bed Indian hospital, complete with doctors, nurses and orderlies, for civilian typhus patients. But for this offer, another, and in that case legitimate grievance, would have been created in that we had had to refuse to return to the Persian Government, to be used for typhus cases, two large buildings which are being used as hospitals, one by the British and one by the Poles.

I am sending copies of this despatch to the Government of India, to His Majesty's Minister of State at Cairo, and to Minbranch at Bagdad, to Paiforce, Bagdad, and to His Majesty's Ambassador at Kuibyshev.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 2602/38/34]

No. 12.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 6th May.)*

(No. 156.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of record of conversation of Minister of State with the Shah, at Tehran, on the 15th April, 1943.

*Tehran, 20th April, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 12.

*Record of a Conversation with the Shah, 15th April, 1943.*

I HAD a private conversation lasting an hour and three-quarters with the Shah to-day. Mr. Hopkinson was also present. His Majesty was extremely friendly, and, as I had found him before, simple and straightforward. The following are the main points which emerged from the discussion:—

#### (1) *Social Reforms.*

The Shah said that he attached the greatest importance to the carrying out of effective reforms in Persia. If people were poor and had no stake in the country, there was no incentive among them to resist external aggression. Of the 17 million population of Persia probably not more than 20,000 were able to lead decent lives. The conditions of the peasantry are now so bad that they might easily lead to actual revolt. He was considering plans both for immediate execution and for the post-war period.

As regards the present, he was encouraging a proposal that three-fifths of the yield of the land tilled by the peasants should be handed back to them, and only two-fifths given to the landlord, instead of, as in the past, in some cases only one-fifth being left to the peasants. As regards the future, he had plans for breaking up the large estates and distributing them to the peasants on a co-operative basis. At the moment only some 20,000 persons in the country could be said to be living a tolerable existence. Certain landowners had properties which were practically whole provinces. There was no reason for any man to own more than two estates. I said that reforms of this nature, which entailed considerable expenditure on the part of the State, were things, in my mind, for the post-war period, as the country had very great economic and financial burdens at present. The Shah agreed that such reforms could not be carried out in war-time, when the country could not stand too great shocks.

#### (2) *Economic and Financial Affairs.*

I emphasised strongly to His Majesty the dangers of the immediate financial and economic situation. It was essential that the Persian Government should face up to the problem and take drastic steps to put their house in order. The present economic and financial drift had to be gripped and checked. I referred to the Bill before the Majlis for the grant of powers to Dr. Millspaugh, and to the imperative necessity of taking effective measures for collecting this year's wheat crop.

The Shah agreed, and said that he thought Dr. Millspaugh's powers would soon be granted by the Majlis. As regards the wheat scheme, there was a plan by which the Government should take 60 per cent. of the crop, leaving 40 per cent. to the owner or cultivator to dispose of as he wished. Mr. Sheridan was not entirely in accord with this. The Shah pointed out that Government intervention in regard to the collection of wheat, e.g., in Khorassan and Kerman, had led to immediate wholesale hoarding. It was possible that it would be better to leave the wheat producers to collect and sell their grain themselves. He believed that a compromise between the two might be the best solution. I referred to the need for increasing taxation in order to balance the budget and to reduce inflation. The Shah said that Dr. Millspaugh was considering a scheme of taxation intended to limit incomes to a maximum figure. This was all to the good, but he doubted whether any Government would be able to collect the money. He referred to the increase of rials in circulation, and begged that steps might be taken to enable the Persian Government to bring to Persia the large stock of gold which had accumulated in South Africa.

#### (3) *Relations with Russia.*

The Shah was obviously extremely exercised over the increasing Russian influence in Persia, and, in particular, of the threat of communism. He referred to the Russian gift of 25,000 tons of wheat, which he said was a Bolshevik and not a Russian gesture. In the same way, the conduct of the Russian troops here he described as a means of propaganda on behalf of communism. He gave the example of two Russian officers who two nights before had rescued two Persian girls from four drunken Americans. He also referred to the shooting of four men and two women by British Indian troops this morning. I undertook to look into this matter, which from his account seemed to be serious. He said that *per contra* the British were becoming increasingly unpopular. There was a tendency to blame the British for everything. Accusations were made against the U.K.C.C. drivers and unknown Jews in Tehran and elsewhere who bought up produce and goods (for resale at higher prices) in the name of the British authorities. It would be much better if the British authorities should ask the Persian Government to do all their buying for them. Then they would not be accused of starving the country by buying up all local produce. I said that this was a point which had arisen elsewhere in the Middle East, and that I would look into the possibility of establishing a buying authority.

The Shah said that the trouble with British assistance had always been that it came too late. It was far better to give a little help before a disaster took place than a great deal afterwards. He referred to the lack of any real public opinion in Persia. Thus power tended to be concentrated in the press, and the newspaper-reading public believed all the lies appearing in the press. I mentioned that I had spoken very frankly with the representatives of the press last night. The Shah had evidently already heard of this.

#### (4) *Anglo-Persian Relations.*

The Shah said that he wished to discuss the future of Anglo-Persian relations. He was most anxious that this should be settled *now* and that we should not wait until the end of the war. Otherwise he feared that by the time the Peace Conference came Persia would have become too weak to withstand outside aggression, even though he was perfectly aware that the British Government wanted to see a strong and independent Persia. He himself had greatly regretted the Allied policy which had led up to the events of August 1941. He denied that there was any truth in the assertion that the Persian Government at that time had been pro-German. They had proved this during the Ali Rashid revolt—a period of great British weakness—when Persia had not moved. No attempt had been made to blow up oil installations at Abadan or Kermanshah. On the contrary, half the Persian forces and a number of their limited stock of anti-aircraft guns had been moved down to protect the oil-fields. No attempt either had been made



at aggression against Russia, a fact proved by the withdrawal of Persian troops into the interior. Against this, all that Persia had received was the joint Anglo-Russian note, couched in rather vague terms, asking for the removal of the German fifth column. If Britain at that time had offered to make a firm alliance with Persia—even a military alliance—it would have been accepted by the Persian Government. With such an agreement, concluded under honourable conditions, Persia would have formed a useful bulwark behind Turkey, which at that time was very shaky. He had no doubt that the Government then could have enforced such a policy in the country.

However, no such agreement was mooted. When he came to the throne he realised at once that a strong alliance with Britain was essential for the future of Persia. He had been very much in favour of the Tripartite Alliance being a genuine military alliance which, even if it had cost Persian lives, would have cemented the country both internally and externally. Owing to the Persian Government's weakness of policy that was not done. Nevertheless, Persia had contributed a great deal towards the Allied cause, mainly through aid to Russia, the effect of which in the South Russian campaign might even turn out to have been decisive. Persia had also suffered a great deal, and she had not, in fact, received full credit for what she had done. Persia could, of course, now join the United Nations and definitely come into the war, but this would only be a gesture, and would do nothing to make the country strong against the day when the Peace Conference opened. Mr. Churchill had told him, when he visited Tehran, that he wanted to deal with a Persia which was a strong and independent Power. He believed Mr. Churchill's words, and attached great importance to them. He would like to see Anglo-Persian relations placed at once on a firm basis with an eye to the future. He asked whether British policy in Persia was conducted from London or Delhi. I replied that, of course, our policy emanated from London, and he said that in that case there was some hope. It was a well-known political principle, he continued, that a foreign Power would always wish to profit from the internal weakness of a neighbouring State. He did not know whether there were elements seeking to promote dissensions in Persia, but he did beg that we should consider the means of adjusting our relations with Persia at once so as to strengthen her for the future. It was a question of national morale, not only of finance and economics. When I questioned him as to how this could be done, he said that he did not know what the external policy of his Majesty's Government (he obviously had in mind Russia) might be. He had little concrete to suggest, but was obviously feeling after some form of closer association with Britain which would act as a block against Russian Communist penetration. One thing, which he thought would help, would be the raising of the status of the legation to that of an embassy. He had spoken to the Duke of Gloucester about this, but he had since been told that nothing could be done until after the war. The present situation, he said, was entirely illogical; the Russians had had an embassy for many years. Even the Yugoslavs in London now had an Ambassador, and the Americans had accepted a Persian Ambassador in Washington. This is evidently a point on which he feels strongly, and I think that we should seriously consider the possibility of meeting him over this.

#### (5) *Internal Affairs.*

The Shah said that the hope of the country lay in the hands of the young—in ideas and not necessarily only in age. He referred to a movement and what he described as "le type des jeunes" which he said was growing, and encouragement must be given to them, but even they were now being described as instruments of British policy because Mr. Harold Nicholson in a broadcast from London had referred to the need for "young men rallying around their young King." I asked His Majesty whether he was aware of the creation of an Anglo-Persian Institute here, and told him that when classes were opened for instruction in English language there had been 2,000 applications. It had, of course, been quite impossible to deal with such a number owing to the lack of teachers, but I thought that it was a significant and encouraging development for the future. His Majesty had not heard of the institute, and expressed the greatest interest. The Shah concluded by referring again to the need for strengthening Anglo-Persian relations at once.

Tehran, 16th April, 1943.

R. G. CASEY.

[E 2939/82/34]

No. 13.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 21st May.)*

(No. 170.)

Sir,

Tehran, 3rd May, 1943.

IN my telegram No. 232 dated the 1st March, I suggested that we had perhaps shown excessive loyalty to the principle of affording maximum aid to Russia, in that we had brought upon ourselves not only positive criticism from the Persians but also comparisons with the Russians highly unfavourable to ourselves. All this, however, was our own doing. In the present despatch I propose to examine the attitude and acts of the Soviet authorities in Persia, and to see whether any deduction can be drawn from them as to the long-term policy of Soviet Russia in regard to this country and to its effect on Persia.

2. Soon after the occupation of August 1941 the Soviet Government asked the Persian Government to agree to the opening of a large number of Soviet consular posts in various parts of the country. In the earlier years after the last war there were some fifteen such posts, including the southern towns of Isfahan, Kerman and Shiraz. All except one were, I believe, closed in about 1938, when the Soviet Government closed down nearly all the foreign consulates in the Soviet Union; and at the time of the occupation there was only one Persian Consulate in Russia (Baku), and only one Soviet Consulate in Persia (Pahlevi). The Persian Government tried to resist the demand for the reopening of so many consulates, basing its attitude on the principle of reciprocity, but secured nothing but the shadowy hope of an extension of Persian consular representation in the Soviet Union after the war; and eventually they had to acquiesce in the appointment of such consular officials as the Soviet Embassy liked to notify to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. There is, however, little evidence to show that these consular officers abuse their functions overtly. If the Soviet consular representatives in Tabriz and Meshed and other places in the Russian zone exercise considerable influence over the local authorities that is balanced by the influence of His Majesty's consular officers elsewhere. The Soviet Consulate in Isfahan seems to cultivate the poorer classes of the population, but we, ourselves, are interested in the hitherto badly-treated factory population of that town. Soviet Consuls in Kermanshah and Ahwaz have perhaps shown more interest in the tribes than is necessary for their work, and the staff of the former have toured a good deal among the Kurds and are reported to have given assurances of friendship—certainly to have gone farther than His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz has gone in his strictly correct dealings with the Kurds in his district. Moreover, the Soviet Consul at Kermanshah, on one occasion, allowed his training in propaganda for oriental peoples to get the better of his discretion: he is reported to have tried some highly characteristic anti-imperialist propaganda on an Indian Moslem officer, and, although he denied this, the origin and character of the Indian officer concerned, and the fact that he is a Moslem, whereas the Soviet Consul represented him as hoping for a Japanese victory, make it certain in my opinion that the officer's report was correct.

3. It will be remembered that on their entry into northern Persia the Soviet authorities disarmed the Persian police and gendarmerie, and refused to allow any Persian troops to be stationed in their zone. The unarmed police and gendarmerie were unable to keep order, but whenever an appeal was made to the Soviet authorities to assist it was rejected on the ground that the Soviet authorities had undertaken not to interfere in the internal affairs of Persia. Gradually and grudgingly the Persian Government were allowed to rearm a number of police and gendarmerie, though the Persian Government always maintained that the number allowed was insufficient. Eventually, the Soviet authorities permitted a small body of Persian troops to be stationed in Azerbaijan, though with little liberty of movement until perhaps quite recently. It is difficult to believe that this policy was due to fear; the Russians are too well acquainted with Persian poltroonery for that. It is significant that the Russians were most difficult in this matter in Azerbaijan, where the weakening of the Central Government might be expected to be pleasing to the local population who are mainly of the same race and language as the inhabitants of Soviet Azerbaijan and who tend to regard the Government at Tehran not only as exploiters but as aliens too. If Russian policy has in effect tended to encourage the growth of an autonomist or even a separatist movement in Azerbaijan, this would hardly be repugnant to the Soviet Government.



4. At first the Soviet authorities encouraged the Kurds, even to the extent of inviting several of the leaders to see the glories of Soviet Russia as found in Baku. Recently, however, they abandoned this policy, and it seems probable that the change was due mainly to the discovery that Soviet Russia had nothing to fear from Turkey and therefore would not need Kurdish help against the Turks, though the Russians may also have been influenced by the fact that in of course of certain Kurdish "atrocities" at Rezaieh in the spring of 1942, the chief sufferers were the Turki-speaking Shias, i.e., precisely the element which would necessarily be the nucleus of any movement against the Persian Government if one should ever develop. This sudden abandonment of the Kurds after a period of cossetting is in complete accordance with the realistic nature of Soviet principles and recalls the crash with which, when President Roosevelt renewed diplomatic relations with Russia, the Soviet authorities abandoned, half finished, the film which was to have told the world of the horror of lynching in the United States, and left the American negro actors open-mouthed at this sudden neglect.

5. The Russians have also taken up the Armenians and have so far shown no tendency to drop them. Reza Shah closed down the Armenian schools; Sawaz-al-Saltanah allowed them to be reopened, and there is no doubt that this was done under pressure from the Soviet Embassy. The Bashnaks, who were inclined to be pro-German, seem to have been brought to heel, and it would seem that most of the Armenians in Persia are now pro-Russian, at least, in the north. Being a pervasive if small minority, their influence is considerable, and since they may well fear that the Persians would like to take revenge on the Christian minorities after the war, for real or alleged collaboration with the invader, they are likely to wish to retain the protection of the Soviet Government.

6. In financial and economic affairs, the policy of the Soviet Government affords a striking contrast to our own; it has been less frank and honest, yet it has possibly been a greater political success. When we were struggling for months to secure, by straightforward means, enough local currency to carry on the common war effort, the Russians were acquiring rials by methods which weakened the Persian Government but won private friends for themselves. In that they failed to a large extent to keep their promise to hand over Soviet goods to the Persian Government against the large credit of about £500,000 which they had extorted, they helped to embarrass the Government and to increase inflation; but when they sold these goods to wholesalers or retailers or individuals at the market price, they not only benefited by the taxes or monopoly dues which ought to have gone to the Government, but they used a political weapon of great power, since commodities such as sugar and piece-goods are so scarce that any Persian who can secure a supply is likely to regard the supplier with great favour. There is little doubt that the Russians have secured many friends by this preferential treatment, while we, in our desire to assist the Persian Government and to prevent speculation and hoarding, have been stiff with the private trader and have encouraged the concentration of essential goods in the hands of the Government, in the hope that this would lead to a fairer distribution and to some check on the rise in prices. At the present time the Soviet authorities are paying customs dues on some goods which they import, but not, it is believed, on all.

7. The effect of Soviet policy on the flow of supplies from the richer northern part of Persia to less favoured parts of the country outside the Soviet zone has been much debated. The Soviet authorities refer rather unctuously to their policy of non-interference, which is an implied criticism of British policy. It is a fact that whereas we have assisted the Persian authorities not only to collect wheat for local centres, but to obtain wheat for Tehran from some of those centres, thereby incurring at times the accusation that we were taking the wheat for ourselves, the Russians have done nothing to encourage the local authorities in Azerbaijan to collect the large surplus of wheat which might have furnished a three or four-months' supply of bread for Tehran. It was to be expected that this would win the favour of the hoarders in Azerbaijan, and even of the ordinary inhabitant, who does not wish to be "exploited" by the capital, but it has even redounded to the credit of the Russians in the very area which is half starved for lack of Azerbaijan grain, the argument being that the existence of larger food supplies in the Russian zone must be due to the greater humanity and forbearance of the Russians—or to British purchases of food in the south. Apart from the major question of the wheat of Azerbaijan, it is not easy to obtain positive evidence as to the policy of the Russians in regard to food-stuffs, but I am convinced that, although some acts of apparent obstruction have been due to

the truculence of individual officers and to the fact well known to foreign officials in Soviet Russia, that there is always a Captain Ivanov who hasn't received any orders, the Russians have more than once held up exports of food-stuffs from their zone to Tehran when they wished to secure some concession from the Persian Government, and that they have prevented the export of sheep, ghi, eggs and other food-stuffs and of charcoal, either to keep these commodities for their own consumption (at a relatively low price), or to maintain supplies for the local population and to keep them content.

8. It is difficult to believe that the recent offer of 25,000 tons of wheat by the Soviet Government to the Persian Government was not planned with the object of damaging us as well as securing credit for the Soviet Government. We had consulted the Soviet authorities in all matters relating to supplies, and invited them to sign the Food Agreement of December last, even though at the time there was no prospect whatever that they would, in fact, be able to supply any grain to Persia; yet they gave us no notice that they were going to offer wheat to Persia—an offer all the more improbable in that at that moment the Soviet authorities in Persia were pressing hard for the delivery in Azerbaijan of the balance of grain due under a contract which binds the Persian Government to supply the Soviet army with 5,000 tons of wheat and 15,000 tons of barley. The propaganda aim of the offer is evident from the fact that the Soviet authorities are still insisting on the delivery of the full amounts of wheat and barley, and that they will not allow the Persian Government to deliver to the Red Army in Azerbaijan, in settlement of the balance, Soviet wheat instead of Persian wheat. Finally, it is perhaps not by accident that the Soviet offer was so timed that it was bound to be reported in the press at the same moment as the report of the opening of a British hospital, complete with doctors, nurses and orderlies, for the treatment of Persian typhus patients.

9. It seems that the great harm which British interests have recently suffered in Persia owing to the oil shortage is due in great part to the slackness—to use no harsher word—of the Soviet authorities. Nothing has injured our interests more than the shortage of kerosene and fuel oil which occurred in March and April. If the demand for kerosene has not been fully met, that is partly due to the fact that it has doubled because kerosene has hardly risen at all in price, whereas the prices of other kinds of fuel have become prohibitive; but the demand for fuel oil, though it has also increased, has not increased to the same extent, and the inability to meet it is due largely to short delivery by the Soviet authorities. They undertook to bring in 150 tons of fuel oil a day for the railways in February and March; they fell short of fulfilment by 1,100 tons in February and 700 tons in March, and to keep the railway running the Americans operating it seized 700 tons of fuel oil consigned to the A.I.O.C. and intended for civilian use. The feeling which the shortage has aroused against the A.I.O.C., who are in no way responsible, and in general against the British, to whom is attributed everything that goes wrong outside the Russian zone, is intense, and will do us harm for many years to come. The failure by the Soviet authorities to deliver the full quota of oil may have been due to *force majeure*, but the fact that the failure was Russia's and that, nevertheless, all the blame fell on the A.I.O.C. and His Majesty's Government cannot be expected to wring withers so tough as those of the Soviet Government.

10. It is not only in the matter of food supplies that we have done most of the work and yet received all the blame. In dealing with suspects, the Soviet authorities have allowed us to work for the benefit of both the Allies, while themselves evading any responsibility in the matter. Being responsible for communications up to Tehran, it follows that we have to maintain security over some two-thirds of Persia. Whenever we have had difficulty with the Persian Government in this respect we have received no help from the Soviet Embassy. On one occasion, when we wished to establish the principle that the Persian Government must hand over to us at Sultanabad for interrogation any suspects for whom we asked, the Soviet Embassy held aloof, and when we proposed to effect ourselves the arrest of several men who were concerned in a plot directed not only against us but against the Russians also, and whose arrest we were afraid to entrust to the Persian Government, the Soviet Ambassador was quite unable to obtain any instructions from Moscow. The fear in which Russia is held suffices as a rule to prevent any danger to Russian interests from Persians in the Russian zone, and if the Russian authorities have any suspicion of a Persian officer or official, the Persian Government are requested to remove him, whereupon he is transferred to the area in which the responsibility is ours. Not only do the Russians remain aloof from our security policy and thereby escape any share in



the inevitable odium, but they even tried to secure our co-operation in dealing with some persons in Tabriz who were believed to be spreading pro-German propaganda. This invitation was refused.

11. In the time of Reza Shah, Soviet propaganda was kept under as effectively as in Nazi Germany. There were no Soviet films; no Soviet propaganda—not even Soviet newspapers—could be sold; and a sharp eye was kept on refugees from Russia, whether the fifty or sixty thousand-odd Persian subjects who migrated to Persia some seven years ago, or the Soviet citizens who entered Persia from time to time on the plea of escaping from Soviet tyranny. Now several cinemas show different Soviet films at the same time, and there is a provincial service of Soviet films so lavish that we are unable to compete with it. The *Tass* newspaper in Russian has much about Russia, but almost nothing about the British or American war effort, and it is followed in this respect by the Persian organ of the Tudeh party, which is undoubtedly supported by the Soviet authorities. This newspaper recently profited by an unimportant article in an American paper to attribute imperialist aims to Great Britain and the United States, and to say how happy Persia could be in the confidence that Soviet Russia harboured no such designs. Another paper, whose owner confessed to us that he had been obliged to accept a present of newsprint from the Russian Embassy, immediately published an article about the export of sheep from the north, saying that the Russians would certainly allow it if they could be sure that the meat was intended for Persian consumption. A third paper which has recently attacked us violently was run (it has since been suppressed) by a cynical black-mailer who pretends to have been converted to communism. It is difficult to believe that such phenomena have not received the specific approval of persons in touch with the Soviet Embassy, and more than one editor who has been allowed to buy newsprint from the Embassy has spoken of the pressure put upon him to induce him to write articles favourable to Russia. Other evidence of the existence of active Soviet propaganda is hard to find. The official Soviet organisations seem to confine themselves to propaganda about the war and about Soviet culture, though His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed has gained the impression that the Soviet army is busily engaged in underground political propaganda. Chauffeurs who travel on convoy into and out of the Soviet zone seem to be eager to report how much better conditions are there, and there is some reason to think that this is not spontaneous.

12. One advantage which the Russians enjoy in this country is the fear with which they are regarded by the Persians. It has not been forgotten that the Russian advance in the 18th century was effected partly at the expense of Persian sovereignty, and that but for the outbreak of the war of 1914 about one-half—and that the richer half—of Persia would sooner or later have become, if not part of Russia, at least in practice, a Russian protectorate. If the Persians were somewhat reassured by the treaty of 1921, the ruthlessness with which the Soviet Government exercised its economic power, *e.g.*, in closing the Caucasus to the Persian transit trade as a means of coercion, kept the old dread alive. Moreover, although the behaviour of Soviet Russia until 1939 tallied with its slogan: "We don't want an inch of anyone else's territory; we won't give up an inch of our own," the Soviet attitude, since 1939, towards Finland, Roumania, the Baltic States and Poland has tended to confirm the Persian's worst fears. Finally, the neatness and despatch with which the Soviet rulers dispose of malcontents in Soviet Russia, coupled with the disappearance in Persia of a number of persons of Caucasian origin who are believed, on good evidence, to have been kidnapped by the Soviet authorities, suffices to keep the unheroic Persian in a state of respectful awe towards the Russians. This enables the Russians to do with impunity things which they know will be kept secret out of fear, *e.g.*, to conclude an outrageous contract for the manufacture of arms and ammunition by the Persian Government for the benefit of Soviet Russia, which requires an outlay by the Persian Government of over £2 million, though the price to be paid for the finished articles has not even been fixed and cannot in any case ever pay the Persian Government for that outlay. When the Soviet Ambassador made the recent offer to bring in from Russia 25,000 tons of wheat he urged the Prime Minister to give this offer immediate publicity, confident that the Prime Minister would not dare to make public at the same time that the Soviet Government still required the execution of the contract for the supply of wheat and barley to the Soviet troops in Azerbaijan. Attacks on Great Britain have been frequent recently, but if Russia is ever mentioned it is with praise. Persian statesmen take this for granted and seem to consider it excusable and natural. The Prime Minister tells me that he recently asked one of the leading journalists in Tehran

why he attacked the British and never the Russians, and that the man replied, with surprise at being asked such a question: "But the Russians are kidnapping Persians . . . ." The Poles are frequently attacked for bringing in typhus, and we for bringing in the Poles. Setting aside the fact that typhus is endemic in this country, it is typical that no Persian ever points out that it was in Russia that the Poles contracted typhus, and that their presence in Russia was no fault of theirs.

13. It is a matter for surprise that the Soviet Government accepted as meekly as any other Government the despotic régime of Reza Shah in Persia, with its complete ban on their propaganda activities. The Counsellor to the Soviet Embassy is credibly reported to have said recently that Soviet Russia is going to take a greater interest in Persia after the war. Two characteristics of the Russian attitude at present towards Persian affairs in general are their support of the Tudeh party and their demand for constitutionalism with its emphasis on their own non-intervention. The Russians do in fact intervene to the extent of giving discreet support to the Tudeh party, whose founder, Sulaiman Mirza, ranks as a communist, and of distributing newsprint to its newspaper and to other papers also. The protection of the Tudeh party has in one case run contrary to the principle of non-intervention: the Persian Government wish to bring to Tehran for trial three men whom they allege to be criminals, but who also happen to have taken part in labour troubles at a factory at Shahi, in the Soviet zone, and the Soviet authorities refuse to permit this. The Tudeh party is not very revolutionary in its published statements, and it is often alleged that the Soviet authorities support it as a blind to cover more serious activities conducted underground. The Soviet authorities might, however, well consider the strict application of constitutional government in Persia, with its guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press, as the best way of producing anarchy, as the preliminary to the setting up of a Soviet form of organisation. In advocating strict adherence to the constitution, the Soviet Embassy must really have their tongue hard in the cheek: complete freedom is all very well for countries other than Soviet Russia, until such men appear as can get into power by means of this freedom and then create the necessary dictatorship. There is no reason for us to think, from our contact with Russians here, that they have any illusions about Persian statesmen or officials or journalists, or suppose that a "democratic" régime can work in this country, and if they support democracy for Persia it is reasonable to think that the aim is not altogether disinterested. Nevertheless, if, as is probable, they are working hard in order to place in the next Majlis a considerable number of men professing extremist opinions, they are assisted, if not fully justified, by the crass selfishness of the small possessing and ruling class in Persia and the vital need for an improvement in the conditions of the poorer classes.

14. If the Soviet authorities in Persia are trying to curry favour with the Persians, to make use of the press and to influence the elections, it is possible that this is in part defensive and a result of suspicion of British intentions. Some ground of suspicion has been given from time to time by light-hearted attempts by British officers and groups to enter, or to obtain permission to enter, the Soviet zone, in order to carry out reconnaissances whose purpose was undefined and whose utility to the Soviet Government was not evident to the Soviet authorities on the spot. His Majesty's Legation have recommended from the beginning the use of frankness with the Soviet authorities and the avoidance of any action which might suggest that we were unduly inquisitive about their zone, or that we wished to acquire a favoured position in this country. It is sometimes suggested, by people who see at close quarters the misery which has resulted from the weakening of control since the abdication of Reza Shah, that we ought to have taken over the administration. These critics have perhaps not reflected that the adoption of this policy, apart from the absorption of a huge body of skilled British officials and the destruction of any hope of getting co-operation from the Persian authorities, would either have been opposed strenuously by the Soviet Government or would have been imitated in the Soviet zone with consequences which could hardly be favourable to our long-term policy in this country. The Soviet authorities may have found cause for suspicion in the efforts we have made to assist the Persians, in order to keep the administration running for the sake of aid to Russia, and to alleviate the hardships of war out of humanity and out of loyalty to the obligations incurred under the Tripartite Treaty. We have earned the hostility of landlords and of many Persian officials by trying to assist the Persian Government to collect the wheat surplus: the Russians have done nothing of the kind in their area and have thus avoided friction with officials and landowners, while making a merit of not interfering in the internal affairs of Persia. The



British and American members of the Road Transport Board have laboured incessantly to rationalise and assist the civilian road transport of Persia, but the Russian member never attends, so that the Russians get the benefit of the labours of the board without sharing in the criticism which is directed against it by the ignorant and the corrupt. It is natural that the relief work done by the Anglo-Persian Relief Society, whose funds are provided largely by His Majesty's Government, and the provision by the British military authorities of a 1,000-bed hospital for civilian typhus cases, should have compelled the Red Army to offer vaccination, ambulances and disinfecting squads to combat epidemics among the civilian population. It is no less natural that the Soviet Government, in view of the propaganda which we have been obliged to do, to convince the Persian public that the British and Americans were doing their best to implement the undertaking to supply Persia with 25,000 tons of wheat, should wish to make some contribution to the Persian food problem; but to spring this offer on us without notice is an act bordering on bad faith.

15. The Americans are perhaps no less an object of suspicion than the British to the Soviet Government and their representatives in Persia. The Soviet Government have so far refused to give their formal assent to the replacement of the British operational staff on the Persian railways by Americans, though the change is obviously to the benefit of the Russians, since the Americans can provide a far larger staff and thus intensify the rate of the despatch of aid to Russia. There is, however, theoretical justification for the Russians' refusal, in that the proposed change does not seem to have been notified to the Soviet Government at the time either by the British or the United States Government; but the hostility to the American advisers which the Soviet authorities are undoubtedly showing is more difficult to justify. The Russians have even forced out of Tabriz an American who had been sent there by the Ministry of Supply to try to collect wheat, not only to feed Tabriz and Tehran, but also to fulfil the Persian Government's contract to supply 5,000 tons of wheat to the Soviet authorities, and they refuse to allow him to go back. From the British point of view the Americans are, perhaps, the sole hope of Persia. British and Russian advisers are ruled out for political reasons; advisers from the smaller countries of Europe would not have the prestige to enforce attention to their advice. It is our hope that the Americans may be able to collect around them a nucleus of tolerably good Persian officials and to ensure that all officials should receive salaries above the level where bribery and embezzlement are almost inevitable. The Soviet opposition, which is none the less strong because it is usually denied in public, is based on the argument which is in striking contrast to the cynical comments which are made on the Persian Government and administration in private by the Soviet Ambassador and other Soviet officials, that the Persians are quite capable of managing their own affairs. Some critics also argue that it is a mistake for the Persians to hand over their affairs to foreigners after being free for twenty years, and there is evidence, which I accept as good, that they have even suggested that the Soviet Union is the place where the best officials are to be found. It seems probable that the prospect which we regard with hope, if not with optimism, the Russians regard with ill will, viz., that the American advisers may succeed in establishing an administration which will gradually make Persia more prosperous and contented and better able to maintain its independence.

16. There is no doubt that whereas at the time of the occupation the Russians were regarded as barbarians capable of any atrocity and we were looked upon with comparative favour, the position is now reversed in the popular mind, and if the richer classes have not changed their opinion, they dare not say so openly. In only one respect, perhaps, is the new Soviet reputation in Persia deserved: the behaviour of their troops. They work their men nearly all the time, let them out little, give them no money to get drunk on, and shoot them for small offences; it has also been stated by a Soviet officer, in conversation with a British consular official, that the Soviet authorities provide the men with regimental prostitutes disguised vaguely as A.T.S. Among our own troops there is bound to be some drunkenness, especially when vodka is easier to get than beer, and there have been violent articles in the press on this subject which cannot be dismissed as baseless. It is unfortunate that the British soldier, who possesses so many good qualities that the Persian lacks—honesty, good-humour, helpfulness, consideration for anyone in distress—is unable to come into contact with the Persian on that level, but appears at best as a remote being with whom the Persian cannot communicate at all, and at worst as a drunken man and therefore contemptible, for although the Persian will fuddle himself at home with

opium, he rarely takes too much to drink in public. At the present moment there is high feeling in Tehran because a few days ago five Persians, engaged in stealing our military telegraph wire, were shot and killed by Indian troops. A violent newspaper campaign on the subject had only been checked by the suppression of a number of newspapers in deference to the protests of His Majesty's Legation. Theft is thought little of among Persians, and even the Persian Government are so light-minded as not to realise the heinousness of interrupting military communications; but what has added to the virulence of the criticism is the fact that the shooting was carried out by Indians, who are described as black, as slaves of the British, and so on. The Persian regards the Indian with a contempt which is quite unjustified, and there is reason to believe that our invasion of Persia in 1941 would have been much less unpopular had we not "humiliated" the Persians by using Indian troops to defeat them. The Soviet Government have used to invade and to occupy Northern Persia not only Russian troops but troops from States such as Armenia and Uzbekistan which are, in fact, much more "slave" to Moscow than India is to us, but this is never made a ground of criticism.

17. The Persians of the richer classes often express the fear that the Russians will refuse to leave Persia after the war. This fear seems to me ill-founded. The Russians are not likely to be so clumsy as to bring upon themselves the accusation of imperialism by failing to execute the provision of the Tripartite Treaty which requires the Russian and British Forces to evacuate Persian territory within six months of the conclusion of hostilities. Should they wish to return later on, and feel strong enough to defy world opinion, it would be as easy to obtain a spontaneous request from Azerbaijan for their return as it was to secure a pro-Soviet plebiscite in Estonia in 1939. It can be taken for granted that the Russians will assert themselves more in Persia than they were content to do between 1924 and 1939; they will have established their position as one of the three greatest Powers, and above all, they will have seen by close acquaintance what a favourable ground for their activities the Persian people afford. Lenin laid down three conditions as necessary for a successful revolution: (1) a state of general corruption and decay above, (2) a conviction among the masses that a change would profit them, (3) the existence of a strong party among the masses capable of directing the revolution. The first two conditions are already found here: nothing could be more corrupt, more completely lacking in public spirit and statesmanship, than the Persian upper class; while the feeling must be growing—exacerbated it is true by war conditions which might be less acute after the war—that any change must be for the better. The temptation to Russia to fulfil the third condition, by providing the strong party to direct the revolution, would be very great, especially as the miserable state of the country would afford full moral justification for the annihilation of the system which was responsible for it. The prize would be attractive: not only the command of Persia, with its oil and its warm water ports, but access to an India offering under some sort of self-government greater opportunities for penetration than at present. It would not be as easy to "inspire" the administration in Persia as the Soviet authorities seem to have done in Sinkiang for some years, Tehran being more in the public eye than Kashgar; but a party nucleus might be found among the many thousands of people who left Russia as refugees within the last ten years or so. It is true that the Persian does not seem inclined by nature to communism, and that the immense inertia which has enabled him to emerge successfully from under so many conquests might be expected to make him recalcitrant to violent changes; but the combination of intense poverty and hardship with the offer of an attractive remedy should be very strong. Moreover, just as the German economic and financial system fitted in very well with that of Persia, so the Soviet system of administration and its determined leadership provide the elements which Persia so conspicuously lacks. Finally, the Persian understands Soviet methods: he is himself a liar and would fall in happily with the humbug of the Soviet régime; he is a coward, and respects force. It is a misfortune which has to be recognised, that Western liberal ideas mean little to a country like Persia, where those who held them have sooner or later to abandon them for lack of encouragement. Liberty and Deputies and a free press have landed Persia in a mess without creating that state of mind in which the individual can profit by what we have to teach. Unless the American advisers stay here for some years and are given all the opportunities required to make their influence felt, it is difficult to see how a generation of Persians is to arise who can manage some form of government that will not degenerate either into anarchy or into an authoritarian régime. At the present moment the outlook for the Persian who is honest and



who believes in gradual reform (and there are such men), is dark. On the other hand, Soviet propaganda can offer a speedy solution. In India we hope that the problem of the Hindu widow will be solved by the gradual extension of liberal and humane ideas; a Soviet commissar would appoint one of the less merry widows to the local Soviet, and leave it to her to ensure the escape of other widows from domestic slavery as well as the observation of the child marriage law, the abolition of temple prostitution, and other reforms which at present seem so far away.

18. It would seem that we shall have a difficult time in Persia after the war. The resentment which the Persian feels against us dates back to 1907, when we abandoned the rôle which he had supposed to be permanent, viz., that of fighting the Russians to protect not only Turkey but Persia also, and endeavoured to limit Russian designs on Persia to the northern provinces not by arms but by agreement. This resentment was increased by the 1919 Agreement, which the Persians, after initial acquiescence, eventually decided to regard as an attempt to establish some form of protectorate over their country. To satisfy their resentment, and to evade responsibility for the consequences of their own cowardice, the Persians then invented the theory that we placed Reza Shah on the throne and, what is more absurd, kept him there for our own ends. They now have at least some shadow of justification for their resentment, in that we and the Russians invaded their country when, as they consider, they had given us no cause; and since it is dangerous to show any feeling against the Russians, they vent their spite on us. This is likely to manifest itself strongly after the war, in violent newspaper attacks against which we shall have no protection, in the persecution of any Persian subjects who may be held to have helped us during the war, and in revenge on the A.I.O.C. for being British, for having helped in the war effort and for having escaped from the corrupt control of Persian officialdom for several years. The attitude that Russia will take up officially will depend to a large extent on the need she has of British and American help in the restoration of her devastated provinces. If we can judge by the past she will try to induce or compel her people to submit to great hardship rather than be indebted to the capitalist world, and even the help she does accept may not bind Soviet policy very tightly to ours in regard to Persia. Russia will be able to count on two factors of importance—the waning of public interest in any place so remote as Persia, and the existence among the British public of a pro-Russian feeling so strong and so blind that any British Government will have to take it into account. In any case, to encourage Persian hostility to our interests in secret, while preserving outwardly a correct attitude, would be very easy for the Soviet Government, given the venality and the cowardice of most Persians. At the back of the Persian mind there used to be, and often still is, the feeling that in the end the British will have to support him against Russia. At the best he will continue to hold this belief, which will encourage him to act as irresponsibly towards us as he is doing at the present moment; at the worst, he may conclude that we are never going to quarrel seriously with Russia about him and try to conciliate the Russians as the more dangerous. In this he may be wise on a short view, since it is, in fact, not conceivable that we should ever fight Russia for the sake of Persia, though British people are still to be found who talk seriously of our keeping troops in the south of Persia as a barrier against Russian penetration. If Persia is to be defended against Russian domination, it can only be done as part of a wide system of co-operation, the foundations of which, we hope, have been laid by the twenty-year pact. Tussles of the type which prevailed between the 1907 Agreement and the outbreak of war in 1914 must be ruled out. It is a question whether we can count upon Persia to do much to maintain her own independence. Throughout the long period of despotic rule, which lasted until 1906, it is difficult to recall a ruler who was benevolent as well as capable, unless we go back to Shah Abbass, and that means going back to the time of Queen Elizabeth. On the other hand, Persia's brief period of parliamentary government has not encouraged optimism in her friends. It is true that representative government has hardly had a fair chance on Persia; from 1906 to 1914 it was menaced by Russian encroachment in the northern provinces; from 1914 to 1924 it was embarrassed by the war and the confusion which followed; from September 1941, when Reza Shah abdicated, it has been hampered by the long disuse of the powers of self-government and by the steep rise in prices and other hardships which have accompanied, if they have not resulted from, the foreign occupation. Whatever the cause of the present conditions, however, it would be foolish to suppose that the prospects for the continued existence of a parliamentary régime in Persia are bright. The form

of government adopted by Reza Shah was probably well-suited to Persia—a Cabinet and a Parliament as a constitutional façade, but a strong hand in the background directing both; only he nullified the good he did by stupidity and greed. At present there is no benevolent and capable dictator in sight, and even if there were and the people were prepared to accept him, it is probable that his advent to power would be discouraged by the Soviet Government—at least during the occupation. Much depends on the degree of success with which the American financial adviser wields the special powers which the Majlis, after dangerous delay, seem likely to confer on him. If that fails there may be such confusion and poverty in Persia that the temptation to take the easy road and to fall in with Soviet ways will be great. The Persian loves his independence, but an independence which seemed to offer nothing but a broadening down from embezzlement to embezzlement might in the long run cease to be attractive. For our part, we must try to discover rulers less venal and conservative than most of those who at present attain to high office, and to induce them to adopt a policy of reform suitable to the human material to which it is to be applied. Our main obstacle will be that Soviet sympathisers can offer a more glittering prize and play upon the baser Persian qualities. Meanwhile, the Russians are acquiring, in comparison with ourselves, a popularity which, albeit undeserved, must be taken into account as a very serious factor—the more serious in that the circumstances which have created this popularity at our expense will make it difficult to redress the balance. It is tragic to learn from General Hurley, the personal representative of President Roosevelt in the Middle East, that among those who are busy to praise the Russians and to criticise the British are senior members of the American forces in Persia.

19. This despatch has dealt with the disease. The malady is deep-seated, because it resides in the nature of the Persian on one side and of the Soviet people and régime on the other; and it is aggravated by the looming proximity of Russia to this country. It must not be assumed, however, that there is no possible remedy, or at least no means of alleviation. There is Persian inertia, which will begin to exercise its full passive force when once the Soviet troops have left the country. This will affect more or less even Persians born in Russia and now "refugees" in Persia, whom the Russians might wish to use as leaders of the revolution. Fear of Russia is very strong in the Persian, but when the Soviet troops have gone there will at least be talk, if not critical articles, about Soviet commercial methods during the war, the iniquitous munitions factories agreement and the humbug of the Soviet offer of wheat. If Persian independence is seriously menaced, the Persians will turn in the first place to Great Britain for sympathy and assistance, though, as I have said, the remedy would have to be sought not in a local tussle but within the wider framework of world security. In the south of Persia, where the British have been known for generations, we still enjoy much respect and goodwill, and although a tendency has been found as far south as Shiraz to blame us for the present miseries on the ground that we are all-powerful and could prevent them if we wished, this feeling may diminish if the crisis abates, and it already has as a counter-weight the general recognition of the relief work which is being done in the south, mainly through His Majesty's consular officers, in the name of the Anglo-Persian Relief Society. The various forms of annoyance which the British are accused of afflicting on the Persians—the oil shortage, the lack of transport, the high prices—will cease or be mitigated, and if they are not forgotten they may perhaps come to be regarded as attributable to the Russians as much as to us. The best kind of British propaganda will survive the war—that of the British Council. There is an immense demand for a knowledge of English as the coming world language and as the key to a literature which the Persian is able to appreciate, and this should enable us to reach the younger generation, where, if anywhere in Persia, some sparks of character and honesty will be found.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.



[E 3087/1/34]

No. 14.

*Exchange of Letters, dated the 24th May, 1943, between Sir William Fraser, on behalf of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (Limited), and M. F. Noury Esfandiary, Oil Delegate of the Persian Government in London.—(Received in Foreign Office the 28th May.)*

(1)

*Sir W. Fraser to M. F. Noury Esfandiary.*

Dear Excellency,

24th May, 1943.

MY colleagues and I have given the most careful thought to your letter of the 31st December, 1942, informing me of the instructions received by you from the Imperial Persian Government.

The company agreed in the early part of the present war to make extra payments over the sums due under the terms of the concession, without any prejudice whatever to the articles thereof, the company having always carried out faithfully all its concessional obligations. This was done solely with a view to giving assistance to the Imperial Government in the exceptional circumstances created by the war in Europe and the arrangement included a stipulation that its duration should be limited to the period up to the end of 1941 and that payments made were outwith the concession and would not affect its terms or create a precedent.

My company also undertook to confer with a view to reaching an arrangement agreeable to both parties in regard to the period after 1941, and is, moreover, most anxious to foster the spirit of goodwill towards Persia, where we have worked for so many years and will work for many years to come under the concession agreement of 1933. Therefore, as an arrangement quite apart from the concession, I am glad to be able to inform your Excellency that the Board has authorised me to agree that with effect from the 1st January, 1942, the company will make up the sums due on account of royalty tonnage, dividend participation, taxation and gold premium to Four Million Pounds Sterling (£4,000,000) in total in respect of each year ending the 31st December in which the aggregate sum payable under articles 10 and 11 of the concession should not reach this figure, up to and including the year in which hostilities between the United Kingdom and both Germany and Italy cease as a result of the conclusion of a general armistice; or, if armistices are concluded with those Powers separately, the year in which the later armistice is concluded. Thereafter all payments to be made by the company shall be regulated by the terms of the concession.

Yours sincerely  
W. FRASER.

(2)

*M. F. Noury Esfandiary to Sir W. Fraser.*

*Imperial Persian Delegation to the  
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (Limited),*

24th May, 1943.

Dear Sir William,

I AM writing to acknowledge, with thanks and appreciation, receipt of your letter of the 24th May, 1943. I note with satisfaction your concurrence in the arrangement set out therein, which I have pleasure in confirming on behalf of my Government.

Yours sincerely,  
F. NOURY ESFANDIARY.

(B).—Intelligence Summaries.

[E 2148/110/34]

No. 15.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 14.)*

(No. 115.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 12 for the period the 17th to 23rd March, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, March 24, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 15.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 12 for the Period March 17 to 23, 1943.*

*Persian Affairs.*

*Political.*

THE Government has at last plucked up courage to order the suppression of two badly offending newspapers, but it still appears to be fearful of the press, the Deputies and public criticism. The vested interests are mobilising their forces to oppose the grant to Dr. Millspaugh of the special powers proposed by the Government (see Summary No. 11/43, paragraph 1). Some agitation still goes on against the Government's announced intention of re-establishing its authority in Fars and in the tribal areas generally, which is not without effect on some members of the Government. This agitation has at least brought into prominence the problem of the tribes and the necessity for a clear-cut tribal policy which will preserve such value as they have while restricting their predatory habits. The appointment of Ahmad Etebar as Minister of Agriculture has disappointed those who hoped for an energetic agricultural policy which might include some measures to encourage the tribes to settle.

*Economic.*

2. The Anglo-Iranian Financial Agreement which was signed in May 1942 (see Summary No. 22/42, paragraph 11) is now before the Majlis for ratification. In the course of his speech in justification of the agreement, M. Bader, Minister of Industry and Commerce, who was Minister of Finance when the agreement was signed, gave the following particulars of transactions in sterling during the nine and a half months from the 28th May, 1942, to the 10th March, 1943:—

	£ Sterling.
Purchases of sterling from the Allies ... ..	18,259,512
Purchases of sterling from other sources... ..	5,004,710
Total ... ..	23,264,222
Sales of sterling by the banks ... ..	13,106,782
Purchase of gold from the Bank of England ... ..	1,995,253
Purchase of 120 tons of silver ... ..	663,053
Commercial engagements ... ..	1,546,535
Value of gold still to be delivered by Great Britain ... ..	5,288,553
Total ... ..	22,600,176
Balance sterling holdings of Government on these transactions ... ..	664,054 (sic)

To this must be added a sum of £2,342,656 held by the Treasury-General, making a total sterling holding of £3,006,702.

[26155]

F 2



The value of imports from Allied countries (excluding Russia) for the year October 1941 to September 1942 was:—

	Rials.
Cereals ... ..	67,679,000
Sugar ... ..	161,229,000
Tea ... ..	188,378,000
Piece-goods ... ..	92,569,000
Tyres ... ..	54,308,000
Motor vehicles ... ..	10,461,000
<b>Total ... ..</b>	<b>692,636,000</b>

The debate on the Bill gave rise to some criticism of the level at which the rial-sterling exchange had been fixed. Comparison with the more onerous terms of the draft Russo-Persian Financial Agreement, which had been debated in secret session a few days previously, has probably induced a greater readiness to accept the British Agreement.

3. A Bill has been laid before the Majlis to authorise the issue of tax-free Treasury bonds to the limit of 500 million rials. It is understood that these are to be short-term bonds, though neither the term nor the interest has yet been settled. The same Bill proposes to authorise the increase of the amount of coinage of low denomination now in circulation from 54½ million rials to 75 million rials.

4. An accident on the railway which held up traffic for a few days nearly produced another bread crisis in Tehran, which had been living to a large extent on the wheat arriving daily by rail from the Persian Gulf. In Kermanshah conditions have slightly improved. Tabriz had been reduced on the 10th March to a reserve of two days' supply, but there is ample wheat in the province, which is being prevented from reaching Tabriz partly by difficulties of transport and partly by intrigues to discredit the American representative of the Ministry of Food and to force the Government to purchase on the black market. Unusually good rains, which have been fairly widespread, have raised hopes of a good harvest, but this has not yet had much noticeable effect on the amount of wheat offered for sale.

#### Press.

5. The press continues its attacks on Great Britain and its incitement of the poor. Two papers have been suppressed, and it is probable that this will have the effect of modifying the virulence of the remainder.

#### Appointments—Civil.

6. Ahmad I'tebar, Deputy for Burujird, to be Minister of Agriculture.

#### Persian Army.

7. The Majlis has sanctioned orders being placed in America for equipment for the army up to a limit of 2,100,000 dollars, and for the gendarmerie up to a limit of 2,400,000 dollars. This is to cover equipment recommended as necessary by the American advisers to the army and the gendarmerie. The principal items for the army are motor transport, tyres and spares, signalling equipment, medical, veterinary, engineering and office stores, clothing and equipment; and for the gendarmerie motor transport, motor cycles, signalling equipment, clothing and equipment.

8. The Military Service Bill (see Summary No. 27/42, paragraph 5) has been passed by the Majlis after much deliberation and argument. The final text is not yet available.

#### Appointments—Military.

9. Sarhang Faridunfar to be Commander of the Gendarmerie in Khorassan.

#### Internal Security.

#### Azerbaijan.

10. A demonstration against high prices and the alleged shortage of bread was made recently at the offices of the Governor-General in Tabriz. There is ground for suspicion that it was staged by the Governor-General himself with the object of discrediting the American representative of the Ministry of Food and of getting permission from the Government to undertake himself the feeding of the town by purchases on the black market to the benefit of himself and his brother-landlords.

#### Western Azerbaijan.

11. The Kurds are still opposing the establishment of gendarmerie posts in what they regard as Kurdish territory. In one instance, after a fight had occurred between Kurds and gendarmes, the Soviet Consul accompanied the Persian commander and persuaded the Kurds to allow the establishment of the post.

#### Fars.

12. General Shahbakhti sent a summons to Nasir Qashgai to come to Shiraz, guaranteeing him safety and a fair hearing. Nasir has, as usual, played for time, asking for three weeks' delay to allow him to consult other chiefs with whom he had sworn alliance. The Government's instructions to General Shahbakhti are that he is to commence operations for the occupation of Firuzabad without further parleying with Nasir. General Shahbakhti is, however, still immobile for lack of transport for this operation and for the protection of the 183 miles of road from Bushire to Shiraz. Meanwhile, Nasir has again wired to certain members of the Government and the Majlis warning them that all the tribes of Kuh-i-Galu and Fars were ready to rise to defend themselves against the Government forces and that he was no longer able to hold them back. This created some alarm among those with property in Fars, but it is believed that the Government was not persuaded to alter its policy. Of the tribes specifically mentioned by Nasir as being on the point of rising, the Mamassani are reliably reported to have sent messages signed by seven of their khans representing the three sections to Shahbakhti to assure him of their loyalty, and Hussein Quli Rustami, of the same tribe, who is to some extent an outlaw, has also made overtures of submission.

#### Persian Baluchistan.

13. In the recent drive for collection of arms from lawless tribes in Mekran about 450 rifles were confiscated, of which about half were .303 and German Mausers and the remainder Martinis and muzzle-loaders.

#### Russian Affairs.

14. For some time past the Russians have been showing increasing dislike of the presence of British and Americans in Azerbaijan. The Americans have found much reluctance on the part of the Russians to allow American transport organisations to operate in the Russian zone. The American representative in Tabriz of the Ministry of Food, who during his stay there was not given even a pretence of support by the Russians, has now had to leave, having been informed that the period of his permit had expired.

15. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz reports that there is a considerable and increasing congestion at the railway enclosure of supplies brought to Tabriz by road for Russia, due apparently to lack of rail transport for its onward journey. This congestion is likely to grow worse as conditions improve on the road from Kazvin to Tabriz; they have latterly been so bad owing to heavy snow as to limit to a considerable degree the flow of road transport. Supplies are now also reaching Kazvin faster than the Russians can clear them, so that an accumulation is piling up there also.

16. A Persian paper which is supported by the Soviet Embassy has recently been making statements whose object appears to be to give credit to Russia at the expense of Great Britain. For example, it challenged the suggestion made by another paper that credit should be given to the B.B.C. for inspiring the present alleged struggle between progressives and reactionaries. Again, in an article suggesting that British and American post-war policy might lead to an extension of the system of mandates to include countries like Persia, the paper expresses relief that Soviet Russia is one of the signatories of the Tripartite Alliance, since she had consistently shown good feeling towards the Persian people, and by her actions of the past twenty-five years and through the speeches of Stalin had convinced the Persian people of the Soviet's concern for the independence of Persia. These sentiments may not have been inspired by the Soviet Embassy; their expression may be due merely to the editor's wish to earn his subsidy. This paper frequently sympathises with Russia on the absence of a second front.

17. On the Zahidan-Meshed route the U.K.C.C. are now operating about 550 trucks and are capable of delivering at Meshed some 6,000 tons monthly for Russia.



[E 2249/110/34]

No. 16.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 19.)*

(No. 127.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 13 for the period of the 24th to 30th March, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, March 30, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 16.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 13 for the Period  
March 24 to 30, 1943.*

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

THE New Year holidays covered most of the last week, with the result that there was little political activity. On the other hand, there was little of the usual light-hearted festivity, and indeed the poor had little cause to be festive. Unusually sustained heavy rain in Tehran had demolished a number of the mud houses in the poor quarters of the town, oil was still scarce, bread none too plentiful, and everything in the way of pleasures far beyond the reach of the poor. The press took the opportunity to stress the hardships Persia was suffering from Allied exploitation. The Shah and the Prime Minister broadcast to the nation. The Shah confined himself to good wishes, pious hopes for the future, an exhortation to be patriotic and brave, and an expression of his conviction that the products of industry and agriculture should be more evenly divided. The Prime Minister's speech had more meat. He stressed that Persia could not hope to escape some inevitable hardships of war or to preserve unchanged the conditions of peace. Persia must be prepared to make sacrifices with her Allies, and the individual to surrender some of his liberty, as all in the great democracies had willingly submitted to severe restrictions. Agitators, hoarders, speculators and all those trying to turn the conditions produced by the war to their personal profit were enemies of the country. The well-being of Persia lay in strengthening ties with Great Britain and Russia, and those who attempted to create discord were acting against the interests of Persia. Persia, he claimed, had given great assistance to the plans of the Allies, but she would not get the reward she had earned unless she went the whole way in co-operation with the Allies. He was now making plans to ensure food supplies, to reduce prices, prevent hoarding and improve order and security. The broadcast should have a good effect on those who believe that the Prime Minister is capable of sincerity.

*Economic.*

2. Grain has been reaching Tehran in sufficient quantities to maintain minimum requirements of bread. During the first seven days of March the amount of imported grain that reached Tehran was 687 tons of wheat, 48 of barley and 14 of millet, and of local grain 219 tons of wheat and 31 of barley. The bad condition of roads resulting from heavy rain and snow has seriously affected collections of grain. Kermanshah had on the 26th March less than a week's supply and required 2,000 tons from other sources than its own to make up the deficit till next harvest. In Shiraz the deficit is estimated at 2,500 tons.

3. Dr. Millspaugh has caused consternation by announcing that he intends to balance his budget for the coming year. This will require both drastic cutting down of expenditure and a heavy increase of taxation, as in the year now ended expenditure greatly exceeded revenue, the deficit having been made up by borrowing from the National Bank.

*Appointments—Civil.*

4. Zain-ud-Abidin Rahnama (F.O. : 171; M.A. : 237) to be Under-Secretary of State in the Secretariat of the President of the Council.

*Persian Army.*

5. If Dr. Millspaugh has his way regarding the balancing of the budget (see paragraph 3 above), General Ridley and Colonel Schwarzkopf will have to recast their schemes for the reorganisation of the army and the gendarmerie. Dr. Millspaugh is at present saying that the maximum provision that will be available for the army is the sum sanctioned in the last budget, viz., 700 million rials.

*Internal Security.**Fars.*

6. Action in Fars by General Shahbakhti still hangs fire owing to his lack of transport. The delay not only adds to the difficulties of achieving a satisfactory settlement, but is damaging to the already low prestige of the Government. British prestige is also now affected since it is now well known that His Majesty's Legation has pressed for the elimination of Nasir, that assistance was promised by British military authorities, and that a liaison officer representing General Headquarters, Persia and Iraq Force is in Shiraz, who the people of Fars are beginning to say is there to endeavour to ensure that British policy is carried out. The prolonged winter may have delayed the migration of the tribes, but they are likely soon to be on the move and insecurity may increase.

7. Nasir Qashgai's cousin, Amir Hussein Salar Afkham, whose father at various times replaced Nasir's father as Ilkhani of the Qashgai, is supporting General Shahbakhti, and is using his influence to separate the sub-tribes from Nasir. He recently told His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz that the Kalantars of the Darashuri had recently assured him that they disassociated themselves from any activities against the Government and promised their support to Shahbakhti. Salar Afkham's family suffered considerably from the hands of Nasir's father, and they are very hostile to Nasir, as is his uncle Ali Khan Salar Hishmat.

*Dashti and Tangistan.*

8. Dissensions have broken out among the khans of Dashti and Tangistan. This is no unusual condition. It is not inopportune at the moment as it should prevent any effective support of Nasir Qashgai.

*Western Azerbaijan.*

9. His Majesty's Consul-General reports an incident that is probably the same as that mentioned in Summary No. 12/43, paragraph 11. His information is that a band of about 400 Shekak Kurds surrounded the village of Kahriz intending to loot. The Soviet Consul accompanied some Persian officers to parley with the Kurds, who argued that they were not Persian subjects.

*Iraqi Affairs.*

10. Abbas Ali Mehdi has arrived in Tehran as Iraqi Minister.

*British Affairs.*

11. Sir Ronald Storrs has been in Tehran on a visit.

*Tehran, March 30, 1943.*

[E 2333/110/34]

No. 17.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 22.)*

(No. 140.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 14, for the period the 31st March to the 6th April, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, April 6, 1943.*



(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 14 for the Period March 31 to April 6, 1943.*

*Persian Affairs.*

*Political.*

THE atmosphere is disturbed. The Government has shown no firmness in dealing with the agitator or with a very subversive press, although a few of the worst papers have been suppressed. The discontent of the lower classes is being fanned; the Tudeh party continues to acquire adherents; and there is anxiety lest the agitation should lead to strikes and sabotage by workers and peasants. New political parties are springing up, usually claiming to represent youth and the working classes, and the Government has felt obliged to authorise the Military Governor to prohibit all political meetings in Tehran. Criticism of the British in the press and in popular talk continues; and a rather bitter attack was made in the Majlis, which was, however, well answered by Tadayyun, the Minister of Food.

2. There is reported to be a split in the Tudeh party, one section following the original founder, Abbas Iskandari, and dissentients being led by his son, Iraj Iskandari, and Suleiman Mirza. The latter section is said to object to the inclusion in the party programme of a statement to the effect that the party is national and has as one of its objects the preservation of the independence of Persia.

3. The Queen Mother and the Princess Shams (sister of the Shah) have returned from their visit to Egypt.

*Economic.*

4. Dr. Millspaugh's first monthly report is of interest. In a review of Persian economy in recent years he notes the decline of agriculture, the excessive urbanisation, the lack of progress in hygiene, the extravagant growth of administrative organisations resulting in a spendthrift expenditure, and the gradual demoralisation of character that resulted from all power and initiative being in the hands of a few. On the other hand, he gives credit for the construction of railways and roads, the development of commerce and the foundation of national industries. In commenting on the rise in the cost of living he points out that it is due only in part to the inflation caused by the heavy expenditure of the Allies in rials; it is also due to unbalanced budgets, which necessitated heavy borrowings by the Government from the National Bank; to the weakness of the Government, which, on the one hand, occasioned a lack of confidence in the cover for the note issue, and, on the other, took no adequate measures for the stabilisation of prices; and to speculation and hoarding. The indebtedness of the Government in January 1943 was 3,400 million rials, whereas in March 1942 it had been less than 2½ million. The revenue during the first nine months of the Persian year 1321 (the 21st March, 1942-20th March, 1943) showed a decrease of 672 million rials in comparison with the same period of the previous year, while for the same periods expenditure showed an increase of 590 million rials. The measures which he proposed to advise as remedies were:—

- (a) Stabilisation of prices and rationing of necessities of life.
- (b) Revision of taxes with a view to withdrawing paper currency from circulation and reducing the deficit in the budget.
- (c) Reduction of national expenditure and cessation of borrowing from the National Bank.
- (d) Development of agriculture and industry.
- (e) Increase of imports as far as transport would allow.
- (f) The more equitable distribution of imported goods.
- (g) Sale of the State lands.
- (h) Importation of gold.
- (i) Sale of metal coin against paper money.

5. The bread situation in Tehran has eased. Supplies of imported grain are reaching the town, as are also supplies from the provinces, as a result of improved transport conditions and the offer of higher prices by the Government. The Food Department has now some four-five days' reserves in hand.

*Items of Interest.*

6. Typhus, which is endemic in Tehran, has now become epidemic on a serious scale. No accurate figure of the number of cases is obtainable, but it is estimated at from 15,000 to 30,000. The Persian Government finds itself short of hospital accommodation and equipment, and improvised hospitals are being set up in various Government and Royal buildings, and the Majlis has sanctioned a credit of 5 million rials for necessary expenses. The Commander-in-chief, Persia and Iraq Force, has authorised the use of an Indian General Hospital for Persian typhus patients. There are less serious epidemics at Kerman, Zahidan, Meshed and other towns of Persia.

7. An aircraft of the Persian Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs, flying on the regular mail service from Bagdad to Tehran, crash-landed between Khanakin and Kermanshah. Two of the occupants were killed and three wounded.

*Appointments—Civil.*

8.—(i) Dr. Muhammad Sajjidi (F.O. 183), to be Director of the Mortgage Bank.

(ii) Nasir Quli I'temadi, to be an Under-Secretary of State in the Prime Minister's Office.

(iii) Colonel Mustafa Dadfar, to be a Director of the Bread Department in the Ministry of Food.

*Internal Security.*

*Western Azerbaijan.*

9. His Majesty's Vice-Consul in Tabriz, who recently toured in Western Azerbaijan, reports that there is considerable anxiety lest the Kurds should this spring repeat their depredations of last year. They are buying arms wherever they can with the large profits made from the sale of grain in Iraq and on the black market in Persia. They oppose the establishment of posts of Persian gendarmerie in tribal territory, but in some cases have been forced by Russian pressure to agree. They have been raiding across the Turkish frontier and in one raid carried off 2,000 sheep, of which 200 were recovered and returned by the Russians. His Majesty's Vice-Consul is of opinion that, if the Russians make plain their disapproval of Kurdish lawlessness, serious disorder this spring need not be feared.

*Fars.*

10. The situation remains quiet and no information has yet been received that General Shahbakhti has yet made any effective move against Nasir Qashgai. The nature of the problem has already changed with the arrival of spring. Those Persians who favour strong measures against Nasir are now being accused of being unpatriotic pawns of British policy.

*Bakhtiari.*

11. A report has been received that Abul Qasim and his followers have forced the evacuation of a Persian military post at Izeh (Malamir). The delay in dealing with the situation in Fars is having a bad effect on the tribal situation everywhere in South Persia.

*Russian Affairs.*

12. A Russian officer in Meshed stated to His Majesty's Vice-Consul that some Spitfire aircraft had arrived in Meshed in February for the training of Russian pilots.

13. A note on Soviet influence in Persia is attached to this summary.

14. His Majesty's Vice-Consul in Tabriz recently visited Western Azerbaijan and gained the impression that the Russians were now regretting the encouragement they had given to the Kurds in the early days of their occupation. They were now appreciating the necessity for settled conditions in Western Azerbaijan and for the maximum production of food-stuffs. They were not, however, willing to allow the Persian Government to maintain adequate forces in that area for the maintenance of order and limited even the size of posts. But they were using their moral influence to assist the Persians to keep the Kurds in order, and on more than one occasion they had demonstrated their support of the Persian authorities by sending Russian officers to accompany Persian officers to insist on the Kurds complying with Persian demands. They are suspicious of any indication of British influence among the Kurds of Western Azerbaijan, and the suggestion that a man is a British agent is enough to ensure his arrest.



*American Interests.*

15. An Irano-American Society has been formed for the encouragement of social relations. The president is Hassan Isfandiari, the President of the Majlis, and the vice-president is the American Minister.

*Polish Affairs.*

16. The number of civilian Polish refugees still in Persia is:—

In Tehran:	10,971 men, women and children.
Isfahan:	1,911 men, women and children.
Ahwaz:	3,971 men, women and children.
Total:	16,853 men, women and children.

*Soviet Influence in Persia.*

1. There has been recently a very noticeable change in the sentiments of the Persian people towards Russia. Closer contact with Russians and experience in Russian methods have already done much to modify the conception, hitherto popular among the masses, of Russia as a boggy and of Russians as brutal savages. The generally admirable discipline of Russian troops in Persia, their good behaviour towards the people, their professed sympathy with the lower classes, their advertised contentment with their own system, the good relations apparently existing between officers and men and the obviously magnificent morale of the Russian people have greatly affected preconceived ideas of the Soviet system. The Russians are at pains to bring to the notice of the Persian people their cultural activities. There are in Tehran two well-stocked Russian bookshops, where Russian classical and modern literature, technical handbooks, newspapers and pamphlets can be obtained, and a permanent exhibition showing pictures of cultural interest, and having also a reading-room. Somewhat similar centres exist in Tabriz and Meshed. Russian films are also much in evidence in Tehran and provincial towns. An increasingly sympathetic interest is being shown in the principles of the Soviet system, and a courageous few even dare to advocate the adoption in Persia of some at least of its practice. This is the more noticeable in that communism is generally repugnant to the Persian people, both poor and rich.

2. The less frightful Russia is to the masses the more of a boggy does she become to the propertied classes. A situation seems to be developing where the masses may draw closer to Russia and the propertied classes come to be associated more closely than they now are with Great Britain. Indeed, Russia is already beginning to be regarded as the champion of the oppressed and is being looked to by the leaders of the discontented as a possible supporter of a revolution against the present ruling classes. The Russians, so the legend goes, have prevented the British removing food-stuffs from the provinces occupied by Russian troops; there the peasants have plenty; in those parts of Persia unfortunately deprived of Russian influence the poor are starving, while the British put large sums into the pockets of contractors, who exploit the worker and corner the people's food for sale to the British for consumption or export. That the Russians also consume and export considerable quantities of local produce has little effect on Persians outside the Russian zone, since there is alleged to be sufficient left for the people of their zone; and the fact that the usual surpluses from the Northern Provinces have not reached Tehran this year is blamed by the public more on the alleged British monopoly of civilian transport than on Russian obstructiveness. There is, however, reason to believe that the people living in the Russian zone are not so convinced of their good fortune as Russian propaganda would lead others to believe.

3. It would be unreasonable to suppose that the spread of these ideas is displeasing to the Russians or that they do not give them discreet encouragement. Whatever post-war objects the Russians have in view, it is unlikely that they will deliberately forgo the opportunity of paving the way for an increase of their political influence in Persia, even if it is only as a defensive measure against the spread of British influence. That the Russians remain intensely suspicious of British (and American) designs in North Persia, and even possibly in the Caucasus, seems to be indicated by their recent request for an explanation of our construction of landing grounds in North and East Persia, by the increasing

difficulty experienced in obtaining passes for British officers to visit Azerbaijan, by their refusal to allow the Americans to operate convoys in the Russian zone and by the gradual extension southwards, although not as yet to any great extent, of their military posts. It might be unwise to interpret other Russian moves, such as the reopening of consulates in South and East Persia, their reconnaissance of the Perso-Afghan frontier, their recent scientific expedition of investigation in South-West Persia, their opposition to the grant of authority to American advisers in Persian administrations, the contract for the manufacture of arms whereby Russia may acquire a partial control of certain factories and industries, the increasing interest they are taking in economic, political and tribal conditions in Central and South Persia, as steps in a far-reaching political plan; there are other reasonable explanations. But there is little doubt that the position of Russia in Persia after the war is likely to be considerably more advanced, much more closely in contact with important British interests, such as India, the Persian Gulf and the Anglo-Persian oil-fields, than before the war.

4. Conditions in Persia to-day are such that the masses will incline towards anyone who appears to sympathise with their sufferings; there is a growing discontent among the lower classes against the landowners and the masters of industry; the contrast between rich and poor is increasingly shameful; in most of the towns the conditions of the lower classes is appalling, lacking food, clothing, medicines and education; in many rural districts it is not much better. Russia is credited with sympathy for the masses; Great Britain is accused of callousness towards their sufferings. Persians have undoubtedly suffered from the Allies' utilisation of the country's communications, from their large demands for currency and from their purchases of food-stuffs, and that being so it has not been difficult to persuade the mass of the people that all their ills are the effect of the actions of the Allies. But, somehow, Russia escapes much of the blame. Conditions are relatively better in the Russian zone, which is, in any case, small compared with the rest of Persia, which sees only British and American control; it is Great Britain who restricts imports and controls the railway that should bring goods and oil from the Gulf; it is the U.K.C.C. who monopolises the civil transport in the greater part of Persia. It is the British Minister who has had to take the lead in bringing pressure on the Persian Government to satisfy Allied demands.

5. Great Britain is, consequently, probably more unpopular than she has ever been before. It would be unjustifiable to assume that Russia does not benefit from this unpopularity or that she fails to encourage comparisons unfavourable to Great Britain between the Russian and the British attitude towards the people. What is even more galling is that the behaviour of Russian troops in Persia should be contrasted favourably with that of British, and that in Tehran the British should have acquired a reputation for arrogance. Respect and awe of the Russians are increased by the fulsome praise of the British press.

6. Britain's unpopularity does not, however, prevent British influence from being very strong in Persia to-day. Britain is regarded by the majority of the middle and upper classes as the only real hope of post-war salvation. Some, at least, of them are conscious that the present economic distress is to some extent due to the inefficiency and corruption of the governing and propertied classes and are beginning to realise that the time has come when greater consideration must be shown to the condition of the masses.

W. A. K. F.

*Tehran, April 6, 1943.*

[E 2335/110/34]

No. 18.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 24.)*

(No. 149.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 15 for the period of the 7th to 13th April, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, April 13, 1943.*



(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 15 for the Period April 7-13, 1943.**Persian Affairs.**Political.*

THE Government remains timorous and indecisive, showing no inclination to take the drastic steps which are necessary to solve the problems with which it is beset, irresolute before the criticism and opposition that any drastic measure must inevitably arouse, anxious not to incur the opposition of vested interests in the Majlis, confused by many advisers. It hesitates to authorise the Military Governor of Tehran to take action against the press; it has aroused doubts of its intention to re-establish its effective authority in Fars in particular and in the tribal areas in general; it fears to press on the Majlis its Bill for the grant of special powers to Dr. Millspaugh (see Summary No. 11/43, paragraph 8).

2. The opposition to forcible action being taken against Nasir Qashgai grows and gains adherents. The impression is being created that the Persian Government is being pushed into this action against its judgment by the British Legation, and some members of the Government are not above the suspicion of encouraging this impression. Those who publicly uphold the necessity for action are accused of being paid puppets of the British. They are not all unaffected by the accusation.

3. Criticism and abuse of British policy has abated. The press has generally adopted a more moderate tone, probably as a result of warnings from the Prime Minister that he would be unable to resist much longer the demands of the British Legation for the suppression of offending papers.

*Economic.*

4. The latest reliable estimates of the amounts of imported cereals required to make up deficiencies in certain provincial areas up to the next harvest are as follows:—

	Tons.
Bushire and Bandar Abbas ... ..	150
Shiraz ... ..	1,500
Yazd ... ..	500
Kerman ... ..	500
Khorramabad ... ..	1,000

Estimates for Sultanabad, Hamadan and Kermanshah cannot be made until it is known how much can still be produced from adjacent areas. In Kermanshah stocks are low and 1,000 tons must be produced from somewhere in the near future. In Tehran the situation is easier for the time being, 3,100 tons having been imported by rail during the fortnight subsequent to the 21st March, in addition to small supplies from Gurgan, whence 1,200 tons have been received in the past six weeks. An unexpected promise from the Russians to import 25,000 tons of wheat via the Caspian ports for the use of Tehran has greatly relieved anxiety.

*Appointments—Civil.*

- 5.—(i) Issan Surush, to be Civil Governor of Tehran.  
 (ii) Ahmad Zalli, from Director-General of Customs to be Director-General in the Inspection Department of the Ministry of Finance.  
 (iii) Ali Muhammad Shaibani (F.O. 193; M.A. 266), to be Counsellor of the Persian Legation in Sweden.

6. The Minister of Finance, Allehyar Saleh, has resigned on account of a disagreement with the American Financial Adviser.

*Internal Security.**Fars.*

7. Military action against Nasir Qashgai is still being delayed on one pretext or another. There is little doubt that General Shabbakhti has been affected by the suggestion that is gaining ground, that the Government is being shaken by the opposition of irresponsible Deputies in its determination to secure the submission of Nasir by force if necessary. The elimination of Nasir is now being represented as a British rather than a Persian interest. The tribes have

no doubt been informed of the apparent hesitation of the Persian Government and encouraged to show a bold front against foreign interference. The Bushire-Shiraz road, the security of which is the principal British interest, remains undisturbed except by minor incidents, and General Shabbakhti now says that, since the tribes are now on the move, it would be unwise to start operations until he has sufficient motor-vehicles to ensure the safety of the road by patrolling. The problem before the Persian Government of re-establishing control over the tribes of the south grows more difficult the longer action is postponed. The incident at Izeh referred to in paragraph 8 below is an indication of the deterioration in the situation since the good effect of Shabbakhti's assumption of responsibility began to wear off as a result of protracted inaction.

*Bakhtiari.*

8. No further developments of importance have been reported since the ejection of the Persian garrison from Izeh. The Ministry of War has issued orders that the situation is to be restored without delay, but this will not necessarily ensure prompt local action. Unless action is taken without undue delay other tribes of the south are likely to be encouraged in their intransigence.

*Khuzestan.*

9. The diversion caused by the Bakhtiari and Bahmai exploit at Izeh has postponed the measures that were in train for the collection of arms from the Beni Turuf. It had appeared that the Beni Turuf would be willing to surrender some at least of their arms without resisting.

*British Affairs.*

10. An Indian General Hospital was opened in Tehran on the 11th April for the reception of Persian typhus patients. There is no doubt that this assistance from the British army is greatly appreciated, and its good effect will increase in proportion to the number of patients who pass through it.

*Russian Affairs.*

11. The Soviet Ambassador sprang a real surprise on the Persian Government by suddenly offering to import 25,000 tons of wheat via the Caspian ports on the condition that it would be used solely to feed the people of Tehran. This offer was made the day before the British military hospital was opened for the reception of Persian patients. That may have been a coincidence. While offering this wheat to the population of Tehran, the Russians still insist on the delivery to them of the full amount of 15,000 tons of barley and 5,000 of wheat which they had demanded from Azerbaijan. The indications that the offer is a propaganda gesture are too strong to resist.

12. While the Russians continue outwardly to maintain a righteous attitude of non-interference in Persia's internal affairs, those Persian papers that are assisted by the Soviet authorities carry on a strong campaign against the grant of special powers to the American Financial Adviser. It is now common talk that the Russians are opposed to all the American advisers. That opposition may be partly responsible for the delay in defining the duties and powers of the American advisers to the police and gendarmerie. If the report is true—it comes from reliable sources—that the Soviet Ambassador informed the Persian Prime Minister that the Russian Government strongly disapproved of the proposal he had heard talked of, that the life of the present Majlis should be prolonged, it is another indication of how the Soviet authorities interpret non-interference. The Prime Minister had, indeed, been considering this idea, but within the last few days circulars have been sent to officials in the provinces warning them to prepare for elections this year.

*American Affairs.*

13. The headquarters of the American Command in Tehran recently held a press conference of Persian journalists, at which the American spokesman, on the authority of General Connolly, denied reports recently current of a serious fracas between Russians and Americans at Kazvin and of general discord between Russians and Americans. He stated categorically that all requirements of the American forces in food-stuffs were imported, regretted that the Persian public had had cause to complain of the behaviour of American troops, and promised



that as soon as possible American troops would be removed some distance from the town and there provided with the necessary amenities.

14. The headquarters of the American Command in Tehran gave a dinner to Russian officers in Tehran on United States Army Day. The American Staff entertained their Russian guests by singing the "International" in Russian.

15. The Persian press announce that a Perso-American commercial agreement has been signed at Washington.

*Tehran, April 13, 1943.*

[E 2751/110/34]

No. 19.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 13th May.)*

(No. 158.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 16 for the period the 14th to 19th April, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 20th April, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 19.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 16 for the period  
14th to 19th April, 1943.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

1. Little progress has been made with any Government business. The Bill for the insurance of workmen (see Summary No. 1/43, paragraph 3) passed the first reading in commission. The Bill for the grant of extensive executive powers to the American Financial Adviser (see Summary No. 11/43, paragraph 8) has been debated by Parliamentary Commissions, but has not yet returned to the Majlis. Soheily is running true to form; prophecies of the early fall of his Government are common, even by Ministers, and various parties are already selecting, and working up support for, the next Prime Minister. Seyyid Zia ed Din Tabatabai, Muhammad Said, the present Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Ali Mansur (F.O. 120; M.A. 164), the present Governor-General of Khorassan, all have their supporters.

2. The Minister without Portfolio, Hussein Sami'i, has been given the task of investigating all complaints against Government employees. He will not lack occupation.

##### *The Press.*

3. The Prime Minister's attempts to control the press by reasonable persuasion have not been successful, even though he went so far as to tell the press that he was satisfied that there was no foundation for the reports that the British had burned wheat and sheep. The moderation reported last week did not last long. Remarks made to journalists by the Minister of State regarding the aid given by Britain to Persia and the necessity for Persians to do more to help themselves called forth impertinent counter-attacks from some papers. Criticism of the behaviour of British and Indian (and American) soldiers and comparison with the model Russian continue, and some papers found occasion for violent outbursts in the killing by Indian troops in the vicinity of Tehran of five Persians caught stealing British telephone wire and attempting to escape. This incident has considerably excited public feeling. On the other hand, the adulation of Russia and Russian troops continues, and the offer by the Soviet Ambassador of 25,000 tons of wheat for Tehran reported in last week's Summary (No. 15/43) provoked an outburst of mawkish sycophancy.

##### *Economic.*

4. Although there are now reserves of wheat for a few days in Tehran, issues of bread have been insufficient to go round, and queues for bread (and oil) are still a daily feature. In Shiraz and Kermanshah the situation is still

critical. Of the 25,000 tons of wheat offered by the Russians for Tehran, 10,000 tons have been promised for delivery early in May.

5. The engineers of the Ministries of Agriculture and of Industries and Mines have struck for more pay.

##### *Appointments—Civil.*

6.—(i) Dr. Misbahzadeh, to be Director of the Press and Propaganda Department.

(ii) Mustafa Sami'i, to be Head of the Protocol Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

(iii) Dr. Ali Akhbar Daftari, to be Counsellor at the Persian Legation in Washington.

(iv) Muhsin Rais (F.O. 172; M.A. 239), to be Persian Consul-General in India.

##### *Persian Forces.*

7. The mission of Persian officers that visited the Middle East Command (see Summary No. 11/43, paragraph 13) has returned, very well pleased with their visit and much impressed with what they saw. There is no doubt that the visit has had a good effect and that it has served a useful purpose. A tentative request has already been made by the Chief of the General Staff that Persian officers should be allowed to attend some of the courses of instruction held in the Middle East Command. Evidence of what British officers had achieved in the administration of the Egyptian army has inclined the officers of this mission more favourably towards giving authority to an American Mission.

##### *Internal Security.*

##### *Fars.*

8. It now appears that General Shahbakhti is unlikely to take direct action against Nasir. The time has passed when Nasir could be dealt with separately from the main body of the tribes, and the Persian forces in Fars are neither strong enough nor mobile enough to deal effectively with a situation where the opposition of the Qashgai tribe as a whole is provoked; particularly having regard to the freedom of movement the tribes have in the summer. He is perhaps right in his appreciation that if he were to embark on offensive operations now it would lead to disorder he could not control and to insecurity on the road. He still talks of disarming the tribes, but it is doubtful whether he is likely to carry that to the point where it would provoke the hostilities that both sides are anxious to avoid. If a consistent policy were followed a fair measure of Government control could probably be established over the Qashgai by progressive stages without arousing more opposition than the Persian forces could overcome. Various chiefs, including the Kalantars of the Mamassani and Dushmanziari, continue to give assurances to His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz that they do not wish to act against the interests of the British and Persian Governments. For the time being the security of the road is satisfactory.

##### *Bakhtiari.*

9. No developments have been reported of the Izeh incident referred to in Summary No. 14/43, paragraph 11. It now appears doubtful whether Abul Qasim Bakhtiari was there. According to a letter he had written to the Persian authorities at Isfahan he was at Ardal, and strongly disapproved of the rebellious action of the tribesmen concerned.

##### *Khuzestan.*

10. Up to the 9th April, when the attention of the Persian military authorities in Khuzestan was diverted from the Arabs to the situation at Izeh, 42 rifles had been handed over by the Beni Turuf.

##### *British Affairs.*

11. The Minister of State visited Tehran from the 13th to 17th April.

12. For months past serious inconvenience has been caused to British military communications in Persia by repeated thefts, amounting in all to a very considerable amount, of telephone wire. As it has always been British wire, and never Persian wire, even when hung on the same poles, deliberate



sabotage is suspected. Repeated requests have been made to the Persian authorities to ensure the protection of British communications, but the nuisance has increased rather than abated. Where possible, British or Indian troops have patrolled the wire and have caught several thieves red-handed. On the 15th April, at Tehran, a party of Persians was caught in the act of removing wire, and five of the party were killed by Indian troops when trying to escape. The hostile press has done its best to excite public opinion against Indian troops over this and other alleged incidents.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

13. The meeting of the Tudeh party to inaugurate its election campaign in Meshed was attended by the local representative of the Soviet Propaganda Department. In Isfahan, too, where the Tudeh party is very active, the Russian Consulate is interesting itself in the approaching elections; and Shiraz was recently visited by the chief representative in Persia of the Foreign Cultural Relations Section of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, accompanied by a representative of the Press and Propaganda Department of the Soviet Embassy. There are reports that Russian officials are now taking an interest in British relations with the Qashgai. This, if true, should give Nasir Qashgai an opportunity of offering his loyalty to a third European Power.

#### *Czechoslovak Affairs.*

14. M. Kadlec has arrived in Tehran as Czechoslovak Minister.

*Tehran, 19th April, 1943.*

[E 2869/110/34]

No. 20.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 18th May.)*

(No. 163.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 17 for the period of the 20th to 26th April, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 27th April, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 20.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 17 for the period the 20th to 26th April, 1943.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

THE evil effects of the outrageous conduct of the press on Anglo-Persian relations and on the internal situation and the increasing indiscipline in all Government departments that was obviously resulting from the unrestricted license of the press to criticise the Government and to incite and inflame public opinion have at last convinced the Prime Minister that action was necessary. By a decree of the Council of Ministers, the Government transferred to the Minister for War full authority for the execution of article 5 of the Military Governorship Law, which sanctions the arrest and detention of persons suspected of opposition to constitutional government or public order and security. By another decree the Government has amplified the rather vague article which describes the offences for which newspapers may be suppressed. These are now defined as: the publication of articles contemptuously criticising decisions made by Government in the interests of law and order or to assure the necessary requirements of the people; incitement against Government by improper and insulting publications concerning the Crown, or the legislative executive and judicial bodies of the country; criticism of, and false accusations against, foreign representatives of Governments in alliance with or in friendly relations with the

Persian Government when such publications would be damaging to the interests of the Persian Government.

2. The Minister for War has been obliged himself to assume the functions of the Military Governor, all other officers to whom the appointment was offered having pleaded that they were unwilling to be accused of suppressing the liberties of the people. This attitude is typical of the lack of confidence of all Government employees in the Government's ability to protect them against attack by the press and of the prevailing indiscipline that has resulted from the weakness of Scheily's Administration. The Minister for War does not lack courage, and he has issued a communiqué announcing that he intends to apply to the letter the laws and regulations of military governorship. He has already suppressed eleven newspapers in Tehran, but since papers are not subject to censorship before publication, offensive articles continue to appear and to circulate before the papers can be suppressed.

3. An attempt was made to work up an agitation against the Bill for the grant of extensive powers to the American Financial Adviser (see Summary No. 11/43, paragraph 8) by closing the bazaars. This coincided with the assumption by the Minister for War of the authority of the Military Governor of Tehran. The bazaars were open the next day, the merchants all fervently denying that they had instigated the movement, and the shopkeepers saying that they had shut their shops on rumours that rioting was imminent. The Chamber of Commerce had since issued a statement denying, on behalf of the merchants it represents, the rumours that the merchants were instigating opposition to the grant of powers to Dr. Millspaugh. The Bill in question has passed the first reading.

4. The Prime Minister issued a communiqué in reasonably firm terms justifying the Bill for the grant of special powers to Dr. Millspaugh on the grounds that effective measures could not be taken against the speculators and hoarders who were in part responsible for the present critical economic situation unless extensive powers were centralised in the hands of an impartial and experienced man. The communiqué also defines the Government's attitude towards the press. It states that, while not wishing to obstruct the expression of legitimate criticism or the enlightenment of public opinion, the Government has decided that it is necessary to put an end to the anarchy of the press that was creating anxiety and disunity among the people, provoking disorder and injuring the relations of the Government with its allies. The Prime Minister spoilt the effect of this communiqué by pleading in a secret session of the Majlis that he had been forced to agree to the suppression of certain newspapers by the pressure brought on him by the British Minister.

##### *Economic.*

5. The Government has now announced that it intends to claim the whole of the landlords' surplus of the next harvest, and that the price to be paid is 3,000 rials per ton for wheat, except in the frontier regions, where the price will later be fixed in relation to the price prevailing in neighbouring countries. The price to be paid for barley and millet will be three-quarters of the price of wheat.

6. Harvesting of barley has now begun in Khuzestan and some parts of the Gulf littoral. No measures for control of the harvest have yet been instituted by the Central Government and it is likely to disappear into speculators' hoards unless prompt steps are taken.

7. The Majlis has sanctioned a credit of 45 million rials for the construction of irrigation works during the year 1943-44.

##### *Appointments—Civil.*

8. (i) Abul Qasim Najm (F.O. : 144; M.A. : 192), to be Persian Ambassador at Kabul.

(ii) Manuchir Nikpey to be Director of the Department of the Opium and Tobacco Monopoly.

##### *Internal Security.*

##### *Fars.*

9. The complete looting of a village in Fars by the Galehzan, one of the smaller sub-tribes of the Qashgai, has been reported by General Shahbakhti, who attributes this new outbreak of brigandage not to his own inaction, but to the encouragement of the Qashgai by the Tehran press and some of the Deputies. Shortly previous to this he had telegraphed his resignation on the grounds that the Government's failure to suppress press attacks on himself and on the policy



he had been instructed to execute and the support given openly by press and Deputies to Nasir Qashgai had unsettled his forces, encouraged the tribes to combine and made his task impossible. He has reluctantly consented to remain in Fars for the present, but there is no doubt that his task is now very much more difficult and that a much greater degree of unity has been established between the Qashgai, the Kuh-i-Galu tribes and the Bakhtiari. A reliable informant who has recently visited Abul Qasim Bakhtiari was shown by the latter a letter recently received from Nasir Qashgai telling him that the tribal leaders had only to stand together and the Government would give up its intentions of establishing authority over the tribes.

10. His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire reports that a column of 500 Persian troops has arrived in Bushire for the purpose of disarming the tribes of Dashti and Tangistan. This is a very necessary operation, but whether General Shabbakhti will really carry it out effectively in his present mood seems uncertain. *Bakhtiari.*

11. From Izeh (see Summary No. 14/43, paragraph 11) Jancki Bakhtiari and Bahmai tribesmen advanced to Qaleh-i-Tul, where they surrounded the garrison, whose fate is not yet known. Relieving columns of insufficient strength were sent out from Ram Hormuz, but made no progress and may have suffered heavy casualties. The incident has been handled with more than usual Persian inefficiency. The responsibility for dealing with it lay with General Shabbakhti, who was sulking and belittled its seriousness. The General Staff in Tehran considered that the possibilities of troubles in Tehran prevented the despatch of troops from the local garrison. Contradictory orders regarding the despatch of reinforcements from other garrisons were sent by the General Staff and General Shabbakhti. Meanwhile, the tribal forces have increased and the difficulties of the Persian Government have increased.

12. From the evidence now available it seems that the initial movement was instigated by Abul Qasim Bakhtiari. He has now withdrawn from active leadership and has recently stated to a reliable informant that his object was only to make a gesture to prevent Persian troops interfering with the upward migration of the tribes and that the further actions of the tribes were contrary to his wishes. He is now again offering to come to terms with Government, but the terms are to be his own.

#### *Khuzestan.*

13. Up to the time when Persian forces had to be withdrawn from the neighbourhood of the Meni Turuf, 250 rifles had been collected from this tribe.

#### *Lurestan.*

14. The Ministry for War states that 211 rifles have recently been collected from the Papi and Piranvand tribes, and that another 590 rifles, which had been handed over to Bakshdars and local officials, have also been withdrawn.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

15. The Soviet Press Bureau has announced that the Russian military medical services in Persia have been instructed to assist the Persian health services to the greatest possible extent in the prevention of the spread of epidemics. Ten centres will be established at places in the Russian zone for the free vaccination and inoculation, and four sanitary groups equipped with disinfectors and bath units will be set up at Semnan, Sari, Gurgan and Meshed to deal with epidemics. A further extension of this work is promised and a free supply of serums and disinfectants on a liberal scale. This is the Russian counter-move to the opening of a British military hospital to Persian typhus patients.

16. Another aspect of Russian methods in Persia is reported by His Majesty's Consul-General in Tabriz. The Russians have recently undertaken to supply the Tabriz market with petrol and oils. They are also contracting for the supply to them of leather from the local tanning factories and are offering 77 rials per kilogramme, whereas the factory cost of production is 84 rials per kilogramme. The Russians have hinted plainly that, unless the contract is concluded at their price, the factory can expect no kerosine, gas-oil or petrol.

17. A report requiring confirmation has been received that the Russians are constructing a landing ground in the vicinity of Fariman, 50 miles south by east of Meshed.

*Tehran, 26th April, 1943.*

[E 2942/110/34]

No. 21.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 21st May.)*

(No. 175.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 18 for the period of 27th April to 3rd May, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 5th May, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 21.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 18 for the period 27th April to 3rd May, 1943.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

THERE has been a slight stiffening of the attitude of the Government. Further papers have been suppressed; the first five articles of the Bill for the grant of powers to Dr. Millsaugh have passed the second reading in the Majlis; overt agitation against Government action against the Qashgai has ceased, indeed articles have appeared in the press calling attention to the failure of the Government to protect the people of Fars against their depredations; and the turbulent Deputy Nowbakht has been suspended from the Majlis for seven days for an unparliamentary attack on the Minister for War. But there is no cause yet for rejoicing. Only continual urging saves the Prime Minister from giving way to vested interests. Laxity and corruption in all administrations throughout the country have reached an unprecedented degree. The cost of living has risen to such heights that Government employees, including army officers, on small fixed incomes must either starve. Indiscipline is common in all Government departments, and noticeably bad in the army.

2. Due to fear of the Military Governor, political party meetings are less active in Tehran. The Tudeh party wished to stage a demonstration on the 1st May, but was forbidden to do so by the Military Governor. It is understood that Abbas Iskandari, who was reported in Summary No. 14/43, paragraph 2, to be leading one section of the Tudeh party, has now been deserted by his followers.

##### *Economic.*

3. The critical period for Tehran's bread supply appears to have passed. 1,400 tons of grain reached Tehran by rail and road in the five days preceding the 26th April, and there is now a reserve for eight days. The Russians have undertaken to deliver at the Caspian ports 7,500 tons of wheat per month, beginning towards the end of May, until their promise of 25,000 tons is fulfilled. In certain provincial towns there is still shortage and much profiteering on the black market, but everywhere there are prospects of a bumper harvest. A Government commission has gone to Khuzestan to arrange for the collection of the harvest, which is already being reaped. In the provinces of Fars and Isfahan much of the wheat-growing areas are now in the control of rebel tribal chiefs, and unless military operations are undertaken to re-establish Government authority in those areas, it is unlikely that much of their wheat will reach the Government stores.

4. It is understood that Dr. Millsaugh is faced with a serious situation in regard to the current year's budget, and that after making all possible economies he finds himself faced with a deficit of not less than 600 million rials on the ordinary budget. In addition, he has to find an increase of at least 300 million rials for the army. He must also find 645 million rials during the first three months for the purchase of the wheat crop, 310 million for the Persian munition factories under contract to the Russians, 100 million for a canning factory (also working for the Russians), 46 million for purchases of cotton, 200 million for purchase of opium, 100 million for the Khuzestan wheat-growing project and a revolving fund of 100 million for his price-fixing scheme. Much of this expenditure should come back, sooner or later, to the Government. All in all, however, he



estimates that the Government will find it necessary to borrow no less than 1,500 million rials in excess of taxation revenue. Owing to the rise in prices, expenditure has greatly increased, while revenue has fallen away owing to insecurity and disorder and a reduction of receipts from customs and State monopolies.

#### *Appointments—Civil.*

5. Murteza Quli Bayat (F.O. 50; M.A. 65), Vice-President of the Majlis, to be Minister of Finance.

#### *Persian Forces.*

6. Conditions in the army and gendarmerie are disquieting. There is grave discontent among officers, whose pay is entirely inadequate in relation to the prevailing cost of living, resulting in an increase in corruption and an almost mutinous insubordination. The men are generally little better off owing to the reduction in rations, due to the shortage of wheat and the high cost of food-stuffs. Animals, in the majority, have been reduced almost to immobility by starvation owing to lack of fodder, and the mortality is high. Generally, there is a lack of confidence in the Government and of faith in the altruism of its intentions or the consistency of its policy. Mutual suspicion and jealousy among senior officers, lack of co-operation of the General Staff with the Ministry for War, opposition to the implementation of the proposals of the American advisers and political intrigues all make for vacillation, indiscipline and inaction. The army budget for the current year has not yet been sanctioned. Dr. Millspaugh has agreed to increase the allotment of 100 million rials, but the Ministry for War is holding out for a further increase. The cost of General Ridley's reorganised army with the reforms in pay and conditions that he considers necessary was estimated to be 170 million rials.

#### *Police.*

7. The Bill for the establishment of a police training college has been approved by the Majlis.

#### *Internal Security.*

#### *Fars.*

8. General Shahbakhti, after a period of indecision, has now reported to the Government that certain sections of the Qashgai are bent on mischief and that security in Fars in general, and on the Bushire-Isfahan road in particular, cannot be maintained, nor can the harvest be collected, unless he takes offensive action against them. He has been given discretion to take such action as he considers necessary, giving the security of the road first priority. Qashgai bands have been pillaging; complaints against them and appeals for protection are now reaching the Government from landowners and villagers in Fars. Nasir Qashgai is reported to be preventing the transport of supplies from the countryside to Shiraz, and his supporters in Tehran are now finding it difficult to rouse any sympathy for him.

#### *Bakhtiari.*

9. It is reported that operations are about to begin for the relief of the besieged Persian garrison in Qaleh Tul and that subsequently Persian forces are to be withdrawn to cover the oilfields. The Persian Government has not been able to send the reinforcements considered necessary for the re-establishment of the garrisons at Izeh and Qaleh Tul and to maintain a line of communication. The Bakhtiari are reported to be increasingly lawless in Chaharmahal, where Persian garrisons are small, and a report from Isfahan says that Abul Qasim Bakhtiari is preparing to cut the road by which reinforcements would be sent from Isfahan. These disturbances may be partly seasonal, but the temper of the tribes of the south is now such that the task of the Persian Government in establishing authority over them with the forces available is one of considerable difficulty, even if a consistent policy is followed. The forces available do not allow of more than one serious operation being undertaken at one time.

#### *Kermanshah.*

10. Migrating tribes have been responsible for some robberies and for the hold-up of two U.K.C.C. lorries between Karind and Shahabad. The drivers were robbed and five bales of goods for Russia were carried off.

#### *Azerbaijan.*

11. The Governor-General has informed His Majesty's Consul-General that Persian troops from Ardebil have begun operations against certain tribesmen of the Talish district who have for some time been a nuisance to both the Russian and Persian authorities.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

12. The Russians have published in the local press a statement of their reasons for the breaking-off of relations with Sikorski's Government. In the course of its argument the statement claims that the command of the Polish army is profoundly reactionary, chauvinistic, anti-democratic and pro-Fascist. Comment in the Persian press has on the whole been moderate. In order to avoid incidents the Poles have withdrawn from Kazvin a small military detachment that was stationed there in connexion with the evacuation of Poles to Khanakin.

13. The Soviet authorities, who have hitherto restricted their kidnappings to their own nationals and to Caucasian refugees, have recently kidnapped a Persian, an ex-official of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by name Maghruri.

14. The Director of Iransovtrans in Tabriz recently informed the local representative of the U.K.C.C. that there had been trouble with the Cossacks in the Caucasus. Pending confirmation, this report should be treated with reserve.

#### *American Affairs.*

15. The Americans have made some capital out of the presentation by General Connolly of a medal to an American soldier for having saved the life of a Persian at the risk of his own.

16. General Hurley has recently visited Tehran as personal representative of Mr. Roosevelt.

#### *Polish Affairs.*

17. M. Stanczyk, Minister for Labour in the Polish Government in London, is now visiting Polish refugees in Persia.

18. The number of civilian Polish refugees still in Persia is:—

In Tehran: 10,500 men, women and children.

Isfahan: 1,983 men, women and children.

Ahwaz: 4,322 men, women and children.

Tehran, 21st May, 1943.

[E 2967/110/34]

No. 22.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 22nd May.)*

(No. 186.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 19 for the period the 4th to 10th May, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 11th May, 1943.

Enclosure in No. 22.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 19 for the Period  
4th–10th May, 1943.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

#### *Political.*

ALTHOUGH there are many prophecies of the early fall of the Government, the Prime Minister has slightly strengthened his position. He appears to have shown some courage in pushing the Bill for the grant of powers to Dr. Millspaugh through the Majlis, but, on the other hand, in doing so he has saddled Dr. Millspaugh with the responsibility for the unpopular measures that



will have to be taken. Those interested in maintaining present conditions may still hope that Dr. Millspaugh's measures will be sabotaged by unco-operative administrations. The Prime Minister still has the support of a number of the Deputies; he holds the portfolio of the Ministry of the Interior, and that Ministry can strongly influence the approaching elections.

#### *Economic.*

2. The Bill granting powers to Dr. Millspaugh to control the collection, distribution and sale of commodities and raw materials, the wages of Government services and the rent of buildings has passed the Majlis. The text is given in an appendix to this Summary.

3. A Government commission sent to Isfahan to settle the disputes between the mill-owners and the workers has announced the following terms of settlement:—

The mill-owners will provide—

- (a) Free bread for workers' families.
- (b) Two suits of clothes for each workman per year.
- (c) Free drugs from the factory dispensary.

The hours of work will not exceed eight per day.

#### *Appointments—Civil.*

4.—(i) Muhammad Ali Humayunjah (F.O. 87; M.A. 114) to be Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

(ii) Muhammad Dadvar to be Farmandar of Resht and Deputy Ustandar of the 1st Ustan.

#### *Fars.*

#### *Internal Security.*

5. There have been no further developments of importance. A Deputy claiming to have influence with Nasir Qashgai has gone to Fars to endeavour to persuade him to submit and to tell him that popular opinion in Tehran has turned against him. There have been more articles in the Tehran press condemning Nasir's intransigence and a broadcast was made recounting some of his misdeeds. He is reported to be collecting grain in those areas of Fars where the harvest is already cut, from the sale of which on the black market he hopes to accumulate funds. His brother Khosrow is reported to be with the Kashquli and Darashuri Khans.

#### *Bakhtiari.*

6. The operations for the relief of the Persian garrison at Qaleh Tul were successful. There was some opposition to the relieving column, but Persian casualties were light and the tribes dispersed. Trouble is, however, likely to break out again until the Persian Government is in a position to concentrate sufficient forces to compel the submission of Abul Qasim and to overawe the Bakhtiari tribes.

#### *Khuzestan.*

7. Taking advantage of the preoccupation of the Persian forces on the eastern side of the province, Sheikh Chassib, the eldest son of the late Sheikh of Mohammerah, who has for some time been residing in Basra, provided himself with a bodyguard of 200 armed Arabs and announced that he intends to settle down on the ancestral lands belonging to his father. He may be able to get considerable Arab support and to incite the Arabs to combine against an attempt by the Persian authorities to continue the disarmament interrupted by the withdrawal of troops for the operations against the Bahmai and Bakhtiari.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

8. The Russians have as yet gained little from the contract they made with the Persian munition factories for the manufacture of rifles and ammunition. They have hitherto failed to provide the raw materials and certain machinery which they had undertaken to supply. The machine-gun factory, which is to produce machine pistols, has not yet been put into operation although work is in progress. Of 13,500 rifles due by the 1st May, only 5,000 have been delivered.

and these had been made up from parts already in stock. Of 8 million rounds of ammunition due on the same date, only 700,000 had been delivered. The Russians have failed to supply any percussion caps. It is reported that they intend to introduce some ten to twelve of their own specialists into the factories.

9. Although reports from Persian sources are certainly exaggerated, there seems little doubt that the Russians are now taking an interest in the forthcoming elections, not only in their own zone. If the tone of the papers they support can be taken as due to Russian inspiration, they resent the maintenance of military governorship in Tehran and its ban on political meetings. They are credited, possibly unjustly, with encouraging the opposition to Dr. Millspaugh, and they certainly give no support to any of the American advisers. They have asked for payment in advance for the first instalment—15,000 tons—of the wheat they have promised to deliver to Persia.

#### *British Affairs.*

10. His Majesty's Minister has left Tehran to attend a conference in Cairo.

#### *Appendix.*

#### *Millspaugh Powers Bill.*

POWERS of the Director-General of Finance Law passed by the Majlis on the 4th May, 1943:—

*Article 1.*—Authority is given to the present Director-General of the Finances, Dr. Millspaugh, to take under his own control the obtaining of commodities other than food-stuffs, and of all raw materials and manufacturers, the importing and exporting of commodities and the transporting, storing and distribution thereof, and likewise the rents of buildings and the wages of all public works and services.

*Note 1.*—The control and organisation of the rents of buildings will be effected by means of regulations which will be drawn up by the Director-General of the Finances and the Ministry of Justice.

*Note 2.*—In respect of import and export commodities the category of commodity which is to be controlled will be announced in advance.

*Note 3.*—In respect of any category of food-stuffs to which it may be necessary to apply this law a protocol to that effect will be submitted by the Ministry of Food to the Council of Ministers for approval, and on approval of the proposal the category in question will be placed under the control of the Director-General of the Finances.

*Art. 2.*—In order to carry out the duties described in article 1 above, the Director-General of the Finances is authorised to make use of all the powers conferred on the Government by the laws of the 14th June and the 22nd October, 1942 the anti-hoarding law of the 18th March, 1942, and the foreign trade monopoly laws of the 25th February, 1941, and the 10th July, 1932.

*Art. 3.*—In application of the said powers the Director-General of the Finances can issue ration cards, set up shops for the sale of goods, or take any other step which he considers useful and necessary to provide the means of bringing down and stabilising the price of goods and of distributing them fairly.

*Art. 4.*—A credit of 5 million rials is granted to the Ministry of Finance for the expenses of the execution of this law in 1943. Authority is also given to the Ministry of Finance to borrow, in case of necessity, up to 100 million rials from the National Bank of Iran to provide capital for the purchase of goods, and to use the loan as a revolving credit.

*Art. 5.*—The Director-General of the Finances is authorised to choose nine citizens of the United States as his assistants in the Ministry of Finance and especially for the execution of this law, and to submit proposals concerning their terms of engagement for the approval of the Majlis through the Minister of Finance.

*Art. 6.*—The Director-General of the Finances will draw up and put into force regulations which may be considered necessary for the application of this law.



*Art. 7.*—Government officials, whether civil or military, or employed by the police, municipalities, or Government institutions, may on no account for their own profit take part commercially in the purchase, sale or brokerage of goods which are under Government control; nor may they trade in or acquire for profit more than their personal needs of food-stuffs; those who infringe this rule will be dismissed from the service and will be punished according to the provisions of the law.

*Art. 8.*—This law will remain in force until six months after the end of the present war unless the Majlis annuls it before that date.

*Tehran, 10th May, 1943.*

[E 3321/110/34]

No. 23.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.*—(Received 9th June.)  
(No. 194.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 20 for the period the 11th to 17th May, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 18th May, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 23.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 20 for the Period 11th to 17th May, 1943.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

THE Government successfully survived an interpellation in the Majlis asking for a vote of confidence, which was given to it by 94 Deputies of 110 present. This, however, is not a true indication of the Government's stability or of the parliamentary support the Prime Minister enjoys. The interpellation challenged the legality of the appointment of two Deputies, I'Tebar (see Summary No. 12/43, paragraphs 1 and 6) and Bayat (see Summary No. 18/43, paragraph 5), to ministerial posts, and also the right of the Government to transfer its authority under article 5 of the Military Governor Law to the Minister for War and put its own interpretation on article 8 of the same law (see Summary No. 17/43, paragraph 1). The position of the Prime Minister is weak; there are dissensions in the Cabinet, and it is, as usual, only the lack of an obvious successor that delays the Prime Minister's fall.

2. The Tudeh party has issued confidentially to its branches its election manifesto and a list of forty candidates for election. Some of these are from the *intelligentsia*, but the majority are men of little standing. The Tudeh party is the only seriously organised political party in Persia. There can be no doubt that it is inspired and assisted from Russian sources. The fear that it may have a solid block of representatives in the next Parliament is very alive in political circles, and there is some talk of the necessity for organising Opposition parties, but it remains little more than talk.

3. Engineers in Government service have been on strike for some days for increases of pay and better conditions. They have recently been joined by professors of the university and some school-teachers. There is general unrest and dissatisfaction among educated Government employees, all of whom are underpaid.

4. The end of the African campaign has had on the whole a good press, but has not materially improved Anglo-Persian relations. For the present the progress of the war is of less interest to most Persians than their own internal affairs.

##### *Economic.*

5. Dr. Millspaugh's second monthly report to Parliament lays stress on the critical financial situation of the country, on the heavy indebtedness of the Government to the National Bank, and on the necessity for ruthless reduction in expenditure. He states that the estimated revenue, together with the maximum amount that can be borrowed from the National Bank, which he puts at 500 million rials, will not allow the Government to meet all its engagements. He asserts that heavy borrowings by the Government in the past are as much responsible for inflation as expenditure by the Allies. He estimates Allied expenditure at 183 million rials per mensem.

6. Bills have been laid before the Majlis for the engagement of further American experts, six for the Ministry of Food and three for the Ministry of Finance, especially for the control of prices.

##### *Transport.*

7. The United States Legation has issued a communiqué stating that up to date the American Government has delivered 342 lorries to the Persian Government and thousands of tyres. The following statistics of the operations of the Road Transport Department are given:—

		Ton/kilometres.			
		Goods carried on behalf of—			
		Government.	Private persons and merchants.	Total.	Lorries in service.
October	...	531,270	...	531,270	96
November	...	626,140	...	626,140	155
December	...	739,984	...	739,984	220
January	...	816,460	675,523	1,491,983	300
February	...	1,697,631	1,027,379	2,725,010	440
March	...	1,586,030	1,850,820	3,436,850	585
April	...	3,158,632	2,772,098	5,930,730	738

The Persian Government has now asked for an additional 500 lorries for the collection of the harvest.

##### *Appointments—Civil.*

8.—(i) Bagher Kazemi (F.O. 105; M.A. 142), to be Persian Ambassador at Angora.

(ii) Jalaluddin Keihan (F.O. 107; M.A. 144), to be Persian Consul-General in Constantinople.

(iii) Imad Kya, to be Persian Vice-Consul in New York.

(iv) Farajullah Bahrami (F.O. 46; M.A. 58), to be Ustandar of the 10th Ustan (Isfahan and Yazd).

(v) Saidi, to be Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Ways and Communications.

(vi) Muhammad Ali Malikzadeh, to be Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior.

(vii) Nasrullah Behnam, to be counsellor at the Persian Legation in Bagdad.

##### *Internal Security.*

##### *Fars.*

9. In last week's summary it was mentioned that a Deputy had left for Fars to endeavour to persuade Nasir Qashgai to submit. He did not go. The Deputies of Fars, with the inevitable exception of Nowbakht, represented forcibly to the Prime Minister that no good could come of further negotiations with Nasir and that immediate steps should be taken to establish order in Fars and to put an end to Qashgai lawlessness and their interference with supplies. Several newspapers continue to remind the Government of their duty to control the tribes and protect peaceable people against their depredations. It is possible that Shahbakhti may shortly take action against Nasir Qashgai.

##### *Khuzestan.*

10. Sheikh Chassib, after some parleying, yielded to the persuasion of His Majesty's Consul-General and returned to Basra. It is reported that his followers are dispersing.



*Bakhtiari.*

11. The Persian forces have withdrawn from the Qaleh Tul area, but the rebellious tribesmen have not paid for their iniquities. As the Persian Government have not sufficient troops to restrain by force all the tribes in active or latent revolt, they are trying to persuade Morteza Quli Khan, son of Samsam es Sultaneh, and the most influential and respected of the Bakhtiari Khans, to accept the post of Governor of Bakhtiari territory. The latest reports are that he is inclined to accept. Although he has been separated from the tribe for some years, his influence should be sufficient to control the Bakhtiari and to eject Abul Qasim. He himself is not the man to encourage tribal movements against the Government.

*Azerbaijan.*

12. His Majesty's Consul-General reports that the operations in Eastern Azerbaijan mentioned in Summary No. 18/43, paragraph 11, have been satisfactorily concluded with the arrest of two insurgent leaders.

*Russian Affairs.*

13. A first consignment of some 630 tons of the 25,000 tons of wheat promised by the Soviet has been delivered in Tehran, with the publicity that was to be expected.

*British Affairs.*

14. His Majesty's Minister has returned to Tehran from Cairo.

Tehran, 17th May, 1943.

[E 3377/110/34]

No. 24.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 11th June.)

(No. 202.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 21 for the period of the 18th to 24th May, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 25th May, 1943.

Enclosure in No. 24.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 21 for the period 18th to 24th May, 1943.

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

THE obvious weakness and indecision of the Prime Minister, who also holds the portfolio of the Ministry of the Interior, are arousing grave fears whether he will be able materially to influence the elections and prevent the return of a number of Tudeh candidates to the Majlis. There is some agitation for the appointment of a Minister of the Interior with more firmness. There is growing discontent among the Deputies with Soheily's inconsistencies and falsehoods. Ali Mansur (F.O. 120; M.A. 164) seems to be a likely successor.

2. Sipahbod Ahmadi, the Minister for War, has refused to act any longer as Military Governor of Tehran. His strict and vigorous application of the military law brought him into constant conflict with those of his colleagues in the Cabinet who are anxious to curry favour with press and Deputies and all parties.

3. The strike of the engineers and professors continues. The half-hearted attempts of the Government to settle it have resulted only in the strikers making increased demands. The unrest is spreading among other educated and underpaid servants of the Government. Anxiety has been caused by Dr. Millspaugh's statements in his second monthly report to the Government to

the effect that the number of employees in Government departments must be reduced, and that increases of pay, necessary though he admitted them to be, could not be expected until the financial situation had improved.

*Transport.*

4. The Prime Minister has issued orders that, since great difficulty is being experienced in providing tyres for cars required for essential Government service, all Government cars are to be withdrawn from the private charge of individuals and to be pooled for use as required. Restrictions on the extravagant use of Government cars for private purposes are long overdue.

*Appointments—Civil.*

5.—(i) Mustafa Quli Kemal Hidayet, to be Governor-General of the 5th (Kermanshah) Ustan.

(ii) Kazim Mudabbir Nuri (Mudabbir es Sultaneh), to be Governor of Isfahan and Deputy Governor-General of the 10th (Isfahan and Yazd) Ustan.

*Persian Forces.*

6. The Ministry for War has asked for a credit of 250 million rials to meet current expenses pending the presentation and sanction of this year's budget. In the preamble to the Bill the following figures are given to illustrate the effect on the budget of the rise in prices:—

	Provision in Last Year's Budget.	Amount Required this Year at Prevailing Prices.
	Rials.	Rials.
Rations ... ..	151,180,080	465,848,478
Fodder ... ..	77,044,143	131,000,000
Clothing ... ..	45,000,000	112,602,060
	273,224,223	709,450,538

*Appointments—Military.*

7.—(i) Sartip Muhammad Hussein Amidi (M.A. 16A), to be Military Governor of Tehran.

(ii) Sartip Razmara (M.A. 243), from command of the 1st Division to be Commander of the Central Recruit Training and Administrative Depot in Tehran.

(iii) Sartip Rohullah Keikavousi, from command of the 7th (Kerman) Division to be Commander of the 1st Division.

(iv) Sarhang Mansur Muzayani, to command the 2nd Division.

(v) Sartip Sztvati, to be an Inspector in the Ministry for War.

(vi) Sarhang Sayyar, to be Military Governor of Faraidun.

*Internal Security.**Fars.*

8. General Shahbakhti has commenced operations for the re-establishment of Government authority in Fars by moving columns towards Firuzabad from Kavar, Kazarun and Jahrum. The advance of the Kavar column was opposed by Nasir's adherents. Details have not yet been received. These operations do not directly involve all the Qashgai tribes. The Darashuri and Qashquli, who are not in this area, are reported to be negotiating with the Boir Ahmadi for passage through their country to their summer quarters. Proclamations have been dropped on the tribes ordering them to report to military posts on their migration and warning them that looting will be punished and compensated from tribal property. Military government has been proclaimed in the town of Shiraz.

*Bakhtiari.*

9. Morteza Quli Khan has agreed to go to Bakhtiari as Governor. He is confident of being able to control the tribe and to get rid of Abul Qasim. His appointment should give the Bakhtiari tribe more confidence in the Government and counteract the effect of those agitators who have been telling the tribes that their only hope of survival lies in resistance. It may also have a calming effect on Southern Bakhtiari in the area adjacent to the oil-fields, where there has recently been disturbance.



*Khuzestan.*

10. The Boir Ahmadi have been creating trouble in the Agha Jari-Pazanun area of the oil-fields, an area undisturbed for some time. On the 12th May they held up a party of cars containing European staff of the oil company, killing an Iranian driver and robbing the Europeans of their possessions.

11. It is reported that because the followers of Sheikh Chassib (see Summary No. 20/43, paragraph 10) did not disperse quickly enough from Qajiriyeh, they were bombed by Persian aircraft.

It is of interest that the Beni Turuf, in spite of the fact that the Persian army had begun to disarm them, showed no inclination to support Sheikh Chassib.

*Russian Affairs.*

12. M. Litvinov, Soviet Ambassador in America, passed through Tehran on his way to Moscow.

13. The Soviet authorities have opened a hospital of fifty beds in Tehran, staffed by Russian doctors, for Persian patients.

*Polish Affairs.*

14. The Polish Ambassador in Russia and all Polish officials who were in Russia have now reached Persia via Askhabad, Bajgiran and Meshed.

*American Affairs.*

15. Mr. Joseph Davies, formerly American Ambassador in Russia, passed through Tehran recently carrying a letter from Mr. Roosevelt to Stalin.

Tehran, 24th May, 1943.

[E 3458/110/34]

No. 25.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 16th June.)*

(No. 217.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 22 for the period the 25th to 31st May, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 1st June, 1943.

Enclosure in No. 25.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 22 for the period 25th to 31st May, 1943.*

*Political.**Persian Affairs.*

THE Prime Minister continues to sit uneasily. A remark by the Shah to the effect that he held no brief for Soheily, but that the next incumbent might be worse, and that, in any case, to change Prime Ministers during a critical period was unsound, probably reflects the opinion of many Persians and accounts for Soheily's retention of his office.

2. Delegates representing the engineers and professors on strike recently interviewed Dr. Millspaugh, but were disappointed on being told by him that the state of the nation's finances did not allow of an increase in pay at present. The strike continues and it may now extend to other Government employees.

3. Some of the Tehran newspapers published a report that General Shahbakhti had resigned from the army and that General Ahmedi had taken over from him in Fars. They added, as a precautionary measure, that this report had not been confirmed to date. It is obvious that this "report" was inspired by Ahmedi's ill-wishers, of whom, owing to his fearlessness, there are many, and by Nasir Qashgai's adherents in the capital. The obvious implication of the report is that General Shahbakhti was too high-souled a patriot to become the instrument of British hostility against the Qashgai, a rôle more suited to the Minister for War.

*Economic.*

4. The Third Regulation for the Stabilisation of Prices is published as an appendix to this summary. The first two regulations refer to powers and duties and are not of sufficient importance to be reproduced here.

5. The text of Dr. Millspaugh's temporary rent restriction regulations is given as Appendix 1 to this summary.

6. Owing to the heavy loss to Government resulting from the sale of bread to the public at the present price while wheat is purchased by Government at 3,000 rials per ton, it has been decided to increase the price of bread by 1 rial per kilogramme. This increase has been sharply criticised in the press on the grounds that it was unjustified in view of the bumper harvest reported from all districts, that it hits hardest the poor, who nowadays eat little but bread, and that the enhancement in price of a staple diet must inevitably lead to a general increase in all other living expenses.

*Persian Army.*

7. The film *Desert Victory* was shown to an audience of 500 Persian army officers. It made an excellent impression.

*Appointments—Military.*

8. Sarhang Dadistan, to be Acting Chief of Staff to General Shahbakhti, *vice* Sarhang Farrukh, deceased.

*Internal Security.**Bakhtiari.*

9. The news of the appointment of Morteza Quli Khan as Governor of Bakhtiari has been generally welcomed by the tribe and has already had a steadying effect in some cases, and to some extent undermined the position of Abul Qasim Bakhtiari. He has already been deserted by some of his followers and he has sent a message to the Persian Commander at Isfahan to the effect that he wishes to discuss terms of submission. The Janeki tribesmen under Majid Bakhtiari, son of Sardar Muazzam, who attacked the Persian garrisons at Izeh and Qaleh-i-Tul (see Summary No. 17/43, paragraph 11) are still being troublesome, and attacked a small Persian garrison at Qaleh-i-Gandurman, about 40 miles west of Shah Reza (Qumisheh). Reinforcements were sent from Urujan, some 10 miles to the north-east, and the tribesmen were drawn off.

*Fars.*

10. General Shahbakhti's operations for the occupation of Nasir Qashgai's stronghold at Firuzabad make slow progress. The column from Kazarun has reached Jirreh, 30 miles to the east, and the column from Jahrum has reached the vicinity of Qir-o-Qavzin, 25 miles to the west. The column from Kavar met with considerable resistance and is being reinforced, having apparently been checked. Meanwhile, air operations are being carried out against any tribal concentrations presenting targets. No attempt has yet been made by the tribesmen to interfere with traffic on the road. Qavam-ul-Mulk, whose family has for generations played an influential part in Fars politics, has been sent to Shiraz by the Shah at the request of General Shahbakhti. It is hoped that his influence will restrict the number of Nasir's supporters and give confidence to those tribes who are distrustful of the Government. There is general satisfaction in Fars that the Government has at last taken action indicating an intention to restrict Qashgai depredations.

11. There is little accurate information regarding the whereabouts of the sub-tribes. The greater part of the Darashuri are believed to have reached their summer quarters; the Kashquli are reported to be endeavouring to get passage through the Dushmanziari country, but to have been opposed by the latter tribe. The Farsimadan and Shishbuluki were ordered by Nasir Qashgai to return to their winter quarters, but some sections may have disobeyed the order and gone north. The small sub-tribes are for the most part still in winter quarters.

*British Affairs.*

12. General Sir H. Pownall, Commander-in-Chief, Paiforce, visited Tehran from the 21st to 24th May.

13. His Majesty's Minister, accompanied by the Oriental Secretary, left for Isfahan on the 20th May and, accompanied by the military attaché, left Isfahan for Shiraz on the 25th May. They returned on the 31st May.



14. The Government of India have provided a mobile company of Indian infantry to assist in the campaign against locusts in the Kerman-Bam-Zahidan area. There is some danger that the swarms if not checked might invade India.
15. Admissions to the Indian General Hospital opened for the treatment of Persian typhus patients amounted between the 11th April and the 20th May to 1,388.

#### American Affairs.

16. Mgr. Spellman, Cardinal Archbishop of New York, has arrived in Tehran for a short visit *en route* to India from Turkey.

#### Polish Affairs.

17. The number of civilian Polish refugees still in Persia as on the 25th May, 1943, is:—

		Men.	Women.	Children.	Total.
In Tehran	...	1,397	6,270	2,870	10,537
Isfahan	...	64	538	1,378	1,980
Ahwaz	...	394	1,401	1,039	2,834
		1,855	8,209	5,287	15,351

#### Greek Affairs.

18. Prince and Princess Peter of Greece arrived in Tehran on the 24th May for a short visit.
19. M. Dmitri Lambros, the Greek Chargé d'Affaires, is leaving Tehran shortly to take up an appointment as Propaganda Officer with the Greek Government in Cairo. He is being succeeded by M. Dziraf as chargé d'affaires *ad interim*.
20. One hundred Greek nationals in Persia have been called up for service with the Greek forces. This total represents every medically fit Greek of military age in Persia. Only two or three were found to be medically unfit. Many of these men had never seen Greece.

Tehran, 31st May, 1943.

#### Appendix 1.

##### Rent Restriction Law.

THE laws No. 7, regarding fixed prices, were established yesterday by the Director-General of Finance in agreement with the Ministry of Justice as follows:—

In view of the powers obtained in accordance with the law passed on the 4th May, 1943, it is laid down, in agreement with the Ministry of Justice, that—

- (1) The rent of houses or part of a house, as well as of all other immovable property leased as at the 20th February, 1943, must not exceed the amount of the rent at that date. If the property is not yet let, it must not exceed the amount of the rent of properties of the same category on the same date.
- (2) Persons living in houses on the date of coming into force of the preceding article, if they are not already liable to expulsion, will remain in their domicile at the rent paid previous to the preparation of definite regulations.
- (3) If the rent of houses and property has been increased after the date of the 20th February, 1943, their rent after the 23rd May, 1943, will be the same as that on the 20th February, 1943.
- (4) These laws are provisional and will remain in force as long as the regulations and alteration of rents have not been established.

A. S. MILLSPAUGH,

Director-General of Finance.

#### Appendix 2.

##### Third Regulation for Stabilisation of Prices.

THE third regulation issued by the Administrator-General of Finance of the stabilisation of prices, dated for the 23rd May, 1943, read as follows:—

"In continuation of the powers vested in me as per law dated the 4th May it is ordered that—

- "(1) The requirements of every foreign Power which should be insured by local purchases, shall be determined, once every six months, by agreement concluded between the representative of the foreign Power concerned or the civil or military foreign authorities, on the one part, and the Administrator-General for the Stabilisation of Prices on the other part, with the approval of the Administrator-General of Finance.
- "(2) The Financial Agencies in the provinces and the heads of Revenue Offices in the towns shall issue export permits for local purchases to the civil or military foreign authorities within the quota announced by the Department for the Stabilisation of Prices.
- "(3) Application for local purchases should be written on special forms supplied by the Department for the Stabilisation of Prices.

"This regulation shall be enforced from the 6th June, 1943."

[E 3588/110/34]

No. 26.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 23rd June.)

(No. 228.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 23 for the period the 1st to 7th June, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 8th June, 1943.

Enclosure in No. 26.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 23 for the Period 1st to 7th June, 1943.

#### Persian Affairs.

##### Political.

HIS Imperial Majesty the Shah, accompanied by Queen Fowzieh, the Minister of the Court and members of his personal staff, left Tehran for a visit to Isfahan on the 6th June. The Shah may go on to Shiraz, but this visit will depend on the stage reached in General Shabbakhti's operations against Nasir Qashgai. The effect of the Shah's visit to the provinces, whose inhabitants feel that they get very little consideration from the Central Government, should be good. The Shah usually succeeds in making a good impression in his personal contacts.

2. Political circles in Tehran, and in the provinces, are greatly concerned about the next elections. The term of the present Majlis ends on the 23rd November, elections should take place on the 24th September, and three months before that, on the 23rd June, the official announcement that new elections will take place is due to be made. Various coalitions of Majlis parties are being



formed, new parties are being organised outside the Majlis for the purpose of pushing new candidates, but so far the only party that has appeared with organisation and discipline is the Tudeh party. The Prime Minister has promised that the elections will be free, that military governorship will be abolished for the period of the election campaign and political meetings freely allowed. But there is little faith left, even among his wavering supporters in the Majlis, in the Prime Minister's promises or in his capacity to ensure the re-election of any Deputy even if he wished to do so. There are few Persians who do not believe that the Tudeh party is supported, inspired and kept together by Russian influence, or that it will eventually be used as an instrument of Soviet policy.

3. Discontent with the Prime Minister increases on all sides, and his early fall is predicted. Seyyid Zia ed Din Tabatabai has a growing number of supporters in spite of the fact that it is generally believed that the Shah would oppose his appointment as Prime Minister. Even Qavam es Sultaneh, who has returned to Tehran, is being mentioned as a possible successor, but he has many bitter opponents.

4. Representatives of the professors and engineers on strike were interviewed by the Shah on the 5th June, and the strikers resumed work on the following day. The terms of the settlement are not known.

5. After his interview with the strikers which was mentioned in Summary No. 22/43, paragraph 2, Dr. Millspaugh published in the press a statement of his views, which provoked much unfavourable criticism. After stating categorically that until Government could afford to increase the salaries of all deserving employees he would not agree to giving increases to any one class, least of all to strikers, he went on to accuse the strikers of attempting to intimidate the Government and of acting under the influence of political agitators. This called forth a rejoinder which reminded Dr. Millspaugh that he had authority to speak on financial questions only, that the political aspect was not his concern, and that the salaries of two of the many foreign advisers now being paid by the Government would go far towards improving conditions for the engineers and professors.

6. The following newspapers which had been suppressed have now been allowed to reappear: *Mehr i Iran*, *Bakhtar*, *Iqdam*, *Keihan*, *Kurshid i Iran*.

#### Economic.

7. The terms of the Soviet-Persian Financial Agreement have now been published. The following are the principal points:—

- (a) Persia is obliged to supply the Soviet authorities with all rials they need (over and above the rials realised by the Soviet authorities through the sale of goods) up to a limit of the equivalent of 15.5 million dollars in any period of six months (at present rate of exchange = 500 million rials).
- (b) Rials will be obtained by the Soviet authorities on demand against the equivalent in United States dollars, credited to the Persian Government in blocked account in Moscow.
- (c) At the end of each calendar half-year the balance of the blocked dollars account in Moscow will be converted as to 60 per cent. into gold. Silver may be substituted for gold by mutual agreement.
- (d) The official dollar/rial rate of exchange will be observed; the price of gold and silver will be calculated at official prices ruling in the United States.

8. The text of a reciprocal trade agreement between the United States and Persia, which was signed at Washington on the 8th April, has been published in the press.

9. Dr. Millspaugh has issued a regulation—No. 5—declaring that the import and sale of the following commodities will in future be a Government monopoly: All cotton goods, sacking and wrapping material, soap and candles, electric light bulbs, insulated wire, paints of all sorts, chemical products of all sorts, motor vehicles, spare parts and accessories, tyres and tubes, lamps, lamp chimneys and wicks, china-ware, glass-ware and kitchen utensils, pins and needles, paper, typewriters and their accessories, ink, coal, firewood, charcoal, all threads. Stocks of these commodities at present in the country or on order from abroad must be declared to the Government.

10. Dr. Millspaugh has presented to the Majlis a Bill for the revision of the Income-Tax Law. His proposals include: Exemption of incomes of 6,000 rials per annum and, in addition, of certain specified amounts for dependants; exemption of interest on savings and of an amount equivalent to nine times the amount of interest received from savings or deposit accounts or Government bonds; exemption of the salaries of Government employees and peasants; a tax on taxable incomes, after deducting the amount exempted of 2 per cent. on incomes up to 10,000 rials per annum, increasing to 80 per cent. on incomes exceeding 500,000 rials per annum. The effect would be to lighten the burden of taxation on small incomes while heavily increasing that on large incomes. The maximum tax now imposed is 20 per cent.

11. The Bill, as was to be expected, has aroused the violent opposition of the rich, who have launched a campaign in the press and among venal Deputies to oppose it. It is criticised on the grounds that it will stifle enterprise and production, and that the Government has not the machinery to enforce it. It has been welcomed by the lower classes.

12. Dr. Millspaugh has instructed all Ministries that, since revenue is insufficient to meet expenditure, a reduction of 15 per cent. to 25 per cent. must be made in the number of Government employees. Until this reduction has been put into effect no salaries will be paid.

13. The Bill referred to in Summary No. 13/43, paragraph 3, for the issue of tax-free Treasury bonds to the value of 500 million rials and for an increase in the amount of coinage of low denomination from 54½ million rials to 75 million rials is now being debated in the Majlis. The increase of small coinage has been approved.

14. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company has agreed that royalties to be paid to the Persian Government should be fixed at £4 million per annum until the end of the war.

15. A municipal tax of 40 dinars per litre has been imposed on petrol in Tehran.

16. The increase in the price of bread (see Summary No. 22/43, paragraph 6) has aroused universal discontent among the poor. Local officials, fearing riots, have in some places refused to apply it. In Ardebil there were riots in protest, which the Russians are accused of having encouraged.

17. The Prime Minister has instructed the Ministry of Commerce and Industry that the following reforms are to be put into effect in factories:—

- (a) Hours of work are to be reduced, especially for women and children.
- (b) Children under 12 years of age not to be employed.
- (c) Effective measures are to be taken to ensure the health of workers.
- (d) The Workers' Insurance Bill, when it becomes law, is to be strictly enforced.
- (e) Washing and recreation facilities are to be provided for the workers.

18. A postal airgraph service between Persia and Great Britain was inaugurated on the 2nd June.

19. Locusts have been found in considerable numbers in the area Bam-Zahidan, and swarms have been found as far to the north as Naim, Qum and Sabzavar.

#### Appointments—Civil.

- 20.—(i) Ghulam Reza Ilhami to be Farmandar of Semnan.
- (ii) Dr. Mahmud Mehran to be Director-General of the Ministry of Finance.
- (iii) Mr. James Robinson, a member of Dr. Millspaugh's staff, to be Director-General of the Price Stabilisation Department.
- (iv) Misbah Fatimi to be Governor-General of Khuzestan.
- (v) Morteza Quli Khan Bakhtiari (F.O. 49; M.A. 60) to be Farmandar of Bakhtiari.

#### Persian Forces.

##### Gendarmerie.

21. A Bill has been laid before the Majlis for the engagement of Colonel Schwarzkopf, of the American army, and a maximum staff of seven American assistants, as adviser to the Ministry of the Interior for the reorganisation of the gendarmerie.



*Appointments—Military.*

- 22.—(i) Sartip Abdur Reza Afkhami (F.O. 2; M.A. 2) to be Commander of the 7th (Kerman) Division.  
 (ii) Sarhang Hussein Mahin to command the Mechanised Brigade.  
 (iii) Sarlashkar Abul Hussein Purzand to be Director of the Army Horse and Mule-Breeding Department.  
 (iv) Sartip Ataullah Alai to be head of the Supplies Department of the army.

*Internal Security.**Fars.*

23. Very little progress has been made with the operations for the occupation of Firuzabad. Persian troops have occupied Farashband, but the main advance from Kavar is still held up, and it is now confirmed that this column met with a reverse. Reinforcements of a battalion from Isfahan and another from Tehran have been sent to General Shabbakhti. Casualties suffered by the Persian forces have been reported by General Shabbakhti to the Shah as 25 killed and 105 wounded, mostly slightly. He also claims to have inflicted very heavy casualties on the Qashgai. He reports that there is evidence that the operations of the tribes are being directed by Germans, who have also organised a hospital in Firuzabad for the wounded. Heavy destruction has been carried out on the Kavar-Firuzabad road. There have been minor robberies of drivers on the road and the first serious interference with Russian convoys, when two Russian trucks, driven by Persian drivers, were held up, forced off the road and burnt. It is reported that, in addition to the Darashuri, the Kashquli and Farsimadan tribes are moving to their summer quarters, pillaging villages in accordance with tribal custom on the way. The Shishbuluki and smaller tribes are apparently still in winter quarters and they must be in some discomfort. The Mamassani and Dushmanziari tribes show no inclination to support Nasir Qashgai and may even be persuaded to give active support to the Government.

24. There is considerable dissatisfaction, among all except Nasir's adherents, with the lack of determination being shown by General Shabbakhti in his operations; the Shah has expressed his displeasure and has instructed the Minister for War to telegraph to General Shabbakhti to the effect that the Shah expects to have news of the capture of Firuzabad while he is at Isfahan (see paragraph 1 above). This, however, is not likely to have much effect. Agitation by the Deputy Nowbakht and his pro-Axis associates continues in Tehran. An anonymous pamphlet was circulated which pertinently asked why of the many robbers in Persia only the Qashgai should be pursued; why not the Prime Minister, who had previously been driven out of office because of his robberies; who protected the Kurds so that they were allowed to keep their arms; and did not General Shabbakhti realise that he would get no better reward than other tools of the English such as the ex-Shah and Admiral Darlan?

*Kuh-i-Galu.*

25. It does not appear that the Boir Ahmadi intend to give any active support to Nasir Qashgai, but they may be relied upon to take advantage of any disorder that may occur. Their chiefs are reported to be fully occupied with the inter-clan feuds, which are characteristic of the Boir Ahmadi.

*Khuzestan.*

26. It is surprising that, in spite of the preoccupations of the Persian troops on the eastern side of the province and of the excitement among the Arabs caused by the incursion of Sheikh Chassib (see Summary No. 19/43, paragraph 7) and by the deportation by the Persian authorities of a respected Arab religious leader, Sayyid Issa Kamaliddin, on the grounds that he was an exciting influence among the Arabs, the Beni Turuf have continued to surrender their arms and by the end of the month had handed in over 500.

*Kermanshah.*

27. His Majesty's Consul reports that there is growing restlessness among the tribes of the Kermanshah Province. There has been inter-clan fighting over a land dispute at Paveh, the Jawanrudi tribesmen driving out the sons of Jaafar Sultan. For the time being peace has been restored.

*British Affairs.*

28. His Majesty's Legation has informed the Persian Government that, since it was not previously consulted, it does not consider that His Majesty's Government is bound by the provisions of the Director-General's Regulation No. 3, which stipulates that the requirements in local purchases of foreign Powers shall be determined in advance every six months in agreement with the Administrator-General for the Stabilisation of Prices—see Summary No. 22/43, paragraph 4 and Appendix 2. His Majesty's Legation is, however, prepared to discuss methods of regulating local purchase.

*Chinese Affairs.*

29. Colonel Tang Te-heng, with two assistants, has arrived in Tehran as Chinese Military Attaché.

*Russian Affairs.*

30. It is reliably reported that the railway from Russian Astara to Baku is now in full operation as a supply route from Persia to Russia.

*Tehran, 7th June, 1943.*



## CHAPTER V.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.

[E 2016/27/89]

No. 27.

*Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 7.)*

(No. 14.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Beirut presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to telegram No. 198 of the 19th March to Foreign Office, has the honour to transmit to him a copy of General Catroux's address on the 18th March to the Lebanese on the restoration of constitutional life.

*Beirut, March 22, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 27.

*Adresse du Général Catroux au Peuple libanais.*

Libanais!

AGISSANT dans l'esprit traditionnel de la France et en conformité des décisions arrêtées, en accord avec le Gouvernement britannique, par le Comité National Français, j'ai pris, à la date du 18 mars 1943, les mesures propres à assurer la restauration de votre vie constitutionnelle.

Ces mesures sont définies dans trois arrêtés :

L'un d'eux remet en vigueur la Constitution de la République libanaise, à compter du jour où une Chambre des Députés, issue d'élections générales à intervenir dans un délai maximum de trois mois, aura elle-même élu le Président de la République.

Cet arrêté modifie la composition de la Chambre future qui ne comprendra plus que des membres élus à l'exclusion de membres nommés.

Le deuxième arrêté organise les pouvoirs de l'Etat pour la période à courir jusqu'à la remise en vigueur des institutions constitutionnelles.

A cet effet, un pouvoir provisoire simplifié est créé. Il a pour mission essentielle de présider à la consultation populaire d'où sortira la Chambre et se retirera dès que le Président de la République aura été élu.

Ce pouvoir est placé aux mains d'un Chef de l'Etat, Chef du Gouvernement, assisté de deux Ministres d'Etat.

Le troisième arrêté désigne, pour exercer la charge de Chef de l'Etat, Chef du Gouvernement, le Docteur Ayoub Tabet.

Cet ensemble de dispositions relève d'une intention fondamentale, celle de résoudre impartialement, démocratiquement, le problème de la reprise de la vie constitutionnelle conformément à l'idéal de la France, aux principes des Nations Unies et aux vœux des populations.

Il importe, en effet, à la dignité nationale que le Liban dispose au Parlement d'une représentation sincère, et que, par suite, les élections soient soustraites aux influences et qu'elles soient faites dans la liberté, l'ordre et le respect des opinions.

Pour qu'il en soit ainsi, il est nécessaire que le Gouvernement qui présidera aux élections n'ait point un caractère politique et que, réduit en nombre, il soit dirigé par une personnalité renommée par son patriotisme libanais, son indépendance de caractère, sa probité et son impartialité. Tel est le cas du Docteur Ayoub Tabet.

Le même souci d'assurer au Parlement l'exercice de sa fonction organique, qui est de représenter le pays, entraîne logiquement l'élimination du sein de l'Assemblée des Députés nommés jusqu'ici par le pouvoir exécutif. Il n'y aura désormais à la Chambre libanaise que des représentants directs de la nation. Cependant, s'il apparaît aux pouvoirs publics, lorsqu'ils auront été constitutionnellement mis en place, qu'il est utile au bien de l'Etat de rétablir la dualité de représentation, la Constitution pourra, suivant la procédure réglementaire, être révisée à cette fin. Mais il est indiscutable qu'en pareille conjoncture, la solution la plus conforme à l'esprit démocratique serait de faire siéger, dans deux Chambres distinctes, les élus de la nation et les représentants nommés.

Telle est l'économie des mesures que j'ai prises et tel est leur esprit. D'autres solutions eussent été possibles. On pouvait songer soit à en revenir à la

situation de 1939, soit à partir du régime actuel. Des raisons d'ordre moral s'opposaient à la première méthode; quant à la seconde, elle devait être écartée pour des raisons d'incompatibilité de doctrines. On concevrait, en effet, difficilement qu'un Gouvernement formé pour appliquer et qui a appliqué un régime des pleins pouvoirs, fût qualifié pour procéder à la restauration du régime constitutionnel et démocratique. En cette affaire cependant, je tiens à le souligner, les principes sont seuls en cause et non les hommes. Ceux-ci ont servi le pays avec dévouement en dépit des graves difficultés du moment. Un hommage leur est dû à l'heure où ils quittent le pouvoir. Et je me plais à le leur rendre.

Libanais! Les fondements de la reprise de votre vie constitutionnelle sont maintenant posés sur des bases saines. Vos libertés publiques vous sont restituées. Vous allez les exercer sans contrainte pendant la période électorale. Je suis assuré que vous en userez avec sagesse comme il convient à un peuple politiquement mûr et qui a conscience de l'importance de l'acte qu'il accomplit en votant. L'Assemblée qui sortira de vos suffrages exercera, vous le discernerez bien, une influence profonde sur l'avenir de votre pays. Pensez donc au Liban en cette grave conjoncture comme moi qui suis votre ami et qui représente auprès de vous la pérennité de l'amitié franco-libanaise; j'y ai pensé avant d'arrêter mes décisions.

*Beyrouth, le 18 mars 1943.*

[E 1774/27/89]

No. 28.

*Weekly Political Summary, No. 51, Syria and the Lebanon, March 24, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office, April 7.)*

General.

GENERAL CATROUX'S anxiously awaited statement of his election plans for the Lebanon was made in a broadcast on the 18th March, in which he proclaimed the restoration of the suspended Constitution with the exception of those clauses which prescribe the nomination by the President of one-third of the Deputies, and the appointment of a provisional Government of three, comprising Dr. Ayoub Tabet as head of the State and of the Government, assisted by two Ministers, to administer the country until the elections are held in three months' time. A decree issued immediately thereafter by Dr. Tabet appointed Khaled Chehab and Jawad Boulos to these posts.

The British authorities had consistently urged the suppression of those clauses of the Constitution providing for the nomination of one-third of the Deputies and the appointment of a neutral interim Government rather than the recall of the old Chamber. They had also expressed their agreement to the appointment of Ayoub Tabet as head of the State. In order, therefore, to make it quite clear that these steps had been taken with the full approval of the British authorities, His Majesty's Minister broadcast on the 19th March, warmly welcoming General Catroux's decisions. The broadcast is reported to have had an excellent effect on the population, which has, on the whole, accepted these arrangements with satisfaction despite the successful efforts which had been made by President Naccache to pose as the champion of Lebanese independence. The President has refused to resign in favour of the new régime, but his refusal makes no practical difference.

This solution of the problem also found much favour in Syria, where opposition to the recall of the 1936 Chamber under the presidency of Hashim Atassi was crystallising as it became increasingly clear that this was General Catroux's intention if he could obtain the agreement of the Nationalists to his conditions. As for the Syrian Government, they were encouraged by the example of President Naccache to adopt an attitude of defiance towards this or any other plan involving their own disappearance from office. On the 18th March the Syrian Prime Minister informed the Political Officer that he had protested to General Catroux, and also to General Collet, that the French plan for the recall of the Chamber was *ultra vires*, and had declared that he, supported by his colleagues, would neither recognise Hashim Atassi if he were recalled as President, nor resign to make way for a provisional Government.

While political excitement was thus at its height, serious rioting broke out in Damascus on the 20th March, the date fixed for the introduction of the new scheme for feeding the Damascus population described in last week's Summary. This was an unfortunate coincidence, but unavoidable. It had been intended to



introduce these changes several weeks earlier, but they had been deferred owing to the difficulties created by the pusillanimity of the Syrian Government, until they could be deferred no longer. On the political side, General Catroux had experienced unexpected difficulties in his negotiations for the formation of a provisional Government, and by the 20th March he could wait no longer, since he was urgently required in North Africa.

It seems clear that the demonstrations were not primarily political in origin, but were due to the partial application of this reduction, to the bad quality of the bread issued and to rumours that further reductions were imminent. The population do not, in fact, seem to have been aware that the ration to which they were to be reduced had been current in other parts of the country for some time past; but, as they have always enjoyed favoured treatment, it is doubtful how far the realisation of this fact could have served to appease them.

The rioting started at 5 in the morning, and a mob forced its way into the Palais de Justice, attempting, without success, to set it on fire, and destroying most of the archives. When the crowd turned their attention to the Sérail, the police and gendarmerie were obliged to fire in self-defence. Five rioters were killed and some thirty police and gendarmes injured. Owing to the inadequate precautions taken by the French to provide against a danger which could have been foreseen, it was not until 10 A.M. that the Troupes Spéciales were called in to protect strategic points. After consultation between General Catroux and His Majesty's Minister, special powers were subsequently given to General Collet by "arrêté" authorising him to supersede the civil authority. A curfew was imposed and other measures were taken to prevent public gatherings, long-range telephone calls, &c.

Rioting continued spasmodically during the next four days, and has not ceased altogether at the time of writing, although the situation is more or less in hand. Provisional figures of casualties are as follows: killed, nine rioters and no police; injured, sixty-five rioters and fifty-two police.

Although the intention had been to reduce the ration throughout the town on the 20th March, it afterwards transpired that this had only been done in a few districts. Many bakeries were looted on the first day, and others forced to close to avoid looting. It was therefore necessary to mobilise the resources of the British and French military authorities in order to bake sufficient bread for the population on the following morning. In certain quarters the mob intimidated the bakers into giving out more than the ration prescribed. By the evening of the 23rd March a fair degree of order had been reintroduced into the distribution arrangements of the O.C.P. A highly suspect proposal, put forward by the municipal authorities and strongly supported by General Collet and his advisers, whereby the control of the O.C.P. would have been virtually eliminated, had been rejected, and sufficient flour was being delivered to the bakers to feed the entire population of the town at the rate of 400 grammes of bread a day. This state of affairs was being accepted by the population with a good deal of murmuring, but without a recrudescence of serious disorders.

In view of this troubled situation, it is not surprising that Hashim Atassi was reluctant to accept office, although General Catroux finally abandoned his attempts to extract any pledge from the Nationalists in regard to the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian treaty or the later formation of a Senate. The Delegate-General therefore decided to follow the Lebanese precedent in Syria, and on the 24th March, after a discussion in Damascus with Hashim Atassi, who appears to have signified his agreement, decrees were issued setting up a provisional Government under Ata Bey Ayoubi as head of the State and head of the Government. By prior arrangement with General Catroux, Ata Bey chose as his three Ministers Mustafa Shehabi, Minister of Finance in the Jamil Ulshi Government; Saidi Atassi, a former Minister of Education under the late Sheikh Taj ed Din; and Naim Antaki, a Christian from Aleppo and a friend and follower of Jamil Mardam. As in the Lebanon, decrees were also issued rescinding the measure whereby the French High Commissioner had suspended the Constitution in 1939, and restoring it with effect from the date of the election of a President of the Republic by the representative Chamber. Elections are to take place within three months. The "Chef d'Etat" is given authority to make laws in the Council of Ministers and to conduct elections.

It cannot be said that the Provisional Government is non-party in character. Ata Bey himself, though not a member of the *bloc*, is an outspoken sympathiser. Mustafa Shehabi and Naim Antaki (the latter a Christian from Aleppo) are members of the *bloc*. Saidi Atassi is the only neutral, despite his relationship with Hashim Atassi, with whom, incidentally, he is said to be on bad terms. On

the other hand, both Ata Ayoubi and Mustafa Shehabi are moderates and enjoy a fair reputation for integrity, especially the latter.

It is too early to assess what the reactions to these changes will be, but a certain amount of opposition must be expected from the rivals of the *bloc*, and this may still further complicate the already difficult situation in Damascus.

#### Wheat.

Despite bad weather, which has hampered transport in most parts of the country, purchases for the past seven days have remained steady at the level of previous weeks.

#### The Lebanon.

The few days which preceded General Catroux's announcement of election arrangements in the Lebanon were marked by increasing political tension, caused partly by the number of conflicting and generally inaccurate rumours circulating as to the nature of those arrangements, and partly by the apparent determination of the Lebanese President and Government to cling to office in defiance of the Délégué général.

On the 13th March the President proposed to his Government that he should forthwith promulgate an electoral decree himself. The Prime Minister and one other Minister supported him; the other four refused and offered their resignation, which, however, the President did not accept. On the 16th March the President and Prime Minister invented another scheme, by which the latter would resign with his Government and would thereupon be charged by the President with the formation of a new Ministry, in which four "yes-men" would take the places of the four dissident Ministers and would at once promulgate the electoral decree. This scheme was abandoned when it was realised that it would not receive British support; but the President and the Prime Minister continued to protest publicly that they would under no circumstances consent to resign at the behest of General Catroux. However, on the morning following General Catroux's proclamation they chose the path of discretion by not going to their offices, in which the Provisional Government promptly installed itself. It was reported that they intended to send a strong protest to General Catroux against his action, but the four dissident Ministers refused to support them even in this, and it is not yet known whether they have done so. In any case, the march of events has clearly brushed them aside.

As stated, public opinion has, on the whole, received the election arrangements with satisfaction. The parties of Emile Eddé and Béchara el Khoury, finally disabused of the illusion that they were to be allowed to divide the portfolios in the Provisional Government between them, are naturally bitterly disappointed and resentful. Certain sections of uninformed opinion are also inclined to criticise the British authorities for having failed to support President Naccache in what is still regarded as his stand for Lebanese independent rights against French interference, but the majority of the population have been quick to note that the British have had their way on the three points to which they are generally known to have attached importance, namely, the holding of the elections at all, the recall of the 1939 Chamber, and the elimination of the principle of nominated Deputies. Whilst the fear still persists that the elections, especially in the provinces, will be run by the French Conseillers, as in the past, the conviction is growing that the British authorities, who are known to favour free elections, will have their own way in this also. Dr. Tabet, although unpopular on account of his obstinate and cantankerous nature, is generally respected for his integrity and independence of character, and it is realised that the personalities of his two colleagues are of lesser importance now that the principles have been so well laid down.

[E 1918/27/89]

No. 29.

(Secret.)

*Weekly Political Summary No. 52, Syria and the Lebanon, March 31, 1943.—*  
(Received in Foreign Office, April 12.)

#### General.

THE decree appointing a provisional Government in Syria under Ata Bey Ayoubi as "Chef d'Etat" did not, as stated in last week's summary, stipulate that elections should be held within three months, but merely provided for the



convocation of the electoral colleges within that time limit. In this respect the decree differed from that previously issued in the Lebanon, which had stated that elections would be held in three months' time. Immediately before leaving for North Africa, General Catroux issued an *arrêté rectificatif* in respect of the latter, prescribing that in the Lebanon also the convocation of the electoral colleges, and not the elections themselves, should take place within three months. This, perhaps inevitably, has given rise to local rumours that the French intend to postpone the elections indefinitely; but such pessimism is probably unjustified, and if there is any such intention it will be overcome by suitable pressure.

It was not to be expected that the provisional Governments which have been set up would please all sections of the population. The new Syrian Government is being criticised in some quarters for its Nationalist bias, and the Lebanese Government is judged to be too pro-French; but on the whole it is realised that a genuine attempt has been made to secure impartiality of administration during the election period, and the knowledge that the interim Governments have British support has done much to render them acceptable to all but incorrigible malcontents and those whose own hopes of office have been disappointed.

Electoral lists are now in process of compilation, and the various political parties are grouping themselves for the coming contest, but it is not yet possible to prophesy with any degree of certainty how the contending factions will line up. There are, however, already indications that the British insistence on impartial elections and refusal to take sides have had the effect of encouraging the opponents of those who by reason of their influence would under different circumstances have been certain of an easy victory.

The disorders which have occurred in Damascus have not had any important repercussions elsewhere, notwithstanding the fact that the supply situation is precarious in many places.

#### *Wheat.*

Cereal collection during the past week has been hampered by bad weather, and the results are below the average.

A survey of the new crop is now being made, and steps have been taken to ensure that the estimates should be more accurate than those made last year, when the O.C.P. organisation was in its infancy.

#### *Syria-Damascus.*

The disorders reported in last week's summary had ceased by the 25th March, but the town remained closed until the 28th, when the majority of the shops reopened. The curfew which was imposed has now been lifted and conditions have returned almost to normal. The reduction in the bread issue has been maintained, but the ration card system is not yet functioning completely, and a much larger part of the population than is entitled to do so is therefore still buying bread at the special rate applicable to the poor.

On the 28th March His Majesty's Minister called on the new Government, who returned his call later in the day. The Government has on the whole been well received despite its Nationalist bias. Jamil Ulshi and his Government, notwithstanding their protests to General Catroux reported in last week's summary, did what was expected of them and quietly withdrew. Their decision to do so seems clearly to have been due to the realisation produced by His Majesty's Minister's broadcast from Beirut that an obstructive attitude would not meet with British approval.

#### *The Lebanon.*

The election arrangements promulgated on the 18th March have now been discussed locally in all their implications. The bulk of opinion still refuses to believe that interference in the elections can be prevented; and considerable criticism has been directed against the Allies for having installed a Government all three members of which are themselves candidates for the Chamber and for the presidency, and two members of which at least are regarded as particularly amenable to French influence.

Nevertheless the lists of candidates which are taking shape in all districts so far show a considerable measure of independence of spirit, in that candidates openly supported by Conseillers are being opposed by combinations of candidates with much greater electoral strength. The final composition of the lists will not be known for another week or two.

Dr. Ayoub Tabet has so far devoted himself mainly to clearing up some of the administrative chaos left by his predecessor and to informing himself of

certain outstanding questions such as those connected with supply. He has made it clear in conversation that he proposes to keep on good terms with both French and British authorities, without truckling to either, and to work for the establishment of an entirely independent, Christian-dominated Lebanese State. His ministerial declaration, which contained assurances of his determination to promote free elections and expressions of gratitude to both French and British authorities, was satisfactory in tone.

The Beirut pharmacists, having so far received no satisfaction from the French authorities or from the Lebanese Government in regard to their protest against the new French regulations on the importation and sale of pharmaceutical products, are threatening an early closure of all pharmacies.

[E 2152/27/89]

No. 30.

*Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 14.)*

(No. 19.)

Sir,

*Beirut, April 1, 1943.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 14 of the 22nd March, regarding the restoration of the constitutional régime in the Lebanon, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a supplementary decree, dated the 25th March, whereby article 2 of Decree No. 129 F.C. of the 18th March is rectified.

2. The effect of this alteration is to specify a limit of three months, not for the election of a Parliament, but for the convocation of electoral colleges, no date being fixed for the former. In the decrees regarding Syria, copies of which were enclosed in my despatch No. 17 of the 1st April, the convocation of electoral colleges is mentioned in the same terms.

3. The absence of any time-limit for general elections has given rise locally to a certain amount of uneasiness, as it is felt in some quarters that the Fighting French may attempt by this means to introduce further delays in the realisation of the full measure of constitutional life. I have as yet no evidence to show that such is in fact their intention, but the possibility cannot be excluded, and it may be necessary to reassure the public by means of some pronouncement on the part of the two Governments.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Minister of State in Cairo.

I have, &c.

E. L. SPEARS.

Enclosure in No. 30.

LE Général d'Armée Catroux a rendu le 25 mars l'arrêté suivant :

Article 1<sup>er</sup>. L'article 2 de l'arrêté No. 129/F.C. du 18 mars 1943 rétablissant au Liban l'application de la Constitution et modifiant certaines dispositions de cette Constitution est rectifié de la façon suivante :

" Art. 2. La Constitution de la République libanaise promulguée le 23 mai 1926 et modifiée par les lois constitutionnelles du 17 octobre 1927 et du 8 mai 1929 est rétablie, avec les modifications qui y sont apportées par l'article 3 du présent arrêté.

" Le rétablissement de la Constitution prendra effet du jour où la Chambre des Députés, issue d'élections à intervenir et effectuées dans les conditions fixées par l'arrêté du Haut-Commissaire No. 2/LR du 2 janvier 1934 complété et modifié par les arrêtés No. 95/LR du 4 mai 1934, No. 279/LR du 3 décembre 1934, No. 119/LR du 29 juillet 1937 et No. 135/LR du 7 octobre 1937, aura procédé à l'élection du Président de la République conformément aux dispositions des articles 49, 74 et 75 de la Constitution.

" La convocation des collèges électoraux en vue de ces élections devra être effectuée dans un délai de trois mois au maximum à partir de la date du présent arrêté."

Art. 2. Le Secrétaire général est chargé de l'exécution du présent arrêté qui, vu l'urgence et conformément aux dispositions de l'article 3 de l'arrêté 96/S du 14 avril 1925, entrera en vigueur par voie d'affichage à la porte de la délégation générale.



*Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 14.)*

(No. 18.)

Sir,

*Beirut, April 1, 1943.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 199 of the 19th March regarding the restoration of constitutional life in the Lebanon, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the declaration made by General Catroux on the 25th March to the people of Syria, announcing, in generally similar terms, the restoration of the constitutional régime in that country. A translation of General Catroux's declaration is also enclosed.

I am sending a copy of this despatch with second enclosure only to the Minister of State, Cairo, His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad, the High Commissioner for Palestine and His Majesty's representatives at Jedda and Aden.

I have, &c.

E. L. SPEARS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 31.

*Message du Général Catroux au Peuple syrien.*

Syriens!

AGISSANT dans l'esprit traditionnel de la France et en conformité des décisions arrêtées, en accord avec le Gouvernement britannique, par le Comité National Français, j'ai pris, à la date du 25 mars 1943, les mesures propres à assurer la restauration de votre vie constitutionnelle.

Ces mesures sont définies dans trois arrêtés.

L'un d'eux remet en vigueur la Constitution de la République syrienne, à compter du jour où une Chambre des Députés issue d'élections générales à intervenir, sur convocation, dans un délai maximum de trois mois, des collèges électoraux, aura elle-même élu le Président de la République.

Le deuxième arrêté organise les pouvoirs de l'Etat pour la période à courir jusqu'à la remise en vigueur des institutions constitutionnelles.

A cet effet, un pouvoir provisoire simplifié est créé. Il a pour mission essentielle de présider à la consultation populaire d'où sortira la Chambre et se retirera dès que le Président de la République aura été élu.

Ce pouvoir est placé aux mains d'un Chef de l'Etat, Chef de Gouvernement, assisté de trois Ministres d'Etat.

Le troisième arrêté désigne, pour exercer la charge de Chef de l'Etat, son Excellence Ata Bey Ayoubi, ancien Président du Conseil des Ministres.

Cet ensemble de dispositions relève d'une intention fondamentale, celle de résoudre impartialement et démocratiquement le problème de la reprise de la vie constitutionnelle conformément à l'idée de la France, aux principes des Nations Unies et vœux des populations.

Il importe, en effet, à la dignité nationale que la Syrie dispose au Parlement d'une représentation sincère, et que par suite les élections soient soustraites aux influences et qu'elles soient faites dans la liberté, l'ordre et le respect des opinions.

Pour qu'il en soit ainsi, il est nécessaire que le Gouvernement qui présidera aux élections n'ait point un caractère politique et que, réduit au nombre de membres indispensables à la gestion des affaires de l'Etat, il soit dirigé par une personnalité renommée par son patriotisme syrien, son indépendance de caractère, sa probité et son impartialité. Il en est ainsi de son Excellence Ata Bey Ayoubi.

Telle est l'économie des mesures que j'ai prises et tel est leur esprit. D'autres solutions auraient pu être envisagées. On pouvait, en effet, songer soit à en revenir à la situation de 1939, soit à partir du régime actuel. La première méthode eût été légale, car, par le jeu même de la Constitution, les pouvoirs naguère en fonctions eussent pu être remis en place. Mais son Excellence le Président Hachem Bey Atassi, consulté par moi, et mû par un scrupule qui honore son caractère et son désintéressement, a jugé que cette solution devait être écartée. Il a estimé qu'elle préjugerait de la volonté populaire, à laquelle il importe de laisser la pleine liberté de s'exprimer par le recours à des élections directes.

Quant à donner mission au Gouvernement actuellement au pouvoir de présider à la consultation électorale, une incompatibilité de doctrine s'y opposait. On concevrait, en effet, difficilement qu'un Gouvernement formé pour appliquer et qui a appliqué un régime de pleins pouvoirs fût qualifié pour procéder à la restauration du régime constitutionnel et démocratique. En cette affaire

cependant, je tiens à le souligner, les principes sont seuls en cause et non les hommes. Ceux-ci ont servi le pays avec dévouement en dépit des graves difficultés du moment. Un hommage leur est dû à l'heure où ils quittent le pouvoir. Et je me plais à le leur rendre.

Syriens! les fondements de la reprise de votre vie constitutionnelle sont maintenant posés sur des bases saines. Vos libertés publiques vous sont restituées. Vous allez les exercer sans contrainte pendant la période électorale. Je suis assuré que vous en userez avec sagesse comme il convient à un peuple politiquement mûr et qui a conscience de l'importance de l'acte qu'il accomplit en votant. L'Assemblée qui sortira de vos suffrages exercera, vous le discernerez bien, une influence profonde sur l'avenir de votre pays. Pensez donc à la Syrie dans cette grave conjoncture comme moi, qui suis votre ami et qui représente auprès de vous la pérennité de l'amitié franco-syrienne; j'y ai pensé avant d'arrêter mes décisions.

*Damas, le 25 mars 1943.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 31.

*Translation of General Catroux's address to the Syrian people published on March 25, 1943.*

Syrians!

TO-DAY, the 25th March, 1943, acting in the traditional spirit of France and in accordance with decisions reached by the French National Committee in agreement with the British Government, I have taken the steps required to bring about the restoration of your constitutional life.

These steps are defined in three decrees.

One of them restores to force the Constitution of the Syrian Republic from the day on which a Chamber of Deputies, resulting from general elections to be held after the convocation, within a maximum period of three months, of the electoral colleges, has chosen for itself the President of the Republic.

The second decree lays down the system of State control for the period preceding the restoration of constitutional institutions.

For this purpose a simplified provisional authority is created. Its essential task will be to preside over the popular consultation from which a Chamber will emerge, and it will retire as soon as the President of the Republic has been elected. This authority is vested in a head of the State who will also be head of the Government and will be assisted by three Ministers of State.

The third decree designates his Excellency Ata Bey Ayoubi, a former President of the Council of Ministers, as head of the State.

These arrangements are the outcome of a basic desire to solve in an impartial and democratic manner the problem of the restitution of constitutional life in accordance with the ideals of France, the principles of the United Nations and the wishes of the population.

The national dignity requires, in fact, that Syria should enjoy a genuinely representative parliamentary system, and that consequently the elections should be immune from extraneous influences and dictated in a spirit of freedom, order and respect for the opinions of others.

In order to achieve this it is necessary that the Government called upon to preside over the elections should be entirely non-political in character and that, reduced to the minimum number indispensable to the direction of the affairs of the State, it should be controlled by a person known for his Syrian patriotism, independence of character, uprightness and impartiality. Such a person is his Excellency Ata Bey Ayoubi.

Such is the nature of the steps which I have taken, and such their spirit. Other solutions might have been envisaged. One might indeed have contemplated returning to the situation which obtained in 1939, or alternatively taking the present position as a point of departure. The first method would have been legal, for, by the normal action of the Constitution, powers which were still in operation not long since could have been restored. But his Excellency President Hashim Bey Atassi, after consultation with me and actuated by scruples which do honour to his character and his impartiality, decided that this solution must be ruled out. He considered that it would pre-judge the action of the popular will, which must be allowed full liberty of expression by resort to direct elections.

The proposal that the Government at present in power should preside over the elections was considered unsuitable from the doctrinal point of view, since a



government which was created to apply, and has in fact applied, a régime of full powers, can hardly be regarded as qualified to restore constitutional and democratic life. I wish, however, to emphasise in this connexion that the issue is solely one of principle, and not of the personalities concerned. The latter have served their country with devotion in spite of the grave difficulties of the hour. A tribute is due to them at this moment when they relinquish office, and it is a pleasure for me to pay it.

Syrians! The renewal of your constitutional life has now been laid on sound foundations. Your public liberties have been restored to you. You will exercise them without constraint during the period of the elections. I am sure that you will use them wisely, as befits a people politically mature and conscious of the importance of the act which it performs in voting. You are aware that the assembly destined to emerge from your suffrage will exert a profound influence upon the future of your country. Think of Syria in this solemn hour, even as I, who am your friend and represent amongst you the permanence of Franco-Syrian friendship, have thought of it before taking my decision.

[E 2046/27/89]

No. 32.

*Weekly Political Summary No. 53, Syria and the Lebanon, April 7, 1943.—*  
(Received in Foreign Office April 19.)

(Secret.)

*General.*

THERE is intense activity by all political parties, but their groupings are not yet definitely fixed. It is reported that the Nationalists intend to hold a congress in Homs at which it is expected that their electoral lists will be decided upon.

The mass of the population still look upon the coming elections with a considerable degree of scepticism, and find it difficult to believe that they will be different in any way from the unscrupulously conducted contests held in the past. So far as they evince any real interest at all, it is rather in personalities than in party programmes.

Amongst Lebanese politicians the conviction is growing—not without reason—that Dr. Tabet intends to postpone the elections as long as possible and meanwhile to push through a number of long-term legislative measures which might more suitably be held over for consideration by an elected assembly.

The latest successes of Eighth Army have dispelled the slight gloom which was produced by Mr. Churchill's recent speech predicting a long struggle still ahead.

There have been no further disturbances.

*Wheat.*

Cereal purchases for the past week have shown no marked increase over the previous seven days.

The survey of the new crop, mentioned in last week's summary, is proceeding smoothly and rapidly.

The O.C.P., through its Service de Statistique et de Liaison, is taking an ever-increasing part in the feeding of the population. Amongst the many functions which this department has taken over are the issue and control of ration cards, the employment of inspectors to control milling operations, and the provision of officials to inspect bakeries and check waste. It is hoped by these measures to put a stop to many of the abuses which have been so prevalent in the past.

Three groups of Syrian notables, representing the Government services, have been shown over the British field bakeries in the Damascus area in order to convince them that the flour used there is not of Syrian origin. These visits and the publicity given to them have had a considerable propaganda effect on public opinion.

*Syria-Damascus.*

The town remains outwardly calm. A further strike, which began in the early morning of the 31st March, proved abortive, and the few shops which had closed reopened within a few hours. It is believed to have been engineered by the Shahbandarists, who are opposed to the present Government, and possibly

also by the Communists, whose newspaper had been suspended by the Free French authorities; but the realisation that the Government has the backing of the Allied authorities and that the latter will not tolerate any further disturbances prevented this demonstration from obtaining any appreciable popular support. There is still, however, a generally uneasy atmosphere, and the Government is undoubtedly nervous.

Political activity in preparation for the coming elections is still confined to internal reorganisation by the parties opposed to the Nationalists. Every opportunity is being taken to make it known that the British authorities intend the elections to be free, and this is slowly beginning to take effect and to counteract the belief, hitherto firmly held, that the victory of the Nationalists was assured from the moment when the provisional Government was formed.

The press censorship has been somewhat relaxed to permit discussion of political questions, though for the most part persons and parties are not being specifically referred to.

*Aleppo.*

Discontent regarding the food situation is widespread. The position here has for long been much more difficult than in Damascus, and the belief that the recent disorders there achieved their object has greatly increased the temptation to resort to similar acts of violence. The exaggerated rumours which have been circulating about the casualties said to have been suffered by the Damascus rioters have increased the general uneasiness, though at the same time they have probably acted as a deterrent upon would-be imitators. The latter are being watched by the Allied authorities, and it is hoped that this inevitable reaction to the recent troubles in Damascus will soon peter out. In Aleppo itself, stocks are now assured, on the present ration basis, until the end of the month, but there are serious shortages in some of the outlying districts.

*The Lebanon.*

Numerous reports are now circulating in the Lebanon to the effect that the provisional Government is proposing to postpone the actual elections for at least six months and is contemplating an increase in the total number of deputies and the reduction of the electoral districts from the *mohafezet* to the *caza*; and these reports have been echoed in the press. Since any of these measures would radically affect candidates' chances, an increasing degree of nervousness and tension has been noticeable in political circles, and there is a general desire for an official announcement of the actual date of elections, the number of candidates and the method of election.

Anxiety regarding possible interventions by the members of the Government, or by the conseillers, with the object of influencing the formation of electoral lists and, later, bringing pressure to bear on the electorate is also widespread, particularly in the provinces; though this anxiety seems to derive more from a general disbelief in the possibility of fair elections than from any action so far taken by either the Government or the French. The fact that all three Ministers are candidates naturally arouses the suspicion that they will sooner or later abuse their position to favour their own chances; and, until quite recently at least, two of the conseillers (at Tripoli and at Sidon) have in fact been blatantly intervening in an attempt to form pro-French lists, though with a notable lack of success. It is hoped that their activities will for a while become less obtrusive, as a result of instructions to refrain from interference which have now been issued to them and to Free French délégués elsewhere by M. Helleu, following a protest made by Dr. Tabet; but it would be unwise to assume that this improvement, if it takes place at all, will be more than temporary.

Criticism of Dr. Tabet is now crystallising on the lines that he is dictatorial by nature and avid for power, so that he may be expected to use every effort to remain in office as long as possible. Since his accession he has made certain unpopular judicial appointments, and has also brought ridicule on himself by signing decrees promoting six gendarmerie officers to the rank of colonel, when the gendarmerie establishment has never before provided for more than one colonel. Apart from this, the Government has taken no important decisions.

*Creation of a Propaganda Unit.*

Until recently, propaganda for the O.C.P. has been provided by the existing propaganda organisations in Beirut, who have received their information and instructions through a press liaison officer working in the O.C.P. offices in Damascus. Principally on account of the highly technical nature of the O.C.P.'s



activities, this arrangement has proved inadequate. It has therefore been decided to set up a small propaganda unit on the establishment of the O.C.P. and to be housed in its building in Damascus. This unit will have two principal functions: firstly, to contend with immediate propaganda requirements, principally the dissemination of news about the O.C.P.; secondly, to obtain basic data on the consuming and producing markets. For this latter function, it has been agreed to install a small market research unit, to be trained and, in the early months of its operation, supervised by the American University of Beirut.

[E 2203/27/89]

No. 33.

*Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 15.)*

(No. 255.)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, April 15, 1943.

WEEKLY political summary.

There have been demonstrations in Homs for an increased flour ration. No casualties occurred and the town soon returned to normal.

2. Acting Délégué General has been persuaded by His Majesty's Minister and Army Commander to send unsatisfactory Délégué at Deir Ez-Zor on leave pending transfer.

[E 2347/27/89]

No. 34.

*Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 22.)*

(No. 261.)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, April 21, 1943.

WEEKLY Political Summary.

No change in the general situation.

2. Administrative preparations for elections in Syria are proceeding satisfactorily, though no date for holding them has yet been announced. In Lebanon position is much less satisfactory, Dr. Tabet having shown himself determined to put off the elections as long as possible. There are also signs that he is abusing his position to favour eventual election of himself and his friends, who are in many cases the French candidates.

3. Bread situation is still serious at Aleppo and Latakia. At Latakia political situation is also tense owing to unbridled electioneering activities of Muhafez, who is backing Suleiman Murshid and backed by French. There are, however, indications that Syrian Government may shortly intervene to check these activities, which are the cause of considerable agitation amongst Opposition groups.

4. Successes in North Africa and other favourable war news have had a good effect on morale, but there is the usual tendency to anticipate events and under-estimate the strength of enemy's positions.

[E 2484/27/89]

No. 35.

*Weekly Political Summary—Syria and the Lebanon, 28th April, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office, 17th May.)*

General.

PREPARATIONS for the elections continue, but there have been no important political developments.

The Free French authorities and the Syrian and Lebanese Governments have agreed to the recruitment on a voluntary basis of 10,000 Syrian or Lebanese nationals for dilution purposes in His Majesty's forces. The response to the call for recruits has so far been satisfactory. This project should help considerably to solve the problem of unemployment, which is threatening to become serious in many districts where large numbers of men formerly employed by the British military authorities have recently been discharged on completion of the work upon which they had been engaged. On the other hand, care will be taken not to recruit men whose technical qualifications are of value to the economic life of the country.

*Syria-Damascus.*

The Free French authorities are reported to be still in negotiation with the Nationalists for the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian treaty in return for French support at the elections, and are also understood to be demanding the inclusion of certain French nominees in the Nationalists' lists of candidates. The latter have not yet been published, and will probably not be produced until the last moment, owing to the danger of their arousing opposition within the ranks of the party.

The Turkish Consul in Damascus, who has been called to Angora to report, informed the political officer before his departure that his Government had now reversed their former opinion that some form of French control was desirable in Syria, and considered that the policy of independence should be implemented. He also said the Turkish Government were anxious for an improvement in frontier control between Turkey and Syria. In addition, he referred to the growing activities of the Syrian Communist party, which he said were causing his Government some concern.

*The Lebanon.*

Steps were taken during the week to convey to Dr. Ayoub Tabet the British concern at the reports of his overt interference in the electoral campaign and of his alleged intention to postpone the date of elections, to increase the number of Deputies and possibly to change the electoral areas. Reports received subsequently indicate that this expression of British dissatisfaction has caused him considerable anxiety. He has admitted to intervening in favour of candidates whom he considers to be good elements, and against one whom he regards as "anti-Lebanese," but professes now to be abandoning all such action in view of the adverse comment it has caused. He maintains his desire to postpone the elections until well after the harvest, in order to put into effect a long-cherished scheme of social reform, but declares his readiness nevertheless to fix the date earlier if he receives a formal request from the French authorities to do so. He favours a slight increase in the number of Deputies in view of the increase of population since the last census, but agrees that it is too late to change the electoral areas.

It was found that Dr. Ayoub Tabet's systematic opposition to all candidates belonging to Bechara-el-Khoury's party arose from his belief that a secret agreement existed between the British authorities and Bechara-el-Khoury under which the latter, if he became Lebanese President, would work to include the Lebanon in a scheme of Arab federation which the British were promoting. Reports in this sense have recently been circulated by Bechara-el-Khoury's political adversaries, as an electoral manoeuvre designed to frighten those who, like Dr. Tabet, strongly oppose any political connexion between the Lebanon and the Moslem Arab States. The necessary assurances were given to him that the reports were without foundation.

The sensation of the week has been the arrest of the notorious Tripoli politician, Rashid Mokaddem, and six members of his family, by the S.I.B. as a result of the discovery in the cellars of their house of a large quantity of opium. Rashid Mokaddem, whose smuggling activities have for years been common knowledge, is an associate of the French Conseiller at Tripoli and of the present Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jawad Boulos, and has recently been charged by Dr. Tabet with the formation, with Jawad Boulos, of an electoral list designed to oppose that of Hamid Bey Frangieh. The arrests resulted from an attempt on the part of the Mokaddems to suborn British military personnel, as they had succeeded in doing in the past, and were thus doubly justifiable; the Conseiller's attempts to prevent them on the grounds that they would cause disturbances in Tripoli have so far proved groundless, and the population are, on the contrary, delighted that action should at last have been taken against one whose misdeeds have for years been connived at by the French. On the other hand, it is more than probable that the French authorities will attempt to whitewash the Mokaddems in order to reassert their influence in the district.

A somewhat similar incident has also occurred in South Lebanon, where the customs officials have seized a small quantity of opium in the car of Ahmed el-Assad, the strong Shia candidate who has of late been proving recalcitrant when the French Conseiller attempted to impose an electoral list on him. Here, however, it is probable that Ahmed el-Assad will be able to cast the blame on his chauffeur, although he has also long been a notorious smuggler.



The many hundred Lebanese who received invitations to the pre-view of the film "Desert Victory" on the 21st April appear to have been suitably impressed by this manifestation of British military might.

Complaints arising out of the redistribution of Lebanese ration cards are steadily diminishing, as it is generally realised that the British authorities are making a serious attempt to clean the Augean stables of the Lebanese Ravitaillement department. Criticisms are, however, bound to continue from those interested parties who realise that a useful instrument of political pressure is being removed from their grasp.

[E 2642/27/89]

No. 36.

*Weekly Political Summary, No. 57, Syria and the Lebanon, 5th May, 1943.—*  
(Received in Foreign Office, 12th May.)

*General.*

THERE has been no important change in the political situation.

Steady British pressure is being brought to bear on the Lebanese head of State to arrange for early elections, to cease from private electioneering activities and to avoid long-term legislative schemes. On all but the first point this pressure has already proved sufficient; and it is hoped that with the assistance of M. Helleu, who is in complete agreement as to the need for early elections, Dr. Tabet will be brought into line very soon on this score also.

As harvest time grows nearer, anxiety regarding the cereals position is diminishing, and although in certain areas, especially in remote hilly districts, the situation is still very precarious, there is now less danger in urban centres of famine and consequent disorders than was the case even a few weeks ago.

On the other hand, the general economic situation is critical. The high cost of living shows no signs of falling; on the contrary, the wholesale prices of commodities continue to rise. The local governments have proved themselves powerless to deal with the situation by imposing direct taxation, which is strenuously opposed by the landowning and commercial classes; and, in view of the serious consequences which are likely to result if the present inflationary tendency is allowed to continue unchecked, measures are being studied by the British authorities for the control of the prices and distribution of essential commodities.

*Wheat.*

Preparations for the collection of the coming harvest continue.

*Syria—Damascus.*

The Nationalists, led by Shukri Quwatli, continue to be preoccupied with the question of securing French backing at the elections in return for an undertaking to negotiate a Franco-Syrian treaty; but as in addition they wish subsequently to participate in the movement for Arab federation, for which they realise that British support is essential, they have also been making advances to the British authorities. The British policy of non-intervention in the electoral contest has been fully explained to Shukri Quwatli, who has been told that, if as a result of free elections he and his party come to power, the British authorities will be prepared to co-operate fully with him, but that meanwhile British support will be given neither to his nor to any other party.

The Ministry of Social Affairs, formed by Munir Ajlani, Minister of Youth and Propaganda in the late Sheikh Taj-ed-Din's Government, has been abolished. Its propaganda functions have been absorbed by the new revived Press Department of the Ministry of the Interior, but that part of the Ministry which was concerned with the scout and youth movements and was Munir Ajlani's especial personal interest has been suppressed.

A meeting arranged by the Communist party has been vetoed by the Free French Délégué on the grounds that public political meetings are still forbidden.

Professor Sami Midani, a prominent Nationalist, has been appointed Dean of the Faculty of Law in the Syrian University in place of Faiz el Khoury, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs.

A very successful reception was held on the 28th April to celebrate the opening of His Majesty's Legation in Damascus. It was attended by the members of the Syrian Government, representative leaders of all political parties and

sections of the community, the consular corps, leading Free French officials, and the British colony.

Mgr. Spellman, Roman Catholic Archbishop of New York, visited Damascus on the 27th April and was met on arrival by General Collet. He appears to have confined himself to ecclesiastical affairs.

The first of the co-operative stores for Government employees and pensioners, the creation of which was foreshadowed in Summary No. 47 dated the 24th February, was opened on the 29th April by the head of the Government. The prices of the goods available in this store (food-stuffs and a few locally manufactured articles) are about half those ruling on the open market.

*The Lebanon.*

On the 27th April Dr. Ayoub Tabet held a press conference at which, after recounting the various measures he was in process of instituting for the betterment of the Lebanon, he gave out to the journalists as a subject for debate in their columns the question of when they thought the elections ought to be held.

It was already clear that at that time Dr. Tabet felt determined in his own mind to resist British pressure for early elections, and that this device of a press referendum was merely a procrastinating manoeuvre; for the severity of the censorship and control of newsprint is such that many newspaper proprietors would hesitate to express views at variance with those which Dr. Tabet is known to hold, so that no reliable conclusion could be drawn from their publications on the subject. In the event, rather less than half the press seems to have had the courage to plump for early elections, whilst the other half favoured postponement.

Rashid Mokaddem is still detained, and the British authorities, military and civil, are combining efforts to induce the French to consent to his deportation from the country, along with a number of his relatives and followers, on the grounds of his undesirability in general and his attempts to suborn British military personnel in particular. The opinion expressed at the time of the arrests by the French Conseiller at Tripoli, that disturbances were to be apprehended in that district, has been belied in the event, for the region has remained entirely calm and the population in general are delighted that this notorious gangster, whose misdeeds have for twenty years been connived at by the French authorities, has at last been dealt with as he deserved.

The formation of electoral lists in the five provinces of the Lebanon is practically at a standstill, the delay in announcing the date of elections and the freely expressed intention of Dr. Tabet to postpone them having given rise to a general and undesirable impression that no decision on this point will be made until General Catroux's return; hesitating candidates, therefore, prefer not to commit themselves for the present. In two of the provinces, North Lebanon and Mount Lebanon, the strong lists formed in opposition to the supposed Government candidates still stand; in South Lebanon, the two powerful Shia candidates, Ahmed el-Assad and Adel Usevran, have agreed to agree but are finding difficulty in deciding on a joint list; while in the Beirut and Bekaa districts the position is still entirely fluid.

[E 2798/27/89]

No. 37.

*Weekly Political Summary No. 58.—Syria and the Lebanon, 12th May, 1943.—*  
(Received in Foreign Office, 24th May.)

*General.*

NO visible progress has been made with election preparations, and political activity is still confined to private meetings and discussions between party leaders. The reluctance of the provisional Governments in both States to make any decisive move is giving rise to misgivings that the elections may be postponed indefinitely; and in certain Syrian circles, both Nationalist and Shahbandarist, the view has been expressed that they are being deferred at the behest of the French authorities to allow time for a French Government recognised by the Allied nations to emerge from the negotiations which are at present proceeding between Generals de Gaulle and Giraud. Such a development would undoubtedly



place the French in a much better position to negotiate a treaty with the local Governments, but there is as yet no clear proof that they are deliberately delaying the elections with this object in view.

The fall of Tunis and Bizerta has naturally given great satisfaction, but has not produced the reactions of relief which followed the victory at Alamein, when the Axis threat to the Middle East was more imminent. For the majority of the population the war is regarded as over, in so far as it might have threatened their material well-being, and it is significant that the price of gold, which fell sharply after the Axis defeat at El Alamein (Weekly Summary No. 32 of 1942), has to-day reached the highest level yet recorded, *i.e.*, £S. 60 to the sovereign.

Further increases have also taken place in the prices of textile goods and other commodities, and serious anxiety is beginning to be expressed about the economic situation.

#### *Wheat.*

Public anxiety in Beirut over the wheat situation has now very largely died down, partly owing to the proximity of what is generally expected to be a good harvest and partly because it is generally realised that the Supply Department, with its increased British participation, is now functioning with increased efficiency. The quality of the flour supplied is also thought to have improved recently.

#### *Syria-Damascus.*

There is no important political activity to report.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has suggested to the Political Officer that the delay in the announcement of elections was due to the lethargy of the head of the State, who had been influenced by the procrastination of the Lebanese Government, and the preoccupation of the other ministers with current administrative affairs, but he undertook to do his best to stir the Government to action.

Owing to the constantly increasing cost of living the Syrian civil servants have made strong demands for an advance of two months' salary, which, on the analogy of a previous advance of the same kind, would never be repaid. The total cost of this measure would be about £Syr. 3 million. It has been pointed out to the Government that the only real remedy for the present serious economic situation is the imposition and firm application of direct taxation and a policy of strict price control.

Unfortunately, the efforts which the Government made recently to apply the income-tax law which was voted last year has been frustrated by the Damascus merchants. It had been agreed that Aleppo merchants should pay 50 per cent., those of Damascus 40 per cent., and those of Homs 10 per cent., of a fixed sum of £Syr. 1½ million for the fiscal year of 1942. The Damascus Chamber of Commerce, however, entrusted with the task of fixing the amounts to be paid by its members, showed such discrimination and injustice in its assessments by making Christians and Jews, not represented in the Chamber, responsible for more than half the sum required that a deadlock has been reached. The law has also been modified to exempt shareholders of companies which pay income tax in respect of their dividends, and this provision will doubtless be used as a means of tax evasion.

The head of the Syrian gendarmerie, Colonel Tashin Anbari, has been appointed Director of the Ministry of Defence, as his command has been given to Colonel Rafic al Azmeh, reputed to be a tool of the Nationalist party. It is possible that the transfer may be a political move on the part of the provisional Government. The appointment of Abdul Ghani Qodmani to replace Colonel Ibrahim Qassab Hassan as Director-General of Police is also regarded as a manoeuvre on the part of the Nationalists, for the new director is known to belong to the *bloc*.

#### *Aleppo.*

Procrastination on the part of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments has given rise to doubts about the prospects of reasonably fair elections, and reports that the Nationalists may not participate in them. It is hoped that much of this uncertainty will be removed in the near future, as Shukri Quwatli has now arrived in Aleppo, following a visit to Damascus by Saadullah Jabri, and it is expected that a reconciliation will be arranged between the rival political groups.

#### *The Lebanon.*

The political officer visited Dr. Ayoub Tabet on the 4th May, and in the course of a long and very friendly conversation explained to him the main reasons which caused the British authorities to favour early elections in the Lebanon. Dr. Tabet, who had obviously been shaken by the intimations conveyed to him that his expressed intention of postponing the elections had displeased us, was at pains to make it clear that he only wished to remain in office for a few months in order to conclude his programme of fiscal reform, and professed himself as willing to fix the date of elections forthwith if the British and French authorities were unanimous in desiring it. On the same day His Majesty's Minister ascertained from M. Helleu that he was fully in agreement with the British view on this subject, and a message was accordingly sent to Dr. Tabet on the 5th May with the suggestion that he should himself approach M. Helleu and take action to fix the date of elections. Dr. Tabet agreed to do so, and the result is awaited.

Dr. Tabet has, however, in the meantime been enquiring when the Syrian elections are to be held, stating that he sees no reason to fix the date in the Lebanon until the date has been fixed in Syria. In view of reports from Damascus and Aleppo (see above), it would seem that simultaneous action in Damascus and Beirut will be necessary to break out of this vicious circle.

The Maronite Patriarch, who has already published in the press, in response to Dr. Tabet's invitation for a newspaper discussion on the subject, his opinion that early elections were desirable, reaffirmed this view in the course of a courtesy visit paid to him by His Majesty's Minister on the 6th May. He also argued that candidates should be compelled, before presenting themselves for election, to take an oath of fidelity to the ideal of a separate and independent Lebanese State; but was left in no doubt that, in the British view, this was incompatible with the principles of democracy, which demand that the electorate must be left to decide for themselves on a candidate's views.

Dr. Tabet has issued two measures calculated to enhance his popularity, one allowing substantial increases in the cost-of-living bonus on officials' salaries, the other a Workmen's Compensation Act. He has also laid down a procedure by which citizens whose complaints or claims have not been heeded by the department to which they were addressed can insure that they are given attention.

The population of North Lebanon has quickly come to believe that Rashid Mokaddem and his gang will not after all be acquitted and released.

Lebanese and French representatives attended a ceremony held on the 6th May to commemorate the so-called "Martyrs' Day," but British representatives were not invited, probably because that it was made clear a year ago that they did not wish to be associated with a ceremony which might be held to be directed against the Turks.

[E 2956/27/89]

No. 38.

*Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 21.)*

(No. 298.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Beirut, May 20, 1943.*

WEEKLY political summary.

The lull in political situation continues owing to the prolonged uncertainty about the date of election.

2. Shukri Quwatli has arranged a temporary truce between rising Nationalist factions in Aleppo and hectic situation has now returned to normal.

3. Messages of congratulation on Allied victory in Tunis have been received from the heads of two States and provincial officials but most of the Nationalist leaders have maintained a negative attitude.

4. Prices continue to rise and gold pound sterling has now touched £S. 64.

[E 3102/27/89]

No. 39.

*Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 27.)*

(No. 309.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Beirut, May 27, 1943.*

WEEKLY political summary.

There have been no important political developments but interest in election has shown a tendency to increase as impression that they may not be long delayed gaining ground.

[26155]



2. Anxiety over economic situation is increasing and a serious crisis may occur unless drastic action is taken. The gold pound has reached £S. 71.

3. Shops were closed in Beirut from 20th May to 24th May following demonstrations by poorer Moslem elements in protest against reduction of flour ration from 9 to 7 kilog., although reduced ration was supplemented by an issue of rice. No disorders occurred.

[E 3260/27/89]

No. 40.

*Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 4.)*

(No. 322.)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, June 3, 1943.

WEEKLY political summary.

Provisional electoral lists have now been published in Damascus. Allowing for statutory delays for dealing with objections, the Syrian electoral colleges should be convoked by 20th June in which case primary election would be held by the end of the month and secondary election by end of July. In consequence, the Lebanese *chef d'Etat* has been asked to set election machinery in motion in Lebanon but has declined to take any action until date of election has been officially announced by the Syrian Government. In view of Catroux's satisfactory reaction when approached in London further pressure is being brought to bear on Tabet.

2. Evidence has been accumulating that Fighting French authorities are pursuing a policy of political representation in order to influence electorate. Several supporters of candidates opposed to known French nominees have already been arrested on [group omitted]st of pretexts and others have been subjected to intimidation by officials of *Sûreté Générale*. The Fighting French acting *Délégué Général* has been informed that these activities have not passed unnoticed and that they will be effectively countered if they continue.

3. Ban on export of capital has been lifted (see my Remac 10) and price of gold has fallen sharply from 73 on 25th May to 55 to-day.

4. A further deputation from Alaouite territory has visited Damascus to petition Head of State for removal of Mohafez.

5. A new Fighting French *Délégué* has been appointed provisionally in Jezireh provinces.

[E 3386/27/89]

No. 41.

(Secret.)

*Weekly Political Summary, No. 62: Syria and the Lebanon, 9th June, 1943.—(Received 21st June.)*

General.

ELECTORAL lists have now been posted throughout Syria, except in Aleppo, where they are expected to be published during the coming week. Administrative preparations for the elections will then be complete, and the electoral colleges can then be convoked. The head of the Government has therefore undertaken to announce the election date as soon as the Aleppo lists have appeared.

In the Lebanon, M. Helleu has informed the head of the Government that it is General Catroux's desire that elections should take place both in Syria and the Lebanon early in July, and Dr. Tabet has therefore agreed to announce on the 25th June that elections will be held after the lapse of the statutory period, i.e., on or shortly after the 10th July.

It is yet too early to assess the extent of the local reactions to the agreement reached between Generals de Gaulle and Giraud, but it will certainly be regarded as strengthening the French position here, and will thus have a generally depressing effect. On the other hand, one by-product of this agreement, viz., the announcement of M. Helleu's appointment as Free French Delegate-General in

Syria and the Lebanon, in succession to General Catroux, and the realisation that the latter will not therefore return to the Levant States, have greatly disconcerted politicians, such as Jawad Boulos, the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, who were counting on the General's strong arm to hoist them into Parliament.

The fall in the price of gold which was reported last week has not been fully maintained, and no appreciable reduction in commodity prices has taken place in the Levant States as a whole. The markets are, however, much steadier, and the danger of a serious inflationary crisis has been at least temporarily averted.

Wheat.

Collections over the past seven days have improved considerably, due partly to the incoming harvest and partly to the rice exchange.

During the past week ten lend/lease lorries were taken over by the O.C.P., making up the O.C.P.'s fleet to 250.

Fourteen British officers recently arrived from India to join the O.C.P. bring up the total of British officers on the O.C.P. to over fifty.

Syria—Damascus.

Despite the imminence of the elections, no party has yet produced a definite list of candidates; and it is becoming increasingly evident that not even the Nationalists are yet sufficiently united to be able to take this decisive step. The Shahbandarists are trying to lead the Opposition, but their position, already weak owing to their lack of prominent leaders, is being undermined by the efforts which the Nationalists are making to persuade their followers to join the new and wider Nationalist party. In addition, a new element has been introduced into the situation by the return from Egypt of Haki Bey el-Azm, a former Prime Minister and head of the Government, who is also aspiring to the leadership of all anti-Nationalist elements with a view to his own return to power, preferably as President; but his chances of success are regarded as very poor.

The Government has nominated a commission to revise the income tax assessments recently imposed by the Damascus Chamber of Commerce on Christians and Jews, who had refused to pay the tax owing to the discrimination shown against them (see Summary No. 58 of the 12th May).

In the paragraph in last week's Summary reporting the demand made by the Armenian community for representation in the new Parliament it was wrongly stated that the minimum numerical qualification for the representation of any community was 3,500. The correct figure is 3,001.

Alaouite Territory.

The Syrian Government has decided to send Bahij el-Khatib, Secretary-General of the Ministry of the Interior, to Lattakia with M. Grellet, French adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, to examine the local situation. Both Bahij Bey and M. Grellet have privately informed the British Political Officer in Damascus they consider the transfer of the Mohafez to be desirable, and that they intend to study means of removing him without causing his opponents to gain too much prestige from his downfall. It is thought possible that when Bahij Bey and his colleague have finished their investigations the head of the State may himself visit Lattakia to endeavour to reconcile the local factions.

It will be recalled that Bahij Bey el-Khatib was also charged by the Government some weeks ago with the investigation of the Ban Jenneh dispute (see Summary No. 56 of the 28th April) which he recommended should be settled by arbitration. Suleiman Murshid has now agreed to this procedure, and has undertaken to abide by whatever award may be given by the arbitration commission which is to be appointed.

The Lebanon.

Although Dr. Tabet has agreed to announce elections in the near future (see under "General," above), he is making no secret of his reluctance to relinquish office. In conversation with the political officer and others he has expressed his disappointment that he is not being given more time to carry out the social reforms in which he is interested, and has questioned the desirability of holding elections at all, maintaining that the country would have been best served by the continuance of his own semi-dictatorial régime, under which new and better political elements could gradually have been introduced into public life. He has, nevertheless, reasserted his intention of loyally carrying out his undertaking to proceed with the elections.



It has again been necessary to address a strong protest to M. Hellen concerning the activities of the French Conseiller at Sidon, who has been openly intervening in the formation of the electoral lists for the South Lebanon district. The ambassador, who admitted having failed to carry out his promise that M. Pruneaud would be ordered to cease meddling in politics (see Summary No. 54 of the 14th April), has now promised once again to instruct the conseiller not to interfere.

The unexpected death on the 4th June of Hikmat Bey Jumblat, Minister for National Defence and Public Health in the Solh Cabinet, simplifies the electoral position in the Mount Lebanon district, as Hikmat Bey commanded a considerable following, but had not yet made it clear whether he would support or oppose the strong constitutional list in his district.

[E 3501/27/89]

No. 42.

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary—Syria and the Lebanon, No. 63, dated 16th June, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office, 28th June.)*

### 1. General.

THE predominant element in the general political situation is, at the moment, the controversy centring around the position of the Mohafez of the Alaouite territory.

The Nationalists, who for some time have been showing signs of uneasiness about their receding chances of obtaining an overwhelming majority at the coming elections, and have in consequence been striving to widen the scope of their party, have become fearful of a French plot to undermine their position by encouraging the separatist tendencies of minority elements in the Alaouite territory, so as to constitute, with similar elements in the Jezireh and the Jebel Druze, an opposition sufficiently strong to hamper or even outvote the Nationalists in the new Parliament. As a result, both Hashim Atassi and Shukri Quwatli are demanding the dismissal of the Alaouite Mohafez, and are threatening to boycott the elections if the existing situation is allowed to continue. Shauqat Abbas, for his part, is reported to have been making overtures to Shukri Quwatli through intermediaries, and may yet succeed in buying the latter's indulgence with promises of future support despite the antipathy between them. The head of the Syrian State has so far obstinately resisted all pressure for the removal of this corrupt official. Fear of the French is undoubtedly one of his motives, but he is believed also to be counting on the support of Shauqat Abbas for his candidature as President—a motive which may well have contributed towards galvanising Hashim Bey to demand the Mohafez's dismissal.

### 3. Syria—Damascus.

Constant pressure has been maintained upon the Syrian Government to announce the date of the elections, since all electoral lists, including those of the Aleppo area, have now been published. The head of the State eventually promised to make the announcement on the 25th June. His reason for this delay has not yet been ascertained, but is probably due to the wish to keep in step with the Lebanese Government.

In a recent conversation with His Majesty's Minister, Shukri Quwatli once more threatened to boycott the elections, expressing the fear lest his party might find themselves faced in the new Parliament by a hostile majority of Deputies returned by unfair means (notably in the Alaouite and Jezireh provinces). He was urged to consider very carefully the implications of such a step, which could hardly fail to damage the prospects of his party and might seriously prejudice the position of Syria at a later date. As a result, he seems to have decided not to act precipitately, but is still in doubt as to what course to pursue.

A decree issued on the 2nd June forbidding banks and other financial institutions to grant credit facilities has been bitterly resented by local speculators, who have threatened to close their shops unless the measure is withdrawn. So far the Government has stood firm.

### 4. Aleppo.

Electoral lists were posted in this area on the 10th June, thus completing the administrative preparations for elections throughout Syria.

The truce recently concluded between the local Nationalist factions is being substantially maintained, although the completion of a combined list of Moslem candidates for Aleppo has been causing some difficulty as the claims of Assad Gorani, who was Minister of Justice in the Ulshi Cabinet, are being pressed by Dr. Kayali in opposition to those of Sheikh Sarmini, a partisan of Saadullah Jabri's.

The Communist party have held two fairly well-attended meetings, which were addressed by Khaled Baghdash, the leader of the party in Damascus. On both occasions the speeches were unobjectionable.

### 5. Homs and Hama.

The electoral battle which is taking place in the Alaouite territory (see below), is having important repercussions in this area, and Hashim Bek Atassi is reported to have threatened that the Nationalists will not participate in the elections unless the Mohafez of Lattakia is removed and certain political internees from the Alaouite territory are released. Faidi Bek Atassi, the Minister of Justice, who recently visited the Free French Délégué in Homs, is reported to have persuaded him to use his influence, through his brother, the Délégué in Lattakia, to secure the removal of the Mohafez, stating that the Government feared that they would be unable to control the Alaouite territory so long as the present Mohafez held office. The Free French Délégué in Lattakia is understood to have replied that he could not intervene in a matter which was for the Syrian Government to decide. This reply was, of course, quite correct in point of form, but it is well known that Colonel Des Essars is supporting the Mohafez.

In Hama Nationalist influence continues to be paramount, despite the allegations of the relatively weak opposition that the *bloc* is backed by the French.

The landowners, whose efforts to obtain higher prices for their cereals (see Summary No. 60 of the 26th May) have so far failed, are now proposing to send deputations to Damascus to lay their claims before the Government.

### 7. Alaouite Territory.

Bahij Bey el-Khatib has now completed the examination of the local situation with which he was charged by the Syrian Government (see last week's Summary). It is understood that, as a result of his investigations, he will advise the Government to introduce sweeping changes in the Alaouite administration, including the revision of legislation issued during the period when the territory was under direct French rule, the gradual elimination of incompetent officials and the replacement of certain judges and magistrates by civil servants from other parts of Syria. As a first step towards the realisation of the latter part of his programme, he has already given orders to the Mohafez to make no new appointments without reference to the Central Government. (From the point of view of the elections this order is unfortunately very tardy.) As regards the Mohafez himself, it is believed that Bahij Bey will recommend that he should be maintained in office for the time being, on the grounds that the onus of carrying out the administrative changes described above will thus be thrown upon Shauqat al-Abbas rather than upon a non-Alaouite official. In view of his known friendship for Shauqat, this recommendation must be regarded as suspect.

It thus seems unlikely that the Syrian Government will take any decisive action and, in fact, the head of the State, who was recently approached on the subject, was evidently reluctant to intervene. There are, however, indications that the Nationalists, fearing that the French are supporting Shauqat al-Abbas in order to ensure the election of anti-Nationalist Deputies in the Alaouite territory, so as to later form the nucleus of an effective opposition to the *bloc*, are themselves pressing Shauqat to resign. Partial confirmation of this has been afforded by Ali Abdul Karim Dandashi, one of Shauqat's supporters, who describes Shukri Quwatli as prepared to receive the Abbas clan into the Nationalist fold on condition that Shauqat resigns from office.

Dandashi admits that Shauqat is now extremely uneasy, and says that he is prepared to co-operate with the British in any way, including the withdrawal of his support from Suleiman Murshid, if they will accept his collaboration. He is even prepared to resign forthwith if the British authorities insist upon his



doing so. Doubtless he feels that, if the British are really determined to get rid of him, he may as well accept Shukri Quwatli's offer of support for his family at the price of his own resignation.

To these indirect soundings the inevitable reply has been returned that, while it is for the Syrian Government to decide whether or not Shauqat Bey should continue in office, he would be well advised in his own interests to mend his ways, and in particular to drop Suleiman Murshid.

#### 8. *Euphrates and Jezireh.*

It is becoming clear that the new Free French Délégué at Deir ez-Zor is unlikely to prove any more co-operative than was his predecessor. His attitude to the British Political Officer is one of undisguised hostility, and he has also been in conflict with the local British Military Commander, whose right to order the closure of the frontier he has refused to recognise. The matter has been taken up with the higher Free French authorities in Beirut, who have undertaken to send a senior official to Deir ez-Zor to investigate the situation.

## CHAPTER VI.—SAUDI ARABIA.

[E 3326/3326/25]

No. 43.

*Personalities in Sa'ûdi Arabia.*—(Received in Foreign Office, 9th June.)

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#### *Note on Titles, &c.*

1. *Sherif*.—Said to apply strictly in Arabia to persons recognised as being in the direct male descent from Hasan, the son of the Caliph Ali. There is, however, much confusion as to the exact meaning of this and the following term.

2. *Seyyid*.—Said to apply in Arabia, though much abused in some other countries, only to persons recognised as being in the male descent from Huseyn, the son of 'Ali.

3. *Amir*.—Given as a title to all princes of the blood and describes the office of practically all provincial governors.

4. *Sheykh*.—Applied very widely, but not indiscriminately, not only to tribal personages, but to townsmen of consequence, especially, perhaps, though not exclusively, to those in official positions, *e.g.*, Sheykh Yusuf Yasin.

5. *Bey*.—Still used, sometimes in preference to Sheykh, by persons who would have been so called by right or courtesy in the Turkish system and who may dislike the association of "Sheykh" with age or desert life, *e.g.*, Fuad Bey Hamza.

6. *Hajji*.—Convenient, in a country where every Hejazi adult has made the pilgrimage, for certain persons not otherwise easy to give a title to, *e.g.*, Hajji Yusuf Zeinal.

7. *Effendi*.—Still applied to persons hardly entitled to be called Sheykh or anything equally honorific, *e.g.*, Muhammad Effendi 'Ali Ridha.

8. *Ibn, &c.*—Means, like its variant, Bin, "son of," or by extension, "descendant of." Replaced sometimes by the article "al," which it is not always easy to distinguish from "âl," meaning "of the house of." All four forms are illustrated by the name of the King, "'Abdul-'Aziz ibn (son of) 'Abdurrahmân al (son of) Faysal âl (of the house of) Sa'ûd," and the abbreviated names ibn Sa'ûd or bin Sa'ûd. The use of the patronymic "Ibn So-and-So" is so common as often to make a man's personal name difficult to trace.

9. *Abû*.—Means "father." Used in combination with the name of an actual son or the name of an object to form a familiar name or nickname, which sometimes becomes an accredited surname. Thus, Colonel Glubb is known in the desert as "Abû Hunaik," or the father of the Little Jaw. Similar names are sometimes formed from other terms of relationship.

10. *Composition of Names*.—The most normal formation is to build from a person's own name by adding that of his father and sometimes names of remoter ancestors and/or a family name. It is not uncommon to omit at least the first Ibn and place the father's name immediately after that of the person described, *e.g.*, Abdullah Ibrahim al-Fadhl. It cannot be assumed, however, that the second of two unseparated names is that of the father, especially if the first be Muhammad, which is often little more than a prefix.

11. The following index gives, except in two cases, the first name of all living Arabs mentioned otherwise than incidentally in the report, but where Muhammad appears to be no more than a prefix it is reduced to M. and ignored for purposes of alphabetical order. Secondary entries have been made in many, but not in all, cases, where a patronymic or a family name seems likely to help to trace particular individuals:—

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4.

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'Abdullah ibn Hasan. 12 (1)

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### 1. Royal Family.

(1) *'Abdul-'Aziz ibn 'Abdur-Rahmān al-Faysal al Sa'ūd.*—King of Sa'ūdi Arabia, commonly known as Ibn Sa'ūd.

Born probably in 1882. Accompanied father on flight from Riyādh upon its occupation by Ibn Rashid in 1891. Grew up under tutelage of Sheykh Mubārak of Kuwait, who gave asylum to family. Seized opportunity in course of local warfare in Eastern Arabia to deliver surprise attack on Riyādh in January 1902 with very small force and retook it. Became recognised head of the family although his father 'Abdurrahmān survived until 1928. Extended his authority gradually over whole of Nejd and Qasim and in 1914 took the coastal province of Hasa from the Turks, who then made an agreement with him. Entered into treaty relations with His Majesty's Government through the Government of India in 1915. Took Hail in 1921 and finally destroyed power of Beni Rashid. Next fought King Huseyn, an old enemy. Took Mecca in 1924 and completed conquest of Hejaz by compelling abdication at end of 1925 of Huseyn's son and successor 'Ali. Acquired suzerainty over 'Asir in 1926. Converted position into one of practical sovereignty in 1930 and later reduced 'Asir to status of ordinary province, following on repression of a rebellion there. Consolidated this position by the Saudi-Yemen Treaty of Taif of the 20th May, 1934, which secured his legal title to 'Asir and Najrān. Has thus become ruler of territory, seaboard of which extend from just south of Aqaba to just north of Medi in Yemen and from Kuwait neutral zone to north of Qatar Peninsula.

Ibn Sa'ūd has measured his titles by his acquisitions. He became in 1902 Amir of Nejd and Imām of the Wahhābis; in 1921 Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies; in January 1926 King of the Hejaz; in 1927 King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies; and finally in September 1932 King of the Kingdom of Sa'ūdi Arabia, defined as a single and united State, comprising his existing dominions, though without express mention of 'Asir.

The hero of this spectacular aggrandisement is a man of fine presence, some 6 foot 3 inches in height and handsome except for a blotch across the left eye due to neglected leucoma. He combines a strong character with courage, much native shrewdness and a charm which, though now a little stereotyped, is still attractive. He is feared rather than loved by his subjects on all of whom except those of the Shi'a persuasion he imposes at least the forms of Wahhābism. His own Wahhābism is sincere, but tempered by a readiness to compromise when his temporal position requires innovations contrary to the prejudice of extremists or sometimes even to the original principles of his sect. On his own ground he is an efficient ruler and a hard one, a Napoleon of the desert, but too much of the desert to cope quite successfully with the problems with which his conquest of the Hejaz and his attainment of an international position have confronted him. In diplomacy he is normally fairly honest, but difficult. He is as well disposed towards foreigners as is compatible with his fundamental belief that Islam is all in all. He has tried a strong constitution very high by living hard and by innumerable marriages. It was reckoned some years ago that he had already had over 200 wives, though never more than the permitted four at a time. He is known to find the natural decline in his powers in this direction disconcerting. In 1938 it was observed that he walked slowly and stiffly, and Mr. Philby stated



that he was not only averse to physical exertion, but also indifferent to public affairs; but he subsequently showed great activity of mind in the Palestine discussions.

Was made a G.C.I.E. in 1920, but does not now greatly prize an honour which he considers too reminiscent of a past connexion with the Government of India only and in some sense vassalish. Received the G.C.B. in November 1935, at the time of the visit to Riyadh of Sir Andrew Ryan. His relations with Great Britain have been mainly friendly, and for the last three years or so he has acted as though he firmly believed in his repeated asseverations, that his interests and those of the Arabs in general are bound up with those of His Majesty's Government. In earlier editions he was described as expecting much for love, but his attitude throughout the Palestine crisis of 1937-39 entitles him to the cancellation of that description. He has been unwavering in his sympathy for the Allied cause throughout the present war and he has proved by his acts that he is ready to give "his friends, the British Government," every support possible in his peculiar and only partly civilised country short of involving Sa'udi Arabia in the war, which, he convincingly argues, would be less useful to His Majesty's Government than his present "neutrality."

The King's eldest son Turki died in 1919, leaving issue. The following is a list of the King's immediate relatives, many of whom also have issue. Philby's *Arabia* is probably the best English authority on the Sa'ud family as a whole, but does not claim to be absolutely accurate.

#### Sons. All Amirs.

(2) *Sa'ud ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz*.—Born at Kuwait in 1901 or early 1902 of a lady of Saudi stock. Has for some years been Viceroy of Nejd, and until 1934 seldom visited the Hejaz. Until 1935 he was less travelled than his half-brother, Amir Faysal, having only left the country once when he went to consult an oculist in Egypt shortly after the "Mahmal" incident of 1926. In 1935, however, he visited Europe and visited several capitals including London where he stayed about five weeks (he received the G.B.E. on that occasion), and he represented Saudi Arabia at the Silver Jubilee and at the Coronation of His Majesty King George VI. In 1940 he visited India.

Sa'ud's designation as Heir to the Throne was formally announced on the 11th May, 1933. He resembles his father in appearance and physique. Also suffers from eye trouble, but has inherited Ibn Sa'ud's "magnetic smile." Said to have had some schooling from Dr. 'Abdullah Damlûji and Sheykh Hâfiz Wahba, but to be in the main untutored. May in other respects be a chip of the old block, but has had little opportunity of displaying his quality to Europeans. Is strongly Islamic, but since his return from Europe has shown many signs of a broadened outlook and little, if any, of the fanaticism which seemed to characterise him earlier. Had commanded on the Eastern front in the Saudi-Yemen war. He now affects a European style of entertaining—even serving afternoon tea to his English visitors—and prides himself on his skill in the management of Christian cutlery, to the amusement of his father, who calls him "Sa'ud the Civilised." He professes a desire to see Sa'udi Arabia progress on Western lines (*e.g.*, introduction of air communications, modern architecture, &c.). He claims that he himself designed his country house at Badia near Riyadh, the amenities of which include a swimming pool. He owns a cinema projector and gives regular showings of British news films. When His Majesty's Minister visited Riyadh in February 1942 Sa'ud broke with Arabian custom by inviting the ladies of the party to dinner. His eldest son, Fahad, was born about 1925, and was married to a daughter of the Amir Faysal, No. 1 (3), in May 1943.

(3) *Faysal ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz*.—Viceroy of the Hejaz in his father's absence and permanently President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Interior, and, in theory, War. Born of a lady of the family of 'Abdul-Wahhâb in or about 1905. Educated partly by Sheykh Hâfiz Wahba. Reported intelligent and has at least had more opportunity than most of his brothers of cultivating his intelligence and powers of observation as he has lived mostly of late years in the comparatively civilised surroundings of Mecca and has travelled in Europe: in 1919, when he was in England; in 1926, when he visited England, France, Holland and perhaps other countries; and in 1932, when he headed the Sa'udi mission which visited London and many other capitals. In physique a much feebler version of his father and elder brother owing to excessive delight in the harem from his youth upwards; possibly also to the use of alcohol and possibly to a tubercular tendency, though neither is proved. Very listless and rather nervous in European company, but can rise to an occasion, as he showed in

1932 by playing his part in London, albeit that of a figurehead, with a good deal of distinction. His decorum is not known to have broken down until he reached Kuwait, where his indulgence in night-life scandalised the Sheykh and his subjects. Believed not to see eye to eye with his father and joined in the onslaught by Fuad, Philby and others on Ibn Sa'ud's principal henchman, 'Abdullah Suleymân, in October 1931. Although 'Abdullah Suleymân had the best of this in the end, the King has continued to treat Faysal with consideration. Received many decorations during his tour in 1932, including an honorary G.B.E. In 1935 showed surprising dash as a horseman in races held at Riyadh on occasion of Sir Andrew Ryan's visit. Reported to have married in October 1935 a daughter of his aunt Nura (see 1 (23)). Represented Saudi Arabia at the London discussions on Palestine in 1939, and seems to have played the part well. In the last two years or so he has acquired much more self-confidence and tries to fill his rôle as Foreign Minister by showing an up-to-date knowledge of events. He talks freely and intelligently in the company of Europeans whom he knows. He has none of his father's picturesqueness of language, but speaks a very pure Arabic, clearly enunciated, with little trace of the Nejdî accent which all his brothers possess. On occasion he is capable of acting with firmness within the instructions given to him by the King, as was shown in the expulsion of the Italian Minister in February 1942.

(4) *Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz*.—Born in or about 1913. Headed the Sa'udi forces which entered Medina in 1925. Was made acting Viceroy when the Amir Faysal went abroad in 1932, but got beyond himself and was replaced by his brother Khâlid. Met Faysal at Kuwait on his return and shared in the bout of dissipation there. Visited the United Kingdom with the Amir Saud in 1937 and 1938. Lives mostly at Riyadh, visiting the Hejaz only for the pilgrimage. Said to be popular with the tribes. Appears to be being brought gradually into his father's counsels; was present, together with the Amir Sa'ud, at several interviews between His Majesty's Minister and the King at Riyadh in March 1942.

(5) *Khâlid ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz*.—Born in or about 1916. Acted as Viceroy of the Hejaz in 1932 (see (4) above). Visited the United Kingdom with the Amir Faysal in 1939. Full brother and constant companion of Amir Muhammad (4) above.

(6) to (27). Sons of 20 and less in 1939 numbered twenty-two. The following is a correct list in order of age: Nâsir (1920), Sa'd (1921), Fahad (1921), Mansûr (1921), 'Abdullah (1922), Bandar (1924), Sultân (1924), Musâ'id (1927), Mish'al (1927), 'Abdul-Muhsin (1928), Mûshari (1932), Muteb (1933), Talâl (1933), 'Abdur-Rahman (1933), Turki (1934), Badr (1934), Nawwâf (1934), Nayef (1935), Fawwâz (1936), Ma'jid (1937), Sulmân (1938) and (?) (1939). Two of them, Mish'al and Sultân, are said to be adopted sons, of the family of the Beni Rashid.

Mansûr, No. 1 (9), deserves separate notice. A favourite of his father, he is perhaps alone among the King's sons in being interested in something other than political gossip, field sports and domestic pleasures. He likes machines, personally sees to the maintenance of his cars and spends a good deal of his time at the Royal garage in Riyadh. Usually in charge of arrangements when the King moves from Riyadh to the Hejaz or to camp, and is said to be responsible for the maintenance of the electrical installation at the Royal Palace at Riyadh. Visited Egypt in March 1942 as the guest of the British Commander-in-chief. On his return to Jedda he gave an interview (with his father's approval of his remarks) to a representative of the B.B.C., which was recorded in the Royal Palace at Jedda and later broadcast from London. He owns a cinema projector.

#### Brothers. All Amirs.

(28) *Muhammad ibn 'Abdurrahmân*.—Said to be a little older than the King and to be a hard and stubborn man on whom Ibn Sa'ud keeps a tight rein. Reported in 1926-27 to be a fanatical Wahhâbi, married to a daughter of Ibn Bujâd (*q.v.*); to be in sympathy with the extremists, whose opposition to Ibn Sa'ud was then growing; and to have left Mecca in anger. Was, nevertheless, in charge at Riyadh in autumn of 1926, and was said to have got increased powers there. Now seldom heard of except on the occasion of journeys between Mecca and Riyadh. Might play a rôle in the event of his surviving the King, though said to have acquiesced in proposal in 1932 to make Sa'ud heir. Has several sons, one of whom is married to a daughter of the King. Aged and infirm, but still takes a great interest in agriculture, especially fruit-growing. In 1938 his eldest son, Khâlid, who was popularly regarded as the chief rival of the heir apparent, was killed in a motor accident.



(29) and (30). Sa'd and Sa'ud, who died in 1916 and 1939 respectively. The former left three sons: Faysal, Sa'ud and Fahad; and the latter two: Muhammad and Faysal.

(31) 'Abdullah ibn 'Abdurrahman.—Born about 1894. Described as neat and spruce in appearance and as ambitious in character, so that King keeps him also well in hand. Seems to like ships, as he visited H.M.S. *Emerald* by special request in 1926 and H.M.S. *Clematis* with King's younger sons in 1928. Like the Amir Muhammad (No. 28), whose close companion he is, he takes a keen interest in agriculture. Accompanied King on pilgrimage and visit to Jedda in 1942.

(32) to (35). Ahmad, Musaid, Sa'd and 'Abdul-Muhsin.—Younger men, the children of the old age of 'Abdur-Rahman ibn Faysal.

'Arâif Branch. Also Amirs.

Certain of the King's cousins are dealt with in separate notices, but a general mention may be made of the 'Arâif as being members of a senior branch of the family by virtue of descent from Sa'ud ibn Faysal, an elder brother of the King's father and a former ruler at Riyâdh. Their generic name of 'Arâif is one applied to raided camels, subsequently "recognised," as the root implies, and recovered by their owners. It seems to have been given to them because they had remained in the hands of the Beni Rashid, but escaped to Ibn Sa'ud in the course of battle in 1904. Some of them rebelled against him in 1910, but the present members of the family form portion of the King's posse of satellite princes. Although inconspicuous, they might produce a claimant, by right of senior descent, to the throne. Various names are given in the *Almanach de Gotha* and Philby's *Arabia*. The most important of these princes, who bear individually the surname of al-'Arafa, would appear to be—

(36) Sa'ud ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud ibn Faysal.—Married the King's sister Nûra. Seems to play a certain rôle in Ibn Sa'ud's entourage. Probably the same Sa'ud al-'Arafa who was described in a recent report from Kuwait as being, according to a reliable informant, a friend of the 'Ajman tribe and secretly hostile to Ibn Sa'ud. Daughter reported to have married Amir Faysal (*q.v.*) in October 1935.

## 2. 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Ibrahim.

Governor of Medina (technically Acting Governor *nice* the King's son Amir Khâlid, who never actually held the post) until May 1936, when he was replaced by Abdullah as Sdayri (No. 86 (1)). Had the reputation of being a severe and arbitrary Governor. Was Governor of Abha in 1926 at the time of the clash between the Ikhwan and the Yemeni pilgrim caravan, the 'Usba, in the Wadi Tanuma. In 1936 appointed a member of the Council of Ministers.

## 3. 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Mu'ammâr.

Governor of Jedda until June 1935, when he was appointed Governor of Taif in the room of Amir Abdullah, maternal uncle of Amir Faysal (No. 16 (2)). Born in or about 1904. Comes of a former ruling family of Nejd, apparently the same Beni Mu'ammâr of Ayaina, who were prominent in the early days of the Wahhâbi movement and are mentioned several times in Philby's *Arabia*. Brought up principally at Riyâdh. Was Governor of Yanbu' for some time and earned a good reputation there. Was appointed to Jedda in August 1932, with the title of Amir, on the death of Hajji 'Abdullah 'Ali Riza, a leading local merchant who had been governor with the old title of Qaimmaqam since King Huseyn's time. He is good-looking and pleasant, but pretentious, probably on the score of his blue blood. He was keen on riding and other forms of sport until afflicted by paralysis in 1939. He went to India for special treatment in March 1941, but returned incurable in October 1941. Now completely deaf and unable to walk.

## 4. 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Musaid ibn Jiluwi ibn Sa'ud.

Second cousin to the King. Governor of Hâil since 1925 or earlier. Said by the Sheykh of Kuwait in March 1932 to be only 40, but to have aged greatly owing to worry. Was much in evidence in 1929 as one of the King's right-hand men at the time of the Akhwân rebellion. Came into prominence in February 1930, when, apparently without the King's authority, he conducted a raid on the scale of a punitive expedition, which it was, in fact, intended to be, into Transjordan. Disavowed by the King at the time, but maintained in his governorate. Was in November 1932 put at the head of the principal force despatched to reduce the 'Asir rebels, and proceeded from Riyâdh to 'Abhâ and

Jizân, where he assumed supreme command of the forces in 'Asir. Said then to be intended for the Governorate-General of the whole 'Asir area, but eventually returned to Hâil. A man for occasions requiring drastic action. Appointed inspector of the frontier area on the Sa'udi-Iraq frontier in 1936, duties he combines with those of Governor of Hâil. In 1939 was said to have aroused suspicion at Riyâdh as having designs on the throne which he might try to carry out on the death of Ibn Saud.

## 5. 'Abdul-'Aziz (ibn Hamûd) ibn Zayd.

Inspector of Beduin in Transjordan frontier area. Born probably about 1897. Comes of a Hâil family said to be related to the Beni Rashid. Said to have been educated in Constantinople. Sent to 'Ammân in summer of 1926 to discuss claims in respect of raids, and attended with two other Sa'udi delegates an abortive conference at Ma'an in September. Was one of the two Sa'udi delegates on tribunal which sat at Jericho from February to May 1927 in accordance with the Hadda Agreement. Was later an Assistant Governor of Jedda. Sent to 'Ammân in August 1930 as Sa'udi agent at the MacDonnell investigation regarding raids. Appointed Inspector of Beduin in the frontier region in January 1931, and has since the 3rd June, 1931, held meetings at long intervals with Captain Glubb, his opposite number in Transjordan. Personally amiable, but will take no responsibility without reference to the King. From 1936 to 1938 was inspector of the whole Transjordan-Saudi frontier, under a scheme for dividing the northern frontier area into three sectors under inspectors with wide powers. In May 1943 was appointed Saudi Consul at Damascus in succession to Rusheyd Pasha (No. 82 in 1939 report).

## 6. 'Abdullah ibn Blayhid.

A leading figure among the Wahhâbi Ulema. Comes from Hâil. Qâdhi of Mecca after its occupation by Ibn Sa'ud, and was described in Eldon Rutter's account of him (1925-26) as a "bent and wizened little man." Appointed Grand Qâdhi of the Hejaz in January 1926. Was instrumental in May 1926 in obtaining a *fatwa* from seventeen Ulama of Medina in support of the Wahhâbi policy of destroying tombs. Head of the Nejd delegates at the Moslem Congress of June 1926. Again visited Medina in November of that year in attendance on the King and in the company of 'Abdullah ibn Hasan (see 16 (1)), bent on purging the place of iniquity as Mecca had been purged. Vacated post at Mecca in 1928 and returned to Hâil. Was thought at that time to favour the extremists of the Akhwân movement. Still visits Mecca at intervals. Thought to be embarrassing in high places owing to his frankness and fanaticism. Signed the pronouncement by the Ulama of Nejd in favour of Jihâd at the time of the Ibn Rifâda rebellion in 1932.

## 7. 'Abdullah Kâzim.

A Hejazi said to be of Cossack origin. Born about 1887. Was employed in the Mecca Post Office in King Hussein's time. Appointed Sa'udi Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in 1926 and still holds the post. Went to Port Sudan in March 1926 as one of Ibn Sa'ud's delegates to negotiate about the E.T.C. cable and showed himself an obstructive negotiator. Was again pretty sticky in taking delivery of Marconi wireless in 1931-33, but created a good impression at the time of the cable and wireless negotiations in the spring of 1935.

## 8. 'Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn 'Aqil (or 'Aqayil).

In 1926 Governor of Jauf, but had vacated the post by March 1928, when he was put in command of a force sent to quell the disturbance created at Wejh by Hamid ibn Rifâda. Probably identical with the ibn 'Aqil who was mentioned in May 1931 as a possible candidate for the governorship of Tebûk, but was not appointed. 'Abdullah ibn 'Aqil commanded the Ikhwan mobilised in June 1932 to repress the further rebellion of Hamid ibn Rifâda.

## 9. 'Abdullah ibn Muhammad al-Fadhl.

Vice-President of the Legislative Council and Assistant Viceroy. Probably born about 1883. Principal member of the Fadhl family *q.v.* Was formerly a merchant in Jedda. Described in 1917 as "anti-Sherif and pro-English" and as going by the sobriquet of "Englisi" in Jedda. Put in prison at that time in Mecca for some unknown offence. Played no particular rôle subsequently (and was so little valued for brain-power as to be known as "the Sheep") until ex-King 'Ali sent him on



a delegation to negotiate with Ibn Sa'ūd at Mecca. Went over definitely to Ibn Sa'ūd and acted as his representative at Rabigh for the 1925 pilgrimage, in which employment he is said to have feathered his nest. Attached to the King's son, Muhammad, as adviser when the young Amir occupied Medina later in 1925. Figured as a Hejazi delegate at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Obtained about the same period, in partnership with Indians settled in Mecca, a contract for motor transport, but lost it. Did better as purveyor to the Government. Sent on an unsuccessful mission to Eritrea in 1927 in connexion with negotiations for the recognition of Ibn Sa'ūd by Italy and proposed treaty arrangements. Also had some part in the treaty negotiations with Great Britain. Became assistant to the Viceroy at Mecca and so on to appointment to his present post in or before 1929. Went in that year on a mission to Persia. Alleged in the same year to have done nicely in the company of 'Abdullah Suleymān by cornering benzine, &c., just before new duties were imposed. Appears to enjoy the King's confidence in a high degree and to steer an even or waggly course between rival factions. Not impressive in appearance or conversation; still somewhat of a sheep; but wears his recent dignities with an acquired air of dignity, sobriety and sagacity, which may be a part of his success. May still have commercial interests, but has long been dissociated from the business of the other Fadhls. Acting Viceroy during Faisal's absence in 1939.

10. *'Abdullah an-Nafisi.*

Important as being Ibn Sa'ūd's agent at Kuwait, where he is established as a merchant and once did a large business in rice, &c. Now elderly and less active. Seems sensible.

11. *'Abdullah ibn Suleymān al Hamdān.*

Minister of Finance. Born about 1887. Of plebeian 'Aneyza origin. Started life in a small way with the Qusaibis, originally, it is said, as a coffee boy. Spent ten years as clerk in their Bombay office. Returned to Nejd about 1919. Said to have gone bankrupt as a broker. Recommended by the Qusaibis to replace his brother, who had died, as a clerk in the King's Diwān. Rose to be head of the Diwān. Became Director-General of Finance and had acquired complete control of all financial matters by September 1928, when it was remarked that he travelled in greater state than the King himself between Mecca and Jedda. Has since been the most powerful of the King's advisers. His position was strongly assailed in October 1931 by a cabal, which included the Amir Faysal, Fuad Hamza, 'Abdullah al Fadhl (perhaps a doubtful enemy) and Mr. Philby. Was sent for a time to lend a hand with the Tawil mission in Hasa, but had his place kept warm for him and returned to it. Was promoted in August 1932 from being Director-General of Finance to the post of Minister of Finance for the Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies, thus obtaining the title of Wazir, hitherto enjoyed only by the Amir Faysal. Continues to be supreme in the financial administration and has his finger in many other pies, being in effect Comptroller of the Privy Purse, Grand Master of Ordnance, Quarter-Master-General on occasion, general manager of the King's establishment of slaves and pilgrimage-organiser. Appointed in 1935 to the specific additional post of Deputy Minister of Defence. Probably entirely faithful to the King, whose needs he supplies at the expense of others having demands on the Treasury, and who gives him a free hand in finance regardless of the effect on public opinion. A man of rather mean appearance, but emphatically a "live wire." Ready and energetic in conversation and full of ideas about development. In recent years has often spent long periods at Jedda acting as the representative of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, taking turns in that duty with Yusuf Yasin. His relations with His Majesty's Minister improved greatly as contacts increased after the outbreak of war. On all occasions he has expressed pro-British sympathies, and, no doubt because he realises more clearly than any other of the King's advisers his country's complete dependence on British aid, has shown himself very reasonable and co-operative. The main burden of dealing with the Italian Minister's procrastinations and evasions in January and February 1942 fell on him and he acquitted himself very creditably. He is the originator of the agricultural development scheme at Al Kharj and shows great energy and enthusiasm in the face of much hostility, envy and ill-natured criticism from his brother advisers. A keen fisherman and a tireless traveller, his other pleasures include tobacco, and, it is rumoured, the bottle. He has a good sense of humour and repartee sharpened in many verbal battles with his rivals.

12. *Abdul-Wahhāb, Descendants of.*

The following seem to be the most notable of the descendants of the founder of Wahhābism:—

(1) *'Abdullah ibn Hasan.*—Is one of the leading Wahhābi Ulema in Mecca. Played a rôle in 1926, with 'Abdullah ibn Blayhid (*q.v.*), in the Wahhābi purging of the Holy Cities, and was in 1929 thought, like him, to favour the Ikhwān extremists. Signed the pronouncement of the Ulama in favour of Jihād at the time of the Ibn Rifāda rebellion in 1932. Now Grand Qadhi. Proud and fanatical.

(2) *Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-'Azīz ibn Sheykh,* nicknamed as-Sahābi, formerly Governor of Taif, transferred to Riyādh in 1932 as Assistant to the Amir Sa'ūd.

(3) *'Abdul-Latif Family.*—Four sons and a probable grandson of a descendant named 'Abdul-Latif were among the ten signatories of the declaration of Jihad referred to under (1). No. (2) and the mother of the Amir Faysal (*q.v.*) also probably belong to this connexion.

13. *'Abdul-Wahhāb Abū Malha.*

A personage of consequence in 'Asir, possibly of the Sheykhly family of Malha near Sabya, although this cannot be affirmed. Was described in 1927 as Director of Finance in 'Asir, and was in that year one of four delegates sent by Ibn Sa'ūd to negotiate with the Imām Yahya. Probably still has the title of Director of Finance and commanded the Sa'ūdi forces which entered Sabya in November 1932.

14. *'Abdur-Ra'uf as-Sabbān.*

Born in the Hejaz probably between 1888 and 1893. Grandson of an immigrant from Egypt. Educated in the Hejaz and in Egypt. Associated with his father, Hasan, and others in what was in 1917 the principal hide and skin business in Jedda and Mecca. Impressed the Hejazis at that time by his knowledge and European manners. Was made Director of Education in Jedda, but was dismissed and reverted to trade in cotton goods and skins. Edited in 1925 the anti-Sa'ūdi paper *Al-Umma* in Cairo with the help of one of the Dabbāghs. Given a post by the Amir 'Abdullah as manager of his estates in Transjordan in or before 1931. Was an active supporter of the Hizb-al-Ahrār-al-Hijāzi, and was concerned in 1932 in the press propaganda and financial arrangements of the outside promoters of movements against Ibn Sa'ūd. Seems to have gone at least once to Eritrea in this connexion. Was dismissed by the Amir 'Abdullah in the autumn of 1932 as a result of these political activities, but went on with them. Excluded from Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan, whereupon he retired to Bagdad, where he was understood to have become a private secretary to the late ex-King Ali. Returned to the Hejaz with or at the same time as Ahmad-al-Mujallid in July 1935, and was appointed in 1936 a member of the Legislative Council. In 1938 did some propaganda for Ibn Saud in Egypt. Appointed Director-General of Waqfs in December 1942 in succession to Seyyid Abdul-Wahhab (No. 17 in 1939 report).

15. *Muhammad Sa'id al-Kurdi.*

Formerly Director of Police in Jedda. Of Kurdish origin, from Zakho. Was previously Director of Police at Rabigh and gave offence to the Legation by trying to commandeer a car which was taking the Nawab of Bahawalpur to Medina. Was transferred to Jedda in 1932 and confirmed in the post early in 1933. Seems to be supported by persons in high quarters, including probably Mehdi Bey (*q.v.*), and, not improbably, the Amir Faysal and Fuad Bey Hamza. A man to watch but not to judge too hastily. Rides a horse, a thing now unusual in Jedda, and looks well on it. Was removed from his post in Jedda and apparently reappointed to Rabigh in 1933. Officer Commanding troops in Jedda in 1936, in which capacity he was in charge of aviation during the presence of the Italian Air Mission 1937-39. According to a Russian pilot, showed ability and a real desire to learn about aviation. Was cultivated assiduously by the Italian pilot, probably received bribes from him, and learned Italian. Very anti-British when the Palestine trouble was at its height.

16. *'Abdur-Rahman al-Bassām.*

Second Assistant in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Educated in Egypt. Speaks English. Helped Sheikh Yusuf Yasin with the English versions of the Sa'ūdi-Koweit Agreements signed at Jedda in April 1942.



## 17. 'Alī Taha.

Assistant Governor of Jedda since 1928, and, in addition, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs since early in 1932. A Hejazi born about 1894. Rose from a small post as secretary to the Governor. Cadaverous and unhealthy. Speaks Turkish well. Well meaning, and not without intelligence, but frightened of his own shadow. Completely ineffective, except on the rarest possible occasions, in connexion with foreign affairs. Normally serves as no more than a transmitter of messages to and from Mecca.

## 18. Bujād (or Humayd) Family.

A leading family in the notoriously fanatical Ghutghut section of the 'Ateyba tribe. A confusing effect is produced by the use in past reports of the names Sultān ibn Bujād, ibn Humayd ibn Bujād and ibn Bujād *tout court*, but they would appear all to apply to one and the same man. This is assumed in what follows regarding:—

(1) *Sultān ibn Humayd ibn Bujād*.—Once one of Ibn Sa'ūd's stalwarts and one of the commanders of his troops when they took Mecca in 1924. Had a daughter married to the King's brother Muhammad. Noted early in 1927 as one of the extremists who were then inclining against the King. Became reconciled with him later, but finally stood in with Ibn Sa'ūd's opponents in the Nejd rebellion of 1929 and was accounted second only to Faysal ad-Dawish in importance. Was one of the earlier leaders to fall into the King's hands and was imprisoned at Riyādh in the spring of that year. Appears to be still in close confinement, as no record has been found of the death of Sultān ibn Bujād, the best known of the names cited above, and "ibn Humayd" was mentioned in a recent report as one of the prisoners who were receiving more lenient treatment than before, though, unlike the others, he was still not allowed to see his womenfolk. May still prove important, as he had a strong hold on his tribesmen, some of whom have been reported sullen over his imprisonment.

(2) *Nāif ibn Faysal ibn Humayd*.—A pretender to the chieftainship of the 'Ateyba, but moved to 'Iraq in 1924, having been ousted by No. (1). Played with the idea of recovering his position in June 1929 and sent a minor relative, 'Obeyd, to spy out the land, but was apparently dissuaded by King Faisal from going ahead. Mentioned in 1932 as being still a refugee in 'Iraq and as a possible aspirant to the hand of Mazyūna, sister of Faysal ad-Dawish, but the engagement or marriage was denied.

## 19. Dabbāgh Family.

A Mecca family of "Moorish" (i.e., some North-West Africa) origin. Appear to be Seyyids. Became prominent in 1932 in connexion with plot behind the revolt of Ibn Rifāda and the preparations for the retarded revolt in 'Asir. The family is numerous. Certain members of it still reside in the Hejaz, including two who were arrested and deported to Riyādh in June-July 1932, viz:—

- (1) *Ibrāhīm ibn 'Abdullah* and
- (2) *'Isa ibn 'Abdullah*.

More important are the following persons abroad:—

(3) *Huseyn ibn 'Abdullah*, brother of the above. Migrated to Mokalla in or about 1926. Has since done school-mastering in South-West Arabia and has been an active intriguer against Ibn Sa'ūd. Went to India in 1927 to enlist support for the Hizb-al-Ahrār al-Hijāzi and their National Pact. Sought, and probably enlisted, the support of Shauqat Ali, who, with his brother, had been violently at loggerheads with Ibn Sa'ūd at the Moslem Congress of June 1926. Went to Egypt and perhaps to Transjordan in 1929. Said to have attended Moslem Congress at Jerusalem in December 1931, when persons concerned in Hizb-al-Ahrār seem to have devised a pendant organisation called Jami'at ad-Dif'a lil-Hijāz. Was using Aden as base early in 1932, but left in summer owing to adverse attitude of British authorities and seems to have since worked mainly in Eritrea. Now excluded from Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan. Returned to Aden in 1936 and allowed to stay there. Opened a school, but soon began to send anti-British articles to Egyptian papers. Left for the Upper Yafa' country, where he engaged in anti-British propaganda. Probably financed by the Italians.

(4) *M. 'Alī ibn 'Abdullah*, another brother. Less conspicuous, but also very active. Took a hand in the actual revolt in 'Asir. Reported drowned at Jizān, but report was contradicted later.

(5) *M. Tāhir ibn Mas'ūd*, uncle of the above. Described as "an egg-shaped man." Born in 1890. Had some employment under King Huseyn. Obtained British-protected passport at Cairo in 1926 on strength of alleged subjection to Sultan of Mokalla. Author of letter from Lahej to Amir Shākir of the 20th February, 1932, which fell into hands of Sa'ūdi Government and revealed plans of conspirators. Seems to have gone further east, as he arrived at Aden from Singapore early in June 1932. Has since been very mobile, visiting Eritrea, Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan and 'Iraq. Was excluded from Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan. Was understood in January 1933 to be heading back to Massawa, and perhaps thence to Aden and the Hadhramaut. Made his peace with Ibn Sa'ūd after promulgation of amnesty early in 1935. Returned to Sa'ūdi Arabia that year and in 1936 was appointed Director of Education. Suspected of being involved in the Sherifian plot, 1940-41, but later pardoned by the King.

Other members of the family need not be enumerated, but they all seem to hang together and to have *attaches* with Hashimites. One, Mas'ūd, a hanger-on at 'Ammān, was closely concerned in the Ibn Rifāda affair and was killed with Ibn Rifāda. The family also have *attaches* with the Idrisis, although there is nothing to explain one mention of (3) above as Huseyn bin 'Abdullah ad-Dabbāgh al-Idrisi.

## 20. Dawish Family.

A leading family in the Mutayr tribe. Its best-known member, Faysal ad-Dawish, famous as a raider, as one of Ibn Sa'ūd's principal lieutenants and as a rebel against him, died as a State prisoner at Riyādh in October 1931. His name is, however, still potent in Eastern Arabia, where he was regarded as more than an ordinary sheikh—a kingly man and a king maker. This gives importance to his sons, two of whom have figured in reports from Kuwait.

(1) *Bandar ibn Faysal ad-Dawish*.—Still a young man. Said to be looked to by the Mutayr as the leader they desire, but to be himself very cautious and unwilling to move at present. Reported in December 1932 to have countered a question by Ibn Sa'ūd as to whom the Mutayr wanted for a leader by saying "No one but Your Majesty."

(2) *Al-Humaydi ibn Faysal ad-Dawish*.—Visited Ibn Sa'ūd at Riyādh in the autumn of 1932, when the King was making efforts to reconcile the ex-rebel Mutayr and 'Ajmān, still hostile to him, and was well received and rewarded.

The ladies of this family seem to count. The political agent at Kuwait, who had befriended them when Faysal was surrendered to Ibn Sa'ūd in January 1930, was visited by various of them on several occasions in 1932. They included Faysal's mother, who hid bitter hatred of the King beneath copious praises; a sister, whose rumoured marriage to a Harb Sheykh was regarded as an augury of reconciliation between his tribe and the Mutayr, but was afterwards denied; and a cousin, still a woman of considerable charm and humour, who had been married to Sheykh Mubārak of Kuwait, to a deceased son of Faysal ad-Dawish and, lastly, as prize of war, to Ibn Sa'ūd's brother 'Abdullah.

## 21. Fadhl (al-Fazal) Family.

Nejdis of 'Aneyza origin long settled in the Hejaz. An original 'Abdullah had at least five sons, all now deceased, with one possible exception. Each of these had issue. Members of the first and second generations after the original 'Abdullah were concerned in firms doing important business in the Hejaz and India, where they had a high reputation, enhanced by their position as business agents of Ibn Sa'ūd, until 1930. Family differences and bad trade led to the collapse of their business at Bombay and Karachi in that year. The two partners most actively concerned in the business in India absconded to the Hejaz, where a third tried to dissociate himself from the partnership. The affairs of the family have for some years been the subject of very complicated litigation and have engaged the attention of various British authorities for reasons too long to recapitulate. The family still have influential connexions in the Hejaz, and several members of it have been given employment by Ibn Sa'ūd. Apart from 'Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn 'Abdullah, who is the subject of a separate notice, the following deserve mention:—

(1) *Muhammad*, son of the 'Abdullah just mentioned. In business in Jedda and does a tidy trade in grain.

(2) *Ibrāhīm ibn Abdurrahmān*.—One of the two who absconded from India in 1930. Appointed a member of the Legislative Council in October 1930. Became later a secretary to the Amir Faysal. Was called on to resign, ostensibly on grounds of ill-health, by Amir Faysal. He is now living in Mecca and engaged



in trade in an unimportant way; but is still said to enjoy the confidence of Amir Faysal.

(3) *Muhammad ibn Abdurrahman ibn 'Abdullah*.—Was a partner in the firm which collapsed in India in 1930, but resided in Jedda and tried to dissociate himself from the other partners, his brother and cousin.

(4) *'Abdullah ibn Ibrahim ibn 'Abdullah*.—Private secretary to the Amir Faysal in 1926. Afterwards one of the partners who absconded from India. Selected in 1931 for the post of Chargé d'Affaires in Holland, under scheme which did not materialise for having a Legation there with the Sa'udi Minister in London as Minister. Appointed Treasurer to the Government later in 1931, as a result of the cabal against 'Abdullah Suleymân. Later became Director of Finance in Jedda, then Government representative to the California-Arabia Standard Oil Company at Dhahran and now Saudi representative for supply matters in Bahrein. Speaks English.

(5) *Ibrahim ibn Suleymân al 'Aqil*.—Son-in-law of father of (4), and has taken the place of (2) as Rais-ul-Diwan of the Amir Faysal. Is an important official and enjoys Amir Faysal's complete confidence. Accompanied him to London in 1939 for the Palestine discussions. As a young man spent considerable time in India. Speaks a very little English and some Urdu. A man of culture and pleasing manners.

## 22. *Fahad ibn Zu'ayr*.

Late Governor of 'Asir. Was head of the mission sent to 'Asir in May 1930 to make the arrangements which subsequently culminated in its practical annexation by Ibn Sa'ud. Was later appointed Amir, though probably not the first to hold the post. Reported to Ibn Sa'ud with increasing urgency in the autumn of 1932 that the Idrisi was getting beyond himself. The Idrisi, professing complete loyalty to the King, complained bitterly of Fahad's rough treatment. The King, anxious to placate the Idrisi, steered a middle course and sent a commission to investigate. Before it could reach the spot the Idrisi had gone into open revolt and Fahad had to escape from his seat of government at Jizân. Was little heard of for some time afterwards, but was appointed Governor of Qunfida in or about June 1933.

## 23. *Fawzan as-Sabiq*.

Sa'udi Chargé d'Affaires in Egypt and consul-general in Cairo. Appointed in August, 1936, upon the conclusion of the Sa'udi-Egyptian Treaty of May, 1936. Previously Sa'udi agent in Egypt. Born about 1888. Belongs by origin to the 'Uqayl, the guild, as it were, of recognised caravan-guides. Educated in a Turkish school at 'Ammân. Said to have lived for many years in Bombay. Is by profession a dealer in camels and horses and still appears to do this business. Was Ibn Sa'ud's agent in Damascus before 1924. Moved in that year to Cairo, where he became Saudi Chargé d'Affaires in 1937. Is described by Mr. Smart as a devout Moslem, plain, slow, courteous and old-fashioned; politically rather innocent, but possessed of a certain native shrewdness. He is never used by Ibn Saud for important political work.

## 24. *Fuad Bey Hamza*.

Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born about 1900, he is a Druze of Abeih, in the Lebanon, where the family are less prosperous than they were. One brother Sa'id was accused of complicity in the murder of a Christian priest at Abeih in 1930, but was finally acquitted in April-May, 1934. Educated in Turkish schools in Syria, the Teachers' Training College, Beirut, and the Syrian Protestant College, Beirut. Was Inspector of Schools at Damascus for a time. Obtained a post as clerk under the Palestine Department of Public Health in 1921. Resigned after a few months and took service under the Department of Education as a teacher in Acre. Transferred in 1922 to a secondary school in Jerusalem as teacher in English and remained until 1926. Studied simultaneously at the Law School, got a Certificate of Legal Studies in 1925 and qualified in five subjects, including Constitutional History and Public International Law, for the Diploma, but did not complete the course. Had a uniformly good record in Palestine, but was mixed up in politics and the Druze insurrectionary movement. May have feared arrest, although he was not, in fact, in danger of it. Left for Egypt on the 2nd December, 1926. Apparently was to go to India on a Syro-Palestinian delegation, but was drawn to the Hejaz, where, after giving English lessons for a time, he was taken into the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by Yusuf Yasin, then acting for Dr. 'Abdullah Danlûji. Became Acting Minister in July 1928, when Dr. Danlûji left on a mission, never to return. Had probably

worked earlier to undermine Danlûji's position. Remained Acting Minister until the Amir Faysal became titular Minister with Fuad as Under-Secretary, but still effective head of the Ministry in December 1930. Retained his post, with a seat on the Council of Ministers when the latter was constituted early in 1932. Prefers to call himself in English Deputy Minister. Visited Europe for the first time as a member of the Sa'udi Mission under the Amir Faysal in the spring of 1932 and did all the real business. Was made an honorary K.B.E. during the visit to London, and for several years carried a passport in which he and his wife appeared as Sir Fuad and Lady Hamza. Visited Europe again in 1934 and 1935 and conducted important negotiations with the Foreign Office, and in 1939 went to London with the Amir Faysal and took a prominent part in the Palestine discussions.

Fuad Hamza is alert, intelligent, well informed on matters pertaining to his work and industrious. Speaks English well and Turkish, but is hampered by lack of more than elementary French. Equally devoted to his own ambitions and to the cause of Arab nationalism, serving Ibn Sa'ud as its exponent, though inclined sometimes to despair of the system of which he has made himself part. Keeps in touch with other Nationalists in Palestine, and probably Syria. Is used by the King as his instrument for foreign affairs, and makes the most of his position, but probably does not enjoy Ibn Sa'ud's full confidence, so that his power varies. Very hostile to 'Abdullah Suleymân and took part in the unsuccessful drive against him in 1931. Is a very poor Moslem, and conforms to Wahabism no more than he is obliged to. Would like to see Sa'udi Arabia, a name of which he was one of the authors, develop on modern, more or less constitutional lines. Likes drafting laws. Would go to great lengths for the causes he has at heart, but is seldom, if ever, dishonest in diplomacy. Rather bumptious and sometimes difficult to deal with, but responds to personal handling. Has been spoken of as anti-British, and as pro-Soviet; probably wrongly. His attitude towards foreign Powers is determined by Arab nationalism, and if, as there is some ground to believe, he accepted a large bribe from the Italians at the time of the Ethiopian war, it does not follow that this affected his advice to Ibn Sa'ud. Possesses a splendid villa in the best part of Beirut which could not have been built out of legitimate savings, even supplemented by a sum of £3,000 which Ibn Saud is said to have contributed to this object.

In 1939 was appointed first Sa'udi Minister to Paris. Removed to Vichy after collapse of France in 1940. Withdrawn from there and appointed first Sa'udi Minister in Angora where he proceeded in April 1943. It is clear that the King does not want him to return to Sa'udi Arabia, and the great power he once wielded has passed entirely into the hands of his rival Yusuf Yasin.

## 25. *Hâfiz (Hâfidh) Wahba*.

Sa'udi Minister in London. An Egyptian born probably between 1885 and 1890. Educated at Al-Azhar. Mixed up in Nationalist and pan-Islamic politics in early manhood and was closely associated with 'Abdul-'Azîz Shawish. Definitely anti-British at time of Great War and said to have been deported from India. Said to have been in Bahrein at one time. Started a school at Kuwait and passed thence in Ibn Sa'ud's service. Became tutor to the Amir Faysal and accompanied the prince to London in 1919. Was one of Ibn Sa'ud's delegates at the abortive Kuwait Conference in 1923-24. In supreme charge of the civil side of the Administration at Mecca in 1925, with a viceregal title, and did well. Read the King's inaugural address at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Much employed on missions and negotiations during the ensuing years. *Inter alia* took part in negotiations with Sir G. Clayton in 1925, 1927 and 1928 and expounded Ibn Sa'ud's views and fears regarding Italian policy in the Red Sea, Bolshevik activity and Hashimite sovereignty in neighbouring countries to the Residency at Cairo early in 1928. During all this period waged a ding-dong struggle against the Syrian influences around the King, and had ups and downs. Was occulted towards the end of 1926, but returned to favour soon after and became Assistant Viceroy beside the Amir Faysal. Thought to have indisposed the Amir by his masterfulness as a tutor and his disregard as Assistant Viceroy for the Amir's position. Relegated in July 1928 to the post of Director-General of Education. Went to London in 1929 to represent Ibn Sa'ud at the International Postal Congress. While there was selected for the post of Minister in London, but did not take up the post for over a year, during which interval he went on a sort of undefined mission to Kuwait and was also employed much about the King's person, though he appeared on the whole to have lost ground to the Syrians. He and Fuad Hamza are dead



enemies. Has during his tenure of the Legation in London represented his country on international occasions, at Geneva and elsewhere. Was designated in 1931 to be Minister at The Hague, but the arrangements have never materialised for reasons of economy. Represented Sa'udi Arabia at the opening of the Tokyo mosque in 1938.

Hafiz Wahba has sown his political wild oats. His anti-British sentiments are supposed to have undergone a change in or before 1928, when he was reported as being accustomed to say that, as regards Egypt, he would always be against Great Britain, but, as a servant of Ibn Sa'ud, believed the King's interest to lie in friendly relations with His Majesty's Government. He has certainly shown himself well-disposed in London, and has on occasion been distinctly helpful. He is a good propagandist for Ibn Sa'ud on the lecture platform and in society. Neither taciturn nor talkative, he appeals by his sense of humour and looks anything but a Wahhâbi (except that he abstains from alcohol and tobacco) at the Hyde Park Hotel or the Savoy. Likes the theatre too, and alleged to have a passion for night clubs to which he gave full rein in New York in 1938. Speaks moderate English, but is not fluent. A useful servant to the King, whose respect he commands, but not probably his entire confidence. He was on leave in Sa'udi Arabia early in 1940 and returned via Koweit, where he settled with the Political Agent the temporary form of the Sa'udi-Koweit Agreements, which were then brought into force pending the drawing up and signing of the final texts. Has not visited Sa'udi Arabia since then.

#### 26. Hamad Suleymân.

Under-Secretary of State for Finance, brother of 'Abdullah Suleymân, *q.v.*, and has worked under him. Once a petty trader in Bahrein and fled the country to evade payment of debts. Acted for his brother as Director-General of Finance during his relegation to Hasa towards the end of 1931. Was appointed Wakil or Under-Secretary when Abdullah was made Wazir or full Minister in August 1932. Has been employed on missions in 'Asir, notably in November 1932, when he was sent with Khâlid-al-Qarqani to investigate the differences between the Idrisi and Ibn Sa'ud's Governor. They were too late to reach the spot before the Idrisi went into open revolt. Went with a Sa'udi mission to the Yemen in 1933, and was reported to have been detained by the Imam at San'a on the situation with Sa'udi Arabia deteriorating. Returned well before the outbreak of hostilities in 1934. In 1935 was a member of a Sa'udi delegation which visited Bahrein, to negotiate the Transit Dues Agreement, and to Kuwait, to discuss the question of the Sa'udi blockade of that neighbouring state. Whilst at Bahrein he was sued by a local Persian merchant, the Political Agent reported, for an old debt. Fell into disgrace with Ibn Sa'ud in the spring of 1936 (as he had done at least once previously) but was apparently begged off by his brother 'Abdullah. Of even meaner appearance than his brother, a poor talker and not, apparently, very intelligent. He disclosed to His Majesty's Minister at Taif in 1942 that his favourite outdoor sport was throwing stones. His eldest son, Suleymân-al-Hamad, born about 1917, takes some part in public affairs: he was for a time director of the agricultural project at Al-Kharj, and early in 1943 he went to Egypt to buy machinery and spare parts for the Minister of Finance.

#### 27. Hamdi Bey.

Formerly Director-General of Military Organisation. Born about 1892 to 1896. Believed to be an 'Iraqi Kurd and to have risen to non-commissioned rank in the Turkish army. Was a colonel in the army of King Huseyn, but passed to the service of Ibn Sa'ud and was officer commanding troops at Yanbu' before 1928. Became Officer Commanding in Jedda in that year. Appointed Director-General of Military Organisation in 1931 in succession to Faudhi Bey Kawokji. Presents all the appearance of a man who might be good in a rough and tumble; none of having the education necessary to create anything serious out of the embryo regular army, as Faudhi Bey might have done had he not lost favour. Hamdi seems to be a man of indifferent character, with a gift for intrigue, which he displayed in connexion with the vicissitudes of the British Staff of the Hejaz Air Force in 1931-32. Acts on occasion as A.D.C. to the King, attending him on his visits to Jedda and being sent to meet sloops, &c. Now insignificant, having ceased to hold any important military position and to be confined to duties as A.D.C. to the Amir Faysal. Stated in 1939 that he had resigned and wanted to return to Iraq, but was not allowed by Ibn Saud to leave the country. Boon companion of the Amir Faysal's Albanian step-father-in-law, Ibrahim Adham. In spite of a gorgeous uniform gives an impression of seediness and has been known to touch a member of the legation for a loan of two riyals.

#### 28. Seyyid Hamza al Ghauth al Madani.

At one time consul-general designate for Java. Became first Saudi Minister to Bagdad 1938. A Hejazi of Medina, born perhaps 1895. Said to have been educated in Turkish schools and to have frequented Turkish society. Sided with Turks at time of Arab revolt, and edited an anti-Huseyn paper at Medina in their interest. Continued to be anti-Huseyn after the success of the revolt and fled. Said to have been sentenced to death by default during his absence. Seems, nevertheless, to have been given an important post at Damascus, which he continued to hold under King Faisal's régime there, even after King Huseyn had launched against him an accusation, probably trumped up, of having stolen valuables from the Prophet's Tomb. Was in Ibn Sa'ud's service by end of 1923 and was one of his delegates at the abortive Kuwait Conference of 1923-24, an appointment which led to a revival by the 'Iraqi delegates of the robbery charge. Became Assistant Governor of Medina after its occupation by Sa'udi forces in 1925. Was later employed in the Palace. Selected in 1931 for the proposed consulate-general at Batavia, to the creation of which the Netherlands Government agreed, but which has never been opened, probably owing to financial difficulties. Filled in time as a member of the Legislative Council, whence he was transferred to the Amir Sa'ud's Diwân in September 1932. Came in King's train to Mecca in March 1933. Much of a palace man evidently. Fell into disfavour during his visit to Medina in 1941, but was later pardoned and reinstated in the King's entourage, and is now frequently present at meetings of the "cabinet."

#### 29. Hithlayn Family.

People of importance in the 'Ajman tribe, much concerned in the Nejd revolt of 1929. Its principal member, Dhaydân ibn Hithlayn, was slain treacherously in April of that year. The following other members of the family deserve mention:—

(1) *Nâif ibn Hithlayn* (nicknamed Abû 'l Kilâb).—Succeeded Dhaydân and carried on the revolt, but surrendered in January 1930 to the British authorities in Kuwait, and was in due course handed over to Ibn Sa'ud. Has since been a State prisoner at Riyâdh, closely confined.

(2) *Hâzim ibn Hithlayn* also took an active part in the revolt, and was one of two leaders who in July 1929 visited Kuwait in the hope of enlisting support. Was fighting together with Nâif in October. Eventual fate unknown.

(3) *Khâlid ibn Muhammad ibn Hithlayn*, described as a "debonair and handsome young warrior." Was one of the Mutayr and 'Ajman Sheykhs living in 'Iraq under King Faisal's protection. Visited Kuwait in 1932 at the time of the Ibn Rifâda affair, apparently to size up the chances of new anti-Sa'udi action. Made his peace with Ibn Sa'ud and returned to Sa'udi Arabia towards the end of 1934. Appointed Amir al Bâdia or Governor of the Ajman desert, with headquarters at 'Aweyma (80 miles W.N.W. of Al Qatif) in 1936.

#### 30. Huseyn al 'Awayni (or Aouzini).

A young Syrian merchant established in Jedda. An enterprising fellow, who derives some importance from being a friend of Fuad Hamza and Yusuf Yasin and having connexions in Manchester; notably with another Syrian, 'Abdul-Ghâni Ydlibi, the naturalised British head of a small company there. This association was close early in 1932, when Ydlibi visited Jedda in order to work up business and with great ideas of getting concessions of all sorts. They claimed to have important support in Lancashire, and specifically that of the Calico Printers' Association (Limited). It was understood in 1932 that 'Awayni was leaving Jedda for good, but he still returns occasionally. Now lives principally at Haifa. In February or March 1933 he went to Riyâdh on behalf of certain merchants to try and dissuade the King from proceeding with the concession to the ex-Khedive's group for the creation of a National Bank. A man likely to have ups and downs of fortune, in dealing with whom commercially great care should be used. Appears to be closely associated in business with Najib Salha (*q.v.*). Has spent the last year or so in Beirut, where he is said to act as Ibn Sa'ud's semi-official purchasing agent.

#### 31. M. Huseyn Nasif.

A well-known Hejazi of Jedda of Egyptian origin. Born about 1882. Inherited much property from his father, 'Omar Nasif, who was a notable personage in Turkish times, as well as the agency in Jedda of the Sherifs of the 'Abadilah branch. Occupies the largest house in Jedda and was once very prosperous, but is now probably less so. Was said in 1917 to have lost favour



with King Huseyn, who had previously been accustomed to stay with him when in Jedda. Was said also to be desirous of British naturalisation at that time. Described as having been a Wahhâbi by conviction, even before the Sa'ûdi invasion. Deported to 'Aqaba during King 'Ali's short reign. Figured as a Hejazi delegate at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Was given the privilege of putting Ibn Sa'ûd up during the years following the fall of Jedda, but has not done so since the King acquired the "Green Palace." Has not held office, as was expected, under the Sa'ûdi régime, perhaps owing to doubt as to his trustworthiness. Rather a dark horse nowadays and may both dislike and be disliked by the régime, but keeps quiet. Said to be a good Arabic scholar and possesses what passes in Jedda for a remarkable library. An aldermanic figure. His eldest son, Husain Nasif, has written a book on the history of the Hejaz. A cousin, M. Salih Nasif, was the figurehead president of the Palestine Defence Committee in Mecca in 1937-38.

### 32. Ibrahim al Mu'ammâr.

Qaimmaqam of Jedda 1937. Identical with the Ibrahim al Junaifi mentioned in *The Heart of Arabia* and, according to the author, Mr. Philby, has a very doubtful claim to the historic name of Mu'ammâr, which he subsequently assumed. In early life travelled much in India, Persia, Egypt and elsewhere in the East, as trader and probably also as journalist and propagandist. About 1926 became head of Ibn Sa'ûd's diwan; transferred to that of the Amir Sa'ûd in 1932. In 1933 was appointed Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad. His alleged undiplomatic activities were the subject of complaint on several occasions, and in 1937 necessitated his removal. An active, able man, interested in world affairs and with a great sense of humour. Has improved Jedda considerably, is useful in pilgrimage matters, and is helpful to foreigners within the limits of his powers. At one time was the principal channel of communication between the legation and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but is not now trusted by the King or the Amir Faysal in confidential matters.

His eldest son, Abdullah, born about 1920, formerly served under Yusuf Yasin in the Political Bureau at Riyadh and has now (May 1943) been appointed first secretary at the Sa'ûdi Legation in Bagdad. Another son, 'Abdul 'Aziz, born about 1923, is a student at the American University of Beirut.


### 33. Muhammad 'Id Rawwâf.

Formerly Sa'ûdi consul in Damascus. Born about 1898. One of a Sherari family which migrated from Jauf to Damascus in 1910. Family not highly considered in Damascus, but 'Id's father maintained close connexion with Ibn Sa'ûd and was helpful to him in negotiations with the Turks. He, the father, made a fortune in camel-dealing and left wealth to his two sons. According to his own account, Muhammad made a large sum of money during the Great War by buying up English banknotes in Damascus at a discount of 20 per cent. to 40 per cent., stealing away to Bagdad as soon as it fell into British hands, and cashing the notes at par. Appointed to his Damascus post in 1929 in succession to his brother Yasin. Had then only had primary education, but was stated last year to be busily improving on it. Was considered by His Majesty's present consul in Damascus rather stupid, though pleasant and useful. Well informed on local currents of thought and pushes in Syrian nationalist circles, without apparently carrying much weight, the idea of an Arab Empire with Ibn Sa'ûd as a suitable ruler for it. The brother Yasin Rawwâf, whom he succeeded, is said to have become Governor of Medina in 1929-30. He was appointed second assistant to the Viceroy of the Hejaz in September 1930, but has faded out of Sa'ûdi official life and now lives at Damascus. Muhammad 'Id Rawwâf was superseded as consul at Damascus by Rusheyd Pasha (q.v.) in May 1933 and appointed an Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In 1935 was appointed Acting Governor (Qaimmaqam, not Amir) of Jedda, but in 1937 exchanged posts with Ibrahim ibn Mu'ammâr. Ceased to be Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad in 1938, when a Saudi Minister was appointed, and was made a member of the Council of Ministers.

### 34. Idrisi Family.

Founded by Ahmed al Idrisi, a native of Fez, who became a notable religious teacher at Mecca and created a Tariqa, or school of religious doctrine. Moved on to Sabya, in 'Asir, where he acquired land and died in the odour of sanctity about 1837 and where his tomb is still venerated. The Idrisis supplanted the Sherifian family, which had ruled at Abû 'Arish in the time of his son Muhammad and Muhammad's son 'Ali. The branch of the family most identified with

'Asir is descended from these two, as appears from the following table, which is not necessarily complete or accurate as regards order of birth:—



The numbered members of this branch deserve further notice.


(1) This Muhammad was a notable man in his day. Born in 1876. Studied in Egypt and at Kufra. Organised opposition to the Turks in 'Asir in and after 1904. Made treaties with His Majesty's Government through the Resident at Aden in 1915 and 1917. Came to terms with Ibn Sa'ûd in 1920, when he ceded to him any rights he might have in the country about 'Abhâ.

(2) Displaced (3) in 1926, after complicated events. Accepted in that year the suzerainty of Ibn Sa'ûd by a treaty signed at Mecca. Accepted in October 1931 the practical annexation of 'Asir by Ibn Sa'ûd, retaining a simulacrum only of quasi-sovereign rights. Joined in the rebellion against Ibn Sa'ûd in November 1932, and on its collapse in due course took refuge in Yemen. After strenuous efforts to obtain his surrender, Ibn Sa'ûd agreed recently that he should remain in the Yemen under the Imâm's supervision, and accorded him a pension. Appears to be a man of weak character, very amenable to influence. Was described some years ago as "monkish."

(3) Succeeded his father in 1923. Was upheld by the Masâriha and other tribes in 1924 against an attempt to displace him by his cousin Mustafa, No. (6), who established himself temporarily at Hodeyda, then an Idrisi possession. 'Ali, in turn, lost Hodeyda to the Imâm in 1925, and was displaced by (2) in 1926. Returned to Mecca in August 1926, and seems to have lived mostly there until he was suddenly arrested and deported to Riyadh in the summer of 1932, under suspicion, apparently, of intending a *coup* in 'Asir. Recently attempted to escape. Was foiled, but did not die, as was rumoured.

(4) and (5), who died on the 5th April, 1935, were very active in organising and conducting the 'Asir revolt of November-December 1932.

The original Ahmed has a numerous posterity through another son, variously called 'Abdul-Al or 'Abdul-Mutâl. His descendants have been principally associated with Dongola, where his tomb is a place of pilgrimage, and with Egypt. The following table shows only those of the branch who have come to notice in connexion with Arabia in recent years:—



(6) Was a trusted British agent during the Great War. Later played a rôle in opposition to his cousin 'Ali, No. (3). Died in Egypt in 1930.

(7) One of the 'Asir delegation which came to Mecca in October 1930 to complete the arrangements for the absorption of 'Asir into Ibn Sa'ûd's dominions. Concerned in the rebellion of November-December 1932, and left with No. (9) for Massawa after it collapsed.

(8) Has been politically active for many years. Works normally, it is alleged, in the Italian interest, but played an apparently pro-Sa'ûdi rôle in 1926-27, at



the time of and after the establishment of Ibn Sa'ūd's suzerainty over 'Asir. Visited Mecca at least three times from September 1926 to September 1927. Was thought perhaps to aspire himself to the post of ruler of 'Asir. Visited His Majesty's agent and consul in Jedda on the 15th September, 1927. Mr. Stonehewer Bird described him at that time as being the King's unofficial adviser in regard to 'Asir and Yemen. He found him a man of intelligence and broad views—pro-Sa'ūdi, but not pro-Wahhābi. Accused by the Sa'ūdi Government in 1932 of again serving Italian interests, and of being concerned in the political plot behind the 'Asir revolt.

(9) Much concerned in the 'Asir revolt of November–December 1932. Was at Jizān at the crucial time, and attempted by a letter and a visit to Kamaran to get His Majesty's Government to recognise what he represented as the restoration of Idrisi rule. Withdrew early in 1933 to Massawa, with his relative M. Al-'Arabi, No. (7).

All members of the family have the title of Seyyid. There is a close connexion between the family and the Senūsi, whose founder was a disciple of the original Ahmed al Idrisi. The spiritual relationship has been reinforced by intermarriage at various times. The Idrisis have also a connexion with the Mirghāni family, whose head resides in the Sudan, and is chief of yet another Tariqa, once powerful and still important.

### 35. *Khālid Al Qarqani* (alias *Al Hūd*, alias *Abu'l Walid*).

A Tripolitan, who is said to have served under the Senūsi, fought the Italians and retired into exile in Egypt, where he has a daughter married to Abdur-Rahmān 'Azzām Bey, formerly a desert fighter in the Senūsi cause, now Egyptian Minister to Iraq and Sa'ūdi Arabia. Al Qarqani was brought to Ibn Sa'ūd's notice, it is said, by Sheykh Hāfiz Wahba, and came to the Hejaz in 1930. Was appointed in September 1930 First Assistant to the Viceroy, but apparently soon vacated the post and went into business with the German merchant, afterwards honorary German consul, de Haas. Was re-employed by the Government to accompany the American engineer Twitchell on his tours of survey for water and minerals. Was sent with Hamad Suleymān (*q.v.*) to 'Asir in November 1932 to investigate the dispute between the Idrisi and Ibn Sa'ūd's Governor. This mission could not be accomplished by the two delegates, who, in the following year, with Turki al Madhi, formed an equally unsuccessful delegation to Sana before the outbreak of the Sa'ūdi-Yemen war. Was a Sa'ūdi delegate to the Bahrain Transit Dues and Koweit Blockade Conferences of 1935. Was also a Sa'ūdi representative at the negotiations over the Red Sea oil concession with Petroleum Concessions (Limited) (added in 1939). Acted as buyer for certain German goods for the Saudi Government. In 1938 was found to be on the staff of Amir Sa'ūd, but later in the year officially appointed to that of Ibn Sa'ūd. Said to have a large salary. Seems to be a trusted adviser, and said to be honest in negotiation, though not necessarily scrupulous in financial matters. Accompanied Dr. Mahmud Hammuda to London and Paris in 1939 in connexion with the proposed amendment of the Sanitary Convention. Visited Germany in 1939 before the outbreak of war on a mission to purchase arms for Sa'ūdi Arabia. Had an interview with Hitler, but was otherwise unsuccessful. Has a slight impediment in his speech. Speaks French and perhaps Italian. Claims to have travelled a good deal in Europe, including Russia, and is regarded by Ibn Sa'ūd as an expert on European affairs. An interesting talker but can be waspish. Said by some people to be anti-British but is probably only rather sourly pro-Arab. Is now in poor health (1943).

### 36. *Muhammad ibn 'Abdul 'Aziz ibn Mādhi*.

A Nejdi, formerly Governor of Jizan. Transferred about 1940 to be Governor of Al Khobar, which post he now holds. A friend of the Qaimmaqam of Jedda, but without the latter's knowledge of the world outside Arabia. Speaks nothing but Arabic and that with a strong Nejdi accent. Comes much into contact with the Americans of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company at Dhahran and was lavish in his hospitality to His Majesty's Minister when he visited Dhahran in March 1942. Earned the gratitude of the Royal Air Force for his help when one of their aircraft force-landed on Tarūt Island in January 1942. A younger brother is Governor of the town of Al-Qatif, and another brother, 'Abdul 'Aziz ibn Mādhi, is Governor of Dhiba.

### 37. *Mehdi Bey*.

Director-General of Police, with headquarters in Mecca, for several years, but in 1938 was made Director-General of Public Security, though no change in

his functions was announced or observed. An 'Iraqi, who has, however, lived little in 'Iraq. Said to have been a regimental clerk in the Turkish army, in which a brother of his is still an officer. Was employed also in King Huseyn's army. He appears to be arbitrary and ruthless and to wield considerable authority. A man of organising ability, and the Mecca orphanage, which is under his charge, has been declared by a competent Indian witness to be the best-organised concern in Sa'ūdi Arabia. In 1938, when he had extended the system of regular police to Hasa, he was given by Ibn Sa'ūd the title of *al Muslih* (The Reformer).

### 38. *'Abdur-Rahmān ibn Mubārak*.

Governor of Wejhi. Little known to the Legation, but worth mentioning because of the importance of his post in relation to Egypt and Transjordan, and because he was one of the leaders of the forces, with advanced base at Dhaba, employed against Ibn Rifāda in 1932. Is possibly a tribal personage rather than an administrative Governor, and may be of the family of Huseyn ibn Mubārak of the Harb tribe, who was a power at Rabigh at the time of the Arab revolt.

### 39. *Muhammad at-Tawil*.

A native of Jedda of Egyptian origin. Got a small post in the customs in Turkish times and rose to be Director of Customs in Jedda under King Huseyn. Played a leading part in the movement of the Hejazi notables to compel Huseyn's abdication and the accession of King 'Ali in October 1924. Remained in theory Director of Customs only, but wielded great influence under 'Ali, and was described as being "practically dictator" in November 1925, after his triumph in a dispute with Ahmed Saqqāf, the Prime Minister, who decided to leave. Promised at that time to devote to the cause of the Hejaz every penny of "certain economies" which he had effected while Director of Customs. Left the Hejaz on the fall of Jedda, but returned in 1927 or early in 1928 and started a motor transport business. Was said in 1928 to have been president of the Hizb-al-Ahrār al Hijāzi, but made his peace with Ibn Sa'ūd after an absence at Riyādh, which was described in February 1928 as a deportation. Was slow to receive official employment, and was perhaps considered unsuitable for such employment in the Hejaz, but was in September 1930 placed at the head of a commission to study and reorganise the financial and economic situation in Hasa. Remained for some time in this employment, despite rumours of assassination or flight. Appeared to have tightened up regulations and trodden on Qusaibi corns in the process, but not to have made the Hasa Customs as paying as he hoped. A capable and well-reputed man, liked by the authorities at Bahrein, but he fell foul of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company to such an extent that Sayyid Hāshim (No. 47) was sent to look after their business with the Government in 1935. At-Tawil was recalled in 1936 and replaced by two separate officials (one being No. 47) in his posts as Director of Finance and Director of Customs. In 1938 appointed (against his will) manager of the Nejd Motor Transport Company.

### 40. *Mustafa Badruddin*.

Director of Customs in Jedda. A North African or of North African origin. Born probably about 1892. Was given a small post in the Jedda custom-house some years ago, and later became Director of Customs at Yanbu'. Transferred to Jedda in the same capacity in 1930. A man of little ability, but was reported not long ago to be disconcertingly honest. If so, he has not seriously infected the custom-house as a whole with this malady. Popularly supposed to hold "Axis views" and certainly conceals very well any affection he may have for the British.

### 41. *Ibrahim an-Neshmi*.

Formerly Amir of Jauf. Said to be a Nejdi; to have been originally a maker of native foot-gear; to have been in Medina while the Hashimites still held it; and to have escaped to the Sa'ūdi side, where his knowledge of the situation in Medina was so useful that he was given a command. He appears to have been employed at Tebūk and perhaps at Yanbu' in the ensuing years. He became notorious in February 1930 for a large-scale raid into Transjordan similar to that of 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Musā'id (*q.v.*) about the same time. He was apparently at the time already Governor of Jauf, a post from which the King dismissed him about the end of the year, not, it was explained, because the man was bad, but because the King desired to eliminate causes of quarrel with His Majesty's Government. Reappeared subsequently as Governor of Al-'Ula, but was transferred to an unspecified post in or about June 1933. Is now (May 1934) one



of the more important subordinate commanders in the Western Army on the Saudi-Yemen border. Governor of Turāba in 1934 until September 1935, when he was appointed Governor of Najrān.

#### 42. Qattān Family.

(1) *Yusuf ibn Salīm Qattān*, said to have been originally a servant in a coffee-shop in Mecca and afterwards of the original Qattān family whose name he took. Became a guide for Javanese pilgrims. Rose to be president of the Mecca municipality under the Turks, but was still so uneducated that he was said to be unable to tell "the letter Alif from a telegraph pole." Became Minister of Public Works under King Huseyn. Was said in 1930 to be full of schemes connected with the pilgrimage and the advancement of his son No. (2) below. Has also come to notice as one of the agents concerned with the properties of the Sherifian family.

(2) *'Abbās Qattān*, an ambitious young man, born about 1901, who was himself president of the municipality in Mecca in 1930 and still occupies that post. He is the right-hand man of Sheykh 'Abdullah Suleymān, Minister of Finance, and is chief organiser of the hotels recently opened at Mecca, Jedda and Medina.

#### 43. Qusaibi Family.

An important merchant family in the Persian Gulf. The Legation is indebted to the Political Agent in Bahrein for an account of them, which was drawn up in June 1931, and of which the following is a summary:—

Said to be descended from a butcher of Riyādh. Composed of the five brothers mentioned below; children of the same mother by two brothers, Hasan and Ibrahim, who married her successively; partners in business and property; engaged in trade between Bahrein, their headquarters, Hasa and Nejd. Accounted, despite the acquisition of wealth, extremely plebeian and disqualified by Arab custom from intermarriage with women of better birth.

(1) *'Abdul-'Azīz ibn Hasan*, simple and wise; the mainstay of the firm; reputed pious; respected by Ibn Sa'ūd. Was Sa'ūdi delegate to the abortive Blockade Conference at Kuwait in 1935.

(2) *'Abdur-Rahmān ibn Hasan*, more enlightened and a wonderful fellow for pearl dealing. Possessed of some knowledge of French and English and accustomed to go to Paris on pearl business. Sensible but conceited.

(3) *'Abdullah ibn Hasan*, intelligent and sharp, but of mean and low character and meddlesome. Inclined to be boastful and disliked by Ibn Sa'ūd.

(4) *Hasan ibn Ibrahim*, very foolish and gruff and as low a character as (3). Hot tempered.

(5) *Sa'ad ibn Ibrahim*, permanently resident in Hasa. Not personally known to Captain Prior. Said to be a good "mixer," but similar in character to (3) and (4).

When the above information was supplied in 1931 the Qusaibis had great influence owing to their position as agents of Ibn Sa'ūd in Bahrein and buyers of his requirements for Nejd, as well as to their wealth and their hold on many to whom they had lent money. Their most distinguished debtor was the King himself, who owed them in 1930 something like £80,000, and who, although about half of this had been paid off by June 1931, still owed them the balance. Abdurrahmān was given in the latter year a roving commission to try and raise the wind for the Sa'ūdi Government in Europe, but failed completely. The relations of the Qusaibis with the King no longer seem to be as close as formerly. They resented the reforms introduced by Muhammad at-Tawīl (*q.v.*). They were driven by bad business to press the King for money. He has of late employed other persons to buy for him, but he is not known to have deprived the Qusaibis of their general agency for him at Bahrein. The Amir Sa'ūd frequently employed the Qusaibis to buy goods for him in Bombay, but was said in April 1942 to have become dissatisfied with them and to be employing other agents.

#### 44. Rashid Family.

Former rulers of Hāil. Little is known of the remnants of this family once so powerful and later so fallen, even before its final collapse, that it was "accounted infamous, even in such a land of violence as Arabia, for its record of domestic murders." It deserves attention, however, because of the possibility of its reappearance on the scene, *e.g.*, if the Shammar tribes from which it sprang should go against Ibn Sa'ūd. It is understood that, after the fall of Hāil, the King pursued a policy of absorption, not of annihilation, and that many persons belonging to the Beni Rashid, or connected with them, passed into his entourage.

Two lads who are being brought up with his younger children and are included in the list of his sons are said to be the children of a Rashid lady, whom Ibn Sa'ūd married after their birth. Their names are—

- (1) *Sultān* and
- (2) *Mish'al*—

the latter of which corresponds with that of an infant child of the last ruling ibn Rashid, as given in the 1917 volume of Personalities in Arabia. Two other persons have come to notice, who are said to be related to the Beni Rashid, viz.—

(3) *Mansūr ibn 'Asaf*, who is said to have been taken into Ibn Sa'ūd's service and to have served for a term as Governor of Tebūk; and his brother—

(4) *Nāsir ibn 'Asaf*, who also served Ibn Sa'ūd, but was reported to have deserted into Transjordan in 1931.

As the information about this family is so meagre, it is worth noting that the following members of it accompanied Ibn Sa'ūd from Riyādh to Jedda in March, 1934:—

(5) Muhammad ibn Talāl (a daughter of his was married to Ibn Sa'ūd in 1938).

(6) Mash'al ibn Mas'ūd ibn 'Abdul 'Aziz.

(7) Rashid al Muheysin al Jabr.

(8) Sultān ibn Talāl al Jabr.

(9) Fahad ibn Hamūd al Jabr.

Of these (6) and (8) may be identical with (1) and (2) given above. The *Umm al Qura* early in 1935 gave a list of the Beni Rashid who came to the Hejāz with Ibn Sa'ūd in March of that year. This list gave all the names, except (6), unless the name Mash'al al Sa'ūd in the 1935 list corresponded with the same person. Two other names appear in the 1935 list.

(10) 'Abdullah al Mit'ib.

(11) 'Ubaid al 'Abdullah.

At least one Ibn Rashid accompanied the King's son, the Amir Faysal, to the Yemen front in April, 1934.

The younger princes are greatly in evidence in Ibn Sa'ūd's entourage, being treated generally very much like his own younger sons.

The only member of the family outside Sa'ūdi Arabia, and therefore of some importance, is (12) Muhammad ibn 'Abdul Muhsin ar Rashid, born about 1910. Lives at the Court of the King of Iraq (according to a 1935 report), out of whose privy purse he is said to receive a pension of about £20 a month. Twice stated to have set out, with the cognisance of the late King 'Ali, to raise the Shammar, cross the frontier and take Hāil, but returned on each occasion with standards still unfurled, having judged the moment not propitious. Still keeps in touch with the Shammar and maintains bedouin mode of life. Described as ordinarily rather dull, brooding young man, and perhaps not very resourceful, but, presented with a good enough opportunity, he would quickly be off across the desert to recapture his ancestral home.

#### 45. Rifāda Family.

Chiefs of the Billi tribe, with an urban establishment at Wejh. The most notable recent member of the family, Suleymān Afnān, played a not inconsiderable rôle during the Great War, but was killed in a raid in 1916 and left two sons, Ibrahim and Ahmed. His brother Salīm, who had died earlier, left a son, Hamid. The cousins in this generation were at enmity. Hamid made a bid for the Sheykhship on his uncle's death. He was one of several Hejazi Sheykhhs who approached the Residency in Cairo in 1924, complaining both of King Huseyn's tyranny and his inability to protect them against the Wahhābis. He came into greater prominence in 1928, when, having returned from Transjordan and taken to brigandage, he attempted a *coup* at Wejh, hoping to dislodge his cousin Ibrahim, who was Governor there and head of the tribe. After a further period of exile he came into still greater prominence in 1932 by invading the Hejāz at the head of a rebel band. He and two, it was said, of his sons were killed, but there may be survivors of this branch. At the outset of the revolt Ibrahim visited the King at the head of a loyal delegation. He is still head of the Billi tribe in the Hejāz, but the Governor of Wejh is now Ibn Mubārak (see No. 38). The family have *attaches* with a section of the Billi established in Egypt.



46. *Rushdi Malhas.*

Was editor of the *Umm al Qura*, the more important of the two weekly newspapers published at Mecca and the unofficial organ of the Saudi Government, but no longer occupied post in 1936, though believed to be still connected with the newspaper. A Palestinian from Nablus. In 1937 or before was appointed Assistant Director of the Political Section of the Royal Diwan. The following year had a violent quarrel with his chief, Yusuf Yasin, but retained his position. In appearance a down-trodden little man, but away from his chief he is affable and talkative. Well read in Arabic literature and history.

47. *Salih ibn Abu Bakr Shata.*

Born probably not later than 1890. Comes of a learned family in Mecca, where he was born. Much employed on Committee for Waqfs, grain distribution, &c., under the Hashimite régime. Fled to Jedda after the Saudi capture of Taif. Was one of the Hejazi notables who compelled the abdication of King Huseyn in October 1924 and rallied in due course to Ibn Sa'ud. Became one of two assistants to the Amir Faysal in his capacity as Viceroy. Spoken of in 1930 as a possible Minister of Education in a Cabinet then rumoured to be in contemplation, but, if the rumour was true, the project was not pursued. When the Cabinet was eventually organised on its present lines early in 1932 and the Amir Faysal was given the Ministry of the Interior, as well as others, Salih Shata was made his chief assistant in that Ministry. In 1936 was a member of the Legislative Assembly. Related to No. 65. Referred to in 1943 as "Second Deputy" of the Advisory Council.

48. *Sdayri Family.*

Take their name from the district of Sdayr in Nejd. Are related to Ibn Sa'ud through the fact that his mother was a Sdayri. He has, moreover, taken two wives from the family. Five members of the family have come to notice in recent years, viz.:—

(1) *'Abdullah as-Sdayri*, Governor of Tebuk since about the beginning of 1931. Transferred early in 1936 to Medina (see No. 2).

(2) *Turki as-Sdayri*, Governor of Asir, with headquarters at Abha.

(3) *'Abdul 'Aziz as-Sdayri*, Governor of Jauif, with headquarters at Qariyat. Because of the proximity of his Governorate to Transjordan and his frequent contacts with the authorities of that country he is the best known and most important member of the family.

(4) *Muhammad as-Sdayri*, younger brother of (3), Governor of Sakaka.

(5) *Ahmad ibn Turki as-Sdayri*, Governor of Al-Qunfida.

49. *Sha'ibi Family.*

Important in Mecca as the Keepership of the Key of the Ka'aba is hereditary in the family. The prerogative is very lucrative because all persons entering the Ka'aba are supposed to make a present to the Keeper according to their means. The family are admittedly descendants of the Quraysh tribe, but not of the Prophet. It is claimed that the pedigree is continuous from pre-Islamic times and that the right to keep the key also dates from that early period. According to one story, there was a blot on the escutcheon in the 19th century, when the male descent failed and the succession passed through a lady of the family who married a slave. The late Keeper's physical appearance suggested that this might be true, but there is no proof of it. Another branch of the family, claiming similar descent, formerly lived in Tunis, but now resides in Mecca. The present Keeper of the Key is—

(1) *Muhammad ash-Sha'ibi*, an elderly man, probably the nephew of the late Keeper, who died in January 1934 and whom this relative was appointed to succeed.

(2) *Abdullah ash-Sha'ibi*, next in succession as Keeper of Key. Is member of the Legislative Assembly and has held numerous other important posts of an honorary nature. Highly respected.

50. *Sherifian Family.*

Also called Hashimites by virtue of descent from the great-grandfather of the Prophet, but this name seems to be more particularly affected by the family of King Huseyn. There have been in the past and are in the present numerous families claiming this descent through one or other of the sons of 'Ali, the fourth Caliph and son-in-law of the Prophet. There are in Arabia itself many individuals bearing the title of Sherif, which is held to imply descent from

Hasan, the elder son of 'Ali, and whole clans known collectively as Ashraf. The strains most conspicuous in the Hejaz trace this descent through an intermediate common ancestor Hasan ibn Abū Numey, who was Grand Sherif of Mecca in the latter part of the 16th century. Three groups of his descendants are accounted specially important, viz.:—

The Dhawi Zeyd,

The Abadila, a particular branch of whom are the Dhawi 'Aun, and

The Dhawi Barakat.

All Grand Sherifs of Mecca in the 17th century were drawn from the rival Dhawi Zeyd and Dhawi 'Aun. The last Grand Sherif belonging to the former was 'Abdul-Mutallib, who held the post three times at long intervals. The majority belonged to the Dhawi 'Aun, of whom came the late King Huseyn and his sons.

Although the most important members of the Sherifian family now live outside Saudi Arabia, their connexion with the Hejaz is so close as to justify this general notice. The following list, very incomplete, shows those who have come to notice in recent years:—

(A) *Dhawi Zeyd.*

(1) *'Ali Haydar*.—Formerly resided in Constantinople. Worked in with the Young Turks and was at one time Minister of Auqaf. Appointed Grand Sherif to supersede King Huseyn in or about 1917, but was naturally unable to assume the post effectively. Sought early in 1926 for British support in obtaining post of Regent or Governor of Hejaz under Ibn Sa'ud. Moved later that year to Beirut, where he died in 1934. Had several sons, the eldest of whom, Abdul-Majid, is married to a Turkish princess (who is not, however, as stated in the last Personalities Report, a daughter of the ex-Caliph Abdul Majid), and showed signs of political ambition after the Armistice. One of 'Ali Haydar's wives and the mother of two of his younger sons is of British birth. Yet another son studied at St. Andrew's and had the distinction of acting as best man at the marriage of a Scotch divine at St. Giles's Cathedral. Civilised people, important to keep in mind, though of no obvious political importance at present.

(2) *Ja'afar Haidar*, brother of the above. Also lived in Constantinople. If alive, may be identical with the elderly Sherif 'Ali Ja'far who lived at Labej in 1932 and was described as a descendant of 'Abdul-Mutallib.

(3) *Sharaf 'Adnan Pasha al Ghali as-Zeyd*.—Formerly frequented both Constantinople and the Hejaz. Spoken of in 1925 as a possible ruler of the Hejaz, if Ibn Sa'ud won the war. Elected president of the Moslem Congress at Mecca in June 1926, and was later the vehicle of Ibn Sa'ud's refusal to hold another owing to attitude of the 'Ali brothers. Represented Ibn Sa'ud in 1927 at conference at Jizân to deal with the Red Sea Petroleum Company's concession in the Farsan Islands. Described in 1928 as "grizzled and doddering." Still resides in Mecca, but apparently a back number.

(4) *Sharaf Ridha*, usually called Sherif Sharaf *tout court*.—Appointed Acting Minister of Finance under Ibn Sa'ud in January 1926. Resides in Mecca and is now a member of the Legislative Council. In 1936 appointed to be a member of the King's suite. Appears now (1943) to spend all his time at Mecca and Taif. A courteous, dignified man, rather silent and with something of a brooding air.

(5) *Khâlid*.—A nephew of the 'Ali Ja'far mentioned at (2). Implicated in the conspiracy against Ibn Sa'ud in 1932 and was active in and around Aden. Perhaps the same as Sherif Khâlid Sadiq Adnan.

(B) *Dhawi 'Aun.*

(6) *'Ali ibn 'Abdullah*.—Formerly Grand Sherif. Dismissed by the Turks in 1907. Resides in Egypt. Described in June 1932 as an active supporter of the Hizb-al-Ahrâr al Hijâzi.

(7) *'Ali ibn Huseyn*.—Ex-King of the Hejaz. Succeeded King Huseyn on his abdication in October 1924, but was compelled to abandon untenable position in Jedda in December 1925. Resided mostly in Bagdad, where he died on the 13th February, 1935.

(8) *Faysal ibn Huseyn*.—King of 'Iraq. Died in 1934 and was succeeded by his son Ghazi.

(9) *'Abdullah ibn Huseyn*.—Amir of Transjordan.

(10) *Zeyd ibn Huseyn*.—Had a Turkish mother, a granddaughter of the well-known Grand Vizier Reshid Pasha, and has property interests quite distinct



from those of his brothers. Born in Constantinople in 1900—formerly Iraqi Minister at Ankara. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Berlin in September 1935.

All these, except perhaps (10), have issue. So had King Huseyn's brother Nâsir, now deceased, who left six sons and four daughters.

(10A) *'Abdul Hamid Al 'Aun*. Understood to be a grandson of (6). Chiefly noteworthy as being the principal figure in the Sherifian plot against Ibn Sa'ûd in 1940. Arrested and sentenced to death, he was pardoned (Amir 'Abdullah of Transjordan interceded for him). After a period of detention at Riyâdh he was allowed to leave the country with the two younger brothers and some other relatives who were also implicated. Now believed to be in Egypt.

(C) *Dhâwî Barakat*.

(11) *Sharaf ibn 'Abdul-Muhsin*.—Seems to have served King Huseyn in Egypt, but entered the service of Ibn Sa'ûd and became Amir-al-Arbân, or Director of Tribes. Appointed President of the Inspectorate of Government Departments in 1930. Recently returned to Mecca from Egypt, but his present official status is not known, as the inspectorate is understood to have been abolished.

(D) *Apparently of the Abadila stock though not of the Dhâwî 'Aun*.

(12) *Shâkir ibn Zeyd ibn Fawwâz*.—Formerly Governor of Taif, a post which seems to have been hereditary in his family. President of the Beduin Control Board in Transjordan and intimately associated with the Amir 'Abdullah, with whom he has thrown in his lot. Died at Amman in December 1934. Was a tenacious enemy of Ibn Sa'ûd and much less a play-boy than his master.

(13) *Hamûd ibn Zeyd*, brother of the preceding.—Probably the same as the 'Sharif Hamûd' who joined the plot with No. (10A) and was carried off to Riyâdh, dying, it is said, on the road.

(14) *Sharaf ibn Râjih*, a cousin of (12) and (13).—Said to have also been Governor of Taif at one time. Now resides at Bagdad. Identified both in Jerusalem and Bagdad as being the Sherif Sharaf mentioned by Tâhir ad-Dabbâgh in February 1932, in a letter which fell into the hands of the Sa'ûdi Government, as a man who might be enlisted in the conspiracy against Ibn Sa'ûd.

(E) *Even less easy to place, but perhaps of the Abadila*.

(15) *'Ali ibn Ahmad ibn Mansûr*.—A younger member of a family, two of whom were prominent in King Huseyn's time and had great influence in the Harb tribe. This 'Ali has only come to notice as having been one of the persons arrested at Mecca and deported to Riyâdh at the time of the Ibn Rifâda affair in 1932.

(16) *'Ali ibn Huseyn al Harîthî*.—One of the Sherifs of Muda'iq, near Taif. Took part in the Arab revolt and is remembered as one of the conquerors of Damascus. Described by Colonel Lawrence as having been at that time an attractive young man, physically splendid and full of courage, resource and energy. Seems to have resettled in the Hejaz, as he was arrested at Mecca and deported to Riyâdh at the time of the Ibn Rifâda affair in 1932.

(17) *Muhammad Mohanna*.—One of the Jedda family, one member of which was Chief of the Controlling Department in 1917, and was then described as a "bottle-nosed bandit," while his brother, still alive, was said to have acquired wealth by smuggling and general robbery. This Muhammad is only interesting because he was arrested at Jedda and sent to Riyâdh at the time of the Ibn Rifâda affair.

(18) and (19) *M. 'Ali and Muhammad al-Bedeywi* (a diminutive of Bedawi). Members of a family distantly related to King Huseyn and formerly important in the Juheyne tribe and in the coast towns of the Northern Hejaz. Despite the similarity of name, they would appear to be two distinct, though closely related, persons. Both were mixed up in the Ibn Rifâda affair in 1932. M. 'Ali became an object of attention in Transjordan and was more or less arrested in July to the displeasure of the 'Amir. Muhammad seems to have been in trade at Suez and Dhaba and was concerned in attempts to get supplies by sea to Ibn Rifâda. It was probably he who was reported killed in the defeat of the rebels.

51. *Suwayt Family*.

Leaders in the Dhâfir tribe. Two members of it figured in reports from Kuwait about 1936:—

- (1) *Ja'dân*, a disgruntled man, hovering between allegiance to King Faysal or to Ibn Sa'ûd and too proud to come to terms with either; and
- (2) *'Ajemi*, recognised as chief of the tribe by Ibn Sa'ûd.

52. *Abu Tuqeyqa Family*.

Formerly chiefs of the Tihâma, mainly Hejazi, section of the Huweytât tribe, with an urban connexion at Dhaba. Rafi'a, their common ancestor, was chief of the tribe prior to his death in about 1870. One of his many grandsons, Ahmed ibn Muhammad ibn Rafi'a, was chief in 1917. He came to notice in 1924 as one of several Hejazi sheykhs who approached the Residency in Cairo with a complaint of King Huseyn's tyranny and his inability to protect them against the Wahhâbis. He appears to have been Governor of Dhaba in 1927, but in that year the family were apparently in serious trouble with the Government, as it is said that Ahmed and four others were "killed by Ibn Sa'ûd," and others fled to Egypt. Numerous members of the family were concerned in the rebel invasion of the Hejaz by Ibn Rifâda in 1932. Seven of them lost their lives in that adventure and five more were reported by the Sa'ûdi commander to have been slain after Ibn Rifâda's defeat. Among the survivors was, however—

- (1) *Muhammad ibn [?] Abdurrahîm ibn Alwân ibn Rafi'a*, who was regarded as co-leader with Ibn Rifâda. He escaped, and after many vicissitudes left 'Aqaba for Egypt early in October 1932. May be the person against whom an exclusion order was made in Egypt rather later, but whose name is given as Muhammad bin Ahmed.

Another probable survivor is—

- (2) *Mahmûd ibn Ahmed ibn Rafi'a*, who ratted on Ibn Rifâda early in the rebellion and tried to make his peace with Ibn Sa'ûd.

Although the above summary cannot be verified at all points, it is inserted in view of the obvious tenacity of the family hatred of Ibn Sa'ûd, and the survival of (1), who seems to have been an active leader and may crop up again.

53. *Turki ibn Madhi*.

Was in 1932 Inspector-General of 'Asir and was associated with Fahad ibn Zu'ayr in efforts to make Ibn Sa'ûd realise the gravity of the situation preceding the open revolt of the Idrisi at the end of October. Identical with the person mis-named at the time 'Abdullah ibn Turki ibn Mahdi, who, with Abdul-Wahhâb Abu Malha and two chiefs of Asiri tribes, was sent on a mission to the Imâm Yahya in June 1927. Took part in further negotiations with the Imâm early in 1928. Would therefore appear to be one of Ibn Sa'ûd's experts in 'Asir and Yemen affairs. Accompanied Khalid al Qarqani and Hamad Suleyman on their fruitless mission to San'a in 1933, before the outbreak of the Sa'ûdi-Yemen war.

54. *Yahya an Nasri*.

Principal quarantine doctor at Jedda. A Syrian, like most doctors, now employed by the Sa'ûdi Government. Born probably about 1897. Studied in Constantinople and Beirut. Previously quarantine doctor at Yanbu'. Pleasant and well regarded by the Legation. Speaks Turkish and French. Was Sa'ûdi delegate to the meeting of the International Health Office, Paris, in October 1934. Appointed early in 1943 to be Director-General of Public Health in succession to Mahmûd Hamdi Hamûda (No. 62 in 1939 report).

55. *Yusuf Yasin, Shaikh*.

Probably born about 1898. A Syrian from Latakia, said by his enemies to be of Yezidi origin. Was at school in Jerusalem in 1917. Joined King Faisal at 'Aqaba and went with him to Damascus. Left on the approach of the French and joined King Huseyn in Mecca. Attached by him to the Amir 'Abdullah at 'Amman, with whom he remained six months. Formed so low an opinion of the 'Amir that, according to his own account, he broke with Huseyn in consequence. Joined Ibn Sa'ûd in due course. Came to Mecca in 1924-25 and started the *Umm-al-Qura* newspaper. Figured as a Nejdi delegate at the Moslem Congress of June 1926. Remained editor of the *Umm-al-Qura* for some years, but was also official Director of Publicity. Took part in negotiations with Sir G. Clayton in 1925, 1927 and 1928. Acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs in absence of



Dr. 'Abdullah Damlūji in 1926 and 1927. Reported in 1928 to have worked to undermine influence both of Damlūji, who resigned that year, and of Hāfiz Wahba (*q.v.*). Employed in various negotiations and again acted at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, for Fuad Hamza early in 1931, and for the 'Amir Faysal and Fuad as well in 1932, but has for some years been principally important as a personal secretary to the King, who made him head of the political section of his diwān in 1930, and whom he always accompanies. Was intermittently in charge of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, during the absences of Fuad Hamza, in 1934, 1935 and 1936. Went to Bagdad at the end of 1935 to negotiate the Sa'ūdi-Iraq Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance. Was notorious for his obstructiveness during the Clayton negotiations, and is naturally obstinate and hair-splitting in discussion, but can on occasion be amiable and even conciliatory. Takes his cue, in fact, from the King himself, to whom he appears to be genuinely devoted, and who probably trusts him as much as any of his near advisers except 'Abdullah Suleymān. Is probably a more convinced Wahhābi than most of the King's alien entourage and is also a strong Arab nationalist, with fewer ulterior motives than Fuad Hamza, having a simpler character and less European knowledge. Has the eyes of a fanatic, but has acquired the figure of a *bon vivant*. Works very hard but delights in creating difficulties and seeks to earn his master's praise for solving problems of his own manufacture. He feels sufficiently sure of his usefulness to the King and the real power of his position to allow himself to be the butt of the King and of those who aim their wit the same way as the King, and often deliberately plays the clown when he judges the King to be in the mood. His gluttony and monogamy are standing palace jokes. He is very jealous of 'Abdullah al Suleyman and of the latter's powerful assistant, Najib Salha. Since 1941 has lived almost continuously in the Hejaz, spending most of his time in Jedda. As the principal channel of communication between the King and the Legation he has in practice exercised the functions of Foreign Minister, the Amir Faysal being little more than a figure-head. He was the negotiator for Sa'ūdi Arabia of the Sa'ūdi-Koweit Agreements which he signed at Jedda on the 20th April, 1942. He still exercises control over the *Umm-ul-Qura* and drafts official communiqués for publication in it. He has much increased the stock of English which he acquired during a short stay in Surbiton when he accompanied the Amir Sa'ūd to England for the coronation of King George VI. Speaks Arabic with perhaps greater rapidity than any other man in Arabia and retains something of his native North Lebanon accent. Went on a visit to Lattaqia, where he and his two brothers own farm property, in May 1943.

56. *Muhammad Surūr as-Sabbān.*

Administrator of the Finance Department. Son of a slave of the Sabbān family (mother stated to have been Abyssinian), and became the moving spirit in their hide and skin business, which was at one time important, but became latterly bankrupt. Was a clerk in the municipality under King Huseyn, and is said to have tried to assassinate Ibn Sa'ūd when he conquered the Hejaz in 1925, and to have been subsequently incarcerated at Riyādh. Returned to the Hejaz about 1929 and was taken up by the Minister of Finance, whose powerful influence got him appointed about two years ago to his present post. Is nowadays second only to him in the Ministry of Finance in practical importance, and during the latter's absence at Hudeyda in May 1934 was in effective control of it. Manager of recently formed Arabian Export Company, a corporation formed to promote the export trade of the country. Continues to have great influence and to be much concerned in commercial enterprises. Reported in 1936 to have a great following in official circles. Pleasant, generous and said to be most capable. Has a younger brother, 'Abdullah, who is not, however, of any importance. By 1939 Muhammad Surūr had lost all influence, and was kept strictly to the limits of his post as head of the Accounts Branch of the Ministry of Finance.

57. *'Abdul Kerīm ibn Zeyd.*

Appointed Governor of Qaf in 1936. Nephew of 'Abdul-Azis ibn Zeyd (No. 5).

58. *'Abdullah Khawāter.*

Of Nejdi origin. Born about 1887. Intimate of 'Abdullah Suleyman and Hamad Suleyman with whom he spent many years in Bombay. Head of a section of the Ministry of Finance and may be a coming man. Is spoken of as a rival to Muhammad Surūr (No. 56).

59. *Asaf ibn Huseyn.*

Appointed Governor of Najrān and the "territories of Yam" in 1934, after the conclusion of the Treaty of Taif with the Yemen. Had previously been Governor of Rus.

60. *Ibrāhīm Shura.*

Egyptian. Born about 1897. Came to the Hejaz in about 1928 as a teacher. Appointed head of the Education Department at Mecca in 1930. Friendly with Sheykh Hāfiz Wahba. Amiable but unimpressive. Has a smattering of English. In 1936 appointed head of the Sa'ūdi Pilgrimage Propaganda Bureau at Mecca.

61. *Jamil Daūd al Musallimi.*

Legal adviser, or assistant, in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Born about 1906. A Hejazi trained in Egypt. Slight knowledge of English. Received his present appointment *vice* 'Id Rawwaf (No. 52) in January 1936. This was notable chiefly as a Hejazi encroachment on what has been for some time almost a Syrian preserve, and was attributed to the influence of Amir Feysal. Jamil Daūd is brother of a pilgrim guide whose activities have come to the unfavourable notice of the Legation. Has been found on many occasions obstructive and tactless. Is probably neither very intelligent nor energetic.

62. *Kāmil al Qassāb.*

Syrian. Born about 1875. Formerly Acting Director of Education in the Hejaz under King Huseyn. Later threw in his lot with Ibn Sa'ūd and became Sa'ūdi propagandist. Prominent in 1936 during troubles in Palestine on account of his activities as Ibn Sa'ūd's go-between with the Supreme Arab Committee at Jerusalem, where he went from Egypt when charged with communications from Ibn Sa'ūd. Paid an unobtrusive visit in summer of 1936 to the Hejaz, and in 1937 tried to persuade Ibn Sa'ūd to take part in a Moslem conference on Palestine. In 1942 was fishing for the post of Syrian representative to Sa'ūdi Arabia.

63. *Khairuddīn Zarakli.*

Syrian journalist. Born about 1880. Editor of *Al Qibla*, Mecca newspaper, official organ of King Huseyn for some years. Later was Hashimite propagandist in Egypt. Go-between between King Ali and Ibn Sa'ūd. Later joined the latter. Adviser to the Sa'ūdi Agency in Cairo in 1935. Now (1943) Secretary of the Saudi Legation there.

64. *Muhammad Sādiq ibn 'Abdullah.*

Born in Hejaz about 1888. In 1920 was principal of the Military School at Mecca. Was Commandant of the Jedda garrison during last days of King Ali. Left for Egypt in 1927.

An associate of Tāhir ad-Dabbāgh in anti-Sa'ūdi activities abroad. At instance of Sa'ūdi authorities was required to leave India in 1933. Subsequently travelled in Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine. Returned with Tāhir to Saudi Arabia under the amnesty of 1935 and in 1936 was made successively Assistant Director of Auqāf and Director of the Census. Reported to be a man of integrity.

65. *Sayyid Muhammad Shata.*

Younger brother of Sālih ibn Abu Bakr Shata (No. 85). Born about 1908. Holder of an Egyptian degree in religious law. Inspector in the Ministry of Education. In 1935 member of an unofficial delegation for the collection of Waqf moneys in various Islamic countries and India, which did not, however, leave this country. In 1936 appointed Inspector of Sharia Courts.

66. *Muhsin At Tayyeb.*

Moroccan by origin. Born about 1887. Held police appointments under the Hashimite régime. Under Ibn Sa'ūd he was similarly employed. Promoted at the beginning of 1936 from a post in the Sa'ūdi police to be secretary and A.D.C. to the Deputy Minister for Defence.

67. *Najīb Ibrāhīm Sālhā.*

A young man of Syrian origin, educated at the American College, Beirut. Born probably about 1902. Came in 1927 to the Hejaz via the Sudan, where employed for a short time by Gellatly, Hankey and Company (Sudan) (Limited). After a short but troubled period of service with that firm in Jedda, he entered



the Ministry of Finance. Speaking English well and of pleasant manners, he made himself useful to the Minister of Finance, whose secretary he became. In 1936 placed in charge of a newly created department of the Ministry of Finance, styled the "Office of Public Works," established to deal with the growing number of foreign concerns holding concessions in Sa'udi Arabia. By 1939 he had established himself in the confidence of Abdullah Sulaiman to the detriment of Muhammad Surūr, was employed as purchasing agent for the Government, and was enriching himself almost openly by bribery and commissions. Has now become indispensable to the Minister of Finance and has been specially commissioned by the King to deal with supply matters, but finds it difficult to exercise his functions without much interference from Yusuf Yasin. Since the outbreak of war he has been in constant contact with the Legation and has shown himself intelligent and frank. He works very hard and has co-operated most helpfully with the Legation in the endeavour to organise the provisioning and finances of the country. Is free in his criticism of the ignorance and incompetence of most of the members of the Sa'udi Government and has made many enemies but is loyally backed by 'Abdullah al Suleymān, and is probably the most efficient of all the King's servants. He is said to have enriched himself but this is scarcely remarkable in a country where emoluments are certain of payment only if the official is in a position to help himself. Although he abstains from tobacco and alcohol he makes no pretence of being a Wahhabi or even a very devout Moslem.

68. *Sa'ūd ibn 'Abdullah ibn Jiluwi.*

Appointed Governor of Hasa upon the death of his father (No. 9 in the 1934 Personalities Report) in October 1935. Born about 1900. Made an unfavourable general impression on Sir Andrew Ryan, who was received by the new Amir at Hofuf with a singular lack of ordinary Arab politeness, in December 1935. Described as repulsive in appearance owing to a super-squint. Reported from Bahrein to take an even stronger line with the Bedouin than his father did, and that much of the father's work in the last four years of his life was, in fact, done by the son. Shows nervousness in the presence of foreigners, but this can be overcome. In 1938 it was reported that his powers were being curtailed by the King, and that troops not under his control were to be quartered at Hofuf.

69. *Sa'ūd ibn Hedhlāl.*

Appointed Governor of Tabūk in 1936 in succession to 'Abdullah as-Sdayri (No. 48 (1)). Reported from Transjordan to have made a popular start, partly by recruiting his bodyguard locally, a departure which created a favourable impression.

70. *Tala'at Wafa'.*

Born about 1900 in the Hejaz. In 1934 member of Sa'udi boundary commission for the Yemen-Sa'udi frontier after the conclusion of the Treaty of Taif. Police official of importance, being Director for the Provinces of Asir and Najrān, and O.C. regular forces in Najrān and Abha in 1936.

71. *Ibrahīm Tāsān.*

A Nejdī born and brought up in Asir. Formerly in the Ottoman army. Now Commandant of the Jedda military district and "Director of the Air Force." Served in the Arab army of Sharif Hussein and was associated with Colonel Lawrence.

72. *Asad al Faqih.*

A young Syrian. Counsellor to the Saudi Legation in Bagdad in 1938. Afterwards Chargé d'Affaires and appointed in 1943 to be Minister there. Has some knowledge of English. A native of 'Aley in the Lebanon.

73. *Khalil Hajjan.*

Director of Police, Jedda. Formerly in Turkish army. Captured by the British during the Great War, but volunteered to join the Sharifian forces. Joined Ibn Sa'ūd after the fall of Jedda in 1925. A heavy drinker.

74. *Khuraiji, Shaikh Muhammad al-*

Brother-in-law to Shaikh Abdullah Sulaiman, to whose influence is attributed the fact that he has become the wealthiest man in Medina.

75. *Sa'd ibn Faisal.*

Governor of Duwadmi, 1938. Born about 1898. Son of a Royal slave.

76. *Shaikh al Ardh.*

Family name of two young Syrians, brothers. The elder, Midhat, who is doctor of the Royal ladies, accompanied the Crown Prince to England for the Silver Jubilee. He came to Riyādh as a penniless refugee and is known to have become rich in a few years, not by doctoring. Stated on very good evidence to have brought with him from Syria as maid to his wife an Armenian girl (entered on his passport as his sister) and to have handed over the unwilling girl to Ibn Sa'ūd as a concubine. Accompanied the Amir Mansūr on a visit to Egypt in March 1942. The younger brother, Fakhri, who describes himself as an agricultural expert, was in charge of a small experimental garden at Riyādh in 1939, and was also employed that year as Courier to Paris.

77. *Shaikh, Muhammad.*

One of the numerous young Syrians in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Accompanied the Amir Sa'ūd to the United Kingdom in 1935 for the Silver Jubilee. Sent to the Yemen in 1937 to sign various agreements on behalf of the Sa'udi Government. Assisted Yusuf Yasin in negotiating the Sa'udi-Koweit Agreements at Jedda in 1940-42.

78. *Yusuf ibn 'Abdullah al Fauzan.*

Formerly lived in Bombay, where he acted as unofficial agent for Ibn Sa'ūd. Appointed Consul-General at Jerusalem in February 1941. An intelligent young man with pleasing manners. Speaks English well.

79. *Bashir as-Sa'dāwi.*

A Tripolitan, believed to be related to Khalid al Qarqani (q.v.). Like Khalid, fought against the Italians. In 1939 used by Ibn Sa'ūd as emissary in Syria and was present at all but the most confidential talks between the King and His Majesty's Minister at Riyādh. Holds no definite post but ranks as one of the King's advisers. Talks Turkish in addition to Arabic but no European language. Was not much in evidence during His Majesty's Minister's visit to Riyādh in March 1942.

80. *Nāsir ibn 'Abdullah ibn 'Aqil.*

Director of Finance at Jedda. A cousin of Ibrahim al Suleyman ibn 'Aqil.

81. *Suleyman Nanih.*

Director of Coastguards. A Nejdī, like nearly all the rest of the service. Friendly and helpful.

82. *'Abdul Aziz ibn Fawzān.*

Manager of the Royal garage at Riyādh. A Koweiti by origin who claims, although it is not known on what grounds, to be a British subject. Said to have served with the British Red Cross in Iraq during the war of 1914-18. A fat, sly, talkative man. He likes strong drink and has an inexhaustible fund of humorous reminiscences and anecdotes. During the Yemen war he was in charge, under the Amir Sa'ūd, of the Sa'udi army's mechanised transport. Although not likely to become a figure of political importance he is worth mentioning as being on intimate terms with the King and his advisers and as having proved from time to time that he has a pretty accurate knowledge of what goes on in the King's councils. He is much in contact with the Amir Mansūr who frequents the garage.

*Obituary.*

(Died since the last report—July 1939.)

1. *Sayyid 'Abdul Wahhāb*, No. 17 in 1939 report.
2. *Mahmūd Hamdi Hamāda*, No. 62 in 1939 report.
3. *Rusheyd Pasha*, No. 82 in 1939 report.



## CHAPTER VII.—GENERAL.

[E 2149/506/65]

No. 44.

*Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 14.)*

(No. 13.)

Sir,

*Beirut, March 20, 1943.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter addressed to the United States Diplomatic Agent by Dr. Carleton, the head of the American College in Aleppo, on the subject of Zionism as seen in North Syria. This document was communicated to me by His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo, to whom Dr. Carleton gave a copy.

2. The writer of this letter is a man of sober judgment, who has considerable experience of the Levant States, and his views are therefore deserving of close attention. Neither I nor His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo consider that his conclusions are unsound, or that his forecast of what is likely to be the result of any extension of Zionism is unduly pessimistic. Dr. Carleton's letter contains, in fact, a fairly balanced statement of this problem, which should be of considerable value to the authorities concerned.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch, with enclosure, to the High Commissioner for Palestine, and to the Minister of State, Cairo, for the particular information of Lord Moyne, who was prevented from seeing Dr. Carleton during his recent visit to Aleppo.

I have, &amp;c.

E. L. SPEARS.

Enclosure in No. 44.

*Dr. Carleton to Mr. Wadsworth.*

Dear Mr. Wadsworth,

*March 10, 1943.*

IT is several days since I received through Mr. Britt your invitation to comment on the question of Zionism as one sees it in North Syria. By the irony of fate it has been a threatened student strike, fomented by rumours of land sales to Jews in Southern Syria, that has kept me too busy to reply until now! Now that is over and I can put down on paper the things that I should like to say on this point could I come into your office to talk it over. You already realise that no letter on so controversial a point can be so complete as to say *all* that ought to be said, or so well documented as to avoid the charge of bias and dogmatism. Hence, if I make categorical statements which seem doubtful to you, I trust you will allow me to defend them later with all the evidence I have at hand.

Although I have not been in very intimate connexion with the leaders of the local Jewish community, I do have some good friends in that group and I should like to begin by speaking of their point of view. The Aleppo Jews number just about 9,000 persons. Most of them have been here "since memory began," but there is a considerable Spanish-speaking group that came here seeking refuge from Christian persecution in the later Middle Ages. The group has been entirely Arabic-speaking and—at least until recently—strongly anti-Zionist. Since about the beginning of the war, however, and particularly since the riot in Bagdad in 1941, there has been some growth of Zionist feeling among the young men on the theory that they "may as well die for a sheep as a lamb." Jewish holdings in real estate have been gradually reduced in favour of more liquid assets, in anticipation of trouble to come. The form of trouble they anticipate varies from a minimum of having to emigrate to Palestine after the war to a maximum of fear of massacre.

The feeling among the Arab community has also been rising. Aleppo has been particularly a commercially-minded city, with little interest in either political or religious fanaticism. Until 1936 there was relatively little activity here of an anti-Zionist nature, but it is estimated that during the years of the Palestine "troubles," from 1937 to 1939, between 300 and 500 young men from Aleppo and environs went to Palestine to serve with the rebels. I feel that it is very clear that it is the reports they brought back, and not mere "Axis propaganda," that produced the sharp rise in anti-Zionist (and consequently anti-Semitic) feeling in North Syria. Similarly during the months since the war began it has

been a case of the fear of Zionism feeding the fires of Axis propaganda, and not the reverse as the Zionists would have the world believe.

During the months since the victory of the Eighth Army it would have been natural to expect a great wave of pro-Allied sentiment in Arab lands, in view of the "pro-victor" policy of the peoples of the Near and Middle East. That has not occurred, in North Syria at least, because of the rising fear of British and American support for an extension of Zionism. Whether that fear has been fostered by the activities of a Fifth Column is beside the point, so long as it receives such a genuine hearing among the population. Other causes may explain it, also. One is the wider circulation of the *Palestine Post*, with its Zionist point of view. Another is the amount of echo that gets through from the great propaganda campaign the Jewish Agency is waging in England and America in favour of "revision." Some would imply that the less responsible elements in the French administration are not above encouraging the rumours, as one point at which they can gain favour with the Arabs by contrast to their more powerful Allies, the British and the Americans, whose prestige would otherwise be overwhelming in these countries. Be that as it may, the point is that anti-Zionist feeling has been spreading rapidly in these parts of the Arab world where it was formerly less common. The mere rumour that "land is being sold to the Jews" or that "the Americans are going to settle Jews in the Bekaa" is enough to foment an attempt at a demonstration or a general strike in cities like Latakia, Hama or Aleppo.

Even should the situation in Palestine itself be stabilised at once—as by formal and official declaration in London that the purposes of the Balfour Declaration have already been fulfilled or that the 1939 White Paper will be replaced at its expiration by another at least as satisfactory to the Arab world—there must be a long process of adjustment. Jews now in Arab lands have become a minority problem of the first order. Plans for any Arab federation are jeopardised by the feeling of neighbouring lands that Palestine must be "quarantined" to prevent spread of what they consider the Jewish "infection." Anglo-American status and prestige in these lands will have to be maintained and built up by a long steady process of divorcing them, in the mind of the Arab, from the Zionist problem even as it exists now. Questions of language and systems of education, of freedom of travel and settlement, of representation in parliamentary bodies, &c., will have to be most carefully worked out with reference to the Jews now in Arab lands, as for the lesser minorities.

Should there be under consideration the *least* extension of Zionism, results of the utmost seriousness would result. That is true whether the extension be geographic—by the enlargement of the area to which the Balfour Declaration is made applicable—or political—by the recognition of even a part of Palestine as "a Jewish State." At the risk of sounding alarmist, for I have not the space here to back up my statements with quotations from scores of hundreds of friends in North Syria, I must say that any move which even looks like opening the door wider to the Jews will surely produce three results:—

1. Complete repudiation of Allied sentiments on the part of the Arab world, even though that means lining up with an Axis that well-informed Arabs now know to be on the way to defeat.
2. Rebellion against anything Anglo-American, not only in Palestine, but over the Arab world as a whole. The Arabs are in a position to put up a much stronger fight than they did in the bloody days of 1938-39. (So are the British and the Jews, but that is aside from the point here, and perhaps only emphasises it.)
3. Imminent danger of massacre for all Jews, whether Zionist or not, in all the Near and Middle East.

Re-reading the above paragraph, I am a bit shocked at how bloodthirsty I sound. I should have doubted those statements a few years ago. At least I should have been ashamed to speak of the Arabs in terms of "rebellion" and "massacre." Yet realism forces me to speak so now. My years in the Arab world have not made me anti-Semitic, but decidedly anti-Zionist. It is partly because I feel for the Jews already here—who came here to flee Christian persecution in many cases—that I feel the question must be seen through the eyes of the Arab world, and not through the eyes of London and New York and Washington.

There is another point that I hope I can state clearly, though it is hard to find the precise words. If there is to be any enlargement whatever of the Zionist policy in the Arab world it will be by the bayonets of British—and possibly American—soldiers. We may call that "maintaining order" and blame the



Arabs if they try to "massacre" Jews under "our protection." But look at it from the other side of the picture. Should such a situation arise, the Arab will be justified in looking upon us as "imperialist," trying to take over Palestine for the sake of the minority among us of British and American Jews. We will become the "bloody foreigners" trying to impose our will by force, and "massacring" Arabs in the process—Arabs who are loyally trying to defend their "freedom." I need not press the point further, but it is well sometimes if we try to "see ourselves as others see us."

Copies of this letter are going to Colonel Summerhayes and to Mr. Britt, who knows that I am writing it. While this is a matter on which one hesitates to be quoted, for it is such a vital matter and one which charges of prejudice are so easily made upon, I am quite willing to have this letter used in any way in your official correspondence with Americans and British authorities.

Very sincerely yours,

ANDREW CARLETON.

[J 1464/2/16]

No. 45.

*Sir M. Lampson to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 2, 1943.)*

(No. 242.)

Sir,

*Cairo, March 5, 1943.*

IN continuation of correspondence ending with my despatch No. 1 of the 2nd January last, regarding the establishment of an office for cultural co-operation between Egypt and Iraq, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine to His Majesty's Minister of State at Cairo, enclosing correspondence with the Egyptian Consul-General at Jerusalem on the subject of this Cultural Bureau.

2. The explanations detailed in the Egyptian Consul-General's letter regarding the objects of the Bureau for Cultural Co-operation are similar to those which have been given to Ibn Saud in the invitation addressed to him to participate in this bureau (see Jedda telegram, No. 76, of the 22nd February, to you).

3. These moves of the Egyptian Government are, of course, part of a general effort by Nahas Pasha to increase his prestige by playing a leading part in the movements in the Arab world towards co-operation in various forms. I have reported on this tendency in despatches on other subjects, more particularly as regards Palestine and Syria (see my despatch No. 121 of the 3rd February).

4. With reference to Sir H. MacMichael's letter to the Egyptian Consul-General, I shall, no doubt, learn, in due course, whether or not the Palestine Government propose to accept the invitation of the Egyptian Government and, if so, what form Palestinian representation would take in this Cultural Bureau.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to the High Commissioner for Palestine, His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, and His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda.

I have, &c.

(for His Majesty's Ambassador),

TERENCE SHONE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 45.

*High Commissioner for Palestine to Minister of State, Cairo.*

Sir,

*February 19, 1943.*

I have the honour to forward herewith for your information a copy of a letter of the 8th February, 1943, which has been addressed to this Government by the consul-general of Egypt, Jerusalem, regarding the establishment of a bureau in the Egyptian Ministry of Education for the purpose of regulating cultural operation between Egypt and the neighbouring Arab countries.

I also enclose a copy of the acknowledgment which I have caused to be sent to the Egyptian Consul-General.

I have, &c.

HAROLD MACMICHAEL,

*High Commissioner for Palestine.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 45.

*Royal Consulate-General of Egypt to the High Commissioner for Palestine.*

(No. 9/1/1.)

Sir,

*Jerusalem, February 8, 1943.*

BUREAU for Cultural Co-operation.

I have the honour to inform you that the Royal Egyptian Government, in execution of the policy which it has always adopted in strengthening the ties of friendship, goodwill and co-operation between Egypt and the Arab sister countries, and in discharge of its desire to fortify these relations, as dictated by the bonds of neighbourhood, unity of language and religion, has established a bureau in the Egyptian Ministry of Education for the purpose of regulating cultural co-operation between Egypt and these countries. It is intended that this bureau be attended by representatives of the participant countries, and hold periodical meetings during February of each year, for the purpose of exchanging views on such matters of cultural and educational nature as may be prescribed, provided that the following subjects will form the principal matters to be studied by the bureau:—

- (1) To lay the basis of a treaty on cultural matters between Egypt and such countries as may participate in the bureau.
- (2) To convene cultural conferences at which Arab countries would be represented.
- (3) To exchange information between such countries as may participate in this bureau on all matters relating to the development of education and instruction, including programmes of study, curriculums, text-books and laws and regulations showing at the same time the reasons for such developments.
- (4) To discuss the question of exchanging teachers and students and the details relating thereto.
- (5) To discuss the question of exchanging books, publications and school equipment between the participant countries.
- (6) To pave the way for the holding of educational and cultural conferences.

In communicating to you the participation of Iraq in this bureau, it gives me pleasure to inform you that the Royal Egyptian Government welcomes to this bureau such sister-Arab States as may wish to join it.

With highest respects,

MAHMOUD FAWZI, *Consul-General.*

Enclosure 3 in No. 45.

*The High Commissioner for Palestine to the Consul-General of Egypt (Jerusalem).*

Sir,

*February 19, 1943.*

I AM directed by the High Commissioner to thank you very much for letting his Excellency have the information contained in your letter No. 9/1/1 of the 8th February, 1943, regarding the establishment of a bureau in the Egyptian Ministry of Education for the purpose of regulating cultural co-operation between Egypt and the neighbouring Arab countries.

I am, &c.

J. S. MACPHERSON, *Chief Secretary.*



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(16489)

## Further Correspondence

respecting

# EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 54

July to September 1943



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## CONFIDENTIAL.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING  
EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 54.—JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1943.

## CHAPTER I.—ARABIA.

[E 4211/583/25]

No. 1.

*Mr. Wikeley to Mr. Eden.—(Received 20th July.)*

(No. 45.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him the annual report on the heads of foreign missions in Jedda

*Jedda, 1st July, 1943*

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Jedda, 1st July, 1943.*

(Passages marked with an asterisk are taken from previous reports.)

## France.

M. P. A. Ballereau, the Vichy Minister, was induced by the Saudi Arabian Government, after great difficulty, to return to France. He left Jedda on the 19th June and the Vichy Legation has been closed. The Turkish Legation is in charge of Vichy interests.

## Fighting France.

\*M. Roger Maigret has return to Jedda as "Délégué" of Fighting France. He was chargé d'affaires and later French Minister in Jedda from 1929 to 1938 (see report for 1937). He is being accorded by the Saudi Arabian Government, as a personal courtesy, all or nearly all the privileges of the head of a foreign mission.

It is difficult to see what useful rôle can be played by a representative of Fighting France in this country at present. France, whether Fighting or not, has lost any prestige she ever had here, and Ibn Saud has described the Fighting French as "just another slice from the same old loaf."

M. Maigret professes to be a firm adherent of the Allied cause, and it is believed that he was one of the first in Syria to rally to de Gaulle. His mentality, however, is revealed by the fact that he considers that any representative of France in Jedda, even an admittedly incompetent and shifty M. Balleareau with his declared hostility to the Allies, is better than none.

As far as is known, M. Maigret holds no communication with his Vichy colleague. (Written in January 1943.)

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*Iraq.*

Jamil Pasha Ar-Rawi was in Jedda from November 1939 to 1941 as Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires. After two years at Kabul he has now returned to Jedda as Minister. He presented his credentials on the 4th March, 1943.

He served during the war of 1914-18 first in the Turkish forces and then with his close friend Nuri Pasha as Said in the Arab forces. Was principal military aide-de-camp to King Hussein.

Jamil Pasha is a very pleasant and friendly colleague, but his health is not good. He is married, but his wife does not appear in masculine society.

*Netherlands.*

\*Daniel van de Meulen has, owing to the internment in Holland of the titular chargé d'affaires, Dr. Dingemans, returned to Jedda, where from 1926 to 1931 he was consul and later chargé d'affaires. He had just been promoted resident in the Dutch Colonial Service, and is merely seconded for the duration of the war. He is an authority on the Arabic language and customs and speaks good English and French. He is a most loyal supporter of the Allied cause. His wife, who is said to have some Javanese blood, has great charm of manner and is most helpful in counteracting her husband's occasional tendency to pessimism. Four of their children are in Holland. (Written in 1941.)

M. van der Meulen made a trip to the Yemen by land in the summer of 1942. In his opinion his trip did much to counteract Axis propaganda in the Yemen and served to show the Yemenis that the Netherlands was still a power in the world.

*Turkey.*

M. Nizamettin Ayashli presented his credentials as Minister on the 2nd August, 1942.

He is most amiable and professes pro-Allied sentiments. He is in charge of German, Italian and Vichy interests. The departure in the spring of the German and Italian internees must have been a great relief to him.

M. Ayashli speaks good French but little English. His wife speaks good English and goes about unveiled. She is a pleasant person and keeps large numbers of dogs, cats and other live-stock as pets in the house.

*Representatives accredited also to other Governments.**Afghanistan.*

\*Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq-al-Mujaddidi, is also Minister to Egypt and resides in Cairo. He came to Mecca on pilgrimage at the end of 1942, but was not seen by his Christian colleagues. (Written in January 1943.)

*Egypt.*

\*Bahrawi Bey has been transferred to a post in the Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and has been succeeded by Mohammed Hosni Omar, who is also Minister to Iraq. He has not yet presented his credentials and nothing is known of him in Jedda.

The Egyptian Legation is in the charge of Abdul Hamid Monir Bey, a most friendly and helpful colleague who co-operates willingly over such questions as the pilgrimage. (Written in January 1943.)

*Persia.*

\*Ali Akbar Bahman, Minister to Saudi Arabia and Ambassador to Egypt, terminated his mission in both countries on an unspecified date in 1942, and, as far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, no successor appears to have been appointed yet. (Written in January 1943.)

*United States.*

\*Mr. Alexander Kirk presented his credentials to the King at Riyadh on the 11th May, 1942. The visit to Saudi Arabia was, literally, a flying one and lasted only a few days.

Mr. Kirk visited Jedda in December 1942 for some days.

Mr. Kirk, who is also, of course, Minister to Egypt, was most friendly during his few days' stay in Jedda, but as he resides permanently in Cairo his colleagues here know little about him.

A welcome addition to the Diplomatic Corps in Jedda was the establishment on the 1st May, 1942, of a permanent United States Legation in the charge of Mr. James S. Moose (Junior), who was previously second secretary at Tehran.

Mr. Moose, while he is in theory just a member of Mr. Kirk's staff, in fact acts as the head of a mission with the rank of chargé d'affaires. He is a most agreeable and co-operative colleague and appears to get on well with the Saudi Arabs. He is married, but his wife and family are in America. (Written in January 1943.)

Mr. Moose has recently been appointed Minister Resident to Saudi Arabia. It is understood that when the appointment is confirmed by the Senate he will present letters of credence to the Saudi Arabian Government and will be freed from the control of the American Minister in Egypt.

[E 5552/506/65]

No. 2.

*Mr. Wikeley to Mr. Eden.—(Received 16th September.)*

(No. 68. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Jedda, 1st September, 1943.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit the accompanying record of the conversations which took place recently at Riyadh between Ibn Saud and Colonel Hoskins.

This document, which was communicated to me by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on Ibn Saud's instructions, is in the form of a letter from the King to the sheikh.

That part of the discussions which turned on Palestine and Arab unity has already been reported to you separately in my telegrams Nos. 345 and 349 and in my despatch No. 66 of the 31st August, 1943.

I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to the Minister of State at Cairo, to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Bagdad and Beirut, and to the High Commissioner for Palestine.

I have, &amp;c.

T. WIKELEY.

Enclosure in No. 2.

(Translation.)

*Record of a Conversation between His Majesty King Ibn Saud and Lieutenant-Colonel Hoskins.*

INFORM Mr. Wikeley that Colonel Hoskins, President Roosevelt's representative, came to see us. We talked with him, and he left on Saturday for Dhahran on his way to Egypt. He talked at great length, questioned us exhaustively and sought our opinion. We gave him the necessary reply. He is the bearer of a letter from President Roosevelt authorising him to discuss certain matters with us on the President's behalf; at the same time he bears a verbal message regarding the Palestine question. We have sent you, as enclosures, the following documents:—

1. President Roosevelt's letter.
2. President Roosevelt's verbal message.
3. Our reply to the President's letter.
4. Our reply to the verbal message regarding Palestine.
5. Copy of our discussion about Arab unity.

In view of the length of these documents and the difficulty of telegraphing their contents, we have sent them to you to-day, and, God willing, you will show them to him.

As regards the Palestine question, we gave a verbal reply to the verbal message, and you will find a copy thereof enclosed herein. In addition, he asked us whether or not there would be a revolt in Palestine, whether we had heard that the Jews had formed a secret army with soldiers, and whether the Arabs had made any preparations or arrangements. We replied that we had heard nothing about the Jewish formations he mentioned except that Britain had asked the Jews for soldiers, whereupon we had asked the British Government about it, and they had replied that what they had asked for were not soldiers for fighting, but men to take the place of British soldiers who had been sent to the front so that they could replace them inside the country in order to ensure internal security.

As regards the Arabs in Palestine, we told him that we could not give any guarantee regarding the conduct of the Arabs in Palestine or elsewhere, for the Arabs were all agreed that the Jews in Palestine were buying arms and munitions and making military arrangements and warlike preparations; we, however, did not pay attention to such talk, but this is what we had heard. He stated that he

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had also heard the same thing and would like to confirm it, to which we replied that the Arabs of Palestine were afraid of this rumour and of the preparations of the Jews which they saw around them; we were confident, however, that nothing would happen so long as Britain was in Palestine; true, the Arabs of Palestine greatly resented this state of affairs, but we would not spare any effort with the Allies to allay the fears of the Arabs, and we hoped that the war would end with the victory of the Allies, for such a victory was profitable to the Arabs. As regards talk about a revolt by the Arabs in Palestine, we had heard nothing, and if we did hear and confirm it we would be against it.

The other questions he asked us about were numerous and are set out as under:—

1. He asked us about our relations with Egypt, and we informed him that they were excellent and the best possible.

2. He asked us about the Caliphate, and we explained to him that this question had arisen thirty-five years ago, and that its past history was known; we then explained to him that there were obligations and conditions attaching to the Caliphate which he who laid claim to it had to fulfil. There are three things which he who claims to be Caliph must be distinguished by and which he must fulfil; these three are:—

- (a) That he rules his people and his country and the countries under his rule in accordance with the Book of God and the teaching of the Prophet.
- (b) That he takes charge of the Caliphate with the agreement of all Moslems and makes "jihad" (holy war) for it with the sword.
- (c) That he has power and strength to protect his country and people from any enemies, fights for them and makes the "jihad" in the cause of God.

Then the President's representative asked what we meant by "jihad," and we told him that it meant that the Caliph had power to prevent him (i.e. Colonel Hoskins) from coming to his country by land and sea, at which he laughed, and asked whether that was possible; to which we replied that only he who possessed such power could seek to be Caliph, for without it there would be no Caliphate. He then asked our opinion as to who should lay claim to the Caliphate, and we told him that it was at present a hollow, meaningless title (literally "a loud voice with an empty belly").

He then asked our opinion about India, what news we had about it and what the aims of the Indians were, complete independence and separation or not. We replied that this was impossible; firstly, it is not in the interests of the Indians, and, secondly, it is not in the interests of Britain; if India obtains her independence this will be harmful to Indian Moslems in the first place, for the Hindus will rise up and slaughter them. In our opinion Hindus and Japanese are both alike and both are heathens. He asked us what Indian Moslems say about this, and we told him that we had told them what was in their interests, namely, that their interests demanded agreement with Britain; if they abandoned this agreement it would mean the beginning of their annihilation; moreover, even supposing Britain were to leave India, any Government that was powerful enough could attack India and conquer it without scruple.

He asked us next about Persia and we told him that in the age of the "Khafar" régime Persia was degenerate and ruined; things changed with the advent to power of Pahlevi Shah, the Government became organised, and the Shah, who had power and influence, oppressed the Arabs; then things grew confused and bad owing to his régime as they were in the bad old days; he asked us: "And now?"—to which we replied that the situation to-day was stable and that the son who reigned in his father's stead was popular; it was, moreover, in the interests of Persia that the Allies occupied it; and if after the war the Allies gave the Persians full independence, that would be in their own interests and provide Persia with an opportunity to desist from evil and do good; one matter, however, we are not happy about in Persia; he asked: "What is that?"—and we replied: "The question of the Russians"; we do not like the Russians to have an entry into Persia or into the Near East, but in view of war-time conditions and exigencies the Arabs can but be patient; no doubt the Allies think of removing them and their mischief after the war. He asked me next what I thought about Russia's principles, and I replied that, as he was aware, these were all bad; the Russians deny this and say that it is false and an invention of English propaganda. We added that it is clear to us that what the Russians do is as patent as the sun, and travellers from the Caucasus have told us more.

Khalid Abdul Walid, who is an eye-witness of this, has told us that they are anti-religious and amoral, but, if God wills, He will make them follow the principles of the Allies. He states that "we" (the Americans) are also busy with Persia and have sent them technicians and experts, and our men are making a railway for them.

He then asked me about the situation in Syria, and I answered: "Syria is one of the finest Arab countries and her men are workers"; they, however, received no help in the past towards their independence, nor were their problems solved until the Allies entered Syria two years ago and the King of Britain recognised their independence; we hope that this will be a good start. As regards their situation to-day, they are doing well, especially following on the elections, when men of the "Kitlah" (Nationalist bloc) took over the Government; these men are the best available, upright and with principles. I wish them luck from start to finish.

He then asked me for my views on the Syrians and Lebanese and the question of the Lebanon's independence, and I replied: "The views of us Arabs and of the whole world are that the fusion of Syria and the Lebanon is the best and most suitable solution whether from the economic or the political point of view; this is what the people talk about and what we desire." From what we gather from Syrians who visit us, there is no difference between Syria and the Lebanon, nor have we heard that there is any enmity or hostility between them. This is what I know.

He asked us what our own situation was as regards civilisation development and education, and what conditions the Arab States wanted and what our opinion about it was? I replied: "There are two points to this question: the first is the question of religion, the traditions of the Arabs, and the religious precepts of the Moslems, matters we cannot possibly allow to be interfered with, however, small they were and even if they were as a grain of mustard; even if I, for example, considered it negligible, the people of Nejd would rise against me in the same way as they would never allow it themselves; as regards the second point, such pursuits as agriculture which provide an abundant livelihood and do not affect religious matters, these we encourage and desire." He told me that "we are prepared to give all assistance in such matters, but I must explain that the technicians and experts we send will be paid for by the Government which employs them." Next he asked us about roads and why we had not built them, to which I replied: "We have this in mind, and asked Mr. Twitchell, the engineer, to discuss it with the American Government and with certain firms; the war intervened, however, and we broke off discussions because without machinery and tools there can be no roads." He stated that he knew that there were certain machines in Egypt which could be used for road-levelling; I told him: "If you find them we should like them."

He then asked us about the pilgrimage and what I thought about it. I replied: "God willing the 'Hajj' will be considerable this year, for no doubt Moslems wish to perform their duty; unfortunately the pilgrims may not be able to obtain their desired comfort because of the lack of cars on the one hand and the lack of the necessary spare parts on the other, for last year and the year before we were obliged to give our own cars to transport the pilgrims, so that all we have now is what we obtained from you the last time, which is insufficient; similarly, the cars which arrived recently need repairs and we do not have the necessary spare parts. Indeed, the Car Company here is in great difficulties and cannot even ensure the transport of the mail; I therefore consider that, with your agreement and approval you might give us 200 or 300 cars for the pilgrimage to be provided either by you or by one of your firms to the above-mentioned company as happened before." "That is all very well," he answered, "but unfortunately the only cars we have are those which are being used on the battle fronts." We retorted: "The small number we require will not affect you as it is but a drop in the ocean, which benefits us without harming you." "I will speak about it," he said.

He then asked me: "Do you wish to charge me with any service?" and I replied: "I have nothing, but in any case you know the channels of communication between us." There are three matters, however, which I would like to tell you about: firstly, every effort should be made not to cut down the amounts of supplies agreed upon and their transportation; we know you are not neglecting this; however, as regards the question of transport, some delay is inevitable, but you and your ally, Britain, can do what is necessary to remove the obstacles which prevent the arrival of supplies in time. Secondly, the question of silver currency: when the pilgrimage takes place and no silver is available the people will be



very perturbed. He replied: "I know about this and so does my Government, and I will do my best." "Finally," I told him, "we need cars and hope that you will not stint us in this matter and in the matter of sending sufficient spare parts."

Then he asked us about Iraq and relations between us. We answered that "there exist no important differences between us and we are as close together as possible; there are a few insignificant matters outstanding between us, but we have not importuned the Iraqis about them. God willing, these will be solved after the war." He then questioned us about the attitude of Nuri-as-Said and the Regent, and we said to him: "We know no more about this than you; I hear about it, but your representatives in Iraq can tell you about it; I have no more to say to you on this matter."

Next he asked us about our opinion regarding Morocco, and I told him that it was clear from what Moroccans coming to the Hejaz said that the people there did not want French rule; that was all I knew about it.

Then he asked us about our relations with the Turks, and we told him that they were now excellent and that although there had been ancient enmity between us because of their destruction of our country in past wars, we were now pleased with them in the present war and wished them good luck; although they derived strength out of their attitude, yet it had been beneficial to the Allies. We were therefore exceedingly pleased with them.

These, then, are the topics he discussed with us. Indeed, he asked about everything and we do not know whether this was on his own initiative or whether he was instructed to do so, except that he told us that President Roosevelt likes to have information and asked him to enquire about everything. This is what we have got, tell the "Britisher" about it, as usual, and let us know the result.

*Letter from President Roosevelt to His Majesty King Ibn Saud.*

His Majesty Abdul Aziz bin Saud,  
King of Saudi Arabia.

*White House, Washington, 17th July, 1943.*

My great and good Friend,

I HAVE instructed Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Hoskins of the United States army, whom I trust implicitly, to seek an interview with your Majesty in order to discuss in my name certain specific matters of mutual interest.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express to your Majesty my best wishes for the health of your Majesty and the happiness and prosperity of your people.

Your sincere friend,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

*Letter from His Majesty King Ibn Saud to President Roosevelt.*

*From Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman al Faisal, King of Saudi Arabia, to His Excellency Mr. Franklin Roosevelt, President of the United States.*

Your Excellency,

I HAVE received with great pleasure your Excellency's letter from the White House, dated the 7th July, which Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Hoskins, your Excellency's representative, brought to me.

I was greatly pleased to meet your representative, who informed me of your Excellency's private views regarding certain matters of common interest. Colonel Hoskins will in turn carry to your Excellency my own views and thoughts. I was delighted to receive your Excellency's greetings which your representative conveyed to me.

Colonel Hoskins carried out the task entrusted to him in an outstandingly able and accomplished manner.

I avail myself of the opportunity of his return to the United States to send your Excellency my sincere appreciation of your noble motives in sending a representative which reveals the firm friendship binding our two countries together. I likewise send my sincere greetings and those of my Government and people and our best wishes to your Excellency and to the American people.

Given at our Palace in Riyadh on the 19th of Sha'aban in the year 1362, Hejrah=20th August, 1943.

CHAPTER II.—IRAQ.

[E 3585/489/93]

No. 3.

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 23rd June.)*

(No. 195.)

*Bagdad, 5th June, 1943.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to continue in this despatch the story of current events in Iraq from the point at which it was concluded in my despatch No. 111 of the 28th March.

2. Measures for the proper utilisation of the new harvest and for the further control of the sale of imported goods have, during the last two months occupied much of the Government's attention and I myself have spent many hours discussing these measures with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance and the British Advisers concerned. The new "Law for the Regulation of the Economic Life of the Country" surprisingly passed through Parliament without damaging amendment—but not without severe censure of the Government's inability to cope with economic problems—and came into force on 13th April. It brought into being a Cabinet Committee of Supplies under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, and throughout the latter half of April this committee worked hard to discharge its onerous duties of "preventing hoarding and speculation and of making available to the people supplies of the necessities of life." The result of the committee's labours was a series of notifications put out in the first half of May by means of which a carefully thought out attempt is being made to check soaring prices and to ensure not only adequate supplies at low prices for internal needs but also to put the surplus of the year's wheat and barley crops at the disposal of the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation for export to the neighbouring countries.

3. Put briefly the plan for these two cereals is that all growers are to surrender to the Government one half of their wheat crop and one third of their barley crop at a fixed price. The balance of the wheat crop may either be kept by owners or sold to the Government at the same price as the wheat compulsorily surrendered. The manner in which owners shall dispose of the balance of their barley crop has not yet been determined, nor have prices yet been announced for either wheat or barley, although the High Supply Committee have decided that the farm price of wheat is to remain unchanged at I.D. 25 per ton. A surplus of well over 200,000 tons of barley is expected and, as you know, I am negotiating a price at which this surplus can be purchased by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation. At the time of writing this despatch it seems that the lowest figure to which the Iraqi Government are likely to agree is I.D. 22/500 a ton (including tax and transport to the nearest rail or river collecting centre). This is a high price for the growers, even if judged on the basis of the current high cost of living, but it is probably not higher than that which could be obtained in the open market, once it became known that the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation intended to purchase large quantities. Iraq, it must be remembered, wishes to get all she can out of the war and the essence of the new doctrine of inter-Allied economy generally called lease-lend, is not even dimly understood. The steps taken to lay hands on the surplus of the 1942 crop of barley, which I described in my last despatch, resulted in the transfer to the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation of nearly 29,000 tons of barley. A further considerable quantity is available in tax centres and it is expected that a substantial proportion of this will be released for the corporation, who will then have all they need before the new crop comes on the market. Control of 1942 barley was removed on the 20th May and all transactions were declared free until the threshing of the 1943 crop. Transactions in old wheat were also freed from all restrictions except that the price remains fixed as before.

4. The preliminary measures taken for the cheaper sale and better distribution of imported goods aim at providing the Government with comprehensive information about all wholesale and retail traders and their stocks. When this information has been collected and collated further action to fix prices will follow. All dealers are to register stocks and in future buying and selling whether in bulk or in detail will be restricted to licensed persons. The immediate effect of these measures has been to curtail wholesale dealings, to frighten speculators and to bring down by 15 to 25 per cent. the retail prices of a number of popular consumers goods such as yashmaks, cheap cotton piece-goods, razor blades and soap. Some



wholesale prices dropped by as much as 30 to 40 per cent. The market is, however, waiting to see whether the new measures will be forcefully implemented and generally expects prices to recover again in view of past experience of the Government's inability to undertake sustained and effective action to control them.

5. Further control has also been established over the available means of motor transport. It is now absolutely forbidden to sell or purchase a motor vehicle or any kind of bicycle or accessories, whether new or second-hand, without the consent of the Director-General of Transport. Control has also been established over all agricultural machinery and irrigation pumps, but in this case it is largely a paper control as proper administrative authority for its application still remains to be set up. The United Kingdom Commercial Corporation have supplied the Directorate-General of Transport with some two thousand tyres of different sizes for sale to authorised purchasers. They are being distributed at fixed prices under the personal supervision of Colonel Le Blanc.

6. The Iraqi Government continue to press me hard for help to meet their own economic needs and tend to undervalue the blessings which, thanks to the good offices of His Majesty's Government, they already enjoy. Their most urgent demand is for cotton piece-goods. The problem of how to supply the quantity needed at reasonable prices is still unsolved, but I am not without hope that Sir Arthur Rucker and Mr. Lloyd may find a solution during their current visit to India. Meanwhile the Iraqi Government have still to prepare a workable scheme for distributing cotton piece-goods at controlled prices to consumers.

7. In March and early April distress was reported in parts of the provinces of Mosul, Arbil and Sulaimani. Many villages were found to be seriously short of food and without the means to buy grain at the high prices prevailing in the local market towns. After some delay, due to departmental muddle, supplies of barley were sent northwards from Government stocks and were either sold at low prices or were distributed free to those without money. These supplies, together with the coming of spring grazing for their flocks, brought some relief to the needy villages but it is unlikely that they will reap much harvest in the summer as they had little seed to sow last year. Further help will therefore be necessary for them next winter.

8. The Budget for 1943/44 was presented to the Chamber of Deputies on the 15th May. Expenditure for the year was shown as I.D. 10,768,000 and Revenue was estimated at I.D. 9,082,560. The Ministry of Defence is the biggest spending department with an allotment of 3 million dinars. Of the estimated revenue about 4 million dinars is expected to be derived from Customs and Excise. The Budget has passed the Chamber and is now in the Senate.

9. Pan-Arabism is, for the time being, quiescent. The idea of a general congress to plan the future of the Arab World has not evoked the fervour for which its promoters hoped and Jamil Madfai was given a discouraging reception when, in March and April, he visited Syria, Transjordan and Egypt as the harbinger of a new advance towards Arab unity. In Syria the political leaders, though ready with general approval for Pan-Arab principles, were too absorbed in their own problems and the forthcoming elections to be able to give active support or attention to practical schemes for federation; in Transjordan the Amir Abdullah was too jealous of the Iraqi motive to have thought for anything but his own position and in Egypt Nahas Pasha appears to have let loose such a storm of verbosity that Jamil Madfai was stunned into silent amazement. The Minister of the Interior, Tahsin al Askari, who was in Cairo at the same time as Jamil Madfai, fared no better with the Egyptian Prime Minister, who showed no disposition to take his cue from the Iraqi politicians. From available reports it seems that the chief difference between their ideas and those of Nahas Pasha about an Arab Congress was that whereas the latter wished to restrict participation to official delegates of the Governments concerned, the former insisted that there should be "national" or "popular" as well as official delegates. In the atmosphere of depression and discouragement engendered by the set-back encountered at the enthusiastic opening of the new campaign, the Amir Abdullah's turgid manifesto (published here on the 18th April) found no echoes and the Bagdad branch of the Arab Union Club has lapsed temporarily into torpor. Inspired articles have continued to appear in the newspapers reasserting Arab hopes and claims but the people of the country continue to show a notable apathy towards the grandiose dreams of their political leaders. The reason for this apathy is not, I think, that people have lost faith in the Arab cause or have deliberately set it on one side, but rather that they are so absorbed in questions of prices and in taking daily decisions bringing intimate profit or loss that for the present other matters are excluded from their minds. Nevertheless, it would, I

feel, be a mistake to rejoice unduly over the present lull in Pan-Arabism. Whether we like it or not, we are likely to hear a lot about Arab ambitions and claims as time marches on, and we may expect the Prime Minister and his friends to keep the ball actively in play. Once Parliament rises in June it is Nuri Pasha's desire to visit Cairo in person, looking in on Syria, Palestine and Transjordan *en route*, there no doubt to explore all possibilities of further progress. I think it very probable that he will discuss *inter alia* the future of liberated North Africa and the aims of the Arab populations in Morocco, Tunisia and Libya with regard to greater autonomy and the enjoyment of the benefits implicit in the Atlantic Charter. This is a theme upon which the vernacular press in Bagdad has developed a certain eloquence since the Axis suffered its catastrophic defeat in Tunisia.

10. This great Allied victory became the subject of a stream of telegrams of congratulation to the Embassy from all parts of the country and the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies telegraphed their good wishes to the House of Commons and to the House of Representatives. Public opinion has now finally awarded victory to the United Nations and feels itself free to discuss the future of the world on this basis, encouraged by the comfortable assumption that so far as Iraq is concerned, the war is over.

11. The current session of Parliament was prolonged for a further six weeks on the 15th April. The principal business of the period covered by this despatch was the new Law for the Regulation of the Economic Life of the Country, the Budget and the new "Organic Law." The first two of these laws I have already discussed and I have reported in detail on the third in a separate despatch. It is still before Parliament and I cannot foresee in what form it will emerge. It will suffice here to say that as drafted it contains nothing likely fundamentally to change the form of government of the country or the manner in which the government functions, except possibly the provisions increasing the size of the Senate which, if adopted, may strengthen considerably an already noticeable tendency on the part of the Upper House to assert its authority in parliamentary life. A new amendment to the Income Tax Law was passed by the Chamber in early May. It provides relief for the small taxpayer but raises steeply the "super" tax on high incomes, bringing up to 45 per cent. the tax payable on incomes of over I.D. 7,000 a year (excluding the first I.D. 1,300 of income which is subject to ordinary income tax). The Senate is still examining this draft law and are said to regard it with disfavour. Another noteworthy measure dealt with by Parliament was a draft law to ratify a new agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company. This provides for an interest free loan by the company to the Iraqi Government of 1½ million pounds in return for which the Government agree to the suspension until two years after the war of the drilling operations of the Mosul Oil Company and of the geological survey of the Basra Petroleum Company. The law was accepted by both Houses. This is the second free of interest loan which the Iraq Petroleum Company group has given to the Iraqi Government. The first was for three million pounds given in 1939 in exchange for an amendment to the Mosul Oil Company's concession and extended the non-production period until 1944. It is possibly of interest to add that in the concluding stages American oil interests in the Companies attempted to muscle in on the deal on their own account and indicated that they would like to see an "open door" policy adopted in Iraq as regards oil. The Administration were, I believe, rather worried by this unexpected development and eagerly embraced the old adage about "Better the devil we know . . . etc."

12. Internal security continues to be good except for an unsatisfactory local situation in the Dohuk district of the Mosul Liwa where Salim Mustafa with his gang of criminal bandits are still at large, in spite of the efforts of the police to liquidate them. Elsewhere a few over-zealous "Communists" have been the only political nuisance. On different occasions pamphlets appeared in Mosul, Arbil and Basra attacking the ruling classes and the usual illicit Communist journals have continued to make their habitual spasmodic and smudgy appearance in Bagdad. At the official opening of a new Bagdad thoroughfare on King Feisal's Birthday on the 2nd May the wife of a well-known "Red" suddenly flourished a flag bearing the words "The Government should seize the produce from the capitalists and land-owners and safeguard the food of the people." She was arrested and led away without arousing any demonstration of sympathy from the crowd. The popularity of communism, nourished on the military achievements of the U.S.S.R. and the rosiest illusions about social conditions in the Soviet Union, is increasing and is likely to continue to increase as owing to fading glories of the Axis it has at present no rival as a progressive and constructive political doctrine.



13. In my despatch No. 24 of the 22nd January I informed you of the assurance given to me by the Prime Minister that he would not until June favour the release of any more persons who had been interned for political reasons. He has recently explained to me that he said June because he was confident that by then the Axis armies in North Africa would have been defeated and that the situation would therefore be favourable for a review of the cases of some of the internees. Those freed in January have done no harm and in present circumstances it does not seem likely that the release of a further number of the minor personalities would cause the Iraqi Government any embarrassment or be injurious to the interests of His Majesty's Government. I have told both the Regent and the Prime Minister that I myself see no adequate justification for any further "appeasement" until the end of the war, but it is probable nevertheless, that the Prime Minister who is being subjected to considerable pressure in Parliament and elsewhere, will take the easy course and reconstitute the previous committee under the presidency of the British Adviser to the Ministry of Interior.

14. The "Board of Education" created by the new "Regulation for the Organisation of the Ministry of Education" which came into force in February last, was set up in April. It consists of the Minister of Education, two senior officials from his department, four senior officials nominated respectively by the Ministers of Education, Communications and Works, Economics and Social Affairs and four members elected by the seven persons already mentioned. Professor Hamley left for the United Kingdom on the 30th April to the great regret of all his colleagues and, as you know, His Majesty's Government are trying to find a suitable successor. The summer holidays are now close at hand and educational affairs are therefore likely to be put aside for some months in favour of more urgent matters. It remains, however, as important as ever that the schools and colleges of the country should be steadily improved and I shall neglect no opportunity to continue to urge the Government to undertake the necessary reforms.

15. The Prime Minister has again been considering the reorganisation of the army and hopes to complete his plans during the summer months when he expects to be free from parliamentary work. He has told me that he has in mind a force consisting of a mechanised and partially armoured division of about 10,000 strong, recruited from long service volunteers, backed by a provincial militia to be recruited by compulsory servicemen called up for an initial training of about three to four months, with annual trainings of a fortnight or three weeks. It has been reported to me from several sources that early in May the Acting Chief of the Iraqi General Staff informed the officers of the Musaiyib garrison that a brigade of the Iraqi army would probably be sent to Syria for war duties at the end of June. He encouraged the officers to welcome such a development which he maintained would help towards the realisation of Arab union. The Acting Chief of the General Staff never acts without the authority of his Minister and his talk to the officers at Musaiyib shows that Nuri Pasha still hopes somehow to persuade His Majesty's Government to reverse the decision given last February not to accept the Iraqi Government's conditional offer of troops for service outside Iraq. Two parties of Iraqi officers have recently visited the battlefields of the Western desert of Egypt. They were most hospitably entertained by the Commander-in-chief, Middle East, and much appreciated both the kindness which they were shown and the opportunities which were given to them to study modern developments in military strategy and tactics.

16. Measures taken in February to prevent the smuggling of sheep out of Iraq into Syria and Palestine unhappily caused some trouble with Saudi Arabia and Syria. To prevent the passage of flocks across the border, the Iraqi Government established a prohibited zone of fifty miles width along the whole length of the western and southern frontiers. Tribesmen who, in accordance with ancient customs, were honestly grazing their own flocks were not to be disturbed, but all others were ordered to keep outside the zone and military and police patrols were established to enforce this order. Unfortunately, at the beginning the Government's intentions were not made properly known to the local officials concerned. In consequence some Syrian and some Saudi Arabian tribesmen were hustled out of the zone with undue vigour, while others had their sheep confiscated on the suspicion of being smugglers. On the Syrian frontier the local officials on each side seem to have settled these incidents by direct contact and without recourse to diplomatic action, but similar misunderstandings on the Saudi Arabian frontier provoked strongly worded protests from King Abdul Azziz al Saud. Soothing replies and explanations were returned and I urged the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs to do whatever they could to hasten

the restoration to their owners of any stock and other property taken away from Saudi tribesmen without really good proof that they were engaged in smuggling. The smuggling season is now over and further incidents are unlikely to occur, but I fear it will take some time before the Saudi complaints have been disposed of.

17. In early May Sheikh Chassib, eldest son of the late Sheikh Khazal, Sheikh of Muhammerah, slipped away from Basra across the Persian border and, with a following of about one hundred armed men, raised the standard of revolt near Ahwaz. Negotiations with the Persian Governor-General and consultations with His Majesty's Consular Officers in the neighbourhood followed and Chassib was soon persuaded to give up this attempt to recover his father's position as a semi-independent ruler and to return to Basra. The Persian Government have naturally expressed the wish that steps should be taken to prevent a repetition of this escapade and the Iraqi Minister of the Interior has instructed the Mutasarrif of Basra to take such action as he thinks necessary for this purpose.

18. The spring now drawing to its close has been exceptionally fine with scarcely any dust. The incidence of typhus has decreased with the advent of the warm weather and, on the whole, public health seems to be good. The infiltration of large numbers of under-nourished Persian coolies attracted by the continued demand of the British forces for labour has, however, given rise to fears of cholera from June through the great heat. The attention of General Headquarters has been drawn to this menace and I am advised that the necessary orders have been issued for the institution of such precautions as may be possible.

19. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Representatives at Angora, Cairo, Tehran, Jedda and Beirut, the Minister of State at Cairo, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan, the Governor-General of India, the Commander-in-Chief, India, General Headquarters, Middle East, the Combined Middle East Intelligence Centre, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Political Agent at Koweit and to His Majesty's Consular Officers at Basra and Mosul.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

[E 4289/4289/93]

No. 4.

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 23rd July.)*

(No. 214.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, 17th June, 1943.*

WITH reference to Viscount Halifax's circular despatch of the 9th June, 1938, and to my despatch No. 96 of the 10th April, I have the honour to transmit herewith a report on the leading personalities of Iraq for the year 1943.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

Enclosure in No. 4.

*Report on Leading Personalities of Iraq for 1943.*

THE ROYAL FAMILY.

1. *King Feisal II.*—Born in Bagdad the 2nd May, 1935. Succeeded to the throne on the death of his father, Ghazi I, on the 3rd April, 1939. His mother is a sister of the Amir Abdul Illah. He has an English nurse and also an English governess.

He and his mother were confined in the Qasr Zahur during most of May 1941, but were removed to the summer palace at Pir Mum (Arbil) just before Rashid Ali and his associates decamped. He is a bright, intelligent child, though somewhat delicate, and so a frequent source of anxiety to Dr. Sinderson. The latter hopes that he will outgrow his tendency to asthma. His Majesty visited Egypt in April 1943, proceeding and returning via Palestine and Transjordan.



2. *Abdul Illah, His Royal Highness the Amir*.—Only son of Ali-bin-Hussein, ex-King of the Hejaz, who died in 1935. Born in the Hejaz 1912. Came to Bagdad as a child with father in 1926, after the latter's expulsion from the Hejaz. Educated partly at home and partly at Victoria College, Alexandria.

He speaks good English.

In November 1936 he married in Bagdad the daughter of Salah-al-Din Fauzi Beg and grand-daughter of Amin Yahiyah Pasha of Cairo.

He is keenly interested in Arab horse racing and maintains a large stable.

Became Regent on the death of King Ghazi on the 3rd April, 1939. Although in Iraq he only enjoys the title of Highness, it is considered proper for foreigners to refer to him as His Royal Highness.

He shows a promising capacity for his official duties.

Divorced his wife in the summer of 1940.

During the Cabinet crisis of January 1941, which led to the fall of Rashid Ali's Cabinet, he endeavoured to resist the Prime Minister's demands for the appointment of new Ministers, but fled to Diwaniyah to escape the threats to his life made by the four army officers, Salah-ud-Din Sabbagh, Kamil Shabib, Fahmi Said and Mahmud Salman. Rashid Ali thereupon resigned and Taha al Hashimi succeeded him. The Regent then returned to the capital.

During the night of the 1st April the four army commanders already mentioned occupied the city with their troops and went to the Palace to demand the resignation of Taha al Hashimi and the appointment of Rashid Ali as Prime Minister. The Regent was, however, warned in time, eluded them and took refuge in the American Legation. Thence he was smuggled out to Habbaniya on the 2nd April and flown to Basra. On instructions from Bagdad the Officer Commanding, Iraq Army, at Basra attempted to arrest the Regent, who took refuge on board one of His Majesty's ships. By now any hope of rallying support for his cause in the south had been lost. On the 16th April he was flown to Jerusalem, together with Ali Jaudat and Jamil Madfai, who had meanwhile joined him at Basra. During the hostilities in May the Regent remained in Palestine. He returned to Bagdad on the 1st June after the collapse of Rashid Ali's régime and was welcomed by a large gathering of officials, notables and well-wishers.

Since then, he has taken his public duties seriously and has done his best to establish his position among the people. He has undoubtedly developed in character during the past two years and has, on several occasions, shown marked firmness and powers of decision, but he lacks the personality which appeals to the imagination of the public. Nevertheless, even if he has not won the affection of the Iraqis he appears to be steadily gaining ground. He is genuinely friendly to Great Britain.

3. *Zaid, His Royal Highness the Amir*.—Born in Constantinople in 1900. Youngest son of the late King Hussein of the Hejaz. Half-brother of King Ali, King Feisal and the Amir Abdullah (of Transjordan). His mother was a Turk. Educated in Constantinople. Fought with the Arab Nationalist forces during the Great War, and won the good opinion of the British officers with the Sharifian army.

Came to live in Iraq in 1922, and was commissioned in the Iraqi cavalry. Acted as Regent for a short time in 1924 during King Feisal's absence.

In 1925 he went to England and studied agriculture at Oxford for nearly three years. During this period he took an active part in the social life of the university and rowed in the torpids for Balliol. In 1928 he joined his father in Cyprus and remained there until King Hussein's death in 1931. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in January 1932.

In 1933 it became known that one of his sisters had contracted a clandestine marriage with Atta Beg Amin, some time first secretary at the Iraqi Legation at Angora (and later at the Legation in London). The Royal Family were indignant, and Zaid was transferred to Cairo in January 1934 as the first Iraqi Minister at King Fuad's Court. He did not, however, proceed to this post, which he ultimately refused to accept. At the end of 1934 he was busy in Athens engaged in litigation concerning extensive properties which he claims to have inherited in Greece. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Berlin in September 1935. In the spring of 1937 it was suspected that he had been using his position as Iraqi Minister to give false certificates for arms destined for Spain. He was recalled to Iraq for enquiries, but apparently established his innocence and returned to Berlin.

He is a pleasant, well-mannered man, and speaks excellent English and Turkish.

In 1933 he married a Turkish lady who had been divorced by her husband. This *mésalliance* mattered little so long as he was not living in Iraq, but when he was withdrawn from Berlin in the spring of 1938 and came to live in Bagdad it was counted against him locally. But for his wife he would probably have been made Regent after the death of King Ghazi in April 1939. In the summer of 1939 he went to live in Istanbul.

Came to Bagdad in October 1941 to meet his brother the Amir Abdullah on the occasion of his State visit to the capital and has remained, living quietly in a small house.

He returned to Turkey in June 1942.

#### OTHER PERSONALITIES.

1. *Abbas-i-Mahmud Agha*.—Chieftain of the Pizhder tribe (Kurdish) see Babekr Agha). Generally on the side of disorder when trouble is brewing. Maintains a tradition of being at feud with Babekr Agha, but both take care that this enmity shall not weaken the strength of the tribe.

2. *Abbas Mahdi*.—Shiah. Born 1898. Secretary to Iraqi Legation in Tehran 1931. Minister for Education, November 1932. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Appointed Director-General of Tapu in October 1933.

Became Minister for Economics and Communications in February 1934, but resigned with Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1934. Reappointed Director-General of Tapu, December 1934.

Appointed Master of Ceremonies in the Palace, March 1937. Joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in June 1937 as Minister for Economics and Communications, and was appointed Minister for Justice in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai in August 1937 after Hikmat Sulaiman's resignation.

Transferred to the Ministry of Economics and Communications in October 1938, and resigned with whole Cabinet in December 1938.

Appointed Principal Private Secretary at the Royal Palace in July 1941.

Appointed Minister at Tehran in January 1943. Pleasant but without personality.

3. *Abdul Aziz-al-Mudhaffar, M.B.E.*—Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1897. Speaks English, German and French well. Served as superintendent in Deputy Military Governor's Office, Bagdad Rasafah, under the Government of Occupation from March 1917, and in 1919 became Mudir of Rasafah. Secretary to the Ministry of Interior, December 1920, and Director of the Press Bureau in 1922. Director of Census Department 1927.

Appointed Mutessarif of Mosul, May 1931. Withdrawn September 1931 for incompetence and tried for misappropriation of public funds. Found not guilty and appointed to be member of Muntafiq Land Court. Lost this post when the court was abolished in June 1932. In the summer of 1933 was appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Tehran, and in May 1934 was transferred to be consul-general in Beirut.

Appointed counsellor to the Iraqi Legation in Paris, May 1935.

In the spring of 1937 he was accused of giving false certificates for munitions bought for Spain and recalled to Iraq. In Syria he was arrested, but extradition was refused and he was released, but remained in Syria. He is married to a daughter of Naji-al-Suwaiddi, and this family connexion brought about his full exoneration in December.

He returned to live in Bagdad in January 1938, and shortly afterwards it was officially announced that it had been proved that he was innocent of the charges made against him in 1937. On his return he went into business.

Early in 1941 started a trans-desert transport service between Bagdad, Syria and Palestine. Was suspected of working for Rashid Ali. After the collapse of Rashid Ali's régime, did his best to clear his name and made lavish use of the "V" sign on his business stationery and press advertisements.

4. *Abdul Aziz-al-Qassab*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Kaimakam of Kut under the Naqib's Provisional Government and did very well. In October 1921 he was appointed Mutessarif of Mosul on probation for six months, but refused to go without the salary of a full mutessarif. In the beginning of 1922 he went as Mutessarif of Karbala, was transferred to Muntafiq in January 1923, and to the Ministry of Interior as Director-General of General Administration in June of the same year. Appointed Mutessarif of Mosul in January 1924. A capable and well-intentioned official without much strength of character. Minister of Interior, January 1928. Minister for Justice, November 1929.



Went out of office with the resignation of Naji Pasha's Cabinet in March 1930. Has not held any other Cabinet post since. Has an adequate pension. Appointed Chief Administrative Inspector, Grade I, November 1933.

He was appointed Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai in March 1935, but resigned with all his colleagues twelve days later. Elected a Deputy for Bagdad in the general elections of August 1935. Appointed Comptroller-General of Accounts in December 1937, in succession to Taufiq-al-Suwaiddi.

5. *Abdul Ghafur-al-Badri*.—Ex-cadet in the Turkish army and second lieutenant in the Sharifian army.

Since 1920 has been editor of the Nationalist newspaper, the *Istiqlal*. This journal has been suspended many times for its violent attacks on the British Government and on British officials in Iraq.

Elected Deputy for Diyala 1933. Re-elected for Kut in the general election of 1934. Lost his seat in August 1935. His paper, the *Istiqlal*, was suspended in November 1936 for one year by Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet for publishing articles defending Yasin-al-Hashimi's administration.

This order was cancelled when Jamil-al-Madfai succeeded Hikmat Sulaiman in August 1937.

Elected Deputy for Kut, December 1937.

In October 1938 he was sentenced to six months' imprisonment for publishing unfounded allegation against the Government in his paper the *Istiqlal*. Released when Nuri-al-Said became Prime Minister on the 25th December, 1938, and returned for Kut in the elections of June 1939.

The anti-British tone of his paper continued after the outbreak of war in September 1939. He was generally suspected of being in Axis pay and with the advent to power of Rashid Ali in March 1940 his paper became the principal mouthpiece of the rebel Government. It was suspended after Rashid Ali's collapse at the end of May 1941 and has not published since.

Abdul Ghafur escaped punishment because of his old comradeship with Nuri Said, but he has been lying very low since June 1941.

6. *Abdul Illah Hafidh*.—Born about 1897 in Mosul. Son of the late Muhammad Ali Fadhil, who was for some time a Senator. Educated in Paris, where he qualified as a dentist. He also studied political economy. He obtained a degree in political science. Became Deputy for Mosul in 1926 and afterwards lost his seat. He then set up a dental clinic in Bagdad. Again elected Deputy in 1933. In 1935 he was appointed Iraqi Consul in Paris, but did not stay there long, and in September 1935 he became Director-General of Commerce. His subsequent posts were Consul-General, Beirut, 1938-39; Consul-General, Bombay, 1939-40; Director-General of Revenue, 1941. In July 1942 he became Minister of Economics and Minister for Foreign Affairs in October 1942. A fat, genial personality with wider horizons than most Iraqis.

7. *Abdul Latif Nuri*.—Born in Bagdad 1888. Gazetted as officer in the Turkish army in 1908. Joined the Iraqi army in 1921. Promoted *aqid* (lieutenant-colonel) in 1926 and *zaim* (colonel) in 1929. He has held the command of the Northern and Southern Districts, and has passed the senior and junior officers courses, and was posted to the Northern District in 1933. Promoted *amir liwa* (brigadier) in 1932.

Joined General Bakr Sidqi as leader of the army revolt against Yasin-al-Hashimi in October 1936, and became Minister of Defence in the Government formed by Hikmat Sulaiman.

Resigned after the murder of Bakr Sidqi in August 1937 and was then placed on retired pay.

Left Iraq in the same year for medical treatment and lived abroad. While in hospital in Damascus he was placed under arrest by the British military authorities when Syria was occupied in June 1941, but was allowed to return to Iraq in September 1941, since when he has been living quietly in Bagdad on his pension.

8. *Abdul Mahdi (Sa'iid)*.—Shiah of Shutia (Muntafiq). Born about 1894. Belongs to an influential family and owns a large estate (Abu Hawan Muqatah). Deputy for Kerbala in Turkish Parliament, and in Iraqi Chamber in 1927. Minister for Education under Rashid Ali-al-Gilani, March-October 1933. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the election of 1934.

He was a strong partisan of Yasin Pasha and a member of the Executive Committee of the party of National Brotherhood (Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani).

After the dissolution of the party in 1935 he played no part in politics, until he was again elected to the Chamber in December 1937.

He was again returned for this constituency in June 1939.

In February 1941 became Minister of Economics in the Cabinet of Taha al Hashimi. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet when Rashid Ali seized power in April. Appointed Minister of Economics in the Cabinet formed by Nuri as Said in October 1941.

Made Senator October 1941.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in February 1942. Resigned in November 1942 as a result of a personal quarrel with Tahsin Ali, the Minister of Education.

9. *Abdul Qadir-al-Gilani*.—Elder brother of Yusuf Gilani. Born Bagdad 1904. Entered Government service 1926, and shortly afterwards was appointed attaché in the Iraqi Legation in London. While in London he studied at the London School of Economics. Speaks good English.

Appointed third secretary at Iraqi Legation in Cairo 1934. Promoted second secretary 1938. On many occasions he was in charge of the legation and maintained excellent relations with the British Embassy. In Egypt he married an Egyptian girl of good family and was popular in Egyptian society. Appointed Master of Ceremonies at the Royal Palace, April 1940, where he appeared likely to exercise a good influence.

These hopes were, however, disappointed, and he associated himself closely with Rashid Ali when the latter became Prime Minister in March 1941, and during the rebellion led by Rashid Ali in May 1941. When it collapsed he took refuge in Persia. After the Allied occupation of Persia he was arrested by the British forces, and after some months' internment in Ahwaz he was sent to Southern Rhodesia.

10. *Abdul Qadir-al-Rashid*.—Sunni of Bagdad, related to the Gilani family. Born 1894. Speaks English well.

Appointed secretary to the Council of Ministers in 1924 in succession to Hussein Afnan. Remained in that post, the duties of which he discharged with noteworthy tact and efficiency, until November 1932, when he was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Naji Shaukat's Cabinet. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Was appointed an assistant manager in the Rafidain Oil Company in October 1933.

11. *Abdul Razzaq al Uzri*.—Born about 1890. Shi'ah. A Bagdad lawyer. Deputy 1931-32. Public Prosecutor in 1932. Subsequently held post of Mutassarif of Kerbala and Diyala. Appointed Minister of Social Affairs by Nuri Said in November 1942. Ineffective and lacking in personality, he became a Minister only because no other eligible Shi'ah could be found.

12. *Abdul Wahid Shaikh*.—Chief of the Fatlah tribe, son of Haji Sikkar, once the most powerful sheikhs on the Euphrates. Abdul Wahid cultivates extensive properties on the left bank of the Mishkab from Abu Sukhair to the Ibrahim. Throughout recent years he has steered his course with a view to maintain to the utmost his political and tribal influence. His support and loyalty were carefully cultivated by King Feisal, and all political parties have thought it worth while to try to make him an adherent. He has many friends and many bitter enemies, and is reputed to deal harshly with his fellaheen.

He was prominent as a leader of discontent in the Middle Euphrates area in the spring of 1935, working with Rashid Ali-al-Gilani to overthrow Ali Jaudat's Cabinet.

He had much influence during Yasin-al-Hashimi's tenure of office, but so abused it that after Yasin's fall in October 1936 he was afraid to return to his tribe.

He was elected to the Chamber in February 1937, but in July 1937 he was arrested and imprisoned for fomenting tribal disturbances in Diwaniyah. After the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Government in August 1937 he was released from prison, but kept under surveillance first in Sulaimani and later in Samawa.

He was permitted to return to his home in July 1938 and elected Deputy for Diwaniyah in June 1939.

In April and May 1941 he closely supported Rashid Ali. In August he was interned in Fa'o and in December transferred to Samarra. He continued, nevertheless, to keep touch with his friends and supporters, among whom Hassan Suhail, of the Beni Tamim, was prominent.

Transferred to the internment camp at Amara in the summer of 1942.



13. *Abdullah-al-Damluji*.—Formerly called Abdullah Said Effendi. Born 1895. A native of Mosul. Studied medicine in Constantinople and calls himself doctor, though it is believed that he did not graduate. Seems to have been serving in the Turkish army when Ibn Saud occupied Hassa in 1913, and to have transferred his allegiance to Ibn Saud. Soon rose to a position of influence in Ibn Saud's Court, and came to Bagdad as his unofficial representative in 1921. Was Ibn Saud's Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1922 and signed the Uqair Protocol. Went with the Amir Feisal-al-Saud to London in 1926, and took part in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Treaty of Jedda in 1927. After this his influence waned owing to the intrigues of Foad Hamza and Yusuf Yasin.

In August 1928 he represented the Court of Nejd, the Hejaz and its dependencies at the Medina Railway Conference at Haifa. The conference was a failure, and when it ended, instead of returning to the Hejaz, Abdullah Damluji came to Bagdad, posting his resignation to Ibn Saud. Arrived Bagdad, September 1928. Appointed Iraqi Consul-General, Cairo, in 1930, recalled October 1930, and appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. This at first was resented by Ibn Saud, and for a short time Damluji's presence at the head of the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs seemed likely to embarrass Nejd and Iraqi relations, but when Nuri Pasha visited Jedda in April 1931 Ibn Saud stated that he no longer wished to raise any objection to Damluji's appointment. Was left out of office when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in October 1931. Appointed Director-General of Health, July 1932, and succeeded Safwat Pasha as Court Chamberlain at the end of 1933.

Returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Jamil-al-Madfai's second Cabinet in February 1934; resigned in July and was reappointed Director-General of Health in September.

He was suspended in 1935 and tried for misappropriation of public funds. He was acquitted and reinstated in his post at the end of December, but resigned a few months later.

For nearly two years he remained out of public life, but in July 1937 he was appointed Master of Ceremonies at the Palace in succession to Abbas Mahdi.

He headed the Iraqi representatives at the funeral of Ataturk in November 1938. Soon after Nuri-al-Said became Prime Minister in December 1938 he was removed from the Palace to an obscure appointment in the Health Department, which was later abolished.

Appointed Director-General of Social Affairs and Health in November 1941.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in February 1942.

Resigned in June 1942.

14. *Ahmad, Shaikh of Barzan*.—A chieftain of the Kurdish Zibar tribe. Headquarters at Barzan at the foot of the Chia-i-Shirin. Exercised powerful influence over the Barosh and Mazuri Bala areas to the north-west of Rowanduz. Friendly relations were established with him in 1919, but no administrative control was exercised in his tribal area. In 1920 he was implicated in the murder of two British officials. He and Faris Agha of Bera Kapra were declared outlaws with a price on their heads, and Barzan was destroyed by troops, but his country was not occupied. In 1922 he welcomed Turkish agents into Barosh and Mazuri Bala, and in September 1922 his men made an unsuccessful attack on Amadiyah. A month later Barzan was again destroyed by the Royal Air Force co-operating with Assyrian irregulars. In 1923, the Turks having been driven from Rowanduz, Sheikh Ahmad turned on their retreating columns and came into Aqra to make peace with the Anglo-Iraqi authorities. His outlawry was cancelled, and he was permitted to continue in unmolested control of his tribal villages and mountains. In the summer of 1931 he began a private war with a neighbouring chieftain of Baradost, Sheikh Rashid of Lolan. He was everywhere successful, drove Sheikh Rashid to flight into Persia and set fire to his villages. Government intervention became necessary to restore order. Iraqi troops were concentrated early in 1932, and after some sharp fighting, followed by intensive air action by the Royal Air Force, Sheikh Ahmad was defeated and driven across the Turkish border in June. He and his two brothers, Muhammad Sadiq and Mulla Mustafa, were interned for a time in Turkey, but the two latter contrived to find their way back into their old haunts in the following winter. After holding out in the mountains for some months they surrendered and were pardoned in July 1933 and allowed to return to their villages. A short time afterwards the Turks surrendered Sheikh Ahmad to the Iraqi Government on condition that his life should be spared. For a little over a year he lived in comfortable and honourable detention in Mosul, but in

November 1934 it was found that he was in collusion with Khalil Khushawi, who was disturbing the peace of the Barzan area, and he was thereupon removed to Hillah.

Permitted to come to Bagdad in April 1935. A short while later he went to live in Sulaimani. He finds it very hard to maintain a large family on the allowance of 30 Iraqi dinars a month that he receives from the Iraqi Government.

15. *Ahmad Mukhtar Baban*.—Born about 1895. Sunni of the Baban family which is Kurdish in origin. He, himself, knows no Kurdish and has no racial interest in the Kurds. A lawyer by profession, he served as a judge for many years. For a short time in 1942 he held the war-time post of Director-General of Supplies and in October 1942 he joined Nuri Said's Cabinet as Minister of Social Affairs. A fortnight later he was transferred to Communications and Works.

16. *Ahmad al Rawi*.—Born about 1894. Sunni of Bagdad. Son of one of the leading Sunni Alims. Became a police officer soon after the formation of the Iraqi Government and after reaching the rank of commandant served in several liwas as a mutessarif. In February 1939 he was made administrative inspector and not long afterwards placed on pension. In June 1941, after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebel Government, he was recalled to duty by Jamil Madfai and made Director-General of Police. In this position he co-operated energetically with the British officials in eradicating pro-Nazi propaganda and intrigues and also gave his personal and official support to all plans for improving Anglo-Iraqi relations.

17. *Ahmad-al-Shaikh Daud, Saiyid*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Born about 1875. He comes of a family of learned men, his father was a well-known teacher in Bagdad, under whom most of the men of Sheikh Ahmad's generation studied. In the early days of the occupation he was a prominent Nationalist. He was arrested and deported to Henjam in August 1920, but was allowed to return to Bagdad in February 1921. Elected to the Constituent Assembly in March 1924, he opposed the treaty of 1922 and voted against it. Failed to secure a seat in the subsequent general election, but was successful at a by-election. In October 1925 he became pro-treaty, but in January 1926 voted against ratification of the extension of the treaty period. Minister for Auqaf under Abdul Muhsin Beg in January 1928, but resigned office April 1929. Elected to the Chamber as Deputy for Bagdad in October 1933, and retained this seat in the elections of 1934.

Lost his seat in August 1935.

He is now an ageing man and is unlikely again to play a prominent part in politics.

Made a Senator in May 1937. Resigned October 1937.

His daughter Sabiha (a teacher on the Women's Training College) became the first woman student in the Bagdad Law College in 1937.

18. *Ahmad-i-Taufiq*.—A Kurdish notable of Suleimani, born 1898, who has had the advantage of a better education than most of his contemporaries. He has held a number of administrative appointments since the first days of the occupation of the Suleimani Liwa. Was appointed mutessarif after the reoccupation of Suleimani in 1924. The Iraqi Government have several times endeavoured to replace him by others less sympathetic to Kurdish aspirations, but those chosen have not been successful. Ahmad Beg has now (1933) been mutessarif without interruption since 1930. He is connected by marriage with the ruling families of the Pizhder tribe, and owns property in the Surdash nahivah. A pleasant and presentable man, who has always been popular with British civil and military officers.

Transferred as mutessarif to Arbil in April 1935.

Made an administrative inspector April 1939. Placed on pension in spring of 1940.

19. *Ahmad Zaki-al-Khaiyat*.—Shiah Baghdadi. Born 1896. Educated Bagdad Law School. Has held the following posts: Secretary of the Ministry of Education, consul-general at Muhammerah and Bombay, kaimakam in several places, Mutessarif of Kut and Hillah and Land Settlement Officer. Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in July 1937.

Dismissed from his post in June 1941 on account of the support which he had given to Rashid Ali's régime in May.



20. *Akram Mushtaq*.—Born Bagdad 1903. Moslem Sunni. Brother of Talib Mushtaq (*q.v.*). Gazetted officer in army 1927. Passed through Cranwell and appointed to Royal Iraqi air force in 1930. Promoted captain 1932. Took an active part in the *coup d'Etat* of October 1936. Promoted major 1937 and lieutenant-colonel in 1938. Appointed Commander of Iraqi air force in September 1937. Retained this post until April 1939, when he was relieved of his command and commission and appointed Director of Civil Aviation. Married a daughter of Sheikh Ahmad-al-Sheikh Daud in spring of 1940.

21. *Ali Jaudat*.—Sunni, of humble Mosul origin. Born 1886. Officer in the Turkish army, fought at Shuaibah; subsequently surrendered to the British and spent most of 1915 at Basra. Was there employed to encourage Turkish officer prisoners to join the Sheriff. He was a member of the Ahd-al-Iraqi. After the war he was Military Governor of Aleppo after the resignation of Jafar Pasha early in 1920, and was subsequently in Dair. Returned to Bagdad with the Amir Feisal in June 1921, and in October 1921 was given the post of Mutessarif of Hillah, which he held till September 1922. He took a very active part in the anti-mandate agitation, and was finally dismissed (on the advice of the High Commissioner) for defrauding the Treasury by underestimating revenue demands on supporters of his political views. In January 1923 he was appointed Mutessarif of Karbala in the hope that he might be able to reconcile the *mujtahids*. He was unsuccessful, and in May was transferred to Muntafiq, where he did very well. Minister of Interior in the Askari Cabinet, November 1923–July 1924, and voted for the treaty. Appointed Mutessarif of Diyala, and later of Basra. In early 1930 was made Director of the Ministry of the Interior. Minister for Finance under Nuri Pasha, March 1930. Resigned from Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in September 1930, as a protest against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of that year, and his seat in the Chamber in 1931, together with Rashid Ali-al-Gilani and Yasin-al-Hashimi in March 1932. Re-elected for Mosul 1933. Appointed principal private secretary to the King, March 1933. Became Prime Minister and Acting Minister of the Interior in August 1934. Was forced to resign in February 1935 on account of the agitation worked up against him throughout the country by Yasin-al-Hashimi and Rashid Ali-al-Gilani. He was made President of the Chamber in March 1935 and appointed Iraqi Minister in London in August 1935. Transferred to Paris in December 1936.

He came to Bagdad on leave in October 1937 and decided not to return to his post at Paris.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Nuri-al-Said's Cabinet in April 1939. Resigned with whole Cabinet in February 1940.

After Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat* in April 1941 he escaped to Basra, joined the Regent and accompanied His Highness to Jerusalem. He returned to Iraq after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion and was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in June 1941.

Resigned with the whole Cabinet in October 1941.

Has a son, Nizar, who was educated at Downing College, Cambridge.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Washington in March 1942.

22. *Ali Mahmud Shaikh Ali*.—Born 1902. Sunni Arab connected with the Ubaid tribe. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School in 1923 and practised as a lawyer for about thirteen years. He also learnt to speak English and French. He became well known as an extreme Nationalist and contributed many articles to the newspaper the *Istiqlal* attacking British policy in Iraq. He was arrested in 1924 on account of his agitation against the first Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, but was acquitted on trial. He was brought before the courts again in 1930 for a similarly violent agitation against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance signed in that year and sentenced to a short term of imprisonment. He has twice been elected to the Chamber of Deputies. He was one of the members of the delegation of Iraqi notables which visited Palestine and Egypt in 1936, and a short time after his return he was appointed (through the personal influence of Yasin-al-Hashimi, the Prime Minister) to a judgeship in the Court of Appeal. In this post he has shown more talent and good sense than was to be expected from his past career. Appointed Minister of Justice in Hikmat Sulaiman's reorganised Cabinet in June 1937. Resigned August 1937 and returned to the Bar.

Banished from Bagdad by Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in November 1938, but was permitted to return when Nuri-al-Said formed a Cabinet in December 1938. In February 1939 he was appointed Mutessarif of Basra, where he soon began to make trouble for the Sheikh of Koweit. After holding this appointment for about a year he was transferred to Bagdad to be Director-General of Customs

and Excise. As a mutessarif he allowed his political prejudices to colour too deeply his administrative activities.

Appointed Minister of Justice in the unconstitutional Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. Fleed to Persia with the rest of the Cabinet after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941. Handed over to the British military authorities by the Persian Government after the entry of British forces into Persia in September 1941. Imprisoned in Ahwaz and thence sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment. Sent back to Iraq and handed over to the Iraqi court for trial in March 1942 and was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment in the following May.

23. *Ali Mumtaz*.—Born 1901. Sunni of Bagdad. Belongs to the Daftari family. Graduated at Bagdad Law College and entered Government service in 1920. Married a daughter of Yasin-al-Hashimi in 1933. Appointed Director-General of Revenues in 1935, but was obliged to leave Iraq for a time when Bakr Sidqi overthrew Yasin-al-Hashimi's Government in 1936. In January 1939 he was reappointed Director-General of Revenues by Nuri-al-Said's Cabinet.

Appointed Minister of Finance in the Cabinet formed by Taha al Hashimi in February 1941. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in April after Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat*. In May 1941 he was appointed director of the newly-created Rafidain Bank, and in October he became Minister of Finance in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said.

Resigned in October 1942 largely on account of his inability to get on with Saleh Jabr, then Minister of the Interior.

24. *Amin-al-Umari*. Born Mosul 1889 of the notable family of the Umaris. Passed out of the Military College in Bagdad in 1906 and then entered the Artillery School in Constantinople, where he remained for three years. Gazetted second lieutenant in 1909 and posted to Adana. Later he served in 1910 in operations against the Shammar and in 1911 and 1912 against the tribes in Samawa, Abu Sukhair and Rumaitha. Entered the Turkish Staff College in 1912. Fought in the Balkan war and was mentioned in despatches for good work on the Chitaljah lines. After the war of 1914–17 he took part (with Jamil-al-Madfai) in the Arab insurrections at Deir-az-Zor and Tell Afar. He returned to Mosul after the general amnesty in 1920 and joined the Iraqi army at the time of its formation. He was promoted Assistant Chief of the General Staff in 1935 and General Officer Commanding the Northern Area in 1937. In August 1937 he refused to carry out the orders given to him by the Government to arrest a number of officers charged with co-operating in Bakr Sidqi's murder, and this successful defiance brought about the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet. Soon after, when Jamil-al-Madfai came into office, Amin-al-Umari was transferred to command of the Bagdad District.

Went to Europe on leave in the winter of 1938 to undergo medical treatment. As a soldier he is out of date and obstinately refuses to modernise his tactical ideas. Was relieved of his command and placed on pension in February 1940 because of the influence which he endeavoured to exercise in political matters outside his proper sphere.

Appointed C.G.S. in June 1941.

Placed on pension in November 1941 because it seemed that he was endeavouring to organise a new military clique to interfere in politics.

25. *Amin Zaki Sulaiman*.—A Moslem (Sunni) of Turkoman origin. Born 1887 in Bagdad. Received his military training in Istanbul and appointed second lieutenant in the Turkish army in 1905.

He joined the Iraqi army in 1921 as a captain, and was promoted major in 1926 and lieutenant-colonel in 1930, when he was placed in command of the 4th Iraqi Infantry Battalion.

He was promoted colonel in 1934 and appointed to the command of the Northern Division with headquarters at Mosul, and a month later he was appointed quarter-master-general. In October 1935 he was given the command of the Euphrates Division, Diwanayah. Promoted brigadier in June 1936.

He was much opposed to the Bekr Sidqi régime in 1936. He remained with the Euphrates Division until August 1937, when he was appointed G.O.C., the 2nd Division, Kirkuk, which position he was still holding when he was appointed acting C.G.S. in March 1940. Promoted major-general in June 1940.

He is now 53 years old and is the senior officer now serving in the Iraqi army. Is a staunch supporter of Taha-al-Hashimi, and is considered a capable



officer and a strict disciplinarian, but is generally unpopular in the army with both officers and men. (Written in 1940.)

Under pressure from Salah-ud-Din Sabbagh, he threw in his lot with Rashid Ali in April 1941 and signed a proclamation charging the Regent with treason against the State. He fled to Persia when British troops advanced on Bagdad at the end of May and fell into our hands when British and Russian troops occupied Persia in August 1941. After provisional internment in Ahwaz, he was sent to Southern Rhodesia. Sent back to Iraq for retrial in March 1942, and in May was sentenced by a military court to five years' imprisonment.

26. *Arshad-al-Umari*.—Of the well-known Umari family of Mosul. Born 1888. Trained as an engineer in the days of the Turk. Municipal engineer in Constantinople. Staff officer during the war. Speaks French and understands some English. Member of the first Iraqi Parliament and supporter of Abdul Muhsin Beg. Appointed by latter first Iraqi Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs. Made Amin-al-Asimah (Mayor of Bagdad), November 1931, and during his two-year tenure of that appointment did much for the improvement of the amenities of Bagdad. Was appointed Director of Irrigation in November 1933. Joined Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in August 1934 as Minister for Economics and Communications. Resigned with the Cabinet in February 1935 and remained without a post until May 1936, when he was appointed Director-General of Municipalities. In November 1936 he again became Mayor of Bagdad, in which capacity he is well known and liked by most of the foreign community. He has proved himself a good friend to Great Britain.

Following the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941, when Rashid Ali and his Cabinet fled to Persia, Arshad Beg formed a Committee of Internal Security to conclude an armistice with the British forces and to maintain order until the return of the Regent.

In November 1941 he was reappointed Lord Mayor of Bagdad. Has done much to embellish Bagdad by opening up new roads and laying out public gardens.

As president of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society he has shown himself very willing to co-operate with the organisers of all kinds of war charity work.

27. *Asim-al-Naqib, Saiyid*.—The fourth son of Saiyid Abdul Rahman and younger brother of Saiyid Mahmud. Born Bagdad 1879. Appointed Naqib on the death of Saiyid Mahmud in July 1936. A man of little character, but he has successfully acquired the conventional appearance of a Sunni Alim and holy man.

28. *Ata Amin*.—Born 1897. Appointed secretary to the Iraqi Legation in London, September 1932, on transfer from a consular post at Angora.

In the summer of 1933 it was discovered that he had, while in Turkey, married one of the sisters of the Amir Zaid, the Iraqi Minister in Angora and younger brother of King Faisal. This was regarded as a scandal at the time, but later on he was forgiven. Appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Rome, October 1934. Transferred to London as counsellor in August 1935. Transferred to Paris as chargé d'affaires in August 1938 and to Berlin in February 1939.

In July 1939 he returned to Rome and remained there until June 1940, when he was transferred to London as chargé d'affaires.

29. *Babekr Agha*.—A powerful chief of the Pizhder (Kurdish) tribe of Qalah Diza (on the Lesser Zab River, north of Suleimani). Has always been honest and friendly in his dealings with the Government, whether British or Iraqi. An able and most estimable man, who has been liked and respected by all who have had close contact with him.

His rival for tribal influence is Abbas Mahmud Agha, who has always tended to be against the Government. Both, however, visited Bagdad in October 1933 and protested their loyalty and obedience to the Iraqi Government.

He behaved well after the Iraqi Government established normal administration in the Pizhder area in 1938.

On the outbreak of hostilities between Rashid Ali's rebel Government and the British forces in May 1941, Babekr Agha, together with Sheikh Mahmud and many of the Sulaimani tribal chiefs, planned a revolt against the Government. Rashid Ali's régime was, however, overthrown before their plans could materialise.

He visited the ambassador in December 1941 and pledged himself to act always under British guidance.

30. *Daud-al-Haidari*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Born about 1880. Son of Ibrahim Effendi, ex-Sheikh-al-Islam. The family comes from Arbil, where Ibrahim Effendi has a small property. Daud Pasha was a Deputy and an aide-de-camp to the Sultan Abdul Hamid. Speaks Turkish better than Arabic. He was in Constantinople during the war, and returned to Bagdad in 1921. Appointed, in October 1922, Amin-al-Umana (Chamberlain) in the King's palace. Member for Arbil in the Constituent Assembly, March 1924, and Vice-President. Voted for the treaty 1924. Hazb-al-Shab and opposed treaty of 1926. Minister for Justice under Taufiq Suwaidi, April–November 1929. Disliked and distrusted in Arbil.

Re-elected to Chamber of Deputies to represent Arbil in general election of 1930, but has not held Cabinet appointment since Taufiq Suwaidi's Cabinet resigned in August 1929. In 1930 became lawyer for the British Oil Development Company in Bagdad, and has done quite well out of this work. Was not elected to the Chamber in the elections of 1934.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Tehran in June 1941. Appointed Minister of Justice in February 1942.

31. *Daud-al-Sadi, Saiyid*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Born about 1887. Prominent extremist. Lawyer. Usually connected with all Nationalist agitations and intrigues. Elected to the Chamber for Hillah in August 1935.

Appointed public prosecutor in August 1936 by Yasin-al-Hashimi's Cabinet. Resigned in December after Yasin's fall.

Elected to the Chamber for Kut in December 1937 and again in June 1939. Banished from Bagdad by Jamil-al-Madfai in December 1938, but returned as soon as Nuri-al-Said became Prime Minister.

An active supporter of Rashid Ali in 1941, he fled to Persia at the end of May after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion. He was handed over to the British military authorities by the Persian Government after the entry of British forces into Persia in September 1941. Imprisoned at Ahwaz and then sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment.

32. *Fadhil Jamali Dr*.—Born Kadhimain 1902. Shiah. Educated at the American University of Beirut 1921–27. Columbia University, New York, 1927–29. Wrote a thesis on education among the tribes for his doctorate. On his return to Iraq he was appointed to the Ministry of Education. In 1933 he was made Director-General of Instruction. He has a natural predilection for American methods and is a disciple of Mr. Dewey.

In early 1938 he was invited by the British Council to visit the United Kingdom to study British educational methods. He was well entertained and shown the best colleges and schools of all kinds. As a result he became far more favourably disposed towards British education.

Although he posed as pro-British and generally collaborated in a friendly manner with the Embassy in developing the work of the British Council, he cannot escape responsibility for the deplorable state of education in Iraq. He was determined to do his utmost to resist British influence and opposed the appointment of a British adviser and the establishment of a boarding school on public school lines under British control. He was finally transferred from his post of director-general and appointed counsellor at the Iraqi Legation in Washington in January 1943, but at the end of May he was still in Bagdad hoping to contrive somehow to return to a post in Education.

33. *Fahmi-al-Mudarris*.—Born about 1874. Superintendent of the Government press under the Turkish régime. Joined the Amir Feisal in Syria and was with him in London in 1920. Appointed Chamberlain on King Feisal's accession. Was in close touch with the extreme Nationalists in 1922, and at the High Commissioner's request was dismissed from the Palace. In June 1924 he was appointed rector of the Al-al-Bait Theological College, but lost this post in 1930 when the college was closed. In March 1932 he was expelled from Bagdad to Arbil on account of his subversive political activities, but was permitted to return to the capital a month later. Since then he has not been prominent in politics, but frequently contributes articles to the press in which he expounds Nationalist views.

Appointed rector of the Al-al-Bait Theological College in 1937. Was placed on pension a year later.

34. *Faris Agha*.—Chieftain of the Zibar tribe (Kurds), who lives at Huki in the Aqra district. From the time of the British occupation of the Mosul liwa in 1918–19 until 1923, he has a stormy record of hostility towards the authority of the Government. Since 1923 he has been quieter, though he and his tribesmen are



always a perpetual danger to the peace of the Aqra district, and the local authorities have little real authority among his villages. He has an old feud with Ahmad of Barzan, whose territory lies adjacent to that of Faris on the opposite side of the Greater Zab River. Elected Deputy in February 1937, but lost his seat in the elections of June 1939.

35. *Hamdi Pachachi*.—Born about 1890. Sunni of Bagdad. Belongs to the Pachachi family, who are one of the richest families of the city. He himself owns valuable property in the town and also agricultural land outside in the liwa. In the early days of the creation of the Iraqi State he had the reputation of being a young hot-head and a leader of the extreme nationalists. Became Minister for Auqaf in June 1925 under Abdul Muhsin al Sadun, and resigned with the Cabinet in November 1926. After this he remained outside politics for many years but returned to public life as Minister for Social Affairs in Taha al Hashimi's Cabinet in February 1941. He took no part in Rashid Ali's adventures in May 1941 and in November 1941 was elected President of the Chamber. He was re-elected to this position in November 1942.

36. *Hanna Khaiyat*.—Syrian Catholic of Mosul. Born 1884. Medical diploma at Beirut and Paris, much medical and administrative experience and extremely able on both sides. Head of the Mosul Hospital under the Government of Occupation. Appointed Minister of Health 1921. When the Ministry was abolished in 1922 he accepted the post of Director of Medical Services. Speaks excellent French. Appointed Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs October 1931. Appointed Inspector-General of Health in 1933. Became director of the Bagdad General Hospital and dean of the Royal Medical College in September 1934. Appointed Inspector-General of Health September 1937. Inspector-General of the Ministry of Social Affairs in December 1939.

Placed on pension at the end of 1940. Reappointed Director-General of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Director-General of Health in July 1941.

Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in January 1943.

37. *Hikmat Sulaiman*.—Sunni. Born 1886. Director of Education in Bagdad under the Turks. Also Assistant Governor. Member of C.U.P. Was in Constantinople at the time of the occupation. Returned in January 1921 and was a candidate for the Ministry of Education. Made Director of Posts in April 1922 and Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in April 1923. Minister of Interior in the second Sadun Cabinet. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930, but became Minister for Interior in March 1933. Resigned from Cabinet with Rashid Ali in October 1933, and from Chamber in November 1933. He played an active part in organising intensive opposition to Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in the early months of 1935, but refused office in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha after Ali Jaudat's fall. Paid a long visit to Turkey in the summer of 1935 and returned full of praise for modern Turkish methods. In the autumn of 1935 he was offered the portfolio of the Ministry of Justice, but did not accept it. Is very influential in political circles, where his intelligence is much respected.

In October 1936 he joined with Bakr Sidqi in the plot which resulted in the successful military revolt against Yasin-al-Hashimi's Government, and upon Yasin's resignation he became Prime Minister. He remained in office until August 1937 when, after the murder of Bakr Sidqi, he and his Cabinet resigned. As a Prime Minister he was disappointing. His intentions were excellent, but his impatience with detail and administrative routine, coupled with the malign influence exercised by Bakr Sidqi over the Cabinet, prevented him from achieving anything of importance.

A well-mannered man of wide Liberal views.

In 1938, though he took no active part in politics, he was on the alert to keep Nuri-al-Said from returning to power. When Nuri-al-Said formed a Government in December 1938, he sent messages of goodwill to Hikmat and later calls were exchanged between Hikmat and Sabah, Nuri's son. In spite of their reconciliation, he was arrested early in March 1939, tried by court-martial for treason and sentenced to death. This was at the same time commuted to five years' imprisonment. In the summer of 1939 he was removed to Sulaimani, where he was interned in a comfortable house.

In April 1941 was released by Rashid Ali and allowed to go to Persia, where he remained throughout the May rebellion. He afterwards returned to Bagdad and gradually began to take part in social life.

He is now (1943) a flourishing farmer and apparently determined to give up politics altogether.

38. *Husain Fauzi-bin-Hassan*.—Sunni of Kurdish origin. Born in Bagdad in 1889. Entered the Military College in Istanbul and received a commission in the Turkish army in 1909. Joined the Iraqi army (artillery) in May 1922. Promoted major 1925. He has passed the Senior Officers' Course at Belgaum, India, and has twice been attached to units in England for training. Promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1929 and colonel in 1933. In 1934 he was appointed Commandant of the Staff School, Bagdad, and in February 1935 he was given the command of the Northern District. In August 1935 he became a brigadier, and in November 1936 he was made G.O.C., 1st Infantry Division. A pleasant man with good manners. He speaks good English. He had nothing to do with the military revolt of October 1936. After the murder of Bakr Sidqi in August 1937 he was appointed Chief of the General Staff. Relieved of his appointment and placed on pension in February 1940 for interference in politics.

39. *Ibrahim Kamal*.—Sunni. Born 1895. Captain in the Shereefian army. A very good officer in the field, where he commanded a battalion. Wounded at the first battle of Maan. Legal officer to O.C., Damascus, under Feisal's régime. Came to Iraq with Jamil-al-Madfai in 1919 making propaganda for the Shereefians. Was afterwards at Dair, but not known to have participated in the attack on Tall Afar. He was in Damascus in April 1921, but subsequently returned to Iraq, and was said to be engaged in inciting people against any form of British control. Was appointed commandant of police, Bagdad, on the resignation of Abdul Latif Felahi. He did well in some ways and kept excellent discipline, but was removed after innumerable complaints of various kinds. After leaving the police he took up the legal profession. Entered Parliament as a Nationalist, but later gave up politics for a well-paid and influential post in the Ministry of Finance. Since then he has given no trouble. Appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise in June 1934.

Proved to be a very efficient director. In November 1936, after Hikmat Sulaiman had had Rustam Haidar removed, Ibrahim Kamal was appointed principal private secretary to King Ghazi. He was not happy in this post for long and in July 1937 reverted to the Customs Department as Director-General. In August 1937 he joined Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet as Minister of Finance.

Concluded convention for the south of Iraq with the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Resigned with whole Cabinet in December 1938 after the military *coup* made against them by Nuri-al-Said.

Tried by court-martial in February 1940 for being an accessory to the murder of Rustam Haidar and acquitted.

Appointed Minister of Finance and Acting Minister of Justice in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in June 1941, after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion. A realist with strong views, he became dissatisfied with the Government's weakness and vacillation in dealing with the removal of pro-Nazi elements in the army and Administration and resigned from the Cabinet in September 1941.

Made a Senator in January 1943.

40. *Jafar, Abu Timman*.—Shiah of Bagdad. Born about 1885. Well educated, with a good deal of influence. Always a strong Nationalist, he joined with Yusuf Suwaidi, Muhammad Sadr, Sheikh Ahmad Daud and Ali Bazirgan in the independence movement of 1920 and actively incited the tribes to rebellion. He evaded an attempted arrest in August 1920 and fled from Bagdad to Najaf. Returned in September 1921 and was energetic in promoting all Nationalist movements, especially the anti-mandate agitation. Minister of Commerce from April 1922 till the end of June, when he resigned after a prolonged opposition to the terms of the treaty. He then organised the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party), of which he became general secretary. He was subsequently arrested and deported to Henjam, where he remained till May 1923. On his return to Bagdad he relapsed for a time into private life, and refused to join the Shiah Hizb-al-Nahdhah. Returned to politics on his election to the Chamber in a Bagdad by-election June 1928. Reformed the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party) September 1928. Telegraphed congratulations to the Labour party on their success in the general election in England in 1929. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the election of 1930, but remained active as the secretary-general of the Nationalist party. Resigned from the Nationalist party in October 1933, declaring that he was withdrawing from politics until there should be a change of heart among those in public life. He returned to active politics in January 1935 and joined with Yasin-al-Hashimi and Rashid Ali-al-Gilani in attacking Ali Jaudat's Cabinet.



He did not, however, join them in the Cabinet formed after the latter's resignation. Elected president of the Bagdad Chamber of Commerce in November 1935.

During the summer of 1936 he became an active critic of Yasin-al-Hashimi's Administration and led a deputation to King Ghazi to protest against the severity of the measures taken by the Government to suppress tribal disorders in Diwaniyah. In October, after Bakr Sidqi's successful military revolt, he joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet as Minister for Finance.

In June 1937 he resigned as a protest against the influence of Bakr Sidqi in Cabinet affairs, and the undue severity with which he considered that the Government were conducting punitive operations against the tribes in Samawa. Made a Senator in February 1937, but lost his seat in the summer of the same year under article 31 of the Constitution. Since then he has withdrawn from political life.

41. *Jafar Hamandi*.—Born 1894. At the time of the outbreak of war in 1914 he was a school-teacher in Bagdad. After the war he graduated at the Bagdad Law School and was appointed to a junior judgeship in Kadhimain. Later he was given an appointment in the Ministry of Justice. In 1930 he was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior and became kaimakam of Najaf, then after serving in several other districts he was made Mutessarif of Kut in 1936 and was later transferred to the same post in Hilla. He was appointed Minister for Education in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in June 1937. Resigned in August 1937, and in September he was appointed Director-General of tribal affairs in the Ministry of the Interior.

Appointed Mutessarif of Kut September 1938, and transferred to Muntafiq February 1939, to Kerbala in September 1939.

Appointed Minister of Social Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in June 1941 after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in October 1941.

Appointed Mutessarif of Bagdad in December 1941.

Resigned in October 1942. In early 1943 he received a substantial grant of Government land in the Hillah liwa. Saleh Jabr as Minister of Finance helped him to obtain this.

42. *Julal Baban*.—Kurd of the Baban family. Born 1892.

In the early days of British occupation he was actively associated with extreme Nationalists and was deported to Henjam in 1920. Released in 1921. Appointed kaimakam in 1923 and continued to serve in the civil administration, holding the posts of mutessarif in Nasiriyah, Karbala and Arbil until November 1932, when he became Minister of Economics and Communications in Naji Shaukat's Cabinet. Became Minister for Defence under Rashid Ali-al-Gilani in March 1933. Resigned with the latter in October 1933. Appointed Minister for Education in February 1934, resigned with Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1934, and was appointed Director-General of the Ministry of Finance in December 1934. Transferred to be Director-General of the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1935. Appointed Director-General of Finance in December 1936.

In August 1937 he joined Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet as Minister of Economics and Communications. Made a Senator. Resigned from Cabinet in May 1938 on account of insinuations made by his colleagues (not without reason) that he had made a corrupt agreement with a Government road contractor. Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in September 1939; resigned with whole Cabinet in February 1940.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet of Jamil Madfai in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

In the sessions of 1941 and 1942 he was active in the Senate as a critic of Government measures.

43. *Jamal Baban*.—A Kurdish lawyer. Born 1890. Served for some time as a judge in the Northern Liwas. Became Deputy for Arbil in the general election of 1928. Appointed Minister for Justice in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet March 1930. Resigned with Nuri Pasha in October 1932. Reappointed Minister for Justice in Jamil Madfai's Cabinet in November 1933. Retained his portfolio when Jamil-al-Madfai reformed his Cabinet in February 1934 and remained at the Ministry of Justice in Ali Jaudat's Cabinet formed in August 1934. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in February 1935, and in October joined the party

organised by Jamil-al-Madfai to oppose Yasin Pasha. Owed his continued presence in successive Cabinets perhaps more to the tradition that each Cabinet must have one Kurd than to his personal abilities.

Returned for Arbil in the elections of June 1939.

After practising as an advocate, returned to public life again by his appointment as Minister of Social Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in October 1941.

Resigned in October 1942 and began practising again as an advocate.

44. *Jamil-al-Rawi*.—A Bagdadi; born 1892, officer in the Turkish army. Served in the Sherrefian forces during the Arab revolt. Chief aide-de-camp to King Ali in Jedda, and came to Iraq with His Majesty after Ibn Saud's conquest of the Hejaz. Elected Deputy for Dulaim in the general election of 1928, became vice-president of the Taqaddum party and Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies. Minister for Communications and Works in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet formed in March 1930. Became Minister for Defence in January 1931, but lost his portfolio when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in October 1931. Appointed Mutessarif of Kirkuk July 1932. Transferred to Kut in October 1935. His services were dispensed with by the Hashimi Cabinet in March 1936. In December 1936 he was in Jerusalem and in touch with the Grand Mufti and the Arab movement in Palestine. Appointed Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires in Jedda September 1939.

Appointed consul-general at Jerusalem in July 1941. Withdrawn in the autumn of 1941 and was appointed Iraqi Minister at Jeddah in December 1942.

45. *Jamil-al-Madfai*.—Of Mosul, born about 1886. Led the party which in June 1920 came from Dair and called upon the tribes to rise against the British in the name of the Sherref. Entered Tall Afar after the murder of Captain Stuart, which he had instigated. Styled himself leader of the Northern Mesopotamian army. On the approach of British troops from Mosul returned to Dair. Returned to Iraq 1923. Soon after, appointed mutessarif and saw service in a number of different *liwas*. Appointed Minister for the Interior under Nuri Pasha in March 1931. Became President of the Chamber in December 1930, following Jafar Pasha's resignation. Resigned October 1931, at the same time resigning from Nuri Pasha's party as a protest against the high-handed actions of Muzahim Beg Al Pachachi, then Minister for the Interior. Composed his quarrel with Nuri Pasha in November and was re-elected President of the Chamber on the 30th November. Again elected President in November 1932 and March 1933. Became Prime Minister in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, but resumed office with a reformed Cabinet about ten days later. Resigned again in August 1934, but accepted portfolio of Defence in Cabinet which was then formed by Ali Jaudat. Became Prime Minister in March 1935, but was forced to resign by Yasin Pasha's agitation in the Euphrates after being in office for only twelve days. In October 1935 revived the party of National Unity as an opposition to Yasin Pasha's Cabinet, but received little support. Declined an invitation to join the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1936. In the winter of 1936-37 he went to the Yemen to obtain the adhesion of the Imam to the Pact of Arab Brotherhood, signed by Saudi Arabia and Iraq in April 1936, and in August 1937, after the resignation of Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet, he became Prime Minister.

He lacks administrative ability, but is a figure in the political world. Is generally popular because he expresses his opinion in an honest, downright manner.

Throughout 1938 he held his Cabinet together and carried on the government of the country in difficult circumstances with success. Forced to resign on the 25th December, 1938, by a military demonstration organised by Husain Fauzi, the Chief of the General Staff, and Taha-al-Hashimi in favour of Nuri-al-Said. Continues to enjoy considerable political influence.

When Rashid Ali seized power by a *coup d'Etat* at the beginning of April 1941, Jamil Madfai fled to Basra, where he joined the Regent. Both narrowly escaped capture by the Iraqi rebel troops and took refuge on a British warship. Thence they were flown to Palestine, where Jamil Madfai remained during Rashid Ali's rebellion of May. He returned to Iraq with the Regent on the collapse of the rebellion, and after considerable hesitation was persuaded to form a Cabinet. Faced with the difficult task of restoring public confidence and security, he showed that he had lost his former resolution and energy. An ageing man, susceptible to the intervention of others, he inclined towards a policy of appeasement and refrained from drastic action against the pro-Nazi elements. Within these limits, however, he co-operated loyally with His



Majesty's Government, and during the four months of his premiership conditions in Iraq were largely restored to normal. Feeling unable, however, to carry out the policy of strong action which was pressed on him from many sides, Jamil Madfai, together with the whole Cabinet, resigned in October 1941.

Since then he has been active in the Senate. In March-April 1943 he visited Syria, Transjordan and Egypt at the request of Nuri Said to canvass support for the idea of an Arab congress to plan the closer union of all Arab States. He met with little success but was pleased to have had an opportunity to maintain his part as a veteran of the Pan-Arab movement.

46. *Jamil-al-Wadi*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Brother of Hamid-al-Wadi, aide-de-camp to the Amir Abdullah, and Shakir-al-Wadi, formerly aide-de-camp to the late King Feisal.

Appointed a judge in 1923 and became director of the Land Registry Department (Tapu) in 1931.

Appointed Minister for Justice November 1932. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Appointed Director-General of State Domains Lands (in the Ministry of Finance) October 1933. Returned to the Ministry of Justice in June 1934 as member of the Court of Cassation, and a month later was appointed Chief Public Prosecutor. Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in April 1935.

Appointed principal private secretary in the Palace in July 1937, but lost this post when Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet fell, and was passed into obscurity as an inspector in the Ministry of Justice.

Appointed Director-General of Tapu in January 1938, and of Land Settlement in August 1939 when the latter Department was amalgamated with Tapu.

Land Settlement was taken away from him in the autumn of 1941. Dishonest and corrupt.

47. *Kamil Chadirji*.—Sunni, born Bagdad, 1901, brother of Rauf Chadirji. His sister is the wife of Mahmud Subhi-al-Daftari. Educated locally and graduated at the Law School. For a short time he held a minor post in the Ministry of Finance, but soon gave up the civil service for journalism and political agitation. In 1930 he was editor of *Al Ikha-al-Watani*, and his paper was suppressed for its attacks on Nuri Said's Government. He later edited *Al Akhbar*, which suffered the same fate as *Al Ikha-al-Watani*. In May 1934 he was convicted and fined £20 for publishing false news in a third newspaper, *Sawt-al-Ahali*, of which he was the responsible editor. In September of the same year he was arrested and charged with the publication of pamphlets attacking King Ghazi, but he was released a few days later as there was no evidence against him. He holds left wing views on social and political questions. He was appointed Minister for Economics and Communications in the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1936.

He resigned in June 1937 on account of his disapproval of the Cabinet's policy on the Euphrates and left the country for several months.

Returned in the autumn of 1937 and soon began to encourage communistic propaganda. He supports the moderate group among the "Communists" in Iraq and is the controller of the left-wing daily *Al Ahali*.

48. *Khalid Sulaiman*.—Brother of Hikmat Sulaiman (*q.v.*). Born 1877. Returned in 1926 from Constantinople, where he had spent most of his life in commerce. Was Minister for Education under Taufiq Suwaidi in April 1929. In the reshuffle of portfolios which followed Abdul Muhsin Beg's suicide in November 1929, Khalid Beg was made Minister for Irrigation and Agriculture under Naji Pasha Suwaida. A pleasant, honest and likeable man, but has no influence in politics. Appointed Director-General, Public Works Department, January 1932. Transferred to be Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in September 1934. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Tehran March 1935.

Retired in March 1939 and now lives on his pension.

49. *Khalid Zahawi*.—Sunni. Born 1889. Entered Military College at Constantinople in 1903. Served in the Turkish army until 1924. Joined Iraq army and was appointed aide-de-camp to the late King Faisal I. Promoted to colonel in 1931 and appointed Commandant of the Military College. Went to the Staff College, Camberley, in 1934 and on his return was made a brigadier and appointed Director of Military Operations. Became O.C., R.I.A.F., in 1936. Appointed Director of Army Administration in 1937. Placed on pension in

February 1939. Appointed Mutessarif of Kut in October 1939. After the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 became Mutessarif of Bagdad, but was relieved of his appointment in June.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Kabul in November 1942.

50. *Khalil Ismail*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1903. Graduate of Law College, Bagdad. Held various positions under the Ministry of the Interior 1925-32. Appointed Secretary to the Cabinet 1932. Director-General of Ministry of Interior 1935. Director-General of Education 1936. Pleasant, reasonable, speaks English well.

Appointed Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in August 1937, but in October he was sent to be Mutessarif of Amarah.

Director-General of Ministry of the Interior September 1938.

Appointed Director-General of Awqaf in 1940. Appointed Director-General of Census in October 1941.

Appointed Director-General of Revenues in December 1942.

51. *Khushaba, Malik*.—Assyrian chieftain of the Lower Tiari tribe, aged about 55. Presbyterian, and generally in disagreement with Mar Shimun. Well educated by American missionaries at Urumia. A striking personality with a romantic record as fighter and leader. Supported the Iraqi Government in their efforts to settle the Assyrians satisfactorily in Iraq and thereby incurred the bitter enmity of Mar Shimun. Many of his followers were, however, quite innocently massacred in August 1933 in spite of their friendly attitude towards the Iraqi Government. He desires to leave Iraq, but does not wish to be resettled in the same place as Mar Shimun.

Since hope of moving all the Assyrians from Iraq has been abandoned, Malik Khushaba has settled down to a quiet life in his village.

52. *Mahmud Subhi Daftari*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Lawyer. Born 1890. Went with his father to Constantinople during the occupation and returned in 1919. Appointed Amin-al-Asimah (Mayor of Bagdad) April 1930, but was dismissed in September 1931. Appointed principal of the Law School November 1931, but resigned immediately after his appointment. Became Director-General of Tapu December 1932 and Amin-al-Asimah October 1933. Transferred to the Ministry of the Interior as Director-General of Municipalities in November 1936. He soon quarrelled with Arshad-al-Umari, the Amin-al-Asimah, and resigned. He was made a Senator in October 1937.

Pleasant, well intentioned and noticeably more moderate in politics than in his earlier days.

Became Minister of Justice in Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in December 1938, but devoted more attention to his entertaining than to his official duties. Resigned February 1940 with whole Cabinet.

Made a Senator in 1940.

He takes an active part in debates and hopes some day to return to office.

53. *Mahrut-bin-Hadhdhal, Shaikh*.—Chief of the Amarat, Anaiza (Arab) tribe of Iraq. He succeeded his father in 1927. Born about 1896. Intensely proud, but wiser than he appears to be. He has endeavoured to maintain good relations with the Iraqi Government, though the Nationalist element in Bagdad regard him with some suspicion on account of his father's close friendship with the British. His tribal area is from the Euphrates southwards to the Nejd border.

He obtained a good contract for the supply of labour on the Haifa-Bagdad road in 1940. During Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 he lost control of his tribe, parties of which attacked and looted some of the road camps.

54. *Mahmud, Shaikh*.—Of the family of Barzinja Sayyidis. He has inherited from his father and grandfather great tribal and religious influence throughout Southern Kurdistan. He was made Hukumdar of Suleimani in 1918, shortly after the British occupation. In June 1919 he revolted against British authority, was wounded and deported to Henjam Island in the Persian Gulf. He was reinstated as Hukumdar of Suleimani in 1922, after the Turks had forced the British political officers there to withdraw. In 1923 armed action had to be taken against him to check his endeavours to establish his influence in the Kirkuk and Arbil Provinces. Suleimani was reoccupied in 1924, but Sheikh Mahmud was not brought to terms until 1927. These were that he was to abstain from politics and live outside Iraq in one of his Persian villages close to the border. He chose Piran and stayed there quietly until 1930, when an outbreak of Kurdish



Nationalist feeling in Sulaimani again tempted him into the political arena. Air and ground forces had again to be sent against him, and on the 31st May he surrendered at Panjwin. He was granted an allowance and sent to live at Hilla. From there he was later removed to Ramadi, and in the summer of 1933 he was permitted to take a house in Bagdad. He receives an allowance of 900 rupees a month from the Iraq Government. He has three sons, Rauf, Baba Ali and Latif. Rauf is quiet and industrious and is a student in the Law College. Elected Deputy for Sulaimani in December 1938 and again in June 1939. Baba Ali, after completing his secondary schooling at Victoria College in Alexandria, was sent to Columbia University, New York, to study political economy. On his return in 1938 he was given employment in the railways. Latif is the pet of his father, and will follow closely in his footsteps, if he has a chance to do so.

His properties in Sulaimani were confiscated in 1931, but restored by special Act of Parliament in December 1938.

Towards the end of May 1941, during Rashid Ali's rebellion, Shaikh Mahmud escaped from Bagdad, and in company with Abbas-i-Salim, brother of Babekr Agha (*q.v.*) he raised a tribal force to attack Sulaimani with the object of ejecting Rashid Ali's officials. Before their plans could materialise, however, Rashid Ali's rebellion collapsed and most of the chieftains returned home. Shaikh Mahmud himself endeavoured to exploit the occasion to obtain concessions to the Kurds, but he was persuaded in the end to disperse his followers and to settle down in Darikella, one of his villages in Barzian. His youngest and favourite son, Latif, who is restless and unreliable, was brought to Bagdad to keep him out of mischief.

55. *Mar Shimun*.—Eshai, Mar Shimun, Patriarch of the Assyrians (Catholikos of the Church in the East).

Born about 1909. Succeeded to the patriarchate in 1920 when a child. Educated in England at a seminary in Canterbury. Since coming of age and assuming the authority of his position, Mar Shimun has actively fostered discontent among the Assyrians. Whatever his position as the head of a spiritual community, his temporal authority is not acknowledged by a large number of Assyrians, estimated at a maximum at 12,000. His aim has been to establish the whole community in a compact enclave under his own spiritual and temporal authority. He was the inspirer of the mutiny of the levies in 1932 and of the exodus to Syria in 1933. Deported by the Iraq Government in the summer of 1933, he was given an asylum in Cyprus, where his father David and his aunt Surma joined him. In October 1933 he went to Geneva to protest to the League of Nations against the massacre of Assyrians which followed the Assyrian attack on the Iraq army at Dairabun (Faishkhabur) in August 1933, and in November went to England to obtain support from friends and sympathisers there. On his deportation King Feisal granted him and his family a provisional allowance of £780 a year, subject to his correct behaviour. This allowance was stopped by King Ghazi in the summer of 1934 on account of the propaganda which Mar Shimun persistently carried on against Iraq.

While paying lip-service to the League of Nations and always ready to petition that body on behalf of the Assyrians, he has proved disloyal to its decisions whenever they have conflicted with his personal ambition. By preferring temporal power to spiritual leadership, he has been the means of inflicting much needless suffering on a deserving people. During the year 1934 he was mostly in England, paying several visits to Geneva when Assyrian affairs were under discussion. He remained in Europe throughout 1935 and 1936, spending much time in London.

In 1939 he was granted British naturalisation and went to live in Cyprus.

56. *Maulud Mukhlis*.—Sunni. Born about 1875. A fine soldier, he behaved with great gallantry with the Sharifian army and was badly wounded. His exploits do not lose in the telling. Served in Syria and was sent in 1920 to Dair, where the agreement between the British Government of Occupation and the Arab Government was reached under his auspices in April. A hot Nationalist, he continued to spread anti-British propaganda among the tribes until he was recalled by King Feisal in June. Remained in Syria after the fall of the Arab Government and returned to Bagdad in July 1921. He lost no time in joining the extreme Nationalist group. There was no post to offer him in the Iraq army, but he was given some land near Tikrit and settled down to cultivate it, with occasional visits to Bagdad and Mosul to take part in Nationalist activities. In May 1923 he was appointed Mutessarif of Karbala, to deal with the Ulema. He

is no administrator, but he kept things quiet at the time of the exodus of the *mujtahids*. An impulsive man, who allows his pan-Arab sentiment to rule his actions. He was bitterly hostile to the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1937 after Bakr Sidqi's *coup d'Etat* and openly condemned the murder of Jafar Pasha. In February 1937 an attempt was made to assassinate him and three of Bakr Sidqi's aides-de-camp were suspected. Maulud then went to live in Syria, but returned soon after Bakr Sidqi's murder in August 1937. Has been a Senator since 1925.

He was elected president of the Chamber in December 1937.

Attended the Arab Parliamentary Conference on Palestine arranged by Alubba Pasha in Cairo in the summer of 1938.

Re-elected President of the Chamber November 1938 and again in June and November 1939. Was not re-elected in November 1941.

In recent years his drunkenness has increased and discredited him.

57. *Muaffaq-al-Alosi*.—Born about 1894. Belongs to a learned family of Bagdad. He is a graduate of the Sorbonne whence he returned to Bagdad in 1926. Was appointed a professor in the law school and afterwards in 1928 Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Two years later he quarrelled with the Minister, Abdullah Damluji, and withdrew to Beirut. In 1931 he accompanied Nuri Pasha to Mecca to negotiate the Iraq-Nejd "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement. In the autumn of 1932 he went again to Mecca, this time to take up a post as judicial adviser to King Abdul Azziz-al-Saud. He remained in Arabia for about a year and then returned to Bagdad. In May 1934 he was appointed first secretary in the Iraqi Legation in Tehran. Transferred to be consul at Beirut in May 1935. Appointed consul-general at Bombay December 1936. Dismissed from the Foreign Service in November 1937.

Remained in Syria until January 1939 when he returned to Iraq. Returned to the Foreign Service in February 1939 and posted to Paris as *chargé d'affaires*. Transferred to be consul-general at Damascus June 1939.

Transferred to Istanbul as consul-general in July 1941. Recalled in November. A heavy drinker, with unsavoury habits, he is not a good consular officer and is suspected of pro-Nazi sympathies.

He was dismissed in April 1943 for insubordination and in the early summer was seeking official employment in Saudi Arabia.

58. *Muhammad Ali Mahmud*.—Sunni. Born 1895. A lawyer who has served in many posts under the Ministry of Justice, including that of Director-General of the Ministry, Director-General of Tapu and judge of the Court of Appeal. Elected to the Chamber as Deputy for Bagdad in 1935 and for Arbil in 1936. Has twice been elected Vice-President of the Chamber and held the post of chairman of the Finance Committee in 1937. Appointed Minister of Finance in Hikmat Sulaiman's reformed Cabinet in June 1937. He resigned in August 1937 with the whole Cabinet.

Elected Deputy for Arbil December 1937 but lost his seat in June 1939.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. On the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion at the end of May 1941, he fled to Persia and was handed over by the Persian Government to the British military authorities in September 1941. Imprisoned at Ahwaz and subsequently sent to Southern Rhodesia to be interned.

59. *Muhammad Amin Zaki*.—A Kurd of Sulaimani. Born 1880. Well educated and speaks French, German and English. Formerly staff officer in Turkish army. Was made Minister for Communications and Works in November 1926, and subsequently held the portfolios of Education and Defence. Exerted little influence in the Cabinets in which he has held office. His policy is to try to please the Kurds by supporting Kurdish Nationalists without compromising his position with the Arabs. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930. Again Minister for Economics and Communications July 1931. Resigned October 1932. Appointed Director-General of Economics and Communications March 1933, but became unemployed when this post was abolished in September 1934. Became Minister for Economics and Communications in March 1935 in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet. Resigned when the Cabinet fell in October 1936.

Elected Deputy for Sulaimani in December 1937 and again in June 1939. Became Minister for Economics in March 1940 in Rashid Ali's third Cabinet.

Resigned in July 1940 on account of severe illness.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in October 1941. Resigned in February 1942 on account of ill-health.



60. *Muhammad Husain Kashif-al-Ghata (Saiyid)*.—Shiah Alim of Najaf. One of the few Arab Divines of importance.

Attended the Moslem Conference at Jerusalem in 1931 as Iraqi delegate. Visited Persia on a prolonged tour in the summer of 1933, and returned to Iraq in February 1934. In the spring of 1935 he took a prominent part in the tribal insurrections on the Euphrates, and gave his full support to the tribes which took up arms against Yasin Pasha's Government. He hoped to persuade them to make a united front with the Ulama in an attempt to force on the Government a series of sectarian demands intended to secure for the Shiah community a greater share in the government of the country. He was only partially successful and, after the defeat of the tribes by the army, he wisely withdrew to silence in the shrines of Najaf.

Declared a jihad for Palestine in the summer of 1938.

In 1939 it was suspected that he had accepted money from the German Legation to foster anti-British feeling.

Issued a fatwa against the British during Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941. His nephew, Ahamad Kashif-al-Ghata, actively supported Rashid Ali and was interned in August 1941 at Fao.

61. *Muhammad Ridha-al-Shabibi*.—Shiah of Bagdad, born about 1880. Belongs to a well-known family. Member of Constituent Assembly and Minister for Education in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in 1924. Again given the portfolio of Education in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha in March 1935. His reactionary views soon brought him into conflict with his colleagues and with the chief permanent officials of his Ministry, and he resigned in September 1935. He became President of the Senate, February 1937, and was reappointed Minister for Education in Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1937. He is president of the Bagdad branch of the Pen Club and has a considerable reputation as a man of letters. Resigned with Jamil-al-Madfai in December 1938.

Appointed Minister of Education in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

Appointed to the Board of Education created in April 1943.

62. *Muhammad Salih-al-Qazzaz*.—Bagdad Mechanic. Born about 1898. Has recently come into prominence as a labour leader and agitator. A professional demagogue, he always thrusts himself in the van of any bazaar troubles, and has been especially conspicuous in encouraging discontent among the labour employed by the foreign companies operating in Iraq. Played a leading part in organising the boycott of the Bagdad Electric Light Company in the autumn and winter of 1933.

During the premiership of Yasin-al-Hashimi he was not allowed to agitate, but when Hikmat Sulaiman came into office in October 1936 Muhammad Salih became the treasurer of the Popular Reform League which was organised by Kamil Chadirji with a left-wing programme. His activities became so tiresome that in February 1937 he was sent to live in Ramadi, where he remained until December 1937, when he was released. Little has since been heard of him.

63. *Muhammad-al-Sadr, Saiyid*.—Born about 1885. An influential Shiah divine of Kadhmain. Was a violent Nationalist in the early days of the British occupation, and played a prominent part in the insurrection of 1920. He fled to Syria when the insurrection was put down, but returned with the Amir Feisal in June 1921. Took an active part in the anti-mandate controversy of 1922, but after the proclamation of the Constitution in 1924 greatly modified his views. Appointed a Senator in 1925, and elected President of the Senate in 1929. He has subsequently been re-elected to this position at each new session, until February 1937, when Ridha-al-Shabibi was elected instead. He was re-elected President of the Senate in December 1937 and again in December 1938, June 1939 and November 1939.

Re-elected President of the Senate in November 1941 and November 1942. A dignified and picturesque personality.

64. *Musa Shabandar*.—Bagdadi Sunni, born 1899.

Elder son of Mahmud Shabandar, a wealthy land and property owner of Bagdad.

Went to Berlin soon after the armistice, and lived in Europe, mostly in Zurich and Berlin, until the autumn of 1932, when he returned to Bagdad.

In January 1933 he was appointed secretary of the permanent Iraqi delegation at the League of Nations.

Speaks English, French and German. Appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation in Berlin in October 1935.

Early in 1937 he was accused of giving certificates of export to Iraq for munitions destined for Spain and recalled to Bagdad, where he was placed under arrest. In December proceedings against him were dropped and it seems doubtful whether there was ever any real evidence against him. Elected Deputy for Amarah, December 1937.

Lost his seat in June 1939. Reappointed to the Diplomatic Service in June 1939 and sent as Chargé d'Affaires to Berlin. Returned to Bagdad October 1939, and was appointed Assistant Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the unconstitutional Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. His polished and friendly manner hid a close and sinister co-operation with Rashid Ali in his pro-Nazi intrigues. On the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941, he fled to Persia and was handed over to the British military authorities in September 1941. Imprisoned at Ahwaz and thence sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment.

65. *Muzahim-al-Amin Pachahji*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1888, a lawyer. Elected Deputy for Hillah in the Constituent Assembly, March 1924, and sat in the first Chamber in 1925. Minister of Communications and Works in the Hashimi Cabinet, August 1924. In 1927, while in London, he made a close study of British politics. Recalled to Bagdad in February 1928 and joined the active Nationalists. His ideas seemed to be tinged with communism. Was prominent in anti-Zionist manifestations in summer of 1929. Became Minister of Economics and Communications in January 1931, and, shortly after, Minister of the Interior, in which post he unexpectedly gave satisfaction to his British advisers. Resigned in October 1931 on account of a difference with his colleagues regarding his dismissal of the Amin-al-Asimah. Towards the end of May 1932 he was charged with complicity in the circulation of scurrilous anonymous letters, making allegations against the personal honour of the King. Resigned his seat in the Chamber and was committed for trial with four others by Bagdad magistrate's court. Acquitted in October 1932. In October 1934 he was appointed Minister at Rome and permanent delegate at Geneva. In November 1935 he was relieved of his duties at Geneva. Appointed Minister at Paris in July 1939.

Remained in France as Minister to the Vichy Government after the collapse of France in 1940. Recalled in November 1941, when Iraq severed relations with the Vichy Government, but did not return to Iraq. In 1943 he appeared to be living in Rome.

66. *Mustafa-al-Umari*.—Sunni of the Umari family of Mosul. Born 1893. Graduated in Law School in Bagdad just before the war. Served as an officer in the Turkish forces fighting in Mesopotamia during the war and was made a prisoner just before the fall of Bagdad. Returned to Iraq after the armistice and entered Government service. Since then he has served in the Waqf Department and in the Ministries of Finance and Interior. His posts included the following: kaimakam in several districts, Accountant General, Director-General of the Ministry of the Interior and mutessarif in a number of liwas. In 1936 he was appointed Mutessarif of the Muntafiq liwa and in June 1937 he joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet as Minister of the Interior. He retained this portfolio in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in August 1937.

During the first half of 1938 he acquired a reputation for taking large bribes, and, though no allegations were proved, the Prime Minister thought it well to transfer him to another Ministry. He accordingly went to Justice in October 1938. In December 1938 he resigned with the whole of Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet after the military demonstration organised by Husain Fauzi and Taha-al-Hashimi in favour of Nuri-al-Said. He is a Senator.

Appointed Minister of Interior in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941. Since then he has been a prominent speaker in the debates of the Senate.

67. *Dr. Naji-al-Asil*.—Bagdadi, born 1895. First became prominent in 1922 as semi-official Hashimite representative in London. Continued to represent Hashimite interests in London until final conquest of the Hejaz by Ibn Saud. Dr. Naji then became destitute in England, and was deported to Iraq in October 1925. In Iraq he was soon employed under the Ministry of Defence in the Iraqi Military Medical Service. Appointed Iraqi Consul-General and Chargé d'Affaires in Jedda in August 1931. Returned to Bagdad in June 1932 to be present during the visit of the Amir Feisal, son of King Abdul Aziz-al-Saud. Appointed consul,



Mohammerah, October 1932. Acting Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, April 1933. Appointed counsellor in the Legation at Tehran, April 1935.

In June 1936, while on leave in Bagdad, he was appointed Master of Ceremonies at the palace, and accepted the portfolio of Foreign Affairs when Hikmat Sulaiman formed his Cabinet in October 1936. Resigned with Hikmat Sulaiman in August 1937, and was not included in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai.

A pleasant man of considerable intelligence. He now (1943) lives in complete retirement and has little prospect of re-employment.

68. *Naji Shaukat*.—Sunni of Bagdad, born 1891. Studied in Constantinople and became a reserve officer. Joined the Sharif and was at Aqabah with Colonel Lawrence, for whom he has a great admiration. Returned to Bagdad in 1919. Early in 1921 he was given an appointment under the Mutessarif of Bagdad, and subsequently became mutessarif. He showed considerable administrative ability, and maintained cordial relations with his British advisers. He was appointed Mutessarif of Kut in October 1922, of Hillah in 1923, and of Bagdad in 1924. Minister for Interior, June 1928, Minister for Justice, September 1929, and reverted to Interior in the changes which followed Abdul Muhsin's suicide. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in September 1930. Recalled to Bagdad in October 1931 to take up portfolio of Interior. Became Prime Minister in November 1932. Received the Order of Grand Officer of the Crown of Italy in January 1933. Resigned premiership March 1933. Minister for the Interior in November 1933, resigned February 1934. Again appointed Minister at Angora April 1934. He accompanied Tawfiq Rustu Aras, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, on his official visit to Bagdad in the summer of 1937, and was then offered a Cabinet post in Hikmat Sulaiman's Government. He declined because of his objection to Bakr Sidqi's influence.

Became Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in December 1938, but resigned in April 1939. Deputy for Bagdad in the elections of June 1939.

Became Minister for Justice in Rashid Ali's Cabinet in March 1940.

After the collapse of France, he became a strong advocate of reinsuring with the Axis. With Rashid Ali's approval he went to Istanbul in September 1940 to establish contact with the German Ambassador, Herr von Papen. It was perhaps more than a coincidence that just before his return to Iraq, towards the end of October 1940, the local Arabic press published the official Axis declaration of sympathy with Arab aspirations, and that just after his return the resumption of direct telegraphic communication between Iraq and Germany and Italy was announced. He resigned in January 1941, but was appointed Minister of Defence in the unconstitutional Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. During Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 he went to Turkey to try and enlist Turkish support for Rashid Ali's cause. After the collapse of the rebellion he remained in Turkey. He was tried *in absentia* by court martial and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment.

In 1942 he found his way to Europe and moved between Berlin and Rome, receiving a Minister's salary from the Reich Government. In 1943 it seemed that he had taken up his residence in Rome, where he was in touch with the ex-Mufti of Palestine.

69. *Nadhif Shawi*.—Born Bagdad about 1890. Educated in Military College, Constantinople, and the Turkish Staff College. Served in Turkish army until the end of the war 1914-1918. He joined King Feisal's army in Syria and fought at Maisalun, where Feisal was defeated by the French. He then returned to Bagdad and for some years was employed as a teacher in the secondary schools. During this period he graduated at the Bagdad Law College. He later returned to the army and was given rank as a senior captain. In 1935 he attended army manoeuvres in England. On his return he was made Commandant of the Iraqi Staff College. After two years in this post he was promoted brigadier and appointed Assistant Chief of General Staff. He was placed on pension in 1939 and became Minister of Defence in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in June 1941 after the flight of Rashid Ali to Persia. He made a pleasant if colourless Minister and resigned with the whole Cabinet in early October 1941.

70. *Najib-al-Rawi*.—Born about 1896. Sunni of Bagdad. Brother of Ahmad-al-Rawi. Married to a sister of Mme. Hikmat Sulaiman. Has for many years practised successfully as a lawyer and in 1942 was elected President of the Law Society. In 1940 he was suspected of being in too close intimacy with the ex-Mufti of Palestine (then a fugitive in Iraq) and with the Italian Minister.

He was careful, however, to avoid becoming involved in Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat* in 1941.

Sleek and *mondain*, he is a prominent figure in upper class social life in Bagdad.

71. *Nasrat-al-Farisi*.—Lawyer of Bagdad, born about 1890. In the early days of the Iraqi Government he held somewhat extreme Nationalist views, which he voiced as a Deputy in the Chamber. Was later given an appointment in the Ministry of Justice, where he served diligently for a number of years.

Minister for Finance, November 1932. Resigned with Naji Beg Shaukat in March 1933. Appointed Minister for Finance in Jamil Beg Al Madfai's Cabinet in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934. Appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in April 1935. Appointed Iraqi delegate at Geneva in June 1937.

Steady and intelligent, but inclined to be obstructive.

Was relieved of this appointment in the summer of 1938 when it was decided to withdraw the Iraqi delegation from Geneva. He then returned to the Bar.

Appointed Minister of Economics in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in April 1943.

72. *Nishat-al-Sanawi*.—Sunni of Bagdad, born 1893. Studied in the School of Law, Constantinople. He was in Bagdad before the occupation, went to Mosul with the Turks, and was employed in various capacities there. Returned after the armistice and took service under the British Administration. Was appointed Director of the Law School when it was reopened in 1919; criminal magistrate, February 1922; judge in the Court of Appeal, March 1923. Amin-al-Asimah, Bagdad, 1925-30. Appointed Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior in April 1930, and became Principal of the Law School, February 1931. Reappointed Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior, November 1931. Appointed Administrative Inspector, November 1933. Became Director-General of Municipalities in June 1935.

Appointed Chief Finance Inspector, May 1936. Placed on pension about end of 1938.

73. *Nuri-al-Said*.—Sunni of Bagdad, born 1888, son of an accountant of Mosul descent. Educated in Constantinople, speaks Turkish, German, French and English. Served in Balkan War. He was one of the founders of the Ahd in 1913, and came from Constantinople to Iraq in order to start branches there. He was in Basra at the time of the occupation as a patient in the American hospital; joined the Arab army in the Hejaz in June 1916, and commanded the troops till the arrival of Jafar Pasha (his brother-in-law); served as C.G.S. till the fall of Damascus. A good strategist very receptive of ideas, clever, hard-working, rash and hot-headed under fire. A modernist with an exceptionally alert intelligence. Was awarded the D.S.O. 1917 and the C.M.G. 1919, and accompanied Feisal in London, Paris and Syria in 1919 and 1920. He always wished for a reasonable rapprochement between the French and the Arabs, and dissuaded King Feisal from offering resistance to the French on the ground that he could not hope for support from the British. When the break came in July 1920 he went with Feisal to England. Returned to Bagdad in February 1921 and took charge of the Ministry of Defence during the absence of Jafar Pasha at the Cairo Conference. On his return he became C.G.S. and Director-General of Police, and held these appointments till October 1922. Acting Minister of Defence from November 1922 to November 1923. Held the same portfolio in Jafar Pasha's Cabinet. Minister of Defence again in November 1926, and retained that portfolio with only short intervals out of office until he became Prime Minister in March 1930. Negotiated and signed the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of June 1930. Visited Jedda in 1931 to negotiate a "Bon-Voisinage" Treaty with Nejd and the Hejaz. Resigned with the whole Cabinet the 19th October, 1931, but reaccepted office on the same day in a reformed Cabinet. Visited Angora with King Feisal July 1931, and again in December-January 1931-32. During latter visit he signed with Turkish Government an Extradition Treaty, a Treaty of Commerce and a Residence Convention. Resigned premiership in October 1932. Appointed Minister at Rome, February 1933, but did not proceed. Became Minister for Foreign Affairs in Cabinet of Rashid Ali Gilani in March 1933. Resigned with Rashid Ali in October 1933 and accepted portfolio of Foreign Affairs and Defence under Jamil-al-Madfai in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, but returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in



August 1934 under Ali Jaudat's premiership. Resigned with Ali Jaudat in February 1935, but retained the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in the succeeding Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai, and returned again to the Ministry in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha in March 1935.

In October, after Bakr Sidqi's successful military revolt, Nuri Pasha, fearing for his life, fled to Egypt with his family, where he carried on a restless agitation from Cairo to secure his return to Iraq. He came back in October 1937 after the murder of Bakr Sidqi and the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Government. He was offered the post of Iraqi Minister in London, but did not accept it. In early December he went to Syria with the intention of working privately for a solution of the problem of the future of the Jews and Arabs in Palestine.

But for two short visits to Bagdad, Nuri-al-Said spent the whole of the year 1938 outside Iraq, occupied principally in desultory conversations about Palestine with politicians in Syria, Egypt and London. On each of his short visits to Bagdad his presence gave rise to rumours concerning his political intentions, but these died away as soon as he left.

In December 1938 he came back to stay, and a few days later a military demonstration in his favour organised by Taha-al-Hashimi and Husain Fauzi overthrew Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet and brought Nuri-al-Said into office as Prime Minister. He represented Iraq at the opening of the London conversations about Palestine in January 1939.

Resigned the premiership in February 1940, but at the Regent's request reformed his Cabinet and continued in office until the end of March, when, with his own collaboration, a new Cabinet was formed by Rashid Ali.

Remained in office as Minister for Foreign Affairs until the end of January 1941, when he and several of his colleagues resigned because of Rashid Ali's increasing inclination towards the Axis. In April, shortly before Taha-al-Hashimi's Cabinet was overthrown by Rashid Ali and the army, Nuri Said wisely withdrew to Transjordan, where he remained until he was able to come back with the Regent at the beginning of June. Before the end of the month he was appointed Iraqi Minister in Cairo, but was recalled to form a Cabinet on the resignation of Jamil Madfai at the beginning of October 1941. From that time onwards he collaborated closely with His Majesty's Ambassador in eradicating pro-Nazi propaganda in Iraq and it was due to his initiative that Iraq declared war on the Axis Powers in January 1943.

74. *Rashid Ali-al-Gilani*.—Sunni of Bagdad, born 1892. A distant relation of the Naqib. In Turkish times was a clerk in the Waqf Department. Fled to Mosul with the Turks on the capture of Bagdad, and after the fall of Mosul practised as a lawyer. In May 1921 he was appointed a judge in the Court of Appeal. His work as a judge won him the good opinion of his advisers. Was appointed Minister of Justice in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in 1924. Resigned over the signing of the Turkish Petroleum Company's Concession in March 1925, which, at Yasin Pasha's instigation, he strongly opposed. Became Minister of Interior in the second Saduniyah Cabinet in June 1925, but resigned almost immediately on being elected President of the Chamber of Deputies. From November 1926 to January 1928 was Minister of the Interior. Re-elected to the Chamber of Deputies in the general election of 1930, but resigned his seat in March 1931, in company with Yasin-al-Hashimi, Naji-al-Suwaidi and Ali Jaudat, as a protest against the conduct of Nuri Pasha's Government. Became a prominent leader of the Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani (the party of National Brotherhood). He encouraged the general strike in July 1931, hoping thereby to embarrass Nuri Pasha's Cabinet. Appointed chief private secretary to the King in July 1932. Became Prime Minister in March 1933. Resigned October 1933. Appointed Senator in summer of 1934. Helped to organise the disturbances on the Euphrates which forced Ali Jaudat to resign in March 1935 and, as Minister for the Interior, joined the Cabinet then formed by Yasin-al-Hashimi.

After Bakr Sidqi's military revolt against the Hashimite Cabinet in October 1936, Rashid Ali fled to Constantinople. He came back in October 1937.

During 1938 he made several speeches in the Senate attacking the policy of Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet.

Deported to Anah December 1938. Returned a few days later when Nuri-al-Said succeeded Jamil-al-Madfai as Prime Minister. Appointed chief private secretary to the Palace in January 1939, and remained in this post after King Ghazi's death in April 1939. Became Prime Minister in March 1940.

Throughout 1940 he moved steadily towards a break with His Majesty's Government and a closer understanding with the Axis. He refused to break off

diplomatic relations with Italy when Italy entered the war, but remained in the closest personal contact with the Italian Legation. He also gave full support to the Mufti's intrigues with the Axis Governments and sponsored the overtures which Naji Shawkat made to the German Minister at Angora in October 1940. In Iraq he gave free rein to the Palestinian agitators and to the pro-Nazi elements of the Press, even allowing it to be stated officially that the policy of his Government was one of strict neutrality in the war in spite of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance. Pressure from the embassy forced his resignation at the end of January 1941, but he returned to office by means of a military *coup d'Etat* on the 1st April. He then set aside the Regent and installed Sharif Sharaf in his place. At this juncture, as part of their war plan, His Majesty's Government began to move troops into Iraq, but Rashid Ali, backed by the army, refused to agree to the presence of more than one brigade.

At the beginning of May the Iraqi army attempted to surround the British air base at Habbaniyah and hostilities broke out. Throughout the month Rashid Ali and his colleagues endeavoured to unite the country in a campaign against us, but, though the townspeople were with him, he received little support from the big tribes and fled to Persia after a comparatively small British column had defeated the far larger Iraqi forces opposed to them. From Persia he contrived to make his way to Turkey, and in December, having broken his parole, he escaped to Germany and joined the Mufti in Berlin, where he became a feature of the Berlin Arabic broadcast. Tried *in absentia* by court martial and sentenced to death in January 1942.

Throughout 1942 he continued to conduct an active campaign against Great Britain from Berlin and Rome and was recognised by the Axis as the legitimate Prime Minister of Iraq.

75. *Rashid-al-Khojah*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1884. Staff officer in Turkish army. Came to Damascus after the armistice. Prominent member of the Ahd-al-Iraqi. He returned to Bagdad in November 1920 and was appointed mutessarif in January 1921. He is weak and much under the thumb of the extreme National group. In February 1922 he was appointed mutessarif of Mosul, where he was completely under the influence of Mustafa Sabunji. As his presence in a frontier division was considered inexpedient by the Iraqi Government, he was removed and reappointed mutessarif of Bagdad. Appointed Iraqi consul-general at Cairo October 1928, and Director-General of Education January 1930. Consul-general, Beirut, August 1931. Chargé d'Affaires and consul-general at Jeddah, August 1933, but did not take up post. Appointed Minister for Defence under Naji Shaukat, November 1932. Resigned with Naji Shaukat's Cabinet in March 1933. Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies November 1933 after resignation of Jamil-al-Madfai. Reappointed Minister of Defence in February 1934, resigned with Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1934. Re-elected President of the Chamber in December 1934. Again appointed Minister for Defence in Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in March 1935, but resigned with the whole Cabinet after being only twelve days in office. Elected to the Chamber in August 1935 and joined the Opposition led by Jamil-al-Madfai. Appointed principal private secretary in the Palace in September 1937.

Appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by Nuri-al-Said's Cabinet in January 1939.

Placed on pension in the autumn of 1941.

76. *Rauf-al-Bahrani*.—A Shiah of Bagdad, born about 1897. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School and was appointed to a clerical post in the Ministry of Finance, where he rose to be Accountant-General (not altogether by merit). Appointed Minister for Finance in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in March 1935.

Resigned October 1936.

Appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise, January 1938. Became Minister of Finance in February 1940 and of Social Affairs in March.

Resigned with Rashid Ali and his Cabinet in January 1941 and joined Rashid Ali's rebel Government in April 1941. Fled to Tehran when British troops approached Bagdad towards the end of May 1941 and was arrested by the British forces which occupied Persia in August. After a period of detention at Ahwaz he was sent to Southern Rhodesia in December 1941 to be interned.

77. *Rauf-al-Chadirji*.—Sunni of Bagdad. He was Mayor of Bagdad at the time of the cutting of New Street and earned a great deal of personal unpopularity thereby. Left for Berlin shortly before the occupation, and subsequently went to Switzerland, returning to Bagdad in the summer of 1920, up to which time permission to return had been refused him. Speaks French, English and German



well. He set up practice as a barrister and consorted much with British officials. He took no part in the Nationalist agitation; nevertheless, when his father was deported to Constantinople in August, he was asked to return with him. He came back in 1921 and resumed his legal work without taking any part in politics. He has most of the business of foreign firms in his hands owing to his knowledge of English. He was in England on a visit during the summer of 1923, returning home in September. A retiring man of modernist opinions. Deputy for Hillah in the Constituent Assembly in March 1924. He was strongly opposed to the passage of the treaty without amendments and voted against it. Chosen director of the law school August 1924. Minister of Finance, Second Saduniyah Cabinet, and afterwards became Minister of Justice in Jafar Pasha's Cabinet in November 1926. Iraqi Minister to Angora autumn 1929. Resigned post as Minister at Angora in December 1930, and returned to Bagdad as legal adviser to the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Appointed Iraqi Minister in London in December 1936, and proceeded to his post early in 1937. Resigned March 1940 and remained in England, where he has a well-paid post with the Iraq Petroleum Company.

A cultured, likeable and intelligent man.

78. *Rauf-al-Kubaisi*.—Sunni; of Kubaisah origin. Born 1885. He was commandant of gendarmerie in Aleppo under Jafar Pasha in 1919 and did useful work in keeping order before the advent of the French in July 1920. Refused office under the French and returned to Bagdad in February 1921. He was appointed Kaimakam of Suq in November 1921, but was removed in June. He then for a time joined the extreme Nationalist group in Bagdad. Appointed Director-General of Prisons in 1924 and subsequently played no part in politics. Appointed Mutessarif of Basra January 1930. Dismissed for incompetence, April 1931. Appointed Director-General of Auqaf in summer of 1933, and Director-General of Census in November 1937.

Mutessarif of Bagdad November 1938 and Director-General of Auqaf April 1939. Resigned June 1940.

Reappointed Director-General of Auqaf in November 1941 by Nuri Said.

79. *Sabih Najib*.—Born 1892. Gazetted to the Turkish army in 1912. Joined Iraqi army 1921, and reached the rank of lieutenant-colonel 1929. Passed a staff course in England, and for some time was Commandant of the Iraqi Staff College in Bagdad. Speaks English and French and some German. Appointed Director-General of Police in March 1931. Represented Iraq on the Syrio-Iraq Frontier Delimitation Commission in 1933. Appointed counsellor, Berlin, June 1935. Transferred to Geneva as Iraqi delegate to the League of Nations in November 1935.

He was appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in December 1937, with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary.

Made Minister for Defence in October 1938. Resigned with the whole Jamil-al-Madfa'i Cabinet the 25th December, 1938.

Tried by court-martial in February 1940 for being an accessory to the murder of Rustam Haidar, Minister of Finance. Acquitted on this charge and sentenced to one year's imprisonment for having used insulting language when speaking of the Government at a semi-public gathering. Was pardoned by the Regent after serving only a few weeks of his sentence.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in December 1941.

Appointed Director-General for Foreign Affairs in February 1943 but had not taken up his post at the end of May.

80. *Sadiq-al-Bassam*.—Shiah of Bagdad. Born 1895. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School, and for several years practised as a lawyer. Deputy for Kut 1930-34. In the Chamber he gave steady support to Yasin Pasha, and was a member of the Ikha-al-Watani party. In June 1935, as a reward for his political services, he was appointed Director-General of Government Lands and Properties in the Ministry of Finance, and became Minister of Education in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in September 1935. Resigned in October 1936.

Elected Deputy for Kut December 1937 and for Bagdad in June 1939. Became Minister of Economics in September 1939. Joined the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in March 1940 as Minister of Education.

Resigned with the whole Cabinet in January 1941. Throughout the disturbances of 1941 he remained inactive and was made Minister of Justice in Nuri Said's Cabinet in October 1941.

Resigned February 1942.

Appointed an unofficial member of the Board of Education in April 1943.

81. *Said-bin-Ali*.—Mir (chief) of the Yazidis. Lives at Baidra near Mosul. Weak character, drinks heavily and indulges in every sort of vice. Much under the control of his mother, Maiyana, who is a woman of personality and was at one time a noted beauty. The Yazidis are dissatisfied with Said Beg on account of his profligate living, and from time to time there is a movement to depose him and substitute another member of the ruling family. So far, however, traditional loyalty has been strong enough to keep Said in his position.

82. *Salah-al-Din Ali-al-Sabbagh*.—Born about 1896. Educated at Istanbul and graduated as an officer from the Turkish Military College. Taken prisoner in the war 1914-18 and released to join the Amir Feisal's army. Gazetted second-lieutenant in the Iraqi army 1921. Has done courses at Belgam and Sheerness and also attached to British units. Instructor at Bagdad Military College 1924. Appointed Director of Operations in the Ministry of Defence September 1937, and became O.C. 3rd Division March 1940. Is an efficient officer, but has the reputation of being a careerist with ambition.

Belongs to the group of senior officers who are particularly active in politics.

With Fahmi Said, Kamil Shabib and Mahmud Salman he formed the group of officers known as the Golden Square, which dominated Iraqi politics in 1940, and, in company with Rashid Ali, brought about the *coup d'Etat* of the 1st April, 1941. He fled to Tehran with Rashid Ali at the end of May 1941 and evaded arrest and disappeared when British forces entered Persia in August.

Turned up again in Turkey in February 1942 and was placed under strict police supervision by the Turkish authorities. The Iraqi Government's request for his extradition was refused.

83. *Salman-al-Barrak*.—Shiah and a tribal notable of Hillah, Minister of Irrigation and Agriculture 1928-29. Has been in the Chamber of Deputies for many years and has frequently held position of Vice-President.

Appointed Minister of Economics in November 1942.

84. *Salman-al-Sheikh Daud*.—Sunni. Born Bagdad about 1900. Son of Sheikh Ahmad-al-Sheikh Daud (q.v.).

A lawyer with a large practice and a forceful personality. Given to women and drink, but a staunch supporter of democracy. He is the one person of note in Iraq who has openly and independently attacked the Axis in speeches and press articles.

In December 1941 he gave £20 to the local fund for comforts and amenities for British troops in Iraq.

85. *Salih Jabr*.—Shiah lawyer of Najaf, born about 1890. Employed for some time as a judge. Elected Deputy February 1930 and resigned from the bench. Acquired notoriety in the Chamber as a persistent asker of questions and ready speaker. Appointed Minister for Education under Jamil Madfa'i November 1933. Resigned February 1934. Elected Deputy for Muntafiq December 1934. Appointed Mutessarif of Karbala in April 1935, where he proved successful. In October 1936 he accepted the portfolio of Justice in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet. Resigned in June over the Euphrates disturbances and went away for several months. He returned when Jamil-al-Madfa'i formed a Cabinet and was appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise.

Became Minister for Education in Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in December 1938. Elected for Diwanayah June 1939. Minister for Social Affairs in February 1940. Resigned in March 1940.

Appointed Mutessarif of Basra in June 1940. Supported the Regent when His Royal Highness fled to Basra in April 1941 to escape from Rashid Ali and the "Golden Square." For this he was arrested and narrowly escaped a heavy sentence. He was in the end released on condition that he left the country. He withdrew to Tehran and returned in June 1941 after the fall of Rashid Ali. Appointed Minister of Interior and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Nuri Said in October 1941.

Appointed Minister of Finance in October 1942 with the special task of finding solutions for the country's economic difficulties.

86. *Sami Shaukat*.—Born Bagdad 1893. Sunni. Brother of Naji Shaukat. Graduated at Military College of Medicine, Constantinople, 1916. Joined the Arab army in Syria in 1919. Appointed to Iraqi Health Service 1921 and subsequently served for several years as Director-General of Education. Became Director-General of Public Health in 1936. An ardent Arab Nationalist.



Appointed Director-General of Education in March 1939. He has done much to increase military education in the secondary schools. Became the first Minister for Social Affairs in September 1939 and Minister for Education in February 1940. Resigned in March with whole Cabinet and was reappointed Director-General of Education in April 1940.

Retained his position throughout the disturbances of 1941 and survived subsequent changes. Is believed by many to have pro-German leanings, but he himself stoutly denies these allegations. However this may be, he has done little himself to eradicate pro-Nazi sentiment from the Iraqi education system.

Appointed Director-General of Social Affairs and Health in January 1943.

87. *Shakir-al-Wadi*.—Sunni of Bagdad, born 1894. Brother of Jamil-al-Wadi. Served as an officer in the Turkish army from 1915 to the armistice. Joined the Iraqi army in 1921. Captain 1928. In 1929 he was attached for training to various units in England, and in 1930 he was promoted major and made aide-de-camp to King Feisal. He was on King Feisal's staff during His Majesty's State visit to England in 1933. Promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1935 and attended the Staff College course. Returned to Iraq 1936 and was appointed G.S.O. 1 in the Kirkuk Division, of which Bakr Sidqi was the G.O.C. He was right-hand man to Bakr in the military revolt of October 1936. He is intelligent, capable and ambitious. After Bakr Sidqi's murder in August 1937 he was appointed military attaché in London, but a few weeks later he was dismissed and placed on the retired list.

Banished from Bagdad in December 1938 for intrigues against Jamil-al-Madfai's Government, but permitted to return in January 1939 after Nuri-al-Said had formed a Government. Appointed to the Iraqi diplomatic service in June 1939 as second secretary to the Iraqi Legation, Tehran.

At first he seems to have done well and kept in close touch with His Majesty's Legation. Later on, however, he seems to have yielded to the blandishments and bribes of the German Legation and, as chargé d'affaires during April and May 1941, he dutifully carried out instructions sent to him by Rashid Ali's Government. Daud Haidari, who was appointed minister at Tehran in June 1941, was asked to keep a close watch on Shakir.

Appointed consul at Jerusalem in November 1941.

88. *Sufuq-al-Ajl*.—Of the Shammar Jarba tribe. Born about 1910. Educated Beirut University. Once spoke English well, but is forgetting it. Eldest son of Sheikh Ajil-al-Yawar, who became paramount sheikh of the Shammar in Iraq in the early nineteen twenties and died in November 1940. Ajil acquired much money from his relations with the B.O.D. Company and from supplying labour to the railways when the line was extended from Bagdad to Mosul. Sufuq inherited this wealth.

Sufuq's eldest brother, Ahmad (born about 1923) is said to have the stronger character and may become influential when he grows a little older.

During the autumn of 1941 some of Sufuq's cousins, led by Mishan-al-Faisal, showed dissatisfaction with Sufuq's leadership, but the quarrel was patched up and the family now accept Sufuq's leadership.

In 1942 he obtained a number of contracts from the British military authorities which increased undesirably Shammar influence. Steps were therefore taken to curtail the number of contracts assigned to him and to check Shammar arrogance. By the middle of 1943 the situation had improved and Sufuq and his subordinate tribal leaders had become more amenable.

89. *Tahsin al Askari*.—Sunni. Born 1892. Fought with the Arab forces under the Amir Faisal 1916-18 and later appointed Governor of Aleppo. Returned to Iraq at the end of 1920 and was appointed to the police with the rank of commandant. Became Kaimakam of Samawa in 1927 and Mutessarif of Kirkuk in 1930; a year later he was transferred to Mosul, where he remained until 1935 when he became Director-General of Irrigation. When his brother Jafar al Askari was murdered by officers of Bakr Sidqi's staff at the time of the latter's *coup d'Etat* in October 1936 he left the country on three months' leave with Jafar's widow and later resumed his post at Irrigation. In May 1940 he was appointed Counsellor in the Iraqi Legation in Cairo and became Minister in October 1941. In October 1942 he was recalled by his brother-in-law Nuri Said to become Minister of the Interior.

He is devoted to the Pan-Arab cause but at the same time well disposed towards Great Britain and the Anglo-Iraqi Alliance.

90. *Taha-al-Hashimi*.—Brother of the late Yasin-el-Hashimi. Born 1888. Served in Turkish army and was employed in Arabia and the Yemen during the war. Was given a post on the Turkish General Staff in Constantinople in 1920, but returned to Bagdad in 1922 to join the Iraqi army, and was at once appointed Officer Commanding Troops in Mosul. Appointed chief of the General Staff and came to Bagdad in 1923. Was attached to Sir Percy Cox in May 1924 for the boundary negotiations with the Turkish Government which followed the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. The post of chief of the General Staff was abolished shortly after his return in August 1924, and for a while he acted as tutor to the (then) Crown Prince Ghazi. Appointed chief of the Census Department in 1926 and Director of Education in 1928. In 1930 he returned as chief of the General Staff to the Ministry of Defence, and was promoted *fariq* (general). In 1931 he visited the Imam Yahiyah of the Yemen and concluded a treaty of friendship between the Yemen and Iraq.

In September 1935 he was appointed Acting Director-General of Education in addition to his other duties.

He was in Angora in October 1936 when Hikmat Sulaiman and Bakr Sidqi forced Yasin-al-Hashimi to resign and wisely did not return to Iraq. He came back in September 1937 and was offered the post of Director-General of Works. He refused this offer on the ground that it was beneath his dignity to accept any position lower than that of Chief of the General Staff.

Elected Deputy for Bagdad in December 1937. Opposed Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in the Chamber. Worked actively on the committee of the Palestine Defence League in 1938. On the 25th December, 1938, in collaboration with General Husain Fauzi, he organised a military demonstration against Jamil-al-Madfai's Government, and became Minister for Defence in the Cabinet which Nuri-al-Said formed when Jamil-al-Madfai resigned. Became a Deputy for Bagdad in the elections of June 1939. Retained the portfolio of Defence in the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in February 1940.

Resigned in January 1941 with most of the members of Rashid Ali's Cabinet and on the 1st February succeeded the latter as Prime Minister. On assuming office he feebly attempted to break the power of the military clique which during 1940 he and Rashid Ali had allowed to dominate not only the army but the Cabinet. They defied him and overthrew him and his Cabinet after it had enjoyed office for only two months. Taha Pasha thereupon went to Turkey, where he remained throughout Rashid Ali's rebel régime. When the Regent had been restored Taha Pasha wished to return to Iraq, but Nuri Said (the Prime Minister) did not want him back and it was arranged that a transit visa through Syria should be refused.

He remained in Turkey throughout 1942 but continued to draw his salary as a member of the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies.

91. *Tahsin Ali*.—A Sunni Moslem born in Bagdad in 1890. Educated in Bagdad and Istanbul. Participated in the Balkan War, fought against the British at Basra, and after the fall of Bagdad joined King Hussain of the Hejaz. Fought under Faisal and was a brigade commander in the Arab army at Aleppo. Was awarded the M.C. Returned to Bagdad with Faisal and became Secretary to the Defence Ministry. Commandant of Police in Mosul in 1922, he was removed because of his connexions with the Sabunchi faction and transferred to the Dulaim area in 1925. Between 1927 and 1938 held a number of administrative posts, including those of Mutessarif of Mosul and Basra. Director-General of the P.W.D. in 1938. Was largely connected with the activities of the local Palestine Defence Committee while in Basra. Became Mutessarif of Mosul again in April 1939, but was removed by Rashid Ali after his *coup d'Etat* in May. Was restored when the Madfai Cabinet was formed in June.

Not particularly clever, and apt to be pig-headed. In Mosul he was too much under local influence and showed a strong prejudice against the Yazidis. He was slow to take action against Nazi sympathisers and favoured a policy of "appeasement." Appointed Minister of Education in the Cabinet formed by Nuri Said in October 1941.

92. *Tahsin Qadri*.—Sunni of Damascus. Born 1893. Was with Feisal in Damascus and accompanied him to Europe in July 1920. Came with him to Bagdad in June 1921, and was appointed an A.D.C. to the King in August. Married the daughter and heiress of Abdul Wahhab Pasha Qartas of Basra.



Appointed Master of Ceremonies in the palace March 1932. Accompanied King Feisal on his State visit to England in 1933 and received the K.C.V.O.

In June 1936 he was compelled to resign from the palace on account of the scandal of the marriage of Princess Azzah. He was later appointed counsellor to the Iraqi Legation in Tehran and took up his post in November 1936. Appointed consul-general at Bombay in December 1937. Speaks English and French. Pleasant and clever.

Appointed Director of Ceremonies in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in February 1939. Became consul-general in Beirut in July 1939.

In May 1941, like all Iraqi consuls, he seems to have carried out his orders from Rashid Ali without protest and his behaviour was strongly criticised by the British authorities.

93. *Talib Mushtaq*.—Sunni of Bagdad, born 1900. Father was minor official. Took part in the anti-mandate agitation of 1922 and in the spring of 1923 was one of those responsible for anti-British posters issued over the signature of the Supreme Committee of Iraq Secret Societies. Appointed Inspector of Schools in 1924 and held a variety of appointments under the Ministry of Education until November 1931, when he was appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Angora. Appointed Director of the Consular Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in November 1935. Appointed consul-general at Beirut in August 1937.

Withdrawn and dismissed from the service in February 1938. He remained for a time in Syria, but returned to Bagdad when Nuri-al-Said formed a Cabinet in December 1938. Appointed Accountant-General in January 1939 and Director-General of Propaganda, Publicity and Broadcasting in May 1939. Became consul-general in Jerusalem May 1940.

During May 1941 he carried on an anti-British propaganda campaign and zealously supported Rashid Ali's rebel Government. He was recalled in June and subsequently interned.

94. *Taufiq-al-Suwaidi*.—Born 1889. Studied law in Bagdad and Constantinople and international law in Paris. In 1913 became first interpreter to the Ministry of Education, Constantinople. Represented Iraq at the Arab Conference held in Paris in July 1913. After the armistice went to Syria and was appointed judge in Damascus. Returned to Bagdad in October 1921 and in November was appointed Assistant Government Counsellor and Director of the Law School. Minister for Education January 1928. Prime Minister 1929. President of the Chamber 1929. Iraqi Minister at Tehran March 1931. Joined Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in July 1934 as Minister for Foreign Affairs, but resigned with the whole Cabinet in August. Held Cabinet office for twelve days as Minister for Justice in Jamil-al-Madfai's short-lived Cabinet in March 1935 and in October was appointed Comptroller-General of Accounts. He became Minister for Foreign Affairs in Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1937, and headed the Iraqi delegation to the League of Nations in September. There he handled the Assyrian and Palestinian questions with tact and moderation.

Again represented Iraq at the League of Nations in the autumn of 1938, and afterwards visited London as the guest of His Majesty's Government. There he had conversations with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and with the Secretary of State for the Colonies about Palestine.

Resigned with the whole of Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet on the 25th December, 1938, as the result of a military demonstration made against them. Represented Iraq at the London conversations on Palestine in 1939 after Nuri-al-Said had returned to Iraq.

Joined Taha al Hashimi's Cabinet in February 1941 as Minister for Foreign Affairs and did what he could to break up the military clique which during 1940 had established a stranglehold over the Government. Was forced out of office by Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat* of April 1941. Tried to join the Regent at Basra, but failed. He took no part in the events of May and would have been asked to join Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in October 1941 if the fact that his brother Naji had been summoned to stand his trial for treason had not made it difficult to include him.

He is aggrieved that he has not been appointed to the Senate and blames Nuri Said for his exclusion. He is not well disposed towards the Regent. Nevertheless, an attempt was made to get him into the Cabinet in 1942, but was unsuccessful owing to the exaggerated conditions he sought to make.

95. *Thabit Abdul Nur*.—Born 1890. Son of Aziz Abdul Nur, a prominent Jacobite Christian of Mosul. He was christened Nikole. Was an officer in the Turkish army, embezzled money and fled to Syria to join Shereefian cause. At this time he changed his name to Thabit, became a Moslem and performed the pilgrimage to Mecca. Came to Bagdad in November 1921 and became prominent in extreme Nationalist politics. Elected Deputy for Mosul in general election of 1930, and appointed Director of Oil Affairs in the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1931. The post was abolished in March 1933. Tried in 1932 for misappropriating the funds of the Agricultural Exhibition (April 1932), but acquitted.

Appointed counsellor in the Iraqi Legation in London December 1933. This post was abolished and he was appointed Iraqi Oil Representative in London in July 1934. Appointed Director of Oil Affairs in the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1935. His post was abolished in November 1936, and he remained without employment until December 1937, when he was appointed to the Iraqi Diplomatic Service.

Early in 1938 he was appointed Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires at Jeddah. There he put forward a number of fantastic proposals to the Saudi Arabian Government for which he had been given no authority by the Iraqi Government. The Saudi Government soon detected the folly of his schemes and gave up taking him seriously. In December 1938 and January 1939 he was in Sanaa visiting the King of the Yemen.

He was on leave in Germany on the outbreak of war in September 1939 and chose to remain there rather than return to Iraq. It is believed that he helps in the preparation of Arabic broadcasts from Berlin.

96. *Umar Nazmi*.—Born Kifri 1893. Graduated at the Bagdad Law College 1913. Appointed Judge, Khaniqin 1913; Baqubah 1914; on the outbreak of the war joined the Reserve Officers' School and was named Public Prosecutor to the Military Court, Bagdad. Appointed Judge, Civil Courts, Kirkuk 1921; Arbil 1923; Kirkuk 1924; Vice-President, Civil Courts, Mosul 1924; Hillah 1925; President, Civil Courts, Djalala; Mutassarif of Kirkuk Liwa 1927. Mutassarif of Kut and Basra Liwas; Administrative Inspector 1931; Mutassarif of Mosul Liwa 1934.

Held other Government posts up to August 1937, when he was made to be Director-General of Revenues. Became a Minister of Economics and Communications in December 1938 in the Cabinet of Nuri-al-Said.

Made a Senator April 1939. Minister of Interior in September 1939 and Acting Minister of Justice in February 1940. Joined Rashid Ali's Cabinet in March 1940 as Minister of Communications and Works.

Resigned in January 1941 with most of his colleagues as protest against Rashid Ali's pro-Axis policy.

Since November 1941 he has been an active member of committees in the Senate.

97. *Yunis Bahri*.—Born about 1904. Of the Jubur tribe of Mosul. From his early days he has been well known for his unprincipled character and immoral private life. From 1923 to 1926 he held minor clerical posts in Government offices. In June 1926 he went on a journey round the world and was repatriated destitute from Paris after having served a term of imprisonment for a misdemeanour. Between 1929 and 1933 he travelled in Arab countries, including Tripoli, Tunis and the Hadhramaut, and also Java, India, Afghanistan and Iran. On his return to Iraq he took up journalism and gave his support to extreme nationalism. He also published a newspaper called *Al Uqab*. He was subsidised in 1935-36 to publish articles favouring the Italian conquest of Abyssinia and in 1936 he sold himself to the German Legation. In April 1939 he went to Berlin and soon afterwards became the announcer of the Berlin Arabic broadcast.

In this position he has been very successful, and his broadcasts were a powerful instrument of German propaganda.

In the spring of 1942 he "went off the air" and it is rumoured that he was put into an internment camp in Germany.

98. *Yusuf Ghanimah*.—An intelligent and hardworking Chaldean Catholic of Bagdad; born about 1890. Diminutive and unimpressive, he mixes freely with Moslems and was made Minister for Finance in January 1928, after having shown industry and ability as *rapporteur* of the Finance Committee of the Chamber.



Has sat in Parliament for Bagdad since the first election. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930, and then began to take part in the activities of the two Opposition parties, the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party) and the Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani (the Party of National Brotherhood). Appointed Director-General of Revenues in the Ministry of Finance, December 1932, and Director-General of the Ministry in 1933. Became Minister for Finance in Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in August 1934. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in February 1935. Appointed Director-General of Finance in June 1935.

Appointed general manager of the Agricultural-Industrial Bank in December 1936.

Was made Director-General of Antiquities in November 1941.

99. *Yusuf Iz-al-Din*.—Sunni. Son of Ibrahim Pasha, a Kurd of Sulaimani. Born Bagdad 1891. Married to the daughter of Ali Agha of Sulaimani. Owns property in Bagdad, Amara and Sulaimani. Educated locally and entered the civil service in 1918. Graduated at the Law School in 1927. Became a finance inspector in 1928 and was promoted Assistant Director-General of Finance in 1930. Became Director-General of Land Settlement June 1934, Accountant-General June 1935. Appointed Minister of Education in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in October 1936. He resigned in July 1937 because of his dissatisfaction with the Cabinet's policy on the Euphrates and with Bakr Sidqi's influence over the Prime Minister.

#### *Obituary since last Report.*

Naji-al-Suwaidi, in an internment camp in Rhodesia.

[E 4699/489/93]

No. 5.

*Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.*—(Received 16th August.)

(No. 271.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, 26th July, 1943.*

SOON after Sir Kinahan Cornwallis had written his despatch No. 195 of the 5th June an acute restiveness became noticeable among the leading members of the Iraqi Cabinet. The Prime Minister, with good reason, was disappointed with Saleh Jabr for his failure to fulfil the hopes placed in him when he went to the Ministry of Finance last October; Saleh Jabr was irritated with the Prime Minister for having obstructed a grant of several thousand acres of Government land which he wished to make to an old friend, he had quarrelled with the Minister of Justice and had fallen out with the Minister of Education, who was becoming increasingly disliked by all his colleagues because of his coarseness; and Tahsin-al-Askari had proved a failure at the Ministry of the Interior. In addition, the Prime Minister suspected Daud-al-Haidari of intriguing against him and had reason to believe that in the absence of a proper Head of the Royal Diwan, minor Court officials were abusing their position to influence tribal visitors to the Palace against the Government.

2. In these confused but typical circumstances, some changes were essential, and so soon as the current session of Parliament ended, Nuri Pasha set about reorganising his Cabinet. His method was that which is usually employed at such times in this country; much hard talking behind the scenes with colleagues and with candidates for office, combined with many consultations with the Regent. His Excellency also came to see the ambassador frequently to exchange views. As a result, the following changes were made on the 23rd June. Saleh Jabr was transferred to Interior and was succeeded at Finance by Jalal Baban. Tahsin Ali was appointed to the Palace as Head of the Royal Diwan and replaced at Education by Abdul Illah Hafidh, who, in turn, was succeeded at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by Nasrat-al-Farisi. Daud-al-Haidari was dropped and consoled with the appointment of Minister, Grade I, in the Foreign Service *en disponibilité* (with full pay) and was succeeded by Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, in whose stead Tahsin-al-Askari went to Communications and Works.

3. The make-up of the re-formed Cabinet was, therefore, as follows:—

Prime Minister and Acting Minister of Defence, Nuri-al-Said.

Foreign Affairs: Nasrat-al-Farisi.

Interior: Saleh Jabr.

Finance: Jalal Baban.

Justice: Ahmad Mukhtar Baban.

Communications and Works: Tahsin-al-Askari.

Education: Abdul Illah Hafidh.

Economic: Salman-al-Barrak.

Social Affairs: Abdul Razzak-al-Uzri.

These adjustments in the Cabinet evoked little general interest or comment and were regarded as routine changes, having no considerable influence in the policy of the Government.

4. The 1942-43 session of Parliament was further extended for ten days from the 1st June to enable the final readings of the draft legislation Amending the Organic Law to be taken in both Houses. This having been done, the session was closed and Parliament dissolved on the 9th June. Under the existing Organic Law new elections will now have to be held and Parliament summoned in special session before the 10th October. The text of the amending law has not yet been published, so I cannot offer detailed comments.

5. In his last despatch Sir Kinahan Cornwallis forecast that, with a view to authorising more releases, the Prime Minister would, before long, reconstitute the committee formed last winter to examine the records of interned persons. In the event this was done about the middle of June and the Prime Minister promised the ambassador an opportunity to scrutinise the committee's recommendations before they were adopted. By the end of the month, though it was approaching the end of its task, the committee had not completed the list of persons who could be released. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister, after a brief bout of pneumonia, effectively dealt with by "B. and M. 693," had left for Syria. I was accordingly somewhat taken aback, on arriving at the American Legation for dinner on the 3rd July, to be told by Mr. Edmonds that an hour earlier the Minister of the Interior had, without referring to the committee, issued orders for the release of fifty-seven internees. As Saleh Jabr was a fellow-guest, I lost no time in tackling him. To do his Excellency justice, I do not think that the Prime Minister had told him of the understanding which had been reached with the ambassador and, in view of the Prime Minister's illness, he had not been able to consult him. I expressed my concern at the precipitate manner in which he had ordered these releases and invited him to explain the reasons for his action. He said that, in the first place, he had himself been primarily responsible for the adoption of a strong internment policy, and in the second, that he was quite satisfied that none of the men released was at all likely to be dangerous. This second contention was largely borne out by examination of the list of those set free. Of the total of fifty-seven, thirty were found to be men of small account and twenty-two others had been provisionally classified by the committee as fit for release. Of the remaining five, however, three were undesirables, with German wives, and one, a thoroughly bad man named Zaki Kadhim, an ex-non-commissioned officer of the Iraqi army who, as physical training instructor in the Teachers' Training College, had, in May 1941, earned notoriety as the organiser and leader of the so-called "Death Squad" of students pledged to fight to the end against the British. At my request, the Minister of the Interior arranged for the men with the German wives to be warned to be careful of their conduct and ordered Zaki Kadhim to live in the provinces under close police supervision. All these people had been sent to internment from Bagdad. The releases of internees from the provinces were dealt with more regularly. The Minister of the Interior was guided by the recommendations made by the mutessarifs and, through the adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, I was able to see the list of names before any releases were ordered. Of the original fifty-four names the Minister was persuaded to delete nine, and of the forty-five who remained only one was of any consequence. This was a troublesome intriguing sheikh of the Fatlah tribe of Diwaniyah. He had been living under restraint in Mandali and is now to be allowed to come to Baqubah. Twenty-three of the forty-five were released on the 18th July and the others are expected to be set free before the end of the month. Notwithstanding the improvement in Saleh Jabr's tactics in dealing with this second batch, I subsequently spoke very seriously to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the need for co-operation and prior consultation in all matters of internal security.



6. On the night of the 16th-17th June a large four-engined aircraft flew over Mosul. The next day several parachutes were discovered some miles to the west of the town, and it was clear that men had been dropped with a considerable equipment for organising political disturbances, espionage and sabotage. Three German officers and one Iraqi student were eventually captured in Kurdish dress near Arbil on the 29th June. The examination of these men has not yet been finished, but from the data so far collected it seems that they intended to drop not to the west of Mosul but much further east, close to the Persian frontier, and that they expected to find confederates ready to help them when they landed. An unpleasant feature of this business is that about a week passed before these agents were apprehended. During that period they undoubtedly received help, including gifts of clothing and food, from friendly villagers, and possibly other helpers. A further fact that has caused no small comment is that the flight of the 16th-17th June was followed on succeeding nights by others, the enemy aircraft droning around at will on each occasion for some time over an extensive area. So far as I am aware, not even a rifle shot was directed at these hostile machines, and this has not helped our local prestige.

7. Nuri Pasha had intended to take leave soon after the middle of June and to pay his long-talked-of visit to Egypt to discuss plans for Arab unity with Nahas Pasha. The sudden illness to which I have already referred prevented him from carrying out this plan and obliged him to go to the Lebanon for his convalescence. He left Bagdad on the 6th July. His health being now apparently restored, he has gone down into Egypt to fulfil his original intention, but it is not clear what proposals he will make to Nahas Pasha. At the beginning of the year he had hopes of persuading the Egyptian Prime Minister to call together a congress of Arab leaders to draw up a plan for some kind of federation of the Arab States, but it was later reported from Jedda that last April he told the Saudi Arabian Minister that, in his opinion, an Arab Congress could not usefully be held until Syria and Palestine had been set free. It seems, therefore, that he may not yet have made up his mind whether Palestine and Syria must have their independence before anything can be done to bring the Arab countries closer together, or whether it is possible to work out a scheme for federation which would take in these countries as they are.

8. After long negotiations and much argument, the Iraqi Government offered at the end of June to fix the price of barley containing 10 per cent. dirt at I.D. 20/500 per ton delivered at collecting centres, produce tax paid. This offer, which represented a reduction of I.D. 4/500, or 18 per cent., on the price paid under the Iraqi Government's fixed price scheme for the balance of the 1942 crop, was accepted by His Majesty's Government. Owing to the Iraqi Government's natural and characteristic reluctance to commit themselves on paper to supply a definite quantity and a last-minute change of ground regarding the method of payment for barley delivered to the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, it was not until the 23rd July that notes were finally exchanged confirming the conditions on which the Iraqi Government undertook to ensure delivery of 200,000 tons of barley at the agreed price to the corporation. Most people think that the price of I.D. 20/500 is good enough to induce growers to sell their barley without aversion; in fact, there are signs that many of them are anxious to offer all the barley they have and not only the third at present requisitioned. The price of barley on the farms has been fixed at I.D. 15/000. The wheat price has also been fixed—at I.D. 25/000 on the farms for best quality, this being the same price as last year, and at I.D. 32/000 delivered at collecting centres, tax paid.

9. The Istihlak (consumption) tax on all natural produce was raised by 1½ per cent. and "super" tax increased substantially in laws passed just before Parliament was dissolved on the 9th June.

10. Many classes of imported goods became much cheaper after the publication in May of the new Law for the Regulation of the Economic Life of the Country and the subsequent issue of decrees canalising and controlling—on paper—trade in imported goods. As, however, the Government showed a lack of determination in setting up machinery for enforcing the decrees, the phase of lower prices soon passed and prices for imported goods are now, with few exceptions, almost back again at their old high level. Meat, fruit and vegetables are now dearer than ever and a large proportion of the working classes cannot afford to buy them. Many townspeople are therefore obliged to do without these very important foods. Farmers, on the other hand, are doing well and are better off than they have ever been, despite the rise in cost of the goods they themselves have to buy.

11. Prosecutions for infringements of the regulations for the control of trading made in May and June have been numerous and the sentences awarded salutary, but it will be no surprise to you, Sir, to know that there is reason to believe that some of the better connected and richer delinquents have not been brought before the courts.

12. Improvement in the direction of public education continues to be noticeable, but a successor to Professor Hamley is still an urgent need. The new Minister, Saiyid Abdul Illah Hafidh, is energetic and broad-minded. He evidently intends to try and keep politics out of the schools, and even welcomes British help. He is well disposed to British educational methods and knows how much needs to be done to reform education in this country.

13. At the end of May disturbances occurred in Hail, in Northern Saudi Arabia. King Abdul Azziz-al-Saud was persuaded that Hashimite intrigues were at the bottom of them, and he caused strongly worded representations to be made to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda. Nothing could be found here to confirm these suspicions, but Ibn Saud unhappily considered that Iraq's rulers were the cause of all his troubles, and in early July he returned to the charge with a long message sent to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires through Sheikh Yusuf Yasin. Unable to produce any evidence to substantiate his charges about Iraqi intrigues in Hail, he reverted to his old grievances and hashed them up with hotly spiced reiteration of his conviction that the Hashimites were trying to encircle and destroy him. Among the few tangible complaints included in this surprising tirade was his claim that the Iraqi Government were conscripting Saudi subjects into the Iraqi army and forcing them to take up Iraqi nationality. The trouble seems to come from the fact that in Zubair there are many people of Najdi origin. The Iraqi authorities claim that Najdis are ex-Ottomans, and therefore became Iraqis under the nationality clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne; but the Saudi Government maintain that Najdis were never Ottoman subjects, and therefore did not become Iraqis but Saudi Arabians. The point is debatable and King Abdul Azziz can no doubt produce arguments in support of his Government's thesis, but there is no justification for assuming that the Iraqi attitude is part of a carefully developed plot to destroy his position and prestige. I have asked the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs to go into this and other outstanding questions with a view to finding a means of improving relations with Ibn Saud, but in his present frame of mind His Majesty is, I fear, unlikely to be appeased by any reasonable adjustment that may be proposed. He is concerned with bigger problems. As I see the situation, he can read the writing on the wall as well as most men, and what disturbs him is not frontier incidents or a dispute about the nationality of a few hundred men, but the vision of Arab unity which looms before him as he looks into the future. He can foresee that any federation of the Arab States must menace his own theocratic and antiquated régime. If he joins the federation, a primitive and backward State like Saudi Arabia can hope for nothing better than a very minor rôle; if he remains aloof, his fate will be no better. His good faith will be impugned and his kingdom will be doomed to eclipse and obscurity. The dilemma for him is real enough, but he is unlikely to resolve it by his present methods.

14. News of the death of General Sikorsky was received with much regret in Bagdad. Only a few days before the accident in which he was killed he had been in Iraq as the guest of the Government, and among other functions had taken part in the official celebrations of United Nations Day on the 14th June. His dignity and sincerity made a favourable impression on those whom he met and much sympathy was felt and expressed with the Polish people for their grievous loss in his death. The Regent telegraphed condolences to President Raczkiewicz, and the Iraqi Government and army were represented at the requiem mass which was said at the Latin Cathedral in Bagdad.

15. The ambassador left Bagdad for two months' leave on the 29th June. The Prime Minister, as I have already related, went to the Lebanon a few days later and the Minister of the Interior left for a six weeks' holiday on the 24th July. Other members of the Government are, I hear, also planning to fade away quite soon. The barley contract having been concluded, there is no important political question which at the time of writing needs urgent attention. The problem of the hoped-for railway agreement is unlikely to receive any real attention at Iraqi hands until the Prime Minister is back in the saddle, a fact which, it must be confessed, causes no small irritation in military circles, from which emanate from time to time murmured suggestions for "firm action." But, as I never lose an opportunity of explaining, Anglo-Iraqi relations are a delicate growth. Even if it were desirable, there are no sanctions we could employ to secure quick action



in such complex matters, while anything savouring of mere table-thumping could only lead to loss of goodwill and resultant deliberate and effective obstruction. In any event, as it is now evident to all that our local forces are reduced virtually to clerks, care-maintenance and labour formations, our military strength here and heavy commitments elsewhere would scarcely justify the sudden adoption of an aggressive policy over questions that are difficult and important, but scarcely vital.

16. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Angora, Cairo, Tehran, Jedda and Beirut, the Minister of State at Cairo, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan at Jerusalem, the Governor-General of India, the Commander-in-chief, India, General Headquarters, Middle East, the Combined Middle East Intelligence Centre, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Political Agent at Koweit and to His Majesty's consular officers at Basra and Mosul.

I have, &c.  
G. H. THOMPSON.

[E 4933/4933/93]

No. 6.

*Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received 12th August.)*

(No. 278. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, 1st August, 1943.*

WITH reference to Sir Kinahan Cornwallis's despatch No. 239 of the 27th August, 1942, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith my annual report on the heads of foreign missions in Iraq for the year 1943.

I have, &c.  
G. H. THOMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 6.

*Report on Heads of Foreign Missions at Bagdad.*

(Passages marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous reports.)

*Afghanistan:* Abdur Rahman Khan, Minister (21st October, 1941).

\*Although an Iraqi mission, headed by a chargé d'affaires, has been established at Kabul since November 1940, I received no warning that it was proposed to appoint an Afghan representative to Bagdad. The arrival of Abdur Rahman Khan, complete with a secretary, on the 11th October came as a surprise both to my colleagues and myself. The new Minister is said to have served as a consul in Bombay and at the Afghan Legation in Paris, but he appears to be somewhat ignorant of diplomatic usage. He speaks English. (Written in 1941.)

\*Owing to the Court mourning for the late mother of His Majesty Zahir Shah, the legation has done no entertaining, but Abdur Rahman has turned up regularly at diplomatic functions and always seems to be friendly and anxious to please, though his stock of conversational topics is small. He appears to have no work to do beyond aiding the occasional student coming home from Europe on his way back to Afghanistan. He has only one hat, a somewhat battered blue Homburg, which has to serve even for funerals. (Written in 1942.)

The death of the Afghan Crown Prince in November 1942 served to keep the legation in the background of Bagdad social life for a further period. Abdur Rahman is still to be seen at various functions, however, and continues to radiate friendliness. He has just returned from leave in Palestine and Syria and is loud in his praise of the many kindnesses shown to him by prominent British officials in those countries. He now has, in addition to the blue Homburg, a rather tired-looking Panamá.

*Egypt:* Mohammed Husni Omar Effendi, Minister (23rd January, 1943).

Came to Bagdad from the Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, where he was head of the Consular Department with the rank of chargé d'affaires. His early career was spent in the Ministry, but he has served at Angora and Rome as a secretary and at Tehran as counsellor.

He is a conceited little man, but seems energetic. He is a devotee of "la vie sportive" and is much in evidence at the Alwiyah Club in company with his Turkish and Saudi colleagues. He plays tennis with vigour and dances with

zeal. He is very proud of the fact that while at Angora he won a prize for the best tango on the floor. It is possibly on this account that he regards himself as God's gift to women.

He plays his part in the promotion of closer Egypto-Iraqi cultural relations, but his style is somewhat cramped by the behaviour of the many Egyptian teachers here, who make no effort to conceal their contempt for this country, its climate, its institutions and its inhabitants.

*Persia:* M. Mohsen Raïs, Minister (28th July, 1943).

He was consul-general-designate for Delhi, but it was decided at the last moment to transfer him to Bagdad in view of the objections raised to the appointment of M. Mehdi Farrokh to the Iraqi capital.

He was Persian representative to the Vichy Government and latterly held a ministerial post for a short time under the Qavam-es-Sultaneh.

I have not yet met him.

*Saudi Arabia:* Assad-al-Faqih, Minister (9th May, 1943).

In an attempt to improve Saudi-Iraqi relations, King Abdul Aziz decided this spring to put the Bagdad Legation in charge of a Minister. Assad Bey, the chargé d'affaires, was accordingly promoted and presented his letters on the 9th May. It cannot be said that relations have shown any signs of improvement yet—on the contrary, they seem to have deteriorated.

Assad Bey, who is a smooth Syrian, is friendly and co-operative in such matters as jointly affect our two missions. He is perhaps a little too eager to find fault with the Iraqis and not interested enough in sending correct reports to his Sovereign or in preventing misunderstandings. He is probably more concerned with feathering his own nest while he can. In fact, it was recently reported that he was using his diplomatic bag for the purpose of smuggling gold to Syria; one of his secretaries is certainly engaged in the traffic.

*Turkey:* M. Ahmed Cavad Ustün, Minister (September 1939).

\*He has served in Vienna and at The Hague. He and his wife are an agreeable couple, but both are congenitally nervous, and it may be said without exaggeration that M. Cavad Ustün is a confirmed hypochondriac. Continued ill-health, whether real or imagined, has not been without its influence on his morale, and he has on several occasions shocked both Iraqis and his colleagues by giving expression to defeatist views. While he may not be fundamentally ill-disposed, I have not found him a helpful colleague in times when robust courage and cheerful confidence are qualities to be desired in the representatives of countries having close relations with ourselves. Nevertheless, he and his wife are at times friendly. (Written in 1940.)

\*Until the Rashid Ali rebellion he is reported to have made some feeble attempts to dissuade the pro-German politicians from taking the course they had planned. When the final break came he busied himself feverishly in efforts to reconcile the two parties to each other and so stave off an armed conflict. He and his wife still suffer from perpetual fear and ill-health. Two months after the collapse of the rebellion he hurried back to Turkey on sick leave, and has not since returned to Bagdad. (Written in 1941.)

\*M. Ustün returned to Bagdad in late 1941 with a new phobia—Russia. He made every effort to enlist the sympathy of leading Iraqis, the Persian Chargé d'Affaires and even the late United States Minister in regard to the Russian danger, if Germany should be defeated. He suggested that the Russian zone in Persia should be taken over by the British. His views were not well received generally, and the Iraqi Prime Minister at one time talked of getting him removed, but soundings taken at Angora did not evoke a favourable response.

He has been very busy personally supervising the onward despatch of goods passing through Iraq in transit to Turkey, even to the extent of haunting the railway goods yard, which has tended to keep him out of mischief. (Written in 1942.)

Relations with M. Ustün have been somewhat complicated at times during the last year owing to a number of unfortunate incidents at the Syro-Iraqi frontier involving the search of Turkish diplomats and other travellers by the F. S. S. authorities. M. Ustün was himself questioned about his baggage in November last and appears to have behaved very childishly.

It was recently rumoured that he had been appointed to Tokyo, but refused to go because Tokyo would soon become a war zone. This, if true, at least indicates M. Ustün's growing confidence in our ability to carry the war into the enemy's territory.



*United States of America:* Hon. Mr. T. M. Wilson, Minister Resident (26th September, 1942).

Came here from India where he was the first United States Commissioner. Before that, he had served as consul-general at Calcutta and Sydney. In the remote past he saw service in China and at various subordinate posts in India. He was in the State Department for a number of years, was Inspector of Consulates and in 1932 was appointed Chief of Foreign Service Personnel in the Department. He is 62.

He is quiet and unassuming, somewhat set in his ways, but possesses a good sense of humour. He likes to potter about old Bagdad and is a popular figure with the vendors of Oriental knick-knacks.

Mr. Wilson is shortly to be succeeded by Mr. Loy Henderson and I shall be sorry to see him go. He has been most friendly and helpful whenever possible. Relations with the American Legation are in fact excellent.

*Representatives Accredited to Iraq but Resident elsewhere.*

*Belgium:* M. Egbert Graeffe, Minister (27th April, 1938).

\*He is also Belgian Minister at Tehran, where he resides.

He pays periodical visits to Bagdad and always shows a keen desire to co-operate closely with this embassy. (Written in 1941.)

\*M. Graeffe visited Bagdad this spring. I find him as hearty and keen as ever. (Written in 1942.)

M. Graeffe performed his annual pilgrimage to Iraq in April. His capacity for telling tall stories seems to be unimpaired. He has the customary Gallic appreciation of the many politico-military errors invariably committed by the Anglo-Saxons in moments of crisis.

*Denmark:* Dr. M. A. E. C. Fensmark, Chargé d'Affaires (17th June, 1939.)

\*Resides at Tehran. He struck me as a good and typically friendly Danish type. He is married. (Written in 1939.)

\*In February the Iraqi Government received a communication from the Danish Government stating that Dr. Fensmark was no longer held to be their representative and that a new minister would be appointed. The Iraqi Government were at first inclined to withdraw their recognition of Dr. Fensmark, but, as the result of my representations, finally agreed to maintain their former attitude towards him. Dr. Fensmark visited Bagdad in April on his way to Syria and the Lebanon. He is undeniably pro-Allied in outlook, but he is rather tiresome to have to deal with. He talks good English, but he talks it too much. He is very gallant. (Written in 1942.)

Dr. Fensmark has fortunately not been to Bagdad this year.

*Netherlands:* Dr. P. L. C. Visser, Minister (7th August, 1941).

\*He is Netherlands Minister at Angora, where he resides. He stayed only a week in Bagdad for the purpose of presenting his credentials, and gave me to understand that he would not often visit this capital. He is a friendly man and created a most favourable impression both in British and Iraqi circles. (Written in 1941.)

\*Dr. Visser visited Bagdad this spring. He further increased his popularity by a lecture he gave at the British Institute on his mountaineering exploits in the Karakorums. His wife, who accompanied him on this visit, did not create such a good impression, and many people were tempted to label her as pro-German. (Written in 1942.)

He has not visited Bagdad this year. The city does not seem to appeal to either M. Visser or his lady.

*Poland:* M. Jan Karszo Siedlewski, Minister (27th March, 1939).

He is also Minister at Tehran and Kabul and resides at Tehran.

\*He has visited Bagdad occasionally during the past year. He seems to be a confused little man, friendly, but weak and gullible. He makes no attempt to look after his nationals, and the greater part of his work in this connexion, therefore, falls on this embassy. (Written in 1941.)

\*M. Henryk Malhomme arrived early this year to be counsellor to the legation, with residence in Bagdad. He has served in the Polish Foreign Office and in Japan. A friendly individual who talks French and some English. He is active on behalf of his compatriots who are at present passing through this country on their way from Russia. He likes to "drop in for a chat" with

members of my staff, but rarely appears to have anything interesting to say. (Written in 1942.)

M. Malhomme has had a busy year. Largely due to his initiative, the Polish forces in this country staged a number of concerts and variety shows in Bagdad during the winter months and M. Malhomme did all he could to popularise his not too popular countrymen. The entertainment provided was welcome to British and Iraqis alike until the novelty wore off. The late General Sikorski's visit also threw the spot-light on M. Malhomme for a brief space. I think he enjoys being in the public eye. He is energetic but so full of complaints as to be tiresome. Rather unduly fond of the bottle and rabidly anti-Russian.

*Sweden:* M. Sven Harald Pousette, Chargé d'Affaires (3rd December, 1941).

\*M. Hugo von Heidenstam was recalled in December last and left the legation at Tehran in the charge of M. Pousette, who was formerly counsellor of the Swedish Legation in London. He has not been here. (Written in 1942.)

M. Pousette has still not visited Bagdad.

*Holy See:* Mgr. Georges de Jonghe d'Ardoye, Apostolic Delegate.

He is Belgian. Although not officially recognised by the Iraqi Government as a member of the Diplomatic Corps, he is invited to, and attends, all diplomatic functions. He has served for years in the Far East and travelled extensively in China and Burma.

A charming and friendly prelate with a dignified presence and a twinkle in his eye, he is somewhat sensitive about the fact that he does not enjoy diplomatic status. Moreover, the present restrictions placed on his use of cyphers and bags irk him so that he frequently appeals to this embassy for reconsideration of his case. He maintains that his essential work is much hampered by his inability to communicate quickly and secretly with the Vatican. I believe him to be genuinely pro-Allied in sentiment, though he has on occasion listened without a murmur to bitter and hostile criticism of Great Britain. Admittedly, this was in 1941 and 1942 when we were meeting with many defeats.

[E 5797/489/93]

No. 7.

*Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received 29th September.)*

(No. 337.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, 12th September, 1943.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, though they have not been able to devise any miraculous remedies for many of the more serious economic ills that beset the country, the Iraqi Government have, during the period that has elapsed since I wrote my last general despatch on the 26th July, succeeded in considerably improving the collection and distribution of available supplies of locally manufactured goods and home-grown natural produce. Owing to transport and other difficulties, grain collection tends to be slow in the north. On the whole, however, the grain needed for the big towns is being steadily collected, and the bread sold at fixed prices by the bakers who receive their flour from the authorities is, in most places, plentiful and of good quality, though it is usually sold at a price which still makes it expensive for the poorer classes. Basra has unhappily been an exception to the general rule. There muddle, lack of good flour mills and some shortage of grain coupled no doubt with corruption and the dislike of local merchants for the Government policy of control has more than once made the bread supply the subject of complaint, in which the British Community Council joined. I urged the need for urgent relief measures on the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, and it may be that these representations, which were received in good part, influenced to some degree the improvement that soon occurred.

2. The General Committee for the Distribution of Commodities in Kind has been able to show a creditable record of achievement. Up to the end of June the committee had distributed over 223 tons of locally manufactured and imported soap at a low price to Government officials and to many non-Government institutions and factories. The director-general of local produce was, moreover, able to show a profit of over I.D. 7,000 on the working of the Babylon Soap Factory during seven months under Government control. In addition over 122,000 metres of utility summer suiting and some 26,000 metres of winter suiting, both made in Iraq, have been distributed at low prices to junior officials throughout the country. Rice and edible oil have also been distributed.

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3. Barley has been coming in from the farms to the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation as fast as the latter can handle it, and deliveries are likely to be maintained at this rate until the whole purchase of 200,000 tons has been disposed of. As a result of pressure from cultivators anxious to sell more than the one-third of the barley crop taken over by the Government, the latter announced on the 19th August that the remainder of the crop would be freed subject to licensed trading. No wholesale licences have, however, yet been issued and purchases have been restricted to those made by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation's agents, except for retail sales in small quantities. The problem has now arisen of persuading the Government not to issue any wholesale barley licences except to the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation's agents in order that purchases by the corporation considerably in excess of 200,000 tons may be facilitated, the additional quantity being required to meet the inevitable emergency demand, this time from India, that experience has always shown is to be anticipated. In the circumstances it is perhaps unfortunate that the suggestion that we should contract for an extra 100,000 tons put forward in my telegram No. 655 of the 14th July was not accepted.

4. Efforts made by local authorities to control the prices of fruit and vegetables have not been altogether successful. In most of the provinces adequate supplies seem to be available at the fixed prices, though these are naturally much above the pre-war level, but in Bagdad the position is less favourable. The Lord Mayor has made a gallant and well-planned attempt to keep prices down, but the retail traders have been persistently obstructive and the public too ready to trade in a new black market. Tomatoes, the most popular and essential vegetable in local cooking, were priced at 40 fils a kilogramme at the beginning of August and at once disappeared from the market, and at the end of the month, with the fixed price up to 64 fils a kilogramme, good quality tomatoes were hard to find in the open bazaar. The pre-war price was about 6 fils a kilogramme for the best quality. The price of meat has continued steadily to rise, and in Bagdad now, at 260 fils (something over 5s.) a kilogramme, it is far beyond the reach of the poor.

5. Imported manufactured articles are becoming more and more expensive, and the elaborate plans developed under the Law for the Regulation of the Economic Life of the Country, enacted in April last, have not yet enabled any effective control of prices to be established. The poor townspeople therefore are likely to suffer grievously this winter for want of warm clothing although supplies are fairly plentiful. The farming population, on the other hand, are, on the whole, very well off. They are obtaining record prices for their produce, have plenty of food for themselves and with their tribal and village handicrafts are much better able to dispense with imported clothing than the townspeople. Nevertheless, in many of the hill valleys in the northern and north-eastern frontier districts, where little grain is grown and there has been a succession of bad harvests, many of the villages are in a sorry plight, and I have of late repeatedly urged both the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs to make it their business to see that the mutessarifs concerned supply these villages in time with food for the winter and seed to sow for next year's harvest.

6. Iraq's difficulties in regard to the import of cotton piece-goods from India remain unsolved. Proposals and counter-proposals have now been exchanged over a long period, and on the Iraqi side some renewed irritation is now becoming evident. This is not the place in which to discuss details, but a general view of the current economic situation would be incomplete without allusion to the disappointment and serious practical difficulties to which failure to find a solution to this problem is now giving rise. As I have urged *ad nauseam*, loss of Iraqi goodwill over this question may well react against our efforts to relieve India's grain crisis.

7. The surrender of Italy was welcomed in all parts of the country, and the other good news received from all the battle fronts has maintained at a high level public confidence in an Allied victory. Internal security remains satisfactory and enemy propaganda insignificant. The released internees have so far given no trouble and the obnoxious Zakji Kadhomi has been sent back to the concentration camp at Amara.

8. The secondary elections have now been completed in most constituencies and the election of Deputies will probably take place about the end of the month. The Prime Minister's idea seems to be to adopt again as Government candidates most of the Deputies in the last Parliament, but to exclude those who were closely associated with Rashid Ali in 1941. I have lately impressed on him (and also upon the Regent) the need for new blood in the Chamber, but his Excellency is obstinately loyal to his old friends and distrustful of change.

9. Thanks to the regular messages put out by the Arab News Agency, the Iraqi newspapers were able to give daily accounts of the Prime Minister's movements when he was visiting in late July and early August Damascus, Beirut, Jerusalem, Amman and Cairo for talks on Arab unity with Arab political leaders. The most important of his conversations were with Nahas Pasha. It is not quite clear what conclusions the two Prime Ministers reached, but it seems that it was left to Nahas Pasha to continue to exchange views with the interested parties and then, later on, to call a conference which would endeavour to work out a practical plan of federation based on the highest common factor of agreement existing between them.

10. The Office for Cultural Co-operation between Egypt and Iraq, established by decree of the Egyptian Ministry of Education in July 1942, held a meeting in Alexandria in early August, which was attended by two officials of the Iraqi Ministry of Education. According to statements which have been made to the press, the meeting resulted in the drafting of a treaty of cultural co-operation to be concluded between Egypt and Iraq, the acceptance by the Egyptian authorities of the Iraqi Secondary School Certificate as qualifying Iraqi students for admission into Egyptian universities without further entrance examination, and the conclusion of arrangements for the loan to Iraq of a number of Egyptian professors and teachers. The Arab news agency announced on the 8th September that in future French would be taught in Iraqi schools, in order to bring their programme into line with that of the Egyptian schools.

11. The Bagdad newspapers continue to publish articles on Arab unity, and one editor has persuaded a number of people, whose interest in the subject is well known, to contribute a symposium of their views. These articles have been moderate in tone and have contained nothing new. A press and radio campaign against Zionism was started a few days ago, evidently under official guidance. I have drawn Nuri Pasha's attention to the undesirability of unduly exciting the public mind at the present juncture, and was informed that this propaganda had been resorted to on the advice of the Iraqi Minister in Washington, who had lately reported a strong anti-Arab campaign in the United States.

12. The Turkish Government appear to be taking interest in the plans which Arab nationalist leaders are now trying to formulate. Soon after Nuri Pasha's return to Bagdad from Cairo, the Turkish Minister called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and asked whether any information could be given to his Government about the aim and scope of the Prime Minister's conversations with Nahas Pasha. He was, I understand, given an outline of the Prime Minister's general ideas on the manner in which the Arab countries could be brought closer together, and a few days later the Prime Minister let me know that he was hoping to arrange for the Minister for Foreign Affairs to go to Turkey to inform his Turkish colleague of the action which had already been taken to further Arab unity, and to explain that the ultimate hope was that any federation of the Arab States brought into being should form part of a larger group of Middle Eastern States formed on the lines suggested by Mr. Churchill in his broadcast speech on the 21st March. This idea bears a close family resemblance to an inspiration that came to the Prime Minister a year or two ago for creating a Middle East *bloc* of countries allied with Great Britain, though its purpose is probably different. His earlier aim was to strengthen Iraq's position *vis-à-vis* the Axis by means of regional defence pacts with the other countries which were also in special treaty relationship with Great Britain; now, his immediate purpose is more likely to be to dispel the misgivings that the Turkish Government have shown in the past and probably still entertain, at the prospect of a united Arab State stretching along the whole of their southern frontier. Up to the time of writing this despatch the Minister for Foreign Affairs has not, however, fallen in with the Prime Minister's proposals, and it now seems unlikely that he will go to Turkey on this mission.

13. On his return home from Egypt on the 10th August, the Prime Minister found trouble waiting for him in the Cabinet. Nasrat-al-Farisi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was upset that such important conversations, touching Iraq's external relations, should have been carried on without his having been consulted or even kept informed. He had expressed his displeasure on this point to several friends, and the local Tapers and Tadpoles, having heard the story, seized their opportunity and for a few days Bagdad buzzed with stories of Cabinet resignations and appointments. Nuri Pasha was, however, able after a long week-end with the Regent to appease the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and to persuade him to defer all idea of resigning until after the assembly of the new Parliament in October.



14. In August the Ministry of Education published their plans for this year's award of scholarships for higher education outside Iraq. In all sixty-three scholarships are to be given for colleges in Egypt or for the American University in Beirut. A wide range of subjects is covered, from Islamic art to veterinary surgery (a knowledge of which is, incidentally, greatly needed in this country where draught animals lead the life of the damned) and mechanical and electrical engineering. The British Council's representative in Iraq hopes to be able to arrange for all Iraqi students, including Government scholars at the American University, Beirut, to be accommodated in a special hostel under the supervision of British tutors. This is an excellent plan and may do something to correct the fiery nationalist spirit, so often akin to Anglophobia, which seems to pervade the university as a whole.

15. Two incidents which occurred in Sulaimani are worth recording. The first was the absconding of Mulla Mustafa, brother of Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan. Mulla Mustafa had been banished to Sulaimani after the conclusion of the Barzan operations in 1931, and evading police control he fled back to his native mountains on the 13th July. He is now reported to have crossed the border to Turkey. Plans are being considered by the authorities to persuade him to return and to settle down peacefully. The second incident was an outbreak of anti-Government pamphleteering in Sulaimani town. The mutessarif suspected that two of the sons of Shaikh Mahmud, Baba Ali and Latif, were behind this nuisance and decided to send them and one or two others to Amara. The police succeeded in arresting Baba Ali, but Latif evaded them by a short head and fled across the border into Persia. This was unfortunate because Baba Ali (a graduate of Columbia University in New York) though disgruntled and ill-disposed towards the Arab Government, is far less likely to cause trouble than his brother Latif, who has been brought up in Sulaimani and has inherited most of the picturesque characteristics of his turbulent father. Baba Ali and his kinsman Jalal, who was arrested at the same time, have been sent to live at Ramadi, and the mutessarif is negotiating with Shaikh Mahmud terms for the return of Latif. Developments are awaited.

16. The Prime Minister is still itching to send Iraqi troops to Syria. He failed last February to persuade His Majesty's Government to accept the offer of a brigade and now, having heard privately that the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, might be willing to use a contingent of Iraqi troops somehow and somewhere, his fertile imagination is once again busy devising new schemes. I think the Prime Minister would himself like to see Iraqi troops winning glory fighting side by side with their British Allies, but he knows that active service outside Iraq in the Allied cause would be unpopular with the Iraqi army. He is obliged, therefore, to stipulate that they shall only be used in an area which is near to home, and where there is little danger of coming under fire. There are obviously serious political objections to the use of Iraqi troops in Persia or Palestine, so Syria is left as the only territory to which it is possible to offer to send them. Service in Syria could moreover be represented in Iraq as a contribution, not so much to the cause of the Allies as to the cause of Arab unity and thus be the more easily justified.

17. The Prime Minister is also eagerly toying with the idea of building a broad gauge railway from Bagdad to Homs. This would connect Iraq with the Mediterranean at Tripoli and would be easier and less costly than to build a line to Haifa. Nuri Pasha no doubt also realises that such a line would be a practical and effective means of strengthening the ties between Iraq and Syria. He has already been discussing with the Director-General of Railways a plan to make a start by building the first section as far as Ramadi.

18. The results of the Syrian elections have been well received in Iraq. The new President, Shukri Quwatli, is well known and popular, and it is felt that, in view of the assurances already given by His Majesty's Government, Syria now has a chance of quickly achieving a position of independence and security similar to that enjoyed by Iraq. The Regent telegraphed his personal congratulations to the President on his election, and many of his subjects did the same.

19. The Iraqi Government formally recognised the Syrian Government on the 3rd September. The Prime Minister tells me that it is proposed, in due course, to raise the status of the Iraqi Consulate-General at Damascus to that of a legation and to make the consul-general at Beirut chargé d'affaires pending the eventual appointment of a minister. The Arab News Agency announced that the Syrian Government will reciprocate by opening a legation in Bagdad.

20. The trouble with Saudi Arabia, to which I referred in my despatch No. 271, has died away, and the sleeping dogs of jealousy and suspicion raised by

the outbreak of disaffection in Hail have once again been allowed to lapse into slumber. The new Persian minister, Muhsin Rais, presented his credentials on the 28th July, and seems to be pleasant and well intentioned. Iraq's relations with Turkey remain normal, but the opening of diplomatic relations with Syria, to which I have already referred, may lead to interesting developments.

21. An opportunity does not often occur in these omnibus despatches of referring to the work of the Ministry of Information in this country, but I think it is well to recall that this continues to be carried on with efficiency and enterprise by the Public Relations Department of this embassy, under the guidance and advice of the head of the mission. The public relations officers have established a sound position for themselves and some of their major conceptions, such as the travelling cinemas on car and launch, and the village reading-rooms, are winning a place among the established institutions of the country. The affiliated organisation, the Brotherhood of Freedom, is also beginning to exercise a considerable influence, through its 650 committees and 7,000 members. Under the auspices of the public relation officers and the brotherhood, a number of tribal sheikhs and other people of substance have recently been entertaining parties of fifty to a hundred British soldiers at their homes and other convenient centres to meet the local people, and these parties have done much to extend and develop good fellowship between the troops and the people of the country. It is gratifying that the discipline and general behaviour of British and Indian troops in this country have been remarkably good and but relatively few "incidents" have occurred. Considering the harsh climatic conditions, the lack of amenities and amusements, and the appalling boredom of the average soldier's existence in this non-operational command, this is a real tribute to the men. Not long ago Nuri Pasha commented to me with obvious satisfaction on this happy state of affairs.

22. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Angora, Cairo, Tehran, Jedda and Beirut, the Minister of State at Cairo, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan, the Governor-General of India, the Commander-in-Chief, India, General Headquarters, Middle East, the Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Political Agent at Koweit and to His Majesty's Consular Officers at Basra and Mosul.

I have, &c.

G. H. THOMPSON.



## CHAPTER III.—PALESTINE.

[E 3648/87/31]

No. 8.

*Viscount Halifax to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 24.)*

(No. 502.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Washington presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of report by Dr. Weizmann, dated the 12th June, 1943: Interview with President Roosevelt.

*Washington, 18th June, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 8.

*Report by Dr. Weizmann of an Interview with President Roosevelt.*

THE appointment with the President was set for the 11th June, 12 noon, but Mr. Sumner Welles suggested that I should meet him in the State Department at 11.45, and he would bring me to the President.

I met Mr. Welles about 11.50 A.M. and he took me over by a short cut from the State Department to the White House, which we reached about a few minutes before 12, and while we were waiting to be received by the President I had a short talk with Mr. Welles. I pointed out to him that I was anxious to discuss with the President the situation in Palestine, along the same lines as we had pursued in our various interviews, namely, that the matter cannot be allowed to drift; that the Arabs must be told that the Jews have a right to Palestine.

To this Mr. Welles replied that it is quite right that the President should be told explicitly what our wishes are, and he made the two following remarks: (a) That Ibn Saud was writing rather unpleasant letters recently and demanding the stoppage of immigration, "which, of course, is childish." I fully agreed with him and said that of course Ibn Saud may be a great man, but that he is a desert prince and is very much removed from world affairs. (b) Mr. Welles stated that the next three or four months will be a period of crystallisation and a great many things are being discussed and will be shaped, and therefore it is very timely that the Palestine problem should be dealt with now.

At this stage we were interrupted and asked to come into the President's room. He greeted us very cordially and began by saying that he had a talk with Mr. Churchill about our affairs; that he had gotten Mr. Churchill to agree to the idea of calling together the Jews and the Arabs, and I understood him to say that he and Mr. Churchill would be present at such a meeting.

I at once remarked that it is most important that the mistakes made at the St. James's Conference in London should not be repeated; that such mistakes can be avoided if the Arabs are told beforehand that the Democracies mean to affirm the Jewish rights to Palestine; that the Arabs have got out of the two wars a great deal, owing to the blood and treasure spent by the Democracies, who, therefore, have the right to determine what sort of settlement they consider fair. The Arabs must be told that the reasons which have brought about the Balfour Declaration and the subsequent development in Palestine have not lost their meaning—on the contrary.

At this stage the President made several remarks: (a) That the Arabs have done very badly in this war. (b) That although the Arabs have vast countries at their disposal, they have done very little towards their development. (c) That possibly the Jews might help with the development, just as the United Nations would. He then said that he believes that the Arabs are purchaseable, to which I remarked that I have heard something to that effect.

The President then asked another question: He is being told that Jewish colonisation is running a deficit all the time, which deficit is being filled up by charitable contributions from abroad, chiefly from America. I replied that such a report is incorrect, that any country which receives new immigrants is bound to spend money on development, and therefore would have apparently an

unfavourable trade balance, but if one estimates the moneys spent for the development of Palestine and the assets created, and takes into account the production of Palestine, then the trade balance is far from being unfavourable.

The President then reverted to the idea of the conference, on which he and Mr. Churchill agreed, and he said: Of course you will see Mr. Churchill and you will discuss it with him—and then interjected the question: Did you see Mr. Churchill here? And I said, no, Mr. Churchill doesn't like to see me because he has very little to tell me. At which he laughed and said he knows that it is the case; that it may be different now in London.

I then emphasised the necessity of doing things now and not waiting for the end of the war; (a) Because one would not like to allow things to harden; (b) Something may happen in Palestine which may create a very difficult position; (c) and this uncertainty is always contributing towards tension. Mr. Welles at that stage said, with the approval of the President, that he fully agrees with such a view, and there is not going to be a line of demarcation between the cessation of hostilities and the beginning of peace. A great many questions are beginning to shape themselves now, like the Food Conference.

The President then asked: "Where would you be if a conference does take place?" To which I replied that, all being well, I shall see that I find myself on the spot where the conference does take place.

Mr. Welles then asked the President whether he would like to send someone to Ibn Saud to prepare the ground, to which the President said that that would be an excellent idea, but Mr. Churchill must be consulted first, and his agreement secured. Several names were mentioned in this connection, like Philby and Mr. Hoskins. Mr. Welles suggested that Mr. Hoskins may serve us well in this capacity.

Dr. Weizmann then took the opportunity of reverting again to the main problem by suggesting that the present situation is most unsatisfactory and dangerous, and these 500,000 Jews in Palestine have begun to feel themselves in a trap, and this, added to the general position of Jewry, naturally creates a very serious state of mind, and the sooner this position is settled and the Jews know that there is a future for them in Palestine, the better. The idea that the Arabs would revolt, seems to me, should not deter the great democracies from doing the right thing by the Jews. This threat of Arab revolt is always there and I do not think that it would materialise if the Arabs would really feel that the democracies really mean business.

The President then raised the question of the difficulty of finding Arab leaders, to which I said that that is a really serious difficulty. When there was a competent and authoritative leader, it was not difficult for him and myself to come to a very important agreement, and I briefly told the story of my first talk with Feisal and Lawrence—which obviously was new to the President.

That terminated the interview, which lasted about a short hour. I thanked Mr. Welles most warmly in the presence of the President for the great kindness and services which he has rendered in this difficult situation, and when Mr. Welles took leave from me outside the gates of the White House I again thanked him, to which Mr. Welles said: You should know, Dr. Weizmann, that I am deeply interested.

On our way out of the office Mr. Welles said that I may hear from him in about six weeks, and that if I want to communicate something to him I can do it through Ambassador Winant.

*12th June, 1943.*

[E 4249/87/31]

No. 9.

*Mr. Eden to Viscount Halifax (Washington).*

(No. 829.)

My Lord.

*Foreign Office, 21st July, 1943.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 658 of the 11th June recording a suggestion by the United States Government for a statement by the United Nations regarding Palestine, I transmit to your Lordship herewith the text of the reply which I handed to the United States Ambassador on the 14th July.

[27005]

E 4



2. As you will see by the revised draft text of the statement, it is now suggested that it should be made not by the United Nations but jointly by the United States and United Kingdom Governments.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Minister of State at Cairo.  
I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

Enclosure in No. 9.

*Note handed to Mr. Winant by Mr. Eden.*

IN your letter of the 10th June you were good enough to inform me that your Government, being deeply concerned over Arab-Jewish tension in Palestine, suggested that a statement, of which you enclosed a draft, should be issued by the United Nations with a view to postponing for the duration of the war a decision on the Palestine question. In subsequent conversation you mentioned that the State Department saw certain disadvantages as well as advantages in a statement on this question by all the United Nations and would have no objection to the issue of a joint statement by His Majesty's Government and the United States Government.

We warmly welcome this proposal, which we think will be most valuable in preventing any further aggravation of the position in Palestine. But we think that the disadvantages of a statement by all the United Nations outweigh the advantages, and we should prefer a joint statement by our two Governments.

The last sentence of the draft which you enclosed recalls a statement made by Lord Cranborne in the House of Lords on the 6th May, 1942, and we have therefore suggested an amendment to that sentence which brings this out more fully. We have also thought it well to add that we shall not permit or acquiesce in any changes brought about by force in the status of Palestine or the administration of the country.

I enclose a redraft of the suggested statement incorporating these amendments and I very much hope that the United States Government will agree that it can be issued in its present form.

ANTHONY EDEN.

*Foreign Office, 14th July, 1943.*

Sub-enclosure.

*Suggested Statement by the Governments of the United States and United Kingdom regarding Palestine.*

THE Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom, having in mind the terms of the United Nations Declaration of the 1st January, 1942, are agreed that, while public discussions on controversial international questions are in general desirable, in order to promote an informed public opinion and clarification of the issues involved, it is undesirable that special viewpoints should be pressed while the war is in progress to such an extent as to create undue anxiety among United Nations and other friendly Governments and peoples.

In this connexion the Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom have taken note of public discussions and activities of a political nature relating to Palestine, and consider that it would be helpful to the war effort if these were to cease. As in the case of other territorial problems, it is not, in their view, essential that a settlement of the Palestine question be achieved prior to the conclusion of the war. Nevertheless, if the interested Arabs and Jews can reach a friendly understanding through their own efforts before the end of the war, such a development would be highly desirable. In any case, His Majesty's Government have already stated that no decision affecting the basic situation in Palestine would be reached without full consultation with all concerned, including both Arabs and Jews. But they wish to make it clear that they have no intention of permitting or acquiescing in any changes brought about by force in the status of Palestine or the administration of the country. The United States Government are in full accord with this policy.

ANTHONY EDEN.

[E 5554/87/31]

No. 10.

*Mr. Wikeley to Mr. Eden.—(Received 16th September.)*

(No. 66.)

Sir,

*Jedda, 31st August, 1943.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 345 of 29th August, I have the honour to transmit the accompanying translation of Ibn Saud's reply to Colonel Hoskins in the matter of the proposed meeting between Ibn Saud and Dr. Weizmann.

I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to the Minister of State at Cairo and His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Bagdad and Beirut and to the High Commissioner for Palestine.

I have, &c.

T. WIKELEY.

Enclosure in No. 10.

*King Ibn Saud to Colonel Hoskins.*

(Translation.)

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful.

*Riyadh, 19th Shaaban, 1362/20th August, 1943.*

YOUR Excellency has informed me of the enquiry his Excellency President Roosevelt has been good enough to make as to my views and the views of the Arabs on the Palestine problem, which has assumed increasing importance in recent months. While thanking his Excellency for his close interest in the matter and for sending so accomplished an envoy as yourself to ask our opinion on the Palestine question, we would inform his Excellency that our views on this question have not changed and that we have already expressed them with all clarity in the two letters which we sent to his Excellency on the 9th November, 1938, and the 30th April, 1943. All that we desire is that the clear rights of the Arabs, which are as obvious as the sun, should not be smothered by the falsifications of history and the social and economic theorisings of the Zionist Jews, for "God has invested these with no authority."

We confirm now all that we said in our two letters previously mentioned, and we express also the hope that the deeds of those who hold the just and humane ideals, to defend which was, we know, the sole reason for America's entering this savage war, will not be linked, through ignorance of the truth, with an act of inhumanity that would obliterate the rights of the Arabs in Palestine and constitute such a tragic and fatal blow to the Arabs as history has never before seen.

While we are happy to receive these honourable promises (see Note 1) that this question will be given just and fair consideration after the defeat of the Axis, we would beg his Excellency to apply the provisions of the White Paper at least for the duration of the war, for the failure to apply those provisions and to stop immigration, which has exceeded the limits laid down for it (see Note 2), is a serious violation of the sanctity of contracts and engagements, and works in favour of the Jews all along the line and against the Arabs in a way that can neither be doubted nor misrepresented. But as regards my taking any effective part in negotiations to solve the Palestine problem otherwise than by expressing my views and giving advice—that is impossible, for I have no direct concern in the country or with the Arab public who are concerned in this question. I, therefore, can only take action after ascertaining the ideas of the interested parties in whose hands lies the power to loose and bind in this question. By such means it would be possible to direct opinion towards a solution of the problems in the light of those ideas, and if his Excellency thinks it fitting that we should approach the Arabs and ascertain their views we will do so, God willing.

As regards his Excellency's reference to my meeting Dr. Chaim Weizmann, I should like his Excellency the President to know that we sincerely welcome all who visit us, no matter what their religion, and do our duty by honouring them as befits their rank. But the Jews are on a special footing. The noble President is well aware of the enmity that exists and has existed between us and them from of old. It is an enmity well known and treated of in the books that we possess, and from first to last has always been deep-rooted in us. Hence it will appear



that we do not feel ourselves safe from Jewish treachery and can neither hold discussions with them nor trust their promises, and that for two reasons: first, because we know their intentions towards the Arabs and the Muslims; second, because we have not consulted the Arabs and ascertained their intentions, although, as we said above, if his Excellency wishes us to consult the Arabs and ascertain their views we are ready to meet his wishes. As for the person mentioned, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, he in particular is my enemy, for it was he who had the outrageous impudence to single me out among all the Arabs and Muslims to address to me the base demand that I should turn traitor to my religion and my country. By that act he has increased my hatred for him and all who follow him. This demand was made in the first year of this war, when he sent to me a certain European to request me to abandon the Palestine question and my support for the rights of the Arabs and Muslims there and to offer me in consideration of that £20 million, this sum being guaranteed by his Excellency President Roosevelt himself. Could there be impudence or baseness greater than this? Could there be a crime greater than the crime that this man has dared to commit in making this request of me and in making the noble President the guarantor of so dishonourable an act? I do not doubt that his Excellency the President would refuse to countenance this both for my sake and his own. This is one of the reasons for my attitude which I should like you to lay before his Excellency so that he may see to what lengths the Jews go in seeking to attain their wicked ends and so that he may look with that sound judgment of his into these acts, the mere mention of which is sufficient description of them.

#### Notes—

1. The envoy asked what was meant by "honourable promises" mentioned in the body of the message. In reply he was told that we had understood President Roosevelt's statement in his verbal message, that after the defeat of the Axis all problems would be settled, to be an honourable promise to settle the Palestine question. Colonel Hoskins agreed with the construction we had put on the phrase.

2. He also asked what was meant by "stopping immigration, which has exceeded the limits laid down for it," for the Government of Palestine had told him that since the issue of the White Paper immigration had not been allowed to exceed the number prescribed in it. In reply he was told that if legal and illegal immigration were reckoned together it would appear that they had exceeded the limits stated. He agreed with this explanation also.

We express our regret that the British Government has not been able to secure the necessary agreement with the Arabs and Muslims to settle the Palestine question. We are sure that the British Government will be able to secure the necessary agreement with the Arabs and Muslims to settle the Palestine question.

While we are happy to receive the British Government's promise to settle the Palestine question, we are sure that the British Government will be able to secure the necessary agreement with the Arabs and Muslims to settle the Palestine question. We are sure that the British Government will be able to secure the necessary agreement with the Arabs and Muslims to settle the Palestine question.

The British Government's promise to settle the Palestine question is a very important one. We are sure that the British Government will be able to secure the necessary agreement with the Arabs and Muslims to settle the Palestine question. We are sure that the British Government will be able to secure the necessary agreement with the Arabs and Muslims to settle the Palestine question.

As regards the British Government's promise to settle the Palestine question, we are sure that the British Government will be able to secure the necessary agreement with the Arabs and Muslims to settle the Palestine question. We are sure that the British Government will be able to secure the necessary agreement with the Arabs and Muslims to settle the Palestine question.

## CHAPTER IV.—PERSIA.

### A.—Miscellaneous.

[E 3795/33/34]

No. 11.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 30th June.)*

(No. 730.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 29th June, 1943.*

MY telegram No. 724.

Counsellor had long talk with the Shah this morning. The latter opened interview by stressing his deep appreciation of the action of His Majesty's Legation in modifying terms of his British press interviews. He said all interviews had consisted of replies to certain questions submitted to him by the journalists. (Text of questions submitted by British journalists go to you by bag.) The Shah stated that replies had been seen and approved by Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ala and Ebtehaj. He himself would have preferred general conversation with the journalists. Counsellor pointed out obvious danger of Heads of States entering into details on foreign policy. The Shah fully agreed and added that much detail had been drafted by his advisers.

Counsellor, after congratulating the Shah on the success of his visit to Isfahan, mentioned how unfortunate it was that the Queen had not yet mastered Persian and could not therefore talk at her ease to Persian people. The Shah agreed and said that he realised that he was not getting all the support he required from the Queen in his difficult task. The latter was extremely shy with everybody and even with himself as a result of her upbringing. Her shyness was often taken for pride but that was not the case. The Shah assured the Counsellor that he would do all he could to improve the situation. In his view the Queen ought to help him in visiting hospitals, &c.

The Counsellor then raised the question of Palace expenditure, which was a subject of such wide criticism. Could not the Shah exercise a stricter control and let it be known that the Palace in time of war and general suffering was an example adopting all possible economies? The Shah replied that if the present expenditure continued he would be bankrupt in two years. His personal expenditure was modest and he could hardly dismiss numbers of Palace employees who would only be left to die of starvation. He realised that it was in his interests to make economies. There would be a change for the better in large sums at present being spent at the Palace on dresses and other luxuries if the interests of those concerned could be diverted to more useful channels. He would do his best.

As regards political questions the Shah felt that Soheily was fast falling under the influence of the Russians. This was dangerous and he felt it might soon be necessary to put Ali Mansur in his place. He was most anxious about elections but he felt that it would be most dangerous for him to co-operate with such retrograde elements as [group undecypherable] who had already made approach to him on the subject. As for Nasir Khan [one group undecypherable] he ought to be liquidated as a traitor and no fate was bad enough for him. His property should be taken from him and divided up amongst the peasants (it is satisfactory to find the Shah adopting so vigorously a suggestion which originally reached him from British Military Attaché).

Before leaving the Counsellor impressed on the Shah the importance of putting complete confidence in all American advisers and giving them a free hand to do their best for the country. This was particularly the case as regards General Ridley and [group undecypherable, ? French] advisers. The Shah agreed and said that there was now no difference of opinion with Ridley as to plan for re-organisation of the army. The question of selection, particularly of Persian officers, for certain jobs had been got round by the Ministry of War submitting to Ridley a panel from which to choose his requirements.

Financial Counsellor is to see the Shah 1st July to explain the gravity of financial situation.



*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 29th June.)*

(No. 734.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 29th June, 1943.*

THERE is no doubt that the Shah hopes to play a larger part in the affairs of Persia. There is good reason to believe that he subsidises newspapers and that he is hoping to influence [group undecipherable] by various means including religious leaders. He retains control of the army and in order to retain its support refrains from using his influence to moderate its more extravagant demands and opposes punishment of officers for any offences they may commit.

2. In a recent conversation with Dr. Millspaugh the Shah indicated to him clearly by various statements including references to the wartime powers of the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain that he thought he himself ought to have power to govern by decree. Dr. Millspaugh gave discouraging reply hinting that the lesson of history was that kings who became politicians did not as a rule remain kings.

3. The Shah is now trying to influence foreign opinion and using opportunities afforded by newspaper interviews for this purpose. American newspapers will shortly publish United Press interview which is on the whole harmless but on 4th July they will print message from the Shah to the American people which in that it harps on the fact that both the Americans and Persians love independence may suggest that we who opposed it in America may not favour it in Persia. In an interview with representatives of the *Daily Chronicle* and *Daily Herald*, the Shah made several rash statements which I have induced him, through Minister of Court, to delete lest they should give rise to controversy in the United Kingdom and perhaps expose His Majesty to criticism. Of these statements one implied that sterling rials rate of exchange was unjust to Persia and another that Great Britain had failed to carry out clause 7 of Tripartite Treaty, entered a repeated claim that after the four Great Powers no country had made such sacrifices for the Allied cause as Persia. Interview also contained the suggestion which, if it had not been deleted, might have aroused Russian suspicion. This was that Persia and Great Britain should have closer relations in economic, political and even military affairs. [Group undecipherable: ? Millspaugh] informs me he was not consulted about these interviews though he thinks the Minister for Foreign Affairs may have been.

4. Possibly the success of his visit to Isfahan has confirmed the Shah in his belief that he was born to be a benevolent despot. Unfortunately there are many difficulties in the road of this aim, in particular the unpopular army and bitter memories of Reza Shah's régime. Moreover, any attempt to set up despotism, so long as the Russians are in Persia, would, I think, meet with opposition from them. This legation has always done its best to give the Shah good advice and in the last few days has saved him from possible attacks in the English press by inducing him to amend newspaper interviews, and has sent message, which it is hoped will reach him, that if he wishes to be thought a reformer and a "man of the left," as he says he does, it would be well to make the Court set an example of austerity. Not only are the Royal family and entourage wildly spendthrift but the Shah himself seems to take no steps to control Palace expenditure.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden (Received 5th July.)*

(No. 271.)

Sir,

*Tehran, 29th June, 1943.*

THE Soheily Government has managed to survive practically intact since my despatch No. 139 of the 6th April last, although it cannot be said that its career has revealed any particular merit. Bayat (Seham us Sultan) succeeded Saleh at the Ministry of Finance, and I'tibar took over the Ministry of Agriculture. Both of these Ministers were also Deputies, a fact which was used in an interpellation by the Deputy Tabatabai during May to attempt to overthrow the Government. The interpellation also alluded to the Government's action in handing over certain powers to the Military Governor in connexion with the suppression of the press, but it failed to find much support and was rejected by a large majority. Whether this showed that the Majlis

was wholeheartedly behind Soheily is more than doubtful. It more probably showed that the Majlis disapproved of Tabatabai, and that the members were unable to make up their minds who would be a satisfactory successor, if Soheily went. A great deal of dissension has been reported among the various members of the Cabinet, most of whom, including Hikmat, Tadayyun and Marshal Amir Ahmedi, seem to have aspired to the post of Prime Minister themselves. Other candidates for that high office were Ali Mansur, now Governor-General of Khorasan, Majid Ahy, now in Russia as Persian Ambassador, and the absent Seyyid Zia ed Din Tabatabai. Hikmat finally resigned in the middle of June, owing, he said, to his feeling that the Prime Minister was not giving him proper support in his administration of the Ministry of Justice. No Minister of the Interior was appointed and Soheily has remained in charge of that Ministry.

2. Signs of a change in tribal policy were to be seen. On the one hand, Marshal Shahbakhti, as the result of constant pressure from this Legation, was definitely ordered to call the bluff of Nasir Qashgai and attack the dissident tribesmen with the forces at his disposal. After a great deal of delay he did so, and on the whole the results seem to be satisfactory, as the Qashgai tribal leaders seem to be breaking away from Nasir and his brother Khosrow, both of whom have fled. I have reported on this more fully in the Section "Tribal Situation" in this despatch. There has, of course, been a good deal of criticism of the action of the Persian Government, both from Deputies like Naubakht and from the Turkish Ambassador, who speak of "fratricidal strife." It is, therefore, to the Government's credit that it has so far endeavoured to restore order and governmental authority in large areas of South Persia. On the other hand, tribal leaders have, in two cases, been summoned to the aid of the Government. Ibrahim Qawam (Qawam ul Mulk) has been sent to Fars to help Shahbakhti, though without formal appointment to any post, whilst the wealthiest and perhaps the cleverest of the senior Bakhtiari Khans, Morteza Quli Samsam-Bakhtiari, has been sent to govern Bakhtiari. The latter left for his post on the 21st June and it is hoped that he will be able to reassert authority on behalf of the Government throughout his tribal territory, and in particular to bring the scatter-brained malcontent, Abul-Qasim, to heel. It must not be imagined, however, that these two appointments mean a return to the old system of tribal rule through semi-autonomous "Il-Khanis."

3. In his three first reports for the Persian months covering the period dealt with in this despatch, the Director-General of Finance (Dr. Millspaugh) has made an assessment of the present economic and financial situation in Persia, and has pointed out that the most urgent tasks before the Government are that they should deal with the inflationary rise in price, and should balance the budget. I have already reported at length on these aspects of the situation, and I propose to do no more in this despatch than indicate in broad general terms the financial and economic background against which the Government carries on the country's business, and the measures that are in being or in contemplation for dealing with the emergency.

4. The price increase has continued, although there are now signs that the measures of control that Dr. Millspaugh has forecast have stayed the upward course. Wages are slowly attempting to keep pace, although up to now the Government, on account of its own financial stringency, has been unable to increase the salaries of its employees, who, in Dr. Millspaugh's own words, are "stealing right and left." Unfortunately, the stealing is not limited to the sums needed by the employees to keep themselves and their families alive. The exchequer is faced with immediate bankruptcy, and it is doubtful if, at the end of the current Persian month, there will be enough cash in the Government coffers to enable the Government to meet its essential obligations.

5. A Price-Fixing Scheme has been inaugurated under the powers conferred on Dr. Millspaugh by the Special Powers Law, which Soheily, with perhaps more courage than was expected, pushed through the Majlis against powerful, if not very vocal, opposition. So far only the beginnings of the scheme are in being, and the measures already taken are in the nature of preparation of the ground. A Price-Stabilisation Section (P.S.S.) has been established under the direct control of an American director-general, responsible to the Director-General of Finance. The authority of the Majlis is being sought for the engagement of nine additional American assistants for this service. Certain goods (mainly essential commodities) have been declared Government monopolies, and their import and export prohibited except by the P.S.S. or by merchants acting under Government licence, and regulations have been made with the object of bringing under Government control the stocks of these commodities that are



already in the country and held up by speculators and hoarders. An attempt has been made to stabilise rents by a Regulation which fixes rents at the figure prevailing in February 1943.

6. Two other important projects are before the Majlis—a Bill to revise the present inadequate law relating to Income Tax, and a Bill to authorise an issue of Treasury Bonds. They are making a leisurely progress through Parliamentary Commissions, and Dr. Millspaugh has now informed the Prime Minister that both must be passed without further delay. The Income Tax Bill has aroused much criticism from the vested interests who would be hard hit by it, and the Prime Minister has already bowed before the storm and hinted that there will be "adjustments" before the measure reaches the Statute book.

7. Other projects have been launched by the Government in an attempt to reduce the amount of currency in circulation, including the sale of Government stocks of silver and diamonds. Not much success has so far attended them. Sales of gold on behalf of His Majesty's Government began on the 26th June, and some incidental relief to the currency situation may be afforded by this means.

8. It is now evident that Persia is faced with a deficit of at least 1,500 million rials on the budget for the current financial year. There is no hope that this can be met from internal resources, and Dr. Millspaugh has already recommended to the Government that an application should be made to Britain and the United States for financial help in the form of a loan.

9. The Majlis has been in session throughout the period under review, and, as mentioned above, has passed some legislation. It also passed the first reading of a Bill for the insurance of workmen in the middle of April. The various so-called "parties" still exist, at any rate on paper. The "Tudeh" party is still the only one which seems to have achieved a definite policy and to have conducted a definite campaign in the provinces. Talk of certain other combinations of parties is sometimes heard, e.g., the "Hamrahan" party of Mustafa Fateh was said to be reaching an understanding not only with the Liberal "Millat" group of Muhammad Sadegh Tabatabai, but also with the "Tudeh," but it seems that the Tudeh party was not enthusiastic for the proposal. A good deal has been heard of Seyyid Zia ed Din Tabatabai, but more by way of criticism than of support. Majlis Deputies such as Teheranchi and Niqabat are bitterly opposed to the return of the exiled Seyyid, and the Russians and the Shah seem equally critical. Nevertheless, the Seyyid has a certain number of supporters both in and out of the Majlis, and their latest idea is to arrange for the Seyyid to return to Persia in a private capacity in order to be able to show himself and conduct his own campaign in person.

10. The elections are beginning to loom very large on the political horizon. The Royal Rescript announcing the coming elections for the 14th Majlis was duly promulgated on the 23rd June, and two months after that the elections are due to commence. The Prime Minister has told journalists that the elections will be free, though whether in actual fact such an unprecedented event will take place is doubtful. Too many political forces seem to be interesting themselves in the coming struggle for a free election to be possible. In the first place, the present Deputies themselves are all anxious to retain their lucrative employment. Secondly, the Prime Minister will no doubt have views, and he seems at present to be making various combinations with wealthy Tehranis and others to secure Deputies who will support him. Thirdly, the Minister of the Interior, if ever one is appointed, will no doubt endeavour to assert himself, as he is in charge of the actual election arrangements. The Shah, too, is expected to have something to say, on similar lines, though not so drastically, as his father used to have. The mullas seem to be coming out into the open about the elections, and the Russians, though they say they are neutral and would never dream of supporting the Tudeh party or any other, are popularly supposed to be intending to rig the elections in the northern areas which are in their occupation. This legation is, of course, subjected to constant pressure to do something about the elections in the south in order to counter-balance the efforts of the Russians. Finally, the army and the gendarmerie may have something to do with the conduct of the elections, especially in the provinces.

11. Mention should also be made of clear signs that both the Shah and the Government are proposing to do something for the religious elements in this country. The mullas at Qum appear to have extracted some promises from the Shah during his journey to Isfahan. They appear to have asked for greater freedom for preachers, for the election of five prominent mujtahids to the next Majlis (a provision which existed in the original Constitution but was ignored

by Reza Shah), and for the presence of a sort of religious adviser at the Court. Certain negotiations with mujtahids of Kerbels and Najaf seem to be in progress, and one of them, Haji Agha Hussein Qummi, made a pilgrimage from Najaf, where he had been throughout the last reign, to Meshed. Four of the oldest mujtahids of Tehran are making overtures to this legation and will no doubt endeavour to get back some of the power, not only religious but also political, of which Reza Shah deprived them so thoroughly. The main pretext for this movement for a return to religion seems to be that it is necessary to counteract the godless influence which is threatening the country from the north. It remains to be seen whether the disadvantages of a reactionary return to political jobbery by venal mullahs will not outweigh the advantages of an anti-Bolshevik drive with the slogan "Back to Islam!"

12. The Shah has continued to take an active interest in all the affairs of his realm, in fact, he is continually criticised for taking too much interest in some of them, especially in the army, which he is determined to regard as his own special preserve. He also continues to spend the large sums of money which his father has accumulated, and though a great deal goes in charity and good works, the fact that no accounts are ever published lends colour to the stories that circulate about His Majesty giving substantial subsidies to newspaper writers and to Deputies in the Majlis. Hussein Ala has continued to perform the functions of an eloquent and punctilious Minister of Court, though he finds it difficult to restrain the bad influences around the Shah, so difficult that it is doubtful whether he ever tries to do so. A Royal visit to Isfahan early in June was a great success and is to be the precursor of other visits to provincial centres. It seems to have been marred only by the failure of the Queen to arouse the enthusiasm of the women of Isfahan; she did talk to a group of Persian ladies, but only for a few minutes, and through an interpreter. The Shah has been trying during the last few days to exercise an influence over foreign politics by means of press interviews. He has sent to the American people a Fourth of July message, which in the stress it lays upon the love of independence which Persia shares with America might be interpreted by the malevolent in an anti-British sense; and in talking to the representatives of the *Daily Herald* and the *Daily Chronicle* he made statements which His Majesty's Legation fortunately succeeded in inducing him to delete or amend. One of these statements implied that the sterling-rial rate of exchange was unfair to Persia; another that Great Britain had failed to carry out clause 7 (the economic clause) of the Tripartite Treaty; while a third claimed that, next to the four Great Powers, no country had done so much as Persia for the Allied cause. It is significant that the Shah did not consult the Prime Minister about these interviews; he may have spoken to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject—knowing that M. Saed would not be a severe critic. The personal extravagance of the Court is causing friends of the Pahlevi dynasty much anxiety. It will be remembered that of the 700 million rials which the late Shah transferred to his son, the latter "lent" 400 to the State. Of the 300 million which he retained, the Shah has given away large sums for charitable and public objects; he has spent much in subsidies to newspapers and individuals to secure their support; and Palace expenditure, particularly that of the Royal sisters, must have swallowed up a very large sum. It is an indication that the end of the 300 million is in sight that he recently sounded Dr. Millspaugh as to a refund, out of the 400 million lent to the State, of a sum which he wanted to give for the provision of a water supply for Bushire—an approach which was unsuccessful. If the Shah has to apply to the State for a civil list and is asked to produce an account of his expenditure since his accession to the throne, the figures, if ever produced, will afford a sad contrast to the prevailing poverty of the country during that period and will make it difficult for the Shah to persuade the people that he really is, as he claims to be, a reformer and a "man of the Left."

#### Food Situation.

13. An improvement in the rate of delivery of imported wheat, barley and millet has made it possible to build up gradually a reserve of grain in the Government silo at Tehran, which by the 19th June amounted to 10,367 tons, or six weeks' supply. This process had already begun when, in the second week of April, the Soviet Government, without previously consulting His Majesty's Government or the United States Government, announced their intention of despatching to Tehran, beginning in May, a quantity of 25,000 tons of wheat at the rate of 7,500 tons a month. The promised wheat, according to the Soviet authorities in Tehran, bore no relation to deliveries under the Anglo-American



Food Agreement. It was also not to interfere, as the Persian Government soon discovered, with the delivery by the Persian Ministry of Supply to the Russian forces in Azerbaijan of the full amounts of grain previously agreed upon between the Soviet authorities and the Persian Ministry of Supply, viz., 5,000 tons of wheat, 15,000 tons of barley and 30,000 tons of rice. More curiously still, from our point of view, the Russian promise to the Persian Government was made independently of the fact that 20,000 tons of wheat and flour were then *en route* to the Persian Gulf on Russian account, including 10,000 tons of lease-lend wheat.

14. The Russian grain began to arrive in Tehran on the 10th May, and by the 19th June nearly 8,000 tons had been delivered. Our own deliveries of wheat are likely to be limited in consequence of this new development to the 25,000 tons originally promised to the Persian Government under the Food Agreement, of which some 21,000 tons have already been handed over. If Russian deliveries are maintained it will probably be unnecessary for us to deliver the further 5,000 tons which it was estimated would be necessary to keep the country supplied until the harvest. Arrangements are also being made to stop any further supply of adulterants from Iraq. Tehran is already consuming all-wheat bread.

15. The Persian Government took advantage in May of the improved supply position in Tehran to raise the price of Government bread throughout the country from 2 rials a kilog. to 3 rials a kilog., in order to avoid the loss hitherto incurred on subsidised bread. This decision aroused surprisingly little criticism in Tehran, but in at least one provincial town the authorities failed to enforce the new price in the face of popular opposition.

16. The bread supply in the provinces remained generally insecure. In the west, sources of supply, which had remained inaccessible during the winter months, became available again in the spring, whilst imported wheat and millet were also despatched in small quantities to eke out local supplies. In the south, Bushire is being fed entirely on imported grain and supplies have also been sent to Shiraz, Kerman and Yezd, but transport difficulties, not to mention the theft of one consignment on the road by the Persian army, have impeded the fulfilment of the original programme for the supply of imported cereals to these provincial deficit areas. Fortunately, the prospects of an excellent harvest, combined with the removal of the threat of a German invasion through the Caucasus, have brought considerable supplies of grain on to the free market in most areas, and where the Persian Government themselves have failed to supply a town with sufficient good bread, all except the very poor have generally been able to buy supplies of "free" bread, at not unreasonable prices.

17. Arrangements to collect sufficient of the new grain crop to meet the requirements of Tehran and the large towns, estimated at 300,000 tons for the whole of next year, have been put in train. Landlords have been required as in previous years to give undertakings to deliver their surplus crops to the Government at a price fixed at 3,000 rials a ton, with special prices in the frontier districts. In order to settle the amount of these undertakings at a fair level, the crops in certain important areas have been assessed by special survey officials working under the supervision of our consular liaison officers. In Khuzistan, where the harvest has already been gathered, landlords have undertaken to deliver some 8,500 tons, at a price which has been fixed at 4,000 rials a ton with a view to discouraging the smuggling of grain into Iraq.

18. The cultivators' share of the crop has been excluded from the scope of the official collection scheme, but the Persian Government is hoping to purchase a large proportion of it either directly or through commission agents, making use where possible of sugar, tea, cloth and other barter goods in part payment. In some districts, especially where the Government has previously experienced difficulty in enforcing undertakings, arrangements have also been set on foot to buy up the landlords' surplus, not by enforcing the undertakings system, but by means of ordinary civil contracts between the Government and individual landlords, or commission agents empowered to purchase from them, with the sole proviso that the contracted quantities from any given area shall be greater than the amounts which would have been due under the legal undertaking. Our consular liaison officer in Shiraz has arranged contracts of this kind for the delivery of 30,000 tons of wheat and barley, and negotiations are in hand for the whole of the surplus crop in the Sistan area in East Persia to be bought up by a reliable British-Indian commission agent who made successful purchases on Government behalf in the same area last year.

19. Although the exceptionally good spring rains have been offset in many areas by indifferent sowings, it seems likely that sufficient grain will be harvested

this summer to remove the two principal incentives to hoarding: fear of scarcity and hope of speculative profit. At the same time the heavy crops in Iraq may be expected to diminish the loss of grain by smuggling. It seems, in fact, reasonable to hope that the Ministry of Supply, aided in the provinces by our consular liaison officers, on whom it has become increasingly dependent, as well as by the officers now being lent from the Syrian grain purchasing organisation, of whom two have already arrived, will succeed in collecting sufficient grain to feed the towns of Persia next year without recourse to Allied help. Some fears have been expressed that grain collection will be adversely affected by the introduction of the new income tax law, on the assumption that landlords will refuse to declare their real surpluses in order to avoid these being used as the basis of tax assessment.

#### Transport.

20. It becomes more and more apparent that this is the bottle-neck in most forms of economic activity. During the period under review the contact between the Allied supply authorities and the Persian administration has increased by the setting up of new committees whose scope it is to see how best the needs of local agriculture, industry and trade can be met. In each case transport has been found to be the primary need. Contact between these committees (on which the Millsaugh Mission is represented) and the Road Transport Board has enabled many transport problems to be solved. The latter has worked continuously, in contact with the Persian Government Road Transport Department whose activities it directs. As the control of motor transport tightened, the expected opposition from merchants and the transport trade arose; it was most virulent, and so general that even the Government and the Prime Minister showed signs of joining it. The Anglo-American authorities, however, presented a firm front against this attempt to break up the control, by threatening to cut off supplies of new vehicles and tyres if the control was sabotaged. The attacks were then concentrated against the British director of the Road Transport Department, whose personal reputation was involved; and a situation has arisen which makes it necessary to replace him as soon as a suitable successor can be found. In spite of these vicissitudes it has been possible to introduce a semblance of organisation into road transport and to divert transport from unessential work to the task of collecting cereals, of fighting locusts, and of carrying essential foodstuffs, fuel for industrial and civilian consumption, &c.

21. The Road Transport Department now has about 500 lease-lend motor trucks and 1,000 contracted motor trucks. In one month it carried 25,000 tons of goods to 423 destinations, half being for the Government and half for merchants, and half of the goods carried being foodstuffs. Still more vehicles are necessary to fulfil plans for the collection of the cereal harvest, to supply the needs of industry (especially the sugar industry, which has a heavy programme of sugar-beet transport) and to distribute elementary commodities such as tea, sugar and cotton piece-goods throughout the country.

22. Deliveries by the railway of civil goods, in particular oil, have greatly improved. The following space on the railway has been allotted:—

	Tons per day.
Cereals ... ..	130
Sugar and tea ... ..	130
Other goods ... ..	34
Oil ... ..	620

This total daily tonnage carried, which excludes supplies to Russia and other non-civil traffic, probably exceeds the whole tonnage carried by the line before it was taken over by the British Army. Nevertheless the Persian Government still complains that not enough is being carried. A request has now been made to carry a large quantity of dates from the south, but this request is believed to have been inspired by influential speculators rather than by responsible supply officials.

#### Civil Supplies.

23. Shortage of shipping caused by military needs necessitated a drastic reduction of import quotas earlier in the year. Even so, the real limit to the amount of goods coming into the country remained the capacity of the ports and of inland transport to receive and distribute them. Much hardship was caused by the scarcity of imported commodities, and this helped to increase the cost of



living. Repeated representations were made on this subject by the Persian Government and, at a recent conference to fix Middle East import quotas, the British and American representatives from Tehran put up a strong case to the Middle East Supply Centre, Cairo. As a result, Persian quotas of motor transport and other essential supplies were increased. It is now planned furthermore to move about 8,000 tons of civil goods each month (including cereals) up the railway. These movements will take place after consultation with the Price Stabilisation Section of the Ministry of Finance and it should be possible to ensure that those goods are carried which will (a) supply essential needs and (b) help to stabilise prices.

24. A useful system of committees now operates. Under the Anglo-American Combined Supplies Committee and its Executive Committee there exist sub-committees dealing with agriculture, industry, chemicals and mining, and medical supplies. All these work closely with the Road Transport Board. Through them increasing contact has been made with the Persian Administration and private industry; and they serve as a link with the Middle East Supply Centre, Olla and the other Allied organisations concerned with civil supplies. The Middle East Supply Centre, Tehran, continue to play an important part in arranging and controlling imports to Persia from countries under British or American control, and in encouraging local development of agriculture, mining and industry. The Russians have been offering more goods than before in an effort to obtain rials and intend evidently to develop this trade regardless of Middle East Supply Centre—and of Persian Government control.

#### *Tribal Situation—Fars.*

25. The gradual elimination by Nasir Qashgai of the authority of the Persian Government from large parts of Fars is well known. All semblance of this authority had disappeared from a large area, centred on Firuzabad, of which he was in undisputed control. It was clear that he was consolidating his position and acquiring more adherents among landowners and peasants, who, since the Government were unable to protect them, had, under the threat of pillage, no alternative to conciliating Nasir. Numerous approaches by the Government not only failed to persuade Nasir, stiffened certainly by the Germans who were known to be with him and by pro-German elements in Tehran, to accept terms consistent with the recognition of the Central Government, but rather increased his prestige. His successful, if polite, defiance encouraged other dissident tribal chiefs to show a bold front, and this resulted in a rapid weakening of Government authority over a widening area extending to the oilfields, and to an increase in lawlessness and insecurity which could hardly fail in time to affect our interests. In Bakhtiari a young Khan, Abul Qasim, had set himself up in defiance of Government with pretensions to be ruler of Bakhtiari, and had collected a band of armed followers which allowed him to exact money and grain from Bakhtiari villages. In April, at his instigation attacks were made on Persian garrisons in the Janiki country sufficiently close to the oilfields at Masjidi Suleiman and Haft Kel to cause a temporary anxiety for their safety.

26. At the end of last year General Headquarters, Paiforce, were concerned about the safety of the Bushire-Shiraz road, which it was, at that time, intended to use to a greater extent for the transport of supplies to Russia. Although there had been no serious interference with our military traffic, a series of minor robberies and hold-ups had hampered the work being done by our engineers on the improvement and maintenance of the road, and had created some anxiety among labourers and transport drivers. It was evident that there would be no real security on the road until the Persian Government had established some respect for their authority in Fars, and that this could not be achieved as long as Nasir Qashgai continued in defiance. The Persian forces in Fars were demoralised after a long period of inaction and were immobile through lack of transport. It was agreed with General Headquarters, Paiforce, that the Persian Government should be urged to take more decisive measures to ensure the security of the road and to re-establish their authority over the Qashgai tribes. General Headquarters, Paiforce, undertook to supply the minimum amount of mechanical transport considered essential for the operations, to provide basic rations, blankets and greatcoats for the gendarmerie protecting the road, in the hope that this would lead to a more efficient performance of their duties, and to send to Shiraz a small staff of British officers for liaison with the Persian troops, and the supervision of the use and maintenance of this transport and the issue of the rations. The Persian Government decided to appoint General Shabbakhti, an officer of the old school with a reputation to maintain for courage, energy and astuteness in dealing

with the tribes, with full civil and military powers in Fars. The mere announcement of his appointment had on the tribal situation an immediate effect which, however, wore off as weeks passed in inaction.

27. There may at first have been some justification for this inaction in the delay in the arrival of the transport promised by Paiforce, without which, it is probably true, General Shabbakhti was unable to act; but the delay was unfortunate in that the pro-German party, whose tool Nasir was, headed by the Deputy Nowbakht, had time to work up a considerable agitation in Parliament and press in favour of Nasir and against "fratricidal warfare." That we had pressed the Persian Government to undertake these operations, that we were providing assistance and that British officers were in Fars to see that they were carried out was well known, and the agitation inevitably assumed a strongly anti-British bias. Only traitors, it was said, would lend themselves to British designs against the patriotic Nasir, whose father had so successfully foiled all British attempts to take possession of Fars. This agitation had a harmful effect on the never very firm decision of the Persian Government, which quickly communicated itself to General Shabbakhti and the forces in Fars; and it was not until the end of May—General Shabbakhti having arrived in Shiraz in February—that he allowed himself to be persuaded that the Government really meant him to act. After an initial set-back the first stage of the operations, of which the object was the occupation of Firuzabad and other important places in the area dominated by Nasir, was successfully completed by the 12th June.

28. As was expected, as soon as it was realised that the Government really meant business, organised opposition rapidly disintegrated, and Nasir, with an unknown but probably not large number of followers and, according to local reports, two Germans, is now in hiding in the hills. The Persian Air Force is using the landing ground at Farrashband prepared by Nasir and the Germans for the arrival of German aircraft. Unless the Persian authorities mishandle things badly the power and prestige of Nasir should now be definitely broken; sporadic raiding may be expected to occur for some time yet, but if the Persian Government show even a moderate degree of firmness and statesmanship they have an opportunity of making a settlement with the Qashgai tribes that would induce them to be well-behaved for some time. The matter will soon be of less importance to our military interests as it is not intended to use the Bushire-Isfahan road for the transport of supplies to Russia after July, but from the economic point of view the restoration of order in tribal areas is of great importance.

29. By their successful challenge of Nasir's bluff the Persian Government has restored something of its lost prestige among the tribes of the South and the effect is already apparent. If the present Prime Minister, who also holds the portfolio of the Interior, could spare time from his manoeuvrings to keep himself in power, to consider how best advantage can be taken of the present favourable position *vis-à-vis* the tribes, he has the opportunity of establishing better relations with them which might go far towards eliminating the causes of tribal unrest.

#### *Persian Army*

30. No real progress has been made with the reform of the Persian army which remains on the whole demoralised, underpaid, underfed, and discontented. Its senior officers embezzle in increasing degree the funds allotted to them for the upkeep and feeding of their troops and animals; its junior officers steal what they can to keep themselves and their families alive.

31. General Ridley's scheme, whereby payment and supply will be withdrawn from the control of commanders and centralised in depots at each provincial headquarters, to be supervised by American officers and controlled directly by the War Office, meets with much opposition. A beginning has been made in Tehran, but even after the implementation of the scheme had been initiated with the Shah's approval, General Ridley met with so little co-operation from the General Staff that he felt obliged to threaten to inform his Government that it was useless for him and his mission to remain here.

32. The Shah continues to insist on his right to exercise executive control of the army, even in matters of detail, and on the direct responsibility of the General Staff to him as Commander-in-chief rather than to the Government. There is continual discord and very little co-operation between the Chief of the General Staff, who is determined to limit the influence and control of the American advisers to the minimum that will avert their resignation, and the Minister for War, who, perhaps not entirely for altruistic reasons, would welcome a degree of control by the American advisers that would restrict the embezzlement of army



funds and limit the power of the General Staff. The Shah gives no greater support to the American advisers than does his Chief of the General Staff. On the one hand he is unwilling to admit that he and his officers have any need of foreign advice; on the other, while aware of the need for reform, he fears to initiate or support any action that would be unpopular with those senior officers on whose attachment to himself he mistakenly relies for the maintenance of his position. The most flagrant cases of neglect of duty or worse go unpunished.

33. General Ridley works with great patience and perseverance. His staff has recently been increased by three American officers, making a total of six in addition to himself, and he has asked the United States Government for more. But his position, his responsibilities and his powers are still undefined, and the terms of his contract are still under discussion with Washington. If he can obtain a band of Persian officers of his own choosing to work with him he may yet be able to effect satisfactory reforms.

34. Without those reforms it is certain that the large credits allotted this year to the army—100 million tomans—will be largely wasted. The credit would be justified if the funds were to be devoted to the purposes for which they have been demanded—the payment of a living wage to junior officers and the adequate feeding of the men, essential preliminaries to the creation of a disciplined army of sufficient strength and efficiency to restore order throughout the country and so permit an ultimate reduction in military expenditure. But apart from the wastage due to fraud there is useless extravagance on establishments that serve no useful purpose in present conditions, as, for example, a Staff College teaching pre-war French theories. Such vain trimmings the Shah pretends are essential to maintain the morale of his officers, whereas they merely pander to their vanity and distract them from the tasks before them—the necessity for the fundamental reform of administration and the restoration of order in their own country.

35. There is perhaps a slight improvement in the sentiments of the Persian army towards the British. In Fars and in Khuzestan assistance given to the Persian troops by the British military authorities has been appreciated. The visit of six Persian officers to Cairo and the El Alamein battlefields in March-April had an excellent effect; His Majesty's Government's offer to train twelve Persian air force officers in England was very well received, and a request has been made by the Persian Minister for War that Persian officers should be allowed to attend courses of instruction in Mid East.

#### *Engineers' Strike.*

36. Towards the end of the government of Qawam es Saltaneh differences arose between the engineers of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and the Government with regard to conditions of employment. The demands of the engineers related to their salaries, and also to the control of technical affairs and departments concerned with technical matters, which they maintained should be in their hands. A Bill on the subject had been prepared but, with the fall of the Government, it had not been pursued. The engineers became more and more dissatisfied and eventually a number of them went on strike in the early part of April.

37. The Government having failed to negotiate with the engineers, the strike began to spread: agricultural engineers of the Ministry of Agriculture and a group of professors and teachers of the Ministry of Education joined in. Various promises were held out by the Government to the strikers but as, by the middle of May, no settlement of the problem appeared to be within sight, representations were made by His Majesty's Legation to the Prime Minister who succeeded in bringing about a compromise with regard to the agricultural engineers and the teachers. The other engineers, however, still remained unsatisfied and their case was referred to Dr. Millspaugh. In a public statement issued on the 31st May, Dr. Millspaugh made it clear that he could authorise no increase in the salaries of the engineers unless a similar increase were authorised in the salaries of other Government employees. He went on to attribute various motives to the strikers, one of which was that they were acting under the influence of political agitators. This statement was immediately interpreted by the Council of the Representatives of the Engineers and University Teachers as evidence of Dr. Millspaugh's intention to arrogate to himself the right to interfere in the political affairs of the country. It was also seized on as a weapon to attack Dr. Millspaugh by those who were anxious to prevent the passage of his Income Tax Bill. Eventually the strike was brought to a conclusion by the personal intervention of the Shah, who gave orders that the claims of the engineers and

teachers were to be attended to. Various appointments which have since been made in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and in the Ministry of Communications indicate that the engineers' claim to have a greater say in the control of technical departments is, in fact, being satisfied.

#### *Press.*

38. After the suppression of twelve of the more extreme papers during the latter part of April and the beginning of May, the general tone of the press became quieter and no more directly anti-British articles appeared. Other factors, notably the improvement in the food situation and the victory in North Africa, no doubt contributed to this. In commenting on the war situation the press in general has adopted a more favourable attitude towards ourselves and our Allies. Although the majority of the suppressed papers have since reappeared under their own or other names, the energies of the press as a whole have been devoted largely to attacking their own Parliament, Cabinet and Prime Minister and to discussing internal affairs such as the new Income Tax Bill and the coming elections. The Income Tax Bill has received the strong support of the left-wing papers but has been vehemently attacked by papers representing vested interests. A particularly violent attack on the Prime Minister and the Deputies, in which the latter were accused of being entirely unrepresentative of the people, led to the resuppression of two papers on the 13th June. Shortly afterwards the Deputies met in secret session and, as a result, the Prime Minister placed a Bill before the Majlis on the 17th June which, if it had been accepted, would have reduced the number of Tehran papers from approximately thirty-five to seven. In open debate the Bill met with lively opposition and it was then withdrawn.

#### *Anglo-Persian Relief Committee.*

39. The Anglo-Persian Relief Fund Committee has continued its work in providing meals, clothing and medical relief to the destitute in the larger provincial towns in the British zone. Full publicity has been given to this work in wireless broadcasts and in the press, and it has undoubtedly had a favourable influence on our popularity in some circles, especially in the southern provinces. In addition to the total of £40,000 contributed to the fund by His Majesty's Government, donations have been received from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (£5,000), and the Imperial Bank of Persia (£1,000). The Persian merchants of Ahwaz have made the record contribution of over £5,000 to the local branch of the fund.

40. While dealing with the subject of relief mention must be made of the medical relief afforded to the Persian population by the British military authorities. The provision (mentioned in my despatch No. 139) of a large typhus hospital for Persian civilian patients, complete with equipment and staff, has undoubtedly had the happiest effect on public opinion, and the travelling dispensary which is now on tour in the Kermanshah district is making an excellent impression. This legation has recommended to the Minister of State that more dispensaries should be provided for Persia if possible. It is noteworthy that the Soviet authorities have, since the typhus hospital was opened, announced a considerable expansion of their medical aid to the local population in their zone and have established a 50-bed hospital in Tehran, staffed by Russian doctors, for Persian patients.

#### *The British Council.*

41. The British Council started an "Anglo-Persian Institute" in Tehran early in the year, and its official opening was most successfully celebrated last week in a series of three receptions attended by over 1,500 people. Regular classes in English have, however, been held since February last. These classes have aroused even greater interest than was expected. Thousands of applications for enrolment were received, and although the institute was at first seriously handicapped by shortage of staff, the situation has now improved and the number of native English teachers is expected to be increased to eight in the very near future. There are now 30 classes, comprising 320 Persian students of both sexes, and about 150 more Persians are members of the library, which is already tolerably well stocked. The Persian authorities are giving the institute every encouragement and M. Hussein Ala has accepted the chairmanship of an advisory



committee which includes two members of the Government, the Under-Secretary for War and other Persian notabilities, in addition to the counsellor to His Majesty's Legation and representatives of the British community. The Minister of Education and His Majesty's Minister are *ex officio* patrons of the institute.

42. The activities of the council in Tehran are meeting a long-felt need and the enthusiasm which they have aroused is proportionately great. They constitute probably the best of all forms of propaganda, and it is earnestly hoped that every encouragement will be given to their further development both in Tehran and in the provinces.

I am sending copies of this despatch to the Government of India, to His Majesty's Minister of State at Cairo, and to Minbranch at Bagdad, to Paiforce, Bagdad, and to His Majesty's Ambassador at Kuibyshev.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 4156/38/34]

No. 14.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 16th July.)*

(No. 100. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 13th July, 1943.*

SITUATION in Persia is admittedly still far from good. On top of the financial crisis comes the military defeat in Fars, which, apart from its effect on public security and public opinion, involves an increase in army expenditure already too great for the revenue of the country. Harvest is plentiful, but there is scepticism as to the Government's ability to collect it. Millspaugh still awaits arrival of the assistants without whose aid he cannot put his price stabilisation regulations into effect. Prime Minister has little influence and seems to regard retention of office as an end in itself. Deputies are not interested in the prosperity or even the solvency of the country, but only in securing their re-election. In the election propaganda and manoeuvres it is difficult to detect any guiding principles except self-interest.

2. Amidst this chaos it is natural to ask whether the throne, which should be a permanent element, can exercise a stabilising influence. You will remember the instructions which were given to me in Foreign Office telegram No. 950 of 23rd October, 1941. By reports which have been sent to you from time to time from this legation you have been informed of what passed at interviews which the Shah has granted to me or to members of the staff. In some respects he has ignored our good advice, particularly in interfering more than is wise in political and even administrative affairs, and in not seeing members of missions other than the British. It has seemed to me recently that the Shah was courting unpopularity by his general policy and that if this unpopularity became vocal we might be identified with him and accused of wishing to restore the kind of military dictatorship which existed under Reza Shah. I, therefore, discussed with senior members of the legation what part the Shah should play and what attitude we should adopt towards him. The opinions expressed, which were recorded in writing and are being sent home as background to this telegram, differ considerably in their estimates of the Shah's character, but less on the policy to be pursued. After weighing them carefully, I give the following as my considered opinion.

3. Shah has attractive manner. He is well informed for his age on world affairs and especially on military matters. He sincerely desires the welfare of his country which, unlike his father, he does not regard as his personal possession. He is democratic in sympathy in the sense that he considers the rich too rich and the poor too poor. On the other hand, he is young in experience and rather weak, and is easily influenced by third-rate confidants. It is not yet proved that he would limit his own or his family's extravagance in the public interest. He shows lack of understanding of the feelings of his own people in his blind admiration of his father and of the Persian army. He still resents our invasion of his country and also the abdication of his father which he attributes to us and he considers us mainly responsible for the present chaos in Persia; and in so far as he favours us, there is danger that his aim is to secure help against Russia rather than to receive and to follow our well-meant

advice. He shares with most Persian officers and many officials the belief that the American advisers have little to teach Persia.

4. Any fundamental disturbance in Persia would be harmful to the Allies, and it is therefore to our interest that the Shah should retain his throne. What advice can we give him that will conduce to that end? I suggest the following:—

- (a) Temptation to hasten reform by becoming benevolent autocrat should be resisted. He should realise that once he interferes otherwise than by giving general advice and guidance to Ministers and other persons of importance he may incur the responsibility for failure, *e.g.*, since he claims and exercises the right to run the army, he might well be held responsible for the military disaster in Fars. He should encourage all honest and progressive candidates for the Majlis to persist and not try to secure election of a body of "king's men." He should support his Prime Minister and influence the army through the Prime Minister and the Minister of War, and should remember that a general who is emancipated from political control may aim at the highest powers.
- (b) He should realise that Persia has never profited by the mutual hostility of Great Britain and Russia, and should look to secure future of his country in some wide framework of international co-operation. His foreign visitors should not be exclusively or predominantly British. He might entertain foreigners, both official and unofficial, to small lunches or dinners at which he could chat to them one by one and obtain a better balanced conception of the situation than he gets at present.
- (c) He should give loyal support to the American advisers in their task of collecting a band of honest and capable Persians who will be able to carry on alone when the Americans eventually leave.
- (d) He should try to base his throne on general popularity and support and not on the army alone. He should visit the other provinces as he recently visited Fars. The Queen, who at present spends most of her time having new dresses made, should take an interest in the Persian people and in social welfare, and should learn to speak Persian. His sisters, who do little but vie with the Queen in extravagance, would be better living away from the Court. The Court should be staffed by men of good character and status.

5. The Court ought to be cleaned up by M. Ala, but he is not a strong character, and I can think of no better man to succeed him. Advice about the Royal Family would have to be given with the lightest touch and in this the best medium might be the Egyptian Ambassador who is greatly concerned at finding the Queen doing so little to conciliate her adopted country. For the rest, if you approve the line suggested, I will do my best to persuade the Shah to follow what I consider the best course in his own interest as well as in the interests of his country.

[E 4251/38/34]

No. 15.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 21st July.)*

(No. 808.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 20th July, 1943.*

IN my telegram No. 100, Saving, which was sent by bag on 14th July, I expressed misgivings about the Shah's tendency to interfere in administration especially in the army. That these misgivings were not unjustified is shown by the appearance in certain newspapers of reference to this subject, in particular the *Dad*, which links up the Shah's interference in the Semirum disaster. Articles even hinted that the Minister of War was kept in ignorance of events and only learnt about the disaster from an outside source (this is true for he was informed of it not by the Shah but by Minister of [group undecipherable]). According to the Minister of War, the Shah was extremely angry at these articles but declared that he did not intend to relax his hold on the army or to refrain

[27005]

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from interference in administrative matters and would rather abdicate than be an Ahmad Shah (Shah to whom Reza Shah was practically mayor [*sic*] of palace until Reza had him deposed). Minister of War states that he was even ordered by the Shah to declare in the Majlis and in the press that he accepted full responsibility for what had happened and had been kept fully informed all along.

2. I felt these facts warranted my asking for an audience. The Shah received me last week. I was accompanied by General Fraser, British military attaché, whose knowledge of Persia and its military and tribal affairs carries great weight. We suggested to the Shah that the recent disaster was due mainly to the following causes:—

- (a) Weakness of the Central Government and especially of the present Prime Minister.
- (b) Failure, in spite of repeated pressure from His Majesty's Legation during the last fifteen months, to deal with tribal question and in particular with tribal land claims.
- (c) Latitude given to pro-Axis elements.
- (d) Mismanagement of the army which is crippled by indiscipline, corruption and lowered morale.

3. The Shah agreed about the first two points. On the third he has, of course, less information than we have. On the fourth he was, I fear, highly disingenuous, representing himself as concerned only with appointments, promotions and rewards, and I was obliged to ask on [group undecypherable] question whether His Majesty had no claim of wider functions—a question on which I did not receive a clear answer. I represented repeatedly to His Majesty the danger of relying solely on the army, the risk that the Crown might be blamed for whatever went wrong if it interfered in administration, and the necessity for him to work with the Minister of War as representing the Government of the country. The Shah's defence was roughly that if the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff did not collaborate it was not his fault, but I suggested it was precisely his function as a constitutional monarch to smooth out such difficulties and that, in the last resort, it was the Chief of the General Staff that must give in on questions of principle. Conversation on this point ended with the piquant hope that the officer who is to become Chief of the General Staff, Razmara, and Minister of War will be able to co-operate fully under discreet personal influence of the Shah.

4. The Shah complained about the press which he asserts blamed him for everything which went wrong and he held the Prime Minister responsible for failing to protect the Crown from attack. This enabled me to emphasise the necessity for the Crown to refrain from interference in the administration and to hint at his subsidies to the press. The Shah at first was inclined to deny that he had subsidised newspapers, then admitted giving small sums to little papers and finally revealed that he had burnt his fingers badly since all papers which he had not subsidised or whose subsidies he had had to discontinue tended to attack him.

5. His Majesty denied firmly that he had interfered in any way in the matter of forthcoming elections but I find no one who believes this.

6. Conversation which I had with M. Ala later in the day suggests that the Shah had taken our warning to heart. It also showed that Ala himself was alarmed not only at the situation in the country but also at the detrimental position in which the Shah has placed himself.

7. I shall deal in separate communications with the question of what is to be done to retrieve if possible situation in Fars.

[E 4252/38/34]

No. 16.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 21st July, 1943.)

(No. 809.)

(Telegraphic.)

MY telegrams Nos. 787 and 808.

Tehran, 20th July, 1943.

In view of the serious deterioration of the general political situation and the possibility of the breakdown of the Government which has been aggravated

by the tribal victory in the south, and of the effect which this is bound to have on—

- (a) Security of Bushire-Isfahan road;
- (b) Wheat collection;
- (c) Position of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company at the fields and Abadan, and
- (d) Our various supply routes to Russia.

I have taken advantage of the Commander-in-Chief's visit to Tehran to review the whole position.

2. As a result of failure of Shabakti's campaign and of his alleged refusal to return to Fars and as employment of British troops in punitive action against tribes is out of the question except in cases of self-defence or in protection of our vital interests, it was considered the solution should be found on the following lines:—

- (a) Clearance for 550 lorries from Bushire by road under strong convoy of British troops starting as from about 23rd July. Proper warning would be given to tribes in advance to abstain from any offensive action against these convoys. Whole matter is in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief.
- (b) In view of the complete inability of the present Prime Minister to handle the situation and of his insincere and vacillating attitude on all political issues, his replacement as soon as possible by Ali Mansur who seems to be the only alternative at present. I have already discussed matters with my United States colleague who is in general agreement, provided that he has nothing to do with it, as his Government would probably prefer not to intervene in any way. The Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, whom I also consulted, was non-committal but doubted whether Ali Mansur, in view of his previous record, enjoyed much popularity in the country.
- (c) Appointment of Qavam ul Mulk as Governor-General of Fars with wide powers including raising of tribal levies both from his own tribes as well as from Mamassani and anti-Nasir sections of the Kashgai. For this he would need funds and arms. The question of funds, of course, would be for Dr. Millspaugh, and he would, I am sure, be prepared to make them available as he regards security as number one priority. Qavam should be given the right to select his own army commanders and be assured in advance by the Ministry of War of full co-operation and assistance of the Persian armed forces. Further, he would have to be given powers within the limits set by the Persian Government to settle tribal differences as far as possible by diplomatic methods. Mamassani land claims would have priority. Appointment of a few Persian-speaking British officers to give advice and moral support to friendly tribes was regarded as desirable if they can be made available.
- (d) Full use to be made of the existence of last year's plot through publicity channels and by arrest by [! group omitted] of dangerous Persians whose disappearance would have a salutary effect. It would be useless to rely on the Persian police in the case of arrests, particularly where Persians were in any prominence. In this connexion see my telegram No. 630, of 1942, and connected correspondence. Now that the German threat to Persia through Russia and Turkey has receded we gain nothing by looking on and taking no action. Last year S.I.M.E. preferred to hold their hand in the hope that they would be able to complete detailed plans for neutralising the conspiracy. As a matter of fact, it has been found impossible to make much progress in this direction and, meanwhile, we are in an anomalous and dangerous position, *e.g.*, at the head of the gendarmerie all this time has been the man who helped Mayer to escape in his official car, and the Government are proposing to appoint as General Officer Commanding Fars a general who is deeply implicated in the plot. More German agents are no doubt reaching this country and the possibility of sabotage with the support of prominent Persians increases. Direct action by ourselves would certainly irritate American public opinion, but as we are now responsible for the security of American troops transporting supplies to Russia, I feel



we are in a much stronger position than last year, particularly as prominent Persians are known to be in touch with the Kashgai, who themselves are harbouring German agents. I doubt, therefore, whether it is any good attempting to obtain American support. The United States Minister, with whom I have broached the matter, was not helpful or forthcoming. The Soviet Chargé d'Affaires would not commit himself to any action in regard to the plot, but direct action can hardly be objected to by Soviet Government in view of their own record in the past. Moreover, our action would only be in the interest of getting supplies to Russia without interruption. M. Maximov did ask for my co-operation against organs of the press supporting revolting tribes. I shall pursue this matter with him. If you agree with the idea in this paragraph in principle, I will submit detailed scheme.

I am working on the lines of conclusions (b) and (c) above and I trust you approve.

[E 4252/38/34]

No. 17.

*Mr. Eden to Viscount Halifax (Washington).*

(No. 4922.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, 26th July, 1943.*

YOU will see from Tehran telegrams Nos. 787, 808 and 809 and my telegram No. 705 to Tehran that the general situation is causing us some concern.

2. Please explain these latest developments to the State Department. In dealing with the action we propose to take, you should not mention Sir R. Bullard's suggestion in paragraph 2 (d) of his telegram No. 809 that we should arrest a number of Persians involved in last year's plot against us. In dealing with the security aspect, you should explain that our essential need is to ensure the smooth flow of Allied supplies to the Russians. Any intervention in internal affairs we may find it necessary to make is of course intended to further this aim. While therefore we do not propose to make any arrests for the present, we might subsequently be obliged by developments which cannot at present be foreseen to carry out some arrests in the interests of security. The passage of supplies is of course as important to the Americans in Persia as to ourselves, and we must take into account the possibility of sabotage organised by German agents with the active assistance of high Persian officials. The State Department will probably be aware in this connexion of the arrest of German parachutists disguised as Kurds who were recently dropped in Iraq, and of the probability that Germans are still at large among the Persian tribes.

[E 4378/38/34]

No. 18.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 27th July.)*

(No. 824.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 26th July, 1943.*

MY telegram No. 809.

Soviet Ambassador being unfortunately still in Moscow I saw the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires to-day, and asked whether he realised that while the war was going well for the Allies everywhere else, situation in Persia had greatly deteriorated. He was already aware of the capture of enemy parachutists in Iraq, and I told him that, according to latest information, four parachutists had landed in the Qashgai country with containers which perhaps held explosives intended to render the Persian railway useless for aid to Russia. A warning which I gave M. Maximov recently about the necessity for common action had perhaps had some effect on him, for he asked at once what could be done to eliminate such dangerous pro-Axis agents as Naubakht and Kashani. I said that this legation had managed to persuade the Prime Minister to order four Persians of Farrashband who had been in contact with the Germans to be sent to Sultanabad for interrogation, but that there were many more dangerous men in Shiraz who ought to be arrested or deported: if the Soviet Embassy worked with us it should not be difficult to deal with such men or even with a Deputy like N. and a clerical like K., but if the Soviet authorities held aloof as they

had done hitherto we should find it almost impossible to have important enemy partisans arrested or removed, since Persians would interpret Soviet silence as disapproval of our action. M. Maximov then disclosed that he had asked his Government for authority to request the Persian Government to arrest N. and K. and perhaps one or two dangerous generals, &c., Anghevi and Yazdan Panah. I agreed as to A. (he has just ceased to be commanding officer of the gendarmerie) since his appearance in the plot, but said that we had nothing more against P. than membership of a society which, though undoubtedly nationalist, might be innocent of intrigue with the Axis.

3. Fall of Mussolini will have made even the blindest Persian partisan of the Axis hesitate, and if we can strike at some of the leaders of the pro-Axis party it would have a very good effect. I shall be grateful for anything that can be done to secure Soviet participation and to obtain a decision as soon as possible.

[E 4156/38/34]

No. 19.

*Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).*

(No. 26. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, 1st August, 1943.*

YOUR telegram No. 100, Saving [of 13th July: Policy to be followed in dealing with the Shah].

I agree generally with your policy as set out in paragraph 4 subject to the following considerations:—

2. I do not think we should adopt too rigid an attitude regarding the Shah's influence in political affairs. The present confusion in Persian politics does not augur well for the continued independence of the country in the political conditions that seem likely to emerge from this war. On the other hand, the Shah can and does have a long-term interest in an independent Persia, which is also our interest. As he must know this quite well, he is a natural ally for us if we play our cards rightly and are able to keep him on the right lines. This means that our policy towards him should be one of friendly guidance and constructive criticism.

3. Following this line of thought, I feel that if the Shah's influence in any given question is available in a way that is conducive to good government and preferably also to popular liberties (such as they are in Persia), then we should encourage him to use it. In particular, we hope he will encourage the creation of a proper civil service, and will initiate reforms designed to clear up the present dishonesty and incompetence. At the same time I agree that we do not want him to turn into an autocrat like his father.

4. As regards the army, it seems obvious that the Shah will wish to preserve a direct interest and a measure of control over it. If any general ever gets effective control of the army, no doubt the Pahlevi dynasty will go the way of the Qajars, whatever the theoretical political control of the army may be at the time. It is generally agreed that a revolution resulting in a change of dynasty would not be in our interest. We must therefore expect the Shah to keep some direct interest in the army, though we should hope he would use his influence to eliminate corruption and improve efficiency and to support his foreign advisers as you suggest. Subject to this comment, I agree with your paragraph 4 (a).

[E 4398/28/34]

No. 20.

*Mr. Eden to Sir A. Clark Kerr (Moscow).*

(No. 1014.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, 2nd August, 1943.*

TEHRAN telegrams Nos. 824 and 831 [of 26th and 28th July: Security situation in Persia].

We are seriously disturbed at development of security situation in Persia and at evidence that it is being exploited by enemy agents and parachutists with possible danger to supply route to Russia.



2. We see from Tehran telegram No. 824 that Soviet Chargé d'Affaires has asked for authority to request Persian Government to arrest certain dangerous persons, including deputy Naubakht. We are ourselves considering taking further action as regards Persians known to have been involved in last year's plot, though as you will see from my telegram No. 705 to Tehran we are doubtful of advantage of arresting them ourselves.

3. Previous experience shows that we are much more likely to secure action by the Persian Government in such cases if we and the Soviet Government act together (as in Afghanistan recently). Please therefore suggest to Soviet Government that they should instruct their chargé d'affaires in Tehran to discuss this question with His Majesty's Minister and with British and Soviet military authorities with a view to making an agreed recommendation as to which Persians should be arrested and on what grounds. When our two Governments are agreed on this, the British and Soviet representatives should jointly ask the Persian Government to carry them out.

[E 4537/38/34]

No. 21.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 3rd August.)*(No. 105. Saving.)  
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 22nd July, 1943.

*Guidance Circular No. 17.*

1. Feebleness of Prime Minister threatens to cause complete disintegration of administration, but he will be difficult to dislodge as the Deputies acquiesce in his inertia.

2. It is agreed in principle that Qawam ul Mulk shall be appointed Governor-General of Fars with wide powers and with Major-General Jahanbani as General Officer Commanding, but Qawam will not go unless he is authorised to settle the Mamassani land claims. Meanwhile Nasir Qashgai is trying to stir up trouble among tribes in Kermanshah district.

3. Brigadier Razmara has been appointed Chief of the General Staff but this is unlikely to lead to any diminution of Shah's direct interference in army administration.

4. The Ministry of Food as such has been abolished and a Department of Food has been created in its place under the direct supervision of Dr. Millspaugh. The latter is seeking to obtain urgently from United States or Middle East an American successor to Mr. Sheridan, who has resigned as from September.

[E 4464/38/34]

No. 22.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 29th July.)*(No. 828.)  
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 28th July, 1943.

MY telegram No. 809.

I have been pressing the Prime Minister almost daily for a decision about Mamassani land. He assured me on the 26th July that the decision had at last been taken and the land the tribe claimed would be given them. To my astonishment, however, he said it had been decided to send to Shiraz to "settle all tribal questions" a committee of officials from three Ministries with Sadiq Sudeq (Personalities 179) as President. I reproached the Prime Minister roundly for this proposal which I described as frivolous and irresponsible and suggested Sadiq Sudeq had been chosen because, owing to his complete insignificance no one had anything against him. The Prime Minister complained that I had been urging him for over a year to do something for the tribes and now he had decided to do something we were not satisfied. I pointed out that the measures which might have been satisfactory a year ago would not suit the present crisis. There was civil war in the country fomented by lawlessness and since the Government was not strong enough to deal with it by military means alone they must adopt a

serious political policy. The Prime Minister said that members of the Cabinet had objected to the proposed appointment of Qawam because it meant the return of the bad old system encouraged by the tribes. I replied that, thanks to the procrastination of successive Governments the bad old days had already come back; that it was not we who proposed Qawam for Shiraz but the Government that sent him there to advise them, and that his proposals seemed to us sound and he himself the only man likely to be able to carry them out. Finally the Prime Minister said that he would appoint Qawam and the appointment was, in fact, made last night after long wrangling in the Cabinet. Qawam reports that he is still without the funds he requires and that he has been told by Millspaugh that funds will have to be obtained from the Allies since there is nothing in the Treasury. I will find out from Millspaugh how the question of finance stands. Now that Qawam seems to have been given powers to deal with land questions finance is the most urgent consideration.

2. Shahbakhti is not to return to Fars. Jahanbani (No. 100) is being sent there as General Officer Commanding at Qawam's request.

[E 4492/38/34]

No. 23.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 1st August.)*

(No. 854.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 1st August, 1943.

MY telegram No. 808.

As result of pressure from M. Ala, the Minister of Court, who threatened to resign, and of continued attacks in the press (and partly, I hope, in deference of our advice), the Shah has undertaken to behave with greater discretion towards journalists and towards questionable people of all kinds, such as [group undecipherable: ? he had been] in the habit of receiving, to exercise economy and reform the Court. He has already dispensed with the services of the Swiss Perron, whose presence aroused criticism. Whether he will succeed in bringing the Queen out and suppressing his sisters remains to be seen. He will, I hope, show greater confidence in M. Ala, who has shown more courage than was expected and is prepared to remain on if the promised improvements are effected.

2. The Shah has, at least nominally, abandoned control of the army to the Minister of War. I do not think Ala wholly approves of this, and I have tried to convince him that the Minister of War and his Under-Secretary are as good a pair of soldiers as could be found for the job; that, if dishonest, it is unlikely that a Chief of Staff working in conflict with them would succeed; and that, in any case, the Shah will no longer be held responsible. M. Ala has promised to press this point of view upon His Majesty if he sees the Shah inclining again towards interference in army affairs.

3. I trust that the Shah's good intentions will last. He seems unable to steer a straight course for long, and I fear he is untruthful, e.g., according to M. Ala, the Shah strenuously denied to him having paid any money to the press, whereas he admitted to me having got into difficulties by subsidising newspapers.

[E 4542/38/34]

No. 24.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 3rd August.)*

(No. 858.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 3rd August, 1943.

MY telegram No. 824.

My Soviet colleague has received no reply to his request for instructions from his Government about asking Persian Government to suppress some of the newspapers and to arrest certain dangerous men. You will remember that Soviet Government preserved silence when we wanted Russian help in regard to arrest of Zahidi, and I have little doubt that in present instance they are hanging back in the hope that, as usual, we shall be compelled to take action and that they can escape responsibility and even profit by propaganda of their supporters in Persia, who can compare Russian policy of non-intervention favourably with our more drastic methods. I have asked Soviet Chargé d'Affaires whether he cannot



inform his Government that the Persian Government, who always prefer inaction, will not easily be induced to demand removal of Naubakhts parliamentary immunity and the arrest of N. and other prominent people, and that, if Soviet Embassy do not adopt a common policy with us, its silence will be interpreted as hostile to our attitude. He has promised to telegraph again, but I have little hope that his representations will be effective. When M. Maiur was in London he used to ask why so many questions relating to affairs in Persia fell to be discussed in London. Now that he is in Moscow at least he would understand the British position here and realise that silence on the part of Soviet Embassy in Tehran when Persian tribes are revolting under instigation of Germans and are being joined by German parachutists is likely to be misinterpreted by Persia and to have an unfavourable effect on the Allied cause in this country.

[E 4589/38/34]

No. 25.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 5th August.)*

(No. 861.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 4th August, 1943.*

CASE of Nowbakht is being dealt with, as already explained, as a separate issue. After full consultation with the head of C.I.C.I., who has come to Tehran on special instructions from commander-in-chief, it is clear that, if Axis-controlled organisations in this country are to be really effectively dislocated for several months to come, a much larger number of arrests than I had foreseen will have to be effected. C.I.C.I. have furnished me with four lists, in order of importance, containing about 140 names in all. In addition, a separate list of about seventy Persian railway employees who are known to be implicated in railway sabotage organisations has been prepared.

2. From my recent telegram you will have realised that the position in Persia has very seriously deteriorated as compared with the end of last year, when Zahidi was arrested. Reported continued arrival of German agents by air amongst the tribes has greatly aggravated an already dangerous situation. Firm action is now, therefore, in my opinion, indispensable. If you are not yet able to agree to any arrests being effected by ourselves, then the only course is for Persian Government to take the necessary action. In that case strongest pressure will have to be brought to bear on the latter, without which nothing will be done. This pressure is most unlikely to be effective except by joint Anglo-Soviet representations with American acquiescence. The attitude of the American authorities may now be more sympathetic than before, having regard to the responsibility of their service authorities for operation of supply routes. Accordingly, if you agree, I propose to hold meeting with my two colleagues and communicate to them confidentially about forty-five names selected from the four lists as well as the seventy on separate list, together with evidence, and to ask for their support on grounds that, although we are solely responsible for security of supply routes to Russia outside Russian zone, proposed action is in the joint Allied war interest. I shall warn my Soviet colleague once more that silence on the part of the Soviet Embassy will inevitably be interpreted by Persian Government as disapproval and might hamper our efforts. If Russian support is not forthcoming within reasonable period, I can see no other course than to act alone and to communicate the list of names to the Prime Minister in writing for arrest by Persian authorities and detention at Sultanabad. On security grounds, and owing to our complete mistrust of the Persian authorities, I consider that, except in the special case of Nowbakht, actual evidence and publicity should be withheld until all the principal persons concerned are in custody in Sultanabad. If Prime Minister issues warrants for arrests, British security authorities will give him all assistance in effecting them. If, however, the Prime Minister refuses, or is unable to take the desired action, it is really impossible for us to accept responsibility for security and other consequences *vis-à-vis* our allies, and the only course would then be for us to effect arrests ourselves with the co-operation of the commander-in-chief.

3. In view of the extreme urgency of the matter, I should be grateful for your earliest instructions.

[E 4589/38/34]

No. 26.

*Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).*

(No. 744.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, 8th August, 1943.*

YOUR telegram No. 861 [of 4th August: Security situation in Persia].

As you will have seen from my telegrams Nos. 1014 to Moscow and 5124 to Washington, which have been repeated to you, I entirely agree that firm action should be concerted at once with your American and Soviet colleagues in the manner you suggest. I hope instructions to them will not be delayed in Washington or Moscow.

2. Russians will be the first to suffer by a diminution of security in Persia and should be as closely concerned as we are. I therefore consider that every effort should be made to get Soviet Embassy to join with us in having arrests of prominent suspects made by Persian Government. Co-operation or at least goodwill of American Minister is also most important, though I realise difficulties in this connexion. As regards direct arrests by ourselves, further telegram will be sent as soon as possible.

3. I agree that security considerations may require withholding of detailed evidence in our representations to the Persian Prime Minister, but you will no doubt feel it necessary to say enough, at least orally, of charges and evidence on which they are based, to show that there is a *prima facie* case for arrest and interrogation.

4. As regards seventy Persian railway employees whom you mention as known to be implicated in railway sabotage organisations, I consider that our direct responsibility for security of southern section of railway entitles us to insist at once on their immediate dismissal and, if we consider this necessary, to protect the railway on their immediate arrest also, either by Persian authorities or, if you prefer and if Commander-in-chief, P.A.I.C., agrees, by British military authorities. You should keep your Soviet and United States colleagues informed.

5. Please repeat all future telegrams on this subject to Moscow and Washington.

[E 4769/38/34]

No. 27.

*Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).*

(No. 755.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, 12th August, 1943.*

MY telegram No. 744 [of 8th August: Security situation in Persia and proposed arrest of Persian suspects].

I am anxious that recourse to direct arrests by British authorities should be avoided unless it proves indispensable to security. American objections to direct arrests are already known (see paragraph 3 of Washington telegram No. 3479 [of 30th July]). Moreover Russians, by holding aloof, would only gain further popularity at our expense.

2. Nevertheless, if action on lines of my telegram under reference does not suffice to meet threat to security, you have discretion, in consultation with Commander-in-chief, to arrange in the last resort for immediate arrest by British authorities of any persons against whom we have convincing evidence showing that their activities constitute a direct or indirect threat to the security of the railway and road supply routes. If we are obliged to take unilateral action, it is important that such action should be based on our responsibility for the security of the supply routes, which is admitted by all concerned.

3. Please keep me fully informed.

[E 4813/38/34]

No. 28.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 15th August.)*

(No. 897.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 15th August, 1943.*

YOUR telegram No. 755.

Nasir's brother Khosro is expected to reach Tehran by air to-day with Persian General Officer Commanding and Colonel Robert. Persian newspapers take it for granted that all is now well, but caution is required since on Khosro's



own showing three German parachutists, who spent some days with the Kashgai, have gone off in the direction of the railway with gold and explosives accompanied by a German armoured car who has been with Nasir for a year. The above was written before I learned of the capture in Tehran early to-day by our security officers of two Germans, one called Mayer, from whose papers and statements we may learn much about the help which they have received not only from the Kashgai but also from the Persian army. The other German, who arrived by parachute some months ago, was about to send message to Berlin by secret wireless transmitter. Papers seized, which are voluminous, include full and up-to-date diaries.

[E 4814/38/34]

No. 29.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 15th August.)*

(No. 898.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 15th August, 1943.

YOUR telegram No. 755.

General Connolly, United States General Officer Commanding, to whom I communicated material illustrating the danger to Allied communications in Persia and a list of railway employees who are believed to be actual or potential saboteurs, is heartily in favour of removal and detention of these men and has promised the co-operation of his staff within certain limits in order to make their arrest as certain as possible. Details are being worked out.

2. On the 14th August I discussed the whole question with my American and Russian colleagues, to whom all necessary material has been communicated. Attitude of United States Minister is more satisfactory than it was last year, in that he promises to say to the scores of relatives who will doubtless appeal to him if the Persian Government effect the arrests we consider necessary, that the arrests have presumably been effected on good evidence, that enquiry, in which Persians will participate, is to be instituted and that the innocent will doubtless be released. This, I think, is as much as we can hope for. I did not tell my colleagues that I had authority to have arrests effected by British authorities in certain circumstances. United States Minister would have objected, while the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires would, I fear, have concluded that Russians could once more leave to us the odium of defending Allied interests.

2. Soviet Chargé d'Affaires said that, in view of the large number of persons concerned, he could only send names to Moscow and await instructions. It was true that he had received general instructions to co-operate with us and we had made an excellent case against the suspects, but they were so numerous and some of them were of such prominence, that he feared that arrests would make a "great noise." I said that if the Soviet authorities collaborated with us and their collaboration was known to Persians there should not be much noise, but that the noise would be really great if the British had to act alone and Persians concluded that the Russians were indifferent or hostile. I told the chargé d'affaires the latest news about German parachutists and impressed on him the danger to the railway and the necessity for haste. He seemed to realise this and only to be appalled at the prospect that for once the Russians might have to come into the open. He assured me that the names would arrive in Moscow by air 16th August.

4. I told my colleagues that, in my opinion, we could not afford to wait for the Prime Minister to find the courage to ask for the exclusion of Naubakht from the Majlis, but ought to present, as soon as possible, request for the arrest of other suspects. I found that the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires had not supported my request to the Prime Minister about Naubakht, but had merely asked his Government whether he might give his support.

5. Finally, I suggested that we should increase and not relax our efforts in the hope that negotiations with the Kashgai would be successful, since the arrest of all the chief conspirators would help to persuade Nasir to be reasonable besides removing the support on which German parachutists, who might arrive at any time, would be counting.

6. Valuable as Russian co-operation would be, we cannot afford to wait for it indefinitely. Unless, therefore, it is forthcoming by the evening of 20th August I propose to present the list of names to the Prime Minister, and at the same time to act as authorised in your telegram No. 755.

[E 4907/4907/34]

No. 30.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 19th August.)*

(No. 321.)

Sir,

Tehran, 6th August, 1943.

WITH reference to Mr. Holman's despatch, No. 201 of the 25th June, 1942, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on heads of missions at Tehran.

I have, &amp;c.

R. N. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 30.

*Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Tehran.*

(Paragraphs marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous reports.)

*Afghanistan (Ambassador):* Mohammed Nowruz Khan (April 17, 1939.)

\*Related to the present ruling family of Afghanistan. Was for some years chief secretary to the present King before being appointed to his first diplomatic post, Tehran. Likes to express the opinion of friendship with Great Britain should be the main plank in Afghan policy. Does not appear to be a man of great energy or ability, but is friendly and popular. Speaks some English. Is a very inadequate doyen of the Diplomatic Corps. Born about 1900. (Written in 1940.)

Mohammed Nowrouz Khan returned to Kabul on leave at the beginning of 1943 and has not yet come back. It is reported that he has been appointed Minister of the Interior. There is no news of any successor, and in the meantime the embassy is in the charge of Seddiqui Djomma Khan, who, although rather a colourless colleague, speaks English and seems well disposed.

*Belgium (Minister):* M. Egbert Graeffe (January 17, 1937.)

\*M. Graeffe is somewhat of a specialist in commercial and financial affairs, with which, I gather, he dealt while employed in Berlin before his appointment to Tehran. He has a considerable amount of energy and determination, and is outspoken in his discussions with the Persian Government. I have never heard him admit ignorance of any subject, official or unofficial, and his claims to omniscience are apt to make people underrate his ability. Both he and his wife speak very excellent English. (Written in 1938.)

\*When the King of the Belgians surrendered to the Germans, M. Graeffe, though a keen Royalist, supported the Belgian Government in exile, and he is still doing so, in spite of the collapse of France.

\*M. Graeffe was probably born about 1885. He talks almost perfect English, as does his wife, who is half-American. (Written in 1940.)

After six years' residence in Tehran, both M. and Mme. Graeffe seem to be feeling that the strain of the climate and altitude, added to anxiety for their son and other relations in Belgium, is becoming too much to bear. M. Graeffe, who is also accredited to Baghdad, frequently visits Iraq for reasons of health as well as of business. When in Tehran he keeps in close touch with the Shah, with whom he shoots and plays tennis. His lack of work leaves him ample time to indulge in his favourite pastime of Persian political intrigues. M. and Mme. Graeffe are spending this summer on the Caspian, and M. Graeffe returns to Tehran at intervals to carry on the affairs of the legation.

*Brazil (Minister):* Senhor Joaquim Eulalio (July 24, 1943.)

Senhor Joaquim Eulalio was previously minister in Athens and Warsaw. His last post was Chairman of the Committee for the Defence of National Economy. He is accompanied by a first secretary, but it is difficult to understand how the time of the legation will be employed in the complete absence of Brazilian interests here. The legation will no doubt be used as an observation post, overlooking Soviet Russia. Senhor Eulalio speaks English and talks with enthusiasm of the years he spent in the United Kingdom. His British-born wife is expected to join him here later.

*China (Minister):* Mr. Li Tieh-tseng (June 28, 1942.)

Mr. Li is the first Chinese Minister to Persia. He was born in 1905 and started his official career as a district magistrate in Nanchang. Since 1931 he has been in the diplomatic service and has served in London for four years, during



which period he acted as secretary to the Chinese delegation to the World Economic Conference, and was also secretary to the Chinese delegation to the League Assembly in 1934 and 1935. He was a member of the Chinese delegation in the abortive negotiations for an immigration agreement in Burma in 1941. (Written in 1942.)

Mr. Li Tieh-Tseng has gathered a large staff around him, including two military attachés. He is a friendly and co-operative colleague. He studied for several years at the London School of Economics and speaks English well. He is rather ungenerous and is said to be very sensitive and to take offence easily. I understand that he is always worrying the Protocol Department about questions of procedure, &c. He has recently been joined by an attractive wife and three out of his eight children.

*Czechoslovakia* (Minister): M. Josef M. Kadlec (April 14, 1943).

M. Kadlec served as Czechoslovak Consul-General in Jerusalem for some years. He seems anxious to ingratiate himself with everyone he meets, and is the perfect stage diplomat. He is accompanied by a hennah-haired wife of Bulgarian origin and a cripple step-daughter (Italian father), who acts as his private secretary. He speaks quite good English and seems genuinely grateful to the British for the part they played when France collapsed.

*Denmark* (Chargé d'Affaires): M. A. E. C. Fensmark (April 13, 1939).

\*Formerly the Danish Minister in Stockholm, was accredited to Tehran also, but M. Fensmark is chargé d'affaires *en pied*.

Born about 1890. Formerly in Angora, and before that was attached to the Danish Court. Speaks excellent English (has an English wife). Energetic, able, helpful and straightforward. Very strongly pro-Ally and detests the Germans and their policy towards his country. It was due, at least in part, to him that about one in five of the men in the Danish community volunteered to serve in the Allied forces. For several months he ignored telegrams from his Government instructing him to work with the German Legation here, but finally obeyed instructions to inform the German Legation that he regarded his legation as neutral. (Written in 1941.) He maintained close relations with the Allied Legations and after the signature of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty, when it was certain that Persia was finally in the Allied orbit, he adhered officially to the Free Danish movement and brought his whole community with him. (Written in 1942.)

*Egypt* (Ambassador): Abdel Latif Talaat Pasha (February 17, 1943).

Abdel Latif Talaat Pasha was educated at the Jesuit Fathers' College at Cairo and the Egyptian School of Law. He has served in the Magistracy in Egypt, in the Royal Household of King Fuad and in the Egyptian Legation at The Hague and Madrid. He was Minister in Persia in 1938 and was withdrawn when Zulficar Pasha was appointed first ambassador in March 1939.

Although Abdel Latif Talaat Pasha should play an important rôle in this country owing to the fact that the Queen is a sister of the King of Egypt, he has apparently only seen her once. The Court seems anxious to keep him at arm's length. He is a sad and lonely figure, which may be due to the fact that his wife has not come with him. In any case, he seems frankly bored with Persia and hankers after his own country. He has great personal charm and culture once one gets beneath the surface of his rather shy exterior. He speaks some English.

*France* (Delegate of Free French National Committee): M. André Godard (May 18, 1942).

M. Godard, the head of the National Museum and an official of the Persian Government, was recognised in May 1942 as delegate. He is a charming and cultured old gentleman, but has not yet shown signs of real political activity or organising ability. Consequently, the Free French movement in Persia is rather inert. He is assisted in his propagandist activities by his wife. His staff includes the former French Assistant Military Attaché, Commandant Jouvel. (Written in 1942.)

*Greece* (Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim*): M. Ion Alexandre Djiras (June 9, 1943).

On the departure of M. Lambros for his new post in London, M. Djiras, who has the rank of first secretary, took over charge of Greek interests here. From what little I know of him, he is a pleasant and helpful colleague and speaks English well.

*Holy See* (Apostolic Delegate): Mgr. A. Marina (October 29, 1936).

\*The position of the apostolic delegate is rather anomalous. His diplomatic status is not fully recognised by the Persian Government, and his name is not included in the diplomatic list. He is, however, invited by the Persian authorities to gatherings attended by "chefs de missions." Mgr. Marina appears to be mainly interested in the religious and charitable side of his functions. He has a friendly and sympathetic character. (Written in 1938.)

Mgr. Marina was bitterly disappointed when Italy entered the war. Very friendly to us and openly shows his disapproval of the Nazi attitude towards religion. (Written in 1940.)

Since the removal of bag and cypher facilities from the Apostolic Delegate last year, official relations have been somewhat less friendly.

*Iraq* (Minister): M. Abbas Mahdi (April 7, 1943).

M. Abbas Mahdi, who is a Shia, previously held the post of Rais of the Royal Diwan in Baghdad. He is always ready to co-operate with this legation. He is a pleasant individual, but somewhat dull and unintelligent. He married late in life and has brought with him his wife and baby. Mme. Abbas Mahdi at present speaks no English or French, but is learning. M. Abbas Mahdi speaks both fluently.

*Netherlands* (Chargé d'Affaires): Jonkheer de Brauw (March 11, 1942).

Baron François van Aerssen Beyeren left Tehran on the 11th March, 1942, on his appointment as Netherlands Minister to the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia. The legation is at present in charge of Jonkheer de Brauw, who speaks English and shows every desire to be on friendly terms with this legation. (Written in 1942.)

*Norway* (Minister): M. Rolf Otto Andvord (April 20, 1942).

Born 1890. M. Andvord is also Minister in Kuibyshev. He was for seven years a member of the Norwegian delegation to the League of Nations. He is a friendly, sociable colleague, gets on well with Persians and has done excellent work among them in the Allied cause. His visit to Tehran is likely to be a short one and most of his time will be spent in Kuibyshev. (Written in 1942.)

I have seen nothing of M. Andvord in Tehran since my last report.

*Poland* (Minister): M. Karol Bader (July 18, 1942).

M. Bader was born in 1897 and during the last war was head of the Press Bureau of the Polish National Committee at Berne. Later he was counsellor and chargé d'affaires at Prague and he was minister at Angora from 1926 to 1931, when he retired owing to his opposition to the policy of Marshal Pilsudski. At the time of the German invasion he made his way from Poland to Angora and since June 1940 has served alternatively at Beirut and Istanbul.

M. Bader is a great relief after his silly and most voluble predecessor, M. Jan Karszo-Siedlewski. He is a co-operative and businesslike colleague and his judgment is sound and balanced. In view of wartime conditions he only entertains on a modest scale; owing to the number of Polish refugees here and the present state of Polish-Soviet relations, he has no easy task, but he works with great tact and discretion. He speaks excellent French and good English. His wife is still in Poland.

*Soviet Union* (Ambassador): M. Andrée Andreevitch Smirnov (July 5, 1941).

Before coming to Tehran M. Smirnov was in charge of the Press Attachés' Department at the Soviet Embassy in Berlin, where he remained until the outbreak of war between Germany and the U.S.S.R. Unfortunately, he and his wife speak nothing but Russian and German. He is a very friendly and sympathetic colleague, with great charm, and from his appearance and manner certainly does not emanate from the working classes. He has no easy task in his dealings with the Persian Government. Both M. and Mme. Smirnov seem to entertain most friendly feelings for our country. As is generally the case in Soviet missions abroad, M. Smirnov possesses little power of decision and all questions at issue have to be referred to the Soviet Government and military authorities for consideration, with the inevitable delays involved. (Written in 1942.)

M. Smirnov was born about 1906 and became ambassador at the age of 35, after serving as an officer in the merchant navy and as press attaché and then counsellor at the Soviet Embassy in Berlin. He was also employed in Prague for a while. Fortunately for Anglo-Soviet relations, he replaced a very stupid man as ambassador in Tehran within a few days of the German attack on Russia.



Within the limits of his powers he is helpful and co-operative, and is personally friendly, with genuine charm. He would be an excellent colleague if he were not hampered by having almost no influence over his Soviet military, economic and NKVD colleagues, and by his Government's invariable omission to send him instructions when there is pressure to be placed on the Persian Government in the interests of the Allies and when Moscow can hope, by taking no action, to get us to do the work and to incur all the odium. M. Smirnov has the characteristic, rare among Soviet officials, of being able to blush when events bring to light some act of particularly gross hypocrisy or effrontery on the part of his Government. He is intelligent and there are signs that he is well thought of in Moscow. Unfortunately, he speaks only Russian and not very good German. He has an attractive and friendly wife, who speaks even worse German, but is picking up a little French.

*Sweden* (Chargé d'Affaires): M. Sven Haralds Pousette (October 14, 1941).

M. Pousette, who is in charge of German, Bulgarian and Hungarian interests, was previously counsellor at the Swedish Legation in London. In view of the delicacy of his task here he has, whatever may be his own feelings, to adopt rather a neutral attitude, and is therefore sometimes the object of criticism by his colleagues. On the other hand, I have always found him a most helpful and sympathetic colleague, and I am sure that at heart he is a real friend of our country. He, of course, speaks excellent English. His wife and family are at present in Sweden. He is an enthusiastic dancer and tennis player, but excels at neither. (Written in 1942.)

M. Pousette left Tehran for one month's leave in Sweden in May last, but has, so far, not returned. In his absence the Swedish Legation is in the charge of Dr. Jarring.

*Switzerland* (Chargé d'Affaires): Dr. Armin Daeniker (June 6, 1936).

A sound and sensible official. Plays no great part in Tehran life. Is distinctly pro-Ally, but needs to go to great pains to be polite to the Axis missions, as a neutral. His wife, whom he married in 1938, is believed to have been the secretary of an anti-Nazi society in Switzerland. (Written in 1941.) He is in charge of Italian interests. (Written in 1942.)

*Turkey* (Ambassador): M. Cemal Hüsnü Taray (December 7, 1941).

Born about 1890. Formerly ambassador in Warsaw and afterwards in Athens. He wields considerable influence in Tehran as the representative of the principal neutral Power in the Near East and of the senior partner of the Saadabad Pact. He is a friendly, if occasionally independent, colleague, though his lack of contact with the Soviet Embassy and mistrust of the Russians is hard to overcome and sometimes proves an embarrassment in the peculiar conditions of Persia. He is acquiring some notoriety by his passion, if only platonic, for the fair sex. (Written in 1942.)

Owing to the height or his unrestrained admiration for women, or to a combination of both, M. Taray's health has been far from satisfactory during the last year. His love of bad bridge and high poker has, however, not decreased. His attitude towards this legation has been particularly friendly and forthcoming of late, possibly as a result of instructions from his Government.

*United States* (Minister): Mr. Louis Goethe Dreyfus, Jr. (December 18, 1940).

Mr. Dreyfus is a professional diplomat with long service. He was probably born about 1890. He is not a year ahead of his Government in his pro-Ally opinions as his predecessor, Mr. Engert, was, but he is very friendly and pro-Ally, and a very frank and loyal colleague. He admits complete ignorance of the Near and Middle East, where he was never posted before, and comes in periodically for information and advice. In return he is always ready to impart any interesting information he may obtain. (Written in 1941.)

Since the entry of the United States into the war Mr. Dreyfus has been obliged to adopt a more co-operative attitude. He is by nature not a strong personality and suffers, I think, from an inferiority complex. In his heart of hearts I think that he would have been happier if the United States had not become involved in the war. However, during the last few months he has shown far more readiness to work in as closely as possible with this legation. He has, unfortunately, not a strong staff and is not as well informed as he should be. Mrs. Dreyfus, who is stone-deaf, is always ready to be most friendly towards this legation. (Written in 1942.)

I have no reason to alter my views of Mr. Dreyfus's character. Recently he has made efforts to co-operate, but his spinelessness and constant fear of criticism, whether by the Persians or by the State Department, render him a most unsatisfactory and unreliable colleague. His relations with the United States forces in this country are far from cordial. I understand he is hoping to go home on leave in the autumn. Mrs. Dreyfus spends her days in charitable work amongst the Persian poor and her nights in playing bridge, with the result that her health is seriously affected.

*Yugoslavia* (Chargé d'Affaires): Dr. Louis Koser (August 17, 1939).

Born about 1895. Has always been friendly towards His Majesty's Legation, and detests the Germans and despises the Italians. Showed great spirit at the time of the Axis attack on his country. Talks English very fairly. Plays an inconsiderable rôle in Tehran. (Written in 1941.)

Dr. Koser left Tehran in August 1942 for a new post, either in London or Canada. Since his departure, the Yugoslav Legation has been left in charge of M. Vladimir Sokolovitch, a colourless, long-haired individual, who has been ill most of the time and is now being transferred to Angora. A new chargé d'affaires, M. Milovan Tomazeo, has reached Bagdad on his way from Angora to Tehran to take over Yugoslav interests.

[E 4908/48/34]

No. 31.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 19th August.)*

(No. 322.)

Sir,

*Tehran, 7th August, 1943.*

IN view of the fact that not only the Persian Government and all classes of Persians but even to some extent the American Food Adviser and the United States Legation have been inclined to lay on His Majesty's Government the blame for the hardships which the country has undergone during the past year owing to the inadequate bread supply, it is, I think, desirable to place on record some account of the difficulties which we had to face and of the efforts that we made to assist and advise the Persian Government in the matter of grain collection in 1942-43.

2. The question how best to control the 1942 harvest first began to engage my serious attention in April of that year when, owing to the failure of the late rains, the crop prospects in some parts of the country were unfavourable and the Government, without making any serious attempt to assess the real position, were calling on the Allies to supply them with large quantities of wheat from abroad. Official corruption and the evil reputation of the Food Department made all classes unwilling to deliver their surplus grain to the Government, while political insecurity led to hoarding, and the high price offered for grain in Turkey and Iraq encouraged smuggling to these countries on a considerable scale.

3. On the 7th May I addressed a letter to the Prime Minister urging him to fix at once a more reasonable price for wheat from the coming harvest than the rate of £8 a ton then in force, and also to put in hand immediately any irrigation projects which would enable increased sowings to take place in the autumn. His reply, however, was couched in vague and pessimistic terms, contemplating a shortage of grain as inevitable and suggesting that the deficit should be made up by imports from the United States or India. The Persian Government were repeatedly warned that they must take adequate steps to set their own house in order before they could expect His Majesty's Government to assist them with imports from abroad, but it was not until July that, under continued pressure from us and, as it turned out, too late to influence appreciably the attitude of landowners, new prices were fixed, varying according to the region from £9 to £13 per ton. The Persian Government also made some attempt to promulgate, under the Anti-Hoarding Law of March 1942, reasonable regulations designed to ensure the collection of the landlords' surplus and some improvement in the situation seemed possible. The intention of M. Bader, then Minister of Finance, was at that time to collect as much of the proprietors' surplus as possible in the shortest possible time and then to purchase the balance in the open market, the peasants being encouraged to sell their surplus by the offer of piece-goods in exchange.

4. It was realised that the raising of the price for the landlords' surplus would not by itself be sufficient to secure adequate supplies, and that the more



formidable obstacle of official corruption had still to be surmounted. With this in mind it was proposed to the Minister of Finance in May that British officials should be appointed in the various wheat-growing areas mainly for the purpose of securing an independent estimate of the position in each area: they would be able to check the reliability of claims for assistance and would also exercise some check on the activities of the provincial revenue officers, so that both landowners and the Government might receive fair treatment and the delivery of grain be encouraged. The proposals were accepted and five officers, known as "Consular Liaison Officers," were duly appointed.

5. In August the Soheily Government was replaced by that of Qawam-es-Saltaneh, who first endeavoured to solve the wheat problem by demanding 120,000 tons from the Allies. This demand was, of course, rejected, there being no reason to suppose that sufficient supplies would not be available from the country for the greater part if not the whole of the year. In many areas, such as Azerbaijan and Isfahan, the crops were, in fact, well above the average, while in Khorassan they had never been better, and a rough estimate by our consul-general in Meshed gave the surplus for that province as over 40,000 tons. In other regions, notably Gurgan and in some parts of the Hamadan district, the areas sown with wheat were more extensive than they had been for many years.

6. The complete unreality of the Persian Government's attitude in asking for supplies from abroad while the harvest was still on the threshing floor demonstrated the bankruptcy of the central food administration. In such circumstances the raising of wheat prices, the enactment of anti-hoarding laws, and the appointment of our consular liaison officers could have little effect. As early as mid-February 1942 I had, indeed, suggested to the Persian Government that, in addition to financial advisers, they should engage in America some experienced persons, *e.g.*, from the staff which carried out relief work with Mr. Hoover in Belgium, to assist the Government in the distribution of monopolised supplies such as wheat and sugar. It was not, however, till the end of September that one American adviser was appointed to work in the Ministry of Supply, and he, unfortunately, was not well chosen. Though probably a slick buyer and seller in ordinary conditions, Mr. Sheridan had, in fact, no qualifications for a post requiring good judgment and organising ability, and he was to prove quite unequal to the task of framing the efficient central food policy on which so much depended.

7. Instead of concentrating immediately on the practical solution of particular problems of grain collection area by area, Mr. Sheridan had recourse to general economic theory for what he imagined was the simple remedy for a situation already rapidly deteriorating. Rejecting the opinion unanimously expressed at a conference held on the 5th October in this legation by all those with any experience of local conditions who were present, that no further change in the official price should be made at this late stage, Mr. Sheridan accepted the advice tendered by Mr. Kahn, who happened to be in Tehran on a visit, that a clean sweep should be made of the whole of the Government's policy and that a so-called world price should be fixed for all wheat transactions throughout the country. It was generally felt that yet another change in the official Government price would have the worst possible psychological effect as indicating anxiety on the part of the Government as to the future and therefore aggravating the very lack of confidence it was designed to allay. In my telegram No. 139 of the 12th October and again in a note given by Mr. Squire to Mr. Casey personally on the 17th October, the opinion was expressed that this policy would be disastrous and, in spite of the fact that we continued to give every assistance to Mr. Sheridan in all his activities, this forecast has proved, I consider, to have been accurate.

8. By the new policy the Government price of wheat was raised to £24 a ton (£28 in Tehran and the districts along the northern frontier) but no effective measures to put an end to the black market were taken, nor, indeed, was the Administration strong enough to enforce any such measures even had it wished to do so. The result, as had been foreseen, was an immediate doubling of the black market price of £30 a ton, and the price, in fact, reached £150 in some districts before the close of the season. Other prices rose in sympathy and a tremendous impetus was given to the inflationary movement. Almost more serious was a result which had not been foreseen. The Government, which by purchasing wheat at £13 a ton and selling bread at 2 rials a kilog, was able to cover its total costs and even earn a small profit in some districts, had intended to maintain the price of bread at its previous level and to bear the heavy loss which the new prices entailed. When, however, the black market price rose to

£60 a ton or more, peasants, who had before been content to eat their own wheat, now sold their own stocks at an enormous profit and flocked into the towns to live on cheap Government bread. This not only increased enormously the demand for Government supplies of wheat but caused bread riots in many of the towns, especially Kermanshah and the west generally. Moreover, the loss on the sale of bread was so great as to add considerably to the budget deficit and aggravate the tendency to inflation.

9. Even so, the new price might well have succeeded, at least for a time, in attracting larger quantities of grain to the Government granaries had the announcement been accompanied by prompt and well-conceived action by the department (later Ministry) of Supply. In the first place, the announcement was made in the press and over the wireless without any previous intimation to the local authorities or any provision for the extra funds required. In consequence, early offers to deliver at the new price were, for several weeks, rejected for want of instructions and lack of funds. When orders were at last received they were nicely calculated to defeat their own object. The new price was not to be paid to those who had not delivered their undertakings in full for the last two years. This was generally interpreted, and with very good reason, as meaning that the Minister of Supply, who was responsible for the issue of this order, was determined to sabotage the work of the American adviser. There were, in fact, three "kings" in this remarkable "imperium," the third being the Under-Secretary, Mr. Assadi, well-meaning and honest, but inexperienced, and subject to continuous attacks by Deputies and other unscrupulous individuals with axes to grind. The resulting spate of contradictory orders only added to the general confusion, which was made worse by the fact that those of Mr. Sheridan, who, as adviser, had no executive authority, were, in fact, *ultra vires*.

10. There was yet another factor which of itself effectively nullified all efforts to put the new policy into force and which passed almost unnoticed at the time. Certain towns such as Yazd, Qum and Kashan have always been allowed to purchase their requirements in the open market, and no attempt was made to introduce other arrangements to meet the altered conditions. As a result, agents for these places continued to purchase their requirements unhindered in the black market, thus effectively sabotaging the whole scheme.

11. The situation might not have been so bad if Mr. Sheridan had been prepared to listen to the advice offered by this Legation. A few out of many instances of his failure to do so are recorded below:—

On his first arrival he was advised that without American assistants in the provinces he could not hope to accomplish his mission, and in the meantime the whole of the consular liaison officers organisation was offered to him to be entirely at his disposal. Neither suggestion was adopted, and it was not until many weeks had passed that Mr. Sheridan realised that his hopes of adequate assistance from young Persians were illusory, and took steps to apply to the United States for the engagement of a number of assistants. It took him still longer to adopt the suggestion that our consular liaison officers should be given a certain amount of authority of an advisory if not of an executive nature, and even then he only invited their assistance in a half-hearted and unmethodical manner, leaving his own officials many opportunities for neglecting their advice and avoiding action which local situations continually demanded. There is good reason to believe that Mr. Sheridan repented, too late, of his failure to make use of the consular liaison officers, and he has been heard to declare, in the presence of British and American hearers, that but for the consular liaison officers such quantities of wheat as were collected would never have been got in.

In the Hamadan and Kermanshah districts there were large stocks of grain in areas away from the main roads and liable to be snowed up during the winter months. Repeated requests to move these stocks while the roads were still open were disregarded. We begged that local officials should be given authority to hire transport for the purpose, but the Central Government were unwilling either themselves to sanction adequate rates of hire or to allow local authorities to do so. As a result some 3,000 tons of wheat were snowed up in these areas which consular liaison officers were at last, when it was too late, given full authority to move by animal transport, at no matter what cost.

In the Kerman area it had long been realised that assistance would be needed before the next harvest. As early as September it was suggested by us that a certain reputable agent should be appointed to buy at the Government price in Sistan enough of the large surplus in that area to make good the needs of Kerman. It was not, however, until January, when Kerman stocks were at the point of



exhaustion, that after numerous urgent representations and weeks of negotiations, the suggested contract was at last given. The contractor was so successful that Mr. Sheridan has engaged him as sole contractor for the purchase of a very large quantity of wheat in Sistan out of the 1943-44 crop.

Repeated efforts to persuade the Government to take action against hoarders have similarly proved almost entirely abortive. In Khuzistan five small hoards were discovered in July, two of them belonging to a deputy named Nasser, but all efforts to persuade the Government to take any action whatever against him were unavailing. Another recalcitrant landlord in the same province was the Ruisut-Tujjar. After repeated expostulations on our part the Government did eventually deport this individual to Tehran, but they have been unable since to bring themselves to take any steps against him, and he has since returned to Khuzistan. Yet a third hoarder against whom we repeatedly urged action is Ali Akbar Khan Baluki of Arak. After long delay orders were given by Mr. Sheridan that he and other defaulting landlords should be arrested. Baluki was, however, released on an undertaking to deliver his surplus grain, a promise which, needless to say, he failed to keep, and when orders for his rearrest were issued by Mr. Sheridan the police were unable to find him until several weeks later when our consular liaison officer personally intervened.

12. The transport story is very similar. In June 1942, I wrote to the Prime Minister urging that early steps should be taken to make the maximum use of animal transport, in view of the certainty of an acute shortage of motor transport in the near future. The manufacture of carts and the hiring of camels from India and Afghanistan were suggested. Nothing was done. The urgency of the problem was again stressed by me to Qavam-es-Sultaneh in August. The result was the same. The employment of many hundreds of camels was also urged on Mr. Sheridan in October, but it was not until two months later that a contract was arranged with the Shahseven tribe, and even this proved abortive as the contract contained no penalty clause, and the camels were almost immediately diverted for the carriage of black market wheat.

13. Local grain collection work also suffered by the arrangement under which all motor transport required for local use had to be provided by the Road Transport Department in Tehran. Provincial Supply Department officials had no authority to hire lorries themselves and had no lorries at their disposal except those provided by the Road Transport Department. These were for the most part contracted lorries, the drivers of which did not like being assigned to the difficult and less remunerative work of short hauls over difficult local roads which grain collection involved, and worked with corresponding inefficiency, if they did not desert altogether. Other causes of inefficiency were the frequent lack of funds for paying drivers and buying petrol and the fact that reference was usually made to Tehran whenever a lorry needed repairs. With a view to making local motor transport arrangements more efficient, a suggestion was put forward that three or four small lorries should be assigned to the consular liaison officers in each of the most important areas, to be run under his personal supervision and control. This proposal, however, was not approved at first by the Road Transport Board, though it was later accepted.

14. In spite of these difficulties the provinces managed somehow to feed themselves. In some areas our consular liaison officer was able to stimulate the officials into sufficient activity, in others the Government gave up the task and allowed the people to subsist as best they could by purchases on the black market. Tehran, however, had to be fed, and here a breakdown soon took place. For this there were many contributory causes, but the greatest was undoubtedly the failure of the Government to obtain for Tehran more than a negligible fraction of the normal surplus of Azerbaijan. Ordinarily Tehran profits to the extent of 10,000 to 30,000 tons from the grain of this the most fertile of all the provinces of Persia, for if Azerbaijan grain does not always come direct to Tehran, it replaces in the Hamadan-Kermanshah area the large supplies exported to the capital. Last autumn I was assured by the Soviet Ambassador in writing that, in addition to the proposal to import 50,000 tons of wheat from Soviet Russia in exchange for an equal quantity of rice, the local Russian authorities would assist in transporting the estimated surplus of 35,000 tons of wheat from Azerbaijan to Tehran. These offers were not carried out; on the contrary, the war situation in the Caucasus compelled the Soviet authorities to demand instead 20,000 tons of wheat and barley from Azerbaijan for the consumption of their troops in Persia. Thus instead of the 35,000 tons expected, Tehran received from Azerbaijan only 242 tons. This was partly due to the supineness of local officials,

an attitude in which the Russians appeared to acquiesce in spite of sundry affirmations to the contrary, and partly to active intervention on the part of the Russians in stopping the movement of grain south, presumably because of their difficulties in securing the fulfilment of their own requirements. This virtual denial of Azerbaijan wheat to Tehran kept the capital on the verge of starvation from December onwards until the arrival of grain from Canada towards the end of March, and was chiefly responsible for so many of the political difficulties encountered by the Persian Government and for the odium which His Majesty's Government have had to bear.

15. The situation was eventually saved by the arrival of the 25,000 tons promised under the Food Agreement and the arrival of the first consignment of a further 25,000 tons which the Russians suddenly undertook to supply, apparently as a propaganda measure.

16. It might be expected that the experiences of the past year would have been sufficient to induce Mr. Sheridan to take all possible steps to ensure that the bumper harvest now in view should not go the way of its predecessor, but, as I have already reported separately, the preliminary arrangements made by the Persian Government have been far from satisfactory and give no ground for optimism in spite of the good harvest now being reaped in many parts of the country. Mr. Sheridan, at a recent conference at which Dr. Millspaugh and representatives of this legation, the United States Legation and Middle East Supply Centre were present, showed few signs of administrative ability. He was uncertain of the total quantity of grain he proposed to collect and was unable, therefore, to inform Dr. Millspaugh of the exact sum he would require to finance his grain purchases. He has not yet, in spite of frequent reminders, made out a transport programme on which lorries can be allotted for collection work, and at the close of the conference he revealed the fact that he had hardly any sacks in which to collect grain. Fortunately, other people had had greater foresight, and Middle East Supply Centre have been able to show that the quantities of sacks which are in the country or will arrive by the time they are needed are adequate.

17. Mr. Sheridan recently tendered his resignation to the Persian Government, with effect from early September, on the plea of private affairs. Since then the Ministry of Supply has been abolished, and the collection of grain has been entrusted to a new Cereals and Bread Section, with its own director-general, which is to work under the direct control of Dr. Millspaugh. Dr. Millspaugh is making strenuous efforts to secure some able and experienced American to direct this department, and it is hoped that a suitable man will arrive soon. Meanwhile, however, what with the inevitable disorganisation which has followed the dissolution of the Ministry of Supply, the weakness of the Central Government in all matters, the greed and influence of vested interests, the unremitting efforts of the Persians who broadcast from Berlin to persuade their fellow-countrymen in this country to hide their grain lest it be stolen by the Allies, the disorders in or near some of the chief wheat areas in Fars and Isfahan, and the failure of Mr. Sheridan to make adequate arrangements in time, it is possible that, in spite of the bumper harvest this year, the Government will have difficulty in feeding some of the deficit areas.

18. This despatch may appear to contain an unduly large proportion of criticism of Mr. Sheridan. Mr. Sheridan has some qualities which have been of use; he is always optimistic and good-humoured, and in the worst days of winter, when the town was often almost without bread, he worked on without losing his head, scraping up small quantities of any kind of grain or other food-stuff that could be made into some sort of loaf. Also it must be remembered that he has not always been supported by the Minister of Supply. Moreover, his policy of erecting a central Government bakery in each of the large towns, although it has been sabotaged completely by the bakers in some towns and partially in Tehran, will have to be adopted eventually unless the Persian population is to continue to be exploited as in the past by what is perhaps the most corrupt and heartless class in a heartless and corrupt race—the bakers. In spite of all this, however, Mr. Sheridan must be adjudged a failure. The United States Government seems to have taken great trouble to select able men for the other advisory posts in Persia, but for the one most in evidence to the man in the street—the Department of Supply—they chose a commission agent without any experience of organisation on a large scale. His failure is particularly regrettable because it tends to discredit foreign advisers in general. The corrupt fear the foreign advisers, the vain think them unnecessary. With Mr. Sheridan the vain have good evidence of the superfluity of foreign advice; while owing to his hasty and spasmodic policy the corrupt have had nothing to fear.



Throughout this difficult time His Majesty's Legation have been fortunate in receiving prompt assistance from His Majesty's Government, from the Government of India and from the Minister of State; and in having as a check on inefficiency and corruption an able group of consular liaison officers, guided by the experience, the wisdom and the imperturbable resolution of Mr. Squire.

I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister of State, to the Government of India and to His Majesty's representatives at Washington and Moscow.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 4932/38/34]

No. 32.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 19th August.)*

(No. 908.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 18th August, 1944.

YOUR telegram No. 1119 to Moscow, Most Secret.

British military security authorities arrested second parachutist night of 16th/17th August making three Germans in two days.

2. Russian security authorities have secured mass of material incriminating Naubakht in conspiracy affecting Russian zone as well as other parts of Persia. [Group undecipherable? Mayer's] diary also makes it clear that Naubakht is the mainspring of the conspiracy on Persian side.

3. I am sure that Prime Minister will not proceed against Naubakht unless pressure is applied by Russians as well as by us. If, therefore, by the time I present my list of persons to be arrested Russians have not received orders to join in the request for N.'s exclusion from the Majlis and arrest, I propose unless I receive your instructions to the contrary to have Naubakht arrested by British military security authorities, since it is most dangerous to leave him free to continue his plotting.

[E 4928/38/34]

No. 33.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 19th August.)*

(No. 909.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 18th August, 1943.

MY telegram No. 908.

At the request of the Prime Minister I discussed Fars situation with him and Jahanbani, General Officer Commanding, Fars, 17th August. British Military Attaché and Colonel Robert took part in the discussion.

The Prime Minister and Jahanbani admitted that they have not the power to reduce the tribes to submission at present and propose trying to bring about the following arrangements:—

- (1) Khosro, who is the younger brother, to be Governor of Firuzabad. Title would be that of an ordinary Governor, but he would be in practice Ikhani of Kashgai, since he would not stay at Firuzabad but would migrate with the tribe for the winter. The Government would not force all Kashgais to submit to Khosro. On the contrary they would try to win some sections away from him just as they would try to split Boir Ahmedi by negotiation.
- (2) Khosro or Nasir to hand over certain rifles and machine guns which the Kashgais captured from the Persian army.
- (3) Nasir to come to Tehran as a candidate for the Majlis. As he would stand for Firuzabad there could be no doubt of his success. Jahanbani suggested that as the seat is vacant Nasir should be elected now at a by-election, but the Prime Minister rightly objected to this as an unnecessary humiliation for the Government as the general election is just about to begin. It is possible that Nasir will refuse to come to Tehran until he has acquired immunity as a deputy. In that case Jahanbani proposes to keep Khosro in Shiraz for the present. I asked Jahanbani to warn Nasir that if he continued to intrigue with the Germans henceforth I would not guarantee my Government would recognise his parliamentary immunity.

- (4) Lands claimed by Nasir, which are in the hands of the Government, to be returned at once. Those which have been sold to third parties to be dealt with by a commission.

3. I had already consulted Colonel Robert and Q . . . ul Mul . . . and both had admitted that in view of weakness and unreliability of the Persian army and need for time for Q . . . to strengthen the Government party, some such concessions would have to be made. We, therefore, spoke to the Prime Minister and Jahanbani to this effect.

Although His Majesty's Government would like to see the whole of Persia peaceful and prosperous, and His Majesty's Legation had always supported Central Government while urging it to deal fairly with the tribes, disputes between Government and its tribes were of no concern to His Majesty's Government unless they endangered the interests of the Allies. His Majesty's Government cannot object to the arrangement which Persian Government propose to make with the leaders of Kashgai, but since it is mainly because of these men that Kashgai territory has been a centre of German activity for over a year, and that other Germans with designs on security and communications have recently come to Persia, we must insist that any agreement between Persian Government and Kashgai should embody an undertaking by Kashgai to delivering [sic. ? deliver] up Germans and their equipment, &c. Prime Minister agreed. He also promised to offer a substantial reward for information leading to the capture of Germans.

4. I mentioned the capture of Mayer and reminded the Prime Minister that he could not have remained at large for nearly two years without the connivance of many Persians, some of them probably of high rank. I expressed doubt about the inability of army officers in general and asked Jahanbani not to take back with him to Shiraz a certain Colonel Alavi, who is on his staff.

5. Our opinion relevant to Q . . . is confirmed by Mayer's diary which records his appointment with regret and describes him as enemy No. 1. I informed the Prime Minister that we were well aware of intrigues against Q . . . even in high official circles in Tehran, but that as our opinion of him as a faithful servant of the Persian Government was confirmed by unimpeachable evidence that the Germans regard him as a redoubtable and incorruptible foe, we expected the Government to give him full support and should regard intrigues against him as intrigues against the Allies. The Prime Minister said that having appointed him Governor-General he would support him. Jahanbani, who is believed to have secret instructions from the Shah to block Q . . . 's work, kept completely silent.

6. I shall hand to the Prime Minister to-day draft notice of offer of reward by the Persian Government and our draft conditions for insertion in the Kashgai agreement. Copies by bag. There is some evidence that Kashgai still have some Germans with them, but would like to be rid of them in some way which will not incriminate them. You may be sure that no method by which German agents can be secured or killed will be neglected.

[E 4970/38/34]

No. 34.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 21st August.)*

(No. 919.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 21st August, 1943.

NAUBAKHT interpellation is down for sitting of 21st August. Prime Minister and Minister of War are feeling more confident since capture of Mayer, while Naubakht is believed to be very nervous for same reason.

2. To suit plan of British security authorities, present list of suspects for arrest is being postponed for a few days.

3. At our instigation Persian Government have published in press offer of reward of 50,000 rials for information leading to capture of any unauthorised German found in this country. We are making it known that separate reward of not less than 50,000 rials will be payable by British authorities.

4. Russian Embassy has received no instructions. I hope that they will get some from M. Maisky who arrives to-morrow on his way through.



[E 5224/38/34]

No. 35.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 1st September.)*

(No. 946.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 31st August, 1943.*

I CALLED on the Shah to-day to express regret that it had been found necessary to arrest so many of his subjects. He seemed rather relieved, partly, I think, because he has long known that the Allies had suspicions against a number of Persians and partly, perhaps, because we have let him know that in German intrigues, Zahidi and Nasir Qashgai were candidates for the throne. He agreed that Persia could justify her adhesion to the Declaration of the United Nations at this late stage by reference to German attempt to stir up civil war and to embroil Persia with her Allies.

2. Bazaar remained closed this morning. This is attributed variously to the inclusion of Mullah Kashani among the suspects and to intrigues of merchants and landowners against Millspaugh. As the Bazaar at Tabriz is also closed, the latter is probably the real reason. The police did not venture to enter Kashani's house to arrest him. Otherwise arrests are proceeding satisfactorily and without incident, and the general effect is said to be on the whole good. Full reports from the provinces have not yet been received, but at least half the [group undecypherable] suspects are said to have been arrested with full American co-operation. The Minister of War has acted with great promptitude and seems to have secured most of the suspects in Tehran including two out of three (group undecypherable ? striker)s and he says strict instructions have been sent to the provinces regarding military suspects there. Among the civilians arrested here are Busheri, Sajjadi, Matin Daftari and Khosro Iqbal. Stimulated by American adviser and improved recent changes in personnel, police are showing unusual activity, but if this should fall off British security authorities may have to effect some of the arrests detailed.

3. Communiqué for publication in local press is being drafted by Russian Chargé d'Affaires and myself and when agreed with Prime Minister will be telegraphed to you.

[E 5252/38/34]

No. 36.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 2nd September.)*

(No. 950.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 1st September, 1943.*

MY telegram No. 946.

Our combined Anglo-Russian list of suspects is made up of (a) [group undecypherable] army officers, (b) 4 police officers, (c) 66 civilians, and (d) 64 railway employees. Of this list 14 army officers, including Aghevli, all the police officers, 21 civilians and 34 railway employees have been arrested up to date; the railway employees are already in our hands and arrangements are being made for the other categories to be handed over to us. Few returns from the provinces including Russian zone have yet to come in.

2. Kashani has so far escaped arrest and Naubakht is reported to have fled with his sons to Shiraz. Everything proceeds smoothly.

[E 5277/38/34]

No. 37.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 3rd September.)*

(No. 952.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 2nd September, 1943.*

MY telegram No. 950.

Following is text of official communiqué published in the press on 2nd September:—

"The public is informed that a German organisation has recently been discovered which has been set up to carry out spying activities and sabotage; it had been divided into various branches and was directed by German agents who were illegally living in Persia. It has become known that this organisation was planning an insurrection and armed action against the Government;

and also that it wished to destroy the bridges and tunnels on the railways and cut lines of communication, in order to prevent transport of military stores for the Allies and to interrupt means of transporting goods needed by Persia and, consequently, to create a state of disorder in the country and disturb friendly relations of Persia and the Allies. Unfortunately a number of Persians are suspected of taking part in these activities and co-operating with the German agents. Accordingly, in order to safeguard the interests of the country and in view of Persian Government's obligations under the Treaty of Alliance, steps have been taken to arrest these persons in order that they may be interrogated.

"Anyone who has any information about the activities of this organisation or about the whereabouts of Germans who are in hiding is requested to communicate it to the Central Police Administration."

[E 5429/38/34]

No. 38.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 11th September.)*

(No. 368.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch of the 29th August, 1943, from His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, to the Iranian Prime Minister, Tehran, *re* German agents operating in Persia.

*Tehran, 29th August, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 38.

*Sir R. Bullard to the Iranian Prime Minister.*

YOUR Excellency is well aware, as the result of the recent arrest of Franz Mayer and of the admissions made by the leaders of the Qashgai, that German agents have been operating in this country for many months and that others have arrived recently. Your Excellency is also aware that three Iranian nationals known to have been connected with German agents, viz Vaziri, Naivandi and Akhbari, have remained at large in spite of repeated requests from His Majesty's Legation that they should be arrested. It is quite evident that such activities could not have been carried on without the connivance and even the assistance of a considerable number of Iranians, and this deduction is supported by ample evidence which is in the possession of the Allies. At least some of the evidence available must have been communicated to your Excellency by the Iranian investigating magistrates who collaborated with the British authorities in the interrogation of the Iranian suspects at Sultanabad; moreover, your Excellency is aware that only a few weeks ago the Tehran police allowed to escape two of the interned suspects who had been allowed by the British authorities to come to Tehran because they alleged—falsely, as it turned out—that they were seriously ill. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government had the right to assume that the Persian Government, in execution of the obligations imposed upon the Iranian Government by the Tripartite Treaty, would make the most strenuous efforts to root out all the pro-Axis activities. Far from doing this, however, the Iranian Government, until the last few days, allowed the Tehran police to become more and more corrupt, inefficient and hostile to the Allies, and while the three above-mentioned suspects continued to remain at large the Iranian Government made repeated requests to His Majesty's Legation with the object of securing the release of some of the suspects who were still under detention or relaxation of control for some who had been released on certain conditions.

2. Recent events have shown that the enemies of the United Nations have designs on Allied interests in Iran and that the security of Allied communications in Iran are threatened. German agents in Iran are making a desperate effort to delay the inevitable defeat of the Axis by trying to disrupt the Allied war effort in this country and to embroil Iran with her friends, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States of America. It is essential to the interests of the Allies that the pro-Axis organisation in Iran should be broken up completely, and I therefore have the honour to hand to your Excellency with this note two lists of



suspects drawn up by His Majesty's Legation in consultation with the Soviet Embassy and to ask that immediate instructions be issued for their arrest and their despatch to Sultanabad for detention and interrogation in accordance with the agreement concluded last year between the Imperial Government and His Majesty's Government.

3. I can assure your Excellency that I should not be making this request if my Government were not fully convinced that it is essential to the interests of both countries. The evidence justifying the arrest of the suspects will be forthcoming as soon as they are in safe custody in Sultanabad. Experience has shown that evidence communicated to the Iranian authorities in advance has often been improperly used and has even reached the persons whose arrest the Imperial Government had been asked to effect.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 5565/1/34]

No. 39.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 17th September.)*

(No. 359.)

Sir,

*Tehran, 26th August, 1943.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 383 of the 28th April last and previous correspondence regarding the conclusion of an arrangement with the Persian Government, in accordance with the Anglo-Persian Financial Agreement of the 26th May, 1942, and the Supplementary Agreement of the 25th January, 1943, for the ascertaining of the amount of the balances in sterling and sterling area currencies standing to the Persian Government's credit, I have the honour to report that an arrangement to this effect was concluded by means of an exchange of notes between myself and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 26th August, 1943, and couched in the terms of the draft referred to in your telegram. In this connexion I have the honour to transmit herewith the following documents:—

- (1) Certified copy of my note to Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 26th August, 1943.
- (2) Original of Minister for Foreign Affairs' note of the 3rd Shahrivar, 1322 (the 26th August, 1943).\*
- (3) Certified translation of (2).
- (4) Uncertified copies of (1) and (3).\*

2. I am sending copies of this despatch, together with its enclosures, to the Minister of State, Cairo; Minbranch, Bagdad; the Government of India, New Delhi; and His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 39.

*Sir R. Bullard to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Your Excellency,

*26th August, 1943.*

IN order to give effect to article X of the Financial Agreement between the Imperial Persian Government and the Government of the United Kingdom, dated the 26th May, 1942 (as subsequently amended by the Supplementary Agreement, dated the 25th January, 1943), I have the honour to suggest that the following procedure be adopted for the ascertainment of the amount of the balances in sterling and sterling area currencies standing to the credit of the Imperial Persian Government:—

- (a) As soon as may be after each of the conversion dates, the Imperial Ministry of Finance shall certify to His Majesty's Legation in Tehran the actual cash balances in sterling and sterling area currencies standing to the credit of the Imperial Persian Government according to the official accounts of the various Government Departments concerned as at the close of business on the relevant conversion date.

\* Not reproduced.

- (b) The Imperial Ministry of Finance shall furnish to His Majesty's Legation supporting certificates from the National Bank of Iran and from the Imperial Bank of Iran, confirming that the sums certified in paragraph (a) above actually stood to the credit of the Imperial Persian Government as at the close of business on the relevant date.
- (c) The Imperial Persian Government shall ensure that the National Bank of Iran and the Imperial Bank of Iran shall respectively communicate to His Majesty's Legation (for transmission to the Bank of England) the names of the banking correspondents in the United Kingdom and the rest of the sterling area with whom the said balances are kept.
- (d) The Imperial Persian Government shall ensure that the said banking correspondents are instructed to certify to the Bank of England, on demand, the actual cash balances standing to the credit respectively of the National Bank of Iran and of the Imperial Bank of Iran as at the close of business on the relevant conversion date.
- (e) Upon receipt by His Majesty's Legation of the certificates mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the Government of the United Kingdom will inform the Imperial Persian Government of the amount of gold that is consequently to be made available to the Imperial Persian Government, of the centre at which the Government of the United Kingdom (in accordance with the option available to them under article XI of the Financial Agreement) are prepared to deliver the said gold, and of the price thereof. The Government of the United Kingdom will further instruct the Bank of England to provide the stated amount of gold upon receipt of the necessary funds from the National Bank of Iran.
- (f) For this purpose, the expression "sterling balances standing to the credit of the Imperial Persian Government" shall have the meaning assigned to it in article I (3) of the Financial Agreement of the 26th May, 1942, as extended to other currencies of the sterling area by the exchange of letters of the same date annexed to the agreement. Balances of sterling area currencies shall be converted into sterling at the London bankers' buying rates ruling for the currency concerned on the relevant conversion date.
- (g) The expression "conversion date" means—
  - (a) the 31st December, 1942;
  - (b) The last day of each calendar quarter thereafter; and
  - (c) The date of the termination of the Financial Agreement in accordance with article XV thereof.

2. I shall be glad if your Excellency will be so good as to confirm that the procedure proposed above is acceptable to the Imperial Persian Government.

I avail, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 39.

(Translation.)

*Note from Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir R. Bullard.*

*3rd Shahrivar, 1322.*

*(26th August, 1943.)*

Your Excellency,

IN order to give effect to article X of the Financial Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, dated the 5th Khordad, 1321 (26th May, 1942) (as subsequently amended by the Supplementary Agreement, dated the 5th Bahman, 1321 (25th January, 1943)), I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Imperial Government agrees that the following procedure should be adopted for the ascertainment of the amount of the balances in sterling and sterling area currencies standing to the credit of the Imperial Government:—

- (a) As soon as may be after each of the conversion dates, the Imperial Ministry of Finance shall certify to His Majesty's Legation in Tehran the actual cash balances in sterling and sterling area currencies standing to the credit of the Imperial Persian Government according to the official accounts of the various Government departments concerned as at the close of business on the relevant conversion date.



- (b) The Imperial Ministry of Finance shall furnish to His Majesty's Legation supporting certificates from the National Bank of Iran and from the Imperial Bank of Iran, confirming that the sums certified in paragraph (a) above actually stood to the credit of the Imperial Persian Government as at the close of business on the relevant date.
- (c) The Imperial Persian Government shall ensure that the National Bank of Iran and the Imperial Bank of Iran shall respectively communicate to His Majesty's Legation (for transmission to the Bank of England) the names of the banking correspondents in the United Kingdom and the rest of the sterling area with whom the said balances are kept.
- (d) The Imperial Persian Government shall ensure that the said banking correspondents are instructed to certify to the Bank of England, on demand, the actual cash balances standing to the credit respectively of the National Bank of Iran and of the Imperial Bank of Iran as at the close of business on the relevant conversion date.
- (e) Upon receipt by His Majesty's Legation of the certificates mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the Government of the United Kingdom will inform the Imperial Persian Government of the amount of gold that is consequently to be made available to the Imperial Persian Government, of the centre at which the Government of the United Kingdom (in accordance with the option available to them under article XI of the Financial Agreement) are prepared to deliver the said gold, and of the price thereof. The Government of the United Kingdom will further instruct the Bank of England to provide the stated amount of gold upon receipt of the necessary funds from the National Bank of Iran.
- (f) For this purpose, the expression "sterling balances standing to the credit of the Imperial Persian Government" shall have the meaning assigned to it in article I (3) of the Financial Agreement of the 26th May, 1942, as extended to other currencies of the sterling area by the exchange of letters of the same date annexed to the agreement. Balances of sterling area currencies shall be converted into sterling at the London bankers' buying rates ruling for the currency concerned on the relevant conversion date.
- (g) The expression "conversion date" means—
- (a) the 31st December, 1942;
  - (b) the last day of each calendar quarter thereafter; and
  - (c) The date of the termination of the Financial Agreement in accordance with article XV thereof.

I avail, &c.

MUHAMMAD SA'ID MARAGHAI.

[E 5567/338/34]

No. 40.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 17th September.)*

(No. 374.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a note to Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, regarding Persia's query about obligations and advantages derived from adherence to Declaration of the United Nations.

*Tehran, 3rd September, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 40.

*Sir R. Bullard to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

M. le Ministre,

*Tehran, 3rd September, 1943.*

ON the 5th July I had the honour to be received, together with my Soviet and American colleagues, by your Excellency and his Excellency the President of the Council. A document was read out in which the Imperial Persian Government expressed a desire to adhere to the Declaration of the United Nations but

wished to know first what obligations and advantages would follow if this step was in fact taken. I duly reported the matter to my Government and I now have pleasure in conveying to your Excellency their reply, which is to the following effect:—

1. If Persia enters into a state of war with one or more of the Axis Powers, she will thereby become eligible for adherence to the Declaration of the United Nations.
2. Persia would not by mere adherence to the declaration assume any additional economic or military obligations, but it is hoped that Persia would thereafter take the most active measures possible, within the frontiers of Persia, in rendering material collaboration and help in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism.
3. The advantages which would accrue to Persia from adherence would be those obviously flowing from full and formal partnership with the thirty-two United Nations in their struggle.
4. Upon adherence to the declaration, Persia would have equal rights with other United Nations to participate in the appropriate conferences concerned with the peace settlement.

I avail, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 5622/82/34]

No. 41.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 19th September.)*

(No. 1007.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 19th September, 1943.*

I SUGGEST that it would be well not to raise the question of position of Persia after the war, but to appear to take it for granted that she will be let alone by ourselves and Russia. If, however, it is possible to learn whether Russia has any views on the subject and, if so, what they are, it would be very valuable. There is one point which has exercised my mind lately, and you might think fit to raise it with the Russians and the Americans now, viz., position during period between defeat of Germany and defeat of Japan. Under article 5 of the treaty Great Britain and Russia are entitled to keep troops in Persia until after cessation of hostilities with Japan, since Japan is one of the associates of Germany. It is presumably to the interest of Great Britain that foreign troops should leave Persia as soon as is compatible with safety, since, so long as Russian troops occupy considerable or perhaps any part of Persia, healthy functioning of Government of Persia is impossible, but oil supplies from Persia will be essential to the prosecution of the war against Japan and, therefore, we must protect the oilfields and refineries until Japan is defeated. Even if Russia does not go to war with Japan she will presumably claim the right to keep troops in Persia until ours leave. Question is, I suggest, what part of Persia she will wish to continue to occupy as a set-off to our occupation of the oil areas.

2. British and American representatives here have been hampered in their attempt to deal with such questions as supplies and budget deficit by inadequacy of co-operation by our Russian colleagues. It would be most useful if Soviet Government could be induced to instruct its new ambassador to Persia to discuss fully with us all financial and economic problems, and to this end to treat Persia as a whole and not as two or three separate zones. At present Soviet authorities seem completely indifferent to the interests of Persia as a whole. They profess scepticism about budget deficit, while they continue to increase deficit by application of munitions agreement and in other ways. Almost complete stoppage of flow of food supplies southward from west and north, while highly favourable to Russia, both economically and politically, has injured Persian interests in general as well as those of His Majesty's Government and of United States Government. This question, I realise, needs very careful handling, as Soviet authorities would deny many facts we know to be correct, but could not prove.

3. Movement of British subjects, military and civilian, into and through Russian zone has always been unreasonably obstructed by the Russians. Improvement has been effected recently, and I do not know that much more can be done since difficulty arises largely from independence of Russian military, and ignorant stupidity and arbitrary behaviour of individual sentries and officers of control posts, but the question might be mentioned. The only military matter of importance is the approaching stoppage of our military convoys carrying munitions

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between the south and Tabriz, because of refusal of the Russians to allow us to build winter quarters for the military drivers. You will remember that the Americans stopped running in the Russian zone for the same reason. If we could discover the motive of this refusal it might throw light on Soviet policy. It is too late to construct winter quarters now, even if the Soviet authorities withdrew their refusal. I am consulting Paic . . . and will send supplementary telegram after seeing Chief of General Staff, who will be here 22nd September.

[E 5626/82/34]

No. 42.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 20th September.)*

(No. 1008.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 19th September, 1943.*

CO-OPERATION with our Allies in Persia.

## A.—With the Americans.

American failure to support us last year was due I consider to State Department's traditional hostility to British policy in Persia as "imperialistic." United States Minister in Tehran, being well acquainted with this tradition, fed the hostility by unfriendly reports stressing alleged harshness of our policy towards Persians. Firm reply by the Foreign Office to State Department complained on this score and similar attitude adopted by Minister of State when he visited Washington opened the eyes of State Department, though too late to afford support in the matter of provision of local currency where it would have been very valuable. Dramatic change in attitude which ensued was probably confirmed by the gradual realisation on the part of State Department that there is no legal basis for the presence of American troops in Persia, that their army commander is interested solely in aid to Russia and indifferent to the interests of Persians, and that American moral superiority towards the British must have been shaken by United States Minister's reports on the conduct of American troops in Persia, about which he receives on an average three written complaints a day from the Minister for Foreign Affairs. American co-operation with us is greatly improved. American army actually assisted our security officers to ensure the arrest of as many of the railway suspects as possible and the United States Minister is giving no encouragement to relatives of suspects who complain to him. Co-operation would be more effective if Mr. Dreyfus had greater force of character. He expects to go to United States on leave towards the end of the year. First Secretary, who will presumably act for him, is completely ignorant of Persian affairs and is only more forceful than Dreyfus because he is honest. He will, however, be assisted by a Third Secretary who until recently was in the Persian Section of State Department. Generally speaking, American co-operation here now depends mainly on the character of United States representative.

## B.—With the Russians.

Last-minute instructions from Moscow to the Soviet Embassy here to co-operate with us have twice secured important successes:—

(1) When the Soviet Ambassador joined me towards the end of 1942 in informing the President of the Majlis that Deputies had behaved very badly towards the Allies in regard to supplies of local currency and in insisting on a further change of attitude, and

(2) when recently the support of the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in regard to suspects made my representations to the Persian Government far more forcible than our isolated efforts a year ago, and helped to secure the assistance of the Persian army and police and to stifle criticism. It will be observed that in both these cases aid to Russia was directly threatened. In the first I had, I think, made my Soviet colleague realise that if supply of rials was any longer delayed we should have to cease work on the roads, payment of freight on aid to Russia and so on. On second occasion Soviet security authorities were first won over to the belief that railway and other communications were threatened and they moved Moscow to send the necessary instructions to the Soviet Embassy in Tehran. Normally the Soviet Embassy do not trouble to co-operate fully, but prefer to pose as friend of Persia and to leave odium of interference to us unless their essential interests, as opposed to the general interests of the Allies, are in danger, and they fear that British and Americans will be unable to struggle

through to a solution unaided. It is true that there was full co-operation with the Russians when we were supporting Kavanal Sultana against the Shah, but that I consider was because he was their man: he was under their control because most of his estates are in the Russian zone, and he had signed the onerous munitions factories agreement. Actual friction with the Russians is rare, except in matters of passage of British subjects into and through the Russian zone, which I mentioned in my telegram No. 1007. This is not the fault of the Soviet Embassy, whose staff themselves suffer at times in this respect at the hands of the Soviet military. Where there has been some slight friction in other matters it has been due to lack of frankness on the part of the Soviet Embassy. The most striking cases were difficulties at Qala Murghi airfield and Soviet offer of wheat to the Persian Government without previous notice either to us or to the Americans. Munitions agreement did not affect us directly, but only in so far as it threw a heavy burden on an already unbalanced budget, but Soviet candour throughout the negotiations fell far short of the requirements of Allied solidarity. Once or twice I learned indirectly that the Soviet Ambassador was disturbed at some action of ours which had been misrepresented to him and I had to clear up the misunderstanding which could have been dissipated before if he had had the candour to raise the subject. We for our part have never consciously kept the Soviet Embassy in the dark on any question of common concern. If greater frankness could be secured it would be an important gain, but suspicion and tendency to nurse grievances are deeply ingrained in the Russian character and, although all our relations at the top have a good effect here, complete elimination of these defects is not to be expected. I feel that M. Smirnov did his best within the limits of his powers and that we cannot expect greater co-operation from his successor unless clear instructions to ensure it are sent to him from Moscow.

[E 5658/239/34]

No. 43.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 22nd September.)*

(No. 393.)

Sir,

*Tehran, 15th September, 1943.*

THE period since my despatch No. 271 of the 29th June last has culminated in the Imperial firman of the 9th September declaring war on Germany. Early in July the Persian Government formally notified me and my Soviet and American colleagues of their desire to adhere to the declaration of the United Nations and asked to be informed what additional obligations Persia would thereby incur, and what advantages she would secure. An agreed reply by all three Governments was in due course returned and the declaration of war followed immediately. Apart from the fact that Germany's principal European ally had collapsed on the previous day, it came at an opportune moment, when the "round-up" of German agents in Persia, to which I shall allude later in this despatch, provided the Persian Government with a ready-made justification for their action. The declaration of war has been very well received by the Majlis and by the press.

2. To the general surprise, perhaps to his own, M. Soheily remains the head of the Government. No one has much confidence in him, and he has maintained his position more by astute manoeuvring and taking advantage of the preoccupation of the Deputies about their chances of re-election than by any remarkable display of statecraft or good government. The Shah, though evidently anxious to change Soheily for either Mansur, Saed or Ala—or perhaps Hajhir—is sensitive about a series of determined attacks on him which have been appearing in the press, and has been frightened into signing, with great reluctance, a document establishing the responsibility of the Minister of War and placing the General Staff under that Minister instead of in an independent position answerable only to the Shah. Soheily can also claim credit for passing the law establishing the powers of the American Director-General of Police, Mr. Timmerman. The vacant post of Minister of Justice has been filled by the elderly Sadr, a stiff and reactionary ex-mulla. Dr. Siyasi, an enlightened Minister of Education, resigned at the end of August, but the Ministry of the Interior has recently been strengthened by the appointment of Tadayyun, in succession to Hussein Samli, who fortunately only served a few weeks, having been appointed on the 10th July.

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3. The elections are supposed to have begun, the usual firman having been issued on the proper date, the 24th August. Up to the present only one election result, that of Kurdan and Shahriyar, has been announced. Most of the other constituencies seem to be inactive and it is doubtful whether many other elections will be concluded before the end of the month of Ramazan (end of September); in fact, a movement for postponing the elections altogether appears to be gaining strength. The usual accusations of intervention by the Russians in their zone are frequently heard, though concrete evidence is very scanty and the Soviet authorities disclaim any interest in the Tudeh party. In our own area, consuls have been encouraged to make recommendations concerning the most satisfactory local candidate, and the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior have both consulted this legation about our views on various candidates. It seems, at any rate, clear that the Government is unhappy about the prospects of riots and disorder during electoral contests. The Tehran elections are hanging fire owing to a dispute between the electoral college and the Government concerning the advisability of abolishing the present military governorship of Tehran.

4. Haji Agha Hussein Qummi (see paragraph 12 of my despatch under reference) returned to Tehran from Meshed in August and awaited a reply from the Government to his proposals for the re-establishment of religion in this country; his principal demands are freedom for women to wear the veil, prohibition of mixed education for young persons, the restoration of the waqf funds to their original administrators, and political pressure on Ibn Saud with a view to securing his consent to the repair of certain tombs in Medina. The Government gave an example of their usual weakness by replying to Qummi in a Cabinet decree in which they stated that in the matter of the veil there would be no molestation and that mixed schools for boys and girls would be abolished, and gave him some satisfaction on the other points also.

5. Public security in the capital and in some of the provinces is deteriorating; hooliganism and stabbing are prominent, and though one criminal has actually been executed in Tehran, robbery and crimes of violence seem likely to go on increasing as long as rising prices increase the misery of the poor.

#### *Tribal Situation—South-West Persia.*

6. In my despatch under reference I suggested that if the Persian Government did not mishandle the advantageous situation that had resulted from the dispersal of Nasir Qashgai's forces and the occupation by Government troops of Firuzabad and Farashband there was an opportunity of making a settlement with the Qashgai tribes that might lead to a temporary peace. The Persian Government, however, failed entirely to make use of the political factors in their favour; the Persian forces failed to press their military advantage; new intrigues were set on foot, encouraged, no doubt, by German agents; and the Boir Ahmadi tribes, under the absconding chief, Abdullah Zarghampur, were persuaded to lend support to the Qashgai.

7. On the 3rd July the tribes, assisted, it is commonly believed, by treachery among the troops, scored a signal success against a Persian garrison at Semirum, a village on the northern limit of the Qashgai summer quarters. The whole force of some 900 men, after a poor show of resistance, was captured by the tribes with all its arms.

8. This disaster entirely altered the situation. The tribes were greatly encouraged. The Persian forces, correspondingly depressed, became obviously incapable of restoring the situation by their own efforts. Fortunately, it had already been decided that Bushire should be closed as an entry port for supplies to Russia and there were only some 550 trucks there to be moved up the Shiraz-Isfahan road. These were escorted by troops of Persia and Iraq force and were cleared without incident. But there was still ample cause for anxiety. The Boir Ahmadi, whose territory touches the southern oilfields, were now in open rebellion; some sections of the Bakhtiari, under Abdul Qasim, were known to be harbouring German agents and to be in close contact with the Boir Ahmadi and Qashgai leaders; the tribes, suffering under real and imagined grievances of the last twenty years, were in a mood that predisposed them to listen to incitement against the Central Government and the British authorities who supported it. It was presumably the desire of German agents to create the maximum amount of disorder in the hope of creating opportunities for sabotage, embroiling British troops with the tribes and dislocating to the maximum extent the country's economy and administration.

9. Frightened by the possibilities and by their own weakness the Shah and the Government proposed to send Qavam ul Mulk to Fars as governor-general with extensive powers, hoping that by his influence he would be able

to rally against Nasir Qashgai the Khassah tribes, who formerly owed allegiance to his family, and even some of the Qashgai tribes. I cordially supported this proposal, but the Government, in truly Persian fashion, having decided that their salvation lay in the Qavam, then made every difficulty about the grant to him of the reasonable conditions he demanded and made no attempt to check the powerful intrigues against his appointment that were at once instigated by Nasir's friends and other enemies of the Allies.

10. It was not until the 10th August that Qavam ul Mulk left for Shiraz. Meanwhile, Nasir and his brother, Khasrow, had already notified the Governor of Bakhtiari, a fellow-tribesman, of their desire to open negotiations with the Persian authorities. This was undoubtedly in part due to the appointment of Qavam, but to a greater extent to the fall of Mussolini and the Russian victories, news of which had by this time filtered through to the tribes. A meeting was arranged between Nasir, Khasrow, the Governor of Bakhtiari and the newly appointed general officer commanding of the Persian forces of the south, at which Colonel Robert, a British liaison officer, who has established some personal prestige with the Qashgai leaders, was present. The outcome of this meeting was that Khasrow agreed to come to Tehran to express repentance for past misdeeds, and to ask for certain terms for himself and his brother. They amounted to this: Khasrow should be made governor of the Qashgai; he undertook to return all arms captured from Persian troops and to restrain the tribes from robbing; Nasir should be allowed to be elected a Deputy for Firuzabad, and when protected by that immunity he would leave Qashgai territory; the Government should immediately return to Nasir those of his lands now held by the Government.

11. Although the acceptance of these terms is almost a surrender by the Government to the Qashgai and in all probability merely postpones a trial of strength, I did not feel justified in advising them to reject them, realising that they must play for time. I informed the Prime Minister that it was for his Government to decide the terms of settlement that should be made with the tribes, but that I should not be satisfied unless they included an undertaking that the Qashgai would hand over any Germans in their territory and would allow British officials free movement among the tribes. Khasrow signed an undertaking to this effect before leaving Tehran. I also impressed on the Prime Minister that the retention of Qavam ul Mulk as governor-general in Fars was essential if I was to be sure that British interests were not being neglected. I informed him that our confidence in the Qavam had been strengthened by the discovery in a diary found on a captured German agent, that the Qavam's appointment to Shiraz was regarded by the Germans with great alarm.

12. In spite of the conciliatory replies given by the Government to Khasrow and their perhaps too evident desire to settle the trouble in Fars by peaceful means, Nasir continues to profess dissatisfaction with the assurances given, and he has refused friendly invitations from the governor-general and the Persian general officer commanding in Fars, supported by the advice of His Majesty's Consul, to visit Shiraz for further discussion. He is now using the pretext that it is his distrust of Qavam ul Mulk that is hindering a settlement. There can, however, now be little doubt that Nasir has only been playing for time and that nothing but force or the threat of force will induce him to abandon his pretensions to be the power in Fars. It is reliably reported that he is harbouring the absconding Deputy, Nowbakht, and his son, whose arrest had been demanded by the Allies, and that, in spite of Khasrow's written undertaking, there are still Germans in Qashgai territory. There is, however, reason to hope that the influence for evil of Germans with the tribes has weakened. Abul Qasim, the rebel Bakhtiari leader, has already surrendered against a pardon and is now in Tehran; there are dissensions among the Boir Ahmadi chiefs, all of whom are, in various ways, making approaches to the Government, though possibly with no more sincere intention than that of gaining time, and, for the time being, the Qashgai have ceased their brigandage. But the elements of disorder are still present, German agents have still the opportunity to incite attacks against our interests, and the foundations of a lasting peace will not be laid until the Persian Government and its forces are strong enough to dictate to the tribes. The Minister for War is now visiting Fars to study the situation on the spot.

#### *Tribal Situation—Kurdistan.*

13. In Northern Kurdistan, although tribal territory is still almost entirely free from Persian control, the fear of Russian action has confined Kurdish lawlessness within reasonable limits. There has been some raiding across the



Turkish border, and the Turkish sheep brought back are reported to have found ready purchasers among the Soviet troops. In Southern Kurdistan, where we are more closely interested, the uneasy peace that has prevailed for some time seemed likely to be disturbed by the escape from Iraqi surveillance and the return to Persia of that troublesome chief, Mahmud Dizli. He endeavoured to rally certain Kurdish chiefs to his support, wrote threatening letters to the commander of the local Persian troops demanding the withdrawal of his forces even further from tribal territory, and then ventured to attack these troops. He was repulsed with some loss, and as, at approximately the same time, a minor operation drove another troublesome chief, Suleiman Rukhzadeh Jaf, back to Iraq, the tribal bellicosity fizzled out. Attempts have been made by German agents to get into contact with some of the Southern Kurdish tribes to prepare them for the arrival of parachutists and to induce them to prepare landing grounds, but reliable information is not available as to the extent to which the tribes have been responsive.

#### *Security.*

14. In view of the serious deterioration in the general political situation, which was being exploited by enemy agents, and the dropping of German parachutists in various parts of Persia, and of the possible breakdown of Government, I recommended, amongst other things, that full use should be made of any information connected with the Axis plot of last year, and that the arrest of certain dangerous Persians—if necessary by ourselves in view of the utter corruption and inefficiency of the Persian police—would have a salutary effect. I fully realised that such arrests might annoy the American Government, but, on the other hand, I considered our case had become immeasurably stronger in that we were now responsible for the security of American troops transporting supplies to Russia. Further, as far as the Soviet Government were concerned, such action was in their real interests and was intended to ensure the safe arrival of aid to Russia without interruption. I had in the meantime discussed the matter with my Soviet colleague and pressed for close co-operation. He replied that he had already asked his Government for authority to request the Persian Government to arrest certain Persian suspects.

15. I was in due course authorised by you to make use of our knowledge of the plot at my discretion, but you were doubtful of the advisability of our arresting the Persian suspects ourselves. At the same time you explained the whole position to the American and Soviet Governments, and invited the latter to send instructions to their representative in Tehran to discuss with me the question of the arrest by the Persian Government of certain dangerous Persians, with a view to reaching agreement on a common line of action. It was felt that such joint action would be far more effective. As it was evident that direct American participation was hardly to be expected, the most that could be hoped for from the American Government was general friendly support.

16. The authority given to me to make use of information about the plot arrived at a most opportune moment, as the Deputy, Naubakht, had just tabled an interpellation of the Government, and of the Minister for War in particular, attacking the Government and the Allies. I accordingly furnished the Prime Minister and the Minister for War with suitable evidence regarding Naubakht's pro-Axis and other treasonable activities, both in connexion with the plot and since that date, so as to enable them to produce a crushing reply. In order to test the sincerity of the Prime Minister's recent offer to me to arrest anybody against whom I might be able to produce proper evidence, I at the same time in a letter of the 5th August requested him to withdraw Naubakht's parliamentary immunity to enable him to be arrested and sent to Sultanabad for detention and interrogation in accordance with the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1942. After the usual delays the interpellation was finally fixed for the 24th August, but Naubakht, undoubtedly scenting danger and realising how weak his hand had become, particularly in view of the arrest of certain Germans in Tehran, failed to put in an appearance. The Government did not feel themselves strong enough to ask the Majlis to remove his immunity, and it is now reported that he and his son have fled to the Shiraz district.

17. It soon became clear that, if the Axis-controlled organisations were to be really effectively dislocated, a much larger number of arrests than originally foreseen would have to be effected. Accordingly, a list of about 140 suspects, including seventy Persian railway employees known to be implicated in railway sabotage organisations, was prepared and communicated by me to my Soviet and American colleagues. Amongst those whose names figured in the list were such

persons as Kashani, Kupal, Pourzand, Naubakht, &c. General Connolly, American General Officer Commanding, whom I also consulted regarding the suspect railway employees, promised full collaboration. The attitude of my American colleague was more satisfactory than last year, and I hoped to be able to rely on his acquiescence in the arrests. At the time my Soviet colleague had not received final instructions, and it was not until the 29th August that I handed to the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs the full Anglo-Soviet list of 162 suspects with a request that they should be arrested and sent to Sultanabad for detention and interrogation. It was made clear to the Prime Minister that written evidence in all cases would be forthcoming as soon as the majority of the suspects were safely under lock and key at Sultanabad. My Soviet colleague spoke in the same sense immediately afterwards. We both assured the Prime Minister that we would continue to give him our support if he agreed to our request. The Prime Minister then promised to give orders for the arrests to begin at dawn on the 30th August. So far the arrests have been effected smoothly and efficiently by the Persian authorities, and it is most gratifying that the demands of the Allies have been executed with such little disturbance to the normal life of the country. In particular, the co-operation of the American military on the railway was extremely helpful. Up to the present about 110 suspects have been arrested. So far it has been unnecessary for me, except in the case of the railway employees, to avail myself of the discretion given to me in your telegram No. 755, namely, to effect arrests ourselves. On the 2nd September the Persian Government, in agreement with my Soviet colleague and myself, issued a communiqué justifying their attitude in regard to the arrests.

#### *Finance.*

18. There has been little or no change in the financial situation, which continues to be critical. Prices continue to rise, and the condition of the poorer classes and lower-paid Government officials is serious. In spite of pruning of all estimates by Dr. Millspaugh, Government expenditure continues to rise and there is a constant excess of expenditure over revenue. Attempts to raise additional revenue by income tax or other means continue to be stultified by obstruction by the Majlis or other interested parties. Sales of gold and silver, both for British and for Persian account, have been carried out, but not on a sufficient scale to check the rise in commodity prices. Faced with a large deficit on the budget for the current year, Dr. Millspaugh advised the Persian Government to approach the Allies for a loan, and also to request the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company for an advance against this year's royalties.

19. An Income Tax Bill prepared by Dr. Millspaugh was submitted to the Majlis on the 28th May. It provides for a sharp increase in contributions in the higher income levels, with the avowed object of recouping from merchants, contractors and landowners some of the extravagant profits made by them during the past year. It has been bitterly obstructed in the Majlis, where the parties affected are most strongly entrenched, and its passage in something like its original form, or its rejection, may well mark the ultimate success or failure of the Millspaugh Mission.

20. The budget, which was submitted to the Majlis on the 29th July, estimated revenue at 1,890,795,096 rials and expenditure at 3,297,718,537. To the estimated deficit of some 1,406 million rials Dr. Millspaugh expects that it will be necessary to add a further 500 million rials to provide some compensation to Government officials for the steep increase in the cost of living. As it will in any case take some considerable time for the income tax law (if and when passed) and other proposed measures to raise additional revenue in Persia, Dr. Millspaugh has advised the Government to request the American and/or British Governments for a loan sufficient to cover the total deficit of 1,900 million rials. A further revolving sum of 500 million rials is needed to finance grain collection, and Dr. Millspaugh has recommended that if possible this sum should also be borrowed from the Allied Governments. In addition to this, the Persian Government have been obliged to approach the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company for advances on the oil royalties payable in 1943-44. The latter approach was successful; the former is still under consideration by the Governments concerned. Meanwhile Dr. Millspaugh is hopefully looking round for financial windfalls. Having asked His Majesty's Legation to try to obtain advances on account of freights due by the Allies to the Persian State Railways, he found himself presented with a bill for over 200 million rials due to the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation;



Dr. Millspaugh then suggested that he be given a respite by setting off the U.K.C.C. claim against his claim for railway advances.

21. In pursuit of price stabilisation Dr. Millspaugh continued to issue regulations under the authority of the special powers conferred on him by the Majlis. The Price Stabilisation Section has been given extensive powers in respect of foreign trade, rent control, control of motor vehicles and tyres, control of transportation and sale of cereals, &c. A Government Pharmaceutical Institute has been established. Dr. Millspaugh recognises that such measures cannot alone stabilise prices, and that they must be supplemented by internal borrowing and emergency taxation. A project for issuing Treasury bonds is before the Majlis. In his latest monthly report he expresses optimism regarding the prospects of control of speculation and inflation, but the results of all his labours are as yet hard to find and very few share his optimism.

22. The cost of living index has moved from 910 in June 1943 to 917 in August 1943. The quantity of notes in circulation has increased from 4,058 millions in June to 4,307 millions in August 1943. The presence of Allied troops makes further expansion inevitable, but every effort is being made to keep the expenditure by British forces as low as possible. The acute shortage of currency notes which was experienced a few months ago has been eased by fairly considerable arrivals from the United Kingdom, and more are *en route*.

23. With the double object of obtaining rials for His Majesty's forces and of reducing commodity prices, sales of gold coins for British account were begun at the end of June; sales of gold bars and of silver were undertaken at the same time by the Persian Government, and close co-operation was established. Owing to various causes, one of which was an inadequate supply of coins, it has not yet been possible to carry out the scheme on the scale originally intended, and the effect on commodity prices has not been noticeable. About £500,000 worth of Persian currency has, however, been obtained in advantageous conditions for His Majesty's forces. The offer of gold has also increased confidence in Persian currency, and has probably led to some reduction in issues of fresh currency. The price of sovereigns has fallen during the period of sales from 700 rials on the 12th July to 580 rials at the end of August. One hundred thousand Pahlavis (equivalent to gold sovereigns) are being coined for British account, and, provided the rather fickle market remains good at the reduced price, sales may be expected to increase.

24. By the Currency Law of the 19th November, 1942, the metallic reserves of the National Bank of Persia were revalued on the basis of 35 dollars per fine ounce of gold and 23½d. per ounce of silver, thus creating a substantial profit in rials which has been carried to a special reserve. All new issues of currency after the promulgation of the law must be backed as to 60 per cent. gold for sterling or dollars convertible into gold and 40 per cent. sterling or dollars guaranteed against depreciation in terms of gold. By a decree of the Council of Ministers, No. 5922 of the 31st May, 1943, the note-issue functions of the National Bank are separated from its banking functions and the bank is divided into an issue department and a banking department. After the separation the commercial or banking section now has its capital fully paid up and its reserves appreciably strengthened.

#### *Civil Supplies.*

25. Since 1941 imports of civil goods into Persia have been drastically curtailed owing to the need to economise shipping. Persia tightened her belt with a fairly good grace and even endured a reduction of imports which was perhaps more drastic than that applied to other Middle Eastern countries. Ordinary import and export trade virtually ceased, and it may be that the *coup de grâce* has been given by Dr. Millspaugh's recent regulations declaring many articles to be Government monopolies and restricting merchants' profits on imports to 5 per cent. There is no question, however, but that these measures were necessary.

26. None the less, if there is now a prospect of more shipping and more goods for the Middle East, Persia should be among the first to benefit. Increased supplies of some essential civil goods are already believed to be in sight; more tea has been offered from India, and the United States may be able to supply cotton piece-goods and yarns. The organisation of road and rail transport is improving, and this should be less of an obstacle to importation and distribution. After her declaration of war against Germany, Persia will probably look to the Allies for a more generous policy in this respect.

27. Persian industry is still in difficulties; transport is easier owing to the allocation of some lend-lease trucks to factories and mines, but there is much discontent among employees because of low salaries. This directly affects supplies of civil goods, and the Anglo-American supply committees are consequently giving all the help they can towards the maintenance of these industries.

#### *Transport.*

28. *Road.*—The Road Transport Department has been reorganised. An American, Mr. Vivian, has replaced Mr. Birkle as director, and the staff has been strengthened by the addition of several Anglo-Saxon assistants. The Millspaugh Mission is showing keen interest in the welfare of the department and is co-operating with the Road Transport Board in improving the control and organisation of road transport. The department now has nearly 1,000 lend-lease vehicles and (theoretically) about the same number of contracted vehicles. The control of the latter is nebulous but will become better as organisation improves. Lend-lease vehicles are being steadily distributed for the transport of cereals; and coal and charcoal are being moved more or less according to plan. Unsuitable tyres and the lack of spare parts and maintenance facilities handicap the efficiency of the department's fleet. The control of road transport in the provinces has left much to be desired but should improve when the department has more staff.

29. *Rail.*—The allocation for civil supplies, excluding oil, amounts to 8,000 tons a month. The allocation for oil for civil requirements is 678 tons a day. Oil stocks in Tehran are now substantial, with the exception of petrol, which became reduced owing to the concentration on supplies to Russia. This position is now being corrected. A British Movements Officer was sent to Ahwaz to supervise civil loadings and an immediate improvement resulted. It is now proposed to set up a Civil Movements Control organisation under the direct supervision of the Millspaugh Mission.

#### *Food Situation.*

30. There have been several fundamental changes in the organisation of the Ministry of Supply since my last despatch was written. It has, in fact, ceased to exist as a Ministry, since in August it was divided into two sections—the Cereals and Bread Section under Mr. Sheridan, to deal with grain collection and the feeding of towns, and the Price Stabilisation Section under Mr. Robinson of the American Financial Mission, to deal with the stabilisation of prices and the distribution of Government monopoly goods such as tea, sugar and piece-goods. Dr. Millspaugh has personally assumed responsibility for grain collection in addition to his duties as Adviser-General of the Finances. Meanwhile Mr. Sheridan's contract expires in September and at his request is not being renewed. He took the few weeks' leave due to him and left Persia on the 28th August, 1943. Mr. Crawford, an American member of the Middle East Supply Centre, has succeeded him temporarily, pending the arrival from the United States of a permanent incumbent, engaged by Dr. Millspaugh, who is expected to reach Tehran during the first half of September.

31. The Persian Government propose to employ three main methods for collecting the grain they need—undertakings by landlords to sell an assessed proportion of their crop to Government at the Government-controlled price, forward contracts with reliable contractors, and purchase from the peasant of his surplus in return for 90 per cent. of the Government price in cash and 10 per cent. in sugar or tea. This last method, known locally as the barter system, is being held in abeyance in most areas, until a considerable proportion of landlords' undertakings have been completed, for fear that landlords should be tempted to withhold their grain in the hope of disposing of it through their peasants and so obtain large quantities of sugar or tea for sale on the black market. In Khuzistan, however, where, contrary to all expectations, undertakings for 14,000 tons have been obtained and delivery of over 10,000 tons already secured, the barter system has just been introduced with a view to buying up a proportion of the peasants' surplus. If all goes well, the estimated total by both methods is between 15,000 and 20,000 tons, or approximately sufficient for the needs of the towns of Khuzistan till next harvest. Last year's collections amounted to about 400 tons only; as a result the local market in wheat had to be freed, and this was followed by an immediate rise in the price of bread to 10 rials or 12 rials per kilo. Government-controlled bread of good quality at 4 rials per kilo. has after one set-back, which took the form of a riot instigated by interested persons, now been on sale in Ahwaz for over a month.



32. The target figure for collection throughout the country was given by Mr. Sheridan, perhaps somewhat optimistically, at 300,000 tons. Collections so far have been slow and are reported by the Cereals and Bread Section to be only 37,000 tons to the end of August. The same source puts undertakings secured plus amounts contracted for at just over 171,000 tons, though undertakings are still being obtained in many areas. The unknown factor, which is liable seriously to reduce Mr. Sheridan's estimate, is the quantity required by the Soviets for their own needs and their attitude towards collection in and export from the Russian zone. I hope that this will become clearer in the course of next week or two. If it does not, I propose to ask my American colleague to join me in a request to the Soviet authorities for a definition of their attitude, since a failure to supply Persia with a considerable share of grain from the rich northern provinces this year would almost inevitably result in an appeal from the Persian Government to the British and American Governments for imported grain to feed the country. The position at the moment is complicated by the fact that the Persian Government has still some 7,000 tons of grain to deliver on contracts concluded with the Soviet last year. Meanwhile Dr. Millspaugh has quite cleverly manoeuvred the Soviet authorities into a more awkward position than they were in last year with respect to grain collection for their own use or for export. Dr. Millspaugh, having inserted a clause in one of his regulations to the effect that all foreign authorities desiring to buy grain were required to obtain his permission, made a statement to the press in which he said that he was satisfied from his own investigations that neither the British nor the American forces were buying grain in Persia for their own consumption or export. The Soviet authorities, owing to the war situation, had need of grain but must first ensure that Persian requirements were satisfied before exporting grain. In any event, he would publish any applications from foreign authorities to purchase cereals in this country. It is not likely that this will deter the Soviet authorities from seeking to obtain a considerable quantity of grain, but it should at least serve to clear us to some extent of the unfounded charge of buying grain to the detriment of the country's food supply, and at the same time to bring the Soviet authorities into the open in this matter. As you are aware, the Soviet authorities exported large quantities of grain last year unknown to the public, and simultaneously secured undeserved kudos by exporting to Persia 25,000 tons of wheat, the delivery of which has just been completed.

33. On the legislative side, Dr. Millspaugh has recently published three regulations, Nos. 14, 15 and 16, which, in brief, are designed to create a Government monopoly in cereals to enable the price of rice to be fixed by Government at a later date, to make the black market in cereals illegal, to prohibit the movement of grain into towns except on Government account, and to enable such members of the public as wish to bake their own bread to buy flour from Government stocks against surrender of bread coupons. Apart from the allocation of too large a quantity of flour as obtainable against a bread coupon, through ignorance of the fact that 1 pound of flour produces 1.4 pounds of bread, these regulations on the whole are salutary. Unfortunately, however, in this country there is an almost unbridgeable gulf between the promulgation of a law and its enforcement.

34. Towards the end of August it became evident that unless energetic measures were taken Tehran would already be faced with the danger of a bread shortage at the beginning of October. Dr. Millspaugh's attention was invited by His Majesty's Legation to the fact that present stocks in the silo would be exhausted on the 18th September, and that the remaining quantities from Russia, even if delivered promptly, would last only a further ten days. From about the 1st October, therefore, the city would have to depend on local collections of grain which up to that date amounted to only 300 tons in all. Dr. Millspaugh, who fully shared our apprehensions, caused energetic steps to be taken to expedite collections and transport to the silo, with the result that the daily deliveries rose first to 50 tons, then to over 100 tons, and on the 6th September over 300 tons were delivered in one day. If this is maintained or increased the silo stock—since consumption is in the neighbourhood of 250 tons a day—will slowly begin to rise from the comparatively low level of 4,000 tons of wheat to which it had fallen. At the same time Mr. Crawford proposes gradually to reintroduce a percentage of adulterant into the bread and thus utilise the imported barley and millet already in stock and barley which is now coming in from the current harvest. The Cereals and Bread Section state that landlords' undertakings obtained in the Tehran area amount to 20,000 tons. If most of these are fulfilled without undue difficulty or delay, a breathing space of two or three months should be gained in which arrangements for the collection and transport to Tehran from

surplus areas can be made. There are, however, apart from the reluctance of growers to part with their grain, two main difficulties in the way of collections throughout the country—shortage of funds and the misuse of transport by drivers and local officials. The first has been accentuated by the bifurcation of the Ministry of Supply into a Cereals and Bread Section and a Price Stabilisation Section. The revolving fund of 5 million rials estimated by Mr. Sheridan to be sufficient to buy the grain needed by the Government, was fixed partly on the assumption that incomings from the sale of tea, sugar and piece-goods would be available, but these will not now automatically accrue to the Cereals and Bread Section. Mr. Crawford is putting to Dr. Millspaugh the case for a further allocation of funds to his section. Meanwhile Dr. Millspaugh has some difficulty in finding even a few million rials at a time for grain purchase which the Cereals and Bread Section distribute piece-meal among areas where the clamour for funds is loudest.

35. To reduce the misuse of transport and to expedite collections generally, arrangements are being made for Major McDowell, Transport Officer, Middle East Supply Centre, and Lieutenant-Colonel Ataullah, I.M.S., whose services have been loaned to the Cereals and Bread Section of the Persian Government, to visit the more important grain-producing areas, if possible by aeroplane.

36. Before he went into hospital with a severe cold a few days ago, Dr. Millspaugh proposed to hold a conference of his senior officials, at which also His Majesty's Legation and Middle East Supply Centre were to be represented, in order to discuss finance, transport and other matters connected with this year's food supply for Persia. I trust the conference will be held as soon as Dr. Millspaugh leaves hospital, and I will see that he is informed of the proposals for dealing with recalcitrant landlords contained in the correspondence resting with your telegram No. 736 of the 7th August, and his views obtained.

37. It is universally agreed that the yield throughout the country this year has been good, but owing to reduced sowings in many areas as compared with those of a few years ago, the harvest should not, I consider, be rated better than high average. Even so, provided proper measures were taken, there should be plenty of grain to seed the towns till next harvest, to leave sufficient for the needs of the villages, including ample seed, and to constitute a substantial reserve with which to start next year. The doubtful factor is, of course, the ability of the Persian Government to collect grain from unwilling landlords and to control speculation. In promoting this object our consular officers and consular liaison officers have been of inestimable value, as Mr. Sheridan himself testified on several occasions before he left. They have witnessed sowings, assessed crops, obtained undertakings, arranged forward contracts, brought abuses and corruption to notice and generally done all in their power to ensure the success of this year's operations.

#### *Armed Forces.*

38. There is nothing to record as regards land forces. The air force is suffering from an acute shortage of aircraft and the almost complete lack of any means of keeping serviceable the aircraft it has, since the British forces have dispossessed it of its best airfields and almost the whole of its hangars and repair shops. It is doubtful if it now has as many as twenty first-line aircraft fit for operational use.

39. A policy has therefore been adopted of drastically reducing its establishment. This has coincided with the appointment of the energetic and unpopular Colonel Mohanna as Chief of the Air Force.

40. His Majesty's Government's offer to train twelve Persian officers in England involves, in its revised form, a financial burden too heavy for the Persian Government to bear. This will be a cause of very great disappointment, particularly to the officers concerned, and it is hoped that some alternative offer may be found possible.

41. The Minister for War has requested that in place of the ten Hurricanes offered by His Majesty's Government in replacement for aircraft taken over nearly two years ago, a corresponding number of other aircraft may be made available of a type which would more nearly meet the requirements of the Persian Air Force, and which it might be able to maintain in a serviceable condition. This shows a welcome preference for the practical over the showy, and if general purposes aircraft can in fact be provided the efficiency and morale of the Persian Air Force should greatly benefit.



42. It is satisfactory that, in spite of the discouragement which the Persian Air Force has received ever since the occupation of the country by the Allies, no air force officer was among those whose arrest was recently made for participation in pro-German activities. This is in notable contrast to the army as a whole.

*Press.*

43. The steady flow of Allied victories during the last two and a half months has led most of the papers to the assumption that peace is not far off and that Persia should therefore be prepared to defend her rights at the Peace Conference. Many papers have argued that she is suffering as much, if not more than, those countries which were actually at war, and that her reward should be commensurate with her sufferings. A few papers attributed these sufferings to Allied occupation of the country and alleged that food-stuffs were being removed by the Allies, but, on the whole, responsibility for the difficult food situation and the unbearably high cost of living is placed on the Government, which is repeatedly and bitterly attacked for its incompetent handling of these questions. The American advisers, in particular Dr. Millspaugh, have come in for much criticism in this connexion, and there is a tendency to despair of their efforts to remedy the financial and economic situation of the country. A similar note of despondency is frequently struck with regard to the forthcoming elections, the general opinion being that, even if they were allowed to be carried through freely, the new Deputies will prove no better than the members of the present Majlis.

44. Attacks on Reza Shah and those who were described as "the traitorous agents of the dictatorship" have been frequent, and the present Shah was more than once warned to behave in accordance with the Constitution. Several papers overstepped the mark in their criticism of royalty and were suppressed. Others met a similar fate for too outspoken attacks on the Government. But suppression in most cases was not a serious matter. Either the paper was released after a brief interval or else it reappeared in a slightly disguised form under a different name. A dozen or more of the Leftist papers have banded themselves into what they called a "Freedom Front," the declared object of which is to achieve national unity in order to defend democracy and oppose despotism. Violent squabbles arose among the different sections of the press over various domestic issues and most scurrilous articles were written by the participants. The one question on which there has been complete unanimity of opinion is the Persian declaration of war on Germany. All the papers welcomed this step and considered it to be in the interests of the country.

*British Council.*

45. The Council's organisation has continued to expand during the period under review. Six more persons have joined the Tehran staff; a summer school was opened in July at Tajrish, outside Tehran; and during the visit to Persia of Professor Ifor Evans, of the Council's London staff, plans which are expected to mature in October were made for the opening of an Anglo-Persian Institute at Isfahan. Professor Evans was received in audience by the Shah; he made numerous contacts among Persians of all classes and lectured with success under the auspices of the Minister of Education. Lectures, film shows and concerts were given at frequent intervals at the Tehran Institute, whose membership rose to 360 students and 450 non-students, while a further 390 students were taught at Tajrish and in secondary schools. Radio lessons in English are now being organised and plans are being actively pursued for the publication of children's and women's journals in Persian in co-operation with the Public Relations Bureau of His Majesty's Legation.

I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister of State at Cairo; to Minbranch, Bagdad; to the Government of India; and to His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 5564/338/34]

No. 44.

(1)

*The Iranian Minister to Mr. Eden.—(Received 17th September.)*

Your Excellency,

*London, 14th September, 1943.*

I HAVE the honour to state that I am instructed by the Iranian Government to bring to your Excellency's notice the following:—

In view of certain events and intrigues carried on by German agents amongst some Iranian tribes against the Iranian Government resulting in regrettable incidents and the despatch by aircraft of special agents by the aforesaid Power for the purpose of destroying railways and severing means of communications, as well as organising espionage and other acts in Iran, it has become evident to the Iranian Government that German agents have been attempting to create by their activities disunity and revolt amongst the people, thereby endangering public order, and the Iranian Government, regarding these illegal acts as hostile and dangerous to the country, have resolved to consider themselves in a state of war with Germany as from the 9th September, 1943, adhering at the same time to the declaration by the United Nations of the 1st January, 1942.

I have, &c.

*Iranian Minister.*

(2)

*Mr. Eden to the Iranian Minister.*

Your Excellency,

*Foreign Office, 22nd September, 1943.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 14th September, in which you were good enough to communicate the decision of the Imperial Iranian Government to declare a state of war between Iran and Germany and to adhere to the declaration of the United Nations of the 1st January, 1942.

2. In a telegram to his Excellency the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs I have expressed the gratification of His Majesty's Government at this assertion of Iran's determination to range herself against the enemy who has attempted to undermine her sovereignty and sow disunity among her people.

I have, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

[E 5743/38/34]

No. 45.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 26th September.)*

(No. 1026.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 26th September, 1943.*

SAYYID ZIA is on his way from Palestine to Persia and is expected to arrive here about 27th September. He will come as a private individual and will probably be received by the Shah before the latter leaves for official visit to Meshed on 3rd October. He will almost certainly be elected as Deputy for some constituency or other.

2. It is too early to say how much support he will obtain in the country and what Soviet reactions will be if later he is called upon to form a Government. I think that owing to his long stay in Palestine he is at present regarded by my Soviet colleague with some suspicion. Moreover, it may not be in Soviet interests that a man like Sayyid Zia, with his reputation for strong action, should be given a chance of producing order out of the existing chaos.



## B.—Intelligence Summaries.

[E 3782/110/34]

No. 46.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 1st July.)*

(No. 249.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 24 for the period 8th to 14th June, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 15th June, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 46.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary, No. 24, for the period 8th to 14th June, 1943.*

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

1. The Shah and his party returned to Tehran on the 12th June. During his stay in Isfahan he visited troops, hospitals, mills, schools and neighbouring villages. His Majesty's Consul at Isfahan considers that the visit was a success.

2. In political circles the main topics of interest are the next elections and the Income Tax Bill. It is to be feared that the opponents of the latter are organising their forces more effectively than its supporters. The Bill is to be examined by three Majlis Commissions, who will estimate its effects on agriculture, commerce and the Budget.

3. In addition to those mentioned in Summary No. 23/43, paragraph 6, the following newspapers have now been allowed to re-appear: *Nabard i Imruz*, *Mihan Parastan*, *Azadegan*.

*Economic.*

4. The bread situation is now fairly satisfactory throughout the country. In Tehran there were on the 6th June over 7,500 tons of grain in reserve in Government stores, of which, according to the Tehran press, 4,234 tons had been received from Russia against the promised quantity of 25,000 tons. British and American deliveries now total 17,500 tons of the 25,000 promised under the Food Agreement. Reports from the provinces show that the bread supply of the principal towns is likely to be assured until the harvest. The prospect of a bumper harvest is inducing hoarders to market their grain now, and generally plentiful supplies of good bread are available for those who can pay the free prices. The next crop should produce a considerable surplus of grain over Persia's requirements for the year, provided hoarding and smuggling can be prevented. The Income Tax Bill has had the effect of making landlords more reluctant to declare their surpluses, fearing that they may be taken as a basis for assessment of income tax. In Khuzestan, where the crop is already harvested, a Government Commission has been fairly successful in obtaining undertakings from the landlords. In Fars the landlords, anxious to avoid the interference of Government officials in the assessment and collection of their crops, have contracted to deliver to Government 36,000 tons of wheat at the Government price, irrespective of their surpluses. Similar arrangements may be made in Isfahan. Prices of foodstuffs show a tendency to fall.

5. A Bill has been presented to the Majlis asking for sanction for a credit of 160 million rials for the Persian Government munition factories. These factories are manufacturing arms and ammunition for the Russians, and the credit is required for the purchase of raw materials, to meet the cost of the completion of the Machine Gun Factory to enable it to manufacture machine pistols, and for the running expenses of the factories. In the contract made with the Russians the latter made no definite undertaking regarding the method, time or rate of payment for arms taken over and they have as yet made no payments.

6. The Persian press states that the amount of revenue received from indirect taxation during the year March 1942–February 1943 was 362,397,395 rials and that this was an increase of 104,033,395 rials over the receipts of the previous year. The principal sources of revenue from indirect taxation are the 3 per cent. tax levied on all commodities brought to markets for sale and the tax on oils and petrol. These account for over 250 million rials.

7. In addition to the places mentioned in Summary No. 23/43, paragraph 19, locust swarms have been reported at Zabul, Birjand, Turbat i Haidari, Quchan, Bujuurd, Kashan and in the vicinity of Tehran. The Government has issued a decree ordering the Ministries of the Interior and for War to instruct all their officials in the provinces to undertake a vigorous campaign against locusts wherever found and to call on village headmen, tribal chiefs and peasants to give all necessary assistance.

*Appointments—Civil.*

8. Muhsin Qarib, to be Director General in the Ministry of Food.

*Persian Army.*

9. A beginning has been made in Tehran with the organisation of a Central Recruit Training Depot and of a Central Depot of Administrative Services as proposed by General Ridley, see Summary No. 2/43, paragraph 9. All recruits on conscription now go to the Central Training Depot, where they will be trained for six months before being drafted to their units. The organisation of the Central Depot for Administration is meeting with much obstruction and it is not yet in effective operation. Three more American officers have now joined General Ridley's staff, which now consists of three field and three junior officers.

*Appointments—Military.*

10. Sarhang Shahandeh, to be Commander of the Behbahan Brigade.

*Internal Security.**Fars.*

11. The Persian forces occupied Firuzabad on the 11th June, having met with little serious opposition since their severe fight on the 25th May. On the 10th June an attack was made on the column that advanced from Lar to Khunj, which, according to the Persian General Staff, was beaten off with loss to the tribesmen. Nasir and those of his followers who have not dispersed have now taken refuge in the hills lying between Firuzabad and Farrashband. The Persian forces at the latter place have reported that they have found a well-prepared landing ground, which is now being used by the Persian Air Force.

12. The Persian General Staff has announced that the occupation of Firuzabad, Farrashband, Qir o Qavzin, Khunj and Ahram—the important places in the area previously controlled by Nasir Qashgai—completes the first phase of the operations; the second phase is to pursue and disarm the rebels. It is probable that organised resistance by Nasir Qashgai is now at an end. It is certain that he called on the maximum support he could get for the defence of the centres where he had exercised an unchallenged rule for over eighteen months, where his stores of grain and any munitions he had were collected, and where he had prepared landing grounds for the arrival of German aircraft. The loss of these places will be not only damaging to his prestige among the tribes, but also a great blow to the Germans and the pro-German party in Persia, who were still working to keep alive the belief that German forces might still reach Persia and reward those who had prepared for their arrival. Nasir is now a fugitive but he may still be in a position to send out raiding bands to be a nuisance. General Shahbakhti is now offering safe-conduct to those tribal families who have remained in winter quarters to persuade them to move to their summer quarters.

13. It has been reported in previous Summaries that the Mamassanni Khans had refused all Nasir's invitations to support him in resistance to the Government. These Khans have been asking that their possession of certain lands should be legally confirmed and they had been promised that a Commission would be sent to Fars to investigate their claims. It is unfortunate that Dr. Millspaugh in



his capacity of Director-General of Finance should have chosen this moment, when the situation in Fars is still delicate, to send them telegrams informing them that their claims could not be considered as they had no legal basis.

*Western Azerbaijan.*

14. His Majesty's Vice-Consul in Azerbaijan recently visited Rezaieh. He reports that the Kurdish situation is quiet and attributes this to the warning given to the Kurds by the Soviet Consul at Rezaieh that disorder might compel the intervention of Soviet troops.

*Tehran, 14th June, 1943.*

[E 3921/110/34]

No. 47.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 7th July.)*

(No. 262.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 25 for the period the 15th to the 21st June, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 22nd June, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 47.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 25 for the period 15th to 21st June, 1943.*

*Persian Affairs.*

*Political.*

1. The Deputies of the Majlis, whose main interest at present is to secure a prolongation of the present Parliament, have recently been heavily attacked in the press. At their request the Prime Minister drafted a Bill to limit the number of newspapers in Tehran and the provinces and to establish a press censorship. The Bill is said to have been approved in secret session, but when the Prime Minister presented it in open Parliament with the request that it should be treated with double urgency the Majlis refused this request, whereupon the Prime Minister withdrew the Bill. It is alleged in some quarters that the object of the Deputies was to discredit the Prime Minister, but the outcome is that, after some complicated lobbying, a majority of the Deputies has promised to continue to support the Prime Minister, and the Prime Minister has promised to do his best to ensure the re-election of the Deputies.

2. In spite of this the Cabinet is shaky and weakened by internal strife. The many candidates for the premiership are very busy endeavouring to secure support. An active campaign against Seyyid Zia-ed-Din has been launched in some newspapers, one going so far as to claim that it knew that the Soviet Ambassador was opposed to the return of Seyyid Zia, because of his known hostility to Soviet interests, and stating that, since the whole of Northern Iran was in Soviet hands, the northern neighbours could cause thousands of difficulties if they were displeased.

3. The Minister of Justice, Ali Asghar Hikmat, has resigned from the Cabinet as he disagreed with the Press Bill referred to in paragraph 1 above. Rahnema, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Prime Minister, has also resigned, to the general relief. He was an evil and mischief-making man.

4. Another resignation was that of Misbazzadeh, the Director of the Department of Press and Propaganda. This was followed by an announcement that the department would be dissolved and reorganised on a different basis.

5. The Majlis is successfully employing delaying tactics in dealing with the Income Tax Bill and other measures proposed by Dr. Millsbaugh, notably the Bills for the engagement of additional American advisers.

*Economic.*

6. Dr. Millsbaugh, in his third monthly report, states that the greater part of the difficulties with which the Government are faced are due to the war and to the utilisation by the Allies of Persian territory, of Government establishments and of means of transport. The Allies had given much help to Persia, but more was needed if a financial and economic collapse was to be avoided. The Allies could help—

- (i) By reducing their rial expenditure.
- (ii) By increasing imports.
- (iii) By collaborating closely with the Persian Government in prevention of the export of essential goods.
- (iv) By paying customs dues on all the goods they import that are not explicitly exempted.
- (v) By refraining from pressing the Persian Government to spend money on repairs of buildings, &c., occupied by Allied troops.
- (vi) By abstaining from paying high wages to Persian labourers.
- (vii) By revising contracts which compel the Persian Government to borrow money to pay for machinery and raw materials required for the manufacture of munitions.
- (viii) By agreeing that payment by the Persian Government for goods purchased in Allied countries should be postponed until after the war.

Points (v) and (vii) are directed against the Russians, who recently asked that the Persian Government should repair, at a cost of 30 million rials, Persian barracks occupied by Soviet troops in Azerbaijan. Point (vii) refers to the contract made with the Persian Government for the manufacture of arms.

7. The Soviet indebtedness to Persia is estimated by the Director-General of Finance to amount to approximately 180 million tomans, of which 46 millions are due to the Ministry of Food, 80 millions to the Railway Administration and 50 millions to the Customs. It would be interesting to know how the Soviet spend the 83 million rials which they obtain monthly by their Financial Agreement with the Persian Government.

8. The press announces the arrival in Tehran by air from the United States of gold purchased by the Persian Government with their dollar credits which is to be sold with a view to bringing rials back to the Treasury. The amount is said to be the equivalent of 500,000 dollars at the New York price of gold. Some of the silver purchased by the Persian Government in India (see Summary No. 42/42, paragraph 3) is also being put on the market.

9. The Ministry of Roads and Communications have been granted credits to complete the Zinjan-Mianeh section of the railway line, and refused credits for the completion of the line Shahrud-Sabzevar-Nishapur.

10. Extracts from the Director-General of Finance's Regulation No. 8 for the control of the sale and use of motor vehicles and accessories are attached as an appendix.

*Persian Forces.*

11. The Minister for War states that General Ridley had written to him to the effect that, in view of the lack of co-operation of the Persian military authorities he would be obliged to inform his Government that it was useless for him and his mission to remain longer in Persia. General Ridley's principal complaint was that the General Staff would not let him have suitable officers to staff his training and administrative depots (see Summary No. 24/43, paragraph 9). General Ridley has said that he has now been promised the officers he wants; that he is satisfied with the support he receives from the Minister for War, but meets with much obstruction from the General Staff. There is no doubt that the Chief of the General Staff, although he has grudgingly accepted a limited rôle for the American advisers, does little to help them even within these limits. This question has further widened the breach between the Ministry for War and the General Staff. Discord became so serious that the Chief of the General Staff asked the Shah to accept his resignation as he could not work with the Minister for War. The Shah instructed him to take two months' leave.



*Internal Security.**Fars.*

12. The statement in Summary No. 24/43, paragraph 13, to the effect that Dr. Millspaugh had informed the Mamassanni Khans that their claims to land could not be considered is incorrect. Dr. Millspaugh had given no such decision.

13. The situation in Fars, so far as it is known, remains much as it was described in last week's Summary. General Shahbakhti has made no movement of importance, but he has stated that he intends to continue with the disarmament of the Qashgai tribes. It is likely that he will come to some arrangement with the tribes regarding the surrender of a certain proportion of their arms. Nasir Qashgai is still in hiding, and is reported to have his brother with him. No serious interference with the Bushire-Shiraz road has been reported.

*Khorassan.*

14. Fighting is reported between rival sections of the Zafaranlu Kurds of Kuchan.

*Turkish Affairs.*

15. The Minister for War reports that he has information that a secret society has been formed in Azerbaijan to encourage a movement for secession to Turkey, the argument being that, since Persia is unable to save Azerbaijan from bolshevism, Turkish protection must be sought. Apart from the fact that the Persian Government maintains an expensive intelligence organisation which has to justify its existence, the Minister for War is not above inventing bogies.

16. The Turkish Government has offered 500,000 doses of small-pox vaccine to Persia.

*American Affairs.*

17. An American, Mr. Harold Allen, an expert in agriculture and rural development, has arrived for service with the Persian Government.

*Russian Affairs.*

18. The Soviet Consulate in Ahwaz has opened a shop in the town for the display and sale of their propaganda material.

*Tehran, 21st June, 1943.*

*Appendix.*

*Extracts from Director-General of Finance's Regulation No. 8, dated 20th June, 1943.*

*ARTICLE 1.*

UNTIL such time as the regulations relating to the fixing of prices and rationing are issued and Government retail shops are opened, no merchant or other person, who has in his possession, for sale or in excess of his personal requirements, car or lorry spare parts, tools or tyres (whether inner tubes or outer covers), may sell them except in the two following ways:—

- (a) To actual users or consumers; that is to say, to persons who will at once bring the article in question into use on his car or lorry.
- (b) To the Price Stabilisation Section of the Ministry of Finance. After the 5th July, 1943, no equipment of this sort nor petrol will be sold to cars to which a licence to run has not been affixed.

*ARTICLE 2.*

By the 5th July, 1943, every merchant, whether wholesale or retail, and other person, who has in his possession, for sale or in excess of his personal requirements, car or lorry spare parts, tools or tyres (whether inner tubes or outer covers), must draw up and submit to the Price Stabilisation Section of the Ministry of Finance a declaration showing the total of these sorts of goods, except for nuts

and screws, the total quantity in stock or the total quantity in excess of personal requirements, the type and make of each article and the present sale price. In the case of tyres the name of the maker, the size and the serial number of the tyre must also be given.

*ARTICLE 3.*

Permits to use motor vehicles will be issued by the Price Stabilisation Section after the owner has made an application and the vehicle and its equipment have been examined.

*ARTICLE 4.*

By the 28th June, 1943, all motor vehicle owners must—

- (a) Place their vehicles at the disposal of the Price Stabilisation Section for examination, and
- (b) Fill up applications for permits in respect of their cars and submit them at the time of examination of their cars.

*ARTICLE 7.*

After 5 P.M. on the 5th July, 1943, any car which is seen without a car licence fixed on the windscreen where it can be clearly seen will be confiscated by the Price Stabilisation Section.

*ARTICLE 8.*

Henceforth no car may be transferred to a new owner, either by sale or by any other means, without the permission of the Price Stabilisation Section. In the event of infringement of this article the Price Stabilisation Section will confiscate the offender's car.

*ARTICLE 10.*

This regulation does not apply to the cars of the Imperial Iranian Army, nor to the cars of the foreign military authorities which are at present in Iran; therefore, army cars distinguished as such will not need a permit.

*ARTICLE 11.*

In the following cases a licence for running a car will be granted without examination or an official application:—

- (a) The Royal Family in respect of cars belonging to it.
- (b) Ministers, Under-Secretaries and Deputies in respect of one car only each.
- (c) Ambassadors, Ministers and other representatives of foreign Governments residing in Iran, and likewise officials of legations and consulates in respect of cars belonging to them.

*ARTICLE 12.*

Henceforth no car will be allowed to leave Iran, other than those mentioned in articles 9 and 10, unless it has the permit mentioned in article 2 or the driver has a special permit issued by the Price Stabilisation Section.

*ARTICLE 13.*

The export of cars, spare parts, tools and tyres from Iran is forbidden.

*ARTICLE 14.*

The examination of cars and issue of licences in Tehran and the provinces will be carried out in accordance with the instructions issued for the purpose by the Director-General of the Price Stabilisation Section.

*ARTICLE 15.*

This regulation will come into force on the 22nd June, 1943.



*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 10th July.)*

(No. 274.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 26, for the period the 22nd to the 28th June, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 29th June, 1943.

Enclosure in No. 48.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 26, for the period the 22nd to the 28th June, 1943.*

*Persian Affairs.*

*Political.*

A ROYAL Decree has been issued ordering preparations for new elections to begin on the 23rd June. In Tehran and to a lesser degree in the provinces canvassing has already begun. The Tudeh party, still generally the most active party, has agreed with two other Left parties, the Hamrahan and the Millat, that they will not oppose each other's candidates. A Democratic party, the Adalat, which has been in existence for some time in name, has recently been adding appreciably to its numbers. The Shah is reported on fairly reliable authority to be creating an organisation to ensure the return for Tehran of candidates of his choice, and it is alleged that the Chief of the General Staff is spending the leave given to him from his military duties (see Summary No. 25/43, paragraph 11) in furthering the Shah's election plans.

2. The Majlis has ratified the Anglo-Persian Financial Agreement (see Summary No. 12/43, paragraph 2), which it has had under consideration since March of this year. Little progress has yet been made with other Bills that have already been before Parliament for some time, the more important of which are the Income Tax Bill, the Bills for Compulsory Education, Insurance of Workers, the Issue of Treasury Bonds, and for the engagement of additional American advisers.

3. The priesthood is again beginning to acquire importance after a long period of eclipse. Some of them are being courted by the Shah and politicians. Arrangements are being made to give an impressive reception to Haji Aga Hussein Murtazavi Qumi, a prominent Shia divine of Kerbela, who is shortly revisiting Persia. While the priesthood has little influence with the so-called educated classes, it is still regarded with some respect by the lower classes, and the advances now being made to certain influential mullahs probably have their origin in the hope that their influence may be used against the spread of Communistic ideas.

4. A new paper has appeared—the *Guity*—which purports to be the organ of the Iranian Workers' Union, a union which has representatives in the provinces but about which little is known. It is unlikely that the paper will survive without Soviet support.

5. The Government finds itself critically short of cash. It has with difficulty met its obligations for the past (Persian) month, which ended on the 22nd June, but sees no prospect of meeting its obligations for the current month without foreign help. 500 million rials are required immediately to finance purchases of wheat under the scheme devised by the Adviser to the Ministry of Food. The Majlis has been asked to sanction the borrowing of this amount from the National Bank, but the bank has in fact not more than 70 million rials to lend. If a complete breakdown of the Administration is to be avoided it seems that a loan will have to be provided from British and/or American sources.

*Economic.*

6. In the preamble to the Bill asking the Majlis to sanction a loan of 500 million rials by the National Bank to the Ministry of Food, the Government explains that of the 750 million rials previously borrowed 579,180,000 rials represented the loss to Government in selling bread at a price lower than its cost.

7. In March last the Majlis sanctioned the exchange of gold coins, held by the Treasury as backing for the note issue, against gold ingots to be imported by the British authorities. These ingots have now arrived and have been exchanged for gold coins which are now being sold to the public on British account by the National and Imperial Banks. The rials so obtained will be available for British expenditure in Persia without increasing the note issue. The price of gold has dropped.

8. By his Regulation No. 9 the Director-General of Finance (Dr. Millspaugh) has decreed that raw cotton shall be a Government monopoly, and that the price, sale, distribution and export shall be controlled by the Price Stabilisation Section of the Ministry of Finance.

9. By his Regulation No. 10 the Director-General of Finance has decreed that the Price Stabilisation Section shall prepare every six months, or at such other time as it may consider necessary, a list of Persia's requirements of imported goods, classified in the following categories:—

- (i) Civilian (non-military) requirements.
- (ii) Requirements of Government administrations.
- (iii) Industrial requirements.

10. There are now over 10,000 tons of grain in reserve in Tehran. Russian deliveries against their promised 25,000 tons now amount to over 9,000 tons. The press announces that up to the 20th June undertakings or contracts to deliver wheat had been obtained from landlords as follows:—

	Tons.
In Isfahan province ... ..	59,000
In Fars province ... ..	39,000
In Khuzestan province ... ..	16,000

These figures are considerably in excess of last year's undertakings.

*Appointments—Civil.*

- 11.—(i) Muhsin Rais (F.O. 172; M.A. 239), to be Persian Minister in Bagdad. He had previously been appointed to be Consul-General in Delhi but had not left Tehran.
- (ii) Dr. Ghulam Ali R'adi Azarkashi, to be Director-General of the Ministry of Education.
- (iii) Hishmat Sanii, to be Governor of Ahwaz and Deputy Governor-General of Khuzestan.
- (iv) Kazim Sayyah, to be Director-General of the newly-created Department of Distribution in the Ministry of Finance.
- (v) Muhammad Hejazi, to be Director of the Department of Press and Propaganda.

*Persian Forces.*

*Police.*

12. The pay of the Police has been increased. A 3rd-grade constable now draws 600 rials per month. Even at this rate recruits will be difficult to obtain.

*Internal Security.*

*Kurdistan.*

13. The Persian General Staff has reports from the commander of the Persian troops in Sennah of the return to Persia from Iraq of Mahmud Dizli. This chief had been a continual source of trouble for some twelve years or so until, driven out of Persia in 1931 by Persian forces, he surrendered to the Iraqi authorities and has since been detained in Iraq. The reports say that on arrival in his village of Dizli he summoned the chiefs of Merivan and Avroman and others, and later sent a letter, signed by himself and other chiefs, to the Persian commander calling upon him to withdraw all Persian forces from Kurdistan and threatening to raise the Kurdish tribes to drive them out if the demand were not promptly complied with. It is doubtful whether this threat is more than bluff and whether Mahmud Dizli will get much support as the Kurds of this area have been left in relative peace by the Persian authorities for some time past.

*Fars.*

14. No further operations have taken place. General Shahbakhti is moving some of his troops—reported to be nearly 2,000—from the Firuzabad area towards



Abadeh and the Qashgai summer quarters, where the greater part of the tribes now is, with the declared intention of collecting their arms. The whereabouts of Nasir Qashgai is not known, nor is there any information to show that General Shahbakhti is taking any steps to hunt him down. There has been no interference during the week with British or Russian traffic on the road.

#### *Bakhtiari.*

15. Morteza Quli Khan (see Summary No. 22/43, paragraph 9) has left Tehran to take up his appointment as Governor of Bakhtiari.

#### *British Affairs.*

16. Valuable assistance has been given by both Paiforce and the Government of India in the campaign against locusts that has been in progress for the past eighteen months. In addition to providing transport for the party of experts from India who operated successfully in Khuzestan in the spring of 1942, Paiforce provided a regiment of mechanised cavalry for control measures in Khuzestan. During this year operations have been confined mainly to Persian Baluchistan and East Persia. Very valuable work was done by a company of mobile Indian infantry in the Bam-Kerman area, and the Government of India has now agreed to send a second company for work in the Birjand area. R.A.F. aircraft have also assisted in the control and destruction of locusts.

17. The Anglo-Iranian Institute of the British Council has been formally opened. It has been informally open for some weeks, has already proved itself a great success, and appears likely to make a valuable contribution to the improvement of Anglo-Persian relations. The demand to learn English far exceeds the teaching capacity of the staff.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

18. It is reliably reported that the Russians have now placed garrisons in Mahabad (Sanj Bulagh) and Bokon, on the road between Mahabad and Saqqiz. Both these places are well south of the line that defines the southern limits of the Russian zone, but the Tripartite Treaty does not limit Russian troops to that zone. The Russians should, however, inform His Majesty's Legation of movements of troops outside the zone originally laid down, and their explanation is awaited.

#### *Polish Affairs.*

19. The number of civilian Polish refugees still in Persia on the 17th June was:—

	Men.	Women.	Children.	Total.
In Tehran ...	1,457	6,304	2,872	10,633
In Isfahan ...	73	538	1,384	1,995
In Ahwaz ...	...	...	...	2,873
	1,530	6,842	4,256	15,501

Tehran, 28th June, 1943.

[E 4098/110/34]

No. 49.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 15th July.)

(No. 280.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 27 for the period of the 30th June to the 5th July, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 6th July, 1943.

Enclosure in No. 49.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 27 for the Period the 30th June to the 5th July, 1943.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

1. The coming elections are the main topic of interest in the press. In North Persia and in Isfahan political parties and candidates are active, but the mass of the people seems to be generally apathetic and resigned to the belief that the next Majlis will be of no greater benefit to them than the present. Blocks of votes are reported to be already on sale. Agitation is being carried on for the abolition of military governorships and the ban on political meetings, and political parties, expecting that their opponents may attempt to break up their meetings by force, are organising their own defensive bands. The Prime Minister has instructed all Ministries to warn their employees that Government officials must abstain from interference in the elections and from any attempt to influence their course. Officials of the Ministry of the Interior, whose responsibility it has been in the past to ensure that the Shah's nominees were duly elected, are especially warned that if they offend in these respects, they will be discharged and punished.

2. The Prime Minister has not yet filled the vacant posts of Minister of the Interior and Minister of Justice. It is believed that he intends to retain the former portfolio himself.

##### *Economic.*

3. The Majlis has passed a law authorising the engagement of six more American advisers for Dr. Millsbaugh.

4. The Majlis has sanctioned a credit of 500 million rials to the Ministry of Food for the purchase of the harvest. See also Summary No. 26/43, paragraph 5.

5. Mr. Sheridan, the American adviser to the Ministry of Food, has informed the Prime Minister that he does not wish to renew his contract, which expires in September. He further recommends the abolition of the Ministry of Food, which he considers to be no longer necessary owing to the plentiful harvest and the plans he has made to collect it, and the transfer of its functions to the Ministry of Finance.

#### *Persian Forces.*

##### *Army.*

6. The Majlis has passed a law authorising the Ministry for War to make purchases in America of equipment for the army up to the value of 1½ million dollars subject to the condition that payment is not made until after the 21st March, 1945. This is in substitution of the Bill mentioned in Summary No. 12/43, paragraph 7, which was wrongly reported therein as having been approved by the Majlis.

#### *Internal Security.*

##### *Fars.*

7. A serious encounter has taken place between a mixed force of Qashgai, Boir Ahmadi and Bakhtiari and the Persian garrison at Semirum, 20 miles south-west of Yazd-i-Khast, also known as Semirum. The Persian troops, who numbered about 500, are reported to have been routed and to have lost all their arms.

Otherwise there are no material changes. The Qashgai tribes are reported to be taking heavy toll of grain and sheep from the villages in the neighbourhood of their summer quarters and to have robbed a number of sheep from the Baseri tribe of the Khamseh confederation, the only tribe of that confederation that had given any support to Nasir.

Nasir is reported to be south of Firuzabad with a band of 200-300, and Shahbakhti has reported to the Ministry for War that he hopes to bring him to bay. A column has been sent in his direction. An unconfirmed report says that Nasir and his brother Khosrow have separated and that Nasir is trying to get to Boir Ahmadi country. Nasir, or more probably some of his friends in Tehran, has distributed leaflets calling on true patriots to stop the killing of innocent

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Persians that was resulting from the obedience of traitors to the policy of foreigners. The Turkish Ambassador, who has for some time shown interest in the Qashgai question, considers that the tribe, being of Turki origin, should be allowed to migrate to Turkey. It is doubtful whether such a suggestion will commend itself to many Qashgais.

#### *Khorassan.*

8. The fighting between rival sections of the Zafaranlu Kurds of Khorassan, reported in Summary No. 25/43, paragraph 14, developed into serious disorder near Shirwan. The local Persian gendarmerie was too weak to restore order and the Russians were reluctant to allow the despatch of reinforcements, but finally agreed to the despatch of a small column of troops. At the time of Soulat es Sultaneh's rebellion in Khorassan in the spring (see Summaries Nos. 6/42, paragraph 13, and 8/42, paragraph 7) the section of these Kurds under Farajullah Beg rose in sympathy, and the present disturbance is said to be due to no punishment having been imposed on them when the rebellion collapsed.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

9. The Government of India Baluchistan Intelligence Bureau reports that a reconnaissance party of five Russian officers arrived in Zahidan on the 7th June from Kabul via Seistan and went on to Khwash. The object of this party was said to be to collect information about troop dispositions, communications, landing grounds and supplies.

10. The Soviet Embassy has not yet replied to the request for information regarding the move southwards of Russian troops reported in Summary No. 26/43, paragraph 18. According to information that has reached the Persian Ministry for War the strength of the troops at Mahabad is one regiment of cavalry with a detachment at Bokan. Patrols are said to have been sent out towards the Iraq frontier to warn Kurdish tribes that any transport of supplies to Iraq will be prevented by the Russians.

#### *Greek Affairs.*

11. Prince and Princess Peter of Greece, who have been staying in Persia for some weeks, left Tehran for Palestine on the 31st June.

*Tehran, 5th July, 1943.*

[E 4259/110/34]

No. 50.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 22nd July.)*

(No. 287.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 28 for the period the 6th to the 12th July, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 13th July, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 50.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 28 for the Period the 6th to the 12th July, 1943.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

#### *Political.*

1. The Prime Minister has improved his position *vis-à-vis* the Deputies, among whom he has for the time being a majority of supporters but still many enemies. The differences of opinion regarding the choice of a Minister of the Interior have been solved by the appointment of the present Minister without Portfolio, Samii, to the Interior, and of Khalil Fahimi, lately Governor-General of Azerbaijan, as Minister without Portfolio.

2. The disaster to the Persian troops at Semirum—see paragraph 8 below—has shocked public opinion and, since the tribes acted with great brutality, less is likely to be heard in the future about the iniquity of fratricidal warfare against the tribes. If at the same time it brings home to the Shah and the General Staff a realisation of the state of demoralisation and inefficiency into which the army has fallen some good may come of it.

#### *Economic.*

3. By his Regulation No. 12, the Director-General of Finance has transferred all Government cars and drivers to the charge of the Supplies Department of the Ministry of Finance, which will allot transport to Government officials as required, giving first priority to those officials concerned with the collection of cereals and of revenue. If insufficient Government cars are available the Supplies Department may requisition or purchase private cars. The above regulation does not apply to cars belonging to the army, the gendarmerie or the police.

4. The report in Summary No. 27/43, paragraph 4, that the Majlis had sanctioned the grant of a credit of 500 million rials to the Ministry of Food was premature. The credit was not actually approved until the 11th July.

#### *Appointments—Civil.*

- 5.—(i) Hussein Samii, Minister without Portfolio, to be Minister of the Interior.
- (ii) Khalil Fahimi (F.O. 65, M.A. 82), to be Minister without Portfolio.
- (iii) Morteza Sarmad, to be Director-General of the Ministry of Food.

#### *Persian Army.*

6. In the current year's budget allowance has been made for the grant of one free ration, on the same scale as to the soldiers, to each Persian officer. Married officers will be allowed to purchase three rations at a special rate of 140 rials each. Persian officers were not previously entitled to rations, even during operations, though doubtless they took them.

#### *Internal Security.*

#### *Kerman Province.*

7. The well-known robber tribe of Buchakchis recently made a raid on the village of Baft, where, it is said, they seized 68 rifles and 4,000 cartridges and killed a few gendarmes. The raid is said to have been intended as a reprisal for the arrest of certain Buchakchi robbers.

#### *Fars.*

8. The fighting at Semirum mentioned in last week's Summary resulted in the complete overwhelming after three days' fighting of the Persian garrison, whose strength is now known to have been about 900. All their arms and stores, which included rifles, machine guns, mortars and two mountain guns fell into the hands of the tribesmen in addition to a convoy of about eight lorries carrying money, personnel and stores, escorted by an armoured car, which was ambushed on its way to Semirum when the garrison was already surrounded. There is little doubt that treachery played some part in the disaster to the garrison.

9. The attacking tribesmen were principally from the Boir Ahmadi tribe, led by Abdullah Zarghampur, one of the tribal chiefs who fled from Tehran in March 1942 (see Summaries Nos. 11/42, paragraph 9, and 12/42, paragraph 16) and has since been to all intents and purposes an outlaw. They were assisted by some of the Darashuri clan of the Qashgai, but as far as is known to the present time no other Qashgai clans are involved. Earlier reports that Bakhtiari tribesmen took part have not been confirmed by later information. The strength of the attacking force is estimated by reliable informants as from 1,500 to 4,000. They were accompanied by an officer deserter from the Persian army, Captain Alavi, who is strongly suspected of being a German agent. There is also suspicion that there were Germans with the tribes. The principal motive of the Boir Ahmadi was, however, probably to seize the opportunity of acquiring rifles and ammunition.

10. There was considerable anxiety in the townships of Shah Reza (Qumisheh) and Abadeh, which lay open to attack by the tribes, and even in Isfahan itself, where the garrison was reported to be so demoralised as to be



unlikely to be capable of defending the town. No further aggressive action has yet been taken by the tribesmen and they may be dispersing. Quarrels over the loot would be a normal sequence to a successful action, but if the Boir Ahmadi are under the influence of Germans future action cannot be predicted.

11. It must be expected that this disaster will have a serious effect on the whole tribal situation in south and south-west Persia. The Persian Government have not got sufficient troops to undertake the difficult operation necessary against the Boir Ahmadi, who defied even Reza Shah. They will probably have to have recourse to the temporary raising of levies from tribes hostile to the Boir Ahmadi, an old and proved unsatisfactory expedient which usually results in the impoverishment of the countryside. These and other measures are now under consideration. They will inevitably take time. But it is essential that the Persian Government should make plain its intention to do something and make a beginning with its measures, otherwise the trouble may spread, possibly affecting the oilfields and important lines of communication and certainly handicapping the collection of the harvest.

12. Shortly before the occurrence of Semirum, Shahbakhti's forces had achieved a minor success against the small forces remaining with Nasir Qashgai, and the latter has asked that an officer should be sent to him to discuss terms of surrender.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

13. The Russian troops who were reported in Summary No. 26/43, paragraph 18, to have arrived at Mahabad and Bikan, have now left those places and have returned to Maragheh in the Russian zone.

*Tehran, 12th July, 1943.*

[E 4557/110/34]

No. 51.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 5th August.)*

(No. 296.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 29 for the period of the 13th to 19th July, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 21st July, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 51.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 29 for the period  
13th to 19th July, 1943.*

*Persian Affairs.*

#### *Political.*

1. Whatever the activities of the Cabinet may be government of the country is not one of them. Disorder in all administrations and insecurity throughout the country appear to be of little or no concern to the Prime Minister. It is said in some quarters that it is the policy of the Russians to produce disintegration and that for this purpose they find Soheily an admirable Prime Minister. If that is their policy they have good cause for satisfaction. There is considerable anxiety about the situation, but no co-operation to find a remedy. Those who see the remedy in close co-operation with Great Britain fear to come forward lest, after the war, Great Britain should again lose interest in Persia and they should be left to suffer from the venomous spite of so-called Nationalists or Communists. The weakness of the Government, the growing strength of the tribes, the demoralisation and inefficiency of the forces, and the bankruptcy of the finances are all producing a situation where a complete breakdown of the Government and of administration is possible. Chaos has gone so far that it is unlikely that it can be checked except by a firm hand, untroubled by constitutional or democratic principles. In these conditions, the coming elections are more likely to produce disorder than a better Parliament.

2. The press publishes a statement by the Minister of the Court denying the rumours that the Court is endeavouring to influence the elections. The

denial is not likely to carry conviction, as it is generally believed, with some justification, that the agents of the Court are being active in those devious ways in which Persian elections can be influenced. There are likely to be lively scenes before the elections. For the Tehran seats alone there are said to be 3,000 candidates.

3. The Government has decided to abolish the Ministry of Food. The functions of that Ministry will be transferred to the Department of the Director-General of Finance, Dr. Millsaugh. The Minister for Food, Tadayyun, is to remain in the Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio.

#### *Persian Forces.*

4. The Shah has decided to appoint Sartip Razmara, an energetic, relatively capable but rather intriguing officer, to be Chief of the General Staff in place of Sipahbod Yazdan Panah. He has also said that the Chief of the General Staff will in future be responsible to the Minister for War. In practice, however, it is improbable that there will be much difference. The Shah will continue to issue orders to the Chief of the General Staff, unknown to the Minister for War when it suits him; and Sipahbod Yazdan Panah, whatever his appointment may be, he will probably continue to be the Shah's chief adviser. But it is to be hoped that the personal relations of the Minister for War and the new Chief of the General Staff will be better than they were with his predecessor.

5. A commission consisting of Sartip Baharmast, an officer with a reputation for honesty and plain speaking, and some officers of the General Staff has been sent to Isfahan to enquire into the circumstances of the disaster at Semirum.

6. Sartip Muhammad Nakchevan, the G.O.C. of the Isfahan Division, has been recalled and is to be court-martialled for neglect of duty. He is being replaced temporarily by Sarhang Mahin.

#### *Appointments—Military.*

7. Sartip Setvati, to be assistant chief of the gendarmerie.

#### *Internal Security.*

##### *Fars.*

8. There is little change in the situation. In the absence of General Shahbakhti, who has come to Tehran to report, there appears to be a truce between the forces of the Government and those of Nasir Qashgai. Armed tribesmen are reported to be joining Nasir from the tribes in their summer quarters, and detached Persian forces in Karzin and Farrashband may be in danger of being surrounded. It is possible that General Shahbakhti may not return. The Government now hopes that Qavam ul Mulk will, if appointed Governor-General of Fars, extricate them from the difficulties into which their own and Shahbakhti's folly has landed them. Qavam ul Mulk was, twenty years ago, a strong influence in Fars as were his ancestors some generations before him. He is, with justification, demanding certain conditions and extensive powers to deal with local questions, and in the chaos of weakness and intrigue that characterises the policy of the Government it is doubtful whether his requirements will have been approved before the situation has deteriorated beyond a point where it is restorable by his influence.

9. In the northern part of the province the tribesmen's success at Semirum has not been followed by more aggression than the usual looting of villages. The Boir Ahmadi are reported to have returned to their own country, but bands of tribesmen have been seen in the vicinity of the road between Shah Reza and Abadeh. Traffic on the road has not yet been interfered with. Convoys of trucks for Russia will be escorted by Indian troops until the accumulation at Bushire is cleared.

10. The Boir Ahmadi under Abdullah Zarghampur have, according to a telegraphic report received from Hussein Quli of the Rustam section of the Mamassanni, given an ultimatum to the Khans of the Mamassanni threatening to occupy their lands unless they join the Boir Ahmadi. The latter are now, with their captures at Semirum, much better armed than the Mamassanni. The Mamassanni have hitherto held aloof from Qashgai and Boir Ahmadi intrigues, but only in the hope that their land claims would be satisfactorily settled by the Government. In this, as in most other matters, the Government delays decision.

11. A report, as yet unconfirmed, says that the Boir Ahmadi are moving down towards the line Behbahan-Gach Saran, with a view to attacking detachments of the Persian army which are dispersed along the road for its protection.



*Bakhtiari.*

12. Morteza Quli Khan, the newly appointed Bakhtiari Governor of Bakhtiari, has reported that Abul Qasim has surrendered to him. It appears to be, however, only a token surrender as Abul Qasim has been allowed to remain in Ardal for one month with his men. It seems that his many years in Tehran have not eliminated from Morteza Quli Khan the characteristics of the Lur tribes to which he belongs and that he is unable to resist the temptation of taking advantage of the present situation and maintaining its suspense in order to force the Government to settle the land claims of his brother khans.

*Khorassan.*

13. The fighting between rival Kurds near Shirwan ceased with the arrival of the troops mentioned in *Summary No. 27/43*, paragraph 8.

*Brazilian Affairs.*

14. M. Joachim Alaiyo has arrived in Tehran as Brazilian Minister.

*British Affairs.*

15. In addition to the company of Indian infantry that has been co-operating in anti-locust measures in the Bem-Kerman area, a second company, also provided by the Government of India, has been working to good effect in the vicinity of Birjand.

*Tehran, 19th July, 1943.*

[E 4624/110/34]

No. 52.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 7th August.)*

(No. 304.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 30 for the period the 20th to 26th July, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 27th July, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 52.

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 30 for the Period  
20th-26th July, 1943.*

(Secret.)

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

THE Shah and the Government are conscious that the situation in the country is critical, and there has been much consultation and discussion, little decision and less action. Between a multitude of conflicting interests and advisers neither the Shah nor his Government can make up their minds, much less agree upon a common policy. Certain changes have, however, been made by the Shah in appointments in the forces, whose object is to tighten up discipline and instil more energy. In Tehran there is much adverse criticism of the Shah and his prestige is low. The proved inefficiency of the army and the Shah's responsibility for it are the subject of much unfavourable comment. Personal attacks on him have been made in the press, and the offending papers have not been prosecuted. Scurrilous attacks are made with impunity on the Government in general and on individual Ministers. There is no respect for the Government and nothing but contempt for the Prime Minister even among his supporters. There are various movements afoot in Tehran and other towns, ostensibly connected with the coming elections, some of which might lead to disorder.

2. The Government is still unable to decide on any policy for dealing with the increasingly serious disorder that has resulted from the success of the Boir Ahmadi tribes against the Persian forces. Any course of action has merely to be suggested to be certain of opposition from nearly everyone except the proposer.

*Economic.*

3. A committee of experts, including representatives from Egypt, Iraq, Afghanistan, Russia, Great Britain and Persia, is now sitting in Tehran to discuss and co-ordinate measures to be taken for the next season's anti-locust campaign, which begins in September.

*Persian Forces.*

4. It is understood that one motive inspiring the appointment of Sartip Razmara as Chief of the General Staff was a desire to encourage the younger and educated officers of the army, of whom one party follows Sartip Razmara. These officers, on the whole, are opposed both to the late Chief of the General Staff and to Sipahbod Ahmadi, the Minister for War, and some of them are opposed to the American advisers. But it may result in better co-operation between the General Staff and General Ridley, as Sartip Razmara in his last appointment of Commander of the Central Recruit Training and Administrative Depot did co-operate to some extent with General Ridley.

5. Sarlashkar Aqevli has been removed from the command of the gendarmerie. Although he has the reputation of being an able and energetic officer, he has been obstructive and quite ineffective and has strongly opposed the grant of any authority to the American advisers to the gendarmerie. His removal may be an indication of an intention to allow them some scope. They have hitherto not been allowed to do anything.

*Appointments—Military.*

6.—(i) Sipahbod Yazdan Panah to be Chief of the Inspectorate Department of the Army.

(ii) Sartip Razmara to be Chief of the General Staff.

(iii) Sarlashkar Aqevli, from Chief of the Gendarmerie, to be Chief of Military Tribunals.

(iv) Sarlashkar Ali Asghar Naqdi, from Chief of Military Tribunals, to be Director of the Conscription Department.

(v) Sartip Hassan Arfa to be commander of the Recruit Training and Administrative Depot.

(vi) Sarhang Mahmud Khosrow Panah to be Chief of Police.

*Internal Security.*

7. Disorder is increasing throughout the country. The obvious vacillation of the Government and the weakness of the Government forces have greatly encouraged the tribes to hope for a return of the happy lawless days of tribal autonomy. Fear of attack by the tribes has forced the Government to withdraw small detachments, and brigands have not failed to take the opportunity of pillaging. The prevailing insecurity must give scope to the intrigues of the Germans, pro-Axis sympathisers and those Persians who are anxious to embarrass Great Britain, even at the expense of their own country, to incite the tribes to greater excesses of destruction than would normally satisfy their natural instincts. Over large areas the crop is disappearing, though some of it will probably reappear later on the black market. A report from Persian sources, but considered reliable, is that four parachutists and a number of cases were seen to drop in Fars near Khaneh Zinian and that they were conveyed to Nasir Qashgai.

*Fars.*

8. It has been decided that General Shahbakhti will not return to Fars. He will be replaced by General Amanullah Jahanbani, an active, fairly honest and conciliatory officer, who is about the best of the bad choices available and the most likely to co-operate with Qavam-ul-Mulk. But the appointment of the latter as Governor-General with extended powers has not yet been approved by the Government. Apart from the usual inability of the Government to take any decision, opposition is being incited by Nasir's pro-Axis friends, by others interested in creating disorder to embarrass the Government and the Allies, and by Qavam-ul-Mulk's personal enemies. Meanwhile, the situation in Fars grows steadily worse. Villages are suffering heavily from the depredations of tribesmen who are carrying off or destroying crops. Tribes that have hitherto been willing to support the Government, or at least to remain neutral, are now being threatened by the Boir Ahmadi. Meanwhile, the troops are quite inactive.



*Bakhtiari.*

9. In Bakhtiari the situation is quiet, but the tribe has as yet shown no indication of being willing to give active support to the Government. Certain minor chiefs are known to have sent congratulations to the tribal leaders who defeated the Persian forces at Semirum. Morteza Quli Khan appears to be establishing his influence in the tribe.

*Isfahan.*

10. Disorder is spreading to the Isfahan-Yezd-Kerman road, where there have recently been several hold-ups.

*Kurdistan.*

11. While in Northern Kurdistan (Western Azerbaijan) belief that the Russians will themselves intervene to suppress Kurdish lawlessness keeps the tribes reasonably quiet, in Southern Kurdistan there is much restlessness. Two troublesome chiefs, Mahmud Dizli and Mustafa Beg, one of the sons of Jaafar Sultan, who were under detention in Iraq, have recently returned to Persia and, together with Mahmud Kanisanani, a renegade Kurdish officer of Persian gendarmerie, are trying to incite the tribes and are demanding what amounts to autonomy for the Kurdish tracts in which they are interested—Avroman-Merivan. The Persian Government is in no situation to do more than temporise. An unconfirmed report says that a messenger from Nasir Qashgai and some Bakhtiari chiefs have been visiting the Sinjahi, Kalkhani, Jawanrudi, Babajani and Waladbegi tribes with a view to inducing them to combine against Government. Another unconfirmed report says that the Jawanrudis have been warned to expect emissaries from Tehran to instruct them to prepare a landing ground where German aircraft will land arms.

Tehran, 26th July, 1943.

[E 4827/110/34]

No. 53.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 16th August.)*

(No. 315.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 31 for the period the 27th July to the 2nd August, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 3rd August, 1943.

Enclosure in No. 53.

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 31 for the Period 27th July to 2nd August, 1943.*

(Secret.)

*Persian Affairs.*

*Political.*

THE political situation remains unstable, but without dramatic developments. The Prime Minister says that he intends to make several changes in the Cabinet with a view to giving it at least the appearance of being more energetic, more progressive and less venal. The Shah, who realises that his position has greatly deteriorated in recent months, is anxious, disturbed by the openly expressed criticism of himself, and, like his father, suspicious of most people except nonentities. He seeks counsel from many quarters, and there are some indications that advice given to him to refrain from intriguing and bribing and other un-kingly pursuits may bear a little fruit. He is concerned at the alleged growing influence of Qavam-es-Sultaneh, who he believes has Russian support, and who, he knows, is hostile to himself. He has been seeing something recently of the Deputy Dashti, who is now aspiring to be Prime Minister with the support of the Adalat party. Seyyid Zia-ed-Din Tabatabai has informed his friends that he is returning to Persia shortly. Whether in the face of Soviet and

Court opposition he will be able to secure enough support to become Prime Minister is doubtful. The Government is far more concerned with consideration of these matters than with the growing disorder in Fars.

2. Although Persians as a whole are much more concerned with the internal affairs of the country than with the progress of the war, the fall of Mussolini had a profound effect on public opinion. For most it removed any remaining doubts as to the outcome of the war. Peace, some think, will come quickly. In an address at a recent levee the Shah said: "Peace approaches. Persia must now so act that in peace discussions she may take her rightful place and the rights of the Persian people be safeguarded." Many are asking what the position of Persia will be after the war. How will she stand with the Allies, particularly with Great Britain? The bogey of bolshevism looms larger, and there is a clearer sentiment that some effort should be made to conciliate Great Britain. In spite of this hostile elements and Nazi sympathisers are very active, and they find support among the many who for personal reasons do not desire to see order established or reforms put into practice that would limit their opportunities for illicit profit.

3. The Deputy Nowbakht has announced his intention of interpellating the Government in a series of questions which are attacks on the Government, the Minister for War and the Allies, particularly the British. The Minister for War will reply for the Government.

*Economic.*

4. The Director-General of Finance has issued a regulation—No. 14—which declares that wheat and barley are a Government monopoly. The sale or movement of these grains, unless under the control of the Cereals and Bread Section of the Ministry of Finance, is absolutely forbidden. Grain hoarded or sold on the free market will be confiscated without compensation. The regulation also announces that on the 23rd November the price to be paid by the Government for grain will be reduced by 33½ per cent., and that all hoards of grain found after that date will be confiscated. It will require a better intentioned Government and a more honest administration than exists at present to ensure the effective execution of this regulation.

5. As yet very little of the new harvest has been delivered to Government stores. In certain areas this is due to prevailing insecurity, in others to lack of transport, and in others to the reluctance of landlords to deliver. Tehran now holds about one month's reserve. The Russians have delivered some 16,000 tons of the 25,000 tons of wheat promised. On the other hand they have taken from Azarbaijan 14,000 tons and are asking for more.

6. In the Budget Bill laid before the Majlis revenue is estimated at 1,890,795,096 rials and expenditure at 3,297,718,537 rials. As cuts have been made in the budgets submitted by Ministries the latter have now to prepare new detailed budgets.

7. The Persian Road Transport Board now controls 700 new Lease/Lend trucks and 900–1,000 locally contracted vehicles.

*Appointments—Civil.*

8.—(i) Ibrahim Qavam (Qavam ul Mulk) (F.O. 169, M.A. 231) to be Governor-General of Fars.

(ii) Ali Motamedi (F.O. 137, M.A. 175) to be Consul-General in India.

(iii) Muhammad Montazim to be Governor of Kasvin.

*Persian Forces.*

9. Both General Ridley and Colonel Schwarzkopf report that since the new appointments mentioned in paragraph 6 of Summary No. 30 they have been receiving better co-operation from the Persian authorities. There is some indication, too, of an intention to remedy the present condition of indiscipline. As a result of the findings of the Court of Enquiry sent to Isfahan to investigate the Semirum disaster a Field General Court-Martial is to assemble to try a number of the officers concerned.

*Police.*

10. A warrant has been issued for the arrest of General Radsar, a former Chief of Police, on the charge of being concerned in the murder of a prominent Parsi, Arbab Kaikhosru, in the time of Reza Shah. It is reported that he has escaped to Iraq.



*Appointments—Military.*

- 1.—(i) Sarlashkar Amamullah Jahanbani (F.O. 100, M.A. 132) to be Commander of the Forces in the south *vice* Sipahbod Shahbakhti.  
(ii) Sartip Qadar to command the Isfahan Division *vice* Sartip Nakchevan.

*Internal Security.*

12. In the address referred to in paragraph 2 the Shah referred to the prevailing insecurity. He impressed on representatives of the press present their duty to support the Government and in no circumstances to take the part of those in rebellion against the Government, who should and would be punished.

*Fars.*

13. The situation deteriorates rapidly in the absence of any effective military or civil authority. The Boir Ahmadi have now attacked the Basht Bavi tribe, a settled tribe closely allied to the Mamassanni, and the latter expect that they will next be attacked in revenge for having refused to join the Qashgais and Boir Ahmadi. The Qashgais are contenting themselves with pillaging villages, and they have not interfered with traffic on the road. They acquired 12 more rifles by disarming a small Gendarmerie post 45 miles north-west of Shiraz. Other marauding bands are taking advantage of the prevailing disorder and are raiding east of the Isfahan-Shiraz road. Nasir Qashgai is reported to have now with him some 700 riflemen in the Qarzin area. An uneasy truce appears still to exist between him and the Persian forces.

14. Meanwhile the Government, having announced the appointment of Qavam ul Mulk as Governor-General of Fars, makes excuse after excuse for delaying the fulfilment of the conditions which he regards as essential to his success. There is very strong opposition to the appointment on the part of the powerful friends of Nasir Qashgai and all pro-Axis and anti-British elements. Large sums are being spent in bribery. Qavam ul Mulk's honesty and pro-British sentiments are well known, and it is recognised that, if he were given the powers he asks for to deal with the situation in Fars, he would act in the interests of Persia whatever private interests were sacrificed.

15. Circumstantial stories seem to confirm the arrival of German parachutists in Fars—see *Summary* No. 30, paragraph 7. One report says they are now with Nasir's brother, Khosrow, north of Ardakan.

*Khuzestan.*

16. In view of the anticipated threat from the Boir Ahmadi to the Behbahan-Gach Saran area and the possibility of their being joined by other Kuhgalu tribes, an additional battalion of Persian infantry is being sent from Tehran to Behbahan.

*Kurdistan.*

17. Reinforcements of a battalion of Persian infantry have been sent from Tehran to Senneh.

*Polish Affairs.*

18. The number of civilian Poles in Persia on the 22nd July was:—

	Men.	Women.	Children.	Total.
In Tehran ...	1,403	5,747	2,558	9,708
Isfahan ...	77	549	1,397	2,023
Ahwaz ...	237	981	704	1,922
	1,717	7,277	4,659	13,653

Tehran, 2nd August 1943.

[E 4937/110/34]

No. 54.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 20th August.)

(No. 330.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 32 for the period of the 3rd to the 9th August, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 10th August, 1943.

Enclosure in No. 54.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 32 for the Period the 3rd to the 9th August, 1943.

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

1. Events seem to be leading to a gradual, but ultimately complete, breakdown of Government and of the administration, or to a violent change of régime. Insecurity, indiscipline and disorder are spreading. There is an absolute lack of confidence in the Government, and despair and pessimism are general because no better Government can be seen. Ali Mansur has refused to be a candidate for the premiership, and Soheily remains, because there is no one else, proving day by day his inability to check the increasing chaos, to which the electioneering manoeuvres of parties, some stirring up the working classes, others taking counter-measures, add confusion and disorder. Government employees, starving on inadequate pay, are ready to revolt. Genuine alarm has been caused by Dr. Millspaugh's regulation prohibiting any purchase of grain except from Government stores. Families have too little faith in the Government to be confident that there will be any grain in the Government stores to buy. Faith in the ability of Dr. Millspaugh, even with the very wide powers he has, to reduce the cost of living or improve the position of the poor and middle classes is waning, so that, while certain of the opposition of the rich, he cannot rely on much support from the poor. Confidence in the American advisers in all departments is decreasing even among those who saw in them a hope of salvation. The financial resources of the Government are nearly at an end, while increasing insecurity makes increasing demands on them.

2. The one courageous and relatively strong man in the Government is the Minister for War, General Ahmadi. If he were given real authority over the army he might steady the tottering fabric, but the Shah and many others fear that he would then become too powerful, so the army, like the State, remains without any effective direction. The Shah loses favour daily with the people, and as an element of stability in the country the Crown now hardly counts for anything. Indeed, it would be hard to find anything stable in Persia to-day or any direction in which British influence can be applied to produce stability.

3. There is great unrest among under-paid Government employees. Strikes have already occurred in the Ministry of Justice, and others are threatened in other departments and services of public utility. Dr. Millspaugh, in a statement in the press, has appealed to Government employees to be patient a little longer with their hardships, of which he is fully aware. He explains that the State has, in fact, no money, but that he has appealed for help and hopes that it will be forthcoming.

4. A Bill has been laid before Parliament for the engagement of American assistants for Dr. Millspaugh to a total of sixty, including those already engaged and those whose engagement has already been approved. There is considerable opposition to the Bill.

5. It is reported that, with a view to economy, the post of Governor-General is to be abolished in all provinces except Fars, Khorasan, Kerman and Azerbaijan.

6. Hooliganism and wounding by stabbing have become so common in Tehran that the Majlis passed a law with double urgency authorising the police to arrest or expel from Tehran persons guilty of, or from their past record known



to be likely to commit, such offences. For almost the first time for two years adequate punishment has been given to a criminal. A man was publicly hanged in Tehran for robbery and murder.

#### *Economic.*

7. By his regulation No. 15 the Director-General of Finance has made it illegal for anyone except the Cereals and Bread Section of the Ministry of Finance to move grain to or from Tehran by any means. Any grain found being transported by other than that agency will be confiscated, and a reward of 50 per cent. of the value of the grain at the Government price will be paid to the person responsible for its confiscation.

8. Discontent with the quality of the bread on sale at the Government price has provoked riots at Kermanshah, Hamadan and Malayer.

9. In a statement published in the press Dr. Millsaugh says that, as a result of investigations he has made personally, he can categorically deny the reports that wheat has been bought by the British.

#### *Appointments—Civil.*

- 10.—(i) Muhsin Sadr (F.O. 180, M.A. 249) to be Minister of Justice.
- (ii) Qasim Meikadeh to be Governor of Shahriza.
- (iii) Taqi Khajeh Nuri (Amir Nusrat) to be Deputy Governor-General of Fars.
- (iv) Kabiri (Adl ed Dowleh) to be Governor of Maragheh.
- (v) Hussein Muhiman to be under-secretary in the Ministry of Finance.

#### *Persian Forces.*

11. A commission consisting of the Prime Minister, the Minister for War, the Chief of the General Staff, General Yazdan Panah and three Deputies recently met to consider what powers the Shah could legitimately exercise under the Constitution over the army. The finding was that his powers were limited to the right of approval in certain cases only of proposals made by the Minister for War, and that the latter was fully responsible for the army. The Shah authorised the Prime Minister to announce in a secret session of Parliament that the General Staff would in future be subordinate to the Minister for War. As a sequel, the Ministry for War drafted a regulation for the Shah's approval defining the duties of the General Staff and departments of the Ministry for War and detailing how the responsibility of the General Staff to the Minister for War was to work in practice. The Shah refused to sign it or to allow the Minister for War to have full authority over the General Staff in practice. But the Minister for War was ordered to tell press and Parliament that he was fully responsible for the army. It is evident that the Shah intends to continue dealing direct with the General Staff and to issue orders without reference to the Minister for War.

#### *Appointments—Military.*

- 12.—(i) Sipahbud Shahbakhti to be an Army Inspector.
- (ii) Sartip Diba to be Director of the Supply Department in the Ministry for War.
- (iii) Sartip Mahmud Iravani to command the 12th Lurestan Division.
- (iv) Colonel Hashemi to be Provost Marshal, Tehran.

#### *Internal Security.*

##### *Fars.*

13. All the country west of the Shiraz-Shahriza road is now at the mercy of the Qashgai and Boir Ahmadi. A mixed force of these two tribes on the 5th April surrounded and attacked a small Persian garrison of little more than a company in Ardakah. A battalion has been sent from Shiraz for its relief. General Jahanbani has arrived in Shiraz and is concentrating his scattered forces, probably more with a view to their safety than to active operations. He and Morteza Quli Khan, the Governor of Bakhtiari, are to meet Nasir Qashgai and Khosrow near Abadeh on the 11th August, presumably for the purpose of again discussing terms of surrender. Recent Russian and British victories and perhaps the fear that Qavam ul Mulk would, as Governor-General of Fars, succeed in attracting to his side some of Nasir's supporters may on this occasion

induce Nasir to abandon his German friends and accept reasonable terms. Qavam ul Mulk, after much difficulty in getting the Government to give him the powers he needs, is leaving for Shiraz on the 9th August, 1943.

#### *Khuzestan.*

14. The Boir Ahmadi raided the A.I.O.C. station at Do Gumbadan 8 miles north of Gach Saran, looted houses of employees, and carried off sheep from neighbouring villages. They did not, however, damage the pumps that supply water to Gach Saran. In the Behbahan area there has been much looting of villages by Taiyibe tribesmen. This, if it continues, may affect the supply of labour to A.I.O.C. workings.

#### *Bakhtiari.*

15. Abul Qasim's appearance of submission to Morteza Quli Khan did not last long. He has now written him a defiant letter refusing to acknowledge his authority. Two Germans and the deserter, Captain Alair, are said to be with him, and he still retains a number of armed men.

#### *Kurdistan.*

16. The Commander of the Persian forces at Senneh has reported that Kurdish tribes under Mahmud Dizli and Mahmud Kanisanani (see Summary No. 30, paragraph 11) attacked his posts west of Senneh and were repulsed with loss. As the Persian military authorities are anxious to avoid getting embroiled with the Kurdish tribes negotiations have been opened with the leaders to endeavour to reach a peaceful settlement.

#### *Zahidan.*

17. On the 12th August six U.K.K.C. and two privately-owned lorries were held up at Hormuk 38 miles north of Zahidan by four armed robbers alleged to be Afghans. The drivers report the loss of 28,000 rials and three sacks of sugar.

A telephone line has been constructed by the Government of India to connect the Persian gendarmerie post at Kuh i Sangi with the British frontier levy post at Robat in British Baluchistan to ensure better co-operation in the interception of raiders.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

18. For some time past the Russians have maintained a garrison at Fariman, 40 miles south by east of Meshed. It is now reliably reported that it has been withdrawn.

19. It is still a matter for conjecture how far the Tudeh party enjoys Russian support. In Azerbaijan, oddly enough, the Russians appear to leave it to itself. In Meshed, on the other hand, at an election meeting attended by about 1,500 people, sweets were handed round by a Russian girl. Qavam es Sultaneh, who, reactionary though he is, is popularly supposed to be regarded with favour by the Russians, is now flirting with the Tudeh party.

[E 5066/110/34]

No. 55.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 26th August.)

(No. 341.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 33 for the period of the 10th to 16th August, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 17th August, 1943.



Enclosure in No. 55.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 33 for the Period  
10th-16th August, 1943.**Persian Affairs.**Political.*

THE position of the Government is so weak that they dare not at present answer the interpellation of the Deputy Nowbakht, fearing defeat. There is an active party inside and outside the Majlis working for the overthrow of the Prime Minister and his replacement by Muhammad Said, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, an honest but weak man, favoured by the Shah, who favours only weak men. This party is likely to vote against the Government, irrespective of the merits of the case. The Prime Minister admits that he only maintains his position because he does nothing and commits himself to no definite policy. The opposition to the American advisers from merchants and those Deputies who would suffer from reforms continues to be very strong, but it has produced a minor reaction in their favour.

*Economic.*

2. By his Regulation No. 16 the Director-General of Finance modifies the restriction imposed on the transport of grain by his Regulation No. 14 by allowing the movement of grain between villages. Regulation No. 14 made the sale of grain a Government monopoly and prohibited the movement of grain except under Government control. Householders are also authorised to purchase flour or grain from Government stores on presentation of their bread coupons up to a maximum of 75 kilog. per annum for a child, 150 for an adult and 250 for a working man. The amount that can be purchased at any one time will depend on the reserves available in Government stores. Landowners living in towns will be permitted to import from their estates to the towns in which they reside sufficient wheat for the consumption of their families.

3. These concessions have done something to allay the public anxiety created by Regulation No. 14. In a communiqué to the press, Dr. Millspaugh gives some explanation of his plans for feeding the population. He attributes public anxiety to lack of confidence in the Government and to doubts as to the Allies' intentions regarding the purchase and export of grain. He expresses hope that if the Government and the Majlis support his measures he will be able to establish confidence in the Government, and says that he is satisfied that two of the Allies have no intention of buying grain in Persia. Russia, on the other hand, was asking for wheat and barley for her own needs, but Russia could not expect grain to be delivered to her until the needs of the Persian people had been assured.

*Appointments—Civil.*

- 4.—(i) Hussein Mohiman to be Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Finance.  
(ii) Kowsar to be Governor of Shahrud.

*Persian Forces.**Army.*

5. It has been decided to abolish the Staff College. It has been for long a useless and expensive incubus.

*Police.*

6. The Majlis has passed a law authorising the engagement of Mr. Stephen Timmerman as Director-General of Police for a period of two years. Among his duties will be—

- The reorganisation of the central administration of the Persian police.
- The organisation of a police training school.
- The reform of prison administration.
- Revision of the regulations for the police.
- Reform of traffic laws and regulations.

His proposals will be subject to the approval of the Minister of the Interior. He will be consulted about appointments and promotions in the police force and in all financial questions connected with the force.

*Appointments—Military.*

- 7.—(i) Colonel Saghafi to be Director of the 1st Bureau of the General Staff.  
(ii) Colonel Samadi to be Director of Personnel of the General Staff.  
(iii) Sarhang Ahad Talib Begi to command the 13th (Khorramabad) Brigade.  
(iv) Sarhang Shahrushahi to command the 12th Kermanshah Brigade.  
(v) Sartip Attaullah Alai to be Deputy Chief of Army Finance.  
(vi) Sartip Muhammad Mir Jalali to command the Central Administrative Depot.  
(vii) Mr. Stephen Timmerman to be Director-General of Police.

*Internal Security.**Fars.*

8. A meeting has taken place between General Jahanbani, Nasir Qashgai, Khosrow his brother and Morteza Quli Khan, Governor of Bakhtiari, the outcome of which was that Khosrow agreed to come to Tehran to discuss terms of submission for himself and his brother with the Government. A British officer was present at the meeting. It has been agreed that while these negotiations are in progress there will be a truce between the Qashgai and the troops, the latter undertaking to make no movement. Nasir has promised that he will restrain the Qashgai tribes from committing robbery during the period of the truce. It is unlikely that it is the intention of Nasir to do more now than play for time until the downward migration of the tribes, which is likely to begin a month before the usual date, is complete. The arrival of Qavam-ul-Mulk in Shiraz, combined with the news of recent German defeats, probably persuaded Nasir that it was time to play for safety. The effectiveness of the Qavam's appointment has already been demonstrated by the strength of the attempts that are now being made by Nasir's friends and other anti-British parties to secure his withdrawal.

9. The Boir Ahmadi who attacked the Persian garrison at Ardekan (see Summary No. 32, paragraph 13), disconcerted by the inconsistency of the garrison in refusing to surrender, withdrew on the approach of a relieving battalion after sacking part of the town. The Persian troops claim that the Boir Ahmadi suffered some twenty casualties, killed and wounded.

*Kurdistan.*

10. The bombastic threats of Mahmud Dizli and Mahmud Kanisanani have come to little. Recent reports from Kurdistan are that the tribes who were threatening the Persian forces west of Senneh have dispersed.

Tehran, 16th August, 1943.

[E 5260/110/34]

No. 56.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 3rd September.)

(No. 356.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 34 for the period of the 17th to 23rd August, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 24th August, 1943.

Enclosure in No. 56.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 34 for the Period 17th to  
23rd August, 1943.*

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

THE Prime Minister now considers that he can count on a majority in the Majlis to give the Government a vote of confidence on the Nowbakht interpellation which is to be taken on the 24th August. But after that it is believed that the Majlis intends to demand some changes in the Cabinet, and the continuance of a majority in favour of the Prime Minister seems doubtful.

2. The arrest of the German agent, Franz Mayer, in Tehran by the British security authorities has caused considerable alarm to those Persians who had

[27005]

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been plotting with him. Several of the more notorious among them have since the arrest made attempts through third parties to ascertain from the legation whether there is any evidence against them. Drastic action by the British authorities is expected. In the press and elsewhere there is noticeable the beginning of a realisation that it is time to give the Allies, particularly Americans and British, some reason to think less badly of Persia.

3. Alarmed by information which they received from Persian as well as British sources that German agents intended to try to destroy the railway, the Persian Government has issued a proclamation announcing a reward of 50,000 rials for information leading to the arrest of any German in Persia without the permission of the Persian Government.

4. The weakness of their forces is obliging the Persian Government to accept a situation in tribal areas which in the years before Reza Shah was a constant cause of insecurity, resulting in loss of revenue and production and hindering development. That situation was the existence of super-tribal chiefs commanding the allegiance of powerful tribal confederations. Reza Shah realised that no unification and no development of Persia were possible while these chiefs were a law unto themselves in vast areas, and he removed them all. To-day Morteza Quli Khan is again chief of all the Bakhtiari, and Khosrow is to be chief of all the Qashgai-Ikhanis in all but name. While the Persian forces and the authority of the Persian Government remain as weak as they are, collection of revenue and of grain in the large areas they control are at the mercy of those chiefs. And unless the Persian forces and the authority of the Central Government are greatly strengthened, those parts of Persia dominated by the tribes may lapse into the condition prevailing in 1910.

5. In Summary No. 26/43, paragraph 3, reference was made to the arrival in Persia from Iraq of a venerable Shia divine, Haji Agha Hussein Qumi. He has visited Tehran and Meshed and has now returned to Tehran. Much has been made of him during his visit, not only by those who respect his standing in religion. He has been fawned on, flattered and encouraged by merchants, politicians and others for their private ends. He is now embarrassing the Government by demands regarding the wearing of the veil and the administration of Shrine endowments which would, if granted, tend to re-establish the power of the mullahs.

6. The members of the committee to supervise the elections in Tehran have been elected. The president is Seyyid Muhammad Sadiq Tabatabai (F.O. 205; M.A. 285). The committee has conveyed to the Government its opinion that the continuance of the military governorship in Tehran is incompatible with free elections.

#### *Economic.*

7. An official statement in the press states that engagements for the delivery of wheat by landlords for the current year now total 400,000 tons, of which 320,000 tons will suffice for the needs of this year, and 80,000 tons will be held in reserve for the coming year. In fact, however, only about 16,000 tons of this year's harvest have as yet reached the Government stores, of which 8,000 have been collected in Khuzestan.

8. In his latest public monthly report Dr. Millspaugh estimates the deficit in the budget for the current year at 1,500 million rials without allowing for any increase in the salaries of Government employees. Some increase is, however, universally admitted to be essential. An increase of 50 per cent. would increase the budget deficit to 1,900 million rials. Such a sum cannot be raised during the current year by the Persian Government by taxation or by internal loans. The new Income Tax Bill, even if it were to become law immediately, would not be effective for some time. The Government already owes to the National Bank the sum of 3,200 million rials and the capacity of the bank to lend is almost exhausted. The Government has no alternative but to ask the Allies for a loan sufficient to cover the deficit of 1,900 million rials. In the meantime they were asking for an advance against that loan of 500 million rials for the purchase of grain, and in order to meet current expenditure they had asked for and obtained from the A.I.O.C. an advance of the current year's royalties.

#### *Appointments—Civil.*

9.—(i) Muhammad Wahid Tunakabuni to be Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Education.

(ii) Ghulam Reza Nurzad (F.O. 149; M.A. 204) to be Director of International Relations in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

#### *Internal Security.*

10. A great and possibly lasting change has come over the tribal situation in the south as is explained in more detail in the following paragraphs. This has been brought about by a series of events which have combined to bring home to the tribes the inadvisability of being associated with the German cause. The defeat of the German summer offensive in Russia and the subsequent Russian victories, the fall of Mussolini, the arrest of Franz Mayer and the appointment of the staunchly pro-British Qavam-ul-Mulk as Governor-General of Fars all had a cumulatively persuasive effect.

#### *Fars.*

11. The result of the meeting mentioned in Summary No. 33/43, paragraph 8, between Khosrow and Nasir Qashgai, General Jahanbani and Morteza Quli Khan, Governor of Bakhtiari, was that Khosrow agreed to come to Tehran on a safe-conduct to discuss matters with the Persian Government. The result of these discussions was that the Government agreed that Khosrow would be made Governor of Firuzabad, that sympathetic consideration would be given to Nasir and Khosrow's land claims, and that the Government would not oppose Nasir's election as a Deputy for Firuzabad. In return Khosrow undertook on behalf of himself and Nasir to return all arms taken from the Persian forces, to restrain the Qashgai tribes from disorder and robbery, to arrest and hand over any Germans in Qashgai territory, to allow British officials to visit freely Qashgai territory, not to oppose the stationing of Persian troops in any part of Fars, and to remain himself in Shiraz or give Nasir's son as a hostage until Nasir left for Tehran. It is unlikely that Nasir will leave tribal territory until he has the immunity of a Deputy.

12. This settlement is far from satisfactory from the point of view of the Persian Government, but as the Persian forces are in no condition to subdue the Qashgai some measures to gain time and to secure even a temporary truce were necessary. It is possible that the Qashgai intend genuinely enough to refuse asylum to Germans and perhaps even to break off all relations with them. If so, the British object will have been to a large extent achieved. But by his appointment as Governor of Firuzabad Khosrow is in effect recognised as chief of all the Qashgai, and if he has the character to consolidate his position he may not in the future easily be brought to submit to the Persian Government. The surrender of their arms by the Qashgai is not part of the present settlement. On the other hand, he is young, even for his 22 years, and, although now a popular figure in the tribe, he may not be able to restrain them from robbery for long.

13. Khosrow, while in Tehran, expressed to members of the British Legation his sincere regret for past misdeeds. He made no secret of his and Nasir's association with Germans, but denied that until recently there had been more than one with the tribe. He admitted that Nasir had prepared a landing-ground for German aircraft, and that the Germans with them had told them that troop-carrying aircraft would shortly arrive with parties to assist the Qashgai to damage British interests. He reported the arrival of parachutists with explosives and that the Qashgai had assisted them with transport. All Germans, he claimed, had now left Qashgai territory.

#### *Bakhtiari.*

14. Germans, probably those who have recently landed by parachute, are known to have joined Abul Qasim and Captain Alavi, the Persian Army deserter who is with him. Abul Qasim, influenced undoubtedly by the apparent defection from the German cause of Nasir Qashgai and his brother and by the same cause that had influenced them—the obvious hopelessness of a German victory—has himself come into Isfahan and surrendered, on what terms is not yet known, to the G.O.C., Persian troops. With his elimination from Bakhtiari the danger of that tribe engaging in anti-British activities is small. Most of the Bakhtiari khans are now anxious to prove their pro-British sentiments.

#### *Kuh-i-Galu.*

15. The third member of the anti-British combination among the tribes of the south organised by German agents, Abdullah Zarghampur of the Boir Ahmadi, has now sent in messages to Qavam-ul-Mulk at Shiraz to the effect that he is prepared to negotiate with him. Abdullah's younger brother, Khosrow, is also negotiating with the Persian authorities and offering to take action against his brother.



*Kerman.*

16. There has recently been much brigandage on or near the Isfahan-Yezd-Kerman road. During the week 10th to 15th August lorries were held up and robbed on five separate occasions. The insecurity is probably nothing more than the result of the prevailing disorder in South Persia. A few successful minor actions by the Persian forces against brigands in the vicinity of the Isfahan-Shiraz road has driven them further afield.

Tehran, 23rd August, 1943.

[E 5432/110/34]

No. 57.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 11th September.)*  
(No. 372.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 35 for the period the 24th to 30th August, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 31st August, 1943.

Enclosure in No. 57.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 35 for the Period*  
*24th to 30th August, 1943.*

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

ANXIETY regarding the Government's ability to secure the nation's bread supplies during the coming year is growing, and they are being severely heckled by the Deputies and the press on this account. Much pressure is being brought on the Government to relax the regulation that forbids the acquisition by private individuals in towns of grain other than from Government stores against their ration coupons. There is still strong opposition to the new Income Tax Bill, and an unrelenting campaign is carried on in the press against Dr. Millspaugh and his mission.

2. The Deputy Nowbakht failed to present himself at the Majlis on the day appointed for the Government's answer to his interpellation. He has gone into hiding.

3. His Majesty's Minister and the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires jointly presented to the Prime Minister on the 29th August a list of some 150 Persians who are known on reliable evidence to have been recently plotting with German agents against the Allies, and demanded their arrest. The Prime Minister agreed that they should be arrested.

4. The Minister of Education, Dr. Ali Akbar Ziassi, has resigned from the Cabinet from dislike of the intrigues with which the Government is surrounded.

5. The four more respectable members of the Election Supervisory Committee for Tehran (see Summary No. 34/43, paragraph 6) resigned immediately after their election. This is interpreted as an expression of their opinion that the elections would be no more free than formerly.

6. The tone of the press has recently been more conciliatory towards the Allies while being severely critical of the Government and the internal situation. The victory of the Allies is generally accepted as a foregone conclusion. There is much local gossip about differences of view between Russia on the one hand and Great Britain and America on the other.

*Economic.*

7. The Council of Ministers has published a decree forbidding the slaughter of cows and of working cattle.

8. The Majlis has passed a law authorising the Ministry of Finance to sell to the Government of India 118,718 kilog. of Persian nickel coins not now in circulation, and to accept payment in aluminium and copper for the minting of bronze coins. The price in each case to be that ruling in New York.

9. The following departments of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce have now been transferred to the Ministry of Finance:—

Exports and Imports, Import Licences, Internal Trade, Barter, Weights and Measures.

*Appointments—Civil.*

10.—(i) Salman Assadi (F.O. 32; M.A. 40) to be assistant to the Administrator-General of Finance in the matter of grain supplies while retaining his post of Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Finance.

(ii) Ghulam Reza Nurzad (F.O. 149; M.A. 204) to be Director of International Relations in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

*Persian Forces.**Army.*

11. The Shah has, under much pressure from the Government, very unwillingly signed a decree making the General Staff responsible to and subordinate to the Ministry for War, while reaffirming his own status as Commander-in-chief. It remains to be seen whether he will in future refrain from interfering in the affairs of the army and from issuing orders without the approval of the Minister for War.

12. A school has been organised under the direction of General Ridley's staff (which is shortly to be increased by four more American officers) for the training of officers in the duties of (a) the Quartermaster-General's Department and (b) the Pay Department.

*Appointments—Military.*

13.—(i) Sarhang Muqbili to command the Shiraz Brigade.

(ii) Sarhang Abdullah Saif to be Acting Chief of Police *vice* Sartip Khosrow Panah, resigned.

*Internal Security.**Fars.*

14. Nasir Qashgai is still pretending not to be satisfied with the assurances obtained by his brother Khosrow from the Persian Government during his visit to Tehran, and he appears to be intending to find excuse after excuse for remaining in tribal territory. It is possible that he may have been joined by the absconding Deputy, Nowbakht. In spite of Khosrow's assurances to British officials, recent reports from fairly reliable sources say that there are still Germans in Qashgai territory. The situation in Fars is still uneasy and brigandage has by no means ceased.

*Bakhtiari.*

15. Abul Qasim is in Isfahan, but, according to His Majesty's Consul, in no submissive mood. His armed following is still being held together in Bakhtiari by Captain Alavi, the Persian army deserter.

*Kuh-i-Galu.*

16. Most of the Boir Ahmadi chiefs are now making overtures, real or feigned, to Government officials and intriguing against each other.

*Khorassan.*

17. The Persian troops who were sent to Shirvan to repress trouble among the Kurds (see Summary No. 29/43, paragraph 13) claim to have collected some 400 rifles from the tribes in that area.

*Russian Affairs.*

18. M. Smirnoff has resigned his appointment as Soviet Ambassador in Persia and is being replaced by Constantine Alexandrovitch Mikhailov, now Soviet Ambassador in Kabul.

19. M. Maisky, formerly Soviet Ambassador in London, passed through Tehran on his way to London.

*American Affairs.*

20. General Connolly, commanding the United States Persian Gulf Service Command, recently invited Persian journalists to visit the elaborate camp for American troops that has been constructed a few miles outside Tehran. The



purpose of the invitation was mainly to persuade the press that the American soldier ate none of Persia's food except fresh fruit and vegetables and to announce that the United States Command fed its 31,000 Persian employees from American resources.

#### Turkish Affairs.

21. The Turkish Government has offered 100 scholarships at Turkish colleges to Persian students, preferably to those having some knowledge of Turkish. This condition has aroused some comment, as it limits the choice mainly to candidates from Azerbaijan, where Turkish designs are sometimes suspect by imaginative Persians. There is a large number of applicants.

#### Polish Affairs.

22. The number of civilian Poles in Persia on the 19th August was:—

	Men.	Women.	Children.	Total.
In Tehran ...	1,297	5,436	2,383	9,116
Isfahan ...	78	545	1,391	2,014
Ahwaz ...	207	736	460	1,403
	1,582	6,717	4,234	12,533

Tehran, 30th August, 1943.

[E 5377/110/34]

No. 58.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 18th September.)

(No. 384.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 36 for the period of 31st August to 6th September, 1943.

Tehran, 7th September, 1943.

Enclosure in No. 58.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 36 for the period 31st August to 6th September, 1943.

#### Persian Affairs.

##### Political.

1. The majority of those Persians whose arrest has been demanded by His Majesty's Minister and the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires—see Summary No. 35/43, paragraph 3—have been arrested. All army officers on the list were arrested within a few hours on the orders of the Minister for War.

In view of the promptitude shown by the minister and the officers to whom his orders were issued it is unfortunate that Indian troops in Isfahan, who were not intended to act unless the Persian authorities failed to do so, should, through a misapprehension and no fault of theirs, have taken steps to make the arrests themselves and, finding that they had already been made, insisted on taking the officers into their own custody. This caused considerable ill-feeling among Persian officers in Isfahan and was bitterly resented by the Chief of the General Staff, who regarded it as an insult to himself and to the Persian army as all arrests of military officers had already been effected. It led to some very violent anti-British articles in the press, the obvious purpose of which is to inflame the feelings of Persian officers against the British. There is little doubt that this campaign has been inspired by the Chief of the General Staff, who announced his resignation (which he has since withdrawn) as a protest against the intervention of Indian troops. The Chief of the General Staff leads a strongly nationalistic party in the army, and he had been hoping to restore some of its lost morale.

2. Apart from the above the general effect of the arrests has probably been good, although there has not yet been time fully to appreciate public reactions. That some arrests would be made has been expected for some time and only in a few cases has any surprise been caused by the selection of those to be arrested.

But the arrests may be made an excuse for working up an agitation against the Prime Minister and his Government, whose position is already weak. The Shah is angry with the Prime Minister for ordering the arrests without previous reference to him.

3. Attempts have been made to create disturbances in Tehran and to persuade the shopkeepers to close their shops, chiefly by merchants interested in provoking demonstrations against Dr. Millspaugh's wheat regulations and his Income Tax Bill. The situation was favourable because there was public anxiety about the restrictions on the purchase of wheat; political parties have been exciting popular feeling over the elections; the mullahs, led by Haji Hussein Qumi have been trying to work up religious fervour, and there was some agitation over the arrests, particularly over the unsuccessful attempt to arrest a prominent and notorious mullah, Seyyid Abul Qasim Kashani.

4. The Ministry of the Interior has published a communiqué announcing that discovery had recently been made of a German espionage and sabotage organisation which was preparing a revolt against the Government and planning for the destruction of railway bridges and tunnels. As a number of Persians was suspected of collaborating with the Germans the Government had arrested them in the interests of the nation and in fulfilment of their treaty obligations. The public is requested to give information to the police regarding the above-mentioned organisation or the whereabouts of Germans.

5. There has, for some time past, been considerable ill-feeling between the Shah and Qavam es Sultaneh, and the latter's subsidised papers have made many attacks on the Shah. There was recently a meeting between the two and it is reported that friendly relations have been established. The Shah is also reported recently to have met one of the leaders of the Tudeh party. As this party and Qavam es Sultaneh are both supposed to enjoy Russian backing the Shah is now believed to be seeking Russian support. One theory has it that this is against the return of Seyyid Zia ed Din Tabatabai which is reported to be imminent.

6. Hussein Sami'i has resigned from the post of Minister of the Interior and has been succeeded by Seyyid Muhammad Tadayyun, hitherto Minister without Portfolio.

#### Appointments—Civil.

7. (i) Seyyid Muhammad Tadayyun (F.O. 207-M.A. 288), Minister without Portfolio, to be Minister of the Interior vice Hussein Sami'i resigned.

(ii) Qasim Alamir to be Farmandar of Khorramabad.

(iii) Lissan Sepehr to be Farmandar of Kurdistan.

(iv) Burzu Kalhur to be Farmandar of Shahabad.

(v) Ahmad Karuhi to be Farmandar of Bijar.

(vi) Dr. Marsban (Said ul Mulk) to be Governor-General of Western Azarbaijan.

(vii) Habibullah Muzaffari to be Director-General of the Ministry of Education.

(viii) Muhammad Muqtadir Mujhdahi to be Deputy Ustandar of the 2nd (Tehran) Ustan.

#### Persian Forces.

##### Army.

8. Eight junior Persian officers have left for Cairo to be trained in a Driving and Maintenance Course, organised by G.H.Q., Mideast.

##### Appointments—Military.

9. (i) Sarlashgar Hadi Shafaqi (F.O. 196-M.A. 270) to command the 3rd (Azarbaijan) Division.

(ii) Sartip Muhammad Hussein Firous (F.O. 75-M.A. 94) to be Commander of the Air Force.

(iii) Sarhang Azarpai to be Commander of the 9th Ardabil Brigade.

#### Internal Security.

##### Fars.

10. Qashgai brigandage has almost ceased, but it is appearing to be increasingly likely that Nasir's overtures to the Persian Government through his brother, Khosrow, has no object but to gain time for the downward migration of the tribe. Nasir has refused the invitation of the Governor-General and the Persian General Officer Commanding to come to Shiraz. There is good evidence that there are still Germans in Qashgai territory and that Nasir is now sheltering



the Deputy Nowbakht and his son who are among those whose arrest has been demanded. Nasir realises that in face of the weakness of the Government and its forces he has a strong position and it is improbable that he will abandon it until compelled to do so by force or the threat of force.

*Azərbaycan.*

11. There has been for some time past sporadic raiding by Persian Kurds across the Turkish frontier. In one of these raids, early in August, the raiders were ambushed by Turkish troops and 39 of them were killed.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

12. The Soviet Vice-Consul in Kermanshah recently made an extended tour through Luristan, contacting several tribal chiefs. In Isfahan the Soviet Consulate shows a consistent interest in Bakhtiari affairs. There is no evidence, however, that Soviet interest in the tribes has any purpose other than the acquisition of information.

13. During the eleven weeks from the 1st June to 14th August over 16,000 tons of Aid to Russia supplies were carried over the Zahidan-Meshed route.

*Postscript.*—Sartip Razmara has been relieved of his appointment as Chief of the General Staff and has been replaced by Sartip Riazi, a French-trained officer of some education and unquestioned honesty.

*Tehran, 6th September, 1943.*

[E 5795/110/34]

No. 59.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 29th September.)*

(No. 395.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 37 for the period of the 7th September to 13th September, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 15th September, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 59.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 37, for the period 7th September to 13th September, 1943.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

1. Persia declared war on Germany on the 9th September. The declaration was approved by the Majlis by 74 votes from 77 Deputies present, had on the whole a good press and, although it cannot be said to have created any wild enthusiasm, it has generally been received with mild approval and hope of favours to come by the public, whose fears were allayed by the Prime Minister's announcement that the Allies had given assurances that Persia would not be required to enter into any additional military or economic engagements. Many have expressed regrets that Persia did not earlier become a belligerent, but only in a few cases are these regrets sincere. The consideration uppermost in many minds is that Persia's association with the United Nations puts her in a stronger position *vis-à-vis* Russia after the war and may lead to some guarantees of her independence.

2. As justification for the declaration of war at this stage the Prime Minister in his speech to the Majlis mentioned the discovery of the German organisation whose object it is to raise revolts against the Government and to damage communications and he referred to the recent arrival of parachutists in Qashgai territory. This will serve Persians as sufficient defence against the charge that they sat on the fence until the victory of the Allies was quite certain and that their only object was to secure representation at the Peace Conferences.

3. The Shah has sent telegrams to the President of the U.S.S.R., the President of the United States and His Majesty The King announcing Persia's

adherence to the pact of the United Nations and giving assurances that it is his firm intention to continue the efficacious co-operation already given by Persia towards the common victory.

4. The Prime Minister, who had been temporarily elated by his discovery that he had the unsuspected courage to take so definite a line as to order the arrest of a number of prominent Persians and to face the Majlis with a declaration of war, is again depressed by the Shah's evident displeasure and by his encouragement of the opposition to the Prime Minister.

5. Although, particularly in the army, some attempt has been made to spread the belief that the Allies selected for arrest—see Summary No. 36, paragraph 1—particularly patriotic Persians who stood in the way of their plans, the public remains unexcited and the press, after a few outbursts, has adopted a moderate tone. There are indications that the effect of the arrests will be good, and that the result will be a decrease in the opposition to Allied, particularly to British, interests and encouragement to genuine supporters of a policy of co-operation.

6. The capitulation of Italy, although not unexpected by Persians, was accepted by most as impressive proof of the certainty of Germany's complete defeat and reduction to impotence. The main concerns of Persians, however, are their own economic situation—high prices, the supply of bread, insecurity—and Russian post-war policy towards Persia.

7. In most parts of the country the elections, which should have been completed before the end of this month, have been temporarily postponed on one pretext or another.

8. The Minister for War has been ordered by the Shah to form a committee under the patronage of Queen Fowzieh for the collection of funds for Russian wounded. It is believed that the suggestion that the formation of such a committee would be appropriate came from the Russians.

##### *Economic.*

9. The Cereals Department of the Ministry of Finance has published the following figures of undertakings for the delivery of grain signed by landlords and of the amounts actually collected up to the date shown:—

<i>District.</i>	<i>Undertakings in tons.</i>	<i>Collections in tons.</i>	<i>Up to</i>
Qazvin ...	1,831	672	2.9.43
Zinjan ...	4,021	218	2.9.43
Gurgan ...	...	...	...
Azərbaycan ...	29,475	3,000	2.9.43
Khorassan ...	17,316	6,476	7.9.43
Samnan-Damghan ...	937	222	26.8.43
Shahrud ...	729	57	2.9.43
Yezd ...	283	47	2.9.43
Kashan ...	...	...	...
Qum ...	481	265	7.9.43
Khurramabad ...	...	...	...
Gulpayigan ...	473	113	24.8.43
Bushire ...	1,022	754	2.9.43
Arak ...	6,606	643	7.9.43
Hamadan ...	7,050	584	2.9.43
Kurdistan ...	6,650	481	2.9.43
Kermanshah ...	11,851	167	4.9.43
Malayir ...	525	113	24.8.43
Khuzistan ...	1,403	1,149	24.8.43
Burujird ...	283	312	24.8.43
Fars ...	3,320	5,270	24.8.43
Kerman ...	5,930	1,157	2.8.43
Zabul ...	8,451	1,803	2.9.43
Isfahan ...	1,794	415	2.9.43
Tehran ...	22,861	8,759	11.9.43
Mazandaran ...	1,540	...	7.8.43
Totals ...	134,832	32,677	

The amount which it is necessary to collect is 300,000 tons.

10. The Price Stabilisation Section of the Ministry of Finance has fixed the price in Tehran of coal at 1,260 rials per ton and of charcoal at 1,200 rials.



*Appointments—Civil.*

- 11.—(i) Ibrahim Khajeh Nouri to be Director of Press and Propaganda;
- (ii) Zain-ul-Abidin Qiami to be Farmandar of Senneh (Kurdistan).

The appointments of Lissan Sepehr as Farmandar of Kurdistan and of Burzu Kalhur as Farmandar of Shahabad have been cancelled—see Summary No. 36, paragraph 7.

*Persian Forces.**Army.*

12. The posts of Minister for War (General Ahmadi), Under-Secretary of State (Brigadier Ansari) and Chief of the General Staff (Brigadier Riazi) are now held by men who have consistently advocated close co-operation with Great Britain and support of the American advisers. Generals Riazi and Ansari are honest and educated men, but it remains to be seen whether they are strong enough to impose their ideas on the army. A beginning is to be made by clearing out some of the old and useless officers, but there will still remain a number of educated younger officers of strongly nationalistic ideas who are opposed to the grant of authority to American advisers.

13. As was reported in last week's Summary of Intelligence, the then Chief of the General Staff, Brigadier Razmara, had resigned as a protest against the intervention of Indian troops in the arrests of Persian military officers in Isfahan and had later withdrawn his resignation. But a few days later he refused to accept certain regulations drawn up by the Ministry for War to implement the Shah's decree making the General Staff subordinate to the Ministry—see Summary No. 35/43, paragraph 11. His principal objection was to the transfer of the Officer Personnel (Military Secretary's) Department from the control of the General Staff to the direct control of the Minister for War. The Shah, who had most unwillingly agreed to the subordination of the General Staff to the Ministry for War, was with difficulty persuaded that Brigadier Razmara should be relieved of his appointment. His removal is a disappointment to a number of ambitious young officers, as Razmara had intended to work for the compulsory retirement of all officers senior to him and his friends. These may be a disturbing element for some time.

14. A Bill will shortly be laid before the Majlis asking for approval of the engagement of General Ridley and not more than thirty American officers as military advisers to the Persian army. The Persian Government does not expect to get as many as thirty officers immediately.

*Appointments—Military.*

- 15.—(i) Sartip Ali Riazi to be Chief of the General Staff vice Sartip Haji Ali Razmara (M.A. 243) relieved.
- (ii) Sartip Ghulam Ali Ansari to be Under-Secretary of State for War vice Sartip Riazi.
- (iii) Sartip Majid Firouz (M.A. 93) to be Director of Personnel in the Ministry for War.
- (iv) Sartip Reza Quli Kerim-Ghovanlou to command the Central Administrative Depot, Tehran.
- (v) Sarhang Mazheri to be head of the 4th Bureau, General Staff, Army Headquarters.
- (vi) Sartip Mahmud Khosrowpanah to be Director of Conscription in the Ministry for War.

*Internal Security.**Fars.*

16. An uneasy peace still reigns in Fars. Nasir Qashgai now pleads that it is Qavam-ul-Mulk's presence in Shiraz that prevents his coming in to discuss terms. He has clearly been encouraged to hold out by the conciliatory reception given to Khosrow in Tehran, which he has interpreted—rightly—as an indication of the Government's weakness. The Minister for War is now visiting Shiraz to examine the situation and the possibility of offensive action against Nasir in consultation with the local authorities.

*Bakhtiari.*

17. Abul Qasim has now come to Tehran, and it is to be hoped that his followers will now disperse unless the Persian army deserter, Captain Alavi, can find money to hold them together. They are now collected at Auragun, where there may still be some Germans. Captain Alavi has also been making overtures to

surrender. Morteza Quli, in spite of the inevitable intrigues of his brother khans, seems to be slowly making good as governor. There is a fair degree of peace in the greater part of Bakhtiari and grain is coming satisfactorily into the collecting centres.

*Khuzistan.*

18. Armed Arabs under a leader, Zumail, have been for some time committing robberies with violence in the neighbourhood of Khorramshahr and Abadan. On the 8th September there was an encounter between them and the local gendarmerie which resulted in casualties on both sides and in the gendarmerie remaining in control of the area. Some local authorities expect retaliation by the Arabs.

Tehran, 13th September, 1943.

[E 5829/110/34]

No. 60.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 30th September.)

(No. 398.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 38 for the period the 14th to the 20th September, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 21st September, 1943.

Enclosure in No. 60.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 38 for the period 14th to 20th September, 1943.

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

PERSIA'S entry into the war continues to have a good press, and public opinion on the whole seems to be relieved that it has received a clear direction. There appears already to be an improvement in the public attitude towards the Allies, perhaps even a little pride at being—as Persians see it—ranged alongside them in the march to victory.

2. The Government has issued a communiqué proclaiming—

- (i) That laws and penalties applicable to a state of war will now be in force throughout the country. The army is responsible for publishing details and particularly those concerned with the safety of roads, railways and telegraphic communications.
- (ii) That to have relations with or to give assistance to the enemy will be considered as high treason and punished accordingly.
- (iii) Any incitement or action that leads to an interruption of road or rail communications or to the sabotage of national factories, workshops, mines or other economic resources will be punished in accordance with the laws in force in wartime.
- (iv) The dissemination of false news, opposition to the foreign policy of Persia, insults to the officials of the Persian Government or of Allied Powers and all actions that may disturb public order are absolutely forbidden.
- (v) It is the duty of all officials of the Government to co-operate with the officials of the Ministries of War and of the Interior who are charged with the responsibility for the execution of these regulations.

3. Scheily's Cabinet is a little more stable. The Shah is said to be on better terms with the Prime Minister and the latter has gained some confidence. But the Government will soon again be in difficulties unless public anxiety about the bread supply can be allayed. It is now acute, and an interpellation of the Government on this matter has been tabled. Differences of opinion between Dr. Millspaugh and the Government are known to the public and faith in Dr. Millspaugh as a supplier of bread or a reducer of the cost of living is not high.



4. There has been a regrettable advertisement in the press of disagreement between Dr. Millspaugh and the Minister of the Interior, Tadayyun. The latter took exception to the issue of an order by Dr. Millspaugh for the formation of a commission to take a new census in Tehran which he considered necessary in order to check the number of bread coupons in issue. The Minister of the Interior pointed out that the taking of a census was his business and not that of Dr. Millspaugh. The latter replied to the Minister's protest in a rather provocative letter which he published in the press. This called forth a retaliatory reply, also published in the press. This gives further material to those of Dr. Millspaugh's critics who accuse him of putting too wide an interpretation on the powers given to him and of acting hastily and obstinately against the advice of the competent Persian authorities. That Dr. Millspaugh, in the task before him, should arouse strong opposition was inevitable. That he should have secured no greater degree of co-operation than he has done is regrettable.

5. The Shah has announced his intention of visiting Khorassan shortly.

#### *Economic.*

6. The Majlis has passed a Bill granting a credit of 500 million rials for the assistance of under-paid Government employees. It is understood that the assistance is to be given in kind rather than in cash.

7. The Bill which has been before the Majlis since March—see Summary No. 12/43, paragraph 3—for the issue of Treasury Bonds to the limit of 500 million rials has now been approved.

8. The press announces that bar gold of a weight of 20,571 ounces has recently reached Tehran from the United States. It has been delivered to the National Bank and will replace silver, to be issued for sale, in the backing of the note issue.

#### *Appointments—Civil.*

9.—(i) Abbas Quli Gulshayan to be Ustandar of the third Ustan (Eastern Azarbaijan).

(ii) Dr. Abul Qasim Shaikh to be Director-General of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

(iii) Dr. Ali Sajjadi to be Farmandar of Gulpaigan.

#### *Persian Forces.*

10. The following officers have been put on the retired list:—

*Sarlashkars.*—Abul Hassan Pourzand, Almad Muini (F.O. 131; M.A. 174), Iraj Mathui, Hadi Atabai, Muhtashimi.

*Sartips.*—Habibullah Qadari, Meh'di Quli Tajbaksh (F.O. 209; M.A. 291), Muhammad Ali Puria, Muhammad Marmand Ali Towfiqi.

*Sarhang.*—Maud Itimadi.

#### *Internal Security.*

#### *Fars.*

11. There is no development of importance in the situation. Nasir shows no inclination to leave tribal territory, nor does Khosrow appear to have any intention of implementing his undertaking to surrender arms captured from the Persian forces. The result of the Minister for War's discussion with the Governor-General regarding future policy is not yet known.

#### *Bakhtiari.*

12. There are unconfirmed reports of concentrations of Boir Ahmadi and Janski tribesmen with aggressive intentions in the area south of Shahr Kurd.

Tehran, 20th September, 1943.

## CHAPTER V.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.

[E 3569/507/89]

No. 61.

Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received 22nd June.)

(No. 32. Secret.)

Sir,

Damascus, 8th June, 1943.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on leading personalities in Syria.

In former years, notes on leading personalities in both Syria and the Lebanon, and on French officials in the Levant States, were combined in a single report. Now that these States have acquired a measure of independence, I consider it appropriate to submit a separate report on each, and to suppress the section dealing with French officials.

The number of biographies may appear large in relation to the size and importance of the country, but public life in Syria is so fluid that a report of this kind can only be of use if it embraces a very wide range of candidates for political notoriety. Even so, it would not surprise me if quite a large percentage of members of the next Syrian Parliament, and even some members of the Government, were not mentioned in it.

I have not hitherto had the opportunity of becoming personally acquainted with more than a few of the leading Damascenes, and I am indebted for the compilation of the present report to His Majesty's Consul at Damascus, who has been assisted by his own staff and by consular and political officers in other parts of Syria.

I have, &c.

E. L. SPEARS.

Enclosure in No. 61.

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67. Fa'ur, Fa'ur Amir.
68. Fawwaz, Sha'alan amir.
69. Ghazzi, Said al.
70. Ghorani, As'ad.
71. Haffar, Lutfi.
72. Haffar, Wajih al.
73. Hajjiri, Ahmad el.
74. Hajjo Agha, Hassan.
75. Hakim, Hassan Bey al.
76. Hakim, Yusuf al.
77. Halabi, Fuad.
78. Halabi, Mohamed Pasha Izzeddine el.
79. Hamzeh, Aref.
80. Hamzawi, Said el.
81. Hanbali, Shakir al.
82. Harb, Nejjib.
83. Hariri, Mohamed Kheir.
84. Hassibi, Abu al Huda al.
85. Hassibi, Subhi al.
86. Hawash, Aziz.
87. Hayani, Taufiq.
88. Hayati, Yahya.
89. Helu, Jabba el.
90. Hindieh, Gregoire.
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93. Homsi, Edmond.
94. Horani, Akram.
95. Hubbi, Yuhanna.
96. Hunaidi, Mohamed al.
97. Huraiki, Bishop Ignatios.
98. Hussaini, Rafiq.
99. Hussieh, Izzat.
100. Hussami, Rashid al.
101. Ibish, Hussein al.
102. Ibish, Nuri al.
103. Ibrahim Pasha, Hassan Fuad.
104. Isa, Yusuf al.
105. Ishaq, Said Bey.
106. Jabi, Dr. Rushdi.
107. Jabri, Ihsan Bey al.
108. Jabri, Saudullah.
109. Jambart, Salim.
110. Jebara, Hassan Bey.
111. Jezairi, Amir Ja'far al.
112. Jezairi, Amir Said al.
113. Jirjous, Wadih Elias.
114. Jneid, Mohamed.
115. Jowhari, Tahsin al.
116. Kabbara, Sami.
117. Kahlale, Habib.
118. Kailani, Abdul Qader.
119. Kailani, Nessib.
120. Kayali, Abdurrahman.
121. Kecati, Rudolphe.
122. Kekhia, Ragheb.
123. Kekhia, Rushdi.
124. Khair, Haj Adib.
125. Khair, Saqr Bey.
126. Khani, Aziz el.
127. Khatib, Bahij Bey al.
128. Khatib, Zeki al.
129. Khouri, Fares al.
130. Khouri, Faiz al.
131. Kinj, Ali al.
132. Kinj, Ibrahim.
133. Kurd Ali, Mohamed.
134. Kyrillos IX, Moghabghab.
135. Liniado, Yusuf.
136. Maasarani, Haj Sulaiman.
137. Maatouk, Khalil.
138. Mahasin, Said.
139. Mamlouk, Nuzhat.
140. Ma'mun, Saifud Din.
141. Marashli, Haj Fateh al.

1. *Abbas, Munir*.—Born about 1905. Of good Alawite family. Brother of Shawkat Abbas, Mohafiz of Alawites. Well educated in France (law). Minister of Public Works and of Posts and Telegraphs in Hassan al Hakim Government

142. Mardam, Haidar Bey.
143. Mardam, Jamil.
144. Mardam, Khalil.
145. Mardam, Mohamed Rashed Pasha.
146. Mardam, Sami Pasha.
147. Martini, Nebib al.
148. Maizer Ibn Abdul Muhssen el Jarba Shaikh.
149. Milki, Raif.
150. Mohammed el Faraj es Salameh. Shaikh.
151. Mudarres, Mohamed Khalil.
152. Mudarres, Nuri.
153. Mujhem Ben Muhaid, Amir.
154. Murad, Hassan.
155. Murad, Leon.
156. Murhej, Farid.
157. Murshed, Suleiman al.
158. Na'asaneh, Habib.
159. Nahmad, Rahmo.
160. Namy, Damad Ahmed.
161. Nawwaf, as Saleh, Shaikh.
162. Nimr, Raphael.
163. Nizam ed Din, Abdul Baqi.
164. Osmani, Ragheb.
165. Phares, Georges.
166. Qais, Shaikh Najib.
167. Qasimi, Shaikh Ahmed el.
168. Qassab, Shaikh Kamil el.
169. Qassab Hassan, Colonel Ibrahim.
170. Qitami, Ogla.
171. Qudmani, Fuad.
172. Qudsi, Nazem.
173. Qumbaz, Abdul Hamid.
174. Qumbaz, Abud.
175. Quwatli, Shukri.
176. Rabbath, Edmond.
177. Raikan Ibn Murshed, Sheikh.
178. Rayess, Munir al.
179. Rayess, Najib el.
180. Ricaby, Haidar.
181. Rida, Khairi.
182. Rifat, Khalil.
183. Reslan, Mazhar Pasha.
184. Saba, Macarios.
185. Safieh, Majed.
186. Sahnaoui, Georges.
187. Sahnaoui, Jean.
188. Said, Riza.
189. Saouda, Phillippe.
190. Sarmini, Shaikh Abdel Qader.
191. Sarraj, Dr. Mohamed.
192. Shamieh, Tewfiq.
193. Shammas, Daoud.
194. Shayish Abdul Karim, Emir.
195. Shahabi, Amir Bahjat al.
196. Shehadi, Amir Mustafa.
197. Sherif, Ihsan.
198. Shretah, Abdul Qader.
199. Shugha'ar, Shaikh Jamal al Din.
200. Sidawi, Wadi'.
201. Sioufi, Mousallam.
202. Stati, Monseigneur Iyunis.
203. Sulahian, Herant.
204. Sulb, Aff al.
205. Tallal Abu Suleiman, Shaikh.
206. Ulshi, Jamil.
207. Urfi, Shaikh Said.
208. Oustwani, Shukri.
209. Yusuf, Mohamed Said al.
210. Zain ed Din, Farid.
211. Zamaita, Shaikh Yahya.
212. Ziade, Louis.
213. Zoubi, Mohamed Mifteh (of Yadouda).

(September 1941 to April 1942), again in Husni Barazi Government (April 1942 to January 1943) and again in Jamil Ulshi Government (January 1943 to March 1943). Very intelligent and tries to perform his duties well.

2. *Abbas, Shawkat*.—Born about 1905. Alawite. Son of Jabir al Abbas head of Khayatin tribe, and brother of Munir Abbas (q.v.). Educated in Syria and in France. In October 1937, when the Alawite Mohafazat was first represented in the Syrian Parliament, was deputy for Tal Kallakh. On the fall of the Nationalist Government and the return of autonomy to the Jebel Alawite (1939) became Mohafiz of Alawite Province. Quarrelled with Free French in 1941 and was sent into *residence forcée* in the Lebanon with his Director of the Interior, Ali el Kinj (q.v.). His brother Munir made Shawkat's reinstatement one of the conditions of his joining Shaikh Taj ed Din's first Government in September 1941. Played leading part in negotiations which led to reincorporation of Alawite Mohafazat in Syrian Republic (January 1942). Well educated, intelligent, supple, hard working and capable, but is said to use his position as Mohafiz for the benefit of himself and his family. Has co-operated with Allies in wheat matters. Speaks excellent French.

3. *Abouchar, Suleyman Sylvain*.—Born Damascus about 1890. Greek Orthodox. Received his secondary education as a civil engineer in Louvain, Belgium. Has had experience in Mexico. Chief engineer of the Public Works Department, South Syria. Speaks French and English. Intelligent, capable, straight. Hot-tempered and dislikes being contradicted. Co-operated fully with British army on their arrival in Syria.

4. *Ahmed, Suleiman el*.—Born about 1875. Alawite. Member of the Kalbiah tribe (*vide* Saqr Khair, Mohamed Bey Jneid) and one of the chief religious leaders of the Alawite. Learned and universally respected. Member of the Arab Academy in Damascus. His son, Mohamed, an Arab poet known as "Badawi el Jebel," is now a Nationalist in politics. He was at first a Separatist and secretary to Ali Kinj in the Department of the Interior in the Jebel Alawite, but, quarrelling with the French over their administration, became a Nationalist member of Syrian Parliament for Banias, 1937. Went to Iraq in 1939 as professor of Arabic. Violently anti-French and believed to have supported Rashid Ali Keilani against the British. Returned to Syria in 1941 and has been living a life of comparative retirement.

5. *Ajlani, Munir*.—Son of Darwish Ajlani. Born Damascus, 1910. Studied in France, where he graduated as doctor of law. Author of a book on Syrian Constitution. Elected Deputy 1936. At outset of Nationalist régime he, with Seif ed Din Ma'moun, Ahmad Samman and Mohamed Sarraj, organised the "Iron Shirts" (an organisation based on Nazi Brown Shirts) and was one of the commanders until it was taken over by Nizhat Mamluk, 1937. Soon after, movement was suppressed by French following disorders in Aleppo and Latakia.

Although his age had been amended by Nationalists to enable him to become Deputy (minimum 30), he bitterly opposed Nationalists in Parliament. In 1938 he and Zeki el Khatib were arrested and tried for writing a manifesto attacking Nationalist Government but were acquitted.

When Dr. Shahbandar returned to Syria, Ajlani supported him and remained one of his intimates until Shahbandar's murder in July 1940, when he gradually ceased his connexion with the party.

In September 1941 he was appointed head of Shaikh Taj ed Din's secretariat, and when on the 17th April, 1942, Cabinet was reshuffled, Shaikh Taj made him Minister of newly created Ministry of Youth and Propaganda under Husni Barazi. Was a member of Jamil Ulshi's Government (January 1943 to March 1943) occupying the same Ministry, the name of which was changed to Ministry of Social Affairs (January 1943). Married on the 20th August, 1942, the daughter of Shaikh Taj.

Conceited and tactless individual, vacillating yet obstinate. Is considered a good speaker by Arabs. By his tactless handling of Boy Scouts nearly brought about a crisis.

6. *Akras, Michel*.—Maronite Archbishop of Aleppo. Born 1877. Educated in the Maronite College at Beirut. Concealed British Consulate archives during the Great War. Probably the most sincere prelate in the Aleppo area, but neither his health nor influence are strong now. He hopes for the continuance of European influence in Syria.



7. *Alexandros III, Tahhan*.—Born in Damascus in 1869, where he was educated in the Greek Orthodox School. His brilliance and his steadiness led to his being sent to the Ecclesiastical College in Constantinople. In 1894 he returned to Damascus and two years later went to the religious academy in Kiev. Studied for a few years in Moscow. In 1903 he was appointed Bishop of Adana and Tarsus, but was badly received by the population there and resigned in 1906. In 1908 he was appointed Bishop of Tripoli and remained there until 1930 when he was elected Patriarch of Damascus by the Damascus electors but not by other members of the electoral college who elected Arsanios, Bishop of Latakia. A schism resulted and the three other patriarchs (Alexandria, Constantinople and Jerusalem) sent representatives to conduct an enquiry into the election. They finally gave their opinion in favour of Alexandros. The schism, however, persisted until the death of Arsanios in 1932. Alexandros has been criticised for his weak handling of the Epiphanius revolt in 1935, which resulted in the formation of an independent church in Latakia in 1936. This independent community existed until 1939, when the French High Commissioner threatened to declare it illegal. Since that date Epiphanius and the Patriarch have been reconciled. The Italian attack on Greece in 1940 brought Alexandros into the open as an outspoken supporter of the Greek cause in spite of the presence in Syria of an Italian Armistice Commission and in spite of the pro-Axis leanings of the French Vichy authorities. As he supported the Greeks, so he supported the Allied cause under the same circumstances. The traditional Russian support enjoyed by the Orthodox Church in Syria having ceased in 1917, the Orthodox community under Alexandros has drawn nearer to the Moslem Syrian Government and, on the whole, further away from the Latin Christian community which has enjoyed the protection of the French Mandate. Alexandros maintains relations with the Anglican Church both in Jerusalem and in England. Does not interfere in politics. Pleasant and cultivated.

8. *Ali, Emir Suleiman el*.—Born Selemieh about 1885. Ismaili (follower of Agha Khan). Landed proprietor and a leader of his co-religionists of the Selemieh area. Used as an arbiter in various tribal disputes. Sincerely pro-Allied; a weak character and a pacifist.

9. *Anbari, Colonel Tahsin*.—Born in Damascus about 1895. Educated in the Military School of Constantinople. Served in Syrian Gendarmerie in which he rose to the rank of lieutenant-colonel under the French Gendarmerie Mission. In June 1941, just before the withdrawal of the Vichy French, was appointed Director of Security. Appointed Acting Director of the Police in September 1941 under the Sheikh Taj régime; and later Director-General of the Gendarmerie with rank of colonel. A very capable man and generally feared. It is almost certain that he has taken advantage of his situation to make money by illegal methods, possibly in collaboration with the President of the republic.

10. *Ani, Abdul Razzag al*.—Born Deir ez Zor about 1890. Sunni Moslem merchant. In close touch with Sheikh Mujhem ibn Muheid (q.v.), Sheikh Daham el Hadi and Sfouk al Yawar of Iraq to whom he acts as agent and banker. Has many relations in Iraq. Takes part in politics. Was Deputy for Caza el Bab in 1936 Parliament.

11. *Antaki, Naim*.—Born Aleppo 1900. Educated in American University, Beirut. Of the Greek Orthodox Communion. A lawyer, he formerly worked with Maître Louis Zaidé and was at one time Dean of the Order of Barristers at Aleppo. Has visited India. Secretary to the Syrian delegation in Paris for the conclusion of the Franco-Syrian Treaty. On his return he became, in July 1937, Director for Foreign Affairs, but resigned in December 1937, being dissatisfied with the way in which he was ignored by his Moslem colleagues whenever important decisions were to be taken. Took no part in politics from fall of Nationalist Government (1939) until selected as Minister for Provisional Government of Ata Bey Ayoubi in which he held Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Public Works (March 1943). Is lawyer of Syrian Petroleum Company. Formerly an ardent Nationalist, his views are now considerably more moderate although he retains his great admiration and friendship for Jamil Mardam. Intelligent and trustworthy. Quite well disposed towards British. Speaks English and French.

12. *Aphram, I. Mar Ignatius; Barsum*.—Syrian Orthodox (Jacobite) Patriarch of Antioch. Born 1884. Educated by the Dominicans at Mosul and

received into the Roman Catholic Communion. Subsequently reverted to his original Church and was ordained in it. Became Patriarch with residence at Homs 1932. His community extends over the Middle East and India (whence he draws considerable funds). Very aware of his own importance and that of his Church. Like most Levant churchmen, mingles politics with religion.

13. *Aractingi, Dr. Yusuf*.—Born about 1885. Educated at Jesuit College in Beirut. Director of Public Health. In the Turkish Army Medical Corps during the war. His brother, Jean Aractingi, is a well-known bacteriologist of Damascus of French education, who is married to a German, sister of the wife of Said Bey al Yusuf.

Ardent Francophile and tries hard as Director of Public Health, but not with marked success. His chief fame is in the collection of old Syrian curios housed in his private house, which is rather a show place.

14. *Armanazi, Najib*.—Born about 1900. From Hama. Docteur en Droit ("à titre d'étranger") of Paris. Was private secretary to President Abed, and so anathema to Taj ed Din, who persuaded de Martel to oblige Abed to get rid of him. Now 100 per cent. Nationalist. Appointed private secretary to President Atassi in 1937. Since the resignation of President Atassi (July 1939) has been unemployed. Lives in Damascus. Is married to daughter of Sami Pasha Mardam Bey and is therefore brother-in-law of Jamil Mardam Bey, with whom, however, he is not on good terms.

15. *Arna'ut, Ma'Aruf*.—Born about 1895. Owner and editor of Damascus daily newspaper *Fata al Arab*. Member of the Arab Academy of Damascus, and author of various works on early Arab history, notably a life of the Prophet. Has been subsidised for some years by Nuri Pasha Said of Iraq and, for that reason, backs him. For same reason is pro-Allied.

16. *Arslan, Amir Adel*.—Born about 1890. A Druse (brother of Shekib Arslan q.v.). Was pro-Turk in the War and enjoyed a Kaimakamship in the Lebanon. Member of the Party of Independence 1919-20. Took an active part in the rebellion of 1925-26 and was condemned to death by the French. Amnestied in 1937. Expelled from Egypt in 1931 after anti-Italian agitations. Lived for some years in Iraq. Accompanied Syrian Prime Minister to Paris in 1937 to discuss ratification of Franco-Syrian Treaty, and subsequently returned to Syria, where he received a warm welcome. Has several times visited the United Kingdom, where he has business interests and where he was connected with Arab centre. Figured on the Palestine Black List (1937 and 1939). Worked with von Hentig and Roser from beginning of year 1941 to arrival of Allies in Syria, June 1941, when he fled to Turkey, when he is believed to have maintained contact with Syria. Is stated to have tried to put Druses against Allies. In October 1941 became head of "Free Syrian Government" created by Vichy.

17. *Arslan, Amir Shekib*.—Born about 1882. A Druse. Brother of Adel (q.v.). Was a Kaimakam of the Shouf in Lebanon during the war. Collected £700 for war fund of General Officer Commanding, Damascus. Proposed the disarmament of the Maronites. Wrote violent anti-British articles in the *Sharq* newspaper of Damascus. Is credited with recommending to Jemal Pasha the hanging of the Syrian Nationalists. Was condemned to death by French court-martial for participation in 1925-26 rebellion. Fled to Palestine and then to Switzerland, where he was Italian agent and propagandist. Pardoned in April 1937 and returned to Syria a month later. Took active part in Bludan Conference, September 1937. At one time was a member of the Syrian Nationalist delegation at Geneva. With Ihsan Jabri (q.v.) published, when in Geneva, Arab Nationalist journal called the *Nation Arabe*. During the Abyssinian war was bought entirely by Italian Intelligence Service. Figured on the Palestine Black List. Appointed Dean of the Arab Academy in Damascus in 1938. Prior to September 1939 was most prominent publicist of Arab nationalism in Europe. In September 1939 went to Berlin to help German propaganda in Arab countries and remained in Axis countries until now, working against Allies.

18. *Assali, Sabri*.—Born Damascus 1901. Sunni Moslem. Took law degree in University of Damascus.

Being of Nationalist outlook joined Nationalist Youth Movement and became its leader in 1940. Active in formation and control of Iron Shirts Movement until 1937, when it was disbanded. Joined up with Shukri Quwatli's Istiklal



Party and became his principal lieutenant in 1940. Under Vichy régime was anti-Allied and organised in May 1941 Committee for Defence of Iraq (*i.e.*, pro-Rashid Ali). Arrested by Allies in February 1941 and interned at Rashaya. Released March 1943. Still has a following among students.

19. *Assioun, Fathalla*.—Born 1899. A lawyer of the Armenian Catholic community at Aleppo. Moderate. Elected Deputy for Aleppo in December 1936. (January 1943.)

20. *Atassi, Adnan*.—Born Homs about 1905. Sunni Moslem. Son of Hashem Atassi (*q.v.*) by whom he is used as contact man. Lawyer. During Nationalist Government was appointed Syrian Vice-Consul and attached for instruction to French Consulate, Istanbul. Married Turkish woman. At one time suspected of pro-Axis activities. Intelligent and well educated but weak personality.

21. *Atassi, Haj Atef*.—Born Homs about 1880. Sunni Moslem. Leader of the Moslem community at Homs with great influence over religious leaders. Fanatical Moslem and anti-Christian. Has considerable political influence and is feared for his outspokenness. Wealthy, shrewd and avaricious businessman.

22. *Atassi, Fadi*.—Born about 1905. Son of former Mufti of Homs and cousin of Hashem al Atassi (*q.v.*). Educated in France (law). Had no political career but was Chief of Municipality of Homs. Became Minister of Education in the Hassan al Hakim Government on its formation in September 1941, but resigned early in March 1942 in pique. Chosen to be Minister of Justice, Education, Social Affairs in Provisional Government of Ata Bey Ayyoubi (*q.v.*) (March 1943—). Weak character and very boastful, being over proud of his education. Afraid of losing his permanent job as Head of the Municipality, Homs.

23. *Atassi, Hashem al*.—Born about 1865. Good landed family. Prime Minister and President of the Constituent Assembly under Feisal, and President of the Constituent Assembly of 1928. Went to Mecca to be one of the three mediators in conflict between Imam Yahya and Ibn Saud. Succeeded Hanano as leader of the Syrian Nationalist bloc in January 1936. Led the Syrian delegation that went to Paris in March 1936 to negotiate a Franco-Syrian treaty after the disturbances of January-March 1936. A Nationalist who tempers courage with discretion. With the Syrian delegation in Paris his moderating and soothing influence was of great assistance to the successful conclusion of the treaty negotiations. Elected President of the Syrian Republic the 21st December, 1936. On his election as President he resigned the leadership of the Nationalist party, which was taken over by Shukri Quwatli. As President showed the same dignified tact and restraining influence as he had done during the treaty negotiations. His influence over the Nationalist party grew less, however, as the Nationalist Government took the bit more firmly between its teeth. Resigned with the fall of the Nationalist Government on the 7th July, 1939, and retired to his property at Homs, where he had built himself a pleasant villa during his tenure of office. Had conversations with General Dentz about resuming office in March 1941 and with General Catroux in September 1941 and again in March 1943, but on each occasion without result. He has remained on his property ever since. He is regarded as a respectable old man of moderate opinions, but somewhat *passé*. A figure-head rather than a leader.

24. *Atassi, Hilmi*.—Sunni Moslem. Born Homs about 1905. Brother of Mukarram Atassi (*q.v.*) and son-in-law of Haj Atef Atassi (*q.v.*). Lawyer. Leader of League of National Action. Clever politician with considerable influence over the masses in Homs. Bitterly anti-French. Has been politically inactive for the last few years, even refusing Shaikh Taj ed Din's offer of post of Mohafiz of Aleppo (February 1942), but now shows signs of renewed political activity.

25. *Atassi, Mukarram*.—Born Homs about 1900. Lawyer. Nationalist Deputy, 1936. Moderate Nationalist in politics. Honest and popular in Homs.

26. *Atrash, Ali el*.—Age 32. Residence Imtane. Reads and writes Arabic and knows some French. No official position, but may be a man with a future. Politically minded and likes to think of himself as a leader of youth. A Nationalist and supports complete union with Syria. Head of Najm section of Atrash. Popular, rich and generous. Spends a lot of his time in Damascus or

Beirut and is reputed to be in love with Emira Amal el Atrash. Anti-French and, in consequence, professed himself pro-British at the time of the campaign of 1941. Still professes himself pro-British, but is an adventurer.

27. *Atrash, Amir Hassan al*.—Born about 1908. Head of the House of Aeré, the leading house of the Atrash family. Husband of the famous Emira Amal (Asmahan), whom he divorced and remarried according to Moslem law (July 1941). Was Mohafiz of Jebel Druse until he was appointed Minister of Defence in Husni Barazi's Government (April 1942 to January 1943), taking the place occupied by his uncle, Abdul Ghaffar Pasha, until the old man's death in March 1942. Was again Minister of Defence in Jamil Ulshi's Government (January 1943 to March 1943). Amir Hassan is a typical Druse. He is ill-educated, stubborn, ambitious and avaricious. Despite his pretence of being pro-British, he did nothing to help the Allies during the Syrian campaign: and nothing to hinder. Pretends to be bitterly anti-French and accuses them of intriguing with his rivals in the Jebel to undermine the position of the Atrashes. He can, however, sometimes be "jollied" into favourable action. Has flirted with Nationalists and even temporarily with the French.

28. *Atrash, Soltan Bin Hamud Pasha el*.—Born about 1875. (Soltan is a name, not a title.) Family originally from Rashaya, migrated to Jebel Druse in 1860's and became paramount Dreuse family there. Soltan is the head of the Kraiye house, which is junior to the Aere house, headed by Emir Hassan (*q.v.*). Under the Turks, Soltan adopted wary tactics and avoided a conflict. In 1925-26 took a leading part in the Druse revolt and became a centre round which the various insurgent leaders moved. When the revolt was crushed Soltan Pasha fled to Transjordan with his closest adviser, the Christian Oqla Qutami (*q.v.*). There he found sanctuary, although condemned to death in absence by French court-martial. In 1937 returned to the Jebel but took no active part in politics, leaving Emir Hassan to dominate the Jebel. He retired to Kraiye, content to live on his past glory, which remains considerable. During the campaign of 1941 took no part. In March 1942, after the death of Abdul Chaffar Pasha el Altrash, at that time Minister of National Defence, was offered the Ministry of Defence, but refused it. Soltan Pasha and Oqla Kutami were awarded pensions for life by the Syrian Government as patriots and heroes of 1925-26 revolt. Ill-educated, of small intelligence and with a reputation for meanness, he is crafty, and managed to inspire in the insurgents of 1925 confidence in his leadership. He remains the most important Druse. Is inclined to be pro-British and is anti-French. He feels, however, that the British have let him down, as they have told him not to intrigue against the Fighting French (and he has abstained from doing so), but have allowed the French to intrigue against him, undermining his influence in the Jebel Druse.

29. *Atrash, Tewfik Bey el*.—Born Suweida, 1890. Druse: of Suweida house of Atrashes. Locally educated, but knows a little French. From 1921 onwards was O.C. Gendarmerie in the Jebel. Pro-French and generally in favour of Britain. Is not liked by Soltan Pasha (his second cousin). Took no part in 1925 revolt. A weak man, but respected locally. Succeeded Emir Hassan (*q.v.*) as Mohafiz of the Jebel in July 1942, after three months as Acting Mohafiz.

30. *Ayesh, Haj Mohamed el*.—Born about 1895. Sunni Moslem. Prominent landowner and merchant of Deir ez Zor. No political career, but well-disposed towards the French. Good reputation in his district for honesty. Became Minister of National Economy in Hassan al Hakim's Government (September 1941 to April 1942), and again in Husni Barazi's Government (April 1942 to January 1943); and again in Jamil Ulshi's Government (January 1943 to March 1943). Not very intelligent, but shrewd. Not interested in politics, and spends lot of time in his district.

31. *Ayyoubi, Ata Bey al*.—Born about 1877. Sunni Moslem. Head of the old and well-to-do Damascus family of Ayyoubi, originally of Chaghour Quarter, Damascus. Claims to be Ansari. Was Mutassarif of Latakia and Kaimakam of Rashaya in the time of the Turks. Director of Ministry of Interior under Haqqi al Azm (*q.v.*), 1921-24, and Minister of Justice under Subhi Bey Barakat (*q.v.*), 1924-25. Has gained the reputation of being honest. Entered abortive elections December 1931 on Shaikh Taj ed Din's list, but did not stand in those of 1932. Made Minister of Justice under Shaikh Taj ed Din's Government, March 1934. Nominated by French to be Prime Minister to replace Taj ed Din after the disturbances of the spring of 1936. Chosen by General Catroux to be Head of Provisional Government to run elections, replacing Jamil Ulshi, March



1943, assuming the portfolio of the Interior. Is on the board of directors of the National Cement Company. In Turkish times he was an Arabphobe—this has not been forgotten by the pan-Arabists. Resigned the office of Prime Minister in December 1936 to make way for a purely Nationalist Government. Was appointed Syrian representative on Board of Syrian Petroleum Company by Khalid el Azm Government (1941). A pleasant person and an experienced administrator, but has lost a great deal of his energy owing to advancing years. A moderate Nationalist.

32. *Azm, Abd al Qader*.—Born about 1882. Sunni Moslem. Studied law at Istanbul. Civil Servant until French occupation, then joined Syrian University. Dean of the Faculty of Law, Damascus, 1927. Minister of Finance under Damad, April to November 1926, when he returned to University. Appointed Rector 1936. President of the Council of State (a legal body) 1941 to 1942. Retired 1942.

Of Nationalist tendencies: respected in academic circles.

33. *Azm, Badi al Muayyad al*.—Born Damascus about 1865. Sunni Moslem. Rich landlord. Educated at Constantinople. Deputy for Damascus under Turkish rule. Member and Vice-President of State Council under Faisal, 1918. Minister of Education in Alaeddin Drouby Government, 1920 (July). Minister of Justice in Jemil Ulshi Government (September 1920). After the departure of Faisal became Director of Justice under Haqqi al Azm (December 1920), and in 1923-25 was President of Damascus State Parliament and a member of the Federal Parliament.

Minister of Agriculture and Commerce (October 1930-32). Acting Minister of Interior (November 1931 to May 1932). Acting Minister of Public Works (May 1931 to June 1932). After Shaikh Taj was obliged to resign position of Head of State, November 1932, was Acting Head of State until May 1933, when first President of Republic (Mohamed Ali al Abed) was chosen. Syrian director on the board of directors of Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban since 1927. President of the association of ex-Soldiers. At present leads a life of retirement.

34. *Azm, Ghaleb*.—Born Hama about 1910. Sunni Moslem. Lawyer. Member of the richest and most feudal family in Hama. Member of Municipal Council, but does not belong to any political party. Strong character, well-educated and ambitious. Has little influence in Hama, but, with Damascus backing, is thinking of entering politics.

35. *Azm, Haqqi al*.—Born about 1875. Sunni Moslem. President of the Council of State. First Governor of the State of Syria (1921-24). One of the French nominees for 1932 elections and accepted by the Nationalists. Made Prime Minister in the first Parliament (1932). Found his Cabinet too much for him and resigned in 1934, when he was replaced by Taj ed Din, the High Commissioner's appointee. He was one of the original members of the "Arab Club," but to-day manages to compress his Nationalist ideals within a French frame. Owns cotton-lands in Egypt which, although heavily mortgaged, yield him a modest income. A wise old man, but spineless.

36. *Azm, Khaled al*.—Born about 1895. Son of Mohamed Pasha al Azm. Does not take an active part in politics, except an occasional intervention in agricultural matters. Member of the Municipal Council. Managing director of the National Cement Factory. A mild pan-Arab. Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Justice in the Bukhari Cabinet, March to May 1939.

Under the influence of the Italian Disarmament Commission, was appointed by Vichy French (General Dentz) on 2nd April, 1941, as "Chef d'Etat" and Minister of Interior. His régime lasted until September 1941, when it was replaced by "Independent" Syrian Government with Shaikh Taj en Din as President. During Syrian Campaign he collaborated closely with Vichy French to preserve order in Damascus. During whole period of office he showed himself to be under the influence of the Nationalists—especially of Shukri Quwatli.

A rich landowner, very pompous, but intelligent and well-educated. Suspected at one time of pro-German sympathies, but probably incorrectly.

37. *Azm, Nazih al Muayyad al*.—Born Damascus about 1895. Educated American College, Beirut, and served as a minor official under Faisal in Damascus. Rebel leader in the 1925 Revolt and was sentenced to death by French, but had fled the country. At some time, on own admission, had run guns into the Yemen. In 1931 was amnestied by French and returned to Syria.

Brother-in-law of the late Dr. Abdur Rahman Shahbandar (a fellow rebel), whose subsequent politics he admired but whose party he did not actively support. When Nationalists persecuted Dr. Shahbandar he was implicated in bomb attack on Jamil Mardam (1938) and was sentenced to two years' imprisonment, but fled to Transjordan, returning in 1939, after the fall of the Nationalist régime.

When Dr. Abdur Rahman was assassinated (July 1940) displayed great energy in tracing the assassins and their connexion with the Nationalists.

Despite his anti-Nationalist views, is not active in politics and spends most of his time on his farm near Damascus. Is mainly pro-British, and could be a desperate character. Rather temperamental and is tending to lost his grip.

38. *Azm, Safouh Muayyad al*.—Born in 1896. Educated in Damascus. Appointed Director of Prisons from 20th September, 1922, till 18th February, 1928. Appointed Kaimakam of Bab, Idlib, Hauran, Izraa and Acting Mohafiz of Hauran on 9th January, 1935. He occupied this post till 24th July, 1939. Under the Government of Directors was appointed Director-General of Police from 25th July, 1939, till 19th June, 1940. Made Head of Municipality (Mohafiz of the town of Damascus) from 20th June, 1940, till 9th June, 1941. Appointed Mohafiz of Damascus Province 9th June, 1941.

Appointed Chief of Police, Damascus, in September 1941, in succession to Tahsin Bey el Anbari, under Shaikh Taj ed Din's régime. Was replaced as Chief of Police in April 1942 by Colonel Ibrahim Qassab Hassan.

A cousin of Nazih Muayyad el Azm. Rather Shahbandarist in politics. Intelligent and anti-Nationalist. Easy going and not too efficient. Collaborated with the British while Chief of the Police.

39. *Azmeh, Adil al*.—Born about 1882. A diplomé of the Turkish School of Law. Whilst a political refugee in Transjordan he formed with his brother, Nabih al Azmeh (*q.v.*), the "Istiklal Party," whose first objective was the expulsion of the French from Syria. During the 1925-26 revolt in Syria he collected, as treasurer of his party, large sums of money from Palestine, Transjordan and other countries. After keeping more than half himself, he provided the rebels in Syria with money and arms on a considerable scale. His flagrant abuse of British political asylum earned him a contemptuous condemnation by French court-martial. He was included in the general amnesty of 1937. On his return he was acclaimed as a great patriot and given high office in the Ministry of Interior by Nationalists in return for forming "Istiklal Party." Back in Syria he used his influence to repay the consideration he had received from the British authorities in Transjordan and Palestine by facilitating the supply of arms and ammunition to the rebels in Palestine during the disturbances of 1936 and in 1937 in going a step farther in employing the Syrian Government machinery, from his key position in the Ministry of the Interior, to assist the recruitment of bandits in Syria for thuggery in Palestine. On the fall of the Nationalist Government in the spring of 1939 he proceeded on leave to Iraq, where he built a cinema with his ill-gotten gains. In his absence (April 1940) he was condemned to twenty years' imprisonment for conspiring to overthrow the Council of Directors (July 1939). In collaboration with Haj Amin Hussaini is believed to have had a part in the Iraq rising (May 1941) and fled to Turkey, where he is still believed to be. An unscrupulous political adventurer.

40. *Azmeh, Nabih al*.—Born about 1876. Brother of Adil al Azmeh (*q.v.*). Graduated from Turkish Military Academy in 1900. His advance in Turkish army was slow, as he was only a lieutenant when the war broke out in 1914. Was taken prisoner by British forces in 1916, but obtained his release to join the Amir Faisal's followers, where, like the Duke of Plaza Toro, he led from the rear. When Faisal was placed in charge of the "Occupied Enemy Territory East" he was made Chief of Police, but fled Syria on the French occupation in 1920. He was made welcome by the Emir Abdullah as a political refugee. He and his brother formed the "Istiklal Party" in Transjordan. This led to his banishment, and he went to the Hedjaz, then to Egypt and so to Palestine, where he continued to foment trouble in Syria. He was one of the first of the Syrians amnestied in the general amnesty of 1937 to return to Damascus. In August and September 1937, under the direction of the mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al Hussaini, and in concert with the Palestinian, Muin al Madi, he organised the anti-British pan-Arab Congress of Bludan. He has, in an astonishingly short time, considerably enriched himself from the subscriptions obtained by the "Palestine Defence Committee," of which he was prominent member. In December 1938 used his influence to try to create trouble for the French, and was implicated in plot against the "security of State," for which he was sentenced



to twenty years' imprisonment and 20 years' banishment. Amnestied November 1940 at instigation of Italian Armistice Commission. Renewed his interest in politics (especially with Shukri Quwatli) and in May 1941 became member of a committee to send recruits and money to Iraq, against British. Fled to Turkey during Syrian campaign, and is still there.

A thoroughly contemptible rascal, who has betrayed his friends one after another.

41. *Babil, Nassouh*.—Born Damascus about 1905, of obscure parentage. Proprietor and editor of Damascus newspaper *Al Ayyam*. Arrested with Ajlani (*q.v.*) in 1938 for his support of Shahbandar against Mardam. Remained supporter of Dr. Shahbandar until latter was assassinated in July 1940, when he and Fuad Qodmani became leaders of Shahbandar Party.

A clever individual of no principle.

42. *Bagdash, Khaled*.—Born about 1910 in Damascus, of Kurdish origin of a family named Kutrash. Sunni Moslem. Educated in Damascus, where he studied philosophy. Became secretary of Communist party in Damascus, 1928. The Communist party was persecuted by the French and in 1934, following the distribution of Communist leaflets, was suppressed, Bagdash being condemned to several years' imprisonment. He escaped to Russia, where he attended the Oriental School of Propaganda. He now claims that, while in Russia, he met Stalin. In 1936 went to Paris and obtained a special amnesty through the Syrian delegation which was negotiating the Franco-Syrian Treaty. Returned to Syria in January 1937 and resumed leadership of the Communist party. Again went into hiding in Damascus at the outbreak of war when Communist party was suppressed, remaining there until Germany attacked Russia (June 1941). Stated to be owner of Communist paper *Saut ash Shaab*, of Beirut. Popular among the working classes and a good speaker. Said to receive substantial subsidies from Russia. Speaks Arabic, Kurdish, Russian, French. Ambitious, and prepared to make trouble.

43. *Bakri, Fauzi al*.—Born Damascus about 1880. Sunni Moslem. Eldest son of late Ata Bey el Bakri. Landed family claiming descent from second Caliph. There is also a closely-related branch of the family in Egypt. Has brothers Nassib (*q.v.*), Sami, Beshir, Mazhar and Khair ud Din and sons Assad and Baha ed Din.

Fauzi was president of the Arab Club, Damascus, in Ottoman days and was condemned to death (in absentia) by Turkish court-martial for desertion in 1916. In 1917 joined the Arab Revolt in the Hadjaz, but does not seem to have played a prominent part. After Faisal's arrival in Damascus Fauzi became an official there. Took a leading part in the revolt of 1925 and was condemned to death. Amnestied 1928 at request of Shaikh Taj ed Din. Failed at 1932 elections and has not since been politically active.

The Bakris, having lost most of their wealth, have tried to retain their influence by placing one member of the family in each political camp. This policy has not served them well, as it has raised suspicions on all sides.

Left for Egypt for duration of war (January 1943) in order "to avoid complications for himself and Allies."

Fauzi himself is a stupid pull of a man and it seems unlikely that he will ever figure largely in politics again.

44. *Bakri, Mohammed Sami*.—Born Damascus 1890. Sunni. Brother of Fauzi and Nassib (*q.v.*), with whom he shares family properties (undivided). Educated Damascus, and has occupied various posts under Ministry of Interior. Last appointment, Acting Mohafiz of Hauran, 1941, whence he fled immediately before Allied attack.

A colourless individual with the well-known Bakri pride. Of rather Nationalist tendencies.

45. *Bakri, Nassib al*.—Born Damascus about 1885. Younger brother of Fauzi (*q.v.*). Acted at one time as honorary Chancellor to the Shereef (afterwards King) Hussein. Joined Arab revolt in 1917. Chief Secretary to Faisal after occupation of Damascus. One of the leaders of 1925 Revolt, condemned (in absence) to death and amnestied with his brother in 1928. Elected in 1931 to Syrian Parliament as moderate Nationalist, and again in 1936 as full-blooded Nationalist. With Saadullah Jabri banished by French to Hassetché in 1936, and therefore enjoyed prestige of martyr. Appointed Mohafiz of Jebel Druse by Nationalists January 1937, but forced to resign by Druses shortly after. Minister of Justice in the Haffar Government (February to March 1939).

Minister of National Economy in Khalid el Azm Government (April to September 1941).

An inefficient and idle person who nevertheless commands a certain following in the lower classes of his district (Qanawat).

46. *Barakat, Subhi*.—Born about 1886. As an undistinguished officer in the Turkish army, he hastily deserted in an Arab cloak on the approach of the British forces in 1918. Has played, always unsuccessfully, many parts; rebel leader against the French in the Alawite territory (1920), Chief of State of Aleppo as French nominee (1922), President of the Syrian Federation (1923) and President of the Chamber (Speaker) in 1932. In April 1932 a neurotic Syrian student attempted to assassinate him. A "whole-hogger" Nationalist, and rather truculent. At present living in Hatay.

47. *Barazi, Husni*.—Born about 1882. Son of Suleiman Agha Barazi, a rich landed Kurdish family of Hama. Minister of the Interior under Damad, 1926. Deported on suspicion of assisting rebels in July 1926. Member of Constituent Assembly, 1928. Opposed by Nationalists in elections of 1932 and was not elected. He was, however, appointed Minister of Education in Taj ed Din's Government in March 1934, and resigned with Shaikh Taj in February 1936. Appointed Mohafiz of Alexandretta in January 1937, he sought to prove his attachment to his new Nationalist masters by intriguing with the Arab parties in the Sanjak against the Turks and the Mandatory, but was ejected in November 1937. Appointed Mohafiz of Damascus in March 1942. On fall of Hassan el Hakim Government (April 1942) was appointed by Shaikh Taj ed Din President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Interior. Succeeded Faiz Khouri as President of the Commission Supérieure of the Wheat Office, in which capacity he promised to secure large quantities of wheat, but did not succeed. Quarrelled with Shaikh Taj ed Din, posing as Syrian patriot, thinking he had the support of his colleagues. Matters came to a head on the 7th January, 1943, when all his colleagues resigned and he was obliged to retire.

A man of some strength of character, but devoid of morals. Intriguer, and accused in the past of trafficking in Hashish. Until he assumed office was heavily in debt.

48. *Barazi, Muhsen*.—Born about 1900. A Kurd of Hama. Educated in France, when he married a Frenchwoman (she died in 1937). Professor at School of Law and later (1941) Dean. Not prominent in politics, but has always been of Nationalist and suspected pro-Nazi tendencies. Appointed Minister of Education in Khalid al Azm Government (April to September 1941). A would-be intellectual. Intriguer. Rather ineffective.

49. *Barazi, Mustafa*.—Born Hama about 1910. Sunni Moslem. Protégé of Husni Barazi (*q.v.*), who appointed him Head of Municipality; consequently opposed by Najib Agha Barazi (*q.v.*). Honest and generous, but weak administrator, with no control over his council.

50. *Barazi, Najib Agha*.—Born Hama about 1885. Wealthy landowner and head of Barazi family, who are of Kurdish origin. Leader of Nationalist bloc in Hama and Deputy in 1936. Most influential man in Hama, but unpopular. Strong character and very ambitious. Cunning, polished, but not well educated. Opponent of Husni Barazi (*q.v.*).

51. *Barmada, Mustafa*.—Born Aleppo about 1885. Educated in the School of Law of Constantinople. Governor of Aleppo 1921 to 1922. Lawyer by profession. Appointed magistrate in 1920 and is now president of the Appeal Court of Damascus, where he normally resides. Moderate Nationalist in politics but inactive. Enjoys reputation for honesty and integrity as a judge and has considerable influence in judicial circles, though little outside.

52. *Barudi, Fakhri*.—Born Damascus 1893. First became prominent in revolt of 1925, in which he took an active part. Elected Nationalist Deputy in 1932 and again in 1936. In 1936 he was Inspector-General of Iron Shirts, a Nazi-inspired youth formation. Exiled for a short period by French for his share in 1936 troubles. Fled to Transjordan in 1939 after discovery of "plot against security of State" and kept a low coffee-house in Amman until he returned to Damascus in May 1941 after formation of Khalid el Azm Government.

A fanatic Nationalist and a bitter xenophobe. As head of the National Arab Bureau in 1938-39 actively aided Palestine rebels in propaganda sphere. A noted Arab orator in low-style Arabic, unbalanced and a heavy drinker. Commonly accused of unnatural vice.



53. *Barudi, Hilmi*.—Born Hama about 1900. Sunni Moslem. Educated in France and a wealthy landowner of notable family. Extreme Nationalist, but lives on his land outside Hama, so enjoys little influence. Suspected of being arms trafficker.

A strong character and unscrupulous.

54. *Bitar, Husni*.—Born about 1885. Moslem. Undistinguished career in Syrian Civil Service. Director of Finance in Council of Directors (July 1939–April 1941), then reverted to Finance Department. Very stubborn. Not popular. No political importance.

55. *Bukhari, Nassouki al*.—Born about 1884. Prosperous landlord. Ex-Turkish officer. Educated in Constantinople. During 1914–18 war was brigade commander in Turkish army. Captured by Russians on Caucasian front. Escaped from prisoners-of-war camp in Siberia through China. Returned to Turkey via United States and Greece and given command of Turkish division on Palestine front. Went over to British when they occupied Damascus in October 1918. In 1925 appointed Minister of Agriculture in the Damad's Government. In 1927 took office as Minister of Education. Formed neutral Government with himself as Prime Minister in March 1939, but was dismissed by French in May 1939 as a preliminary to the appointment of the Council of Directors (July 1939). Since that period has taken only a mild and academic interest in politics. A man of principle and well respected.

56. *Chatti, Abdullatif*.—Born about 1885. Moslem. Undistinguished career in Education Department. Syrian Civil Service. Director of Education in Council of Directors (July 1939 to April 1941). After became Chief of Court of Accounts. Appointed Mohafiz of Aleppo in July 1942 on account of failure of Nabih Martini to cope with difficulties of Ravitaillement.

Not an outstanding personality; although faced with some opposition, appears to have made a success of his mission in Aleppo. Politically unimportant.

57. *Daham el Hadi, Sheikh*.—Born 1895. Bedouin chief and head of the Shammar Khrossa. Disputes the leadership of all the Shammar of Syria with his cousin, Meiza Abdul Muhssen, who actually heads the Shammar confederation. Also claims hereditary leadership of the Iraqi Shammar, from which he was evicted by the British. He is therefore bitterly jealous of Sheikh Sfook and continually contrives to undermine his position. Appointed Deputy of the Jezirah tribes in 1936. Exiled in 1942 for obstructing road constructions and wheat purchase.

A proud and truculent sheikh, ignorant of his limitations and of world conditions.

58. *Dahr, Haj Sami Sayem al*.—Born 1896. Wealthy industrialist and head of a weaving business. President of the Aleppo Chamber of Industry. Contributed largely to the Nationalist party funds and was treasurer of the funds collected for Palestine, but became discontented with the policy of the Syrian Nationalist Government and resigned from the Nationalist bloc in March 1939.

59. *Dandashi, Ali Abdul Karim*.—Born 1905 at Tel Kalkh. Member of the Danatch clan. A Sunni Moslem. Studied at the Islamic College in Beirut till 1928. Joined the Scout movement in 1923 and has remained associated with it. In 1937 he took a group of Syrian Scouts to the Jamboree in Holland, travelling by way of the Balkans, Austria and Germany, returning through France and Italy. On this occasion he stayed for some time in Berlin and Potsdam, where he associated with Syrians in Germany, notably one of the Dalati brothers, who are associated with him in the Scout movement. From 1937 has devoted most of his time to scouting and was elected Chief Scout in November 1941. Is associated with the League of National Action, which was founded by his cousin and of which his colleague in the Scout movement, Dr. Rushdi Jabi (*q.v.*), is leading member. His arrest was ordered by the French in February 1942, but the order was cancelled at the end of March, and, shortly after, he paraded at the head of the Scouts at the review of the Syrian gendarmerie.

Dandashi played an important part in the dispute between the Scout movement and the Ministry of Youth and Propaganda under Munir Ajlani (*q.v.*), opposing Government control of the Scout movement. Since the Allied occupation has shown himself willing to co-operate and has taken part with his scouts in passive defence exercises. Energetic and a disciplinarian.

60. *Dome, Michel*.—Born in Mardine, Turkey, about 1905. Syrian Catholic. Was educated in Aleppo, where his family settled in 1915. Interpreter to French Services Spéciaux 1923 to 1930. Appointed head of the Municipality of Kamishli 1931, which job he still retains. Took leading part in Separatist movement in the Jezirah in 1937 and 1939. He was awarded the Légion d'Honneur, Croix de Guerre and Mérite Syrien by the Syrian Government and "Nishan al Iftikhar" by the Iraqis for his work in the frontier provinces. Capable and intelligent, but allows his personal interests to influence him in his public position. Speaks and writes Arabic, French, Turkish, Kurdish and Armenian.

61. *Drubi, Sabri*.—Born about 1885. Wealthy landowner and head of second most important family in Homs. He has never held office and has little political influence, being generally disliked. Avaricious. Inclined to be Francophile.

62. *Elian, Michel*.—Born Aleppo 1900. Greek Orthodox. Professes the most extreme form of nationalism. Is secretary at Aleppo of the Nationalist bloc. Is main supporter of Saadullah Jabri (*q.v.*). Is considered more unselfishly enthusiastic for the Nationalist cause than any other Aleppo Nationalist. Educated locally.

63. *Fahl, Hamdi*.—Born about 1905. Educated in the Law School of Damascus. Lawyer by profession, but during the Nationalist régime he was appointed "chef de cabinet" in the Presidency. When Hashem Atassi resigned he resumed his law practice until he was selected as secretary to Shaikh Taj ed Din in September 1941, and appointed acting chief secretary when Munir Ajlani vacated that post in April 1942. Speaks French. Has no political past.

64. *Faraj, Bishop Antoine*.—Greek Catholic. Born in Damascus in 1885. Appointed patriarchal representative in Egypt in 1922 and in Damascus in 1928. Intelligent intriguer. Rules his flock with a despotic rod. As a Latin, his sentiments have inclined towards Italy, but after the Allied occupation in 1941 he concealed his pro-Italian propensities. An arch scrounger.

65. *Farkuh, Abdullah*.—Born Homs about 1900. Greek Orthodox. Nationalist Deputy for Homs, 1936, representing minority. Uncle of Michel Elian of Aleppo (*q.v.*), by whose influence he was nominated Deputy. Inveterate gambler. Enjoys little popularity amongst Christians but cultivates Moslems only.

66. *Fatayah, Mohamed al*.—Born Deir ez Zor about 1880. Sunni Moslem. Deputy in Istanbul in days of Ottoman Empire. President of the Municipality of Deir ez Zor. Headed the movement in Deir ez Zor in May 1941 to help Rashid Ali in his revolt by touring the country and trying to send recruits to join the Iraqi army. Strong supporter of the Nationalist bloc and on bad terms with the French. Although too old to fill his position of head of municipality efficiently, he clings to it for the position it gives him and his party in the Deir ez Zor area and for the opportunity it provides of public appearance and speech-making.

67. *Fa'ur, Fa'ur Amir*.—Born about 1900. Chief of the El Fadl Bedouin (sedentary) near Lake Hula. The lands of his tribe are astride the Syria-Palestine frontier. Sells his lands in Palestine to Jews. Elected Deputy for Kuneitra, December 1936. Strongly suspected of being engaged in smuggling arms and men to Palestine during the disturbances of 1937 to 1939. Was useful to British during and before Syrian campaign (June 1941). Went on pilgrimage to Mecca, winter 1941–42, and, on return, spread pro-Allied propaganda at instance of Ibn Saud. In May 1942 toured Syria with Jamil Shamat, securing the signatures of ex-Deputies to a declaration in favour of the President of the Republic, Shaikh Taj ed Din.

A weak and spendthrift individual who has not maintained the renown of his family established by his father. Always playing at politics but with no conviction. Has the ambition to become a Minister. An agreeable but ineffective personality.

68. *Fawwaz, Sha'alan Amir*.—Born about 1907. Grandson of Nuri whom he succeeded on latter's death in 1942. Even before he became chief, had a strong following in the Ruwalla, whom he commanded during their Razzias. Treacherously slew his rival and cousin, Farhan bin Mashur, near Palmyra in April 1935. Has married both his sisters into Ibn Saud's family, one to Ibn Saud himself and the other to the Amir Saud. These matches are looked upon by th-



Bedouin as having a political significance in connexion with the Wadi Sirhan grazing lands and the Jauf Oasis. Was Deputy 1936-39 under the Nationalist banner.

During the British blockade of Vichy Syria (1941) conducted a remunerative contraband trade between Transjordan and Syria. During Syrian campaign he and the Ruwalla remained strictly neutral although the Vichy French gave them a number of arms which they largely surrendered on the Allied arrival in Damascus. In 1942 he was given profitable contracts by the British army.

Like all Bedouin, a shameless money seeker. Despite the fact that much of his earlier life was spent in Syrian and European cabarets, he is now a more dignified character, respected by the other tribal leaders and may become the leading force in the desert.

69. *Ghazzi, Said al.*—Born about 1895. Took law degree in Damascus in 1921. Deputy to the Constituent Assembly 1928, but lost his popularity with the Nationalists by supporting Shaikh Taj ed Din. Pressed for Nationalist participation in 1932 elections. When negotiations with High Commissioner's delegate came to a deadlock (Ihsan Sherif insisting on standing), Said al Ghazzi withdrew his own candidature. Reputation enhanced by not being a party to the subsequent deals. Withdrew a second time in favour of Afif el Solh in July by-elections. Included in Ata Bey al Ayoubi's Cabinet as Minister of Justice in March 1936. Refused the post of Mohafiz of Latakia in January 1937. Appointed Director-General of the Ministry of National Economy, 1938, and Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in 1938, but dismissed in 1939. Good-natured, intelligent, comfortably off. Too colourless to be either useful or dangerous. Of Nationalist tendencies, but dissatisfied with treatment received from that party. In the last two years has been friendly with Turkish Consulate.

70. *Ghorani, As'ad.*—Born Aleppo about 1905. Sunni Moslem. Qualified as lawyer at Damascus Law School. Is advocate for Mohamed Khalil Mudarres of Aleppo. Made some stir at Bludan Lawyers' Conference, August 1942, by advocating reform of Sharia Law. Minister of Justice in Jamil Ulshi Government (January to March 1943), until which time he had taken no part in politics. Speaks French. Has relatives in Turkey.

Appears intelligent and honest. Politically attached to the Mudarres family.

71. *Haffar, Lutf.*—Born Damascus 1888 of a family of well-established merchants. Minister of Public Works under the Damad, 1926, and deported for Nationalist sympathies some months later. Member of the Constituent Assembly, 1928. Accepted post as administrator of Ain Fijeh waterworks, 1931. Deputy in 1932 and again in 1936 when he was elected vice-president of the Chamber of Deputies. Minister of Finance in the second Jamil Mardam Cabinet (July 1937 to February 1939). Prime Minister, the 23rd February to the 14th March, 1939. Implicated in the murder of Dr. Shabbandar in July 1940, and fled to Baghdad. Returned to Syria after the charge against him had been dropped and the Government of Directors replaced by the moderate Nationalist Government of Khaled-Bey el Azm (*q.v.*) in April 1941. Is interested in the newspaper *Al Inshaa*, which is nominally owned and directed by his cousin, Wajih el Haffar (*q.v.*).

Not an extreme Nationalist and not a strong personality though a leader of the Nationalist bloc. A good second fiddler.

72. *Haffar, Wajih al.*—Born Damascus about 1910. Sunni Moslem. Nephew of Lutfi Haffar (*q.v.*). Studied French school, Damascus, and took law degree at Damascus University. Editor and nominal proprietor of *Al Inshaa*, a daily Nationalist organ, really owned by Lutfi. Member of the Committee of Nationalist Youth Movement. His paper is more moderate than its rival, *Al Qabas* (edited by Nejib Rayyess (*q.v.*)).

A colourless individual.

73. *Hajjiri, Ahmad el.*—Age 68. Practically illiterate. President of Druse religious court of appeal. Residence Qanawat. Usually in opposition to Atrash family. A venerable old man and much respected; can also be a troublesome old man. Maintains he has claims to land in Transjordan. Rich and mean. Is of the Zein ed Din family.

74. *Hajjo Agha, Hassan.*—Born about 1898 near Mardine, Turkey. Head of Haverkan tribe of Kurds which moved into Syria about 1922. No specific

education, but reads and writes Kurdish, Arabic and Turkish. With his late father took prominent part in Separatist Movement in the Jezirah. Resides at Hassetché, where he is acting president of the Mohafazah Council. Pro-Ally and co-operative.

75. *Hakim, Hassan Bey al.*—Born Damascus about 1886. Was an Inspector of Finance and later Director of Posts and Telegraphs in Faisal's Syrian Government of 1918-20. He was held responsible for delay in sending off Faisal's reply to General Gouraud's ultimatum in July 1920. (It was the absence of a reply that provided the excuse for General Gouraud to order French troops to advance on Damascus.) Exiled by the French but had fled to Egypt and later went to Iraq. Then he obtained an appointment as manager of the Arab Bank's Jaffa branch. Amnestied in 1937, he returned to Damascus and, as a loyal Nationalist, was appointed Director-General of Wakf. Minister of Education in Bukhari Cabinet, March to May 1939. Later became Director of Government Agricultural Bank. In September 1941 became President of Council and Minister of Finance in "Independent" Syria under the presidency of Shaikh Taj ed Din, as proclaimed by French. Quarrelled with President over latter's financial requests and with French over non-granting of various concessions of form to independence. Because of his rather stubborn and limited capacity was on bad terms with his colleagues whom he was unable to pull together. Was undoubtedly pro-British, but was very indiscreet in falling under the influence of unworthy counsellors. He gave his enemies a chance to attack him because he openly proclaimed himself as opposed to the feudal landlords and because, although materially honest, he provoked laws to benefit himself in small ways. In April 1942 he was forced to resign in rather unpleasant manner, after defying the President, and reverted to former employment as Director of the National (Syrian) Agricultural Bank.

76. *Hakim, Yusuf al.*—Born about 1875. Greek Orthodox from Latakia. Brought up in the Ottoman magistrature. Was president of the Cour de Cassation, but accepted interim portfolio as Minister of Justice under Damad, 1926, at instance of the French High Commissioner, reverting in 1928 to his judicial functions. Still a friend of the Damad.

An old man who likes to be on good terms with everyone.

77. *Halabi, Fuad.*—Born Damascus about 1905. Sunni Moslem. Married to an Atassi of Homs; formerly civil judge in Damascus and Homs. Appointed Acting Mohafiz of Homs, 1942, and confirmed in October. Reputed honest as judge, and has shown himself an astute and capable administrator. Since his confirmation, however, he has displayed political ambitions, and so has shown himself reluctant to take a strong line when notables are concerned.

78. *Halabi, Mohamed Pasha Izzeddine el.*—Born about 1883. Educated in Istanbul. Residence Suweida. Under Turkish régime was a Government official in Zebdani and Jebel Druse. Arab Nationalist. Took part in revolt against French (1925). After rebellion went to Transjordan. Financial position poor. Has co-operated with French and was liked by Colonel Bouvier. Said to have received £P.300 from de Gaury in June 1941. Son, Tewfik, medical officer with Groupement Druse. Is considered suspect because he was president of a committee which collected money for the Iraqi Red Cross in 1941. This was probably done under Vichy influence. Even if not reliable, he is not a flagrant double-crosser. Towards the end of 1942 teamed up with the Emir Tellal el Amer, in a series of meetings and deputations, complaining of the Atrash administration. Was made president of the O.C.P. Commission in Suweida in 1942, but dismissed soon afterwards for corruption. Is not intelligent.

79. *Hamzeh, Aref.*—Born about 1903. Educated in Damascus. Studied law in the Damascus School of Law. Member of the Court of Appeal, having been appointed to this post in year 1936. Appointed head of the Damascus Municipality in April 1942. Member of a well-known Damascus family claiming descent from the Prophet Mohamed. Popular, pleasant, well-mannered and well educated, but rather weak.

80. *Hamzawi, Said el.*—Born about 1895. Member of the Hamzawi family who claim descent from the Prophet Mohamed, and who have traditionally occupied the post of Naqib el Ashraf since the Omayyad Dynasty (635 to 750 A.D.). The Hamzehs and Hamzawis are of the tribe of Bani Qoreish.

Related by marriage to the Mardams. Appointed Naqib al Ashraf (custodian of the sacred places) by Shaikh Taj ed Din in July 1942. No political



past. Has a good library of Arabic books and is a great scholar of Arab law and history.

81. *Hanbali, Shakir al.*—Born about 1880. Lawyer. Mutassarif of Damascus, 1924. Minister of Education under Damad, 1926-27. Minister of Justice, 1930. Acting Minister of the Interior, 1932. Disliked by the Nationalists. Professor in the Syrian University, School of Law. Intelligent, moderate, of no moment politically and unlikely to stage a come-back.

82. *Harb, Nejib.*—Age 33. Education Arabic and a little French. Residence Suweida. Newspaper correspondent. Supports Nationalist *bloc* and is anti-Atrash. Has been imprisoned in the past for being pro-German. Has also in the past had the support of Ali (Imtane) Atrash. Is unreliable and a fisher in troubled waters. Originally from the Lebanon. Came to Mjamer in 1916 and attached himself to the Harb family there. Popular locally and a good speaker. Not well-off. Started a newspaper (Al Jebel) in August 1942, under the patronage of the Délégué, Colonel Olive.

83. *Hariri, Mohamed Kheir.*—Son and heir of Ismail. About 40 years of age. Executes all business deals on behalf of his father, who is now an old man and inactive. The most influential sheikh in the Hauran. Considered a large landowner. After the entry of the Allies into Syria he was one of the principal agitators for the co-ordination of the Hauran with Transjordan. During the summer of 1942 he was a leading figure in the move for a Haurani Mohafiz. His name headed the telegram of protestation sent to General Collet on the 20th August, 1942, complaining of Husni Barazi's high-handed method for the collection of wheat. This telegram demanded Barazi's resignation under threat of non-co-operation with the O.C.P. Frequently travels to Damascus, where he has dealings with political personages.

Has relations with French and British authorities. Literate, but not educated. Politically conscious, ambitious and willing to run with the hares.

84. *Hassibi, Abu al Huda al.*—Born Damascus about 1889. Wealthy landowner with properties at Qatana. Elected Deputy for Wadi el Ajam in 1932 elections as French nominee, and again in December 1936.

Moderate, sympathiser with Nationalist *bloc*, but not prominent in politics.

85. *Hassibi, Subhi al.*—Born about 1890. Son of late Ahmad al Hassibi, who was Naqib al Ashraf (Custodian of Holy Places) at Damascus. Agricultural engineer. Lieutenant in Ottoman army (1914-18). Inspector of State Domains (1922-26). Acting president of the municipality, 1925. Was at one time president of the Agricultural Bank, then director of the Locust Bureau (1929-36). Was a member of the Constituent Assembly, 1928. Strong Nationalist, but not noisy. Keen on his job, intelligent and a good fellow. Takes no part in politics, but farms his lands. Related by marriage to Muayyad el Azms (*q.v.*).

86. *Hawash, Aziz.*—Alawite. Born about 1885. Chief of the Matawirah tribe living at Safita. His family fortunes, never great, have diminished to such an extent that he has to rely on his tribe (which is not rich) for financial support. Commissaire of Police in Beirut under Turkish régime. Resentment of favour shown by French to other Alawite leaders made him throw in his lot with the Nationalist *bloc*, and he was made Mohafiz of the Hauran (1939) and subsequently of the Damascus province whence he was retired in 1941. Lived in retirement at Safita, and was arrested by the Vichy authorities during the battle of Syria. Later released by Fighting French, who do not, however, regard him as reliable. His attitude to the British is equally unreliable. At present living in Damascus.

A man of many marriages. Lavish, educated, but of limited intelligence, stubborn, courageous and popular in spite of his poverty.

87. *Hayani, Taufiq.*—Born about 1895. From Aleppo. Kaimakam of Douma in 1925 and Governor of Hauran, 1930. Secretary to the Syrian Government after the dismissal of Shaikh Taj ed Din (1932). Acting Governor of Damascus during the elections of April 1932. President of the Municipality of Damascus, 1936, and Mohafiz of Damascus. Dismissed March 1942 and shelved in Council of State.

Of no political importance.

88. *Hayati, Yahya.*—Born about 1885. Ex-Turkish officer. Studied at the military school in Constantinople, and rose during the 1914 war to the rank of colonel. After the occupation of Damascus he became a supporter of Feisal. Took a leading part in 1925-26 revolt against the French, and afterwards

escaped to Transjordan. Later joined Dr. Shahbandar in Egypt. Condemned to death by the French, but amnestied in 1936. Returned to Syria, and in 1938 was appointed Director-General of the stillborn Ministry of National Defence. Since then has done nothing, although his name was mentioned in 1942 as a candidate for the directorship of police.

Believed to be quite honest and a strong character amounting almost to a mania. A keen student of military science, and accepted as expert military commentator in the ex-Turkish Officers' Club.

89. *Helu, Jabba el.*—Born Latakia about 1900. Greek Orthodox. Unscrupulous self-seeker and member of the Parliament for Safita, Jebel Alawite.

90. *Hindieh, Gregoire.*—Armenian Catholic Archbishop of Aleppo. Born 1895. Educated in the Armenian Seminary in Rome. Member of a wealthy Aleppo family with political connexions. A brother was at one time Minister of Finance. Formerly known as a Francophile; after his brother's resignation from the Finance Ministry he became a vehement critic of the French administration in Syria, and later became just as critical of the Syrian Nationalist Administration.

A prelate whose interests are more temporal than spiritual and who is not much trusted locally.

91. *Hindieh, Henri.*—Born 1899. Partner in Hindieh Frères, one of the more considerable Aleppo business houses. Syrian Minister of Finance under Shaikh Taj ed Din (1934-36). At one time Francophile, but after his resignation he became a critic of the French Administration in Syria, and is now very hostile to the Syrian Nationalists. Is neither influential nor popular.

92. *Hiraki, Hikmat.*—Born about 1895. Prominent Moslem landowner of Maaret-en-Noman (Aleppo region). No political career, but always friendly to the French. On very good terms with the Bedouins of his district and with his own tenants, being kindly. Became Minister of Ravitaillement in the Hassan al Hakim Government (September 1941 to April 1942), again in Husni Barazi's Government (April 1942 to January 1943) and again in Jamil Ulshi's Government (January 1943 to March 1943). Was also appointed Deputy to Jamil Ulshi as President of the Wheat Commission. A peasant. Shrewd.

93. *Homs, Edmond.*—Born 1897. Son of Albert Homs, a private banker with interests in Egypt, who did lucrative business with Turks during the 1914 war. Edmond was educated in Switzerland and England. Was Syrian Minister of Finance (March to October, 1936). Member of Syrian delegation for the conclusion of the Franco-Syrian Treaty in 1936. Elected Nationalist Deputy for Aleppo, December 1936. Took unofficial charge of the British Consulate at Aleppo during 1941 evacuation and has always been outspoken in his British sympathies. Is intelligent and pleasant, if somewhat indolent.

94. *Horani, Akram.*—Born Hama about 1915. Sunni Moslem. Lawyer. Extremist leader of Youth Party at Hama. Intelligent and has considerable influence over young men, including sons of notables, in spite of his anti-feudal views.

95. *Hubbi, Yuhanna.*—Born about 1888 at Jezirat ibn Omar, Turkey. Educated at Catholic College in Mosul, where he worked as teacher and preacher, and later was secretary to the Catholic Mission. Syrian Catholic Archbishop of the Jezirah. A confirmed supporter of the Nationalists, and later of the Separatist Movement in Jezirah. Went to Paris in 1937 with the Syrian Catholic Patriarch, Cardinal Tappouni, and succeeded in securing from the French Government certain additional safeguards for his community in Jezirah, but was obliged to remain in Beirut for a time in 1938. In 1939 was again connected with the Separatist agitation in the Jezirah, which contributed to the downfall of the Nationalist Government in July 1939. During Vichy régime in Syria was pro-Ally and helped Allied troops during the occupation (1941). A keen churchman and an astute politician who ably protects the interests of his flock.

96. *Hunaidi, Mohamed al.*—Born Deir ez Zor about 1890. Sunni Moslem. Rich landlord and president of Deir ez Zor Chamber of Commerce. Part-owner of Deir ez Zor Electricity Company and owner of several pumping engines along the Euphrates. Supporter of Nationalist *bloc* and linked with Mohamed el Fatayah (*q.v.*) and Mohamed el Ayesh (*q.v.*), being one of the strongest supporters of the latter.



97. *Huraiki, Bishop, Ignatios*.—Born about 1900. Greek Orthodox Bishop of Hama. As usual with Levant ecclesiastics, more interested in politics than church matters and tries to get his finger in every pie. Plays off Moslems against French. Supporter of Nationalist bloc. At meeting at Aleppo (21st November, 1942) to commemorate Hanano, Nationalist hero, made a speech to the effect that there were no minorities. This roused uproar in the Christian and French circles. Clever and unscrupulous.

98. *Hussaini, Rafiq*.—Born Homs about 1875. Sunni Moslem. Member of important Moslem family. Wealthy landowner. Nationalist Deputy 1936. Used by Hashem Atassi (*q.v.*) for his wealth and not for his intelligence.

99. *Husrieh, Izzat*.—Born Damascus 1910. Sunni Moslem. Arabic education. Was a typesetter in newspaper office of *Istiklal al Arabi* until 1942, when, on the death of the owner-editor of that paper, he became its editor. No political past.

100. *Hussami, Rashid al*.—Born about 1881. Occupied various legal positions in Government and retired from post as Procureur-Général of the Court of Cassation (1935). Until 1941 practiced at the bar, then was appointed Muhafiz at Hama.

Of Nationalist tendencies, but is not active in politics. Respected.

101. *Ibish, Hussein al*.—Born about 1890. A Kurd. Son of Ahmad Agha al Ibish. Was formerly well known in Cairo as dealer in racehorses. Married sister of Abdul Rahman Yussef and inherited large properties near Damascus, which he farms. Hunted big game with Prince Yussef Kemal. Sportsman. After succession of bad years with his farm, became rather short of money and left his house in Damascus to live on his farm. Owing to increased prices of late, is in better circumstances. Takes no part in politics, but is in close touch with Bedouin who camp on his lands. On account of his sporting propensities is popular with foreigners.

102. *Ibish, Nuri al*.—Born about 1895. Younger brother of Hussein. Was at Cirencester Agricultural College. Very like his brother, who is his partner.

103. *Ibrahim Pasha, Hassan Fuad*.—Born about 1866. Kurdish Moslem. Medical practitioner and expert in forensic medicine. Prominent member of the Nationalist bloc at Aleppo. He has a big influence over the populace, to whom he is known as "Abouna". An ardent pan-Arab, fanatically anti-French. Elected Deputy for Aleppo December 1936, he resigned in March 1939, but his resignation was not accepted by the Chamber. Despite failing health, his influence remains considerable. Principal opponent of Saadullah Jabri (*q.v.*). One of the extreme Aleppo Nationalists. Has maintained friendly contact with the British. His brother, Jamil, was arrested by the British in September 1942 for hostile attitude and propaganda.

104. *Isa, Yusuf al*.—Born Jaffa about 1880. Greek Orthodox. Deported by Turks for Arab nationalism. After Great War came into conflict with British authorities in Palestine for opposing Zionism and came to Damascus, where he founded newspaper *Alef Ba*. Leader of anti-Zionist demonstrations 1929. Took an active part in elections of 1932, siding with the Nationalists, but failed to be elected. In his paper he continually attacked British policy in Palestine, though during Palestine troubles he took a very moderate line and on outbreak of hostilities became frankly pro-British, remaining so, to his personal loss, during the Vichy régime.

Quarrelled violently with Munir Ajlani, Minister of Youth and Propaganda, November 1942, over the creation of the Journalists' Institute, which he boycotted. Cousin of Isa al Isa of the newspaper *Falestin* of Palestine.

Yusuf Isa is the best journalist leader-writer in Damascus and his paper is the most widely read. As he is in failing health, he tends to leave the editorship to his staff.

105. *Ishaq, Said Bey*.—Born 1897. Elected Christian Deputy for the Jezirah in 1937, despite the opposition of the Syrian Nationalists. One of the leaders of the Separatist movement in the Jezirah.

106. *Jabi, Dr. Rushdi*.—Born Damascus 1902. Sunni Moslem. Doctor of Medicine of American University of Beirut 1926. Doctor to Damascus Municipality 1936. Is more interested in social and political activities than in medicine. Since early 1920's has been associated with Ali Dandashi (*q.v.*) in Syrian Scout movement. Member of League of National Action (1936) and on good terms

with Nationalist bloc, who made use of Jabi's scouts for political demonstrations and propaganda. Implicated in plot against the security of the State and Bahij al Khatib (July 1939) and fled the country to Transjordan, where he established a clinic in Amman. In his absence was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment and twenty years' banishment, and only returned to Syria in 1941, when charges against him had been dropped. In 1942 appointed president of Higher Scouting Committee and participated in movement to oppose affiliation of Scouts with Syrian Ministry of Youth. Eventually came to terms and was nominated head of Higher Scout Committee. His brother Jamil, also a member of the League of National Action (a Germanophile), fled the country on the Allied occupation.

Not a prominent nor pleasing personality in spite of his position.

107. *Jabri, Ihsan Bey al*.—Born Aleppo about 1885. Brother of Sa'adullah al Jabri (*q.v.*). Deputy for Aleppo in the Parliament at Constantinople during the Turkish régime and for a time A.D.C. to the Sultan. Returned to Aleppo after the war and proceeded to Damascus, where he was Chamberlain to King Faisal during the latter's short reign. Fled with King Faisal at the time of the French occupation of Damascus, first to Palestine and then to Iraq. In 1924 he was delegated by the Syrian Arabs to go to Geneva to uphold the cause of Syrian independence at the League of Nations in company with the Druse leader, the Emir Shakib Arslan. Sentenced to permanent banishment from Syria and remained in Europe working for this cause from 1924 to 1937. Amnestied in April 1937 and was Muhafiz of Lattakia in November 1937 to April 1939. Was actively associated with bread strikes in Aleppo March 1941. After Allied occupation remained relatively hostile. Arrested the 4th September, 1942, by British for contact with Axis (suspected).

A hot-headed Nationalist extremist who, on account of his family associations, carries some weight.

108. *Jabri, Saadullah*.—Born Aleppo 1890. An extreme Nationalist who helped organise armed opposition to the French in 1920 and who has worked against them ever since. Was a member of the Syrian delegation for the negotiation of the Franco-Syrian Treaty in Paris. Was elected Nationalist Deputy for Aleppo in 1936. After his return from Paris he became much more moderate. He was Minister of Interior in Jamil Mardam's first Government (December 1936 to July 1937) and first Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of the Interior in the second Jamil Mardam Government (July 1937 to February 1939). Was suspected of complicity in the murder of Dr. Shahbandar (July 1940) and fled with Jamil Mardam and Lutfi Haffar to Iraq, returning only after the court had withdrawn the accusation of complicity (probably under the influence of the Italian Armistice Commission) and the Government of Directors had been replaced by the Government of Khaled el Azm. Although vaguely hostile, has remained quiet since the Allied occupation (June 1941). Made inflammatory speech decrying the measure of independence granted by the Allies at Hanano's celebration (the 21st November, 1942). Pleasing personality, somewhat discredited as a result of his term of office, when his inefficiency was revealed. Influential demagogue, though not popular with his own family and with most Nationalists. Xenophobe.

109. *Jambart, Salim*.—Born 1873. Merchant. President of the Aleppo Chamber of Commerce. Formerly Syrian Minister of Public Works, but resigned in 1933, since he was not prepared to endorse M. de Martel's draft treaty. A moderate Nationalist, he was defeated in the last Syrian elections. Minister of National Economy in the Haffar Ministry (February to March 1939) and in the Ministry of Nassouhi al Bukhari in March to May 1939. Agreeable and generally respected, but hardly a live wire. A leading and respected Francophil Christian.

110. *Jebara, Hassan Bey*.—Born about 1897 at Alexandretta, where he was educated in the French Collège des Frères. Worked in the Deutsche Palestina Bank and on the Bagdad Railway before the 1914 war. After the armistice of 1918 he supported the French, and in 1942 was appointed Director of the Finance Department in the Sanjak of Alexandretta. Went to Geneva in 1937 to assist the League of Nations experts in drawing up the statute of the sanjak. Supported the Alawite element in the sanjak, which he has done much to organise. Expelled from Alexandretta in August 1938 and appointed Director of Finance at Aleppo later in that year. Appointed Director-General of Finance by Khaled el Azm in April 1941 and combined this with the directorate of Supply



for one year. Being born in the Hatay, he bitterly resents its cession to Turkey, especially as the Turks confiscated his property there. Until outbreak of war was *persona non grata* to Turks.

An able financier and believed to be honest, but a timorous personality although of stubborn character. Not liked on account of his coldness. Politically inactive.

111. *Jezairi, Amir Ja'far al.*—Born about 1895. Curator of Arab Museum, Damascus. Son of Amir Taber. Nationalist sentiments, but does not appear in politics. Cultivated, honest, but of no account.

112. *Jezairi, Amir Said al.*—Born about 1872, Head of the Algerian family who migrated to Damascus when the French occupied Algeria. Proud of descent from Abd-al-Qader. Takes himself very seriously. Headed electricity boycott, Italian boycott and Hejaz railway agitation during the summer of 1931. Has properties in Palestine and so likes to keep in with the British authorities. Up to the neck in debt. Narrowly escaped being sold up in 1931. His son, Abdul Razeq, tried to murder him in 1934, because of his supposed stinginess. Not very clever nor entirely sane. Rather a joke with everyone.

113. *Jirjius, Wadih Elias.*—Born Latakia about 1900. Member of the Jirjius Syrian Orthodox family which is respected and important in Latakia. Educated at Damascus. Doctor of Law. Khalil Jirjius, the natural head of the family, being a Government servant, Wadih Elias has taken political charge of the family and was Syrian Orthodox Deputy for Tel Kelekh to the Syrian Parliament, 1937. Very friendly to British and opposed to French—a fact which is said to have been the cause of his exile by Free French in 1941. Opposed to the Obeid family. A young man of narrow views and little intelligence who has already got on the wrong side of the law.

114. *Jucid, Mohamed.*—Born about 1885. Alawite, Chief of the Rasha-winah section of the Kalbiah tribe living at Salhab in the Masiaf district. Is very popular with his tribe. Owner of extensive properties on which he has recently redeemed the mortgage. Is paid by the Syrian Tobacco Monopoly to suppress tobacco smuggling, but is believed, nevertheless, to help smugglers. On bad terms with Suleiman Murshed (*q.v.*), jealous of the Abbas and Kinj families. Deputy for Masiaf in Syrian Parliament, 1937. Middle aged, calm and reasonable, keeping on good terms with the Administration and the French as he considers this to be in the interest of his tribe. For this reason the other leaders in Alawite area and in Syria regard him as spineless.

115. *Jowhari, Tahsin al.*—Born Deir ez Zor about 1890. Sunni Moslem. Educated in Istanbul and later in French Agricultural College in Algeria. Director of Agriculture in Alexandretta and later Inspector of Finance, Aleppo. Appointed Mohafiz of Jezirah in June 1942. A Nationalist, at one time associated with Saadullah Jabri (*q.v.*). Willing worker but, for lack of sufficient drive or as a result of the inefficiency of his subordinates, has not accomplished much.

116. *Kabbara, Sami.*—Born Damascus 1904. Sunni Moslem. Doctor of law of Montpellier and Geneva. Diplôme of the "Institut des Hautes Etudes de Droit International." Chief Clerk to the Speaker of the Syrian Parliament 1932/33. Owner and editor of newspaper *Al Nidal*.

As a personal friend of the late Dr. Shahbandar, is opposed to the Nationalists. Claims his paper is independent. A well educated man, but not considered intelligent.

117. *Kahhale, Habib.*—Born Damascus 1893. Greek Orthodox, Educated American University, Beirut. Was a Deputy for Damascus to the Syrian Representative Council in 1924. Proprietor and editor of the weekly humorous magazine, *Al Mudhek el Mubki*—which enjoys a wide circulation in Arab countries and which deals with politics.

An accomplished after dinner speaker who has often broadcast. An opportunist of moderate Nationalist outlook.

118. *Kailani, Abul Qader.*—Born Hama about 1875, and is now head of Kailani family, descended from the 11th century namesake. Rich and respected on account of religious prominence of family. Trained in law in Istanbul. Deputy under Turkish régime. Minister of Agriculture under Shaikh Taj ed Din, 1928-29. Nationalist. Xenophobe. Wrote to Rashid Ali during Iraqi Revolt (1941), urging him to continue to fight and has corresponded with Amir Adbullah. Now old and mentally deranged.

119. *Kailani, Nessib.*—Born about 1896. Of Hama. Deputy for Douma in 1932. French nominee. Non-party. Not re-elected in 1936. Has almost succeeded in dissipating the sufficiency his father left him.

120. *Kayali, Abdurrahman.*—Born 1890. Educated in the American University of Beirut. Married into the Mudarres family. King Faisal's Chamberlain at Damascus. Prominent Nationalist and inclined to preach moderation. His influence is probably less than might be expected. Intelligent, but not masterful. Elected Nationalist Deputy for Aleppo in 1936. Minister of Education and of Justice in the former Nationalist Government. Went to Geneva in December 1936, to put forward the Arab claim for Alexandretta. Sent from Damascus to Aleppo in February, 1937, to apologise to the French for the Iron Shirts clash with the French Gendarmerie. Minister of Education and Justice in the second Jamil Mardam Cabinet (July 1937 to February 1939). Minister of National Economy in the Lutfi Haffar Cabinet (February to March 1939). Known for his peaceful feelings and his Anglo-Saxon sympathies.

121. *Kecati, Rudolphe.*—Born 1885 in Cairo. Roman Catholic. Doctor of law of Paris. Lawyer for the Damascus Municipality 1931/39. Owner and editor (assisted by his son André who also speaks on Damascus radio) of Damascus French language daily *Le Matin*. D.N.B. agent at Damascus from 1938 to beginning of war. Supported Axis whenever it paid him in Vichy year. Complete opportunist and clever lawyer.

122. *Kekhia, Ragheb.*—Born Aleppo about 1880. Educated at Melkia School, Istanbul, where he was contemporary of Faiz Khouri (*q.v.*). Connected by marriage to moderate section of Jabri family. Entered civil service and at end of Great War was Kaimakam in Aleppo region. In 1928 made president of Court of Appeal, Damascus, and during Nationalist régime was appointed President of Council of State—a job he lost when, on fall of Nationalists, he was made member of Court of Assize. On the 17th April, 1942, was appointed Minister of Justice in Husni Barazi's Government, but was not reappointed when Jamil Ulshi formed his Government on the 8th January, 1943. A Nationalist, but such a weak character that his views do not matter. Inefficient, except as an intriguer. As judge of irreproachable honesty. Holds pan-Arab views and is xenophobe.

123. *Kekhia, Rushdi.*—Born 1905. Belongs to a well-known Aleppo Moslem family. Studied law at Damascus University. Elected Deputy for Aleppo December 1936, he became known for his vehement speeches in the Syrian Assembly. Resigned from the Nationalist bloc March 1939. Supporter of Dr. Hassan Fuad Ibrahim Pasha (against Saadullah Jabri (*q.v.*)).

124. *Khair, Haj Adib.*—Born Damascus 1890. Received elementary education in Damascus. Merchant and contractor. Has undertaken various contracts in Palestine. Owns large book-shop (Librairie Universelle) in Damascus, which is managed by his son-in-law. Member of the Istiqlal group of the Nationalist party and is personal friend and intermediary of Shukri Quwatli (*q.v.*). Was implicated in plot against Bahij al Khatib 1939, and was condemned to twenty years prison and twenty years exile, but amnestied November 1941, under pressure of Italian Armistice Commission. Under Vichy régime in Syria was pro-Axis, and it is believed that Von Hentig (the German Commissioner to Syria) met various Nationalist leaders in his house. Worked as a contractor to British army, 1942. Plausible, specious, intriguer.

125. *Khair, Saqr Bey.*—Born about 1890. Alawite. Leader of Kalbiah tribe of the Alawite. Member of the Administrative Council of the Alawite Province. Resides at Rasioun, near Jableh. In 1936 supported Ibrahim Kinj (*q.v.*) in his opposition of union with Syria, but now supports Nationalist party for reasons of regional politics, as he considers that the French support his rivals. Not intelligent, ill-educated and coarse.

126. *Khani, Aziz El.*—Born about 1885. Educated in the School of Law of Constantinople. Was for several years Director of Awkaf of Damascus. Appointed Qadi of Aleppo in August 1929 and of Damascus in 1940. Physically and mentally robust. Has always been a partisan of Sheikh Taj, whose eldest daughter is married to his son Farid, nicknamed the "Damad." Respected because of his position, strong personality and honesty. Promoted in October 1942 to 2nd grade.



127. *Khatib, Bahij Bey al.*—Born about 1893 in the Lebanon and educated at the American College, Beirut. Appointed a Government clerk in Faisal's Administration (1919-20) and went to Palestine on the occupation of Syria by the French. He returned in 1923 and obtained a minor Government post. During the revolt of 1925-26 Bahij Bey served in the Ministry of the Interior and earned the reputation of being a pro-French official. He afterwards served under Shaikh Taj ed Din in 1928 and as private secretary to Haqqi Bey al Azm in 1932, thus incurring the displeasure of the Nationalist party. He was then sent as Mohafiz to Deir ez Zor until 1934, when Shaikh Taj ed Din, once more Prime Minister, appointed him Administrative Inspector in the Ministry of the Interior. He also filled the posts of head of the Municipality and Director-General of Police. In 1937 the Nationalist party, who had come into power, dislodged him on account of his alleged pro-French sympathies. He was, however, retained in Government service on French insistence and did much to quieten down the situation in the Jebel Druze, where he went as administrator in November 1937. Did equally good work in the Jezirah in 1939. When Nationalist Government under Jamil Mardam was dissolved and the Constitution suspended, he became (9th July, 1939) President of the Council of Directors, a Government of civil servants. He administered Syria wisely and efficiently until April 1941, when the Council was replaced by the Khaled al Azm Government. In June 1939 a group including Najib and Munir Rayess, and believed to have been hired by Nationalists, plotted to murder him, but the plot was discovered and culprits arrested. They were subsequently released at the orders, it is believed, of the Italian Disarmament Commission (November 1940). During the Khaled al Azm Government Bahij occupied his old post of Inspector-General of the Interior, but on formation of Shaikh Taj ed Din's Government (September 1941) he reluctantly (on French pressure) accepted appointment of Acting Minister of Interior. Had several disagreements with the French over their non-implementation of promise of independence and with the President over his interference with internal departmental affairs. When Cabinet was reformed after fall of Hassan al Hakim (18th April, 1942), Bahij again reverted to post of Inspector-General. He is younger brother of Shaikh Fuad al Khatib, prominent figure of Arab revolt, and later Prime Minister of Transjordan, and great Arab poet and anglophil.

He has earned the unusual reputation of being a painstaking and honest public servant. Speaks French and English fluently. Not above political intrigue, for which he is well placed, owing to his wide contacts.

128. *Khatib, Zeki al.*—Born about 1890. Not known before the elections for the Constituent Assembly, 1928. Lawyer. Nationalist Deputy in 1928 and 1932. Inflammatory speech on the 20th December, 1931, contributed largely to the troubles of that day. Is an extremist. Quarrelled with the Nationalists (of whom he had been a leader) over the terms of the Franco-Syrian treaty. Not re-elected in 1936 elections. On return of Shahbandar (1937) was actively associated with him until former's death in July 1940. Became Minister of Justice in Hassan al Hakim's Government September 1941, until its fall in April 1942. Was attacked by Shahbandar party because he did not appoint Shahbandarists to office and resigned from the party in March 1942. Suffers from ill-health. Weak and ineffective.

129. *Khoury Fares al.*—Born about 1875. Brother of Faiz Khouri (*q.v.*). Educated at American College at Beirut. Was a dragoman at British Consulate, Damascus, from 1899 to 1909. Lawyer. Minister of Finance under Faisal, when he discreetly lined his pockets. Minister of Public Instruction under Damad, 1926. Deported some months later on suspicion of assisting rebels, thus winning martyr's crown of glory and confidence of Moslems. Well-off. Chairman of board of directors of National Cement Company; professor of the School of Law, but resigned in 1941; legal adviser to the municipality until 1942, when he passed it to his son Suhail. Took leading part in the general strike of 1936. Went to Paris in March 1936 as member of the Nationalist delegation to negotiate a Franco-Syrian treaty. Deputy, December 1936. Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies (Speaker) on the 21st December, 1936, in recognition of his services to the Nationalist bloc in the treaty negotiations. Since fall of Nationalist Government in 1939, has played no active part in politics, although he continues to hanker for his old post of Speaker to Parliament. Despite his age, still mentally alert. Is a prudent and skilful, if unscrupulous, politician, who is, despite his religion, on good terms with the Moslems.

130. *Khoury, Faiz al.*—Born about 1891. Greek Orthodox. Dean of the Faculty of Law at the Syrian University, Damascus, from year 1941 to 1943.

Educated by Irish Presbyterian Mission, at American College, Beirut, and at Law School, Istanbul. Originally Protestant, but converted to Orthodoxy in 1935 as latter community had representative in Chamber and Protestants had not. Elected to the Constituent Assembly, 1928, as mouthpiece for his brother Fares (*q.v.*). Noted Nationalist. Nationalist Deputy in 1932 with great following among university students. Played a leading part in the first session of Parliament and again during the general strike of 1936. Re-elected Deputy in December 1936. Head of the Damascus Bar, 1936 to 1940. Minister of Finance and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the fifteen day ministry of Lufti Haffar, 1939. Minister for Foreign Affairs under Hassan al Hakim, September 1941 to April 1942, and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Finance in Husni Barazi Government (April 1942 to January 1943). Took strong line with the French over concessions of form to Syrian independence, but was unsuccessful. In agreement with Lebanese, struggled to obtain control of "Intérêts Communs." Framed budget for 1942 balanced (on paper) with proceeds from new taxes on income and agriculture. Was president of Commission supérieure to monopolise Syrian wheat, and displayed considerable energy and courage. Was attacked by landlords, &c., as being a Christian and corrupt, and forced to resign presidency of Wheat Office in July 1942. When Jamil Ulshi replaced Husni Barazi as Prime Minister (January 1943) Faiz Khouri gave up the Ministry of Finance, retaining only the Ministry for Foreign Affairs; one of the reasons for this being that it was felt that, as a Christian, he was not in a strong position to enforce taxation projects. He remained in office until the fall of the Ulshi Government, March 1943.

A man of moderate opinions of considerable intelligence who tempers his undoubted ambition with prudence. Speaks good English and French. Despite his religion, is on good terms with Moslems.

131. *Kinj, Ali al.*—Born 1895. Alawite. Brother of Ibrahim (*q.v.*). Director of the Interior in the Alawite Administration since 1939. Was exiled by Free French, together with Shawkat Abbas (*q.v.*) for some time during the summer of 1941, but later returned to his position. Was dismissed in January 1943 by Damascus Government, but appears to have refused to accept his dismissal. The Abbas family tend to defend him as they use him for his influence over his brother Ibrahim (*q.v.*), who fears him. The credit for his salary in his post of Director of Interior was suppressed from the budget of 1943. Uncouth, unintelligent, dishonest, tactless, intriguer. Detested generally, especially by Christians. It is believed he will be appointed Director of Agriculture for Alawite Province.

132. *Kinj, Ibrahim.*—Born about 1880. Alawite, of peasant stock. Has risen to the leadership of the Hadadin tribe during the last twenty to thirty years, having wrested it from the Al Hamid family. Appointed president of Alawite Administrative Council in 1931. In 1936 opposed the union of the Alawite Province with the Syrian State and Alawite representation in the Syrian Parliament. Since 1918 has backed the mandatory Power, and has been on good terms with the Abbas family (*q.v.*) through his brother Ali (*q.v.*). By this means, by time-serving politics and by tobacco, hashish and even arms smuggling, has accumulated both land and wealth. In politics is opposed to the Nationalist bloc. Bluff, more diplomatic than his brother Ali, ill-educated, but shrewd and popular owing to his lavish generosity and hospitality.

133. *Kurd Ali, Mohamed.*—Born 1875. Former newspaper editor. Minister of Public Instruction under Haqqi al Azm, 1921, and Taj ed Din, 1928-32. During 1914-18 war wrote ferocious leaders against British and French, and in 1921 was foolish enough to visit Jemal Pasha in Berlin and was dismissed by the French. Was made president of the Syrian Arab Academy, but was removed from office in 1934 on the ground of his insufficient knowledge of the Arabic language. Again became president of the Syrian Arab Academy in 1941.

Of no political importance, though a fanatical Moslem.

134. *Kyrillos IX, Moghabghab.*—Born about 1858 in Lebanon. Educated in Lebanon and at Rome (1879-84). Greek Catholic Patriarch since 1926. Ordained priest in 1887. Formerly Bishop of Zahleh (1900). Generally considered anti-French. Tried to remove Greek Catholic priests from seminary of St. Anne at Jerusalem (Pères Blancs) without success. Unpopular with his flock and the French High Commission, who pointedly gave Légion d'Honneur to his vicar-general. Spends half his time in Egypt and half in Syria and



Lebanon. Has recently earned hostility of Moslems on account of his efforts, which were unsuccessful, to get the Christian churches to combine to send a delegation to France in March 1936 to protect the interests of the "minorities" in connexion with the Franco-Syrian Treaty negotiations. A Vicar of Bray. Pro-Allied, but very senile.

135. *Liniado, Yusuf*.—Born about 1880. Jew. Son of Yahya Pasha Liniado. Formerly a banker, but now penniless. Counsellor in Criminal Court (1909-14). Judge in magistrates' courts (1914-18). Member of Syrian Congress under Faisal. Member of Damascus Municipal and Provincial Councils. Deputy in 1928 and 1932. No party, but Zionist in feeling. Never opposes the Nationalists. Re-elected Deputy in December 1936, representing Jewish minority.

A chameleon, but pro-Allied.

136. *Maasarani, Haj Sulaiman*.—Born Homs about 1905 of humble family. Sunni Moslem. Chemist. Extreme Nationalist who, by demagogic methods, acquired political influence. President of Muslim Orphanage, Homs, and local secretary of Nationalist *bloc*. Nationalist Deputy, 1936. Several times imprisoned between June and October 1942 for harbouring Palestinian rebels. His brother, Abdul Hadi, is now interned.

137. *Maatouk, Khalil*.—Born Damascus, 1880. Greek Catholic. Employed in the Tobacco Monopoly at Damascus. Member of Council of State under King Faisal, 1918. Syrian Commissioner of the Customs Administration, 1926. Went to Persia as merchant and worked with the Tobacco Monopoly there. Accumulated a large fortune by means that probably would not bear investigation. On his return to Syria dabbled in politics and became associated with Shahbandar party after death of Dr. Shahbandar (July 1940), and inspired to its leadership. His connexion with this pro-British party led the Vichy French to send him by plane as a prisoner to France at the outbreak of the Syrian campaign (June 1941). He was released by intervention of the Armistice Commission. An unpleasant personality both in appearance and conversation, ostentatiously wealthy, very intelligent, very ambitious and quite unscrupulous.

138. *Mahasin, Said*.—Born about 1885. Poor Damascus family. Educated Constantinople. Lawyer. Minister of Interior under Taj ed Din, 1928-30. Rigged elections to the Constituent Assembly, 1928. Was attacked by Nationalists and jettisoned by Taj ed Din. Then became a Royalist. Head of the Damascus Bar (1940 to 1942). Professor of civil law in the Syrian University. One of the best lawyers in Damascus (a partner of Sami Midani). Keeps free of politics.

139. *Mamlouk, Nuzhat*.—Born about 1882. Of Damascus. Was educated in Damascus and later in Constantinople, where he obtained a military proficiency certificate, and in 1909 was commissioned into the Turkish cavalry. In 1910 he was engaged in a punitive expedition against the Druses. Went in 1912 on Turkish military mission to Afghanistan. Joined Turkish Flying Corps in 1916 and served with it in Persia and Iraq. After the war he left the Turkish army and in 1922 joined the Syrian gendarmerie. In 1926 he was Acting Commandant of Police in Aleppo, but was later retired on political grounds. In May 1936 he was called upon by the Nationalist party to organise and command the Hadidi (Iron Shirts). In January 1937 was appointed Commandant of Police in Aleppo. As a result of bloodshed during demonstrations provoked by Ironshirts in Aleppo and Latakia, the organisation was dissolved and Mamlouk quietly removed from his office (1937). Has not since been employed and has not been active politically. Not popular. Militaristic.

140. *Ma'mun, Saifud Din*.—Born Damascus 1898. Sunni Moslem. Doctor of law of Paris. Joined Nationalist Youth Movement and took active part in disturbances which preceded advent to power of Nationalist Government, 1936. Became leader of Youth Movement (1936-39). Was one of the commanders of the Iron Shirts, a Fascist-inspired emanation of the Youth Movement, until its dissolution in 1937. Arrested by French in March 1939, and amnestied as a result of pressure by Italian Armistice Commission (November 1940). During rest of Vichy year was anti-Allied. Arrested, but soon released by Allied Army on Occupation of Syria (June 1941). In autumn, 1942, became pro-Allied, and broadcast from various Middle East stations. In June 1943 he sent a telegram to Nuri Pasha Said congratulating him on Iraq's declaration of war on Axis. Elected vice-president of Damascus Bar.

141. *Marashli, Haj Fateh al*.—Member of a wealthy Aleppo Moslem family. Notorious pro-Turk during 1914 war, but joined Ibrahim Hanano in the rebellion which he organised against the French and fought with him till 1921, when he escaped to Turkey, where he owns villages near the Syrian frontier, and settled in Gazi Aintap. Opted for Turkish nationality and is still *persona grata* to the Turks, in whose interest he is still reputed to be working, despite the gratitude lavished on him by the Syrian Nationalists. Returned to Aleppo in April 1937 on the proclamation of the amnesty and was accorded a triumphal reception. Is now living quietly.

142. *Mardam, Haidar Bey*.—Son of Sami Pasha Mardam Bey. Born Damascus 1898. Graduated from Law School, Damascus, 1923. Married Damascus Christian and went to France to study law for several years. Secretary to municipality 1929-30. In 1936 appointed Kaimakam at Ma'arat. January 1938 (Nationalist Government) appointed "chef de protocole" in the Foreign Office and in March 1938 appointed Acting Mohafiz of Jezirah. In July 1939 appointed Kaimakam of Idlib. In August 1941 appointed Mohafiz of Homs, where he remained until June 1942, when he was dismissed because he was suspected by Syrian Government of carrying information to French. In August 1942 he was appointed to Foreign Office as "chef de protocole."

Mildly Nationalist in politics, married to Christian wife, pleasant and open-minded but rather lacking in energy.

143. *Mardam, Jamil*.—Born about 1890. Cousin of Sami Pasha. Nationalist member of Constituent Assembly 1928 and member of various deputations sent by Constituent Assembly to the French High Commissioner. Deputy in 1932 and Minister of Finance. Formed and led a party of Syrian Arabs to try to effect a settlement between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya in 1934. Was member of the Nationalist delegation that went to Paris in March 1936 and became Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy on the 21st December, 1936. His Cabinet fell in July 1937 owing to internal quarrels over spoil and desire of Nationalists outside Government to participate. He formed new Cabinet July 1937, but his Government was attacked, notably by Dr. Shahbandar and Munir Ajlani, over the 1936 Franco-Syrian Treaty, of which he refused to give details. His Government became weaker still when in autumn of 1938, despite his visit to France, the French Parliament refused to ratify the treaty. Relations between Mardam and Shahbandar deteriorated to such a point that an attempt was made on Shahbandar's life. Eventually Jamil Mardam was forced to resign. He and his Cabinet were openly accused by the press of great corruption and peculation. When Shahbandar was murdered in July 1940 Jamil Mardam was accused by the Shahbandarists of complicity. Mardam, with a few others, fled to Bagdad and the charge against him was dismissed by the court, allegedly under the influence of the Italian Armistice Commission. Was in Bagdad at beginning of Rashid Ali revolt (May 1941), but is believed to have exerted moderating influence on rebels. Returned to Syria May 1941 after formation of Khaled al Azm Government.

When Sheikh Taj became President (September 1941) and Hassan al Hakim Prime Minister, Mardam attempted mildly to organise opposition on grounds that new Government was not constitutional. In January 1942 he went to Egypt, and, on his return, tried to provoke a political crisis by pretending that he enjoyed the confidence of the British, who had asked him to form a Government. He repeated this manoeuvre with greater insistence in June 1942, after an interview with Nahas Pasha (then Prime Minister of Egypt). As a result, the Allies obliged him to live in the Lebanon and a communiqué was issued condemning his action. His political pride and prestige suffered greatly from this action of the Allies. Permitted to return from Lebanon (October 1942).

An intelligent and subtle politician who prides himself on his ability to accommodate himself to any situation. Avid of power.

144. *Mardam, Khalil*.—Born about 1890. Nephew of Sami Bey Mardam (*q.v.*) and cousin of Jamil Mardam (*q.v.*). Wealthy poet; member of Damascus Arab Academy. Speaks English and no French. Has had no political career and has kept clear of politics. Was member of jury to judge B.B.C. Arabic poetry contest in Jerusalem about December 1941. Minister of Education in Husni Barazi's Government from June 1942, and again under Jamil Ulshi (January 1943 to March 1943).

A pleasant personality. Pro-British, but not interested in politics.



145. *Mardam, Mohamed Rashed Pasha*.—Born Damascus 1868. Sunni Moslem. Wealthy landlord. Has two sons, Ibrahim and Mamduh.

No particular education. Under Turkish régime had various judicial functions and was a member of Faisal's State Council.

Takes no part in politics.

146. *Mardam, Sami Pasha*.—Born about 1860. A rich landlord, but extremely miserly. Enjoys general respect, but is of little account politically. Uncle and father-in-law of Jamil Mardam (q.v.) and of Najib Armanazi (q.v.).

147. *Martini, Nebih al*.—Born 1884. Began his career as a clerk in a Turkish police office. Held various administrative positions and was Mohafiz at Deir ez Zor during British occupation (1918). Mohafiz of Aleppo from 1925 to February 1937, when he was put on the retired list. Reappointed Mohafiz of Aleppo by Council of Directors 1939, and continued in office until 1942, when replaced by Abdul Latif Chatti. He then came to Account Department, Damascus.

Moderate, well-meaning, but weak and unreliable.

148. *Maizer ibn Abdul Muhsen el Jarba, Sheikh*.—Born 1907. Became head of the tribe of Shammar of Zor in 1907, when French recognised him instead of Mishaal al Fares. Distant cousin of Daham al Hadi (q.v.), who aspires to his place. Deputy 1936-39. In 1941 had contacts with German Armistice Commission in Beirut.

Of a peaceful disposition and weak in character. Was always led by French.

149. *Milki, Raif*.—Born Hama about 1905 of humble family. Sunni Moslem. Lawyer. Extreme Nationalist and fomenter of riots. Very intelligent and has great influence over the masses, who support his anti-feudal policy. Sincerely believes in his cause. Is prepared to use violence.

150. *Mohammed el Faraj es Salameh, Sheikh*.—Born about 1900. Leader of the Wulda semi-sedentary tribe on the Euphrates, centring on Raqqa. Is on bad terms with Mujhem ibn Muheid (q.v.) of the Fedaan. Has considerable influence on Abu Shaaban Confederacy (semi-sedentaries). Banished January 1943 for obstruction to Allied wheat plan.

Intelligent but inclined to hypocrisy and at times to violence.

151. *Mudarres, Mohamed Khalil*.—Born 1894. Member of a family of wealthy Aleppo landowners. President of the Aleppo Cotton Spinning Company. Moderate in politics. Appointed Minister of Finance in the Ministry of Nassouhi al Bukhari (March-May 1939). Was several times consulted by Sheikh Taj ed Din in 1942 with a view to his becoming a Minister in the Syrian Government, but is reputed to have refused any office unless it was that of Prime Minister. He did not therefore become a member of the Cabinet. Industrious and well respected but conceited and touchy.

152. *Mudarres, Nuri*.—Born about 1890. Moslem. Wealthy member of Aleppo family. No political history previous to becoming member (representing Aleppo) of Council of Directors (July 1939 to April 1941), when he retired to his properties. Honest. Hard working.

153. *Mujhem ben Muhaid, Amir*.—Born about 1885. Bedouin chief, head of the Fedaan Wuld tribe in the Jezirah and Euphrates region. Given the title of Amir and awarded the Legion of Honour by the French in 1921 on the model of the chiefs of the Rualla. Deputy for Jezirah in 1936. Has well-armed forces and has been supported since 1926 by the French. Of considerable importance but unpleasant, cold and astute in character, likely to turn any emergency to his advantage. Always wears black spectacles. His eldest son, Nouri, lacks his father's dignity and astuteness.

154. *Murad, Hassan*.—Born Homs about 1900. Sunni Moslem. Weak, dishonest character of poor reputation but of some influence amongst youth and extremists on account of his eloquence. Now unpopular because he is considered to be a French informant.

155. *Murad, Leon*.—Born in Aleppo about 1900, and was a clerk in French delegation there. On account of his efficiency in this capacity was transferred to the High Commission in Beirut, where he remained on the economic side until his appointment in August 1942 as Director of Ravitaillement for Syria. While in the High Commission at Beirut he performed his duties efficiently and consequently had his term of service renewed for a further period of three months.

156. *Murhej, Farid*.—Born Hama about 1900. Greek Orthodox. Wealthy landowner of Hama, who habitually indulges in smuggling. Cultivates friendship of Moslems, with whom he is well established. Enjoys support of Bishop Hureiki (q.v.).

An attractive personality but entirely self interested.

157. *Murshed, Suleiman al*.—Born about 1895. Alawite, living at Jawbat Borghal near Haffeh. Started life as a shepherd but is now without doubt the most remarkable personality in the Alawite Province. About 1923 proclaimed himself a semi-divine being and secured some thousands of followers in Haffeh and Massiaf, to whom he was known as "Al Rabb" (the Lord). He imposed on the credulous pedantry of the Jebel Alawite by various devices, such as ventriloquy and luminous paints to enhance his divine pretensions. Deputy for Sahioun district to the Syrian Parliament in 1937, but in 1939 was used by the French and the Abbases (q.v.) to overthrow Nationalist influence in the Alawite Province. At this time he usurped the properties of various Nationalists (including the Shreithah family (q.v.), from whom he took the important village of Bustamo), Christian villagers and even of his own followers. His conduct and his success have cost him the friendship of the other Alawite chiefs, who resent his autocratic behaviour (the Abbas family, for reasons of local policy, continue to tolerate him), and cost him the adoration of his followers, whom he has shocked by his unbridled licence, especially in matters of women and seizures of property. His real supporters have been reduced to a few hundred and, while he remains feared, he is no longer respected. Because of this change in his fortunes, the Syrian Government, not without the tacit approval of the Abbas family (q.v.), dared to summon him to Damascus in autumn 1942 and compelled him to restore to the Shreithah family the village of Bustamo. Had it not been for the conciliatory policy of the late President, Taj ed Din el Hassani, he would have been compelled at that time to restore other properties.

An unrepentant individualist, exploiting to the full the political powers which his divine pretensions give him, but prepared to co-operate with the strong. His three sons are at the American University of Beirut.

158. *Na'asaneh, Habib*.—Syrian Catholic Archbishop of Aleppo. Born 1894. Educated in the Jesuit College at Beirut, and a man of some culture. Francophil; on good terms with his Patriarch.

159. *Nahmad, Rahmo*.—Born 1876. Well-to-do Aleppo business man. Head of Jewish Community in Aleppo and member of the Administrative Council of the Vilayet since the Turkish régime.

160. *Namy, Damad Ahmed*.—Born about 1885. Circassian origin. Grandfather was Emir Mahmoud and Governor of Tripoli. Father was Fakhro Bey and had large estates in Beirut. Ahmed Namy was son-in-law of Abdul Hamid and retains, rather questionably, the title of Damad, although divorced. Became Chief of State of Syria 1926-28 at a critical moment and worked conscientiously at a policy of conciliation. The French High Commissioner dropped him without ceremony and replaced him by Taj ed Din. Supported Nationalists in the Advisory Council, 1931. Still clings to the hope of being made King of Syria. Has far less political influence than he thinks due to the fact that (a) he lives in Beirut, (b) he is a Circassian and not an Arab and (c) he has a Christian wife.

Well meaning, dignified, perhaps a little fatuous.

161. *Nawwaf, As Saleh, Sheikh*.—Born about 1880. Bedouin chief. Head of the Hadidiyin tribe, the largest in the Aleppo district. Sheikh Nawwaf was educated in the tribal school at Constantinople, and for the last thirty-five years has been Chief of the Hadidiyin. Given Legion of Honour in 1925. Deputy for Aleppo Tribal Area 1936-39.

An astute and benevolent ruler, peace-loving and respected. His son Sattam now manages many tribal affairs.

162. *Nimr, Raphael*.—Born 1877. Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Aleppo. Educated in the Balamand Monastery, near Tripoli. On bad terms with his Patriarch. An intriguer. Visited South America at the end of 1938 and is still there.

163. *Nizam ed Din, Abdul Baqi*.—Born 1903 in the Nassibain, Turkey, where his father was Kaimakam. Elementary education. Is recognised as a



political leader of Moslems in the Jezirah. Owns large properties from which he draws his income. Reported to have sympathised with the revolt of Rashid Ali in Iraq.

164. *Osmani, Ragheb*.—Born Latakia about 1888. Sunni Moslem. Good Arabic education and practised as journalist until 1940 when he founded newspaper *Al Siassa* which was subsidised in Vichy year by Italian Armistice Commission.

Opportunist, open to highest bidder.

165. *Phares, Georges*.—Born Damascus 1896. Greek Catholic. Educated at Jesuit College, Beirut. Owner and editor of Damascus French language daily paper *Les Echos de Syrie*. Has always been pro-Allied and in particular pro-British, even in most difficult times. Reuter's correspondent at Damascus.

166. *Qais, Sheikh Najib*.—Chief spiritual judge of the Supreme Druse Mejliss of the Bayada of Hasbaya (a hereditary function). His jurisdiction over the Druses of Damascus was acknowledged (without emoluments) by the Syrian Government in 1942.

An agreeable personality but of no political account even in the Jehel Druse.

167. *Qasimi, Sheikh Ahmed el*.—Born about 1900 of poor parents and, after a religious education, was appointed as clerk in the Wakf Department where he has worked his way to the top of the tree. Has shown himself very liberal-minded in the matter of archaeological investigations in Mosques, etc., and has shown considerable energy in restoring the Omayyad Mosque and the Bimaristan in conjunction with the French Service des Antiquités. Speaks French. Rather a twister but not politically active.

168. *Qassab, Sheikh Kamil el*.—Born Damascus about 1870 and received a religious legal training. Is considered an expert on religious law. While a supporter of Faisal was a member of the Independence Committee formed to oppose an agreement between Faisal and the French. This committee provoked Damascene resistance to the French which ended with the battle of Meisalun. Then went to the newly formed Saudi Arabia where he became Minister of Education. Returned to Damascus and took part in the Syrian Revolt of 1925 and was exiled until 1937 when amnestied. Formed Society of Ulema, a powerful religious association and became its first head. Tried to induce Sheikh Taj to make him the equivalent of Sheikh al Islam but was unsuccessful (1942). Has always been a politician and enjoys a certain power in the Midan Quarter. Belongs to no party and likes to exploit his influence. Most ambitious. An eloquent public speaker.

169. *Qassab Hassan, Colonel Ibrahim*.—Born about 1895. Educated in the Military College at Istanbul and served in the Great War in the Turkish Army. Officer in the Syrian Gendarmerie and became military A.D.C. to Sheikh Taj in September 1941. Was appointed Chief of Police after Cabinet re-shuffle in April, 1942. A short man who wears high heels to add a few inches to his height. Rather colourless. Was completely under the influence of Sheikh Taj but not without ideas for the improvement of the Police Department. Dismissed from post of Chief of Police in April, 1943.

170. *Qitami, Oqla*.—Born about 1883. Residence Kharaba. Greek Orthodox. Leading Christian of Jebel Druse. One-time Deputy to Syrian Parliament. Supporter of Atrash family who use him as contact man. Was protégé of Emir Selim el Atrash. Education Arabic only. Said to be bastard son of Shibli Bey el Atrash. Sultan Pasha and Qitami were awarded pension by Syrian Government (1942) for their part in 1925 Revolt.

Influential and intelligent. An intriguer who is viewed with great suspicion by the French. Professes to be pro-British.

171. *Qudmani, Fuad*.—Born Damascus about 1900. As a result of serving as a clerk in a lawyer's office, was "tolerated" as a lawyer about 1920. Of no importance until he became member of Shahbandar party in 1938. Remaining loyal to his chief, when latter was murdered, he shared with Babil (*q.v.*) the leadership of the party.

Elected Dean of the Damascus Bar in October 1942 after elections, whose validity was challenged by his opponents.

Not very intelligent and rather unpopular.

172. *Qudsi, Nazem*.—Born 1906 in Aleppo. Lawyer. Hot-head. Extremist. Active during troubles of February 1936. Resigned from Nationalist *bloc* March 1939. Considered suitable in 1941 as British propagandist, but refused pay. Suggested for position in Syrian Cabinet in March 1942, but his candidature was ruled out by the Allies on account of his past xenophobe record.

173. *Qumbaz, Abdul Hamid*.—Born Hama about 1910 of unimportant family. Sunni druggist. President of Chamber of Commerce and secretary of Nationalist *bloc*, Hama, December 1942. Rich and ambitious. Has little influence except among small business men.

174. *Qumbaz, Abud*.—Born 1890. Native of Aleppo. Greek Catholic. Served with the Foreign Legion and took part in the Verdun fighting in 1916. Professional letter-writer. Said to be a police spy. Organised a body of Christian young men known as the "White Shirts" as a counter-movement to the Nationalist private militia known as the "Iron Shirts." Suspected of having promoted the sanguinary incidents of October 1936, he was imprisoned for over forty days and subsequently released by order of the High Commissioner. Now living a retired life and believed to be a French secret agent.

175. *Quwatli, Shukri*.—Born about 1886. Landlord. Supporter of Faisal régime and anti-French. Removed himself to Palestine on the French occupation, but returned later. During the rebellion of 1925 afforded every assistance to the rebels (except, of course, personal participation in fighting), for which he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment by court-martial. He fled to Palestine, but was amnestied in 1931 and again returned to Syria. Interested in his farm and a "national" fruit-preserving project. Vice-president of the Nationalist *bloc*. Made Finance Minister and Defence Minister (combined) in Jamil Mardam's Cabinet on the 21st December, 1936. During Palestine disturbances of 1936-39 secretly financed terrorists in Palestine and helped in purchase of arms in Syria. Did not form part of Jamil Mardam's second Cabinet (July 1937 to February 1939) because they quarrelled. As head of his own party (Istiklal), but allied with the Nationalists, was bitterly opposed to Council of Directors, but until French armistice (June 1940) did not take overt political action. Although pretending to be a friend and admirer of Ibn Saud, he was in close contact with the Italian Disarmament Commission during the whole of their stay here and seems to have distributed money on their behalf. Was a constant caller on the Italian Consulate in Damascus and met Roser, the German Agent, several times during the latter's stay in Syria. Acted as the "eminence grise" of Khaled el Azm when latter was in power (April to September 1941). On arrival of Allies was openly opposed to them and judged it best to go on "pilgrimage" to Mecca when rumours were current that certain arrests were to be made (October 1941). Went to Bagdad, where he was entrusted by Ibn Saud with various negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Returned to Damascus (September 1942) owing to illness of daughter.

A fanatic xenophobe and a determined exponent of pan-Arabism. Not particularly intelligent (by local standards), but stubborn, deriving his strength from his reputed honesty, both intellectual and financial.

176. *Rabbath, Edmond*.—Born Aleppo 1903. Aleppo lawyer. Renounced his Greek nationality on attaining his majority. Became a Syrian subject and joined the Nationalist *bloc*. Deputy for Aleppo 1936-39. Has written several books on Syrian political problems, of which the most important is *Unité Syrienne et Devenir Arabe* (1937). Formerly an extremist, his views have lately become moderate. Now resides in Beirut.

177. *Raikan Ibn Murshed, Sheikh*.—Born about 1905. Bedouin chief. Head of the small but predatory Saba's tribe (Bteinat), which is usually encamped in the Salimiyeh district. Deputy for the Damascus tribes 1936-39. A sheikh after the novelist's heart. Generous to the poor but a fierce ruler. Realises that the nomadic life of the Bedouins is doomed to extinction and is now actively sedentarising his people.

178. *Rayess, Munir al*.—Born Hama in 1899. Sunni. Brother of Najib (*q.v.*). Strong Nationalist. Joined Palestine rebels in 1936 and became second in command to Fauzi Qawekji. Appointed head of the Secret Police (*i.e.*, political) by the Nationalist Government in 1938 and in that capacity aided Palestine rebels. Dismissed a few months later on charges of brutality. Condemned to twenty years prison and twenty years' banishment for plotting against life of Bahij al Khatib (head of Council of Directors) in 1939, but



released in 1940 at intervention of Italian Armistice Commission. Fled June in 1941 on Allied approach and is now believed to be broadcasting from Athens.

A dangerous agitator and intriguer, associated with the Arab Club, League of National Action and the ex-Mufti.

179. *Rayess, Najib el.*—Brother of Munir (*q.v.*). Born Hama 1898. Sunni. Proprietor and editor of *Qabas*, a strongly Nationalist organ. His paper has been suspended at various times for its violent attitude, notably in 1938 for its attitude towards Palestine troubles. In 1939 condemned to twenty years prison and twenty years' banishment for implication in plot to murder Bahij al Khatib (head of Council of Directors). Amnestied November 1940 on intervention of Italian Armistice Commission. In Vichy year was anti-Allied. Arrested, but soon released by Allies in February 1942. Rearrested in June 1942 for his share in Jamil Mardam's (*q.v.*) false claims to Allied support. Released March 1943. A strong Nationalist, but he and his paper are for sale.

180. *Ricaby, Haidar.*—Born about 1913. Son of the late General Rida Pasha Rikabi, C.B.E. (Governor of Damascus after the British occupation in 1918). Educated in Victoria College in Alexandria and was a teacher in Iraq until May 1941, when he returned to Syria. Was appointed Acting Chef de Cabinet in the Syrian Foreign Office at its creation in September 1941. Brother of Akram Rikabi, director of the Kaddoura Agricultural College in Tul Karm. Is mildly Nationalist in outlook, although so far he has not been politically active. Speaks and writes very good English. Efficient and hard-working. A good Moslem.

181. *Rida, Khairi.*—Born Hama about 1900. Circassian. Started life as schoolmaster and in 1939 became chief of police, Aleppo. Acting Mohafez at Deir ez Zor and Hassetché 1942. Appointed Mohafez, Hama, June 1942, by Husni Barazi (*q.v.*), a fact he has never forgotten. Has never taken action against Barazi family and connexions. Nationalist and Francophobe. Capable administrator.

182. *Rifaat, Khalil.*—Born about 1880. Educated at Constantinople. Lawyer. President of the Criminal Court of First Instance under Feisal and Haqqi al Azm. Director of Police under Damad. Procureur-General to the Courts of Cassation and Appeal. Inspector-General to the Ministry of Justice. Was Director of Justice in Council of Directors (July 1939 to April 1941). Reverted to post of public prosecutor after fall of Council of Directors.

Has a good reputation as a judicial official. A great friend of Bahij el Khatib (*q.v.*).

183. *Reslan, Mazhar Pasha.*—Born about 1883. Native of Homs. During 1914 war was Kaimakam of Mosul. After war was made Director of Education under Faisal Government. Subsequently was appointed Mohafez of Deir ez Zor. In April 1921, after the establishment of the Amirate of Transjordan, he was appointed judicial adviser by the Amir, and was later made financial adviser. In July 1921 Reslan formed a new Government, with himself as Chief Minister. He was replaced by Rikabi in March 1922, yet returned to power in February 1923, but resigned in September of the same year. He subsequently held office as Minister of Finance, but in May 1924 he again threw his hand in and came back to Syria. In 1926, however, he fled the country after having been implicated in the 1925 revolt. He returned in 1928, was Deputy for Homs in the Constituent Assembly of 1928 and again in 1932. Made Minister of Justice and Education (1932/33). Appointed the first Mohafez of Latakia, under "Nationalist" Government, in January 1937. Attached temporarily to the headquarters of the Nationalist bloc, December 1937. Minister of Interior in the fifteen-day Ministry of Lutfi Haffar, 1939, and again in the Boukhari Government, March to May 1939. He is a typical specimen of a Turkish-trained Arab official. He is courageous but slow-witted, holds strong Nationalistic political views, but moderates his passions in matters affecting the administration of his district or department.

184. *Saba, Macarios.*—Greek Catholic Archbishop of Aleppo. Born 1873. Educated at Ain Traz in the Lebanon. Was a Patriarchal Vicar in Egypt, where he is said to have accumulated a competence. One brother, Costaki Saba, was a Nationalist Deputy. Another, Amin, was employed in the Banco di Roma at Aleppo. The Greek Catholics were at one time the largest Christian community in Aleppo, and their archbishop is regarded as dean of the archiepiscopal body in that town.

185. *Safieh, Majed.*—Born about 1905. Sunni Moslem. Educated in Damascus. Lawyer at Latakia and a leader of the moderate Moslem party and the Shahbandar movement there. His father, Said Safieh, was supporter of Amir Faisal. In 1937 Majed Safieh supported the French against the Nationalists. Was friendly with the Abbas and Kinj families (*q.v.*), who used him as a link with Sunni Moslem elements in Latakia and Sunni Moslem administration in Damascus. Recently Safieh, the Mufti of Latakia, and another Moslem notable quarrelled with Abbas family, who are thus deprived of Moslem support (save at Tartous). The reasons for the quarrel were: the measure of toleration accorded by the Abbas (for reasons of political alliance) to Suleiman Murshed (*q.v.*) and their unwillingness to treat Sunni Moslems on equal terms as their own co-religionists. Aggressive and cunning personality.

186. *Sahnaoui, Georges.*—Born about 1885. Greek Catholic of humble extraction. Brother of Jean (*q.v.*). Successful merchant (building materials). Nationalist. Member of Constituent Assembly, 1928. Deputy December 1936-39. Member of the firm Michel Sahnaoui et Fils, who are agents of the Shell Oil Company. Clever and pushing.

187. *Sahnaoui, Jean.*—Born about 1905. Greek Catholic of humble extraction. Brother of Georges (*q.v.*). Member of firm of Michel Sahnaoui et Fils. Appointed honorary Spanish Vice-Consul in 1936. Because prominent in Greek Catholic circles was considered pro-Italian, but in year following French collapse showed considerable signs of being pro-British. In April to September 1941 was Minister of Finance in Khalid al Azm Government. During winter of 1941-42 was engaged in large contracts for British army, in which he was not too well treated.

Amiable personality, rich, clever, but not very effective; close personal friend of Khaled el Azm (*q.v.*).

188. *Said, Riza.*—Born about 1875. Educated in Constantinople and Germany. Specialist in eye diseases. Minister of Public Instruction under Haqqi al Azm 1921. Rector of Syrian University until he was removed in 1936 from office by the French on account of his Nationalist sympathies. A pedant with political ambitions which are not likely to be realised.

189. *Saouda, Philippe.*—Born Beirut 1891. Roman Catholic. Educated Jesuit College, Antoura, Lebanon. Director of all branches of Banque de Syrie et du Liban, situated in Syria. Honorary Swedish Consul at Damascus since 1938; president of Rotary Club. President of association of former students of Jesuit Fathers. Pro-Allied, co-operative, reasonably able, forthright, phlegmatic and somewhat uncouth.

190. *Sarmini, Sheikh Abdel Qader.*—Born 1865. Lawyer practising in the Sharia Court at Aleppo. Prominent Nationalist, but not extremist. Son, Zafar, condemned to term of imprisonment for incitement in February 1936. Nationalist Deputy for Aleppo December 1936.

191. *Sarraj, Dr. Mohamed.*—Born about 1905. Owns property in Hama. Took a diploma in political science in France. Returned to Syria and supported the Nationalist cause. Elected a member of the Committee of Iron Shirts. Appointed in January 1938 as Director of the Political Section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Lost office April 1939 with fall of Nationalist Government. Partly on account of unfortunate love affair with a French woman and partly through loss of his money, lost his reason. Underwent a cure in Lebanon until 1941, when he went to live on his property in Hama.

Pleasant but weak.

192. *Shamieh, Tewfiq.*—Born about 1880. Greek Orthodox. Head of Faisal's political bureau. One of the leaders of the People's party 1924, but, because he supported Sheikh Taj ed Din in 1928, the Nationalists dropped him. Minister of Public Works under the Damad 1926, and Minister of Public Works under Taj ed Din 1928-29. Minister of Finance 1931, but unemployed after the elections until June 1936, when he was appointed Mohafez of the Euphrates. Kidnapped by Jeziriot autonomists December 1937. Was still Mohafez when Allies arrived during Syrian campaign in June 1941. He collaborated closely with Allies in settlement of the infamous Mayadin incident. Accused of speculation, he was transferred to Hama as Mohafez 1942, but resigned almost immediately. Lives on his property in the Qalamoun.



A well educated man, speaking English and French with definite Nationalist outlook. Anxious to bring about closer unity between His Majesty's Government and the Greek Orthodox Church.

193. *Shammas, Daoud*.—Born in Mardine, Turkey, about 1901. Syrian Catholic. Educated in Mardine and Istanbul. Worked as an interpreter with the French Services Spéciaux. Visited Europe on several occasions. A supporter of the Separatist movement in the Jezirah, but interested primarily in agriculture.

194. *Shayish Abdul Karim, Emir*.—Born about 1895. Chief of the Mawali Qibliyin and has influence throughout the tribe. In 1925-26 joined rebels against French and sentenced to a year's imprisonment. Deputy 1936-39. Has considerable hold over his tribe. Intelligent but a hypocrite.

195. *Shehabi, Amir Bahjat al.*—Born about 1885. Moslem. Cousin of Mustafa (*q.v.*). Studied law in Constantinople. Given an appointment in the Damascus police during the Faisal régime, but dismissed by the French. Elected head of the Damascus Bar in 1934-36. Mohafez of the Jezireh 1937. President of the Damascus Court of Appeal 1938, but resigned a few months later to resume his practice. Member of Iraq Defence Committee (May 1941) organised to collect money and recruits for Iraq rising. An influential Nationalist.

196. *Shehabi, Amir Mustafa*.—Born in Damascus 1893. Of Lebanese origin (Hasbaya). Cousin of Amir Bahjat (*q.v.*). Studied at one of the French schools in Damascus, at Istanbul and at the Agricultural School of Chalons, France. Lieutenant under Faisal and took flight when Faisal was forced to withdraw from Syria. Returned to Syria in 1923, when he was appointed Director of State Domains. In 1934 his position as Director of State Domains was suppressed and Shehabi was attached to the Ministry of Agriculture by Sheikh Taj ed Din. In 1935 he was one of the Directors of the Damascus Exhibition, and in 1936 (February to December) was Minister of Education under Ata Bey Ayoubi. He accompanied the Syrian delegation to Paris for the negotiation of the Franco-Syrian Treaty (1936). Mohafez of Aleppo (February 1937 to March 1939) under the Cabinet of Jamil Mardam, and went into retirement, devoting his time to compiling an Arabic-French botanical dictionary. Appointed Minister of Finance in the Jamil Ulshi Government on the 8th January, 1943. Resigned on personal issue on the 17th March, 1943. Was appointed Minister of Finance, National Economy and Ravitaillement in Ata Ayoubi's Provisional Government, March 1943. In politics Amir Mustafa Shehabi is a sympathiser of the Istiklal group, but plays no active part. Enjoys reputation as a man of probity and drive. An agreeable personality, modest in demeanour and means but can be very obstinate.

197. *Sherif, Ihsan*.—Born about 1892. Lawyer. French degree (à titre d'étranger). Secretary of the People's party 1924. Member of the Constituent Assembly 1928, when he held most uncompromising Nationalist views. Insisted on standing for elections in 1932, thus nearly spoiling the agreement with the High Commissioner's delegate. Nationalist Deputy 1932 and 1936. A man of sincere convictions with a violent temper. A minor Nationalist leader, who has, however, not been active for some time.

198. *Shretah, Abdul Qader*.—Born about 1890. A very rich and pious Sunni Moslem and head of one of the most important Moslem families in the Alawite Province. His family was robbed of a portion of its property by Suleiman Murshed (*q.v.*) in 1939. It was restored in 1942, notably the village of Bustamo. Deputy in Syrian Parliament 1937. Convinced Nationalist in politics. Arrested in November 1942 for anti-Allied sentiments and believed connexion with Axis spies. Haughty and truculent.

199. *Shughar, Sheikh Jamal al Din*.—Principal of the venerable Druse Sheiks of the Bayada (religious centre) at Hasbaya.

200. *Sidawi, Wadi*.—Born Damascus 1907. Greek Orthodox. Took law degree, Damascus 1925. Worked as assistant for seventeen years to Yusuf el Isa (*q.v.*) on the paper *Alef Ba*, and in 1942 bought *Al Kifah* from Amin Said, but abandoned it in early 1943 to its original proprietor. Speaks English and French. Has always been staunchly pro-Allied and is particularly pro-British, even under most difficult circumstances. Very touchy but good hearted. Pleasant and quiet personality.

201. *Sioufi, Mousallam*.—Born about 1885. One of the leading merchants in Damascus. President (1942) of the Chamber of Commerce and director of the National Cement Company. Nationalist sentiments, but steers clear of active politics.

202. *Stati, Mgr. Iyunis*.—Born about 1884. Of Homs. Syrian Catholic Bishop of Damascus (1933). Not a fanatical Christian, *i.e.*, he can bear sight of Christians not members of his church. Is an ardent defender of the "minorities" cause. Generally esteemed. Pro-British in Vichy year.

203. *Sulahian, Herant*.—Born 1872. Originally from Aintap in Turkey, he rendered valuable service to his people during the massacres at Aintap in 1895. Now a merchant at Aleppo. Is of the Armenian Gregorian faith and belongs to the Armenian "Hintchak" political party. A good speaker. Deputy for Aleppo in December 1936-39. Has spent recent years in Beirut.

204. *Sulh, Afif al.*—Born Saida (Lebanon) 1890. Studied law at Istanbul, but does not practice. Interested in politics and opposed the Turks before the 1914 war, during which he was Turkish officer. Sent on a mission by M. de Jouvenel to Jebel Druse in 1926 to negotiate with leaders of the revolt. At that time, was one of the leading Nationalists willing to co-operate with the French for the Independence of Syria. Organiser of the Nationalist Party in 1927. Accused of giving the names of the Arabs hanged by Jemal Pasha, but no proof forthcoming. Took an active part in organising the general strike in January 1936. Was exiled by the French, but was amnestied with others in March of the same year. Deputy for Damascus, 1936. Is now a minor leader of the Nationalist Party.

205. *Tallal Abu Suleiman, Sheikh*.—Born about 1900 and is head of the Hamad section of the Slut. Mudir of the Southern Ledja. Fought for the French against Druse in 1925. His tribe has an evil reputation for banditry and robbery and has a feud against the Druse. Tallal is intelligent and ambitious.

206. *Ulshi, Jemil*.—Born about 1880. Damascene of modest extraction. Major in Turkish army. Was Faisal's liaison officer in Beirut and is credited with playing into the hands of the French. On the French occupation of Damascus succeeded Ala ed Din Droubi as Prime Minister of Damascus Government but was dismissed after a few months. Attached himself to Taj ed Din, who appointed him Minister of Finance, 1928, and Minister of Interior, 1930. Lined his pockets well. Was included in the Taj ed Din Government, 1934-36. From 1936 until the assumption of power of Sheikh Taj ed Din in September 1941, he suffered a complete eclipse, though mentioned as a possible head of State in April 1941, when the Government of Directors was dismissed by the Vichy French. When Sheikh Taj ed Din assumed power, Jemil Ulshi's influence became stronger and he was considered as possible successor to Hassen el Hakim in April 1942, but did not come to power until January 1943, when he succeeded Husni Barazi. After the death of Sheikh Taj ed Din he remained in power as Prime Minister without a President of the Republic until March 1943, when his Government was replaced by the provisional Government of Ata Bey Ayoubi which was nominated by General Catroux to conduct elections. During his period of government was completely under the power of the French.

Clever intriguer, with considerable knowledge of the forms of Administration but no grasp of principles. Weak character. Has only a small following because, among other things, he is regarded as having betrayed Faisal.

207. *Urfa, Sheikh Said*.—Born Deir ez Zor about 1890. Sunni Moslem. Claims to be related with the Sherifian family of Mecca. Mufti of the Euphrates. Officer in Turkish army in World War but was with the Amir Faisal in Damascus in 1919 and since then has remained in close touch with leading political personalities in Iraq. Opposed the Rashid Ali Revolt in 1941. Strong pan-Arab and keen supporter of policy followed by the late King Faisal. A good orator and able to sway a crowd by sheer fanaticism. On friendly terms with the French though at heart he dislikes them intensely. Opposed to Mohamed el Fatayah (*q.v.*).

208. *Oustwani, Shukri*.—Born about 1870. Has always been in Damascus where he was secretary of Muftis. On the death of Sheikh Ata Effendi el Kasm, the former Mufti, he was nominated Mufti in year 1941. No politics. Reputed honest, good and gentle. Guided by stronger personalities.



209. *Yusuf, Mohamed Said al.*—Born about 1899. A Kurd and landowner. Son of Abdurrahman Pasha and hereditary chief of Kurds in Syria and Palestine. He received his education in Austria and Germany during 1914 war in company with many young Syrians who, for political reasons, were made much of by the German authorities. Speaks German, French and English and affects pose of perfect man-about-town. Has great influence among Kurds owing to his position, but has largely now lost it. Has a German wife. Of no political importance.

210. *Zain ed Din, Farid.*—Born about 1910. A Druse of Lebanese origin. Studied at American University, Beirut, specialising in economics, and later continued his studies in England and France (Doctor of Law, Paris, 1932). Acquired Syrian nationality and joined the Nationalist bloc. In July 1938, was appointed Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. After fall of Nationalist Government, went to Beirut. Was a prominent member of the Arab Club in Damascus, the centre of pro-Nazi intrigue. In 1940-41 is believed to have been go-between for the Italian Armistice Commission and Shukri Quwatli. Arrested by Allies and interned. Is xenophobe in general and Anglophobe in particular.

211. *Zamaita, Sheikh Yahya.*—Born about 1875. Damascene. Sheikh Imam in Turkish army during war and was chief disciple to Badr ed Din. Exerts a certain influence among simpler sections of the people and was political agent to Sheikh Taj ed Din. Since death of Bah ed Din, has been trying, with no success, to establish himself as leader of the Ulema. Shrewd and intelligent.

212. *Ziade, Louis.*—Born 1886. Prominent member of the Aleppo bar. Ambitious, insinuating manners, prefers to settle cases out of court. Retains Lebanese nationality and has ambitions both in Lebanon and Syria.

213. *Zoubi, Mohamed Mifteh (of Yadouda).*—The second most influential man in the Hauran, but most probably the richest. Head of the Zoubi family but not the striking personality of his late uncle Faris. Invariably cautious of the good relations existing between him and the French. A dealer in arms and contraband merchandise, the situation of his property at Yadouda near the Transjordan frontier being ideal for such actions. During the Palestine disturbances (1936-39) he almost certainly assisted the rebels. Politically-minded, very ambitious and crafty.

[E 3691/27/89]

No. 62.

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary—Syria and the Lebanon. Secret.  
No. 64.—(Received in Foreign Office, 6th July, 1943.)*

#### 1. General.

IT has been officially announced in Damascus that first-degree elections will take place on the 10th July and secondary elections on the 25th. The official decree convoking the Electoral Colleges has not yet appeared, but is expected hourly. The number of Deputies has been increased from 101 to 122, to correspond to the estimated increase in the population.

It was announced in the Lebanese press on the 18th June that the decree fixing the date of the elections would appear on the 22nd June, but it has not yet been published. In view, however, of the undertaking recently given by the head of the State that the elections in the Lebanon would be held so as to synchronise with those in Syria, the decree cannot now be long delayed.

Unfortunately, the communiqué foreshadowing the electoral decree also included the announcement that the number of Deputies in the new Chamber would be increased from forty-two to fifty-four. Of the twelve new seats, ten were given to Christians and only two to Moslems. The Moslem community not unnaturally rose in its wrath, and for the last three days has been holding a series of meetings to decide on a course of action. The Délégué-Général, when paying a courtesy call on the Lebanese Mufti on the 19th June, was confronted with an official demand that he should induce the Lebanese Government to cancel this decree, together with an intimation that, failing this, the Moslems would protest to the British, United States and neighbouring Arab Governments, and would boycott the elections. M. Helleu, who was obviously taken aback, attempted unsuccessfully to pacify the Moslems, but has so far given no indication that he will meet their demands. A strongly-worded protest signed by all the prominent

Moslem leaders in the Lebanon has accordingly been prepared for circulation to the Allied and Arab Governments, and a copy has been received by this mission. Nuri Pasha, when he arrives, will undoubtedly be expected to assist. The Christians in general are pleased by the decrees, but some of the more far-sighted are now beginning to realise that a hornet's nest is being stirred up and that they themselves are likely to be the principal sufferers in the last analysis.

In view of the resentment which this step may be expected to arouse amongst the Syrian Moslems, Shukri Quwatli, the Nationalist leader, has been promptly given to understand that it was taken without the knowledge of the British authorities, and is viewed by them with disfavour.

The political crisis in the Alaouite Territory has not yet been solved.

The acquittal by the French Military Tribunal of Rashid Mokaddem is, however, bound to lead to a certain diminution of British prestige and to a consequent stiffening in the attitude of the Mohafez and his faction, who had been showing signs of extreme nervousness regarding the intentions of the British authorities.

There are indications that, following the liberation of French North Africa, and in anticipation of an understanding between Generals de Gaulle and Giraud, the French here are beginning to feel themselves in a much stronger position to oppose both British and native demands. The Free French Délégué-Général has already made a speech reasserting France's claims to the Levant States, which, he stated, could count upon the resolution of France to maintain, while fully respecting the national independence, her "historic positions." He concluded by saying that France to-day was able to speak loudly and firmly to obtain the respect of her rights and to assure the defence of her interests. This attitude will certainly be resented by the local populations.

#### 2. Wheat.

Purchases for the past seven days show an increase over former weeks, and the season is beginning to get under way after a late start due to weather conditions.

A further seventy-nine lend-lease lorries recently arrived in this country consigned to the Office Economique de Guerre. Negotiations are now taking place to make these available for use by the O.C.P. This measure will largely ease the transport difficulties caused by lack of railway wagons.

#### 3. Syria—Damascus.

Apart from the official announcement of the date of elections, there have been no important political events, though both the Nationalists and their opponents have been active.

As a result of the incompetence and injustice displayed by the Chamber of Commerce in the distribution of income tax assessments among Damascus business houses (see previous Summaries), a group of merchants is setting up a rival institution to be called the Commercial Association.

Owing to the insufficiency of their wages, various members of the Damascus city police have tendered their resignations. The Government has countered this move by insisting on the continuance in their jobs of all those whose three-year contract has not expired.

After protracted negotiations, the Syrian Government has agreed that the entire Syrian wool clip for 1943 should be purchased by the British Government. The clip has been exempted from export dues, so that producers will be able to profit by the whole of the price of 290-310 piastres per Aleppo *rotl*.

#### 4. Aleppo.

The revision of electoral lists is proceeding. A large number of inaccuracies have been discovered, and the numbers of the various religious communities are therefore still far from certain.

A show of amity between the Jabri and Kayali-Moudarres factions was made when some of the Jabri family (though not Saadullah Jabri himself) attended a luncheon given by Mohammed Khalil Moudarres, at which a number of French and British officers were present. Unfortunately, a dispute which occurred a few days after the election of the committee of the local chamber of commerce came near to reopening the recently closed breach between the two factions. The secretary of the chamber, who is a supporter of Jabri's, accused his critics of trying to use the chamber as an instrument of the important textile works, which are controlled by the Moudarres family. Blows were exchanged, and the meeting



was suspended by order of the Mohafez. It is not thought that the rival factions wished to cause one another trouble over this matter, but in the event it has made their future co-operation more difficult. The supporters of the Moudarres family are now urging that no change should be made in the composition of the committee apart from the dismissal of the secretary, and it is hoped that the latter's political friends will not try to resist his removal too strongly.

The cost of living remains very high despite a slight tendency towards a fall in prices. There have been several minor strikes: teachers in Government schools are refusing to correct examination papers until their demands for increases in salary have been met; clerks of the religious trusts have stopped their leisurely work; and the tramwaymen, a more important class of public servants, staged a short strike on the 16th June and achieved their object after defeating the efforts of the company officials to break up the strike by working the trams themselves. The flour ration is still small, of bad quality and difficult to obtain, but the population refrains from creating disturbances in the hope of an early improvement.

#### 8. *Euphrates and Jezireh.*

*Euphrates.*—Relations between the British Political Officer and the Free French Délégué have now become so strained that co-operation between the two authorities has ceased to exist. It is quite clear that the French Délégué-Adjoint is endeavouring to force the Political Officer's removal in revenge for the removal of Colonel Alessandri. Apart, moreover, from the question of personal relations, a serious situation has arisen through the délégué's attempting to change the policy of the O.C.P. in this area without reference to the Central O.C.P. authorities. At a meeting held on the 19th June, attended by the Mohafez, the Délégué-Adjoint, O.C.P. officials and a number of local sheikhs, the Délégué quite unwarrantedly announced the reversal of the method of collection decided upon for the present harvest and the return to the system of quotas which was so unsuccessfully practised last year. He also stated that the local ration would be raised from the present 12 kilog. per month to 200 kilog. per year. (In this connexion it is interesting to note that rumours, believed to be French-inspired, have recently been circulating in Deir ez Zor that the Délégué's predecessor had to leave the area because the British authorities had continually refused his request to increase the ration.) Orders have been issued by the O.C.P. authorities in Beirut suspending this decision by the Délégué-Adjoint, and the French Regional Director of the O.C.P. has been recalled to Damascus to report.

Several unsuccessful efforts were made by the French Délégué-Adjoint to prevent the British Political Officer from attending this meeting. Colonel Lanusse even requested the local British Military Commander to order the Political Officer not to attend.

The matter has been taken up very strongly with the Free French authorities in Beirut, who have sent General Humblot to investigate the position.

*Jezireh.*—The Kurdish tribes are threatening to boycott the elections unless they are given equal electoral rights with their Arab neighbours belonging to the semi-sedentary tribes. According to an old electoral law (which was not, however, enforced at the last elections), taxpayers of the requisite age among the semi-sedentary tribes have the vote without being required to be registered in the official lists; but this condition is imposed in the case of sedentary tribes, to which almost all the Kurds belong. As registration was suspended some months ago owing to the influx of refugees from Turkey, the Kurds complain that they are deprived of several thousands of voters. Moreover, they resent the arbitrary manner in which the number of voters among their neighbours, the Tay tribe, has been estimated, alleging that the sheikh of this tribe has been allowed to fix the number of votes to be cast by his followers without any reference to outside control.

The Kurds have protested to Damascus, but the reactions of the Central Government are not known. In the meantime, the local Catholic bishop is attempting to mediate.

#### 11. *The Lebanon.*

The main political development that has occurred was the issue on the 17th June of two Lebanese decrees increasing the number of Deputies in the future Chamber from forty-two to fifty-four, and stating that the announcement of the date of elections would be made on the 23rd June (see under "General" above).

Preparations for elections have been proceeding, but the preparation of electoral lists has been so much upset by the appearance of the above-mentioned

decrees that the situation is now fluid again in all districts. There is much activity amongst candidates, and charges of interference are being freely bandied about against both French and Government officials, though on the whole too vaguely to warrant action.

Discussions, so far inconclusive, have been proceeding between British, French and Lebanese authorities on the subject of the recent Lebanese decree imposing minimum wages in commerce and industry. Pending a definite interpretation of this very amateurish and unsatisfactory piece of legislation, all main employers of labour have refused to apply its provisions. A small strike has consequently already occurred amongst the I.P.C. employees at Tripoli, and considerable labour troubles are to be expected at the end of the month if no decision has been taken before then.

The price of gold has remained steady at about £Syr. 60, and the rise in commodity prices has for the moment been checked.

[E 3779/27/89]

No. 63.

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary. Secret. No. 65.—Syria and the Lebanon, 30th June, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office, 12th July.)*

#### 1. *General.*

THE Lebanese Government has now published a decree announcing that elections will take place on the 26th and 27th September. Dr. Tabet has thus failed to honour his private undertaking to ourselves that he would hold elections in the Lebanon at approximately the same time as those in Syria. It is clear that this postponement is attributable in part to the French, who wish for more time to persecute the Opposition; but Dr. Tabet himself, who may or may not be actively assisting in these shady intrigues, is undoubtedly anxious to prolong his term of office by every means in his power. His pretext for postponement was the Moslem agitation against the two decrees increasing the preponderance of Christian seats in the future Chamber. That agitation is undoubtedly serious and liable to cause disorders; but Dr. Tabet shows no real signs of any intention to redress the grievance which provoked it. Ostensibly as a sop to Moslem opinion, he has announced that a census will be held before the elections; but this, while it may show an increase in the Moslem percentage of the population, will not affect the main question of the Lebanese emigrants. According to most of the experts, a reliable census would take anything up to eight months to complete with the inadequate mechanism available; and this may well be Dr. Tabet's real motive for introducing a fresh complication.

In Syria, where a relatively virtuous and able interim Government is in power, and where the French have accepted as inevitable the success at the elections of the Nationalist *bloc*, the situation is much easier. Only at Deir ez Zor, where the new Délégué-Adjoint is behaving far worse even than his predecessor and is attempting to reverse the policy of the O.C.P. for his own glorification, and at Lattakia, where controversy still rages round the Mohafez, is there any serious political tension.

The outcome of the Rashid Mokaddem affair (see Weekly Summary No. 56) is a very unsatisfactory compromise, which represents a sacrifice of his undoubted rights by the Army Commander, in the interests of higher policy, to the political corruption, parochial outlook and base suspicions of the French administration. For details, see under "The Lebanon."

#### 3. *Syria—Damascus.*

The announcement of the election date has not so far been followed by any important political developments. No party has yet issued an official list of candidates or published a programme. There has been much talk of a union of parties under the leadership of Shukri Quwatli, but the smaller political groups are still unwilling to surrender their independence in favour of a party which has so far failed to define its political aims. It is, in fact, doubtful whether Shukri Quwatli is at present able to count upon the support of all his Nationalist associates, since the ranks of the party are still far from closed.

It is interesting to note that Khaled Bagdash, secretary-general of the Syrian Communist party, which has been very active during the past few months, called upon Shukri Quwatli recently, and subsequently made a declaration to the press



to the effect that the Communists would not object to the leadership of Shukri in a national union.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has explained the increase in the number of Deputies from 100 to 124 as not so much due to the natural growth of the population since elections were last held in 1936 as to the facts that, (1) as a result of conditions brought about by the war, more people were now registered with the Census Department than ever before; (2) in urban districts greater numbers of people have been obliged to register in order to obtain bread ration cards; and (3) immigration from the Hatay and Turkey has seriously added to the total population of Syria. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has also pointed out that the Government had been as liberal as the Electoral Law allows in according parliamentary representation, especially to minorities.

Some excitement has been aroused by the transfer of the Jewish seat from Damascus to Aleppo, and it is understood that Shukri Quwatli has lodged a protest at the abolition of the Damascus seat. In point of fact, however, on the basis of the electoral figures available, while the Jewish vote is more than sufficient to justify the allocation of one seat (3,001), it is insufficient to justify two (9,001), and therefore the Syrian Government have correctly awarded the seat to Aleppo, which has a Jewish population of 3,069—some 400 more than Damascus. The agitation is merely an illustration of the mentality of Damascus, which considers that it should be specially favoured in all things.

In general, however, there have been no protests of importance against the distribution of seats. In the circumstances, therefore, it may be taken for granted that the seats have, by Syrian standards, been allocated with impartiality, and that this preliminary obstacle—a not inconsiderable one in Syria—has been surmounted with success.

#### 11. The Lebanon.

A communiqué has been published by the Lebanese Government announcing that preparations are being put in hand forthwith to hold a census before the elections. This is ostensibly an attempt to pacify the Moslem community, whose resentment has been roused to a high pitch by the decree increasing the proportion of Christian to Moslem Deputies (see last week's Summary). It has made the Moslems hesitate as to their next step, but cannot be said to have pacified them, and there is no indication that their leaders have in any way weakened in their determination to defend Moslem interests by all the means in their power. It now appears that the principle of counting Lebanese nationals resident abroad in the total estimate of the population was admitted in the last elections, so that the Moslems cannot now hope to contest it. Their leaders are, however, proposing to concentrate their opposition on the manner in which the census is to be held, and on the method of defining what proportion of the Lebanese abroad have in fact retained their citizenship.

The Moslem leaders assert that, if they cannot obtain full satisfaction in their demands for equal participation in the elections, they will not only make every attempt to induce their community to boycott them, but will formally announce their inability in future to co-operate in the Lebanese State as a whole, on the grounds that, so long as the French are here and support Christian pretensions to control the Lebanon, they will never get a fair deal. They contemplate in that event putting forward demands that (a) the Lebanon be federated into one State with Syria, retaining only local autonomy; or, if this is unacceptable to the Christians, that (b) the four cazas attached to the Lebanon in 1920 be reattached to Syria and that the Lebanon, thus reduced to its pre-1914 frontiers, be placed under international control, with Beirut as a free port.

Dr. Tabet is reported to be endeavouring to use the Najjadé leader, Jamil Mikkawi, who has for some time past been under the influence of the Sûreté Générale, to stir up opposition to the Moslem Committee.

The Moslems are also bringing pressure to bear on the Emir Khaled Shehab, the only Moslem in the present Government, to resign, on the grounds that he has not protected their interests; and they will probably try to bring about the downfall of Dr. Tabet also. Dr. Tabet himself is under no illusions that his recent actions have gained him Moslem hostility and have not endeared him to the British. He may therefore be expected to cling still more closely to the French as his only supporters.

The trial of Rashid Mokaddem (reference Summary No. 56 of the 28th April) resulted, as was expected, in his acquittal by the French Military Tribunal on the charge of smuggling narcotics; and the tribunal failed to arraign him on the

still more serious charge of attempting to suborn British military personnel. His re-arrest was demanded by the General Officer Commanding, Ninth Army, but was refused by the Délégué Général, who insisted that this notorious gangster should not only be allowed to return to Tripoli, but also to stand for elections. The discussions which ensued revealed the determination of the French to safeguard at all costs what they perversely conceive to be their prestige; and their attitude was so intransigent and irresponsible that the Army Commander was obliged to consent to an unsatisfactory compromise arrangement in order to avoid a clash, the repercussions of which, at so critical a military juncture, could not be foreseen. It was agreed that Rashid Mokaddem should be allowed to live under Sûreté surveillance in his house outside Tripoli and to stand for elections, but that, directly after the elections, his handing over for deportation would be demanded of the Lebanese authorities if he had been elected and of the Delegate-General if he had not. Steps have been taken to inform the Lebanese authorities of these conditions in order to counteract as far as possible the discouraging impression which his release will otherwise cause amongst the more independent-minded sections of the population.

Reports of interference in the electoral campaign by the French Conseillers continue to come in from all areas, especially Tripoli, where the French attitude as exemplified in the Mokaddem affairs indicates clearly that such interference may be expected to increase still further as the elections approach. At one period during the discussion of this affair M. Helleu went so far as to announce that, unless Mokaddem, whom he admitted to be generally regarded as a "French" candidate, were not set at liberty, he would be compelled to arrest Camille Bey Chamoun as a "British" candidate; and a circumstantial report has since been received that the Sûreté Générale are still thinking of arresting this innocent man, though they have not yet done so. This blatant cynicism leads inevitably to the conclusion that elections in the Lebanon conducted under such conditions will be a farce.

Small disturbances are reported from both Tripoli and Zahlé as a protest against the irregular and insufficient distribution of food supplies, but the grievances in question now appear to have been redressed.

[E 4423/27/89]

No. 64.

*Record of Meeting held in Secretary of State's Room, Foreign Office, on 14th July 1943 (Minutes agreed with M. Massigli).—(Received 29th July, 1943.)*

The following were present:

The Secretary of State.	M. Massigli.
The Right Hon. R. G. Casey, Minister of State.	M. Viénot.
Major-General Sir E. L. Spears.	M. Francfort.
Sir A. Cadogan.	
Sir M. Peterson.	
Mr. Baxter.	
Mr. Hankey.	

#### *Anglo-French Relations in the Levant.*

The Secretary of State said that, reading the telegrams from Cairo to Beirut, he had felt that the position in the Levant States was deteriorating. There were obvious stresses and strains between the British and French authorities there. In so far as this might be due to a misunderstanding of British policy, he wished once again to make His Majesty's Government's position clear. It had already been laid down several times in statements both by himself and by the Prime Minister, and it had not changed. His Majesty's Government had no desire to undermine or challenge the French position in the Levant, nor had they any ambition whatever to succeed to the French position of predominance there. He emphasised that His Majesty's Government had no territorial ambitions as the result of the war.



As regards our more immediate objectives, he would ask Sir M. Peterson to explain the position.

*Sir M. Peterson* said that our main aims in Syria were twofold, and in principle our intervention would be limited to these two aims. First of all, His Majesty's Government were interested in the preservation of military security, and, in the second place, they were concerned that nothing should be done to imply that the guarantee of independence given to the Syrian and Lebanese States would not be carried out. Beyond that, and as between Allies, His Majesty's Government felt that they were entitled to expect that they should receive full help from the territories in question in the war effort.

The Mokaddam case was one which affected the question of military security. His Majesty's Government did not feel that the French authorities had given them satisfaction, and he much hoped that M. Massigli would be able to say something about this.

*M. Massigli* expressed his thanks for the statements which the Secretary of State and Sir M. Peterson had made. He did not for a moment doubt that His Majesty's Government would adhere to the undertakings that they had given. He, of course, accepted the assurance of the Secretary of State that the British had no intention of substituting themselves for the French in the Levant, and on his side he could give the most positive assurance that independence would be given to Syria and the Lebanon.

As regards the present situation, M. Massigli said that the situation was a hybrid one, and some incidents were no doubt inevitable. A change of régime was going on in the States themselves, and there had been changes of personalities, General Catroux had left, &c. He agreed that it was serious when incidents affected military security and that the situation must certainly be improved.

M. Massigli said that he agreed with the aims which the Secretary of State had expressed. Independence has been promised to the Syrian and Lebanese States, and that promise had been guaranteed by His Majesty's Government. The promise would be kept. Elections were to be held very shortly, and then consideration would have to be given to the further implementation of the promise. Possibly the parallel of Iraq would be followed, possibly something like the 1936 treaty; anyway, the whole question would be agreed with those concerned. He observed that the situation was complicated by the fact that the Syrian and Lebanese officials had little experience of government, especially in so far as concerned economic questions; but he repeated that there would be no question of going back on promises given.

As regards the list of questions which had been forwarded to him for discussion, M. Massigli said that some of them were new to him, but he would ask for information, and discussion could be pursued either in London or in Algiers. In particular, as regards the Mokaddam case, he had as yet had no reply to his enquiries from Beirut. He realised that Mokaddam was not a saint. The impression in Beirut that it was a political matter, which was possibly incorrect, had no doubt envenomed the question. In any case, he now knew what we wished.

*Mr. Eden* said that he wished M. Massigli to be aware of our causes for serious complaint, and would therefore ask our representatives on the spot to state these.

*Mr. Casey* said that he saw the situation from midway between London and Beirut, and he would like to explain, with sympathetic frankness, his point of view on Anglo-French relations. His Majesty's Government had repeatedly explained their lack of political ambitions, but that it was difficult to avoid the impressions that those statements had never been believed by the French. He felt acutely the atmosphere of distrust and the lack of frank and friendly co-operation. He emphasised that the only reason why the British were in Syria was for the prosecution of the war. Yet, owing to this distrust, he had to spend almost more time over relations with the French than over all other problems put together. The question was a constant anxiety and preoccupation. To give an example, he had recently had to discourage the commander-in-chief from moving divisions into Syria because, owing to the lack of appreciation of the acute economic position and of the necessary measures to meet inflation, he had been afraid that their presence would finally unbalance the local economy. Another example was that the necessities of military security seemed to find no understanding among French officials. The situation was very serious, and he found that there was a state of permanent exasperation in the Middle East about it. He hoped his frankness would not be mistaken, because what he wanted was friendly co-operation.

*M. Massigli* agreed as to the necessity for friendly co-operation. As regards the question of inflation, he observed that the local sale of sterling had recently been authorised and had had important effects. He would be glad to consider other methods of improving the situation, which might also be discussed with M. Rausan, who was in London, in further detail.

As regards military security, he would like to know what more was required, and possibly to discuss privately any personal questions which might be involved.

*Mr. Casey* reminded M. Massigli that the ability of Syria and the Lebanon to invest in the sterling area had taken a great many anxious months to secure.

#### *Economic and Financial Situation in the Levant.*

*Sir E. Spears* said that it was difficult to make French officials in the Levant understand the urgency of the financial question. He had negotiated for months in an endeavour to make arrangements for the sale of sterling and agreement had only been reached at the eleventh hour. There was agreement with some of the French economic experts in principle as to the measures and machinery required, namely, the creation of a combined import board with British and American representatives on it, to co-operate with the Middle East Supply Centre, and continued co-operation between financial advisers through an Anglo-French financial committee. Possibly American co-operation would be desirable in the financial committee also. But the execution of these proposals was urgently necessary.

*Mr. Casey* emphasised that what was required was a system of rationing and price control on a joint Anglo-French basis. He emphasised that the local French authorities still did not seem to realise the real danger of the economic situation.

*M. Massigli* said that the committee would examine the question of taking some such steps. He observed that he wondered if rationing and price control was possible in an eastern country.

*Mr. Casey* said that he believed it was possible in respect of the half-dozen or so principal commodities. It had been done in Syria and the Lebanon in respect of bread and rice. It had been done in other eastern countries and he knew that the French economic experts were in favour of it in Syria and the Lebanon.

*M. Massigli* said that, with regard to the proposed combined imports board, he would like to know whether the French could be represented in the Middle East Supply Centre, which affected both Syria and Jibuti. There had been a number of difficulties and the French were not sure that their interests were being adequately considered. The territories under French control needed to import certain commodities to meet their requirements, and, in addition, they had commodities for export; in his view, the imports programme of the M.E.S.C. might take French requirements into further consideration. M. Massigli mentioned as an example the supply of paper required for the printing of books which could only be done in Syria, whence they were exported to wherever they might be required overseas. M. Massigli asked that the question of French representation on the M.E.S.C. should be examined further.

*Mr. Casey* explained that the Middle East Supply Centre was at present Anglo-American only, because the sources of imported goods were at present British or American. Even if French participation were possible, there would be an embarrassing difficulty also if others, e.g., Egyptians, Iraqis and Persians, wished also to be represented.

*M. Massigli* said he would be glad, all the same, if his proposal could be examined. The object, after all, was to pool the resources of the Middle East.

*Sir E. Spears* suggested that perhaps the solution might be found in the proposal already made for a Combined Imports Committee, as this would provide the French with a suitable channel for putting forward French requirements.

*The Secretary of State* observed that there would be more French shipping and also goods from French sources as the Mediterranean opened. Possibly there was an answer there to Persians and others who wished to be represented. He asked M. Massigli to examine urgently the question of setting up the required economic and financial machinery, and said that His Majesty's Government, for their part, would examine the question of French representation on the Middle East Supply Centre.



### Security.

*M. Massigli* said, as regards security, he would be glad to hear general and detailed criticisms of the present state of affairs.

*Sir E. Spears* said that we wished to avoid local rivalries which at present seemed to predominate. The wishes of the army regarding security should come first. As an example, he cited the issue of diplomatic passports, which had been done in many cases without strict adherence to the rules and which had escaped the control of the military authorities.

*M. Massigli* said there might be a shortage of suitable personnel for such work. It would now be possible to reinforce the officials from North Africa if necessary. He would ask for the list of diplomatic passports issued and would pay particular attention to this question.

*The Secretary of State* and *Sir E. Spears* said the arrival of qualified personnel would be very welcome.

*M. Massigli* said he was ready fully to examine security questions, to which he wished to pay special attention.

As regards the requests of the British army, he wished to recall, first of all, that the French authorities were responsible for general security, of which frontier security was a part. He pointed out that, in speaking of security, it should first of all be quite clear what was meant by this term. Were the British authorities perhaps putting forward under the heading of military security requests which the French authorities would not be prepared to accept under the heading of general security? He remarked that military authorities, whether French or British, had a tendency to enlarge the scope of the expression "military necessity"; military authorities always aimed at ideal security, often without taking account of political conditions.

*The Secretary of State* remarked that in fact the military authorities might sometimes base on considerations of military security requests which they had to make in questions which were not themselves military.

*M. Massigli* emphasised that he could not accept the principle that everything that the army wished would be granted, but he agreed that most careful account should be taken of the needs of the army. He asked for a short note of the cases in which the requests of the army on important questions had been refused.

In the course of the discussion on this question both *Sir E. Spears* and the Minister of State said that in matters of security the views of the army should prevail.

### Censorship Questions.

*Sir E. Spears* gave censorship questions as an instance of the difficulties encountered. British participation in the Syrian censorship was really inadequate. Liaison officers were kept badly informed. In his view, there should be a partnership; in reply to a question by *M. Massigli*, he made it clear he was referring both to postal and press censorship as well as military censorship. Constant requests had been made about this, and General Catroux had been asked both in Beirut and in Cairo several times.

*M. Massigli* said that this was a large question and almost amounted to a request for a "droit de regard." If Syria had been an active zone of operations, he would have understood the request better. But, in so far as it was a general question, it came under the heading of general security, which by the 1941 agreements was within the competence of the French.

*The Secretary of State* said it was really a question of mutual confidence.

*Sir E. Spears* said that he only wanted the same position as in Egypt, where there was complete co-operation. He wanted there to be British officials working with French officials and that they should decide together what policy should be pursued in censorship questions. The press censorship was also of importance in the war interest.

*M. Massigli* said that the position was really very delicate. Egypt was not quite a parallel. He asked that proposals should be put forward in an aide-mémoire distinguishing between questions of principle and their application. He

remarked that so far as possible it was desirable to avoid questions of principle. Without wishing to commit the Committee of Liberation in advance, he undertook to examine how the needs of the army could be met in whole or in part.

It was agreed that *Sir E. Spears* would prepare a memorandum on the subject on his return to Beirut and would communicate it to the French authorities and would send a copy to the Foreign Office so that the matter could be followed up if necessary.

### Mokaddam Case.

*The Secretary of State* said that we were not concerned with the moral character of Mokaddam, but we could not admit that he should go unpunished after having suborned British troops.

*Sir E. Spears* said there had often been cases of deportation and the best solution would be that *M. Mokaddam* should be deported. In reply to a question by *M. Massigli* about the effect of the election, he said that no one was more undesirable than Mokaddam as a Deputy. Unfortunately, the French authorities, not we, had made the Mokaddam case a political one. Mokaddam had become a protégé of the délégué adjoint at Tripoli for the purpose of the elections in spite of what General Catroux and *M. Helleu* had said about there being no intervention. *M. Helleu* had even intimated that, if Mokaddam were arrested, he might have to arrest also his electoral opponent. He wished it to be understood that this man was in no sense a British candidate.

*M. Massigli* said that he would do his best to arrange a satisfactory solution. The question was already being studied.

### Intérêts communs.

*Mr. Casey* (who took the chair at this point on the departure of the Secretary of State) explained briefly the problem presented by the "Intérêts communs" and how at present the proceeds of indirect taxation came back to the French delegation. We believed that it was an elementary form of independence that the State should enjoy the benefit of their own revenues.

*Sir E. Spears* said that General Catroux had stated in a letter to the Minister of State that he was proposing to keep the "Intérêts communs" as a bargaining counter in subsequent negotiations. He hoped this argument would be dropped.

*M. Massigli* said *Mr. Casey* showed great confidence in the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. He wondered whether the experience of the O.C.P. justified this. He asked if *Mr. Casey* was convinced that the Syrians would use the funds properly when they got them.

*Sir E. Spears* said that, without the co-operation of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, the O.C.P. could not possibly have functioned. As for the way in which the Syrian and Lebanese Governments disposed of their funds, they now disposed of the major portion of them and had the advantage of French advisers in so doing. If further guidance were needed, no doubt the proposed Anglo-French Financial Committee would provide it.

*M. Vienot* pointed out that the question was essentially one to be settled with the new Governments after the elections. This view was generally agreed.

### Issue of Decrees.

*Mr. Casey* explained that over a year ago General Catroux had said in the course of discussions in Cairo that he would inform *Sir E. Spears* in advance of all important arrêtés which he proposed to issue. The British authorities were, in fact, practically never informed in advance.

*Sir E. Spears* explained that decrees were pouring out and it was impossible to know the state of the law on any question; he gave as an example a decree about requisitioning of buildings and another about the Bank of Syria.

*M. Massigli* said this was an example of a divergence of view about the exact implication of the phrase military security. He felt that this was a question which could be settled by close personal relations. He would discuss it with *M. Helleu*.

In the course of this discussion it was pointed out that questions which affected the economic and financial stability of the country might also affect its security.



*Tel Habou Incident: Gardes mobiles.*

Mr. Casey recalled that, a year ago as the result of a disturbance, nineteen villages had been sacked and a Franco-British court of enquiry had been held and had awarded compensation. This had never been paid and the British authorities were being held responsible.

M. Massigli said he agreed that decisions taken should be carried out.

Sir E. Spears said there was also the question of reorganisation of the Gardes mobiles, to which the army commander attached great importance. In reply to a question by M. Massigli, he said it was not a financial question as they were paid by the British authorities.

M. Massigli said he would investigate these questions.

Mr. Casey, concluding the discussion, said that, in all friendship and frankness, he did not consider the questions raised at the meeting were symptoms of good Anglo-French co-operation. He would like these half-dozen questions settled, but they were only symptoms of the disease which was affecting Anglo-French relations. He would be infinitely grateful if M. Massigli could do anything to cure the complex itself.

M. Massigli said he saw there was a complex to be cured. No doubt some Frenchmen were over-sensitive in defining what they considered to be their rights. He agreed it should be easy to settle in a spirit of "camaraderie" if, on the French side, they could be sure that a solution arrived at in a particular case would not be considered in the future as a precedent. He would examine the question and discuss it with M. Helleu. Possibly, some changes of officials might also be useful.

Sir M. Peterson said that M. Massigli had spoken as though, after the elections, it might be intended to proceed to a treaty. He wondered whether the Committee of National Liberation would feel entitled to sign a treaty in the name of France.

M. Massigli appreciated the difficulty, but observed that General de Gaulle had been recognised as able to make a declaration granting Syrian and Lebanese independence, and presumably there would be no objection to matters being taken a step further.

[E 4083/27/89]

No. 65.

*Mr. Lascelles to Mr. Eden.—(Received 15th July.)*(No. 35.)  
Sir,

Beirut, 2nd July, 1943.

WITH reference to His Majesty's Minister's telegram of the 16th June, I have the honour to report that on the 21st June the Syrian Government issued two decrees, the first fixing the date of the elections, the second laying down the allocation of seats in the new Chamber to the various cazas and communities.

2. By virtue of the first decree, primary elections will be held throughout Syria on the 10th July. Provision is made for the reopening of the polling booths for a further period of one day in cases where the voting is not completed on the first day, or if three-quarters of the voters abstain. Elections in the second degree will take place on the 26th July, and polling booths may reopen on the 29th if 80 per cent. of the voters fail to record their votes.

3. I enclose a table<sup>(1)</sup> showing the distribution of parliamentary seats, by electoral districts and by creeds, as laid down by the second decree, and the corresponding figures for the 1936 elections.

4. The most important feature of the new distribution is the increase in the total number of Deputies from 100 in 1936 to 124 in 1943. This measure does not, as might appear at first sight, signify an increase in the population of nearly one quarter. As the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs has explained to His Majesty's Consul, it is due partly to the normal increase and to the influx of persons from Turkey (particularly the Hatay), but also and mainly to other factors, notably the special circumstances of the war, which have forced more people to register than ever before, especially in the towns and the frontier regions. The Government have further been as generous as the law allows in

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

granting parliamentary representation; as for example in the creation at Aleppo of one Greek Orthodox seat for immigrants of that denomination from the Hatay, and of one seat for the Syrian Catholics of Aleppo and Jezireh combined.

5. In the Jezireh, while the Syrian Orthodox community continues to have one seat only, the number of Sunni seats has been increased from two to six. This is accounted for by the growth of the Arab and Kurdish populations of that district, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed His Majesty's Consul that on the basis of the information available to the Government the award is correct. In conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs Colonel Gardener took the opportunity to point out that there had, on the other hand, been no increase in the number of Deputies to be returned by the Alaouites. Naim Bey Antaki explained that when elections were held for that region in 1937 the Government had not possessed exact statistics of the population and had, for political reasons, made a generous award of seats. He considered, in fact, that the number of seats allocated had at that time been excessive, and was now, as a result of the natural increase in the Alaouite population, correct.

6. Another interesting point is the increase in the Bedouin representation by two seats. An official in the Ministry of the Interior has explained that a special régime exists for the tribesmen, because they never register and cannot be expected to do so. Accordingly a *bloc* total is granted on the judgment of the Government. It appears that on the present occasion the (French) Bedouin Control advised an allocation of no less than eighteen seats to the tribesmen, but the Government, rightly considering this demand extravagant, decided to raise the total by about 25 per cent.

7. It will be seen that the Jewish seat has been transferred from Damascus to Aleppo. This change has aroused considerable excitement in both Jewish and non-Jewish circles, and Shukri Quwatli himself states that he lodged a protest against the abolition of the Damascus seat. In point of fact, however, on the basis of the electoral figures, while the total Jewish population is more than sufficient to justify the allocation of one seat (for which a minimum of 3,001 voters is required), it is insufficient to justify two (for which a minimum of 9,001 is required). The Syrian Government have therefore correctly awarded the seat to Aleppo, which has a Jewish population of 3,069—some 400 more than that of Damascus.

8. In general, however, there have been no protests of importance against the distribution of the seats. Shukri Quwatli, for instance, states that, apart from the question of the Jewish seat and one or two smaller points, he is quite satisfied that the distribution is just. In the circumstances, therefore, I think it may be assumed that the seats have, by Syrian standards, been allocated with comparative impartiality and that the Government have surmounted this preliminary obstacle—a not inconsiderable one in Syria—with a fair degree of success.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Minister of State at Cairo.

I have, &amp;c.

D. W. LASCELLES.

[E 3957/27/89]

No. 66.

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 66, Secret—Syria and the Lebanon, 7th July, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office, 15th July.)*

## 1. General.

THERE is no noteworthy change in the situation. In Syria preparations for the elections are proceeding smoothly, and there seems to be reason to hope that at least the primary elections, which are scheduled to take place on the 10th of this month, will pass off without hitch.

In the Lebanon the belief is gaining ground that the elections will be postponed indefinitely, or at least until such time as the French have made quite certain that their nominees will be returned.

As a result of the imposition of restrictions on credit, the price of gold has fallen by approximately 10 per cent. and there has been a similar drop in textiles. There has also been a slight, and possibly transitory, reduction in the high cost of living.

General Catroux arrived by air from Algiers on the 3rd July on a visit of farewell which has been stage-managed to produce the maximum political effect.



Everything possible has been done to emphasise the continuance of his "supervisory interest" in the Levant States; but the new French "Co-ordinator of Moslem Affairs" has failed to see any Lebanese Moslems, and apparently has no intention of taking any steps to redress their grievances. They therefore remain quite unappeased. Nahas Pasha has made vigorous representations on their behalf to General Catroux, claiming that both the recent anti-Moslem decrees and the postponement of the Lebanese elections are measures contrary to assurances which he received at an earlier stage from the ex-Delegate-General.

Nuri Saïd Pasha arrived in the Levant States by air on the 6th July. Officially, he is staying quietly at Shtaura in the Bekaa, but Shukri Quwatli and many other Moslem notables are visiting him there and will no doubt enlist his assistance.

### 3. Syria—Damascus.

In Government circles preparations for elections continue, and there is no sign that the Government desires or intends to seek any pretext for postponement. Indeed, the head of the State, in a declaration made to foreign press representatives, has emphasised that the elections will be held on the dates appointed.

No important changes have taken place in the general situation, though talk of the unification of parties continues. It seems unlikely that definite lists of candidates will be published by either of the principal parties until the primary elections have been held.

Considerable deference was accorded to Shukri Quwatli at the inaugural meeting held on the 26th June of a society recently formed for the collection of funds to build a hospital in Damascus. The Rector of the Syrian University took the chair, with the head of the State on his right and Shukri Quwatli on his left, the French and British representatives being seated below. In his speech Shukri suggested that the unity shown by those present in collaborating in this humanitarian project should be carried into the field of politics, and that Syrians should unite to achieve liberty, sovereignty and independence.

General Collet has been obliged to relinquish his post temporarily owing to illness. His duties are being performed by M. Fauquenot, the Délégué-Adjoint at Aleppo, who has been replaced there by Commandant Gave of the S.S.

### 7. Alaouite Territory.

Since the announcement of the elections and the return of the Mohafez from Damascus the situation has been strained. In two districts, viz., that of Djebel and Lattakia, the possibility of disorders is already apparent. In the former, which is the stronghold of the Kinjs, factional strife has broken out between Ibrahim Kinj and his young nephew and rival, Bahjat Nasur. Unfortunately, both the Mohafez and the Free French authorities are obviously supporting Bahjat, who has been permitted to strut about the streets of Lattakia and invade the Government offices with a retinue of about sixty odd tribesmen, all fulminating against the Kinjs.

The Political Officer, who was also visited by this mob, has drawn the attention of the Délégué-Adjoint to the danger of such a movement at the present moment, when political and tribal animosities are running high.

In Lattakia the Haidari section, led by Aly Shihab Nasir (an ex-Deputy of 1936), realising that the authorities are bent on ensuring the election of Badawi al Jebel, are hinting that they will boycott the elections.

Both these areas are regarded as potential danger-spots, and the Délégué-Adjoint, with whom the Political Officer is in close touch, has therefore issued an order cancelling all permits to carry firearms until the elections are over. The necessary police dispositions are also being taken in readiness to cope with any situation that may arise.

The Mohafez, Shauqat al Abbas, is proceeding on leave on the 7th July. It is understood that Ismail Ghoury, Commandant of the Gendarmerie at Lattakia, will act as Deputy Mohafez during the election period.

Lists of persons selected to supervise the elections in each district have been circulated. The anti-Mohafez party maintain that this is the last straw, as the majority are supporters of Suleiman Murshid and Shauqat al Abbas. On these men depend the counting of the votes and the orderly conduct of the elections.

### 11. The Lebanon.

The Lebanese Moslem leaders are still standing firm in their opposition to the recent amendments to the Lebanese Electoral Law. The French attempts to split them by encouraging the Najjadé leader, Jamil Mikkawi, to express support of Dr. Tabet and opposition to the Mufti have merely resulted in the complete discrediting of Mikkawi and in a drastic reduction in the number of his followers. It is understood that the Najjadé will shortly hold a meeting for the purpose of deposing Mikkawi and electing in his stead a certain Anis Saghir, a Nationalist whose past record is not wholly satisfactory, but who is *persona grata* to the Moslem leaders. The latter have now prepared a memorandum to the effect that they have no confidence in Dr. Tabet's impartiality in respect of either the census or the elections, and that they maintain their demand for the cancellation of the new electoral decrees. This memorandum is to be sent to M. Helieu, with a copy to General Catroux and to the Allied and Arab representatives who received copies of their previous protest.

General Catroux on his arrival visited Dr. Tabet, who seemed pleased with the interview, and received Emile Eddé and Bechara el Khoury, but no Moslem leader. To Bechara el Khoury he expressed surprise that the new electoral decrees should have been issued without reference to him, and discussed in general terms what further amendments might be expected to satisfy the Moslems. It is reported that the Constitutional party had previously complained to him, through Mme. Catroux, of the opposition shown to it by the French and Dr. Tabet.

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires and the Political Officer discussed with Dr. Tabet on the 29th June the implications of the new Lebanese law on minimum wages in so far as it concerned British interests. Dr. Tabet made it quite clear that, with an eye to his own electoral prospects, he could not rescind any clause of this law, but stated that employers might be informed, on his authority, that they were at liberty not to apply the family allowances laid down under the decree pending the elaboration by the Lebanese Government of revised legislation. In the meantime, the employees of the I.P.C. at Tripoli have gone on strike because the company have so far refused to pay them the increases and allowances provided for by the law; the situation in Tripoli is peculiar in that there are three large French concerns close to the I.P.C., all of which have applied the new law *in toto* to their employees.

Rashid Mokaddem's return to Tripoli, even under surveillance, had the expected depressing effect on those elements of the population who are not subservient to the French; this effect seems to be diminishing as the conditions of his release and the ultimate intentions of the British in regard to him become more widely known.

An impression that elections in the Lebanon will never be held is reported to be gaining ground in several districts and to have been accepted with equanimity in view of the general impression that, despite declarations to the contrary, the elections will be largely rigged.

[Z 8042/6504/69]

No. 67.

Mr. Eden to Mr. Macmillan.

(No. 90.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, 19th July, 1943.

M. MASSIGLI came to see me this afternoon for a farewell visit before his return to Algiers, when we surveyed Anglo-French relations in general. While he did not specifically ask for recognition in any form, M. Massigli made plain how anxious he was to bring about a *détente* in relations between the Committee and the United States. I told him that I shared his view, and added that I felt sure that any action the Committee could take to increase American confidence in them would be valuable. M. Massigli said he was anxious to get back to Algiers quickly, since, though the Committee was gaining strength, they were sadly lacking in political knowledge and international experience. I gathered that he had received one or two telegrams recently from the Committee as a whole which had troubled him. He indicated that he thought the Committee would like to put M. Viénot in charge of French affairs here, if that were agreeable to us. I made no objection.

2. I then raised the question of Syria, when M. Massigli reported to me on his discussions with Mr. Casey and General Spears. He said that he had sent a



recommendation to the Committee on the subject of Makkadam and, though he did not tell me what it was, I formed the impression that he had suggested that he should be handed over to us. For the rest, we agreed that an effort should be made to settle all outstanding financial problems while Mr. Casey and General Spears were in Algiers.

3. On the wider political plane I impressed upon M. Massigli the need for a "new deal" in respect of the French attitude to us in Syria. I had the impression that there were too many people causing unnecessary difficulties for our authorities. While M. Massigli did not contest this, he hinted that, as in the past in Syrian affairs, there were, perhaps, faults on both sides. Anyway, it was his intention to do all he could to ensure full French co-operation. Mr. Casey had given him one or two names of particularly recalcitrant French officials, and he would see when he got back to Algiers whether anything could be done about them. In any event, it was his intention that Anglo-French relations in Syria, as elsewhere, should work smoothly. If he were not successful in bringing this about, or if he were not given sufficient scope, he would willingly make way for another. He asked for our help in his difficult task; I assured him that he should have it.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

[E 4142/27/89]

No. 68.

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 67—Syria and the Lebanon, 14th July, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office, 23rd July.)*

#### 1. General.

FIRST degree elections were held in Syria on the 10th and 11th July and, according to reports so far received, passed off without serious incident.

Nowhere have results yet been announced, but outside the Alaouite territory, where Shurki Quwatli has little authority and where the Mohafez has openly prepared the ground in favour of his own feudal interests, a comfortable victory for the Nationalists is scarcely in doubt.

The more important parties have still not made known their lists of candidates or their programme. As a result, primary electors have elected secondary electors without knowing which candidates the latter will be called upon to vote for, or the principles for which they stand. This curious and unsatisfactory state of affairs seems to be due to the fact that in the past the French have always made known their programme, and the absence of such a lead now has left a void which Syrian politicians are either too cautious or too lacking in ideas to fill.

In the Lebanon General Catroux has interviewed the Moslem leaders and has made certain proposals designed to remove their grievances (see under *The Lebanon* below). These proposals have, however, given rise to a violent agitation amongst the Christians, and the Maronite Patriarch has sent a message to Dr. Eyoub Tabet assuring him of his full support. There is, consequently, considerable tension between the communities, and a certain amount of rioting may result in Beirut.

#### 8. Euphrates and Jezireh.

*Euphrates.*—Numerous complaints have been made by local sheikhs about French interference in the election campaign, and certain of them have threatened to cause trouble unless this interference ceases. These sheikhs have been informed that the British authorities will not permit any disorders, and it is not thought likely that they will cause serious trouble unless the French themselves resort to physical intimidation.

There is no doubt that these sheikhs have been encouraged to adopt a truculent attitude by the knowledge that the British and French authorities are at variance with one another in this area as a result of the misconduct of the French Délégué Adjoint.

The latter has now, as a result of his visit to Beirut, undertaken to observe the Franco-British Agreements in force in this province, and to maintain at least a polite façade as far as his relations with the British Political Officer are concerned.

*Jezireh.*—The situation is quiet in the Jezireh. Conditions in Hassetché have been normal following the settlement of the local supply problem (see Summary No. 66 of the 7th July).

No definite agreement has yet been reached between the Kurds and Arabs regarding election candidates in the Kamichlie district, but it is believed that both sides are now prepared to settle their differences.

#### 11. The Lebanon.

On the 8th July the Moslem leaders sent M. Helleu a further protest against the new Lebanese electoral laws, in which they accused the Lebanese Government both of having exceeded the powers they received from General Catroux on their appointment and of having acted illegally in including 159,000 Lebanese resident abroad in the total population figures when computing the number of Deputies, thus altering the balance between Christian and Moslem communities, though making no serious attempt to check whether these emigrants conformed to the Lebanese suffrage laws.

On the same date General Catroux received a personal letter from Nahas Pasha stating that lively suspicions had been aroused in Egypt by the postponement of the Lebanese elections and by the alteration of the Lebanese electoral law in favour of the Christians. The letter pointed out that an understanding between the Christians and the Moslems in the Lebanon was essential as a basis for agreement between these communities throughout the Near East, and expressed the hope that a new anti-Moslem policy was not being embarked upon. Nahas Pasha ended by stating that the Lebanese Moslems would boycott the elections if held under the new law, and that they had appealed to him; he called upon General Catroux, as the only person capable of resolving the problem, to take action, and suggested that the Moslems would be satisfied if the proportion of the Christian to Moslem Deputies were again changed to the ratio 29 : 25.

In the next four days General Catroux interviewed several Lebanese notables, and called officially on the Mufti, where he was confronted by the assembled Moslem notables with reproaches for not having seen them earlier, and with demands for the removal of the present Lebanese Government and the amendment of the electoral laws. Some of the Christians whom he saw also expressed concern lest the feeling which the new laws had aroused amongst the Moslems should induce the latter to raise the whole question of the status of the Lebanon, which they recognised could only exist on a basis of Christian-Moslem co-operation.

In his various conversations General Catroux made no secret of his conviction that Dr. Eyoub Tabet had committed a major political blunder and that M. Helleu had proved himself incapable of discharging his duties, by allowing the development both of this highly controversial issue and of a difference with the British so acute as to be evident at all. (He doubtless referred to the Mokaddem case.) He also showed that he had not been kept informed of the Moslem grievances and had only discovered their gravity after reaching this country.

On the evening of the 12th July he sent the Moslem leaders a set of new proposals designed to satisfy their grievances. These included: (1) the adoption of Nahas Pasha's suggested division of seats between the Christians and the Moslems in the ratio of 29 : 25; (2) the appointment of a new Moslem Secretary of State, in whose hands the executive power would be placed, Dr. Eyoub Tabet being retained as titular Head of the State but shorn of all powers and forbidden to stand as a candidate for the elections; (3) the shelving of the problems of the census and of the Lebanese emigrants until they could be considered by the Chamber after its election; and (4) the advancement of the date of the elections to the 1st August. The Moslems seemed inclined to accept this solution, but had not finally made up their minds before a violent Christian agitation was started against it, led by the Maronite Patriarch. The resulting tension has obviously rendered any solution far more difficult to achieve.

The Iraqi Prime Minister has spent the past week in the Lebanon and has seen many prominent personalities, with whom he has discussed political affairs and, in particular, his own scheme of Arab federation. He has not shown any grasp of the peculiar features of the Lebanese political situation nor any intention of intervening directly in it in the manner of Nahas Pasha, but has persisted in regarding the Lebanese question as only one facet of the whole Near Eastern problem—a point of view which commends itself to most Moslems but is totally



inacceptable to the majority of Christians and also, of course, to the French authorities.

General Catroux has visited both Tripoli and Sidon, in both of which places desperate efforts were made by the French Conseillers to stage enthusiastic demonstrations of welcome; in the former the Mokaddem family were in the forefront of a particularly artificial performance. In both places the enthusiasm shown was strictly limited, which is not surprising in view of the number of times the inhabitants of these towns have been whipped up to manifest their devotion to France on some similar occasion in the last few months. A jarring note was struck in Tripoli by the Qadi, who stressed the people's desire for independence and for ultimate union with other Arab States.

The strike in the I.P.C. installation at Tripoli ended without the company having to make any concessions, though the employees have sent a deputation to ask Dr. Tabet to interpret the new Wages Law in their case. In most other cases employers seem to have come to terms with their employees without having to pay most of the increases for which the law provides.

An attempt which is now being made to control the prices of vegetables, fruit and meat is reported from some areas, notably the Bekaa, to be having a salutary effect.

[E 4281/27/89]

No. 69.

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary. Secret. No. 68. Syria and the Lebanon. 21st July, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office, 4th August.)*

#### 1. General.

REPORTS from outlying regions of Syria, received after the compilation of last week's Summary, confirm that primary elections passed off without important incident. In several districts votes had to be paid for on a considerable scale in order to achieve the necessary minimum.

General Catroux left for Algiers on the 16th July with the Lebanese political crisis still unsolved. M. Hellen's subsequent attempts to solve it on the lines prescribed by the general were unsuccessful, and on the 21st July he resorted to the stop-gap solution of inducing Dr. Tabet to resign and bringing in a new interim Government (see under "The Lebanon").

#### 3. Syria—Damascus.

In the opinion of His Majesty's Consul, the calm in which the primary polling took place can be attributed to the facts that in nearly all quarters agreed lists of secondary candidates were made before polling day by the leaders of the quarters, and that neither the Government nor the French exerted undue pressure on the electors. Neither Shukri Quwatli nor the Shahbandar party has yet, however, published official lists.

On the 14th July Colonel Oliva-Roget, the Délégué at Soueida, took over the post of Acting Délégué in Damascus in place of M. Fauquenot, who returned suddenly and without explanation to Aleppo. The change has pleased the Nationalists, who have always regarded M. Fauquenot as an enemy.

Nuri Said Pasha spent a day in Damascus and dined with the head of the State and Shukri Quwatli. In conversation he did not reveal much interest in the local situation, but expressed the view that the elections had been properly conducted and that Syria was well set on the path to independence.

#### 4. Aleppo.

In a few quarters elections had to be continued on the 11th, as the necessary minimum percentage of votes had not been recorded on the 10th. Even so, only a third of the electors in Aleppo voted.

No settlement has been reached between the Jabri and Kayali factions, and, although the chance of a joint list has not yet been destroyed by the publication of definite opposing lists, the odds are against the closing of the breach due to personal jealousies and ambitions. It is believed that Saadullah Jabri scored in the primary elections and that he can now count on the important backing of the Tashnag Armenians.

Lutfi Bey Haffar and two other supporters of Shukri Quwatli arrived in Aleppo in a further attempt to prevent the breakdown of the reconciliation made at the time of Quwatli's visit.

#### 5. Homs and Hama.

Here, too, there was marked apathy towards the elections. In Homs only about 30 per cent. of the electorate voted; in Hama the proportion was nearer 60 per cent. As far as can be seen, the votes in Homs appear to have been fairly equally divided between the National *bloc* candidates and their opponents, with a slight advantage to the *bloc*, particularly in the country districts. This comparative failure of the Nationalists is probably due to their mishandling of local feuds and to the ill-will of Hashim Atassi, who is resentful at having been pushed into the shade by Shukri Quwatli.

In Hama the list fixed by Shukri Quwatli is supreme for the time being, but the individual candidates are already beginning to intrigue behind one another's backs.

Although pressure was brought to bear on the electors by the candidates and their agents, there were no complaints of interference by the French in either town.

#### 6. Jebel Druze.

Primary elections passed off without serious incident, and the people seemed determined not to allow anything to interfere with their harvesting.

Yousef Pasha has submitted a petition to the Central Government asking for the reversal of the decision that his candidature should not be accepted, and went to Damascus to further his cause. He was followed closely by the Emir Hassan, who will no doubt do everything possible to preserve the *status quo*.

#### 8. Euphrates and Jezireh.

*Euphrates*.—No detailed reports received from this region.

*Jezireh*.—The expected agreement between the rival parties in the Kamichlie area did not materialise, and Hassan Hadjou Agha, the leader of the Kurdish party, after making several unsuccessful attempts to join with Abdul Baqi, the Arab leader of the rival faction, eventually decided that a single list of Moslem candidates was out of the question. Both parties consequently presented a list of three candidates for the Moslem seats.

The Kurdish party asserted—apparently with truth—that the local government officials had shown discrimination in favour of the Arab leaders, and they therefore appealed to the Mohafez of the Jezireh. In a statement which enraged the Kurds, the Mohafez was ill-advised enough to threaten to hand them back to Turkey. After despatching telegrams of protest to the Syrian, British and French authorities, they decided, however, to go ahead quietly with the contesting of the seats.

#### 11. The Lebanon.

General Catroux's proposals, outlined in last week's Summary, were accepted with little demur by the Moslems, but aroused bitter opposition from the higher Christian clergy. The counter-agitation was led by the Maronites despite the fact that it was not they, but the Christian minorities, who stood to lose by these proposals.

During the next two days General Catroux, in his numerous conversations with notables, made it clear that he had little patience with Christian claims and declared his determination to force his solution on the Christians and on Dr. Tabet. On the 15th July he started negotiations with Abdullah Beyhum (whom he had proposed, and the Moslems had accepted, for the post of head of the Government) and with the Maronite Patriarch. He did not dissent from the latter's insistence that his notorious little factotum, Taufiq Awad, should be made a Minister under Abdullah Beyhum, and the Moslems agreed on condition that Awad were not given the portfolio of the Interior and were not allowed to stand as a candidate. He also came to agreement with Abdullah Beyhum on most points, particularly that there should be no French interference in the elections and that Abdul-Hamid Kerami's candidature should be "supported rather than opposed." The question of the number and distribution of seats remained, however, unresolved, and General Catroux seems to have found the Christians more intransigent on this and on other points than he had expected. He therefore decided that he could no longer put off his return to Algiers, and, after broadcasting a farewell message to the Lebanese on the 15th July, in which he



exhorted them to unity amongst themselves and stressed their connexion with France, he left by air for Algiers on the 16th July.

M. Helleu, faced with the thankless task of attempting to enforce the general's decisions, spent the next week in fruitless negotiations with the rival factions. On the 21st July he decided to cut the Gordian knot by insisting on Dr. Tabet's resignation. The latter accepted with surprisingly little fuss, and a new interim Government was formed consisting of Petro Trad, a Greek Orthodox nonentity, as head of State, Abdullah Beyhum (Sunni) as head of the Government and Taufiq Awad (Maronite). This, it must be emphasised, is only a partial solution. The new Government is left to settle for itself the main outstanding problems of the proportion of Christian to Moslem seats, the date of the elections and the census. Dr. Tabet's departure does, however, remove one important stumbling-block. It remains to be seen how far agreement has already been reached behind the scenes in regard to the outstanding questions—as also how far the new Government can count on French support against the Maronites, on whose allegiance they have always relied in their long-term policy.

In the prevailing uncertainty as to the conditions in which elections will be held, if indeed they are to be held at all, electoral activity has been on a small scale in all districts. The Constitutional party, encouraged by General Catroux's attitude, and particularly by his alleged statement that their arch-rival, Emile Eddé, is not eligible to stand for the presidency, to believe that they were now regarded by the French with more favour than hitherto, are displaying great confidence in the outcome of the elections and have been at pains to manifest their approval of General Catroux's proposals.

Adel Bey Useyran, the only genuinely independent personality in the South Lebanon, has addressed to the Allied representatives a strong, and well-founded, complaint against the interference of the French Conseiller at Sidon in both the administration and the electoral campaign in the South Lebanon. He has, however, imprudently circulated this protest publicly, and has, moreover, admitted to encouraging his followers not to attend General Catroux's farewell reception at Sidon, as a result of which three of them have been arrested by the Sûreté. In general, however, his efforts to make a stand for Lebanese rights have increased his prestige, and may encourage similar action elsewhere.

Dr. Ayoub Tabet, in pursuance of his plans for fiscal reform, had brought out a new tax on buildings to replace the antiquated Ottoman tax, and this appears to have been comparatively well received. His attempts to collect the war profits tax had, however, led him into a morass of discussions with the Beirut Merchants' Association, and he had been compelled to allow a further period of grace for appeals against assessments whilst he pursued his negotiations with them. His relinquishment of office will probably result in the indefinite shelving of these problems.

Nuri Pasha left Beirut for Jerusalem on the 19th July without having openly intervened in the Lebanese political crisis.

[E 4459/27/89]

No. 70.

*Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 69; Syria and the Lebanon.  
28th July, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office, 6th August.)*

#### 1. General.

Secondary elections took place throughout Syria on the 26th July and resulted in a sweeping victory for the Nationalists. There was a complete absence of excitement or disorder.

In spite of much lobbying there has been no change in the situation in the Lebanon, and the date of the elections still remains to be settled.

The fall of Mussolini has caused the usual exaggerated hopes of a speedy ending to the war.

#### 3. Syria-Damascus.

In Damascus the whole of the Nationalist list, headed by Shukri Quwatli, was elected. Minority candidates returned include Naim Antaki, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the provisional Government, and Faris Khouri.

#### 4. Aleppo.

The Saadullah Jabri and Moudarres factions did not, after all, present a combined list, but the better elements in both lists have been returned, though the majority of the Deputies elected are Jabri's nominees. Four of the Moslem candidates failed to obtain the required minimum of votes and a second poll will therefore take place for these candidates on the 29th July.

#### 5. Homs and Hama.

In Homs the Nationalists completely swept the board. Both Adnan and Helmi Atassi have been returned; Hashim Atassi did not stand. It now seems pretty well established that he had given General Catroux an undertaking to conclude a treaty with France if he returned to power, and as a result he has been completely discredited.

In Hama the Nationalists have had a similar victory, the opposition having completely faded away.

#### 11. The Lebanon.

No progress has been made towards the solution of the problem of the number and distribution of seats in the future Lebanese Chamber, the three members of the new interim Government being in disagreement amongst themselves on this point.

Abdullah Beyhum, the new head of the Government, acting under the orders of the Moslem Committee, has urged that Dr. Tabet's decrees altering the electoral law shall be rescinded, thus returning to a total of 42 Deputies; whilst the other two, acting under Christian pressure, favoured a further increase to 63 Deputies. The French, though evasive, clearly incline to the Christian viewpoint. A series of undignified efforts to reach a compromise by bargaining, rather than by negotiation, have been undertaken during the past few days, but the Moslems have held firm whilst the Maronite Patriarch, whose views are faithfully represented by his creature, Tawfiq Awad, remains adamant in his demand for 63 Deputies, divided, as in the last elections, in the proportion 35:28 between Christians and Moslems. On the 26th July a deputation of déléguation officials endeavoured, without success, to force this solution on the Moslems, who resisted it, and the matter rests there for the moment. It is probable, however, that a fresh attempt will now be made by the French to secure acceptance of the ratio proposed by Nahas Pasha, viz., 29:25—a ratio accepted at an earlier stage by the Moslems but rejected by the Christians. The date of elections has hardly been discussed pending the solution of the greater problem, but it seems unlikely to be fixed before mid-August at the earliest.

The new interim Government has naturally undertaken no effective administrative work, being wholly engaged in these electoral discussions. A report of the division of portfolios amongst them, giving Tawfiq Awad the Interior despite previous assurances to the contrary, has now been denied in a communiqué which records that the signature of all three Ministers is required on any measure they may promulgate.

Public opinion is contemptuous of the new régime and particularly of the inclusion in it of Awad, who is almost universally detested. On the subject of the electoral decrees Christian and Moslem feelings are liable to run dangerously high if a solution is not soon found, though protracted discussion is causing increasing weariness and disillusionment.

[E 4611/27/89]

No. 71.

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary, No. 70, Syria and the Lebanon,  
4th August, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office, 17th August.)*

(Secret.)

General.

NOW that the final results of the Syrian elections are available it is possible to assess some of the tendencies which have been at work during the electoral campaign. The overwhelming success of the Nationalists, whilst undoubtedly attributable to the superior organisation and financial power of the National bloc, to the belief that the party enjoyed the blessing of the French (who, although



disliked, have to be placated) and the British, and to the personal prestige of Shukri Quwatli, is also indicative of the resurgence of pro-Nationalist sentiment, and of the growing desire that the end of the war shall not find Syria inarticulate and helpless. The last-minute withdrawal from the contest of Hashim Bek Atassi (see Summary No. 69 of the 28th July) marked the failure of French attempts to strike a pre-election bargain with the Nationalists over the question of a Franco-Syrian treaty, and the new Parliament may be expected to prove intransigent on this issue. In addition, the recent comings and goings of political personalities from neighbouring Arab States, whose interest in Syria is growing as the question of Arab union comes increasingly to the fore, have not escaped the observation of the more politically minded, who see in the Nationalist leaders their future spokesmen when the time comes to put forward Syria's claims to leadership in a federation of Arab States.

At the same time it would be wrong to assume that the election results are an accurate expression of public opinion as a whole. Popular interest in the elections was at no stage very considerable; for instance, only some 30 per cent. of the electorate voted during the primary elections in Damascus and Aleppo; and even if they had all voted the result would still have been unsatisfactory, since the system of elections in two degrees reduces to manageable proportions the number of people who have to be squared by one means or another, and is, therefore, an encouragement to corruption.

The manner in which the elections were conducted has, however, completely justified the policy of strict impartiality which has been followed by the British authorities since the electoral campaign began. Despite the charges of indifference which were levelled at the British authorities at an earlier stage in the proceedings by candidates who, for their own reasons, would have liked to see them turned into an Anglo-French contest, it is now generally recognised that the policy of disinterested watchfulness adopted by the British has rendered the elections singularly free from foreign interference. Both French and Syrian authorities have, of course, used their influence in favour of certain candidates; but there has been little or no open intimidation; and the number of complaints and petitions which have been addressed to the Central Government on the score of interference is very small. On the whole the elections may therefore be regarded as the nearest approach to an impartial popular consultation which is possible in a politically immature country such as Syria. The provisional Government is to be congratulated on the unexpected degree of success they have achieved in overcoming the many problems which confronted them.

Shukri Quwatli has informed the Political Officer that he is confident that he can form a Government strong enough and sufficiently homogeneous to govern the country well and in accordance with national aspirations.

The Lebanese political crisis has been solved, after a week of intensive negotiations, by the imposition by the French and British authorities of a compromise whereby the new Chamber is to consist of fifty-five members, of whom twenty-five are to be Moslem and thirty Christian. This solution has been accepted by the Moslems on condition that a census is taken within the next two years, on the basis of which fresh elections will be held. The Christians have accepted the settlement also, though in the case of the Maronite Patriarch, Emile Eddé, and a minority of extremists, with a bad grace.

The price of gold has fallen to £Syr. 48 per sovereign, and there has been a sympathetic drop in the wholesale prices of silk and cotton. The retail markets have, however, not yet benefited as wholesalers are holding on to their stocks in the hope that the drop may prove to be temporary. Food-stuffs, particularly meat and vegetables, continue at their previous high levels.

#### *Syria.—Damascus.*

Further details of the voting in Damascus show that the triumph of Shukri Quwatli's party was complete. Every member of his list obtained an absolute majority of votes, Shukri Quwatli himself gaining 628 out of 719 valid votes cast. The Opposition's strongest candidate, Dr. Sami Kabbara, polled only 386 votes. It is also of interest to record that Khaled Baghdash, the local Communist leader, polled only 130 votes.

The extent, however, to which these results may be regarded as representative of the full range of Damascus public opinion must be limited by the considerations referred to under "General" above.

The Syrian Government has passed a decree forbidding the sale, or lease for a period exceeding nine years, to any foreign person or predominantly foreign

company of real property in Syria, without express authorisation of the Government. The complete text of this decree is not yet available, but it is known to apply to companies formed for agricultural exploitation, drying of marshes or creation of settlements. If strictly applied, it should, therefore, constitute an effective barrier to the Jewish agricultural and industrial penetration of Syria, of which there has been talk here from time to time.

On the 30th July the head of the Government, in the presence of His Majesty's Minister and M. Helleu, officially opened the pipe bringing water from Yaduda to Deraa Town. The artesian wells and piping were constructed by the Royal Engineers shortly after the Allied entry into Syria, and have now been left for the population of Deraa, since its own main water supply was destroyed during the campaign.

#### *Aleppo.*

The polling which took place on the 29th July, for those candidates who failed to secure a clear majority of votes, resulted in the election of three more supporters of Saadullah Jabri, who has therefore scored a considerable victory, and established his claim to be the Nationalist leader in this area.

#### *Jebel Druze.*

Polling took place in an atmosphere of calm and resulted in a triumph for the Atrash family, three members of which were elected, viz., the Emir Hassan and Yousef Pasha for Soueida, and Ali Mustafa for Salkhad. The other Deputies returned, namely, Hassan el Amer for Chahba, Ogla Bek el Qutami for the minorities, and Sheikh Saoud el Fawaz of the Sardiye tribe representing the Bedouin, are all Atrash nominees.

The completeness of this victory gives some cause for apprehension, as Atrash arrogance may now be expected to increase, but it is satisfactory to report that direct French interference in the elections in this area was negligible.

#### *Tribal.*

Of the Deputies returned to represent the Bedouin tribes, the more important are the Emir Fawwaz ash-Shalan, a brother-in-law of Ibn Saud, Sheikh Trad Ibn Milhem (Hassana), the Emir Faour Ibn Faour (Fadel), and Sheikh Meizer Ibn Muhsin (Shammar of Zor).

#### *The Lebanon.*

Discussions regarding the number and distribution of seats in the future Lebanese Chamber continued during the early part of the week under review with increasing acerbity. In the interim Lebanese Government, Abdullah Beyhum was pulled one way by the Moslem Council and Tawfiq Awad another way by the Maronite Patriarch; while Petro Trad continued to express senile optimism as to his power to settle the question without showing the slightest signs of being able to do so. Many of the Christians, roused by the Moslem attitude and incited by Emile Eddé, were showing an increasingly uncompromising spirit in support of the Maronite Patriarch's demands; whilst the Moslem Council was not unaffected by the arguments of some of its weaker members that, provided a juster division between Moslems and Christians was assured, some increase in the number of Deputies would improve their own chances of being elected.

In the face of these conflicting claims, M. Hellen showed himself irresolute and was therefore the readier to accept the assistance of His Majesty's Minister in solving the problem. After full discussions, it was agreed that the best solution was to adopt Nahas Pasha's suggested figure of 54 Deputies, divided 29:25 between Christians and Moslems, but that, if it proved impossible to get the Christians to accept this, one more seat would be allotted to them, making the proportion 30 Christians to 25 Moslems.

With M. Helleu's full agreement, His Majesty's Minister visited the Maronite Patriarch on the 29th July to explain the Allied point of view. As was expected, the Patriarch was unreasonable and obstinate, but was left in no doubt that his attitude was most detrimental to the cause of Lebanese independence and was calculated to lose him all British sympathy. The following day His Majesty's Minister visited the Lebanese Mufti, in whose house most of the members of the Moslem Council were assembled, and urged them to accept the Allied solution. After some discussion they willingly agreed to do so. The Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Beirut was also visited by the counsellor with



the object of persuading him not to associate his community with the intransigence of the Maronites.

On the 31st July M. Helleu published a decree announcing the solution described in paragraph 2 above and stating also that a census would be held within two years to determine finally the actual population figures. On the same day both M. Helleu and His Majesty's Minister broadcast from Beirut explaining the solution and stressing the full agreement of French and British authorities in arriving at it. The date of the elections has not, however, so far been fixed, though it is hoped that they will take place towards the end of the current month.

The solution found, which is widely attributed to British action, has the full support of the Moslems, who are flattered at the manner in which they were consulted by His Majesty's Minister, and of a large section of the Christians, notably the Constitutional party. Tawfiq Awad, who visited the Maronite Patriarch on the 1st August accompanied by Abdullah Beyhum, reported on his return that he had persuaded the Patriarch to accept the situation with comparatively good grace. Only Emile Eddé and his immediate followers, all violent partisans of a Christian-controlled Lebanon, are dissatisfied and critical. The population as a whole, weary of these long drawn-out discussions over elections for which they have no great enthusiasm, seem inclined to accept the solution without further discussion and to regard the whole matters as now past history.

[E 4779/27/89]

No. 72.

*Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 71—Syria and the Lebanon—11th August, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office, 23rd August.)*

#### General.

POLITICAL activity in Syria is centred round the formation of the new Government and the election of the President of the Republic. So far there are no clear indications as to the composition of the Government or the choice of a President. Hashim Bek Atassi, the last elected President, is under a cloud for his pre-election negotiations with the French. Moreover, it is felt by many that present conditions require the presence at the helm of a firmer hand, and there are legal doubts regarding his eligibility. One view is that when the Constitution was suspended in 1939 Hashim Bek's functions were usurped, and that he remained President *de jure* until his five years' term of office expired in December 1941. On the other hand, those who wish for his return claim that his presidency has been in suspense since 1939, and that he is entitled to resume office for the two and a half years required to complete his term. He himself does not appear to have a clear opinion of his position, since on the one hand he recently accepted a pension as an ex-President from the Jamil Ulshi Government, and yet is said to have declared that he refused to stand for election because he considered himself to be the real President of the Republic and therefore ineligible.

As a result of this uncertainty, the eyes of many are turning towards Shukri Quwatli, who has been putting out discreet feelers in various directions. On the 6th August he gave a banquet to the Deputies from the Jebel Druze, mostly of the Atrash family, whose attitude he is anxious to sound; and on the same day he sent Lutfi Haffar and Fares Khouri to Homs to seek the views of Hashim Bek Atassi, who is reported to have replied that he would be ruled by the desires of his friends. It seems probable therefore that Shukri's attitude will be determined by that of Hashim Bek, as he is unlikely to put forward his candidacy unless he is certain of the result.

It is also thought possible that Ata Bey Ayoubi, the head of the Provisional Government, may stand, with French support; but his only chance of election would be if Shukri Quwatli and Hashim Bek Atassi were unable to agree. The election will take place on the 17th August at the first session of the new Parliament.

As expected, the passions roused in the recent Christian-Moslem controversy regarding the number and distribution of seats in the future Lebanese Chamber subsided as soon as it was understood that the solution found had been imposed by concerted action between the British and French authorities. The press on the 4th August published an exchange of letters between the head of the State and the Maronite Patriarch in which the latter gave his blessing to the electoral

arrangements made, thus showing that one of the most important causes of irritation had been removed. The various politicians at once turned their attention to the composition of electoral lists, and electioneering activities have been hastened by the publication on the 5th August of a decree announcing that the elections will be held on the 29th August—about a month earlier than the date originally fixed by Dr. Ayoub Tabet.

The news of Allied military successes, and the general expectation that Italy will soon be out of the war, has led to a sharp fall in wholesale prices, though retail prices are still slow in following. The gold pound has now fallen to £Syr. 37.

#### Syria—Damascus.

The new Parliament will be officially opened on the 17th August, when it will proceed with the election of parliamentary officials, the establishment of the validity of the elections, and the election of a President of the Republic (see under "General" above).

Shops were closed on the 2nd and 3rd August, when the Government again attempted to enforce the payment of income tax (see Summaries Nos. 54, 58 and 62). After compelling a Christian merchant to pay a contribution of £Syr. 5,000 by threatening to impound his goods, the Government tried to adopt the same measure with a Moslem merchant, whereupon his fellow merchants closed in sympathy and sent deputations to the Serail. The Government's attitude in the matter is not yet known, but it is feared that the strike may intimidate them into abandoning the collection of the tax, which is urgently needed by the Syrian Treasury.

#### The Lebanon.

The unity which was shown by the Lebanese Moslems during the recent crisis is now being somewhat threatened by the electoral rivalries of the principal members, but it has so far held together sufficiently to take concerted action in two important matters in which Moslem interests are involved.

The first of these was the resignation on the 5th August of the Moslem member of the interim Government, Abdullah Beyhum, on the grounds that he could no longer suffer the constant interference of the head of the State and of certain French officials in minor administrative matters. The Congress at once asked him not to resign and assured him of their full support; they also protested in writing to the Délégué Général against the alleged interferences. Both the head of the State and the French authorities also begged Abdullah Beyhum to withdraw his resignation, which he eventually agreed to do.

The other and more important question concerns the situation in Tripoli. Here the followers of Rashid Mokaddem have during the past week indulged in a series of aggressions against the followers of Abdul Hamid Kerami, and on the 5th August a serious riot ensued in which two persons lost their lives. The local police, gendarmerie and gardes mobiles, on the pretext of maintaining order, showed a wholly unjustifiable bias in favour of the Mokaddem faction, the aggressors from which remained unpunished whilst Kerami and his partisans were searched, interrogated and otherwise molested. The object was clearly two-fold: to convince the population that the Mokaddems, despite the house arrest, and the uncertainty of the future deportation of their leader, were still the most important electoral force, and also to give the impression that the disturbances merely resulted from the rivalry of two leaders so that the removal of both from the electoral arena could be put forward as a justifiable solution. At the same time Abdul Hamid Kerami was approached by the French with an offer of compromise under which the opposition to his candidature would be withdrawn if he accepted to take certain French nominees, including a Mokaddem, on his electoral list and would agree to drop Hamid Frangieh. Kerami appears to have declared his refusal to accept such a bargain under duress, and the Moslem Council in Beirut informed the French authorities that, if the conseiller were not withdrawn during the electoral period, they could not answer for the consequences.

In the meantime the British authorities, in order to obviate the risk of serious breaches of peace, induced M. Helleu to accept the participation of British personnel in the surveillance of Rashid Mokaddem (thus converting it from a farce into a reality), and also to agree to the immediate arrest of Rashid's eldest son. It has also been confirmed in writing that Rashid will be handed over to the British authorities for deportation immediately after the elections.



In other Lebanese provinces the formation of electoral lists will be completed this week. In Mount Lebanon there will be a straight fight between the lists headed by those inveterate rivals, Emile Eddé and Béchara el Khoury, with the odds at present on the latter. In South Lebanon the main fight will be between the rival lists of the two strong Shia candidates, Ahmed el Assad and Adel Osseyran, the former of whom is being actively backed by the conseiller at Sidon and who in any case has a better chance. In Beirut and in the Bekaa there will probably be only one list.

A series of disturbances, one of them serious, have taken place in Zahlé, ostensibly at least in connexion with the method of assessing crops employed by the O.C.P. An enquiry has been promised.

[E 4999/27/89]

No. 73.

*Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received 24th August.)*

(No. 46.)

Sir,

Beirut, 7th August, 1943.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 430 of the 28th July regarding the holding of secondary elections in Syria, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a list (¹) of the successful candidates according to the districts which they will represent in the new Chamber of Deputies.

2. The second degree elections on the 26th July passed off in an atmosphere of calm throughout the whole country, and so far no serious incidents have been reported from any locality, the rumour of one death in Homs not having so far been confirmed. The usual charges of discrimination and interference have been made by numbers of unsuccessful candidates, and a few complaints have already been heard, but in point of fact preliminary reports suggest that there has been remarkably little interference either by the French or the Syrian Government themselves. Shukri Quwatli has himself assured me that the elections were, on the whole, carried out fairly. They were the best in this respect ever held in Syria.

3. The results of the first count, announced on the 27th July, show an overwhelming majority in favour of the Nationalist *Bloc* candidates headed by Shukri Quwatli. In Damascus his list was returned complete. It contained, in addition to Shukri Quwatli himself (who gained 628 out of 719 valid votes cast in Damascus), Jamil Mardam and Shukri's two henchmen, Lutfi Haffar and Sabri Assali among the Moslem members, and, among the Christians, Fares Khoury, former president of the Syrian Chamber of Deputies (and, incidentally, a dragoman at the Damascus consulate from 1899 to 1909), for the otherwise unrepresented minorities, and Naim Antaki, the young and energetic Minister for Foreign Affairs in Ata Ayoubi's Government, representing the Greek Orthodox community. It is an indication of the measure of Shukri Quwatli's success that the Opposition's strongest candidate, Dr. Samy Kabbara, the publisher of *el-Kabbara*, the Shabbandarist party newspaper, only gained 386 votes. It is also of interest to record, in view of the persistent reports of the spread of communism in the Levant States, and in Syria in particular, that Khaled Bagdash, the leader of the local Communists, polled a mere 130 votes.

4. In the provincial towns the results show the same preponderance in favour of the Nationalists. In Hama the stand put up by a small number of independent Nationalists, not on the official list, was negligible, and the official list was consequently returned virtually unopposed: in Lattakia and in Homs the Nationalists also swept the board. Hashim Atassi, formerly President of the Republic, did not stand for Homs, and it now seems fairly well established that he has been completely discredited as a result of having given General Catroux an undertaking to conclude a treaty with France if he returned to power. Both his sons, Adnan and Hebni Atassi, were, however, elected. In Aleppo, Saadallah Jabri, Shukri Quwatli's chief representative in North Syria, scored heavily over his competitors, and out of sixteen places, gained ten outright, with a very mediocre team. As four Moslem and two Christian seats did not receive the requisite number of votes, a second ballot was held on the 29th July, as a result of which Saadallah Jabri secured a further two seats, and Dr. Kayafi, the head of the Opposition, was elected.

(¹) Not printed.

5. In the tribal districts the feudal chiefs have, as was to be expected, been chosen. It will be seen, for instance, that the Emir Fawwaz ash-Shalan, a brother-in-law of Ibn Saud, will represent the Damascus district: and that Soueida has returned two members of the Atrash family. It is reported from the Jezireh by the political officer at Deir ez Zor, that the candidates who were reputed to have French support have all failed to secure election. On the Alaouite territory, Suleiman Murshid, the notorious gangster and tribal "god" has contrived to have himself elected. Although he is in every way quite unworthy to sit in the Chamber of Deputies there is not sufficient objection to him on the score of military security to warrant representations on that score, and, in any case, I consider that he will cause less trouble if he comes to Damascus to occupy his seat in the Chamber of Deputies than by remaining in the Alaouite territory. I do not, therefore, propose to make representations either to the French or the Syrian Government themselves.

6. The second count of the votes took place on the 29th July but it did not make any appreciable difference to the results.

7. The elections have, in short, shown overwhelming proof of the preponderance of pro-Nationalist feeling in Syria, and I anticipate that Shukri Quwatli will have something approaching an 80 per cent. majority in the new Chamber. Though this need cause no surprise, for signs were not wanting that the trend of articulate public opinion was moving in the Nationalist direction, I attribute their success in the election, specifically, firstly, to their vastly superior organisation (including greater party funds) secondly, to the common belief which was possibly spread by members of the party themselves that they enjoyed the blessing of the French (who, although disliked, have to be placated) and the British, and thirdly, to the undoubted personal prestige which Shukri Quwatli himself enjoys.

8. While there can be no doubt that the Nationalists commanded the greatest following in Syria I, nevertheless, feel that the great majority of votes they secured does not in fact adequately reflect public opinion. Popular interest in the elections was at no stage very considerable, and only some 30 per cent. of the electorate, for instance, voted at the primary elections in Damascus and Aleppo, and even less in the outlying districts. Even if they had all voted the result, however, due to the disadvantages of the two degree election system, would still have been unsatisfactory. In Damascus, for instance, the scaling down of the total number of voters from 8,000 to 830 naturally reduced to practical proportions the number of people who had to be squared, and this practice is made more feasible by the fact that many of the secondary electors are barely literate and are, moreover, unacquainted either with the names or the personalities of the candidates from whom they are called upon to choose.

9. Nevertheless, as far as the actual conduct of the elections is concerned, I am agreeably astonished by the general atmosphere of calm and impartiality in which the elections took place, and by the comparatively small number of complaints and petitions which have been addressed to the Central Government on the score of interference. This satisfactory result is certainly due, in the opinion of all impartial observers, to the fact that the British authorities had let it be known that they desired that the elections be as impartial as possible, to the considerable number of British officers in the country and to the knowledge that the elections were being closely watched by the other Arab countries as well as by the local representatives of the United Nations.

10. While there is no doubt that money passed freely between electors and elected, more notably in Christian circles, and that promises to gratify interested parties were probably still more current, this must be regarded as the normal practice in the Levant States, and it remains true that the Syrian Government have, in fact, overcome the many problems which confronted them with considerable credit to themselves and an unexpected degree of success.

I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister of State, Cairo, Resident Minister, Algiers, High Commissioner, Jerusalem, His Majesty's Ambassador, Cairo, His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad, and His Majesty's Minister, Jedda.

I have, &amp;c.

E. L. SPEARS.



*Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received 26th August.)*

(No. 48.)

Sir,

Beirut, 12th August, 1943.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on leading personalities in the Lebanon.

2. In former years notes on leading personalities in both Syria and the Lebanon, and on French officials in the Levant States, were combined in a single report. Now that these States have acquired a measure of independence, I consider it appropriate to submit a separate report on each, and to suppress the section dealing with French officials.

3. The records contained in the last report, which was compiled in 1939, have been rewritten and expanded to such an extent that it has been found simpler to create a new series rather than attempt to insert emendations on the printed copy. Although it is extremely difficult in this country to cover in a report of reasonable length all the personalities who are likely to play a part in public life, I consider that the present series should provide adequate information for present needs as well as a basis for future reports.

4. For the compilation of these notes I am indebted to His Majesty's Consul-General at Beirut.

I have, &c.

E. L. SPEARS.

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1. *Khaled Abdel Khader.*—A Sunni Moslem landowner and one of the leading Beys of the Akkar (North Lebanon); born 1896. Ex-Deputy and a supporter of Emile Eddé. Is actively engaged in smuggling and is on very friendly terms with Rashid Mokaddem (No. 54).

2. *Aboud Bey Abdel Rezzek.*—A Sunni Moslem, born 1891. The principal Bey of the Akkar (North Lebanon) and the largest landowner in the Lebanon. A former Deputy and a supporter of Béchara el Khoury. A sly and crafty individual, whose sole interest is personal gain. Very influential in his district; also supports Abdul Hamid Kerami (No. 43), chiefly because the latter is an enemy of his rival, Khaled Abdel Khader (No. 1).

3. *Me. Habib Abi-Chahla.*—A Greek Orthodox lawyer of Beirut, born 1903. Holds the Paris degree of Doctor of Law. Several times a Minister. Is Emile Eddé's most prominent supporter in local politics, but, unlike him, has pan-Arab leanings. Able, but intriguing and insincere.

4. *Me. Joseph Abou Khater.*—A Greek Catholic lawyer of Zahlé, born about 1905. Studied law in France. A leader of the anti-Skaf faction in Zahlé. Is extremely intelligent and ambitious and may have a political future if he becomes less mean and more accessible.

5. *Me. Roukos Abou-Nader.*—A Maronite lawyer of Beskinta, born 1883. Several times a Deputy and twice a Minister; supports Emile Eddé. Influential in the Metn district, but somewhat discredited on account of his exceptionally low morality.

6. *Mgr. Antoine Pierre Arida.*—Maronite Patriarch; born 1863; from Becharré (North Lebanon). Appointed Archbishop of Tripoli in 1908 and Patriarch in 1932. An ill-balanced, obstinate and avaricious old man whose only aim is to enhance his own political importance and his community's position; is inconsistent and always influenced by the last person he has seen. Quarrelled with the French High Commissioner in 1935 over the tobacco monopoly, and with General Catroux in 1941 over the choice of Lebanese President; is consequently less well-disposed than his predecessors to the French and would support any foreign Power prepared to pay his price. By tradition the leading religious personality in the Lebanon, but his prestige has diminished of late years.

7. *Amir Majid Arslan.*—A Druze from Shwaifat, born about 1908. Ex-Minister; a member of Béchara el Khoury's Constitutional party. The most influential of the Lebanese Druzes on account of his family name. Unlike most Arslans, has never been pro-Axis. Well-meaning but unintelligent.

8. *Amir Rafik Arslan* (cousin of No. 7).—A Druze, born about 1898. A Director in the Lebanese Administration and many times a Deputy. Intelligent, but at present lying low.

9. *Ahmed el Assad.*—A Shia Moslem from Taibé (South Lebanon), born 1905. A feudal chieftain whose influence is paramount in the Jebel Amil. Dishonest, unreliable and quite unprincipled; suspected of promoting smuggling over the Palestine frontier. Was a Minister in the first "independent" Lebanese Government in 1941-42, but was displaced when it fell in July 1942 owing to British objections. Has since been wooed by the French, but would still prefer to play with the British if given any encouragement.

10. *Me. Taufiq (Toto) Awad.*—A Maronite lawyer of Hasroun, born 1908. Belongs to an influential family of North Lebanon and is a relation of the Maronite Patriarch, to whom he acts as legal adviser and land broker. Contrived by doubtful methods to become a Deputy in the 1937 Chamber. By constant intrigue succeeded in 1942 in securing a reconciliation between the Maronite Patriarch and both General Catroux and President Naccache. Was appointed Assistant Secretary of State in the interim Lebanese Government in July 1943. A professional go-between, who is universally disliked and despised for his dishonesty and mendacity.

11. *Me. Ibrahim Azar.*—A Maronite lawyer of Sidon, born 1906. A member of the Constitutional party and a former Deputy. Not over-intelligent and very cautious, but sound and reliable. Opposed by the French for his pro-British tendencies.

12. *Amir Khalil Bellama.*—A Maronite from Bikfaya, born about 1888; belongs to a well-known family. For many years practised as a lawyer in Cairo. Twice a Minister. Exceptionally stupid and rather a laughing-stock.



13. *Dr. Raif Bellama*.—A Maronite bacteriologist of Beirut, born 1897. Is a professor at the American University of Beirut. Has so far taken no part in political life but has political ambitions. Has strong pan-Arab leanings. Honest, intelligent, and a good orator, but not an outstanding personality.
14. *Abdullah Beyhum*.—A Sunni Moslem from Beirut, born about 1873. Was Secretary of State in 1934, in 1939-41, and in the interim Lebanese Government appointed in July 1943. Honest but colourless and past his prime.
15. *Amin Beyhum*.—A Sunni Moslem landowner of Beirut, born 1907. Has not so far held office, but is considered one of the most prominent younger Moslems, and is likely to emerge as a political figure. Is nationalist and anti-French in his views.
16. *Mohammed Ali Beyhum* (brother of No. 17).—A Sunni Moslem of Beirut, born 1889. Prominent in Moslem political circles, but has never been a Deputy. Well-meaning and pleasant but ineffective.
17. *Omar Beyhum*.—A Sunni Moslem proprietor of Beirut, born 1881. A former Deputy. Has great influence in Beirut Moslem circles, particularly over the Najjade party, in whose formation he played a large part, and by whom he is constantly consulted. Brusque and uneducated, but honest and consistent in his Nationalist views.
18. *Salah Beyhum*.—A Sunni Moslem of Beirut, born 1895. Has so far held no office, but is prominent in Moslem circles. Professes pan-Arab ideas and is anti-French. Honest and principled but not very bright.
19. *Me. Jawad Boulos*.—A Maronite solicitor of Tripoli, born 1900. Ex-Deputy; was Minister for Foreign Affairs in the provisional Lebanese Government of March 1943, but was eliminated with it in July. A servile tool of the French, to whose support he owes his position. Supports Emile Eddé's party.
20. *Me. Philippe Negib Boulos*.—A Greek Orthodox lawyer from Koura (N. Lebanon), born 1902. Has held various magisterial offices. In 1941 was appointed by the Vichy authorities a member of President Naccache's administration, and held office in the first two "independent" Lebanese Governments, in the second of which he was Minister for Foreign Affairs. Weak and ineffective, but honest and likeable.
21. *Me. Camille Chamoun*.—A Maronite lawyer from Deir el Kamar, born 1901. Once a Minister; a prominent member of the Constitutional party. Strongly pro-British and for this reason viewed with suspicion by the French. Very influential in the Chouf district. Honest, able and extremely likeable.
22. *Amir Jemil Chehab*.—A Maronite from Beirut, born 1898. Belongs to the Christian branch of a leading Lebanese family. Was Director of Finance from 1931 to 1941; has since held important posts in the Supply Department. A hard-working and conscientious but exceedingly obstinate and narrow-minded official, who periodically quarrels with his superiors.
23. *Amir Khaled Chehab*.—A Sunni Moslem from Hasbaya, born 1891. Belongs to the Moslem branch of the Chehab family and is very prominent in South Lebanon. Has been Prime Minister and President of the Chamber; was a member of Dr. Ayoub Tabet's interim Government appointed in March 1943. Inclines to the Constitutional party. Honest and respected, but weak and easily led.
24. *Michel Chiha*.—A Roman Catholic banker of Beirut, born 1893. A member of the Board of Administration of the Banque de Syrie. Was Deputy in 1926, at which time he assisted in the drafting of the Lebanese Constitution. A supporter and adviser of the Constitutional party. Advocates a Christian Lebanon protected against Moslem and Jewish domination. A shrewd and cautious financier, who is highly respected.
25. *Ahmed Daouk* (brother of No. 26).—A Sunni Moslem of Beirut, born 1889. After many years in the Beirut Municipality was appointed Secretary of State in the Administration appointed by the Vichy authorities in 1941. Became Prime Minister of the first "independent" Lebanese Government in December 1941, but resigned in July 1942. While in office proved himself incompetent and servile and has lost much of his influence in Moslem circles.

26. *Omar Daouk*.—A Sunni Moslem of Beirut, born 1865. President of the Chamber of Commerce and a highly respected proprietor who is prominent in Moslem charitable activities. Ex-Senator; nowadays takes no active part in politics but is often consulted, and has much influence. Honest and shrewd.
27. *Badr Dimishkieh*.—A Sunni Moslem of Beirut, born 1878. Has been president of Beirut municipality. Has relations with Palestine Jews through his son-in-law, who is a merchant of Jaffa. Venal and a hypocrite.
28. *Me. Emile Eddé*.—A Maronite lawyer of Beirut, born 1888. President of the Republic from 1936 to 1941; has also had much ministerial experience. Leader of the principal Lebanese party and a fanatical exponent of the concept of an independent Lebanon separate from the Arab world. Was a member of the Lebanese deputation to Paris in 1919 to ask for a French mandate, and has always had close relations with the French authorities, who regard him as their chief Lebanese supporter, but would support any Power whose policy furthered his designs. Very intelligent and persuasive, but is impulsive, lacks judgment, and is none too scrupulous in his methods of enlisting support.
29. *Nassouh el Fadel*.—A Sunni Moslem, born 1883. A landowner of the Danieh district (N. Lebanon), where his influence is predominant, and an associate of Rashid Mokaddem (No. 54). Has been a Deputy; supporting Emile Eddé.
30. *Dr. Samih Fakhoury*.—A Sunni Moslem of Beirut, born 1881. Ex-Deputy. Inconsistent in his political allegiances. A relative of the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, who stayed with him on his flight from Palestine, but is not unfavourable to the Allied cause.
31. *Me. Hamid Frangieh*.—A Maronite lawyer from Zghorta, born 1905. Was Minister for Foreign Affairs in the first "independent" Lebanese Government of 1941-42 and had previously held ministerial posts. His attempts to promote Lebanese independence and his close collaboration with the British rendered him *persona non grata* to the French. The most prominent Christian politician in North Lebanon; in general agreement with the Constitutional party. Intelligent, honest and able, though not always sound in judgment; well qualified to become a political force in the future if not kept down by French opposition.
32. *Pierre Gemayel*.—A Maronite from Bikfaya, born about 1909. Leader of the Phalange party and affects extreme Lebanese Nationalist and pro-Christian views. Although subject to Jesuit influence, is nowadays strongly critical of the French. A hot-headed and rather unbalanced demagogue, whose influence outside his followers is limited.
33. *Nasri Haddad*.—A Roman Catholic of Beirut, born 1898. Served for many years in the Finance Department of the French High Commission. In 1941 was appointed Director of Finance in the Lebanese Government, which post he still holds. Honest and capable, but wholly under French influence.
34. *Ibrahim Haidar*.—A Shia Moslem from Labwé (Bekaa), born 1888. Several times minister; his last such post, in 1937, terminated owing to his alleged connexion with a hashish racket. A leading member of one of the two principal Shia families of the Bekaa. Shrewd, but shifty and dishonest.
35. *Subhi Haidar* (cousin of No. 34).—A Shia Moslem from Labwé (Bekaa), born 1893. A director in the present Lebanese Administration. Unintelligent and not over-honest.
36. *George Haimari*.—A Maronite from Beirut, born 1898. Chief of the President's Secretariat, which post he has held since 1920. A partisan of Emile Eddé, but is an adept at trimming his sails and does his best to serve successive masters faithfully. His political influence varies according to the personality of the President.
37. *Sheikh Husain Hamadi*.—Grand Druze Sheikh-ul-Akl. Born about 1868; from Baakline (Mount Lebanon). Was given this title after the first World War by the French authorities, who used him to demonstrate Druze attachment to France. Very venal and not respected by his community. His two sons were both dismissed from judicial posts for accepting bribes; the elder then went to Italy and was for some time employed by the Bari Broadcasting Station. The father was in close touch with the Italian Armistice Commission, but nowadays professes pro-Allied sentiments.



38. *Sabri Hamadi*.—A Shia Moslem proprietor of Hermel (Bekaa), born about 1903. Is head of the most prominent Bekaa family and claims 60,000 adherents, but has strong rivals in the family. Was elected Deputy at an early age and was a minister in 1938. Has little education and is wholly unprincipled, but has always been pandered to by French and Lebanese authorities on account of his nuisance value in the remote North Bekaa region, and is consequently arrogant.

39. *Sayed Ahmed el Husseini*.—A Shia Moslem from Akoura (Bekaa), born 1888. Has several times been minister but has usually resigned on personal grounds after a short time in office. An honest, old-school official, influential in Shia circles and generally respected, but uneducated and muddle-headed.

40. *Sheikh Sayed Istefhan* (brother of No. 41).—Maronite, born 1892. Owes his position to his brother's influence. A close friend of Emile Eddé's, and is on good terms with Abdul Hamid Kerami (No. 43). Influential in Maronite circles in North Lebanon.

41. *Sheikh Yusef Istefhan*.—A Maronite of Kafar Saghab (N. Lebanon), born 1886. Was once a minister and a supporter of Emile Eddé, but is nowadays associated with Hamid Frangieh (No. 31). Very influential in his district; once successfully toured Australia, where many of his family are settled. Moderate in all ways.

42. *Joseph Karam*.—A Maronite of Zgorta (N. Lebanon), born 1891. A rather weak character who is overshadowed by Hamid Frangieh and Jawad Boulos, both of the same district. Pro-French and a supporter of Emile Eddé.

43. *Abdul Hamid Kerami*.—A Sunni Moslem of Tripoli, born 1891. At one time Mufti of Tripoli, but was dismissed by the French in 1920 on account of his hostile attitude towards the French Mandate. Aims at creating a confederation of free Arab States in the Near East. Strongly opposed to the separation of the Lebanon, particularly the Tripoli district, from Syria. Was a close friend of Haj Amin Hussaini but, unlike some members of his family, is not pro-Axis; dislikes the French, but is nowadays by way of becoming pro-British. Refused in the past to recognise any Lebanese Government, but is now a candidate in association with Hamid Frangieh (No. 31). Has no party connexions, but inclines to Béchara el Khoury, who defended him in 1936, when he shot and killed a member of the Mokaddem family, his chief rivals. Well educated and intelligent. Has a large following and can count on the support of the vast majority of Moslems in Tripoli on any major issue, such as pan-Arabism or the demand for union with Syria. Is wealthy and possesses much property.

44. *Rafaat Kazaoun*.—A Sunni Moslem of Qabb Elias (Bekaa), born about 1908. Suspected of Axis sentiments, but probably merely ambitious and fanatical.

45. *Gabriel Khabbaz*.—A Greek Catholic of Beirut, born 1900. Proprietor of *L'Orient*, the French-subsidised Beirut newspaper. Ex-Minister; a close follower of Emile Eddé. Has recently modified his former strong support of the French. A fanatical and somewhat ill-balanced exponent of the concept of an independent Christian Lebanon. An inveterate gambler and venal.

46. *Sheikh Muhammed Taufiq Khalid*.—Sunni Mufti of the Lebanese Republic. Born about 1878; from Beirut. Became anti-British over the Zionist question in Palestine and earlier in the war was strongly pro-Axis; had numerous contacts with the German and Italian Armistice Commissions. Nowadays, like many Moslems, has much modified his views with an Allied victory in sight. Formerly considered not sufficiently energetic in defence of Moslem interests and consequently not highly thought of by his community, but enhanced his prestige in the summer of 1943 by his advocacy of the Moslem case on an electoral issue.

47. *Sheikh Farid el Khazen*.—A Maronite landowner of Jounieh, born 1895. A smuggler in his younger days, but nowadays respectable. Ex-deputy. A member of the Constitutional party and influential in the Kesrouan district. Shrewd and amusing but uneducated and unscrupulous.

48. *Michel Khattar*.—A Greek Catholic manufacturer from Deir el Kamar, born 1889. President of the Silk-Growers' and Industrialists' Associations. Has held no office but has much political sense, which causes him often to be consulted by Ministers in office. Strongly pro-British and has co-operated well with us. Very likeable, with an unusually strong and independent character.

49. *Sheikh Béchara el Khoury*.—A Maronite lawyer from Beirut, born 1891. A bitter rival of Emile Eddé for the Presidency, for which he was beaten by Eddé in 1935; has been several times Prime Minister. Leads the second most important political party. Is a good lawyer, but as a politician is unreliable and hesitant. Professes pro-British sentiments but is sycophantic by nature and would support anyone who furthered his presidential ambitions, by which he is wholly dominated.

50. *Kabalan Issa Khoury*.—A Maronite proprietor of Ainata (Bekaa), born 1915. Is a nephew of the Maronite Patriarch, whose influence he uses freely. Resides in Beirut. Used to grow much hashish on his properties. An active and ambitious young man, but wholly unprincipled.

51. *Monseigneur Youssef Malouf*.—Greek Catholic Archbishop of Baalbeck and Haifa, born about 1898. Was appointed by Rome. Very intelligent and ambitious; aims at becoming the next Greek Catholic Patriarch. Loses no opportunity of flattering British and French authorities in turn.

52. *Khalil Matouk*.—A Greek Catholic from Damascus, born 1885. Said to have acquired his considerable fortune through embezzling that of Teymourache, former Persian Minister of Court, when the latter was imprisoned and entrusted it to him to bring out of Persia. Poses as pro-British and was for a short time deported to France by the Vichy authorities in 1941. Holds views on Near Eastern politics but is not taken seriously.

53. *Jamil Mikkawi*.—A Sunni Moslem lawyer of Beirut, born 1911. Was leader of the Najjadé party, in which capacity he had a certain nuisance value, until July 1943, when his failure to conform to the attitude of the Moslem leaders on the electoral issue lost him most of his popularity and the majority of the party seceded to a rival leader. A pretentious young coxcomb, who is not unintelligent but lacks stability. Married to a Frenchwoman, and nowadays has certain French connexions, but remains fundamentally opposed to any foreign influence.

54. *Rashid Mokaddem*.—A Sunni Moslem of Alma (near Tripoli), born 1890. Leader of the anti-Kerami faction in Tripoli, ex-deputy and member of Emile Eddé's party. A gangster who has gained considerable wealth and notoriety through his smuggling activities, which the French have made no attempt to suppress. He has always received their support in order to counteract Kerami's influence. Is illiterate, ruthless and wields much power especially amongst the Moslem lower classes. Arrested by the British military authorities in June 1943 for having suborned British soldiers in connexion with his smuggling activities and, although released at French instance, is to be deported after elections.

55. *Monseigneur Ignace Moubarak*.—Maronite Archbishop of Beirut. Born 1876, from Rachmaya (Mount Lebanon). Studied in Rome; appointed to his present see in 1919. Impulsive, courageous and somewhat quarrelsome when thwarted; is critical of his Patriarch, with whom he is on indifferent terms, and has not hesitated on occasions publicly to attack the French authorities, usually for not accepting his suggestions in political matters. While determined to further his community's interests, is more practical and realist than most local prelates in his political outlook. Has made approaches to the British but will support any authorities who will favour his community.

56. *Me, Alfred Naccache*.—A Maronite of Beirut, born 1889. An unsuccessful lawyer, who has held magisterial posts since 1925 and was President of the Court of Appeal. Was unexpectedly nominated head of the Lebanese Administration by the Vichy authorities in 1941, having held no previous administrative post. Continued in office after the Allied occupation and was nominated President of the Republic by General Catroux in November 1941. Much under Jesuit influence, and widely unpopular. Very honest, but impulsive, volatile, and incapable. Accepted dismissal by General Catroux in March 1943, after a last-minute attempt to retain his position by invoking the "independence" of the Lebanon, and has been relegated to the political scrap-heap.

57. *Gibran Nahas*.—A Greek Orthodox of Tripoli, born 1891. Was formerly Mohafez of North Lebanon and is a prominent figure in that district. Ex-Deputy. Under French influence and of mediocre intelligence.



58. *Me. Moussa Nammour*.—A Maronite lawyer from Muallaka (Bekaa), born 1883. Minister of the Interior in the second "independent" Lebanese Government; has held many previous Ministerial posts. A shrewd and highly experienced administrator who skilfully contrives to keep a foot in all camps without owing allegiance to any party; influential in the Bekaa and generally respected, though not over-honest.

59. *Alfred Nasser*.—A Greek Catholic merchant and insurance agent of Beirut, born 1878. President of the Merchants' Association. So far has taken no part in political life, but has political ambitions. A typical shrewd, grasping, short-sighted Beirut merchant.

60. *Monseigneur Nifon Saba*.—Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Zahlé, born about 1888. Average intelligence. Much beloved by his community; poor. A good man and pro-British; hence dislike by the French.

61. *Muhieddin Nsouli*.—A Sunni Moslem journalist and merchant of Beirut, born 1900. Proprietor of the newspaper *Beirut*. Ex-Deputy. During the 1928 Palestine troubles wrote violent anti-British articles and in 1941 was interned as an Axis sympathiser, but while interned wrote strongly pro-Allied articles and since his release has continued to collaborate effectively.

62. *Izzedin Omari*.—A Sunni Moslem of Iraqi origin, born about 1887. Was for several years a judge and has been governor of various districts. Was Chief of Police from 1935 to 1937, when he was retired as a result of a scandal; was reinstated in the same position in 1942. Active and a disciplinarian, but venal and subservient; consequently not respected.

63. *Henri Pharaon*.—A Greek Catholic banker of Beirut, born 1902. Socially prominent and a leading racehorse owner. Popular amongst the middle and lower classes, especially Moslems, and is a promoter of the Najjadé party; also believed to finance the Constitutional party. Ostentatiously generous and hospitable.

64. *Dr. Moustafa Rifai*.—A Sunni Moslem of Baalbeck, born about 1895. A well-educated and strict Moslem of an old Syrian family, descendants of the Prophet. Kind, simple-hearted, and much respected. Formerly reputed to be pro-German, but his views have changed and in 1942 he gave two talks on the Jaffa radio comparing the democracies to Islam. His political tendency is towards Damascus and the National Bloc.

65. *Amin Saad*.—A Maronite of Ain Traz, born 1898. Nephew of a former President, by virtue of which relationship he became a Minister in the first "independent" Lebanese Government, but proved a complete failure and is unlikely to hold further office. A foolish and negligible character.

66. *Me. George Sabbagha*.—A Greek Orthodox lawyer and journalist of Beirut, born 1893. Proprietor of the Arabic newspaper *Saut ul Ahrar*. A mediocre journalist. Has close relations with the Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Beirut.

67. *Ali Salam*.—A Sunni Moslem proprietor of Beirut, born 1897. The eldest of the eight sons of the late Salim Salam, a follower of King Feisal; professes pan-Arab and pro-British ideas and has some influence. A bumptious and rather tiresome person, who has, however, never wavered in his support for the British cause.

68. *Saib Salam*.—A younger brother of No. 67, less forceful but more reasonable. Is a candidate for the Chamber.

69. *Joseph Salem*.—A Greek Catholic of Tyre, born 1895. Manager of the Beirut Water Company. Ex-Deputy. Has considerable political influence in South Lebanon. Has Nationalist leanings and keeps on good terms with the Moslems, but belongs to no party. Honest and intelligent, with an unusually well-balanced and far-sighted outlook, but not over-courageous.

70. *Mgr. Elie Saliby*.—Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Beirut. Born 1876, of Souk-el-Gharb. Appointed Archbishop in 1935 on the death of his predecessor, to whom he had been assistant. Opportunist, and is considered dishonest in his handling of the large Wakf funds of his community, by a large section of which he is distrusted and criticised. Professes staunch friendship for Great Britain.

71. *Ramez Sarkis*.—A Protestant journalist of Beirut, born 1891. Owner of the Beirut newspaper *Lisan ul Hal*. Was Minister of Education in the first

"independent" Lebanese Government, but proved exceptionally incompetent and is unlikely to hold further office. Professes pro-British sentiments, having had an Anglo-Saxon education, but is a colourless personality who carries no weight.

72. *Mgr. Maximos Sayegh*.—Greek Catholic Archbishop of Beirut. Born 1878, from Aleppo. Was appointed Archbishop of Tyre in 1919 and of Beirut in 1933. Is well liked by his community, to whom he devotes himself. Has a tendency to mix in politics, in which he has not always shown sound judgment. Is on the whole pro-French, but advocates an Anglo-French-American guarantee of an independent Lebanon.

73. *Seyyid Abdul Husain Sharafeddin*.—Chief of the Shia Ulema (Mujahiddin). Born about 1867; resides near Tyre, of which his son is Mufti. Was a student at Najaf. Strongly anti-Christian and Xenophobe; during the 1936-38 Palestine troubles preached the Jihad against the British, but likewise refused to support the Vichy authorities against the British in 1941 because no Moslem interest was involved. Tried to play off the British authorities against the French after the Allied occupation. Enjoys considerable prestige in Moslem religious circles and is an important personality in South Lebanon.

74. *Alfred Skaf*.—A Greek Catholic of Zahlé, born 1907. Member of a prominent Bekaa family. His appointment as Minister in the first "independent" Lebanese Government was his first introduction to public life; as Minister of Supply he tried hard, but found the problems involved too great for his mediocre intelligence and did not retain his office when the Government fell. A conscientious and likeable young man, but not over-scrupulous.

75. *Riad es Solh*.—A Sunni Moslem, born 1898. Belongs to an old and prominent Sidon family. His father held administrative office under the Turks, and Riad, though known as an adherent of the Arab cause, escaped internment during the First World War. During the mandatory period he extended his Arab contacts and visited Geneva with Sheikh Arslan; he refused all collaboration with the mandatory authorities and was exiled by them for two months in 1935. Nowadays enjoys a considerable reputation in pan-Arab circles and has great influence over the Moslems of Syria and the Lebanon; he has never held Government office and generally effaces himself, to emerge for brief periods as a Moslem leader at a crisis. Very intelligent, with an unusually wide and realistic outlook, but is unscrupulous and distrusted by most Christians on account of his so-called anti-Lebanese views. Is a candidate for the Chamber, but French hostility will always hinder his chances of office.

76. *Sami es Solh*.—A Sunni Moslem of Sidon, born 1891. Educated in Istanbul. In 1920 was an official of the Hejaz Railway. Subsequently entered the Lebanese magistrature and held several posts, including that of president of the Court of Cassation. His appointment as Prime Minister of the second "independent" Lebanese Government in July 1942 was his first introduction to political life. A well-meaning, impulsive but fundamentally foolish man whose extreme vanity makes him unreliable and a bad judge of character. On first appointment plunged into a variety of undigested schemes and defied the French, but was soon brought to heel. After his dismissal in March 1943 returned to his magisterial post.

77. *Dr. Ayoub Tabet*.—A Protestant of Beirut, born 1883. A doctor of medicine of the American University of Beirut, but does not practise. Lived in the United States before and during the First World War, during which he was an active French propagandist. Was a Minister in 1928 and Secretary of State in 1936. Was appointed provisional Head of State in March 1943 in order to arrange elections, but had to be dismissed in July for having exceeded his powers in initiating a series of ill-considered measures. A strong and excitable protagonist of the concept of an independent Christian Lebanon; obstinate, opinionated and full of muddle-headed good intentions. Enjoys a reputation for personal integrity which seems hardly merited. Pro-French.

78. *Emile Tabet*.—A Maronite proprietor of Beirut, born 1879. Brother of No. 80, but was long estranged from him. Has strong pro-British views, which he has expressed to any British official who would listen during the last twenty-five years. Ex-Deputy. Not nowadays taken seriously. Rich and avaricious, but good-hearted.



79. *Georges Tabet*.—A Maronite landowner of Beirut, born 1891. Several times a Minister and a candidate for the Presidency. President of the recently-formed Maronite Council and of the Maronite Charitable Association. Influential amongst middle and lower class Christians but notoriously untruthful and not trusted. Belongs to no party and tries to keep on terms with French and British.

80. *Jacques Tabet*.—A Maronite landowner of Beirut, born 1887. Very rich, and socially prominent; holds views on economic problems but plays no part in political life. Unpopular on account of his meanness but not ill-intentioned.

81. *Mr. Selim Tacla*.—A Greek Catholic lawyer of Zouk (Kesrouan), born 1897. Ex-Minister and has held many administrative posts. A leading member of the Constitutional Party. Regarded as outstandingly able in administration and is always in the running for Ministerial office. Honest and intelligent; keeps on good terms with both British and French authorities.

82. *Dr. Jamil Talhouk*.—A Druze landowner of Aley, born 1887. Ex-Deputy. Comes of a leading Druze family which has a traditional friendship with the British. Often considered for Ministerial office but never actually held one. Of mediocre intelligence, shrewd and obstinate.

83. *Sheikh Husain Talih*.—Druze Sheikh-ul-Akl. Born 1855; from Jdeideh-ech-Chouf (Mount Lebanon). Intelligent, honest, and has pro-British tendencies. Takes no part in politics.

84. *Cardinal Ignace Gabriel 1st Tappouni*.—Syrian Catholic Cardinal and Patriarch. Born 1879; from Mosul. Appointed Bishop of Srouj and Patriarchal Vicar-General at Mardine in 1913; Archbishop of Aleppo in 1921; elected Patriarch in 1929. Made Cardinal in 1933 at the instance of the French High Commissioner, who desired a counterpoise to the dictatorial pretensions of the Maronite Patriarch. Very pro-French and devoted to the Jesuits; detested by all Moslems, especially those of Syria, for his protection of the Christians in the Jezireh. Considered fanatical and venal.

85. *Salim Tayara*.—A Sunni Moslem proprietor of Beirut, born 1887. Ex-Mayor of Beirut and has held several Municipal posts. Has much influence amongst the Moslem middle classes. Honest but mediocre.

86. *Habib Trad*.—A Greek Orthodox banker and landowner of Beirut, born 1885. Has held no office but is a prominent social figure who wields some influence in political and commercial circles. Not over-intelligent.

87. *Mr. Pierre (Petro) Trad*.—A Greek Orthodox lawyer of Beirut, born 1873. Was for many years Speaker of the Lebanon Chamber. Appointed provisional Head of State in July 1943. Vain and of limited intelligence, but prides himself on keeping on good terms with all parties and communities and has the reputation of being skilful in settling disputes.

88. *Gibran Tuéni*.—A Greek Orthodox journalist of Beirut, born 1891. Owns *An-Nahar*, the leading Arabic daily, and is the best Lebanese journalist. Once a Minister. Formerly belonged to the Constitutional Party but now independent. An intelligent and outspoken critic with strong Nationalist ideas, who is therefore unpopular with the French.

89. *Mr. Adel Usseyran*.—A Shia Moslem proprietor and lawyer of Sidon, born 1903. Has not so far been in political life, but is regarded as one of the two strongest personalities of South Lebanon. Has relations with the Constitutional Party but does not belong to it. A strong Nationalist and very anti-French, but at present well-disposed to the British. A blunt and uncompromising lawyer who revels in political argument.

90. *Mr. Abdullah Yafi*.—A Sunni Moslem lawyer of Beirut, born 1899. The only prominent Moslem follower of Emile Eddé and therefore in the running for the Premiership, which he has once held. A colourless personality, unusually pro-French for a Moslem.

91. *Yusuf ez-Zain*.—A Shia Moslem from Nabatiyeh, born about 1873. Ex-Deputy; has some following in South Lebanon. Shifty and venal.

[E 4900/27/89]

No. 75.

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary, No. 72, Syria and the Lebanon, 18th August, 1943.—(Received 26th August.)*

(Secret.)

General.

THE new Syrian Parliament met for the first time on the 17th August and elected Shukri Quwatli as President of the Republic by 118 votes out of 120. Fares Khoury was elected President of the Chamber by 115 votes out of 120. This followed upon a week of intense activity in Damascus, Aleppo and Homs, during which Shukri Quwatli visited Hashim Bak Atassi, from whom, it is believed, he obtained a written declaration renouncing his claims to the presidency and giving his full support to Shukri. The opponents of the Nationalist bloc, apparently with French encouragement, have been canvassing votes for Ata Bey Ayoubi, for whom they had, earlier in the week, been hopeful of gaining a majority; but when agreement was reached between Shukri Quwatli and Hashim Bek Atassi it became clear that Ata Bey had no chance of success.

The recent conversations between Nuri Pasha Said and Nahas Pasha on the subject of Arab unity have attracted much attention in Damascus, and have aroused the hope that the time may be drawing near when the Syrians will be able to participate in such discussions. In a declaration made a few days ago to the Arab News Agency, Shukri Quwatli expressed his belief that Syria should stand by the sister Arab countries and work for their common good and prosperity; and in a speech which he made following his election he again referred to the Arab countries, to which, he said, Syria had been closely attached throughout the centuries. Shukri also referred to the Atlantic Charter, and affirmed his intention to further the development of Syria's true national aspirations in accordance with the Allied views of freedom set out therein. He subsequently referred again to the charter in a conversation with His Majesty's Minister, and it is clear that it will form the basis of Syrian policy in the future. The press has also given renewed publicity to a declaration made by Saadullah Jabri in Aleppo on the 21st July, in which he stated in unequivocal terms that, as Britain and France had acquiesced in the formation of an Arab Confederation, the Arab countries should now work for its realisation. Jabri again referred to this subject in a speech made shortly before his departure for Damascus to attend the opening session of Parliament.

The drop in wholesale prices has continued, and sugar, which two months ago stood at 250 piastres a kilog., can now be bought at 110-120 piastres. There have been a number of failures among merchants in Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo, and some have already been officially declared bankrupt. The policy of the banks has been to show no sympathy with known speculators.

His Majesty's Minister's recent broadcast supporting the decrees published by M. Hellen (see Summary No. 70 of the 4th August) has had an excellent effect upon the Moslems of Syria, and the settlement is generally recognised to have been the work of the British and not of the French. The speech has encouraged the belief that, contrary to the general impression prevailing hitherto, the refusal of the British to support individual candidates or parties in the elections is due to genuine impartiality, and not to indifference where major issues are concerned.

Syria—Damascus.

A delegation of merchants who have been badly hit by the fall in the price of gold and the consequent drop in wholesale prices visited the head of the Government at the beginning of the week and asked for a moratorium for the settlement of their accounts. Their demands included (a) authorisation to export local produce to foreign countries; (b) authorisation to transport all goods without restriction within the country; (c) a moratorium of sixty days for the discounting of bills; (d) examination by the Government of the cases of merchants who are "in difficulties" with a view to extending help to them; and (e) relaxation of the penalties for default or delay in meeting engagements.

So far as is known, the Government took no action, though the banks are reported to have been lenient with certain *bona fide* merchants whose difficulties were not the result of speculations.



*The Lebanon.*

A week of feverish activity on the part of candidates for the Lebanese elections has resulted in a bewildering series of agreements and disagreements between political rivals, and in no district is the final composition of the electoral lists yet clear.

In Beirut one list is almost complete and another is in the throes of formation under the inspiration of the Délégation générale, whose political director was dissatisfied with the main list. Neither list has any strong political bias; each merely represents a collection of individuals who have agreed to band themselves together in order to pool their united electoral resources, but will certainly separate again so soon as the Chamber comes into being. Various recent political discards, including Alfred Naccache, Sami es Solh and Dr. Ayoub Tabet, are expected to figure on the second, or reserve, list.

In South Lebanon Adel Bey Usseyran, convinced of the impossibility of successfully fighting the strong list composed by Ahmed el As'ad in conjunction with Riad es Solh (who, somewhat unexpectedly, decided to stand for the South Lebanon instead of Beirut), has apparently agreed to join their list with certain of his followers—a development which has aroused the ire of the French Conseiller at Sidon. The efforts now being made by the latter to upset this arrangement may result in its modification before the date of the elections.

In the Mount Lebanon both Emile Eddé and Bechara el Khoury have virtually completed their lists, and the battle will be joined between them with relatively little French interference; it is thought that some candidates from each list will be elected, the greater number from Bechara el Khoury's.

In the Bekaa the situation is almost farcical; the attempts of the French to impose a list of candidates chosen by themselves, on what principles it is by no means clear, have resulted in a strong protest against their interference from three of the candidates most usually labelled "pro-French." The final outcome, in a region so completely devoid of worthy representatives, matters little.

In North Lebanon the situation has evolved surprisingly. The appearance of British Security Mission personnel in the house of Rashid Mokaddem, the issue of warrants for the arrest of Rashid Mokaddem's son Nafez and of his uncle Omari, and the suspension of the Mohafez and Chief of Police have convinced the population in general, and the Mokaddems in particular, that the British authorities will eventually have their way. The Mokaddems themselves felt this so strongly that during the week they approached Abdul Hamid Kermai with an offer to withdraw their opposition to him and to nominate one of the most prominent of their members still at liberty to stand for elections on his list. This offer was accepted, so that all rivalry between the two families—the only likely cause of trouble on election day—seems to be at an end. The conseiller at Tripoli has since been working desperately to rake up sufficient candidates to form an opposition list, but he has not so far succeeded, and it is as yet uncertain whether he will succeed. The French authorities have been attempting to spread the impression that riots are still likely in this area, obviously as a pretext for imposing so-called security measures which could be used for political pressure, but this attempt is being resisted.

The Lebanese Government has continued to do little or nothing. Taufiq Awad, its third member, is busily engaged in conducting his electoral campaign in North Lebanon; Abdullah Beyhum, whilst doing his best to keep the wheels of administration revolving, is still complaining bitterly of the interference of the Cabinet politique and of the head of State.

[E 5104/27/89]

No. 76.

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary (No. 73) Syria and the Lebanon, 25th August, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office 6th September.)*

## 1. General.

FOLLOWING the election of Shukri Quwatli as President of the Republic, Ata Bey Ayoubi submitted the resignation of the provisional Government in the form of a letter stating that his Government's mission was now at an end as the country had returned to constitutional life. Shukri replied thanking the interim Government for the neutrality which they had observed in the conduct of the elections and praising their wisdom in the conduct of affairs. At the same time he requested them to remain in office until a new Government had been formed.

It was generally expected that the new Government would be formed immediately, and that it would include representatives of the Jebel Druze and Alaouite Territory. The composition of the Government was not, however, decided until four days later, and when it was announced it was found that the Druze and Alaouite provinces were not represented. Shukri Quwatli has explained to a member of His Majesty's Legation that, although he would have had no intrinsic objection to the inclusion of a Druze, this would have made it impossible to reject the demands of other minorities such as the Alaouites and the Kurds, and that he was determined to get together a team composed of people chosen on their individual merits. The final composition of the Government was as follows:—

President of Council: Saadullah Jabri.

Foreign Affairs (and Vice-President of the Council, although this latter appointment has not yet been gazetted): Jamil Mardam.

Interior: Lutfi Haffar.

Education and Defence: Nassouhi Bukhari.

Finance: Khaled el-Azm.

Public Works and Ravitaillement: Mazhar Pasha Reslan.

Justice: Dr. Abdul Rahman Kayali.

Agriculture and Commerce: Taufiq Shamieh.

Of these Ministers all have previously held ministerial office, and four have been Heads of Governments. All have Nationalist tendencies to a greater or lesser degree. Their experience of administrative affairs might lead one to believe that they would form a strong Government, but in fact serious cleavages already exist between them which the somewhat unstable character of Saadullah Jabri is unlikely to heal. Moreover the discontent aroused among the Druze and Alaouite Deputies by the non-inclusion of their representatives in the Cabinet, and the fact that Damascus has five out of eight seats in it, will probably weaken the Parliamentary position of the Government from the outset.

The French do not at the moment appear to be attempting to exploit the weakness resulting from regional claims for representation in the Cabinet. The Druze Deputies did not attend the parliamentary session of the 21st August as a protest against the non-inclusion of a Druze in the Ministry, and it would appear that this was due to the action of the Emir Hassan el-Atrash. Jamil Mardam informed the Political Officer that he had, he thought, persuaded the Emir, who had almost certainly hoped himself to be a Minister, to make no serious trouble; and the acting Free French Delegate, Colonel Oliva Roget has left for the Jebel Druze to use his influence to calm the Atrash family.

A message of congratulation, telegraphed to Shukri Quwatli by the Head of the Lebanese Provisional Government, was read out in Parliament on the 21st August, and was criticised by one deputy for the mention made in it of "complete Lebanese independence" which, it was alleged, indicated an attitude hostile to Arab unity. The Speaker of the House argued that the phrase in question should not be so interpreted, since the Head of the Lebanese State, in whom the Speaker said he had confidence, realised that his mission was to secure local independence as a necessary pre-requisite to any discussion of the Lebanon's future relations with the Arab world.

At the same session, two Aleppine deputies, namely Nazem Qudsi and Rushdi Kekhia, criticised the speech made by Shukri Quwatli following his election (see last week's *Summary*), which they contended did not indicate sufficiently clearly that the President intended to obtain complete independence for Syria. Rushdi Kekhia declared that "the independence of General Catroux and the Allies" did not suffice. Jamil Mardam defended Shukri Quwatli's speech, which he said was the best programme which could be devised at the present time, and at his request the Speaker called upon all present to declare individually in public session whether they were for or against the adoption of Shukri Quwatli's speech as the official Government programme. Only the two deputies above-named voted against it. The evening newspapers in which the above debate was reported were, it is believed, bought up immediately upon publication on the orders of Shukri Quwatli, who apparently did not wish detailed reports of this debate to be broadcast. It is not, however, known which part of the debate he especially objected to.

In the Lebanon the electoral campaign is being pursued with vigour, but great indignation is being aroused by the blatant intervention in the formation of the electoral lists which is being resorted to by the political department of the

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Délégation Générale and, undoubtedly on that department's instructions, by the French Conseillers at Tripoli and Sidon. In North Lebanon, in addition, Taufiq Awad, one of the members of the interim Government, has been abusing his position to instruct officials in his district in a sense favourable to his own chances. Action to combat this unwarranted interference, and to secure at least moderate impartiality in the matter of security arrangements on election day, is under urgent consideration. Very strong representations have been made to M. Hellen, but it is unfortunately all too clear that the Délégué Général is incapable of controlling anybody.

#### 4. Aleppo.

There has been no important political activity, the local deputies having been absent in Damascus.

Shukri Quwatli's election to the Presidency has been generally welcomed locally, and the choice of Saadullah Jabri for Prime Minister has also given satisfaction.

#### 5. Homs and Hama.

The election of Shukri Quwatli to the Presidency has been well received, but the new Government is regarded with little confidence, owing to the absence of either Druze or Alaouite representatives. The appointment of Mazhar Pasha Reslan as Minister of Supply has been received with indifference, as he and his family have only a limited local popularity. Adnan Atassi is reported to be disappointed that he did not obtain a Ministry or even an appointment as one of the Secretaries of the Chamber as consolation for the enforced retirement of his father, Hashim Bek. The Hama deputy, Nejib Agha Barazi, is also annoyed, as he had hoped for the Ministry of Agriculture or the vice-Presidency of the Chamber. His failure to obtain either of these appointments has not, however, caused any disappointment amongst his constituents.

The supporters of the National Bloc in Homs are very bitter about the non-election of their candidate, Haj Suleiman Maasarani, and strenuous efforts are being made to secure his election in the near future. The method they propose is the appointment of Adnan Atassi to a diplomatic post, thus leaving his seat vacant. Adnan, who would be happy to have such a post, is however seeking to profit by the occasion, and says that he will accept nothing less than an appointment as Minister Plenipotentiary. Also because of the failure of Maasarani, the local adherents of the Bloc are incensed against the Mohafez of Homs, Fuad Halabi, whom they accuse of having adopted an anti-Bloc attitude. This is quite untrue, for the Mohafez is inclined to the Bloc, but his attitude during the elections was one of exemplary neutrality. The people consider, however, that neutrality should mean 100 per cent. support for themselves, and they now propose to ask for the return of the former Mohafez, Haydar Mardem Bey, who is at present in the Hauran. It is to be hoped that they will be unsuccessful in their efforts, as the present Mohafez has co-operated extremely well with both the Délégué and the Political Officer, and has been a remarkably honest administrator, whereas Haydar Mardem Bey, was neither honest nor reliable.

On the 21st August the markets closed in Hama in protest against the imposition of income tax. The strike had been originally arranged for the 19th August, but it was decided to wait until the new Parliament had assembled at Damascus before demonstrating. On the 17th August a circular had been sent round demanding declarations of income, and stating that if no declarations were made individuals would be assessed on their 1942 income. The strike is a protest against this and against the demand that merchants should institute book-keeping, which they say they cannot afford. In fact, it is one more effort on their part to avoid income tax altogether. There are no other demonstrations in the town, and the strike is not expected to last more than a few days.

Prices generally have risen slightly during the past week, probably due to the recovery in the value of the gold pound, which has risen from 39.85 to 44.50. One bankruptcy has been reported in Homs, but the majority of the merchants have been able to meet their commitments without selling their stocks.

#### 6. Jebel Druze.

No detailed report received.

According to Shukri Quwatli his decision not to include a Druze representative in the new Syrian Cabinet (see under "General" above) caused great

resentment in the Jebel. The six Druze Deputies withdrew before the closure of Parliament, and there was much agitation at Soueida, including apparently a move to get rid of the officials of the Central Government who are employed in the Jebel. Shukri was so much concerned at this agitation, which, he said, was not backed by the French, that he asked for British help in calming it. The latest reports would seem, however, to indicate that the situation is now fairly quiet at Soueida.

Shukri asserts that he went to great pains to explain his attitude to the Druze and enlist their support. He even offered, when they proved obdurate, to give a Cabinet post to the Emir Soltan Atrash. The latter, however, declined to accept it; and Shukri refused to take Hassan-el-Atrash in his stead, considering him tainted by his service under Sheikh Taj-ed-Din.

#### 7. Alaouite Territory.

The election of Shukri Quwatli as President of the Republic, and the formation by Saadullah Jabri of a Government composed mainly of ex-Prime Ministers, have aroused a great deal of speculation regarding possible changes in local administration, especially as this area is not represented in the Cabinet. This omission has not yet, however, aroused any serious outcry.

#### 8. Euphrates and Jezireh.

All attempts to induce the French Délégué Adjoint, Colonel Lanusse, to adopt a more co-operative attitude *vis-à-vis* the British authorities having proved fruitless, the French have now agreed to his removal and have appointed M. G. Cassin, former French Consul at Kabul, in his stead. The military powers of the délégué are being entrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel Roux, who was formerly in command of the French troops at Djibouti. M. Cassin arrived in Deir ez-Zor on the 14th August, and Colonel Lanusse is therefore expected to leave shortly.

At the same time a new British Political Officer has been appointed to this region and has been given, in addition, the rank of consul.

It has not yet been possible to induce the new Syrian Government to annul the election of Dahan el-Hadi, but pressure to this end is being maintained on the Government.

#### 11. The Lebanon.

The closing date for the receipt of applications to stand for the Lebanese elections was the 17th August, by which time a very large number of candidates had made application, though many of them without any real intention of standing unless they could secure places on a strong electoral list. The process of forming these lists has continued unabated up to the present; and although the main lines are now clear in all districts, further changes may take place up to the eve of elections as a result of last-minute bargains between candidates or pressure by the authorities.

The number of lists seems likely to be greater than appeared at first. In Beirut two fairly strong lists are now complete, though French support of one has disheartened the members of the other to the point of threatening withdrawal. In Mount Lebanon Emile Eddé's and Bechara Khoury's lists are now complete, and there is talk of a third list, which, however, may not eventuate. In South Lebanon one strong united list has been formed, and the counsellor has placed together a rival list which is, however, unlikely to have much success. In the Bekaa two lists have been formed, but the French are understood to be attempting to fuse them, to the indignation of those candidates who would thereby be squeezed out. In North Lebanon two main lists, one under Abdul Hamid Karami and Hamid Frangieh and the other under Jawad Boulos and Taufiq Awad, are now virtually complete, and a third list is talked of but is unlikely to come about.

#### 12. Press and Propaganda.

*Internal.*—The Lebanese press appears to have been given considerable freedom to discuss the elections, although some offending passages have been censored. According to its editor, the *Revue du Liban* received a severe rebuke from the Chef du Bureau de la Presse for publishing a special election number. The paper has nevertheless sought and obtained permission from the Lebanese Government to produce another special edition next week.

The Syrian press published criticisms by Syrian Deputies of the emphasis put on the Lebanon's "perfect independence" in the message of congratulations



addressed by the Lebanese head of State to the Syrian President. Arab countries were, it asserted, looking forward not to mere independence, but to pan-Arab unity.

The press of both countries was unable to explain the difference between the market price and the Bank price of gold, but commented that it opened another way to quick riches.

#### External.

No outstanding comments.

#### Enemy Wireless Propaganda.

Enemy stations broadcasting in Arabic have continued to applaud the Nationalist victory in Syria and to call for the ejection of the "colonisers" in the interests of true independence. The Lebanon is now being urged to return Nationalist candidates in the coming elections, enemy broadcasters alleging that the French have provoked trouble between Christians and Moslems in Beirut and have forbidden Beirut papers to support Moslem candidates.

[E 5281/27/89]

No. 77.

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 74, Syria and the Lebanon, 1st September, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office 9th September.)*

#### 1. General.

French interference in the Lebanese electoral campaign continued unabated up to election day. A detailed protest to M. Hellou by His Majesty's Minister against the flagrant interventions of MM. Boegner and Rozek and the conseillers in Tripoli and Sidon in the formation of electoral lists was answered only by denials and by a series of weak and easily-disproved counter-charges against the political officer at Tripoli and of vague accusations against unnamed British officials of the O.C.P. M. Hellou did, indeed, promise to confine his conseillers to their houses (in which, in any case, most of their political activities are carried on) until after the day of the elections, but went back on even this the following day. He also induced all three members of the Lebanese provisional Government to write him a letter declaring that neither he nor his officials had intervened with them in electoral matters. The weak and harassed Abdullah Beyhum sent M. Hellou on the following day a recantation in which he reiterated in general terms his complaints of French interference.

As election day approached, candidates' tempers became distinctly frayed, and both local and Allied authorities were inundated with protests and counter-protests against all kinds of electoral abuses on the part of the Lebanese and French administrations. Both Emile Eddé and Bechara el-Khoury complained that officials in the Mount Lebanon district were showing partiality against their candidates, while from North Lebanon came a steady stream of telegrams from Abdul Hamid Kerami's party, protesting against the undoubted attempts of Taoufik Awad to corrupt the administration and police in that area.

In these circumstances it is satisfactory to record that the elections, which took place on the 29th August, passed off with no serious disorders and that, though intervention and trickery were undoubtedly widespread, they were at least less blatant and less successful than on former occasions. The British authorities succeeded in preventing the use of French or local troops for security purposes in such a way as to give an impression of intimidation, and in the event these troops were kept well in the background. Order was maintained by the police and gendarmerie (the latter diluted with *troupes spéciales*) in a manner which reflected great credit on the head of the Lebanese Gendarmerie, in whom the sole responsibility was vested. Though there were minor brawls and fights in several places, and at least two serious attempts were made at Tripoli on the life of Kerami, no one was killed.

In all the outlying districts—North Lebanon, South Lebanon and the Bekaa—the lists which had been openly backed by the French suffered defeat. In Beirut, on the other hand, the list which had been formed by M. Boegner in opposition to that of Georges Tabot, and which included two former Presidents (M. Naccache and Dr. Ayoub Tabet) and one former Prime Minister (Sami Solh) dismissed by General Catroux, was largely successful, though four seats out of

nine remain to be balloted for. In the Mount Lebanon a count lasting over fifty hours provided only eight successful candidates out of a total of seventeen seats, but seven of these were from Emile Eddé's list. The *ballotage* for the remainder is due to take place on the 5th September.

Both during and after the elections, bitter complaints were received about the unsatisfactory manner in which the lists of electors had been revised. It was stated, apparently with truth, that large numbers of electors were not permitted to vote because their names could not be found on the lists. These irregularities appear to have been most serious in Beirut and the Mount Lebanon—the only two districts where French protégés had any success. It is noteworthy that in Beirut, where it is said that some 8,000 Armenians were thus prevented from voting, only 26 per cent. of possible votes were cast, as against over 60 per cent. everywhere else. Pending the production of further evidence, it is impossible to judge how far this state of affairs was due to trickery and how far merely to departmental laziness and inefficiency. Numerous other complaints of malpractices in the registering and counting of votes in the polling booths have been made but will be difficult to prove.

The population as a whole seem to have appreciated the attempts of the British authorities to introduce a new spirit of impartiality and justice into the elections, and it is generally agreed that the results, though far from satisfactory, represent a definite advance on past elections, where lists were merely imposed beforehand by the French authorities through the Government in power. Nevertheless, the new Chamber will not contain more than a dozen Deputies with any strength of character or independence of purpose, and these dozen, Moslem and Christian, are far from united in their aims; so that it is too much to hope that anything like a strong Government can be formed amongst them.

The Syrian Parliament lost no time in broaching the question of Arab federation. On the 26th August a motion was proposed by Nazem Qudsi (Aleppo) that the Government should work for the attainment of a Confederation of Arab States and the unification of Arab countries. The Prime Minister declared the Government to be in favour of the motion, which was at once carried by acclamation.

A few days previously, Shukri Quwatli had requested an interview with a member of the British Legation to discuss what he described as a very urgent matter. He stated that he had already, since his accession to power, been under strong French pressure to negotiate a treaty, and feared that General Catroux, who, he believed, would visit the Levant States shortly, would apply still stronger pressure. He made it plain that he was averse from entering into any such negotiations, and enquired as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government. He was informed that while His Majesty's Government were favourably disposed towards the eventual conclusion of a Franco-Syrian treaty similar to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, they held it to be contrary to the general policy of the United Nations to allow such a treaty to be negotiated before the end of the war, and thought it most unlikely that the French Committee of Liberation would be regarded as entitled to conclude one in the name of France. This appeared to encourage the President greatly.

The question of Syria's attitude towards the Axis Powers has also come under review. On the 26th August, the Speaker read out in Parliament a written proposal that Syria should declare war on the Axis submitted by Colonel Yahya Hayati, a former officer in the Turkish Army (who is not a Deputy and does not hold any official position), but ruled that the matter must be studied by the Government before being submitted for the consideration of the House.

Parliament has now gone into recess until mid-October.

There has been a slight rise in the price of gold. Wholesale prices, which suffered a sharp drop when the price of gold fell recently, have now risen again in proportion; whilst retail prices, which remained almost unaffected when wholesale prices fell, are tending to rise still further.

#### 2. Wheat.

Two Cereals Commission meetings have taken place during the past seven days under the presidency of Jamil Mardam, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the new Government. The President has so far shown a marked preparedness to co-operate.

Purchases for the week the 20th–26th August inclusive were 31,000 tons, or an average of over 4,400 tons per day.

The main problems of the O.C.P. at the moment are connected with storage and transport.

[27005]



### 3. Syria-Damascus.

Apart from the resolution passed on the 26th August calling upon the Government to work for Arab unity and the suggestion that Syria should declare war on the Axis (see under "General" above), Parliamentary debates have not contained anything of importance. A motion proposed by the Minister of Justice calling for a general amnesty (with certain exceptions) for prisoners in local gaols has been approved. Scrutiny into the validity of the elections has resulted in the recognition of two unimportant Deputies being deferred pending further consideration. One of the Deputies in question is accused of having bought the secondary electors, and in the other case there is a dispute regarding the accuracy of the count; but in neither instance is there any suggestion of foreign interference.

In a declaration to the foreign press on the 25th August, the President of the Council stated that the foreign policy of his Government was to continue to participate in the Allied war effort, to consolidate relations with France and the Allies on the basis of complete Syrian independence, and to establish relations with the other Arab States on a basis still to be determined. The Government's internal policy, he said, was to achieve complete independence and to develop the prosperity and resources of the country.

His Majesty's Minister made formal calls upon the Syrian President and Government on the 31st August.

### 5. Homs and Hama.

Hashim Bek Atassi has publicly demonstrated his support for Shukri Quwatli by visiting him in Damascus, accompanied by the Mohafez and a number of local Nationalists, to congratulate him upon his election.

The opposition to the Mohafez of Suleiman Maasarani and his supporters has petered out. Maasarani has informed the Mohafez that he has withdrawn his objection to the elections, which in any case have already been confirmed by the competent Parliamentary Commission. The Mohafez was apparently well received by Shukri Quwatli, and now seems more certain of his position.

The strike provoked by the Government's attempt to collect Income Tax (see last week's Summary) proved short-lived, and there were no disturbances.

### 6. Jebel Druze.

There was considerable excitement in Soueida when it became known that the new Syrian Government would not include a Druze representative. Many demonstrations took place, but there were no disorders. The Syrian flag was taken down from the Sérail, but was restored the following day; shops remained closed for two days.

The Druze deputies, as a result of pressure brought to bear on the Emir Hassan by the Syrian, French and British authorities, returned to Damascus for the final sitting of Parliament on the 26th August. It is not clear whether the Emir still cherishes hopes of office; the Government, however, intend to remain firm.

### 7. Alaouite Territory.

When the Syrian Parliament first met it seemed likely that the Alaouite deputies would split into two parties, comprising on the one hand the supporters of the Nationalists Bloc and on the other their opponents, consisting of some twelve deputies led by Munir el-Abbas. Subsequently, however, Munir and his supporters called on Shukri Quwatli and the Head of the Government and assured them of their wholehearted support for a policy of Syrian unity. It seems clear therefore, that despite their local differences, there is no longer any likelihood of any body of Alaouite deputies supporting the now moribund policy of secession from the Syrian State.

Ibrahim and Ali Kinj are also reported to have visited Shukri Quwatli and the Prime Minister and to have met with a cordial reception.

Although the Kinjs withdrew from the elections, there is reason to suspect that their earlier attitude towards the Mohafez' party has provoked the permanent animosity of the French authorities.

### 9. Tribal.

The question of the relations between the Syrian Government and the Bedouin tribes has been raised in Parliament by Sheikh Trad el Milhem, of the Hassaneh Tribe. In a speech on Bedouin affairs, during which he declared himself in favour of complete Syrian independence and of Arab federation, he called upon the Government to substitute Syrian for French control of the tribes. He pointed out that these comprised about 20 per cent. of the population of Syria, and said that it was incumbent upon the Government to concern itself with their education and to provide increased medical and sanitary facilities. He also demanded the development of irrigation and agriculture in the nomad areas. His speech was seconded by Rushdi Kekhia (Aleppo) and Nejib Rayes (Damascus), who suggested the creation of a Tribal Administration on the lines of that in force in Iraq.

The Syrian Parliament has passed a resolution requesting the release of Sheikh Daham el-Hadi from internment.

A state of tension has arisen between the Feda'an Wuld and the semi-sedentary Afadla tribes, as a result of orders given to the Afadla by the French S.S. Officer at Tel Abiad to evacuate certain lands and villages North of Raqqa in favour of the Feda'an Wuld. This is interpreted by the Afadla as the beginning of reprisals for their not having supported the candidate of the Emir Mujhim, paramount Sheikh of the Feda'an Wuld, who was favoured by the French, at the elections. The Afadla claim, it is believed rightly, that the lands in question are theirs; they point out that they were allocated to the Afadla by a Tribal Council in 1938; that they have paid taxes on the lands; and have delivered 100 tons of wheat from them to the O.C.P. The Délégué has given orders for all action to be suspended pending consideration of the case, and has despatched troops to the scene to maintain order.

### 12. Press and Propaganda.

More than 9,000 copies of a large poster containing an extract from His Majesty's Minister's recent broadcast speech calling upon each elector to vote according to his conscience were put up near polling booths throughout the Lebanon, while an even larger number of handbills containing a longer message in the same sense from Monsieur Helleu were distributed or pasted up nearby. They were both welcomed by the press as having "a soothing effect upon the mass of the population."

Several papers questioned the title of Taufiq Awad, Assistant Secretary of State in the Lebanese provisional Government, to function as Minister of the Interior, and protested strongly against his use of his official position to influence the electoral campaign in favour of his own party.

Enemy radio stations showed some interest in the Lebanese elections, alleging "de Gaullist" interference with Moslem leaders and national demonstrators. The new Syrian Government was urged to strengthen its Army and make military service compulsory, while in another broadcast, Syria was described as the centre of Arab hopes and was called upon to go to the aid of Palestine, which had resisted the Jews unaided for so long.

[E 5421/27/89]

No. 78.

*Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 75, Syria and the Lebanon, 8th September, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office 20th September.)*

### 1. General.

THE results of the first elections on the Mount Lebanon district were only announced on the 1st September, after nearly sixty hours' work in counting the votes. Only eight out of seventeen candidates achieved clear majorities—seven from Emile Eddié's ("Nationalist") party and one, Camille Chamoun, from Bechara el-Khoury's ("Constitutional") party. In anticipation of the balloting for the remaining seats, which was planned to take place on the 4th September, both sides began intensive electoral campaigns in which money was freely spent and all available means used to influence electors.

The balloting finally took place on the 5th September, having been postponed for 24 hours as a result of representations from the Constitutional party. It



passed off without mass disorders, but three people are reported to have lost their lives and the Constitutionists assert one of these—a Druze—was murdered in cold blood by a member of the *Sûreté* whilst visiting a polling-booth. Both Bechara el-Khoury and Emile Eddé were elected, together with four members of the former's and three of the latter's lists, the final count thus giving six seats to Bechara el-Khoury and eleven to Emile Eddé. Intervention by agents of the *Sûreté Générale* on a grand scale is alleged by the disappointed Constitutionists, and there appears to be a great deal of evidence in support of their charges.

Balloting in Beirut, which also took place on the 5th September, resulted in one more member of Dr. Ayoub Tabet's list and three members of the opposition list being elected. Before the balloting there seems to have been much jockeying for position amongst the candidates, and at least one was induced to stand down in favour of his opponent on prompt repayment of his electoral expenses. In this manoeuvre also the *Sûreté Générale* are taxed by the Constitutionists with direct complicity.

The new chamber must, according to the Constitution, meet before the 21st September, and in the meantime all thoughts are turned to the question of who is to be President. It is believed that both Emile Eddé (if he is convinced that his own candidature would be illegal) and the French authorities are likely to give their support to Dr. Ayoub Tabet, who is considered to be the best available protagonist of the idea of an independent Christian Lebanon; of the numerous possible alternatives, Bechara el-Khoury commands considerable support, but he has lost prestige as a result of the Mount Lebanon results and is by no means universally popular.

There are indications that the absence of any allusion to a Franco-Syrian Treaty in the recent speeches of Shukri Quwatli and his Prime Minister (who is said to have adopted the President's speech as his Government's programme—see *Summary* No. 73—in order to avoid making any such reference) has greatly perturbed the French authorities. Having failed to persuade any of the deputies to raise the question in the Chamber, which has now gone into recess, they approached the Prime Minister and Shukri Quwatli's secretary, holding out the bait that the French would consider the immediate cession to the Syrian Government of the Bedouin Control and the Customs, if a satisfactory statement were made during the Parliamentary sitting of the 26th August. The Prime Minister is reported to have put the matter to the Council of Ministers but the latter refused to take any action. The alleged offer of the Customs is interesting, if true; but it is doubtful whether the French would be willing to pay such a price for a mere statement in Parliament. Furthermore, the question of the Lebanese share in the Customs would have to be considered.

His Majesty's Minister's declaration on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the outbreak of war has been widely reprinted in the vernacular and French language press.

The invasion of Italy and the renewed successes of the Russian armies have again raised hopes of an early end to the war, and have offset the disquiet caused by rumours of disagreement between the Allies, of which the ill-intentioned had pretended to find confirmation in the Prime Minister's speech from Quebec. Mr. Churchill's cordial references in that speech to France gave great satisfaction to the French, but naturally did not please the Syrians to the same extent.

Recognition of the Committee of Liberation by His Majesty's Government, the U.S.S.R. and the United States has raised French morale considerably. Naturally the unconditional Russian recognition has strengthened the pro-Russian tendency already existing among some Frenchmen, but the British recognition has also been sincerely welcomed. Its reservations are understood and appreciated by most, and its tone is favourably contrasted with the less cordial statement of the United States.

The Banque de Syrie started selling gold to the public in Aleppo and Damascus on the 3rd September. This move has been generally welcomed and has brought down the price of gold in the bazaars.

### 3. Syria—Damascus.

The new Government has, as yet, taken no measures of any political importance. The inauguration of the new régime has coincided with the month of Ramadan (which began on the 31st August) when the ramshackle administrative machine turns over more slowly than usual.

Great satisfaction has been given by an announcement made on the 2nd September by Tahsin Bey Qadri, the Iraqi Consul-General in Beirut, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that his Government had recognised Syrian independence and desired to exchange diplomatic representations with Syria. Pending the nomination of a minister to Damascus, Tahsin Bey is to act as *chargé d'affaires*. The Iraqi Government has not as yet recognised Lebanese independence. The Egyptian Government, which already recognises Syria, has decided to appoint a *chargé d'affaires* to Damascus.

About the same time a certain Abdul Mun'im Rifai, assistant Rais Diwan of the Emir Abdullah of Transjordan, was visiting Damascus to hand a personal letter from the Emir to the President of the Republic. Abdul Mun'im Bey, who was the guest of the Syrian Government during his stay, also visited the president of the chamber and the president of the council. His visit and the Emir's letter are locally thought to be connected with the present visit to Cairo of Taufiq Abul-Huda, the Prime Minister of Transjordan, to discuss Arab federation. It is significant that immediately before his trip to Cairo Taufiq Pasha "happened" to be staying in Damascus.

Colonel Oliva-Roget, who has been acting delegate in Damascus since the 14th July, has now been confirmed in this appointment in succession to General Collet who, it is rumoured, is to be given a command in Morocco. The new delegate, who until his arrival in Damascus to deputise for General Collet was *délégué adjoint* in the Jebel Druze, is on the whole popular with the Nationalist party because in 1931 he advocated a policy of understanding between them and the French, who since the 1925 revolt had regarded the Nationalists with suspicion. It is reported that the new *délégué* has been instructed by General Catroux to continue to maintain a close connexion with the Jebel Druze.

Syrian Government circles have, on the whole, been pleasantly surprised at the results of the Lebanese elections. The victory of Riadh Solh and Abdul Hamid Korami and their partisans in South and North Lebanon respectively, and the election of Sami Solh in Beirut, have encouraged their friends in Damascus, who wish for close relations, if not unity, between Syria and the Lebanon. The results of the Mount Lebanon elections have, however, been regarded with suspicion, heightened by the delay in their announcement. Reactions to the results of the *ballottage* which has just taken place are not yet known. It remains to be seen whether the Syrians are justified in the trust which they appear to place in Riadh and Sami Solh.

It has been announced in the press that the Popular (Shahbandar) party has given up the premises which were formerly its headquarters. It would seem that the party, which was already moribund, received its *coup de grâce* at the elections.

### 4. Aleppo.

In the absence of the more important local deputies, political interest is still centred in Damascus, and there have been no local events of importance. Confidence in the Government has risen as a result of Shukri Quwatli's firm handling of the Druze.

### 6. Jebel Druze.

The popular excitement over the failure of the Syrian Government to give a ministry to a Druze Deputy has died down, but it is clear that the Emir Hassan is still deeply incensed at having been pushed aside. He has informed the political officer that he is not prepared to accept the argument that the appointment of a Druze minister would have necessitated giving ministries to the Alaouites, the Kurds and the Bedouin, as he considers the Druze, by reason of the armed support which they have contributed in the past to the cause of Syrian independence, have a greater claim on the Government than any other section of the community. The Emir has stated categorically that, although up to now he had been prepared to abandon his claim for Druze autonomy and allow the Jebel to be gradually assimilated to the rest of Syria, he has now revised his opinion.

It seems that the Emir and the Druze Deputies were induced to return to Damascus for the final session of the Syrian Chamber before Parliament went into recess by a promise of a ministry made by an emissary sent to Soueida by Jamil Mardam. It is said that this move was completely unknown to Shukri Quwatli and the Prime Minister, who were furious when they heard of it and ordered the offer to be countermanded. Whether the Head of the Government



and the Prime Minister really were ignorant of the matter is not known; it may be, however, that Jamil Mardam was endeavouring to win over the support of the Emir (who might control as many as 35 votes in the Chamber) for use in an emergency.

The French authorities do not, so far, seem to have made any attempt to take advantage of the incident; they may perhaps judge it preferable to support Shukri Quwatli now in the hope of favours to come. But if those favours—and particularly the Government's agreement to initiate treaty negotiations—do not materialise, their attitude may well change in the Jebel and possibly in the Alaouite territory also.

#### 7. Alaouite Territory.

The return to a constitutional régime in Syria is having an important effect upon the outlook of local political leaders. It is realised that Shukri Quwatli and his Government are firmly in the saddle. Parties and groups formed under French patronage may be expected to dissolve, and it seems not unlikely that the middle-aged politicians who have hitherto been the preponderating influence here as elsewhere in Syria, may eventually be swept away by a younger generation with a more modern and less parochial outlook.

Certain changes are already apparent; leaders such as Suleiman Murshid, the Kinjs and the Abbas family are seeking to establish themselves in the favour of the new Government. Suleiman Murshid, who recently visited Shukri Quwatli to offer his allegiance as a "Syrian patriot," is asserting that he was well received. On his return he complained to the political officer that the Abbas family were endeavouring to break the influence of all the other Alaouite leaders, including himself and the Kinjs; but until some definite proof of a break occurs, any suggestions made by Suleiman that the alliance between himself, Shauqat al-Abbas and the French S.S. officers has been dissolved must be treated with extreme reserve. If, however, he is really determined to assume the rôle of a thorough Nationalist, he must expect very quickly to encounter the animosity of the French, since they are not likely to welcome the defection of a man who owes his wealth and position to them. In the meantime, however, Suleiman continues to play the part of local tyrant. On his return from Damascus he found that the inhabitants of the village of Janbet Borghal, his headquarters, who had hitherto been amongst his staunchest supporters, were showing signs of revolt against his rule. Reports of what then happened are conflicting. It is alleged that Suleiman's bodyguard surrounded the village and threatened those who opposed him with death. One casualty is in hospital in Lattakia. Gendarmes arriving on the scene the next day found all quiet, but arrested those who had made complaints against Suleiman Murshid, and advised the others to go and assure him of their allegiance. He appears, therefore, to be still assured of the support of local officials.

The Mohafez is understood to have offered his resignation to the Government, but with what result is not yet known. This may be regarded as an astute move, as on the one hand he has forestalled the Government if his dismissal were intended and on the other hand, if his resignation is not accepted, his position will be greatly strengthened.

It is reported that by the 1st October all detached posts of Gardes Mobiles in outlying districts will be withdrawn to district headquarters, where they will train under the S.S. officer. Whereas in the past the S.S. officers have detailed the Gardes Mobiles for duty as circumstances arose, local Syrian executives will now have to rely on the Syrian Gendarmerie, and requests for assistance in suppressing disorders will have to be made in writing to Free French headquarters.

[E 5576/27/89]

No. 79.

Extract from *Weekly Political Summary No. 76—Syria and the Lebanon*, 15th September, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office, 23rd September.)

(Secret.)

#### 1. General.

THE Lebanese Parliament has been convened for the 21st September to elect a President of the Republic and the week has passed in active lobbying amongst the Deputies. Amongst the known candidates are Emile Eddé (Nationalist Bloc), Bechara el Khoury (Constitutional Bloc), Dr. Ayoub Tabet, Alfred Naccacche

and Petro Trad. Of these, the last three have little or no popular backing; and at the outset it appeared likely that there would be a straight fight between the remaining two, who are traditional rivals. The Constitutionalist and their allies were, however, by no means confident of obtaining a victory over Emile Eddé, who was known to enjoy French support; and many of them foresaw that, even if Eddé were defeated, he would constitute so formidable an opposition in the Chamber as to render Bechara el Khoury's position extremely difficult. An attempt was therefore made by the anti-Eddé faction to discover a non-party candidate with sufficiently strong popular backing to stand in place of Bechara el Khoury. Various names were suggested, but the attempt failed. Meanwhile, Emile Eddé on his side, conscious of the fact that his legal title to stand for re-election to the presidency was more than doubtful, professed to be willing to withdraw in favour of a Deputy or an outsider acceptable to both parties. The French, who were also probably impressed by the weakness of Eddé's legal position, finally let it be known that the candidates favoured by them were Petro Trad and the Emir Khalil Bellama. The former of these, apart from his incompetence and unpopularity, is not a Maronite, and his election for the presidency would thus constitute a break with established tradition and give rise to many complications. The latter is a complete nonentity.

His Majesty's Minister saw M. Helleu at the latter's request on the 16th September and agreed with him in principle as to the desirability of inducing both Bechara el Khoury and Emile Eddé to stand down, in order to prevent the perpetuation of a parliamentary rivalry which had done the country much harm in the past. It remains to be seen, however, whether Bechara el Khoury will agree to renounce his long-cherished hopes. Moreover, although there is reason to believe that Eddé might agree to support one man (Camille Shamoun) who would be entirely acceptable to the great bulk of Bechara el Khoury's adherents, that solution would probably be by no means welcome to the French.

The Italian capitulation caused a great sensation and more popular enthusiasm than any other Allied victory. In Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo the streets were beflagged, and official and other deputations have visited the Allied authorities to offer their congratulations. While Germany is still respected, especially by the Moslem population, Italy was generally disliked and despised even before the advent of Mussolini. Sympathy with Italy was confined to a few Roman Catholic elements who wanted a change from French control and were the special object of Italian propaganda.

The announcement of General Collet's transfer to other duties has been received with great satisfaction in Syrian circles, particularly in the Aleppo area, since he was regarded as a major obstacle to the achievement of Syrian independence.

#### 3. Syria—Damascus.

The news of the Italian armistice coincided with the arrival in Damascus of Omar Fathi Pasha, chief aide-de-camp to the King of Egypt, with a personal message from the King to the President of the Republic. The Syrian Government paid considerable honour to the Royal messenger. On the morning of his arrival the local press published the texts of letters exchanged by the Egyptian and Syrian Prime Ministers, in which the former invited Saadullah Jabri or his nominee to visit Egypt to give his views on Arab unity. Saadullah Bey has accepted the invitation on behalf of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but intends to go himself with Jamil Mardam if his other duties permit.

Damascus is to elect one Moslem Deputy to fill the seat made vacant by the elevation of Shukri Quwatli to the presidency. The same secondary electors will vote as on the 26th July, but prospective candidates must submit their candidature anew. Voting is to take place on the 9th October and *ballottage*, if necessary, is fixed for the 12th October.

The Minister of Finance has issued a public statement, which seems to show that the new Administration, unlike its predecessors, intends to take a vigorous line in the matter of taxation.



## CHAPTER VI.—GENERAL.

[E 4462/2551/65]

No. 80.

*Mr. Eden to Viscount Halifax (Washington).*

(No. 916.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, 8th August, 1943.*

THERE have been recent indications that the United States Government are adopting, in regard to the countries of the Middle East, an attitude which does not entirely take into account the special interests of His Majesty's Government in that area, and His Majesty's Government therefore wish to secure closer co-ordination of British and American Middle Eastern policy, and thus to avoid future misunderstandings, which might if unchecked have an adverse effect upon the general relations between our two countries.

2. This general tendency of the State Department's Middle Eastern policy is illustrated by a recent incident in Afghanistan, a country where American interests, as compared with those of His Majesty's Government, are so insignificant that the United States have not until lately thought it necessary to establish a diplomatic representative in Kabul. The State Department recently sent instructions to their new Minister in Kabul to intervene in a manner highly prejudicial to our interests in negotiations which the Soviet and British representatives were conducting with the Afghan Government regarding the subversive activities against India and the Soviet Union of certain persons financed by the Axis Legations in Kabul. Fortunately, it proved possible to secure the despatch from Washington of revised instructions to the American Minister in Kabul, before the latter had taken action in accordance with the State Department's previous objectionable directions, and it was thus possible to prevent any prejudicial consequences to the Allies from arising out of this particular incident.

3. A very similar tendency has been evident from time to time in the State Department's policy towards Persia. Last year, for example, the State Department took strong exception to the whole attitude which they believed His Majesty's Government to be adopting towards the Persian Government. They protested in particular against the arrest by British troops of General Zahidi, the Persian Military Governor of Isfahan, on account of his complicity in a pro-Axis plot. They claimed that such action was likely to alienate the Persian Government and people, and to make the task of the United States advisers more difficult. Moreover, the United States representatives in Persia, presumably in accordance with the State Department's wishes, were at pains to make it clear to the Persian authorities that the British attitude was not to be regarded as having American sympathy or support. There was, of course, on that occasion little difficulty in providing the State Department with a full explanation of the necessity in the Allied cause for the measures to which they had taken exception. But the fact remains that, although the main aims of British and of American policy in Persia ought to be almost identical, the Americans in Persia have shown not only a marked reluctance to co-operate, but sometimes even, as on the occasion referred to above, a tendency to criticise and obstruct.

4. Another question where the State Department have recently shown a lack of understanding of British Middle Eastern policy is that of the suggested appointment of an American Consul at Bahrein. It was explained to the State Department, in reply to their enquiry whether this proposal was acceptable to His Majesty's Government, that we were unwilling to agree to the appointment of any foreign consuls at Bahrein, since the establishment there of the official representatives of other Middle Eastern countries would be bound to give rise to political complications. The hope was therefore expressed that the United States Government would be content not to press this suggestion. But the State Department, in spite of their knowledge that the proposal was unwelcome to His Majesty's Government, and in spite of the fact that there are less than one hundred American residents in Bahrein out of a total foreign colony of sixteen thousand, at once renewed their request for the appointment of an American Consul, mainly on the inadequate ground that the absence of American Consular representation in the island had aroused criticism.

5. The State Department have also taken independent action in a matter affecting Saudi Arabia where, as in Afghanistan, American interests have only recently been regarded as sufficiently important to justify the establishment of a

United States Legation. Some weeks ago Ibn Saud enquired of His Majesty's Government whether he would be able to secure his requirements of arms by Lend-Lease from the Americans; and the reply sent to him, which was based on the existence of an unofficial understanding between the British and American Munitions Assignment Boards regarding zones of responsibility for the supply of arms, suggested that his arms requirements should be stated in London rather than in Washington. The State Department thereupon instructed their Legation at Jedda to inform the Saudi Arabian authorities that it is the policy of the United States Government to receive enquiries regarding the availability of American military supplies directly from the appropriate representatives of the Governments of the independent countries of the Near East, and to add that if it is feasible such supplies will be furnished them. This undertaking to supply Ibn Saud, if feasible, with American arms takes no account of the obvious importance which His Majesty's Government, in view of their responsibilities for defending and maintaining order in neighbouring Arab countries, must always attach to preventing excessive supplies of arms from reaching the Arabian Peninsula.

6. The United States Government have also, as you are aware, taken the initiative recently as regards Palestine, but in this case they have only acted after consultation with His Majesty's Government and in agreement with their wishes. His Majesty's Government have cordially welcomed the proposal for a joint declaration with a view to discourage undesirable partisan activities which might conflict with the war effort, and they are in sympathy with the proposal to send Colonel Hoskins to Riyadh to ascertain whether Ibn Saud's attitude is such as would enable direct conversations to be arranged between Jews and Arabs, and thus possibly lead to an agreed settlement of the Palestine dispute. Nevertheless we were somewhat surprised that, without consulting us, the United States Government invited Ibn Saud or one of his sons to visit Washington with a view to discussing Palestine. I can only hope that, despite the examples of American unco-operativeness referred to in preceding paragraphs, there is no reason for anxiety lest the State Department, in a matter of such importance as this, may take in the future some ill-advised step which might have dangerous consequences for His Majesty's Government as the Power which has to bear the responsibility for Palestinian affairs.

7. In the case of Iraq, we have consulted the United States Government regarding a suggestion that the Regent should visit Washington and London, but after six weeks' delay we have received only a very vague reply.

8. It is obviously most unfortunate that there should be any lack of co-operation between British and American policy in the Middle East, and I myself see no essential reason why any important differences should exist. British and American interests in each of the countries concerned are approximately the same. Both His Majesty's Government and the United States Government desire to see these countries tranquil, contented and prosperous, and both Governments are equally concerned to promote such measures as are necessary for the security of Allied troops and for the effective prosecution of the war. But British interests in all the countries of the Middle East are inevitably greater than American interests, if only for geographical reasons, and it is legitimate to hope that the United States Government will take into account the fact that the responsibilities which His Majesty's Government have in that area, *e.g.*, for the defence of India, Iraq, Transjordan, Palestine and Egypt, entitle their views to special consideration in any matters affecting these and neighbouring countries.

9. One reason which is sometimes suggested to account for the increasing attention which the United States Government are devoting to the Middle East, and for their apparent readiness to pursue an independent policy at the risk of friction with Great Britain, is the American interest in the oil of the Persian Gulf area. It is thought in some quarters that United States oil resources will in a few years cease to suffice for American needs, and that the oil of the Persian Gulf may thus come to have for the Americans a very great importance indeed. I shall be interested to learn whether your Lordship considers that the position of the world's future oil resources has in fact affected the State Department's attitude, and whether the State Department are in any way under pressure from American oil interests as regards Middle Eastern policy. But even if this were so, I see no reason why oil questions should necessarily lead to Anglo-American rivalry in the Middle East. In the Iraq Petroleum Company, American and British oil interests participate on equal terms; and even if the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company is a purely British concern, there is a purely American company



working the Dhahran oil-fields in Saudi Arabia, and the Bahrein Petroleum Company, although technically British, is financed and owned by American capital.

10. It is sometimes suggested, moreover, that one of the reasons why the United States Government find it difficult to co-operate closely with His Majesty's Government in the Middle East arises from the feeling that Great Britain has in the past exploited the Middle Eastern territories for her own imperialist ends and has retarded political progress contrary to the wishes of the inhabitants. Seeing that His Majesty's Government have done more than any other Power to promote Arab freedom and to develop the countries of the Middle East, I hope that this misapprehension may without much difficulty be dispelled.

11. Again, there is in the mind of the American public a feeling that the United States enjoys in the Middle East, as the result of her disinterested cultural and missionary activities in the past, a great fund of goodwill which might be utilised now in the joint interests of the Allies. This is perhaps a reason not only for a desire to exert American influence there to a greater extent than heretofore, but also perhaps for an apprehension lest too close co-operation with British policy might prejudice this goodwill. I recognise that the degree of American willingness to co-operate will vary from time to time, and would be adversely affected by any serious outbreak of anti-British feeling among the Persians or the Arabs. But I think that under present conditions the Americans can associate with us without forfeiting their hypothetical reserve of goodwill.

12. There is, I understand, a further belief current in the United States which it may not be so easy to counter, namely, that His Majesty's Government desire to pursue an exclusive policy in the Middle East, without regard for legitimate American interests. Encouragement may have been given to this idea by the refusal of His Majesty's Government to agree to an American Consul at Bahrein. In order to remove this apprehension, it will be necessary to make it clear that His Majesty's Government have no objection whatever to the legitimate exercise of American influence in the Middle East, and have no intention of regarding that region as an exclusively British preserve. Far from wishing to exclude American influence, His Majesty's Government in fact desire to obtain the active help and co-operation of the United States, but they wish in some way to ensure that American influence is not used against British influence in an area where British vital interests are so closely affected. It is only by full and frank discussions of the aims of British and American policy, and of any possible divergence of views that may be revealed in the course of those discussions, that a satisfactory understanding between London and Washington can be reached.

13. Another view, expressed in reports which have reached me from various sources, is that the unco-operative attitude of the State Department is almost entirely due to the influence of Mr. Wallace Murray, the Political Adviser for Middle Eastern Affairs. It is not easy to suggest how this difficulty can be overcome, but there appear to be two alternatives: either to arrange for a frank discussion of mutual problems with Mr. Murray himself, in the hope of overcoming his suspicions and prejudices, or else to engage in similar discussions with Mr. Murray's official superiors, in the hope of neutralising his anti-British tendencies, at least in matters of major importance. This is a matter on which I shall be glad to receive your Lordship's views.

14. I should perhaps add that, with the exception of Mr. Dreyfus, the American Minister at Tehran, I have had no cause for complaint regarding the attitude of the United States representatives in the Middle East. In particular, Mr. Kirk, the American Minister at Cairo, Mr. Engert, the American Minister at Kabul, and Mr. Wilson, until recently the American Minister-Resident at Bagdad, have shown themselves consistently helpful. It is mainly in Washington that difficulties seem to originate.

15. The conclusion reached by His Majesty's Government is that it will be desirable to initiate in the immediate future discussions with United States representatives regarding policy in the Middle East. I feel that these conversations should take place in London rather than in Washington. I therefore propose to authorise you to make a communication either to the President or to the Secretary of State to the effect that His Majesty's Government are anxious to establish a closer co-ordination of policy in the Middle East. It would be made clear that, while the Middle East is an area of essential strategic importance to the British Commonwealth, we hope that the United States Government will be prepared to collaborate closely with us in that area, and for this purpose a mutual understanding of each other's aims and interests is much to be desired. For this purpose, His Majesty's Government would greatly welcome the visit to London of a high American official for the purpose of an informal exchange of views both

on current questions in the Middle East and on some problems that may arise after the war, in the hope of securing full mutual understanding.

16. The proposed communication would add that the discussions might, in the view of His Majesty's Government, cover not only political questions, but also any other Middle Eastern questions which either Government may wish to raise. For example, it would seem useful that the two Governments should exchange views on the future development of Anglo-American co-operation in economic matters. The value of such co-operation has already been strikingly shown through the admirable work of the Middle East Supply Centre. Hitherto, owing to the shortage of available supplies, the activities of the Supply Centre must have appeared to the Governments of the Middle Eastern countries as mainly restrictive; but it may shortly be possible to relax the existing restrictions, and the time now seems to have come when the future of this Anglo-American organisation might usefully be considered. His Majesty's Government would propose that the first step might be to bring the local Governments gradually into consultation by means of conferences on subjects of interest to them, such as transport, food production and rationing statistics. Later, provided that the local Governments proved responsive, arrangements might be made to associate them even more closely with the Centre's work. Eventually they might, perhaps, if they wished, be admitted to full participation in all the Centre's activities. There would seem to be great advantage in an endeavour on these lines to make Anglo-American control over supplies and distribution, which will presumably have to remain in being in the Middle East until some considerable time after the end of the war, more acceptable to the local Governments by a progressive process of consultation and partnership, accompanied where possible by a gradual relaxation of restrictions. Finally, as a long-term objective, it may be found desirable to establish a Middle East Economic Council as a consultative body representative of the Middle East Governments and of other Governments with major interests in this region, but His Majesty's Government have not thought it necessary to reach a decision on this latter point at the present stage.

17. You should not approach the United States authorities on the lines suggested in paragraphs 15 and 16 above pending further instructions, but I shall be glad to receive your Lordship's observations by telegram on the points mentioned in this despatch, together with your recommendations on the question whether, in the light of your comments on the point raised in paragraph 13 above, a definite invitation should be issued to some member or members of the State Department by name. I would prefer to invite a member of the State Department, rather than some personal representative of the President.

18. Finally, I enclose, but not for communication to the United States authorities, the first draft of a memorandum<sup>(1)</sup> regarding British policy in the Middle East, prepared here as a possible basis of discussion with any American official who may be designated to take part in these proposed Middle East conversations. I shall be glad to receive by despatch any observations which you may wish to offer regarding its contents. It does not, as you will notice, deal with Egypt or the Suez Canal, since these are questions on which the State Department appear sufficiently to understand our attitude.

19. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Minister of State and to His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



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**CONFIDENTIAL**

(16570)

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respecting

# EASTERN AFFAIRS

## PART 55

October to December 1943



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**FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING  
EASTERN AFFAIRS**

PART 55.—OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 1943.

**CHAPTER I.—AFGHANISTAN.**

[E 6153/6153/97]

No. 1

*Sir F. Wylie to Mr. Eden.—(Received 14th October.)*

(No. 33.)  
Sir,

Kabul, 1st July, 1943.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in Foreign Office circular despatch No. L3603/571/405 dated the 9th June, 1938, I have the honour to enclose a copy of the records of leading personalities in Afghanistan duly corrected up to the end of June 1943.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch, without enclosure, to the Secretary of State for India and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.  
F. V. WYLIE.

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Records of Leading Personalities in Afghanistan.*

(The references in brackets are to "Who's Who in Afghanistan, 1936," issued by the General Staff in India.)

1. *Abdul Ahad* (W.W. 4).—Born about 1880. Son of Qazi Ghulam. Brother of W.W. 63. "Sardar-i-Ala," Ismail Khel Ghilzai; owing to long residence in Wardak, is known as "Wardaki." From 1909 to 1916 was Chief Usher (Arzbegi) to the Ameer. Appointed Hakim (Governor) of Kataghan. Was arrested with his brother for complicity in the murder of Ameer Habibullah Khan (1919) and banished, but was later acquitted. In 1922 was appointed A.D.C. to King Amanullah and was a great favourite of his. Sent to Wardak valley during the Mangal rebellion in 1924-25 to maintain loyalty amongst the Wardakis. During Amanullah's absence in Europe was for four months Governor of the Eastern Province, but was relieved and sent to Moscow to meet King Amanullah, it being realised that he was incapable of administering the province. Returned to Kabul July 1928. Officiating Minister of Interior November 1928. Supported Amanullah in his efforts, from Kandahar. Fled with Amanullah to India May 1929 and went to Persia. Returned to Afghanistan December 1929. Elected President of the National Council (Rais-i-Shura) 1930. In November 1931 proceeded to Farah as Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator), Farah and Chakhansur. Returned to Kabul in spring of 1932 and re-elected President, National Council. Is reported to belong to the "Charkhi" family party. Re-elected President of the National Council 1933. Visited Wardak country March 1933 to check pro-Amanullah propaganda. Served on a commission on the Helmand water dispute June 1933. In October



1933 visited North Afghanistan with Prime Minister and others. Re-elected President of National Council 1934, 1935, 1936 and 1937. In 1937 visited Europe for medical treatment. Is suffering from diabetes. Still President of National Council 1943.

Is apparently friendly to members of the British Legation, but does not convey an impression of sincerity.

1A. *Abdul Ahad* (W.W. 5).—Son of Abdul Ahad Khan of Ghazni and brother of W.W. 315. Born 1902 in Kabul. Tajik. He owns property in Kabul and Ghazni. An infantry officer. Was sent to Turkey about 1925 for military training and studied in Military Academy, Istanbul. Returned to Afghanistan via Herat early in 1929; reached Kandahar just after Amanullah fled to India. Returned to Herat. Later joined late King Nadir Khan in Southern Province and took part in fighting there. Appointed Officer Commanding, Arq, after Nadir's succession. Appointed General Officer Commanding, Kandahar, in 1930. Has more than once been congratulated by the King on his good work as General Officer Commanding, Kandahar. Attended manoeuvres in Delhi, January 1935. After his return held frequent field parades of Kandahar garrison and started seriously to learn English, of which he spoke little. Appointed General Officer Commanding, Herat, in June 1935. Came to Kabul, was received by the King and returned to Kandahar and left to take up his new appointment. An intelligent little man, with a great sense of humour, he is a keen student of his profession and from all accounts a capable commander. Popular and loyal. Speaks Turkish well. Was very friendly to British Military Attaché on his visit to India and was much impressed by the friendliness and hospitality of British officers he met. In 1936 he visited Musabad on the Persian frontier to select a site for a post in area given to Afghanistan by the Boundary Commission. Trained men in ambulance work. Takes an interest in medical work and rewards doctors who have done good work. His brother joined Abdul Majid (W.W. 72-A) in Herat for his tour in Europe. Popular in Herat. Appointed commander in Farah Province during Helmand water dispute. Sister married to W.W. 553 in 1936. Royal appreciation presumably in connexion with services in Helmand water dispute. A very hospitable man, polite and enlightened, prepared to discuss any subject but not very communicative on military matters. Appears keen on his profession and anxious to improve training and equipment of the army. Professes loyalty for Central Afghan Government and Government of Herat. Said he was impressed by his visit to Indian manoeuvres in 1935 and with British methods. Reported that he exercised more influence than the Governor of Herat. In absence of the Governor of Herat, he and Mohammad Ali Khan officiated as Governors jointly. He opened a school in Robat-i-Ghurian where officers learn English. Formed a local intelligence corps in Ghurian. Transferred from command of Herat forces, appointed Governor of Ghazni 1937. Inhabitants of Katawaz are said to have confidence in him; has some influence with the various tribal leaders. Accused Indian Government of intrigue with the Ghilzais. Detailed men in Katawaz for pro-Government propaganda. Bribed Suleiman Khel visitors to keep away from rebels. Warned Suleiman Khel against Fakir of Ipi, whom he called a "British agent" working against Afghan interests. Visited Turkey in 1942 for medical treatment and returned in 1943. His visit to Turkey is thought to have had some political motive. Commandant of an infantry division in the Kabul army corps (1943).

2. *Abdul Aziz* (W.W. 10).—"Sardar-i-Ala," Barakzai. Son of Mazullah Khan and nephew of the Ulya Hazrat. Born 1876. Appointed Yawar (equerry) to the Ameer in 1919. Amin-ul-Wajuh (octroi superintendent) 1920. Went to Kandahar in November 1920 to raise new battalions for the Ameer. His recruiting caused much discontent. Returned to Kabul January 1921 and appointed Minister for Home Affairs. Also appointed Ishaq Aghasi Mulki (Civil Chamberlain) to the King. Appointed Naib-ul-Hukumah (Governor) of Kandahar in December 1921, relieved early in 1923, but did not return to Kabul until the middle of 1924. Appointed to officiate as Minister of War 1924-25. Appointed Minister of Interior, June 1925. Accompanied Amanullah to Kandahar in 1929, where he acted as Governor, March and April. Fled with Amanullah to India 1929. Was one of the few men really trusted by Amanullah and was a great favourite of his. Went to Meshed. Returned to Kabul November 1929. As a friend of Muhammad Wali was suspected by Nadir and was deported to Jalalabad the 4th August, 1930; brought back the 20th August and confined in the Arq. Was released in January 1931. Was placed under

surveillance in connexion with Ghulam Nabi's plot in November 1932. Still (1943) in Kabul, unemployed. A good Persian scholar and very conceited; suspected to be pro-Amanullah.

3. *Abdul Aziz Khan* (W.W. 13).—Son of the late Ghulam Haidar Charkhi. Born 1891. Brother of Ghulam Siddiq (W.W. 309). Was a lieutenant-colonel (Kandak Mishar) of artillery. Was on the Asmar front in 1919. Commanding Arandu October 1919. Promoted Ghund Mishar (brigadier) and proceeded to Mazar-i-Sharif June 1920. General Officer Commanding, Kunar Valley, 1922. Hakim (Governor) of Laghman 1923-24. Under-Secretary to the Minister of the Interior 1926. Officiated as Home Minister 1927. Governor of Mazar November 1928. Wounded and imprisoned in Mazar-i-Sharif by Saqavis February 1929. Sent to Kabul March 1929 but escaped. Arrived Quetta and left for Meshed July 1929. Returned to Kabul, via India, April 1930. Left Kabul by air on the 20th July, 1930, to visit his brother Ghulam Nabi (deceased) in Angora. Accompanied ex-King Amanullah to Mecca in 1931. One of the Amanullah party in Europe. Lived some time in Constantinople at No. 110, Grande Rue de Sisti, but left for Berlin when Amanullah was in Mecca in 1935. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. In September 1935 was at Constantinople, but was expelled from Turkey that month and left for Germany.

4. *Abdul Hadi Khan* (W.W. 38).—Dawi Kakar of Kandahar. Son of Abdul Ahad, a Hakim (Governor) of Kandahar. Member of the Afghan Peace Delegation June 1919. Formerly editor of the *Aman-i-Afghan*. Assistant to the Foreign Minister as Mustashar (counsellor) in charge of Indian Affairs. Member of the Afghan delegation, Mussoorie Conference 1920. Arrived Kushk November 1920 with a mission to enquire into the position of the Afghan consul. Appointed Afghan representative at Bokhara. Returned to Kabul July 1921 and resumed his duties in the Foreign Office. Appointed Minister in London January 1922. Relieved August 1924. On return was appointed Minister of Commerce. Was suspected of "Republican" intrigues during Amanullah's absence in Europe 1928. Went to Russia for three months in 1928 in connexion with Russo-Afghan trade. Retired from Ministry of Commerce in October 1928 to become a candidate for the National Assembly. Joined Amanullah in Kandahar and fled with him to India May 1929. Resided in Karachi and returned to Kabul in November 1929. Appointed Afghan Minister in Berlin December 1929. Resigned in March 1931, as he considered the attitude of the Afghan Government was too friendly to His Majesty's Government. Went to Mecca in 1931. Reported to have met ex-King Amanullah in Venice March 1932. In May 1932 returned to Kabul after performing pilgrimage to Mecca. Was closely watched by Afghan Government, who doubted his loyalty. In 1933 (December) was arrested and imprisoned on suspicion of pro-Amanullah activities. Still (1943) in jail in Kabul. Has the reputation of being an ardent Nationalist and particularly anti-British, but financially honest. Has also been reported to be pro-Russian.

In June 1935 reported to be sending letters from jail to the Republican party in Kabul, advising them to look to Britain rather than Russia for help.

King Zahir Shah is said to have announced grant of money to his relatives who interviewed him in August 1935.

5. *Abdul Hakim Khan* (W.W. 43).—Was a junior under-secretary at the Afghan Foreign Office; transferred as a junior under-secretary to the Ministry of Education in 1923. Appointed secretary to Afghan Legation in Rome, February 1927. Appointed second secretary, Afghan Legation, Berlin, May 1931. Assistant secretary in western branch of Afghan Foreign Office in 1934 and 1935. Was Rais of the Afghan representatives at Joint Commission at Chaman in April/July 1936. Governor of Eastern Province in September 1939.

6. *Abdul Husain Khan* (W.W. 47).—Mirza. Son of late Abdul Aziz. Born and educated in Persia. Accompanied his father to Tehran in 1920. Was Under-Secretary in Charge of Reception and Visa Branch of Afghan Foreign Office January 1924. Dismissed in August 1925, partly for taking heavy commission on goods purchased in India for Afghan Government. Director of Afghan Transport Company, Kabul, 1926. Appointed consul-general, Delhi. In business in Karachi 1929. Returned to Kabul November 1929. Appointed Afghan Minister in Rome and presented credentials the 17th May, 1930. Afghan delegate to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva 1931-32. Attended Disarmament Conference, Geneva, during 1933, and seemed very friendly with Litvinov.



Transferred as Ambassador to Moscow during 1933. Brought the body of the late Sardar Muhammad Aziz Khan to Kabul in June 1933 and returned to Moscow in December.

Speaks quite good English and has many friends in India, where he spent some time during the Great War.

Visited Kabul September 1935, then returned to Moscow.

Reported to have pro-Amanullah leanings.

Returned to Kabul July 1938. Appointed Minister of Public Works, October 1938. Appointed Minister of Posts and Telegraphs 1940. Suspected of intrigues with enemy 1942-43. Left for Washington in April 1943 to take up newly created post of Afghan Minister there.

7. *Abdul Jamil Khan* (W.W. 49).—Firqa Mishar (major-general), Khwaja of Kulangar, Logar. Cousin of Haji Nawab Khan (W.W. 472).

Held the post of Hakim (Governor) at Asmar for a short time during the reign of Amanullah. Joined Shah Mahmud (W.W. 414) during the revolution 1929. Appointed Commandant of Police, Kabul, November 1929. Appointed officiating Governor of Kabul, April 1931. In July 1931 was sent to the Hazarajat on temporary duty in connexion with the Ghilzai-Hazara dispute. In November 1931 went to Mukur in connexion with the effort to effect the surrender of Abdur Rahman (W.W. 99), which was successful. Appointed officiating Governor of Mazar, December 1931. Recalled to Kabul in November 1934 owing to complaints of his corruption. 1936 unemployed in Kabul. Said to lack character and ability. His loyalty to the Yahya Khel régime is questionable. Still (1943) unemployed in Kabul.

8. *Abdul Karim Khan* (W.W. 52).—Barakzai. Son of Qazi Saad-ud-din Khan. A grandson of the late Khan-i-Mulah Khan, chief Qazi of Afghanistan.

Naib-ul-Hukmah (Governor) of Jalalabad from February 1903 till early in 1905, when he was summoned to Kabul and imprisoned. Was subsequently appointed Inspector-General of Education at Kabul. In 1914 was Governor of Hazarajat. Was unemployed in 1917. Arrested in 1919 with his son, Azim Jan, and accused of having attempted to murder the Ameer. Azim Jan was reported to have been executed. In 1921 promoted civil brigadier and appointed Hakim (Governor) of Ghazni. In January 1922 took over governorship of the Eastern Province. November 1923 appointed Governor of Turkestan. November 1928 appointed Governor of Kandahar. In March 1929 went to Hazarajat and raised a force of Hazaras. Was in Kabul when Nadir Shah entered the city, but absconded to India. In the spring of 1932 returned to Kabul, and was arrested on account of pro-Amanullah activities in November and his property attached. Released in March 1933 and property restored.

Was said to be extremely corrupt and pro-Russian.

Did not come to notice again until 1935, when he was reported to have recently founded a general trading company called the Shirkat-i-Karimi, in Kabul, and to be negotiating for trade facilities with Japanese companies. Trying to live down his reputation of being pro-Amanullah, but is not trusted by the Afghan Government. Unemployed, except as a trader (1943).

9. *Abdul Majid*, alias *Abdul Majidoff* or *Hakimoff* (W.W. 73).—Tarak of Herat. Born about 1902. Son of Abdul Hakim. A man of no important family. Was at one time an official in the customs office in Herat, from where in 1920 he went to Moscow and was at one time attached to the Afghan Embassy there. Started business in Moscow, and made a considerable amount of money by exporting and importing contraband goods with the connivance of the customs officials. In about 1930 he settled in Berlin. Was recalled to Kabul in 1933 by the Afghan Government to organise and manage the Ashami Company. Prior to proceeding to Berlin he is believed to have had a considerable amount of his property confiscated by the Soviet Government. Believed by some to have Soviet tendencies, but this has been officially denied by the Afghan Government. Has tact and is a capable business man.

In spring 1935 carried out an extensive business tour in Northern Afghanistan. Speaks Russian and German.

Has a wife and four children in Berlin.

In January 1936 managing director of the Afghan National Bank and Ashami Company. In 1936 went to Europe to arrange for trade credits and contacts. Is an ardent Nationalist in his trade negotiations and the most important business man in Afghanistan. Largely responsible for the introduction of the monopoly system and formation of various trading companies. Was

also responsible for the propaganda part of the issue of the new currency notes (1935-36). Still in Europe (December 1937) negotiating loans and trade credits and purchasing machinery and armaments. Attended Nazi Congress meeting in Nuremberg in 1937.

Returned to Kabul, March 1938. Appointed Minister of Trade, September 1938. Proceeded to Delhi December 1938 for trade discussions with the Government of India. Appointment changed to Minister for National Economy, April 1939. Left Kabul January 1941 for United States but changed plans at Karachi and went to Germany for medical treatment. Ill and in Switzerland 1943. Shows reluctance to return to Afghanistan but still advises Afghan Government on economic matters. In 1943 sent 210,000 Afghanis for distribution as charity amongst bank employees. His financial affairs in Afghanistan are believed to be controlled by Government.

10. *Abdul Tawab Khan* (W.W. 124).—Muhammadzai. Son of late Mahmud Tarzi. Born 1902. Went to Europe for education October 1921. Admitted Saint-Cyr early in 1924 and completed a course of nearly three years' duration there. Spent one year with a French cavalry regiment. Head of Cavalry School, Kabul, 1928. Accompanied King Amanullah to Europe 1928. Escaped from Kabul to Peshawar with Inayatullah (W.W. 366) by British aeroplane January 1929 and went to Europe. Married (1931) in Istanbul Zakiri Khanum, daughter of a retired Turkish naval captain. Still (1943) in Europe and a member of Amanullah's party. Speaks French fluently and is a smart-mannered man, of whom more may be heard in the future. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933.

11. *Abdul Wahab* (W.W. 126).—Muhammadzai. Son of the late Mahmud Tarzi. Born about 1900. Accompanied his father to the Afghan Mussoorie Conference 1920. Left Kabul for London with despatches August 1921. Educated at Exeter College, Oxford. On return to Kabul was appointed to a branch of the Foreign Office. Went to Kandahar at the time of Amanullah's abdication and acted as Foreign Minister there. Accompanied Amanullah on his flight to India and left India with him. Has since lived in Europe. In Rome September 1934 and in close attendance on the ex-King. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. In October 1935 was living in Istanbul. In Rome December 1936.

12. [Nil.]

13. *Abdur Rahim Khan* (W.W. 89).—Naib Salar (general). Safi of Reza, Kohistan. Son of Abdul Qadir Khan. Born about 1886 in Kohistan. Brother-in-law of Muhammad Husain, accountant under Ameer Habibullah Khan, who was executed by King Amanullah Khan.

Appointed to Sar-i-Os (commander of the Royal bodyguard) by Ameer Habibullah at age of 16. Served for five years in Kabul. Afterwards was for ten years supervisor of bridge construction in the Eastern Province. Promoted Ghund Mishar (brigadier) (1921) and posted to the Cavalry Kandak of the Herat army. Recalled to Kabul about 1927. Later transferred to Mazar-i-Sharif as Ghund Mishar of the Cavalry Ghund. On outbreak of the 1928 revolution returned to Kabul and joined Bacha-i-Saqao in Charikar during the latter's second attempt to capture Kabul January 1929. Sent by Bacha-i-Saqao to Mazar-i-Sharif to organise a revolution. He deposed the Governor and left for Maimana, and thence for Herat, which he reached on the 4th May, 1929, after defeating some Herati forces under Muhammad Ghaus (W.W. 262). In May appointed Civil and Military Governor by Bacha-i-Saqao and reappointed later by Nadir Shah October 1929. Said to be very popular with the Heratis and to be governing his province well. His loyalty to the Central Government was at one time uncertain, while the form of administration he set up in Herat was reported (1930) to show signs of Soviet influence. After the success of Shah Mahmud (W.W. 414) in the spring of 1931 in Kataghan and Badakhshan, he seems to have decided to submit to Nadir Shah, and sent his son, Abdul Halim Khan (W.W. 43A), to Kabul in August. He returned in September, accompanied by Firqa Mishar (Major-General) Muhammad Shuaib Khan (W.W. 611A), who had been appointed General Officer Commanding, Herat, and a Mustafi (revenue official). In August 1932 visited Kabul, and in September was confirmed in appointment of Naib-ul-Hukmah (Governor), Herat.

Dealt firmly with an attempt to incite the Herat garrison to mutiny in 1933. Met the Prime Minister at Maimana at time of Nadir Shah's assassination and gave his allegiance to King Zahir Shah. Appointed head of Perso-Afghan Boundary Commission September 1934.



In 1935 reported to be anti-Russian. Owns a large estate in Kushk.

Arrived in Kabul in June 1935 and appointed Minister of Public Works. A man of great personality who governed his province well. While he was in Herat rumour was always rife about him: that he was pro-Russian; that he intended to set up an independent kingdom; that he was pro-Republican; that the Afghan Government intended to remove him, &c. His loyalty is doubtful, and he is a man who may play an important rôle should the present régime collapse. In July 1935 awarded 150 acres of land near Kabul. Was being closely watched by the Government (1936), as he was suspected of pro-Amanullah tendencies or disloyalty to the Afghan Government.

Reported as being connected with the Republican party. Appointed Assistant to the Prime Minister with status of a Cabinet Minister (1938), which post he still holds (1943). Suspected of intrigues with enemy legations 1943 and still being carefully watched by Afghan Government.

14. *Abdur Rahman Khan* (W.W. 99).—Tarak, Ghilzai. Son of Sher Jan, who was a refugee in India from Amir Abdur Rahman.

Was a resident of Loralai, Baluchistan, for about forty years, and is known as "Abdur Rahman of Loralai." Received the title of "Khan Sahib" and an allowance of 75 rupees *per mensem* from the Government of India. Applied for permission to proceed to Afghanistan in 1929. This was granted on condition that he obtained the sanction of the Afghan Government of the time. Was given six months' advance of his allowance as final acquittance and left for Afghanistan in the early part of May 1930. Was met by a large body of Ghilzais of all sections, and gave out that he had come to Afghanistan "in order to see that his tribe got their rights." A series of minor hostile acts on the part of the Ghilzais under Abdur Rahman culminated in an attack on Kalat-i-Ghilzai at the beginning of October 1930. This was unsuccessful. After several abortive attempts to persuade Abdur Rahman to come in, it was decided in December 1930 to use force. An attempt was made to capture him at Aoband, but he escaped. He then went into hiding to avoid capture by Nadir Shah's troops. Remained at large until November 1931, when the Afghan Government made determined efforts to effect his surrender and succeeded in getting him to come in under safe conduct without having to resort to the employment of force. Was brought to Kabul by Pir Ali Haidar (W.W. 171A), where he was pardoned by the King, given 6,000 rupees and a house in Kabul, where he now lives.

A man of considerable influence amongst Ghilzais. Reported to be pro-Amanullah, and is still under surveillance on this account. He periodically visits Chaharbagh.

15. *Abdus Samad Khan* (W.W. 118).—Tajik.

Secretary of Afghan Legation in London; returned to Kabul May 1925, visiting Mecca *en route*, and appointed a junior Under-Secretary in the Afghan Foreign Office. His post was abolished, owing to economies of budget of April 1926, and he was thrown out of employment. Appointed a member of Afghan deputation to Ibn Saud's All-Muslim Conference, May 1926. Appointed First Secretary to Afghan Legation, Paris, October 1926, and left in that month for Paris. Appointed to the Foreign Office as Assistant Secretary, November 1928; transferred to the Protocol Branch, Foreign Office, Kabul, February 1931. Appointed Minister at Rome, and left to take up appointment in February 1936. Represented King Zahir Shah at coronation in London, 1937. Still in Rome, 1943.

An intelligent man possessing good manners. Speaks English.

16. *Ahmad Ali Jan (or Khan)* (W.W. 140).—Sardar, Muhammadzai. Born 1899. Son of Suleiman Khan and cousin of the late King Nadir Shah. Brother of Ali Shah Khan. Appointed A.D.C. to King Amanullah 1923, but incurred his displeasure by marrying, without his approval, a daughter of Prince Musa Khan (W.W. 461A). Governor of Jalalabad in 1923-24. Imprisoned by Bacha-i-Saqao in April 1929, but was released in October. Appointed Minister in Paris, November 1929, and transferred to London, June 1931. Represented Afghanistan at the Economic Conference, London, 1933. Relieved in July 1933 and appointed Minister of Education. Returned to Kabul in October 1933. In 1936 Minister of Education. Left Kabul in November 1937 on appointment as Ambassador at Tehran.

Is a pleasant man, a keen sportsman, but not very capable. Appears to be lazy. Is said to be pro-British and is always very friendly to members of the British Legation, Kabul. His wife was educated in England and speaks and

writes English perfectly. He himself speaks English, French and Urdu. Has a son born about 1926. Appointed Minister in London (1939). Still (1943) Minister in London.

17. *Ahmad Ali Khan* (W.W. 141).—Firqa Mishar (major-general). Tajik. Son of Abdul Wahid Khan. Born 1886. Known as Ahmad Ali Khan "Lodin."

Appointed Afghan agent at Bombay January 1917. Was in Kabul March 1919. Appointed Afghan consul in Peshawar November 1919, but was not permitted to enter British territory. Wrote to Ameer saying this was due to his having been Mehmandar (entertainment officer) to the Russians in Kabul. Appointed Sarhaddar (frontier officer) at Dakka September 1920. Relieved in March 1921, but remained as a political officer. Was said to be much trusted by the Ameer, who refused to listen to complaints against him. Relieved and returned to Kabul November 1921. Appointed Hakim-i-Kalan (Governor), Kohistan, December 1921. Was Governor of the Eastern Province during the crisis over the Landi Kotal murders, and organised pursuit of Ardali and Daud Shah (W.W. 237). Governed his province harshly and disgraced Mir Zaman of Kunar. Appointed Minister, Berlin, September 1925. Returned to Kabul 1927. Chief of Kabul Municipality, November 1928. Sent to Charikar to raise recruits, December 1928, but failed. Fled with Amanullah to India, May 1929, and with Inayatullah to Persia. Returned to Kabul, December 1929. Officiating Minister of Court, January 1930. Deputy War Minister, April 1930. Appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator), Kataghan and Badakhshan, July 1930. Relieved by Naib Salar (General) Muhammad Ghaus Khan (W.W. 262) and went to Mazar-i-Sharif as Deputy Governor. On departure of Muhammad Yakub Khan (W.W. 675) in May 1931 to Russia for medical treatment, was appointed to officiate as Rais-i-Tanzimieh, Northern Provinces. Returned to Kabul, January 1932, and appointed First Muin (secretary equivalent to adjutant-general), War Office. Granted (1935) some of the Charki family land.

A clever, capable man, with considerable force of character. Whilst in India proved courteous, able and sensible. Always smartly turned out, and is said to be one of the most capable of the Afghan army officers. Speaks German and is popular with the German instructors, whose methods he is said to prefer to those of the Turkish instructors. His attitude to the British is difficult to gauge, but he is invariably courteous. Has been reported to be pro-Amanullah. Said to be corrupt and a flatterer. Still Rais-i-Urdu (adjutant-general) 1943.

18. *Ahmad Shah Khan* (W.W. 149).—Sardar, Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Muhammad Asaf Khan. Born at Dehra Dun 1889. Returned to Afghanistan 1901. Accompanied Ameer Habibullah Khan to India in 1907. On the night of the murder of Ameer Habibullah Khan (1919) was in command of the guard. The sepoy of the Ghund-i-Ardalian (an infantry unit), whose colonel, Ali Shah Reza, was executed as the actual murderer, believed that Ahmad Shah Khan was the real murderer and that their colonel had been made a scapegoat. It is stated, however, on excellent authority that the actual murderer was not Ahmad Shah Khan. Married a sister of the late Shaghassai Ali Ahmad Khan, one time Wali of Kabul. Was an A.D.C. of ex-King Amanullah. Went to Europe via India in 1929 with a message from Bacha-i-Saqao to Nadir Khan. Returned to Kabul early 1930. Appointed Wazir-i-Darbar (Minister of Court) April 1930. In March 1932 went on pilgrimage to Mecca as representative of the King and negotiated a "Treaty of Friendship" with Saudi Arabia. Visited India in the spring of 1933 for medical treatment, where he married a second wife. His eldest daughter was married to King Zahir Shah in November 1931. Speaks English and Urdu and is a pleasant, well-mannered and easy-going man. In 1934 was reported to be on bad terms with the Premier. Visited India in November 1936. His four sisters were married to—

- (a) Late King Nadir Shah.
- (b) Late Muhammad Aziz Khan, brother of (a).
- (c) N. S. Abdul Ghani Khan (W.W. 34).
- (d) Muhammad Akbar Khan (W.W. 161).

Went to Tehran for the wedding celebrations of the Crown Prince of Iran (1939). Still Wazir-i-Darbar (1943).

19. *Ali Muhammad Khan Mirza* (W.W. 179).—A brother-in-law of the Ameer Habibullah. Travelled in Europe, and on return (1923) was appointed as



assistant in the Ministry of Education. In 1925 promoted Under-Secretary, Ministry of Education. Appointed Minister at Rome, February 1927. Was with Amanullah in London March 1928. Minister of Commerce November 1928. A member of Bacha-i-Saqao's "Council for the Maintenance of Order" February 1929. Appointed Minister of Education November 1929. In June 1933 was appointed Afghan representative at the Economic Conference, London, and in July was appointed Afghan Minister, London. Appointed Minister in Switzerland and representative of Afghanistan to the League of Nations February 1935, but was still in London in June 1935. Selected to represent Afghanistan at the Fourth International Hospital Conference in Rome in May 1935. Summoned to Kabul July 1935, and arrived there the same month via Moscow and Termez. Returned to London via India in October. Speaks English and is intelligent and capable.

Represented King Zahir Shah at funeral of King George V in London January 1936.

Returned to Kabul (1938) and appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. Visited Tehran (1939) for the wedding celebrations of the Crown Prince of Iran and to attend the meeting of the Council of the Saadabad Pact. Is still (1943) Minister for Foreign Affairs. Not a strong character and not sufficiently influential to be able as Foreign Minister to make important decisions. Professes to be pro-British in his sympathies.

19A. *Ali Shah Khan* (W.W. 180).—Mohammadzai, Naib Salar and Sardar-i-Ali, son of Mohammad Sulaiman Khan, first cousin of late King Nadir Shah. Son-in-law of S. Musa Khan (W.W. 461A) and brother of Ahmad Ali Khan (W.W. 140). Was commandant of military schools and the military college from 1932 to 1939. Appointed Governor and General Officer Commanding, Kandahar, in 1939. In August 1941 he was transferred to the Southern Province as Governor (Rais-i-Tenzimia) and General Officer Commanding Southern Province army corps and promoted to the rank of Naib Salar (general). He is a pleasant, rather easy-going individual, but has not been very successful as an administrator in the Southern Province.

20. *Allah Nawaz* (W.W. 182).—Indian of Multan. Son of Khan Bahadur Rab Nawaz Khan, honorary magistrate, Multan. As a student in Lahore ran away to Afghanistan. In Jalalabad (1920) was an assistant editor of the *Ittihad-i-Mashriqi*. A superintendent of schools, Jalalabad Circle. Was agent of the Indian Revolutionary party in Afghanistan and Tashkent and channel of communication between them and the Hindustani Fanatics. In 1927 was employed by the Deutsch-Afghanische Company as an interpreter. Helped Nadir Shah in his advance on Kabul 1929. Appointed Minister of Court October 1929, and equerry November 1929. Was appointed to supervise the work on Dar-ul-Aman May 1930. In July 1930 accompanied the Minister of Justice (W.W. 256) to Ghazni for negotiations with the Suleiman Khel, in which he is reputed to have done well. Left Kabul for Europe via India in April 1931, ostensibly for medical treatment, returning to Kabul in November 1931. In March 1932 again went to Europe for the same reason, and returned in January 1933. In June 1933 was appointed Minister of Public Works, but spent most of the year in the Southern Province in connexion with the disturbances there. Left Kabul on visit to Europe, ostensibly for medical treatment December 1933, but in reality, it is believed, to enquire about the trial of Said Kemal, the murderer of Sardar Muhammad Aziz, and to discuss affairs of State with Sardar Shah Wali Khan (W.W. 585). Popular rumour in Kabul said he had been sent to assassinate ex-King Amanullah. In spite of rumours that he was returning to Kabul, was still (1935) in Europe. Appointed Minister, Berlin, 1935, but was not at first accepted by the German Government owing to his being the representative at the trial of Said Kemal. Was devotedly attached to the late King Nadir Shah. His life has been threatened by the Amanullah party. Trusted by the Prime Minister (W.W. 337), who considers him very capable. Travelled to Kabul by German monoplane (August 1937). Returned to Germany with his family (October 1937).

Again visited Kabul (1938) and returned to Germany. Played an important part in the Government's efforts to quell the Suleiman Khel rising of 1938. Visited Kabul in 1940 via Russia. Said to be anti-British. Is still (1943) Minister in Berlin.

21. *Amanullah Khan* (W.W. 183).—Ex-King of Afghanistan, third son of the Ameer Habibullah Khan by the Ulya Hazrat (W.W. 346). Born the 1st June, 1892. In 1914 married Souriya, daughter of the late Sardar Mahmud Tarzi.

In 1916 was reported to be friendly with the German mission in Kabul and in favour of intervention in the war against Britain. When the Court moved to Jalalabad in the winter of 1918-19 he remained behind as Governor of Kabul, and was in a very strong position, with control of the arsenal, treasury and stores, when the Ameer was murdered in February 1919. He proclaimed himself Ameer, declared his uncle Nasrullah a usurper, and accused him of complicity in the murder. The troops in Jalalabad and Kabul sided with him and Nasrullah was compelled to submit. On the 27th February was formally crowned by the Tagao Mullah, and in a speech stated that Inayatullah (W.W. 366) had by his recognition of Nasrullah's usurpation forfeited his claim to the throne. On the 13th April held a special durbar in Kabul for the trial of those accused of the Ameer's murder, and at its conclusion a colonel, named Ali Shah Reza, generally regarded as a mere scapegoat, was sentenced to death and was executed. Sardar Nasrullah and others were sentenced to imprisonment for life. Amanullah soon found his position threatened by intrigue on behalf of Inayatullah and the restiveness of the army who were not satisfied with the enquiry made into the murder of Habibullah. The army was therefore despatched to the Indian frontier, in order to divert its attention and to take advantage of the disturbances in India should these develop into open rebellion. The Commander-in-chief apparently exceeded his instructions and precipitated hostilities, which resulted in the Third Afghan War. A variety of considerations led to the grant of lenient terms to Afghanistan, including the recognition of her complete independence. As a result Amanullah Khan was able to claim that he had won the freedom of his country by the sword, and, by the conclusion of treaties with a number of European countries, that he had brought about the recognition of Afghanistan on a basis of equality by the Great Powers. These tactics gained him considerable prestige, both in his own country and throughout the East. This prestige tended to increase his natural vanity and render him impatient of advice. Through his wife he had been brought under "Young Turk" influence, and he proceeded to carry out a fantastically rapid programme of reform without regard for the backwardness and prejudice of his people, particularly the mullahs. He failed to profit by the warning sounded by several rebellions, the most serious of which was the Khost rising of 1924, and continued to spend his revenues on schemes for social or educational progress, whilst neglecting his army. These tendencies were exaggerated as a result of his European tour of 1927-28, and particularly, it is believed, as a result of his visit to Mustafa Kemal at Angora. In the autumn of 1928 the Shinwaris rose in revolt and were soon followed by other tribes. Bacha-i-Saqao, a brigand of low birth, attacked Kabul in December 1928 and again in January 1929. Amanullah announced his abdication in favour of Inayatullah on the 14th January and fled to Kandahar a day or two later. At Kandahar attempted to rally support for Durrani dynasty and formally rescinded his abdication. In April he advanced on Kabul, but owing to the hostility of the Ghilzais was repulsed near Ghazni and defeated at Mukur. Arrived at Chaman with his family on the 23rd May, and sailed from Bombay for Italy on the 22nd June, 1929. Visited Mustafa Kemal in Angora in February 1930, returning to Italy. Revisited Turkey again for three months in June. Left Constantinople hurriedly for Italy. Returned to Turkey in September, but went back and spent the winter in Italy. Left Naples for Jedda to perform pilgrimage on the 5th April, 1931, with the object of either rehabilitating himself in Moslem eyes, or concerting measures for the recovery of his throne. Published a letter decrying King Nadir and his régime. Left Jedda for Suez, the 9th May, 1931. His Mecca party included Muhammad Adib (W.W. 137), brother of Souriya, Abdul Fateh Tarzi (W.W. 20A), the late Ghulam Nabi, Shuja-ud-Daulah (W.W. 612), and two officials of the Angora Embassy, Fazal Ahmad and Abdul Aziz. Returned to Italy, via Alexandria, the 21st May. Left Rome for Switzerland, the 20th June, 1931, stayed at Montreux. Visited Rome in July and returned to Switzerland. Visited Montecatini in September, and was back in Rome by the beginning of November. Left Rome on short visits to Naples in December 1931 and Venice in March 1932. At Venice reported to have met Afghan Minister from Berlin; more likely it was Abdul Hadi Khan (W.W. 38). Said to have definite understandings with Soviet and Persia and to have many friends in Germany. Constant rumours of his whereabouts and intentions were circulated among the tribes on both sides of the border during 1932, culminating in one, which was put about during the Dare Khel revolt in November, to the effect that he was in Gardez. The ex-King was, however, in Italy or Switzerland throughout the year. He was reported to be writing his autobiography, and to be going to Russia when he had finished it to have it published by the Soviet.



This has never materialised. In Europe he has constantly intrigued against the present Afghan régime with a view to regaining his throne. In July 1933 he visited Constantinople and held a meeting of his principal supporters there. Reported to have tried, unsuccessfully, to obtain Soviet support to his efforts. The execution of the late Ghulam Nabi, one of his chief adherents, intensified his hostility against the Yahya Khel. Members of his party were responsible for the assassinations of King Nadir Shah (Kabul 1933) and his brother Muhammad Aziz (Berlin 1933) and are active in intriguing on Amanullah's behalf. His chief supporter in Europe is Ghulam Siddiq (W.W. 309), a brother of the late Ghulam Nabi. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. Receives an annual allowance of about £150 a month from the Italian Government. In March 1935 again performed the pilgrimage to Mecca, where he met a number of sympathisers, especially Indians, but appears to have effected little. Returned to Rome, where he normally lives. Since then his adherents in Europe and Asia have been active in spreading propaganda against the present Afghan régime amongst the North-West Frontier tribes. He owns property in Switzerland, which he occasionally visits. Has three sons and four daughters. Different opinions are held as to the possibility of his return, but this seems unlikely unless the situation in Afghanistan seriously deteriorates, possibly as the result of further assassinations of members of the present ruling family, or feeling on the Indian side of the border definitely turns in favour of initiating an incursion into Afghanistan on his behalf. Since he has been living in Italy he invariably leaves for Switzerland during the summer months, but, in 1935, instead of going to Switzerland he rented a large house in Stresa in Northern Italy, and took with him his family and Hasan Jan Muhammad, his brother-in-law. Returned to Rome after a short visit to Montreux on the 17th August, and believed to be in Rome (1937). Visited Mecca again in 1935. Rumoured to draw an allowance from Russia. Still in Italy (1943). Reported to have visited Switzerland (1943). After staying at Gstaad and at Villars he returned to Rome. He was accompanied by an Italian mistress.

22. *Asadullah Khan* (W.W. 199).—Sardar, Muhammadzai, Firqa Mishar (major-general). Born 1911. Is a son of the late Ameer Habibullah by the Ulya Janab, sister of the late King Nadir Shah. Is thus a half-brother of ex-King Amanullah and a cousin of King Zahir Shah. Educated at the French school, Kabul, and speaks French fluently. Imprisoned in Kabul by Bacha-i-Saqao in 1929 and grossly ill-treated. In November 1929 visited Lahore for medical treatment. On return was appointed Sar-i-Os (Commander of the Royal Bodyguard) and A.D.C. to the Minister of War. Appointed to officiate as second secretary (equivalent to quartermaster-general) War Office, in addition to his other duties, in December 1930. In 1931 qualified at the Infantry Officers' School, Kabul. Promoted Firqa Mishar and appointed General Officer Commanding, Guards Division, 1933. In 1934 acted as Officer Commanding Infantry Officers' School, in the absence of the German instructor, Major Christenn. Is still (1937) General Officer Commanding, Guards Division, and, as such, in command of the Arq and household troops, including the Hazirbashes (personal bodyguards of the Royal family). He is also in charge of the advanced course for officers. Nervous in manner; appears to be intelligent and to take a keen interest in his command. Is important as the lineal representative of both the "Kabul" and "Peshawar" Sardars. Has a son born in 1934. Unconfirmed reports that he is not entirely loyal to the Yahya Khel have been received from time to time.

Went to Persia to attend the millenary celebrations of the poet Firdausi, October 1934, and returned to Kabul in the same month, having met Reza Shah.

Left Kabul for Europe (March 1937) and represented King Zahir Shah at the Coronation of King George VI. Attended Turkish manoeuvres (August 1937) and returned to Kabul (September 1937).

Appears to take his profession seriously and is popular. Has acquired more *savoir-faire* of recent years. He visited India again in 1939 for medical treatment, and is learning English (1943). He is not a strong character or likely to be a danger to the Yahya Khel régime. He belongs to the faction of W.W. 414 and is on good terms with most of the members of the Royal Family. On the reorganisation of the Kabul Army Corps in 1939 he was relieved of his appointment as General Officer Commanding Guards Division and became Inspector-General of the Afghan Army, an appointment he still holds (1943). He occasionally officiates as Minister of Defence.

23. *Ata Muhammad Khan* (W.W. 207).—Haji, Tokhi. Son of the late Sardar Abdullah Khan, who was Governor of Mazar in the time of Ameer

Habibullah. Order of Astor. Quarrelled with Hashim Khan in the time of Ameer Habibullah. Was in Jalalabad when Ameer Habibullah was murdered; was arrested and condemned to death, but was reprieved at last moment. Again arrested on suspicion of complicity in unsuccessful attempt on Amanullah's life at Paghman in 1920, but released at Mahmud Tarzi's request. Appointed diplomatic representative, Bokhara, but his arrival coincided with the Bolshevik revolt (1920) and he returned to Mazar. Was one of Afghan officials ordered to render secret assistance to Enver Pasha in Central Asia (1922). Unemployed for four years. Appointed Governor of Balkh at time of Amanullah's visit to Mazar (1928) just prior to latter's visit to Europe, and awarded the Order of Astor. During the revolution fought against the Saqavi forces of Abdur Rahim (W.W. 89), was defeated and fled to Tashkent. Accompanied the late Ghulam Nabi in his unsuccessful effort to recapture Northern Afghanistan in April 1929, and again retired to Russian territory. Appears to have returned to Afghanistan soon after Nadir Shah's accession. Was a member of the Commission of Reconstruction sent under Yakub Khan (W.W. 675) to Mazar-i-Sharif in March 1930. Commanded a flying column during operations against Ubrahim Beg 1931. Promoted Firqa Mishar (major-general) and awarded the Order of Astor 2nd class, 1931. Appointed a member of the Council of Nobles December 1931. Visited Mecca in 1932. Has a reputation for courage. Is reported to be pro-Russian. Is now (1943) President of the Council of Nobles. Is reported (1943) to have pro-German sympathies.

24. *Ata-ul-Haq* (W.W. 209).—Born about 1885. Eldest son of the late Khwaja Jan of Serai Khwaja, Koh-i-Daman. Brother of the late Sher Jan and the late Muhammad Sadiq Khan, two of the Bacha-i-Saqao's officials. Lived in India until he was 16. Accompanied Ameer Habibullah on his tour in India 1907. In July 1920 appointed to command at Kalat-i-Ghilzai, and was suspended in March 1923 for inefficient handling of the Wazirs. Took over command of Kandahar Infantry Brigade April 1923. Spent two years in Moscow in charge of Afghan students. Appointed Foreign Minister by Bacha-i-Saqao June 1929. Arrested with Bacha-i-Saqao November 1929 on capture of Kabul by Nadir Shah. Is well educated and possesses pleasant manners.

Was released from jail in 1938.

25. *Badshah Gul I (Fazl-i-Akbar)* (W.W. 224).—Haji Khel, Mohmand. Eldest son of the late Haji of Turangzai (W.W. 257). One of the leading anti-British Mohmands. Has for several years paid occasional visits to Kabul. Is believed to communicate with the Soviet Embassy and the Ghadr party there. Took a prominent part in the Mohmand disturbances of 1933, and acted as intermediary between the Mohmands and Afghan Government. Supported the Faqir of Alingar in his attacks on Loe-Agra in 1935. Is apparently pro-Yahya Khel. Leader of the Mohmands against us in August 1935. Brought to Kabul by the Afghan Foreign Minister September 1935. Is a personal friend of the Prime Minister (W.W. 337). Has two sons at school in Kabul being educated at State expense.

Left Kabul in March 1936 for his home, and Afghan Prime Minister states that he has undertaken to return to Kabul when asked to do so. Whilst in Kabul the Afghan Prime Minister tried to educate him with a view to broadening his outlook, but allowed him to return to Mohmand country after a few months. The mantle of the Haji of Turangzai has fallen on his shoulders.

Visited Kabul in January 1940, and is reported to be engaged in anti-Soviet propaganda in Mohmand territory on behalf of the Afghan Government. Frequently employed by the Afghan Government to assist them in settling Mohmand tribal disputes in the Kunar valley and for propaganda purposes. Anti-Japanese and in 1943 condemned the Indian Congress for their alleged support of Japanese aims in India.

26. *Faiz Muhammad Khan* (W.W. 243).—Sardar, Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan (W.W. 317). Born about 1892. Was secretary to the late Muhammad Aslam Khan, Afghan Envoy, Tashkent. Returned to Kabul March 1920. Adviser to the late Muhammad Wali Khan, Afghan Envoy to Moscow 1920. Returned from Moscow and in charge of arrangements for the Suritz party September 1920. Arrived Tashkent the 5th January, 1921, en route to Moscow. Appointed first counsellor to Muhammad Wali's mission to Europe 1921 which visited London, America, Paris and Rome. First Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office 1922. In addition acted as Minister of Education 1923. Appointed Minister of Education March 1924. A member of Bacha-i-Saqao's



"Council for the Maintenance of Order" April 1929, although at one time the Bacha had condemned him to death. Appointed Foreign Minister by King Nadir Shah November 1929. Went on pilgrimage to Mecca in 1933. Well educated and intelligent, has a good name for honesty in financial matters. Is friendly, insincere and self indulgent, particularly as regards drugs, the use of which renders him incapable of sustained mental effort. Prefers airy discourse of abstract principles to discussion of practical details, and is tiresome when he feels obliged to live up to his reputation as a humorist. Was sent to Eastern Province in September 1935 to dissuade Afghans from joining Mohmand Lashkars. Held a jirga at Dakka, and appears to have achieved some success in his object. Returned to Kabul the 23rd September, taking Badshah Gul I (W.W. 224) with him. Left Kabul December 1935 for an extended European tour.

Visited Iraq and Turkey, where he was well received. Later went to Paris, where he saw M. Flandin, and Geneva. In London was received in audience by The King and had conversations with the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs and India, Mr. Eden and Lord Zetland. Saw Herr Hitler in Berlin and finally reached Kabul in April 1936 via Moscow. Again visited Europe in 1936, and returned in January 1937. Appointed Ambassador to Turkey (1938). Still (1943) Ambassador to Turkey.

27. *Fazl Ahmad Khan* (W.W. 250).—Hazrat Sahib of Chaughatan, Herat. Son of Abdul Wahab and grandson of Hazrat Muhammad Umar Jan of the family of Sirhind Pirs. Born 1892 at Bakharz in East Persia, where his father was in exile. The family returned to Afghanistan in 1902. Qualified as a judge in religious matters. Visited Nadir Shah on his accession in 1929, and was appointed Assistant Minister of Justice 1930, and officiating Minister of Justice *vice* Sher Agha (W.W. 256) in 1932. After Nadir Shah's assassination visited Kandahar to spread propaganda in favour of King Zahir Shah. Appointed Minister of Justice 1934. Member of the joint Perso-Afghan Commission to enquire into the Zorabad (Iran) incident December 1934. His family is influential and receives an allowance from the Afghan Government, but he himself lacks influence and character. He has pleasant manners and is friendly. Married in 1930 a daughter of Sher Agha (W.W. 256). Still (1943) Minister of Justice.

28. *Fazal Ilahi* (W.W. 255).—Indian, Maulvi. Born at Wazirabad, Gujranwala 1882. Son of Haji Miran Bakhsh.

After matriculating from the Scottish Mission School, he joined the Canal Department and was later employed on the North-Western Railway. He had always been religiously inclined, and used to receive instructions in Sufism from Sufi Wali Muhammad of Fatuhi Walla in Lahore District. In 1905 he visited Asmas. In 1907 he resigned his post and devoted himself to the study of the Koran. Accompanied a messenger of the Ameer-ul-Mujahidin on a tour through India in 1908, collecting for the Mujahidin cause. Later he was made trustee of the Muhajidin fund for the Punjab. Still continued to pay occasional visits to Asmas, and at the beginning of 1915 he and his brother facilitated the flight of the Lahore students to the Mujahidin colony. During the Mohmand disturbances of 1915 Fazal Ilahi toured India collecting subscriptions for the Mujahidin who were taking part. On his return to Wazirabad was arrested and interned in Jullundur jail. Released in 1918 and confined to the Wazirabad Tehsil. In the middle of 1920 slipped off to Kabul and thence to the Mujahidin colony at Chamarkand, where with the help of the late Maulvi Bashir he worked for the downfall of Niamatullah, Ameer at Asmas. In 1921 proclaimed himself Ameer of Chamarkand. Was chief instigator of the murder of Ameer Niamatullah. In 1923 a dispute arose between Fazal Ilahi and Maulvi Bashir over the Ameer'ship at Chamarkand, and in November 1925 Maulvi Bashir persuaded the Ameer of Asmas to join with him in evicting Fazal Ilahi. The latter, realising his weakness, abdicated at the beginning of 1926 and proceeded to Asmas. In March 1926 returned to Chamarkand, but did not take charge, the colony being controlled by a committee. In January 1927 the dispute between Maulvi Bashir and Fazal Ilahi was settled by a jirga of mullahs and the late Haji of Turangzai (W.W. 257) at Chamarkand. The settlement and property were divided equally, but Bashir having the larger following was declared Ameer. Joined the Haji during the Mohmand unrest 1927 and May 1930. Was evicted from Dir in 1931. Took part in the Bajaur disturbances of 1932 and worked on behalf of Congress and redshirt prisoners in India. Was summoned to Kabul in April 1932 and interviewed by King Nadir. Remained a bitter enemy of the late Maulvi Bashir, for whose murder in 1934 Fazal Ilahi was believed to be responsible. He

frequently visited Kabul, where he was formerly in touch with the Russian Embassy and Ghadr party, and according to Afghan official information still is so. In 1934 he was reported to be spreading pro-Amanullah propaganda in Kunar. A friend of Fazal Maksim. Was evicted from Chamarkand in January 1935, since when he has been endeavouring to become Ameer of Chamarkand Colony, but in March 1936 his claim was rejected by a large jirga. Is reported (1939) to have left Chamarkand for Waziristan. The ban on his return to India has been removed by the Government of India.

29. *Fazal-i-Umar (Sher Agha)* (W.W. 256).—A member of the family of Sirhind Pirs established in Kabul. Son of Qayum Khan, deceased, Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazar. Assumed the title of Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazar on the death of his elder brother, Sher Agha in 1925, the latter having succeeded to the title on his father's death. In 1926 went on pilgrimage to Mecca and did not return to Kabul, but eventually went to Dera Ismail Khan, where in 1928 he was intriguing against Amanullah. Was expelled from the North-West Frontier Province in March 1928 under Frontier Security Regulations for preaching against the Afghan Government. In September 1928 Amanullah asked him to return to Afghanistan but he refused. After the abdication of King Amanullah he went to the Southern Province where he assisted Nadir Shah. Appointed Minister of Justice November 1929. In July 1930 was sent as Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator) of the Ghazni area and returned to Kabul at the end of August. In June his daughter married Fazal Ahmad Khan, Hazrat Sahib of Chaughatan, Herat (W.W. 250). In December 1931 tendered his resignation and ceased working as Minister. He was reported at this time to be spreading anti-Nadir propaganda. His resignation, however, was not accepted until December 1932. Was granted a visa in December 1932 to proceed to India, from whence he was to have proceeded on pilgrimage to Mecca, but owing to the death of his mother he returned to Kabul. Visited Sirhind, India, in February 1935, and was instructed by the Afghan Government to persuade the Hazrat of Chaharbagh to return to Afghanistan. Reactionary and opposed to progressive reforms. His wholehearted support of King Zahir Shah is therefore doubtful, and he is not trusted by the Afghan Government. On the other hand, is probably not pro-Amanullah. He appears to have been in favour of "jihad" on behalf of the Mohmands September 1935, when he visited the Southern Province and brought back to Kabul the principal religious leaders, who, after holding meetings in his house, tried to induce the Prime Minister to declare "jihad." Wields great influence amongst the Suleiman Khel Ghilzais. Said to favour friendship with the British as opposed to the Soviet. Is said to be on bad terms with Saïvid Hasan (W.W. 546). Prime Minister doubts his loyalty, and would have liked in 1935 to arrest him, but was afraid to do so. Visited Sirhind (Punjab) on pilgrimage in March 1940.

Given a fort and 70 acres of land in Chahardeh by King Zahir Shah (March 1936). Visited Mecca, 1938. In 1942 expressed a desire for an Allied victory and according to one report asked his followers to pray for such a victory.

30. [Nil.]

31. *Fazal Rahim* (see *Rasul Jan, Agha*).

32. *Ghaus-ud-Din* (W.W. 264).—Patullah, Ahmadzai, Ghilzai. Son of the late Jehandad Khan, who was implicated in the Ahmadzai Mangal revolt of 1912, and executed for insolence in 1914. In 1915 was concerned in a conspiracy against Ameer Habibullah with Akram Khan and Azam Khan, sons of the late Ayub Khan. Was confined in Jubbulpore jail. Given permission to return to Afghanistan by ex-King Amanullah. His father's family lands and property were restored to him in November 1920. Arrested March 1924 and detained in the Arq whilst there was trouble in Khost, but later released and proceeded to Khost, where his handling of the Ahmadzai Ghilzais in the Ameer's favour gained him the title of "Mir Afghan." Awarded 1½ lakhs of rupees for his services. Made overtures to the British Government after the flight of Amanullah to Kandahar January 1929. Lent his support to Nadir Khan in the Southern Province and raised a lashkar of Ahmadzais. His treachery, on account of a bribe from Bacha-i-Saqao, was the cause of Nadir Khan's defeat in the Logar Valley in April 1929. Again made overtures to the British Government for support of his claim to the throne. Fled from Hariob to Parachinar at the beginning of October 1929 as a result of the discovery by Nadir Khan that he was in communication with Bacha-i-Saqao. In Delhi under surveillance January 1930, from whence he was removed to Jubbulpore. Deported to Burma in May 1930.



A deceitful, treacherous and untrustworthy man, who is always intriguing for his own ends. Has since been transferred to Kodai Kanal, Madras Presidency, from Burma (1936). Requested permission for his family to return to Afghanistan in 1936, on which the Afghan Government offered to allow him to return also, but on conditions which were unacceptable to him. Offered his assistance to the Afghan Government against Germany and Russia but this was believed to be merely a cloak to cover his real intentions of establishing himself with the Ghilzais.

33. *Ghulam Ahmad Khan* (W.W. 292).—Son of the late Shahghassi Ali Ahmad Jan, and grandson of the late Luinab Khushdil Khan. Married to a niece of Sardar Faiz Muhammad Khan (W.W. 243) in 1927. Appointed aide-de-camp to his father when the latter was Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator) of the Eastern Province in 1924. Left Kabul for Kandahar via Peshawar and Quetta, the 10th March, 1929. Returned to Quetta on his father's arrest by Bacha-i-Saqao and proceeded to Peshawar, September 1929. Returned to Kabul on the accession of Nadir Khan. Accompanied Shah Wali (W.W. 585) to Bombay, December 1929. Returned to Kabul 1930 (April). In January 1932 visited Lahore for medical treatment, returning to Kabul in March. Went into partnership with Chandan Khan, agent for Burma Shell Company, and managed the petrol business in Kabul. Visited India five times during the period April–December 1932. Assistant manager of the Petrol Company of Afghanistan 1933. In March 1935 appointed Deputy Minister of Court. His stepmother, Suraj-ul-Benat, is a sister of ex-King Amanullah. Assistant manager of the new petrol company in 1936. Relieved of his appointment in the Petrol Company in 1938 and appointed Deputy Court Minister, of which appointment he was relieved in July 1938. Fled to Tirah in September 1939, after discovery of a pro-Amanullah plot, in which he was found to be the ringleader. In November 1939 he was surrendered by a Chamkanni jirga to the political agent, Kurram, and lodged with other leaders in Jamrud Fort. Has since (1940) been transferred to Poona and is still there (1943).

34. *Ghulam Faruq Khan* (W.W. 273).—Muhammadzai. Son of the late Sardar Muhammad Usman Khan. Employed in the Afghan Cypher Department 1926. Assistant manager Motorani Company. Arrested with his father at the same time as ex-King Amanullah arrested the Hazrat Sahibs of Shor Bazar, September 1928. Released October 1928. Arrived in Peshawar from Kabul by air February 1929 accompanied by one of the younger Hazrat Sahibs, Sanai Maksum. Returned to Afghanistan with Sardar Hashim Khan March 1929. Later was employed on propaganda work for Hashim Khan in Mohmand country. Arrived Peshawar via Shabkadr, September. Left for Ali Khel via Parachinar October 1929. Appointed Under-Secretary to the Minister of the Interior December 1929. Appointed Governor of the Eastern Province December 1930. In January 1932 married the daughter of Ghulam Muhammad (W.W. 289). His first wife, daughter of the late Sardar Muhammad Aziz Khan, died some time before. In April 1932 was in touch with Afridis and Mohmands, including Badshah Gul (W.W. 224). In July the Safis of Kunar complained of his harsh treatment. Left Jalalabad on the 1st December, 1932, on relief by Muhammad Qasim Khan (W.W. 506) and took over the Governorship of Kandahar. Returned temporarily to Jalalabad in December 1932 to deal with Hassan Khan (W.W. 344), in which he was successful. Did well as Governor of Kandahar and displayed considerable energy. Was awarded the Sardar-i-Ala in January 1933. In July 1935 appointed Governor of Herat in succession to Abdur Rahim. A great favourite of the Prime Minister (W.W. 337). Is capable and hard-working, believed to be loyal to the existing régime. Keen on road and building development (1936). Appointed Governor of Kandahar (1938). Is stated to be in poor health (1939). Relieved of his post of Governor of Kandahar (1939) owing to poor health and appointed officiating Home Minister. In 1941 appointed Governor (Rais-i-Tanzimiah), Kataghan and Badakshan Provinces, and in 1942 returned to Kabul to officiate as Home Minister. Relieved of the appointment of Home Minister later in the year, but retained his appointment as Governor of the Kataghan and Badakshan Provinces which he still holds (1943). Incurred the displeasure of the Prime Minister in 1942 owing to a liaison with the wife of his brother-in-law (a son of W.W. 288). He divorced his wife and, much against the wish of the Royal Family, married the wife of his brother-in-law.

35. *Ghulam Haidar* (W.W. 275).—Mirza, Wardaki. Son of Ghulam Raza, and brother of Mirza Ghulam Muhammad, Wardaki (W.W. 288). Was Afghan Postmaster in Peshawar 1903–19. Trusted by Ameer Habibullah. His office was

one of the centres of espionage in India. Held lucrative post of forwarding agent at Peshawar, but relieved in 1916 by Ali Ahmad Khan. Arrested in Peshawar in May 1919 for violent anti-British intrigue and interned in Burma. Released and returned to Afghanistan on conclusion of peace. Left Kabul on the 29th September, 1920, for Bokhara to act as Afghan Envoy there. In November 1920 he was reported to be head clerk to the special mission to Russia. During March 1921 he returned to Bokhara from Tashkent with Abdul Hadi's mission. Arrived Kabul July 1921. Appointed Under-Secretary in charge of Russia and Turkestan Branch of Foreign Office in 1923. In January 1924 appointed Collector of Customs, Kandahar. Employed as Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Revenue, Kabul, June 1929. Chairman of Trade Disputes in Kabul (1930) and appointed Deputy-Director Posts and Telegraphs early 1931. Relieved of appointment of chairman of Trade Disputes April 1932, and appointed customs officer, Kabul. The main backer of trading firm called Shirkat-i-Umed (December 1932). Appointed customs officer, Herat, 1934. Is married to a sister of Abdul Karim (W.W. 52). Still (1937) customs officer, Herat. Again appointed customs officer at Kabul (1938). Still (1943) customs officer at Kabul.

36. [Nil.]

37. *Ghulam Siddiq Khan* (W.W. 309).—Sardar-i-Ala. Son of the late Sipah Salar (Commander-in-chief) Ghulam Haider, Charkhi. Brother of the late Ghulam Jilani Khan, late Ghulam Nabi and Abdul Aziz (W.W. 13). Born 1894. Assistant to Gul Muhammad Khan, Afghan Envoy in India, October 1919, and a junior member of the Afghan delegation at the Mussoorie Conference. Left Mussoorie with despatches for Kabul June 1920, and was refused readmittance into India owing to his improper behaviour at Mussoorie and intrigues with seditionists. Appointed assistant president to the Muhajarin Committee, Kabul, August 1920. Second counsellor to the Afghan Mission under Wali Muhammad Khan which visited Europe in 1920. Returned from London to Kabul with despatches September 1921. Left again for Europe, via Peshawar, October 1921. Appointed Afghan Minister at Berlin 1922, where he remained until April 1926, when he was relieved by Ahmad Ali (W.W. 141). Visited Angora whilst en route to Kabul from Berlin. Appointed first personal secretary to the King and Minister of Court January 1927. Appointed to officiate as Foreign Minister January 1927 during absence of the late Mahmud Tarzi in Europe. With King Amanullah in Europe in 1928. Appointed Foreign Minister November 1928. Sent to Jalalabad to bargain with the rebels December 1928. Fled with Amanullah to Kandahar January 1929. Despatched to Russia by Amanullah on a special mission March 1929. Assumed the duties of Afghan Minister, Moscow, April 1929. Returned Kabul December 1929. In Mecca June 1930. In Berlin 1930 engaged in anti-Nadir activities. Set out for Afghanistan under promise of free pardon from the King. Arrived in Kabul the 7th March, 1931. Suspected distributing agent of Amanullah's letters in Kabul April 1931. Arrived Berlin the 18th July, 1931, to take up the appointment of Afghan Minister. Worked almost openly against his own Government and Britain during his tenure in Berlin, encouraging anti-British propaganda over the Dokalim Boundary question at the beginning of 1932 and granting a visa to Ishar Singh Ghadrte against the wishes of the Afghan Government. Wrote to Nadir professing his loyalty in July 1932. His brother, the late Ghulam Nabi, was staying with him in July 1932 when he was invited to return to Afghanistan by the King. As a result of the plot discovered when Ghulam Nabi was executed in November 1932, Ghulam Siddiq was dismissed from his appointment. Visited Mecca during spring 1933 and in touch with pro-Amanullah Afghan element amongst the pilgrims. Visited Constantinople in early summer and was in touch with Soviet representative, Bovoroi, through his brother, Abdul Aziz Khan (W.W. 13). Engaged in active pro-Amanullah work in Europe. Visited Berlin in November 1933. Visited Rome in January 1934. In 1934 married Bibi Khurd (W.W. 230), sister of ex-Queen Souriya (W.W. 623). Lives in Berlin (1936), and frequently visits Rome, where he is believed to be in close touch with Amanullah and working hard on his behalf. Receives an annual allowance from the Italian Government. A close personal friend of ex-King Amanullah and greatly trusted by him. Speaks French, German and a little English. Bitterly opposed to present Afghan régime, and now ex-King Amanullah's principal adherent in Europe. Stated to be wealthy and to have money invested with Haji Ghulam Haidar (W.W. 278). Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. Believed willing to work for Italian interests in Asia. Believed to have been involved in spring 1940 in a plot to restore Amanullah with German and Russian assistance.



Plans said to have miscarried owing to disagreement between Germany and Soviet. Was reported in April 1940 to have arrived in Stalinabad. In 1941 he arrived in Istanbul but the Turkish Government refused him permission to stay there and he returned to Germany.

38. *Ghulam Yahya Khan* (W.W. 311).—Muhammadzai. Born 1898. Son of Habibullah Naib Tarzi, deceased, and nephew of the late Mahmud Tarzi. Brother of W.W. 109, and cousin of W.W. 325. Formerly secretary of Afghan Legation, Berlin. Appointed Under-Secretary, Visa and Passport Branch of Foreign Office, June 1926. Transferred to charge of Persia and Turkey section of Foreign Office, November 1926. Received Order of Astor, 1st class, February 1927. Accompanied Amanullah to Europe 1927-28. Roughly handled by Bacha-i-Saqao's men, but still in the Foreign Office, January 1929. Appointed Afghan Minister, Rome, December 1929. Assistant Secretary, Political Department of Foreign Office. Promoted First Secretary, Afghan Foreign Office, 1930. Visited Chakhansur, November 1931, in connexion with Helmand water dispute with Persia. Officiated for the Foreign Minister in the autumn of 1933. Appointed Director (Rais) of Department of Public Health February 1935. Appointment raised to that of Minister in June. Member of Republican party. A pleasant, well-mannered man of no outstanding ability. He has been reported to be pro-Amanullah. Speaks German and Turkish. Still (1939) Minister of Health. Was relieved of his post of Minister of Health in November 1939, and appointed Minister of Posts and Telegraphs. Reappointed Minister of Health 1940, a post he still holds (1943).

39. *Gul Agha* (see *Siddiq Agha Muhammad*).

39A. *Gul Ahmad Khan* (W.W. 315).—Tajik. Son of Mirza Abdul Ahmad Khan. Brother of F. M. Abdul Ahad Khan (W.W. 5) and Abdullah Khan, Governor of Herat. Born about 1897.

Was in charge of Government buildings at the beginning of Amanullah's reign. Later on became Superintendent of Roads and Ways. Afterwards appointed Assistant Chief Judge. Some time later was placed at the head of the Intelligence Department. During Amanullah's march to Ghazni from Kandahar, Gul Ahmad fled with his family from Kabul and joined the ex-King on the way. In 1929 said to be in Karachi. A member on the committee for reform led by Muhammad Yakub Khan (W.W. 575) to Mazar-i-Sharif, June 1930. Believed to be Governor of Mazar-i-Sharif 1931. Arrived in Kabul June 1931. Appointed President of the Kabul Municipality in 1932. Appointed Governor of Mazar-i-Sharif *vice* Abdul Jamil Khan (W.W. 49) in November 1934, which post he still holds (1943). Appointed Minister of Health in 1939 but appointment later cancelled.

Believed to be capable and intelligent. Supporter of the present Afghan régime. Speaks some English.

40. *Habibullah Khan Tarzi* (W.W. 325).—Muhammadzai. Born 1896. Son of the late Muhammad Zaman and nephew of the late Mahmud Tarzi. Cousins, W.W. 100 and W.W. 311. Was a junior Under-Secretary in Indo-European branch of the Foreign Office 1922-23. Proceeded to Paris as secretary to Mahmud Tarzi when latter was Minister at Paris. On his return to Kabul was appointed Under-Secretary in charge of the branch of the Foreign Office dealing with India and Europe. Appointed Afghan Minister in Paris, November 1928. Relieved by Ahmad Ali Jan (W.W. 140) December 1929 and returned to Kabul. Third secretary in Foreign Office, May 1931. Chief delegate to the Dokalim Boundary Commission, June 1932. Chief delegate on the Persian Boundary and Helmand Water Commission, October 1932. Visited Herat and Islam Kala, thence to Zulfikar and Chakhansur in this connexion. Completed his work on the Persian boundary survey in June 1933 and returned to Kabul. Appointed Minister at Tokyo in July 1933 and presented his credentials there in October 1933. Speaks English fluently; a pleasant, well-mannered man. Returned to Kabul June 1939, and appointed first secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Still (1943) first secretary in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

41. *Hazrat of Shor Bazar* (see *Fazl-i-Umar*).

42. *Inayatullah Khan* (W.W. 366).—Sardar, Muhammadzai. Eldest son of Ameer Habibullah Khan. His mother is the Ulya Jan Badr-ul-Haram. Born the 20th October, 1888. Visited India in December 1904. Held the appointment of Muin-us-Saltanah ("Helper of the State") under Ameer Habibullah Khan. Created Sardar-i-Ala in 1905. Appointed Minister for Education in 1916.

Was the recognised heir to the throne up to the time of Ameer Habibullah Khan's death. Married a daughter of the late Mahmud Khan, Tarzi, and was at one time said to be under the latter's influence. During Ameer Habibullah Khan's reign he received an allowance of 1,30,000 rupees per annum. After the murder of Habibullah Khan, Sardar Nasrullah went through the form of offering him the throne. He, however, refused it, probably well knowing that the decision had already been made in Nasrullah's favour, and that no other course was open to him. When Nasrullah, in turn, was compelled to yield to the claims of Amanullah, he had to accompany the former to Kabul. On arrival at Kabul, though not compelled to share Nasrullah's imprisonment, he was kept under strict surveillance. At the darbar at which those accused of the murder of Ameer Habibullah were tried, Amanullah decreed that Inayatullah had forfeited all his claims by his cowardly acquiescence in Nasrullah's usurpation of the throne and by his failure to take any steps to discover the authors of the crime. He was told that it would be advisable that he should retire into private life and take no further part in public affairs. Although occasionally seen in public, he undertook no Government work, and was presumably deprived of his appointment of Muin-us-Saltanah, &c. In October 1919 he was reported to have been arrested by the Ameer, and to be practically confined to his house until 1922. There was an abortive rising by the Safi regiment in his favour in June 1920. This regiment was raised in Tagao by Inayatullah. Sanctioned a yearly allowance of 1½ lakhs of rupees and an escort of twenty men, March 1921. He consistently refused to take up any Government appointment. In July 1922 was allowed a certain measure of freedom, which was increased until he moved about apparently without restriction. When Bacha-i-Saqao attacked Kabul on the 14th December, 1928, was summoned by the King and confined in the Arq. Forced to accept the throne on Amanullah's abdication, the 14th January, 1929, but on being besieged in the Arq by Bacha-i-Saqao, abdicated on the 17th January, 1929, on condition that he and his family were sent to Kandahar by air. Evacuated to Peshawar with his family in the Royal Air Force planes, the 18th January, 1929, and proceeded to join Amanullah in Kandahar. Fled with Amanullah to Bombay, the 23rd May, 1929. Sailed from Bombay for Persia, via Basra, the 6th July, 1929. Arrived in Tehran, the 27th July, 1929. Left Tehran for Europe, May 1930, and was in Berlin believed plotting against Nadir Khan. Applied for permission to reside in England for six months (June 1931). Visited England, August 1931, and stayed three weeks in London with his wife and eldest son Khalilullah (W.W. 399). Then joined Amanullah in Rome. Visited Constantinople for his nephew's wedding, December 1931, and then went on to Tehran, where his sister joined him from Kabul. In receipt of 800 tomans per month from Persian Government in February 1932. In August the Persian Government were said to be intending to discontinue this allowance, his sole means. Since then has remained in Tehran, where he now resides. Probable that the allowance made him by the Persian Government has been stopped, and that he is living in comparative penury. His sister, who had been with Amanullah in Rome, joined him in the autumn of 1933. Is periodically the subject of rumours in Afghanistan, generally to the effect that he has arrived, or is expected to arrive, in some part of the country. Lacks initiative, intellect and energy, but combines dignity with pleasant manners, and had a reputation for being honourable and straightforward. An agent of Inayatullah was reported to have visited Afghanistan in May 1935. Stated to have been granted a monthly allowance of about 5,000 rupees (Afghani) by the Afghan Government (1939). Is reported (1940) to be in touch with German agents in Iran, and probably receiving money from Germany to stir up trouble in Afghanistan. Still reported to be in Iran (1943).

43. *Mahmud Jan* (W.W. 415).—Sardar-i-Ala, Shahgassi, Barakzai. Born 1885. Son of Shah Muhammad Khan, and a distant cousin of Abdul Aziz Khan, and the Ulya Hazrat. Officiated as Minister of Public Security in 1922 and as Governor of Kabul in 1925. Was in charge of the Public Works and Secret Service. Also in charge of the Frontier Tribes Department, of which Haji Muhammad Akbar was Under-Secretary. Was in partnership with Herr Harten, German engineer in charge of Dar-ul-Aman works, and made a lot of money out of public works. Created Sardar-i-Ala, January 1927. Appointed Wali of Kabul, December 1927. Captured by rebels near Jalalabad, December 1928, where he had been sent to restore order. Arrested by Bacha-i-Saqao, February 1929. Released during the Independence celebrations, August 1929. Was appointed officer in charge State Workshops, November 1929, but was deprived



of his appointment the following month. Imprisoned in the Arq on a charge of theft of Government funds and jewels, January 1930. Under trial for being concerned in the Koh-i-Daman revolt of 1930. Released in January 1931, but rearrested with other members of the Shahgassi family in connexion with the Ghulam Nabi and Dare Khel plots in November 1932. His brother Zobain also arrested. His ears are said to have been trimmed as a punishment. Was released in November 1933 and kept under surveillance. A stout, pleasant gentleman; was friendly to foreigners. A great personal friend of ex-King Amanullah. Speaks Pushtu.

Reported to have been arrested in March 1936 for the murder of his own son. Reported to be still in Kabul jail (1943).

44. *Mohendra Pratap Singh* (alias *Raja*) (W.W. 437).—Indian agitator, son of Raja Ghanshyam Singh, Jat, of Mursan, Aligarh, United Provinces, and brother of the Maharani of Jhind. Founder of the Prem Vidyalaya (the Free Industrial and National Arts College) of Brindaban. Went to England at the end of 1914, and to Berlin in the autumn of 1915 where he posed as an Indian prince. Had an interview with the Kaiser and accompanied the German mission to Kabul in 1916. Arrived at Mazar-i-Sharif in 1917. Endeavoured to come to India, but returned owing to our precautions. In 1918 with a party of Afghans left Mazar-i-Sharif for Russian Turkestan, and proceeded to Tashkent. In March 1918 was in Berlin, and later went to Petrograd, where he received a warm welcome from Trotsky and Joffe. Same year visited Constantinople, where he delivered Ameer's reply to the Sultan. No reliable news in early 1919 as to his whereabouts, but supposed to have gone to Tashkent via Bokhara. Came to Kabul with the Suritz Mission December 1919. Regarded as an imbecile of no importance by the Bolsheviks in Kabul, but Obaidullah (W.W. 491) found him useful as a figurehead and to attract Hindus to his party. Left Kabul and arrived at Wakhan, the 14th June, 1920, en route for China. Sent a letter to the Governor of Tashkurghan saying that he had been appointed Afghan Envoy to China by the Ameer. He soon returned as passage to China was refused by the Chinese authorities. In September 1920 he was in the Pamirs. Did a tour in China and Japan and returned to Kabul in autumn of 1923. Left Kabul, the 16th September 1924; visited California, China, attempted to enter Tibet, then went to Japan, whence he was deported. Returned to Afghanistan in October 1926. His reception in Kabul was remarkably frigid and although he held a number of receptions very few people of importance attended. This was mainly due to the displeasure of the King at Mohendra having styled himself Afghan representative at a Pan-Islamic conference in Japan, photographs describing him as such and showing his unceremonious arrest and deportation having been seen by the King in English illustrated papers. Left Kabul for the north, the 31st January, 1927, and arrived Moscow, February 1927. Returned to China but back in Moscow November 1928 preparing to hold "Pan-Asiatic" Conference in Kabul. Owing to outbreak of rebellion was prevented from leaving Tashkent to come to Kabul by King Amanullah. Went to Tehran January 1929 and returned to Moscow in April 1929. Returned to Kabul from Moscow by air December 1929. Was in close touch with Allah Nawaz (W.W. 182). He was deported by air to Termez in March 1930. Visited Berlin and reached New York on the 27th May, 1930. Is believed to be of some use to the OGPU. Was in China in 1931 and 1932. (His address there was P.O. Box 20, Peking, China). Published two books: *Afghanistan, the Herat of Aryan, and Long Live India!* Moved to Japan at the end of 1933 or beginning of 1934, where he was in touch with the Japanese Government. Continued to spread anti-British propaganda. Left Japan secretly for Siam in June 1934, believed at Japanese instigation to further their pan-Asiatic policy. Forbidden to lecture in Siam. Turned out of Siam, arrived Tokyo, August 1934, having been deported from Canton.

Was in Manila in February 1935, back in Japan in April 1935 and left for America in July 1935. Has agitated for his own return to India through the Indian Legislatures. Has been regarded as an Afghan subject since 1934.

In the Far East in 1937. Reported to be in Japan (1942).

45. *Muhammad Afzal Khan* (W.W. 138A).—Malik. Sangu Khel Shinwari. Born about 1885. During the Khost rebellion 1924-25 assisted Amanullah with a party of Shinwaris. One of the leaders of the revolt in the Eastern Province against Amanullah in November 1928. Turned pro-Nadir and during the Shinwari disturbances of February 1930 assisted Government and took an active part in the final settlement and collection of arms. In May 1930 is said to have requested permission, which was refused, to raise a lashkar to assist the

late Haji of Turangzai in his attack on British territory. Suspected of intrigue with Russians, March 1932. Deprived of his Khanship, September 1932, but was reinstated after interview with Prime Minister. Early in 1932 was deprived of appointment as Officer Commanding Khassadars but was later reinstated. His loyalty to the present régime is doubtful. Incited Afridis to resist road scheme in spring of 1935. In 1938 he led a Shinwari rising against the Afghan Government. Later he fled to Tirah, and was pardoned in 1939. The Afghan Government have offered him favourable terms if he will settle in Kabul, where he is at present. In Kabul under surveillance (1943).

45A. *Muhammad Afzal Khan* (W.W. 138).—Firqa Mishar. Born 1892. Son of Naib Salar Ghulam Nabi Khan (W.W. 299). Nasir, Ghilzai of Shakadarra Koh-i-Daman. Sardar-i-Ala.

Trained at Harbiya College, Kabul, and later for two years, 1927-29, in Turkey. Served in the third Afghan War and the Mangal rebellion, 1924. Was Second Secretary (Q.M.G.), War Office, July 1930. G.O.C., Khanabad, 1931, but relieved in November that year. Accompanied Shah Mahmud (W.W. 414) to Gardez, November 1932. Officiated for War Minister during early part of 1933. Appointed Governor and G.O.C., Southern Province, July 1933, which post he held till September 1941 and where he has on the whole done well. On bad terms with Major-General Pir Muhammad (W.W. 500), the G.O.C. and Governor of Urgan (1934-35). Visited Kabul June 1935. Unpopular with certain tribal leaders, who in 1936 tried to get him transferred. Was ordered by Minister of Defence in 1937 to prevent tribesmen crossing into Waziristan. Complied, but ordered district officials not to use force in stopping them, with excuse that force might create anti-Afghan Government feelings. Reported to have supported the Faqir of Ipi's cause and to have financed Ipi propaganda, and encouraged Ghilzais to disobey Government orders, at the same time reporting to his Government that certain sections in his province had anti-Government tendencies. Settled long-standing dispute between Zadran and Tannis by fining both tribes in 1939. Member of the Republican party.

Intelligent and keen on his profession. Has personality and is a good disciplinarian and capable of handling troops in the field. Neither very religious nor popular. Is in the good books of the War Minister, under whom he is now (1943) working in the War Ministry. His loyalty to present régime is doubtful. Believed to have assisted the German and Italian agents to visit the Faqir of Ipi, and to have been involved in the German shooting incident in the Logar, July 1941.

46. *Muhammad Agha Sami* (W.W. 555).—Brother of Shahgassi Muhammad Yakub Khan (W.W. 675). Son of Muhammad Yusuf Khan, a Munshi to Ameer Habibullah. A Mohmand by birth, but the family have settled in Ghazni for some generations. Was Mehmandar to the British mission in Kabul, 1921. Appointed Commandant of Police, Kabul, but was dismissed in 1923, partly due to escape of Ardali and Daud Shah (W.W. 237) from Kabul gaol and partly due to reports of his complicity in murder of one Abdul Ali. Appointed Political Officer during Mangal rebellion 1924, and sent to the front, where his services earned appreciation of the Ameer. Appointed Mehmandar to Wakils of Eastern Provinces during Ameer's visit of April 1926. Reappointed Commandant of Police, Kabul, August 1926. Was a trusted personal informer to the Ameer. Efficient, controlled a mob with great skill during the fire which gutted the British Legation at Kabul December 1926. Appointed officiating Governor of Kabul November 1928. Arrested by Bacha-i-Saqao February 1929, but escaped and joined Amanullah in Kandahar. Sent to Tashkent as courier by Amanullah, returning again to Kandahar via Duzdap, April 1929. Accompanied Amanullah in his flight as far as Quetta, where he remained. Left for Meshed in August 1929. Later returned to Kabul. Arrested and sentenced to banishment for implication in Koh-i-Daman revolt, July 1930, but subsequently released. Said to be doing propaganda work in favour of Amanullah. On pilgrimage to Mecca, March 1931. Arrived Tehran with W.W. 675 in December 1931. Applied for permission to visit India but was refused. Still in Tehran, where his brother Yakub Khan (W.W. 675) has joined him; also his nephew and niece from Quetta. He and his son, Muhammad Bashir, deprived of Afghan nationality, November 1933. His property in Afghanistan is said to have been confiscated in 1934 and his family deported to Iran.

Is reported (1940) to be in touch with German agents in Iran, and probably receiving money from Germany to stir up trouble in Afghanistan. Still reported to be in Iran (1943).



47. *Muhammad Akbar Khan* (W.W. 161).—Muhammadzai. Brother of W.W. 113, Minister of Health 1930. Cousin of the late King Nadir Shah, to whom he was Surgeon-General. Director of Medical Services October 1932. Appointed Minister at Rome 1935 and presented his credentials in May 1935.

Relieved of appointment as Minister at Rome, March 1936, and returned to Kabul. Is married to a sister of W.W. 149. Civil A.D.C. to the King, 1942.

48. *Muhammad Alam Khan* (W.W. 164).—Mulki Ghund Mishar (civil brigadier) Alisherzai Shinwari. He is looked upon as the head of the Shinwaris. In 1904 he was deprived of employment for beginning to raise three regiments of Shinwaris without orders. In March 1919 Amanullah issued orders for his arrest, which he contrived to evade, for his support of Sardar Nasrullah Khan. In June 1921 was granted an annual allowance of 3,000 rupees. Was chief instigator of Shinwari opposition to hasht nafri (conscription of one in eight). Was a great friend of the Sultan Muhammad Khel family, of which King Nadir Shah was the head. A leader of the Shinwari rebellion November 1928. Was one of a delegation sent by Bacha-i-Saqao to Nadir Shah in April 1929. Appointed Governor, Eastern Province, May 1929. Ordered to raise the Shinwaris against Hashim Khan (W.W. 337) June 1929, but met with little success. Fled to Landi Kotal December 1929, but returned to the Eastern Province early in 1930 and in April 1930 was said to be working on behalf of King Nadir Shah. Was suspected of being in the pay of the Russians. Intrigued with Afridis in 1930. Not trusted by the Afghan Government, he was kept in Kabul under surveillance in autumn 1933. Later he was allowed to return to the Eastern Province, where he helped to persuade the Shinwaris to send their sons to school in Kabul. Early in 1935 was reported to be involved in a conspiracy against the Government. His loyalty is doubtful. He frequently visits Kabul.

Joined Mohmand Lashkar 1935. Said to be friendly with W.W. 138A January 1936, and hostile to the Afghan Government.

Living at his home in the Eastern Province in 1943.

49. [Nil.]

50. *Muhammad Aminullah Jan* (or *Amin Khan*) (W.W. 186).—Sardar, Muhammadzai. Born the 12th October, 1885. Third surviving son of Amir Abdul Rahman. His mother was a slave girl belonging to the late Bibi Halima, who was said to have adopted him before her own son was born. Was formerly in charge of the Shara (Muhammadan Law) Department at Kabul, and was also in charge of the Jabba Khana (magazine). In 1917 he held the appointment of Sardar-i-Madafia (director of military defence). Has one son born about 1903, and a daughter said to have been married to Sardar Abdul Qudus August 1919 at Kandahar. Appointed A.D.C. to the King 1926. Arrested by Bacha-i-Saqao in January 1929. Arrived Quetta and left for Lahore the 4th November, 1929. Residing in Tehran 1930 in straitened circumstances. Appealed for an allowance from the Government of India in 1930. Is said to be very eccentric. In Iran 1943.

50A. *Muhammad Atiq Khan* (W.W. 209A).—Muhammadzai. Sardar. Son of Rafiq Khan and son-in-law of Sardar Ahmad Shah Khan (W.W. 149). Court Minister. Brother of Babo Jan alias Zulilkha, widow of late Sardar Hayatullah Khan, step-brother of ex-King Amanullah.

Visited Moscow in 1935. Is an economic expert trained in Germany and holds the post of a Technical Director in the Afghan National Bank. Reported to be pro-Amanullah and kept under surveillance 1939. Reported to have said that, providing no revolution broke out, Afghanistan will be able to check British influence in eight years' time.

Speaks Russian and German fluently. Strongly Germanophile, the present increased German influence in Royal Family said to be due to him.

Brothers are Muhammad Umar Khan (W.W. 658) and Muhammad Rahim Khan, Assistant to the President of Kabul Municipality.

51. *Muhammad Ayub Khan* (W.W. 211).—Kizilbash. Was head clerk to Ameer. Appointed assistant to Finance Minister April 1924. Awarded (1925) Order of Astor and 2,000 rupees for good service in Khost rebellion. Received Order of Sardar-i-Ala February 1927. Appointed Minister of Finance September 1928, but relieved of his appointment October 1928. Appointed Minister of Finance by King Nadir Shah November 1929. Accused of embezzlement in October 1930. Carried out a tour of inspection in Kataghan and Badakhshan

in June 1932. In October 1932 returned to Kabul and resumed appointment of Minister of Revenue December 1932. Dismissed in September 1933 and his son arrested. Pro-Amanullah. Still unemployed in Kabul 1943. Is a brother of W.W. 449.

52. *Muhammad Daud Khan* (W.W. 238).—Elder son of the late Sardar Muhammad Aziz Khan (brother of King Nadir Shah). Born 1909 in Kabul. Educated at the Amania College, Kabul. Spent nine years in France and returned to Kabul in October 1930. 1931 attended a year's course at the Infantry Officers' School, where he worked hard and was well reported on by the senior German instructor. November 1932 promoted Firqa Mishar (major-general) and appointed General Officer Commanding, Eastern Province. In February 1934 assumed the duties of Governor of the province in addition to his duties as General Officer Commanding. His strictness made him unpopular and he was inclined to be headstrong and hasty. Took a great interest in the training of his troops and the Eastern Province detachment at the Independence celebrations in 1934 was conspicuous for its smartness. In July 1935 was transferred as Governor and General Officer Commanding, Kandahar, and General Officer Commanding of the Farah and Chakhansur Division. A strong personality. A keen soldier and energetic. A favourite of his uncle the Prime Minister (W.W. 337). In 1934 married a sister of King Zahir Shah. Is likely to be much heard of in the future. Speaks excellent French, and is very well-mannered and friendly. Governor and General Officer Commanding, Kandahar, in 1936 and 1937. Warned to be more tactful by the Prime Minister. Appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator) of the Eastern Province (1938).

Appointed General Officer Commanding Kabul Central Army Corps and Commandant of the Military Schools in Kabul in August 1939, the appointment he still holds (1943). Since the reorganisation of the Kabul Army Corps in 1939-40 his influence has increased. The Kabul Army Corps now has a separate budget and is almost independent of the Ministry of Defence. He promoted some 220 officers in August 1942 with the approval of the King, but without reference to the Minister of Defence (W.W. 414). His corps is improving in efficiency, and his subordinates, though admiring his personality and drive, are somewhat afraid of him. In 1942, when the prospects of the Allied nations appeared not too favourable, he was believed to be advocating an approach to Germany by the Afghan Government. He is stated to be a strong Afghan Nationalist, who is inclined to resent the employment of foreign advisers.

53. [Nil.]

54. *Muhammad Gul Khan* (W.W. 315A).—Son of Muhammad Khurshid Khan (W.W. 408). Kuchi Mohmand of village Baru (on the Hisarak Rud, about 7 miles west of Batikot). Educated in Turkey. Was a Ghund Mishar (brigadier) in Amanullah's army in 1927. Promoted Firqa Mishar (major-general) and appointed General Officer Commanding, Eastern Province, in 1928. In Jalalabad during the Saqavi régime until the burning of Jalalabad, when he returned to his home at Baru. He joined H.R.H. Sardar Hashim Khan (W.W. 337) in Khugiani country about March 1929. Was Minister of the Interior in Nadir Shah's first Government October 1929. Promoted Naib Salar (general) and appointed to officiate as Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator), Eastern Province. He held this post until the summer of 1930. During this time he did much to restore order in the province and dealt with the Shinwari attempt on Torkham in February 1930. After the Kohistan rising in 1930 he was appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh of that district and apparently succeeded in pacifying the people. Assumed duties of Minister of Interior in October 1930. Appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh of Kandahar in February 1931, and left for Kandahar via India. Administered the province with firmness and efficiency. Congratulated by the Government on his work January 1932. Visited Kabul for Independence celebrations August 1932; was awarded the Sardar-i-Ala, first class, and a grant of 25,000 Kabuli rupees. Was offered Governorship of Herat in September 1932, but refused owing to his friendship for Abdur Rahim (W.W. 89). Appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh, Mazar, Kataghan and Badakhshan and Maimana, November 1932. Relieved at Kandahar by Ghulam Faruq (W.W. 273) in January 1933, and left for Mazar. In 1934 there were rumours that his loyalty to the present régime was doubtful and that he was in favour of a republic. A quiet, well-mannered man, but ruthless. Has a strong personality and is ambitious. He is regarded as one of the most capable officials in Afghanistan. Speaks Urdu, Persian, Pushtu, Russian and Turkish. He was very loyal to the



late Nadir Shah. Visited Kabul September 1935. Believed to have asked the Prime Minister to help the Mohmands against the British. Refused to visit Eastern Province to explain Mohmand situation to Afghans, and believed to have quarrelled with Prime Minister (W.W. 337) on this subject. Returned to Mazar about the 1st October. Reported to be on bad terms with W.W. 315. Stated to be connected with the Republican party. Resigned Governorship of Northern Provinces 1940 and appointed Minister of State 1941, a post he still holds (1943) though he has withdrawn to his estate at Haibak and remains there in spite of the Prime Minister's attempts to induce him to take a more active part in the Administration. His resignation of the Governorship of the Northern Province is thought to have been due to his dislike of Abdul Majid's (W.W. 73) trade development schemes.

55. *H.R.H. Muhammad Hashim Khan* (W.W. 337).—Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Yusuf Khan (junior) and uncle of King Zahir Shah. Half-brother of the late King Nadir and of W.W. 414 and W.W. 585. Born 1886. Commanded the Sar-i-Os (bodyguard) at Kabul and accompanied Ameer Habibullah to India in 1907. Appointed Naib Salar (general) of Herat and left Kabul in 1916. Keen on instituting reforms, but checked in this direction by threat of mutiny on the part of the troops. Arrested and sent to Kabul after the murder of Habibullah, but subsequently released. People of Herat refused to have him back after his release and he was relieved. Appointed Governor of Jalalabad December 1919. Governor, Eastern Province, 1920. Went on tour in July 1921 and distributed rewards to the Mohmands and some Bajauri tribesmen, at the same time doing his best to create an atmosphere of hostility to the British; the next month he warned the tribesmen to be ready for "jihad." Summoned jirgas of the Malikdin Khel and Kambar Khel Afridis to Jalalabad in September 1921. Rewards in the shape of money were doled out to the tribesmen, who were informed that Nadir Khan had promised to arrange permanent allowances and the distribution of rifles for them from the Afghan Government. Reported in August 1921 to have engineered, in conjunction with Nadir Khan, the robbery of one of the British mission mail bags *en route* from Kabul to India. Went to Kabul from Jalalabad on the 10th November, 1921. Officiating as Minister of War, Kabul, January 1922, *vice* Nadir Khan, who proceeded on tour. Went to Europe with his father in 1923. Appointed Minister at Moscow March 1924, when he was unpopular owing to his constant suspicions of Soviet policy. Opposed the military training of Afghans in Russia, and on his views being disclosed by the Afghan Government to the Soviet authorities he resigned and left Moscow 3rd July, 1926, to join his brother Nadir Khan at Grasse. Offered position of Minister at Tehran, which he refused, October 1926. Nur-us-Siraj, the sister of the King, whom he wished to marry, was betrothed to Amanullah's cousin, Muhammad Hasan Jan (W.W. 342) in October 1926. This was looked upon as an insult by Hashim Khan and his brothers. At Grasse December 1928. Granted diplomatic visa for India *en route* to Afghanistan January 1929, and left Marseilles with Nadir Khan and Shah Wali (W.W. 585) on the 8th February, 1929. Left Peshawar for the Eastern Province 6th March, 1929, where he tried to obtain support for Nadir, but met with little success. Was defeated by Bacha-i-Saqao and arrived Parachinar 19th September, 1929. Arrived Quetta 1st October, 1929, where he remained under surveillance until 27th October, 1929, when he was permitted by the Indian Government to proceed to Kandahar. Proceeded to Kabul, 9th November, 1929, on his appointment as Premier and Minister of Interior. This appointment he has since held, insisting on a high standard of work and efficiency. High-handed in his dealings with other Government officials he is consequently both feared and hated. Was on tour in the Northern Provinces when Nadir Shah was assassinated and returned immediately to Kabul. Swore allegiance to Zahir Shah, since whose accession he has been the real ruler of Afghanistan. A real patriot and a tremendous worker, he has laboured to improve the stability of the country. So far as can be judged, genuinely dislikes the Russians and is alarmed by the possibility of the spread of bolshevism in Afghanistan. A quiet, dignified man with charming manners and a keen sense of humour. Is quick-tempered, outspoken and, when roused, ruthless. Trusts very few of his fellow-countrymen and tries to do too much himself. He makes up his mind quickly. Is said to have been lately more tactful in his dealings with other officials, but is still unpopular. The danger of his being assassinated is great. Is very friendly to members of the British Legation in Kabul. Understands English well and speaks it fairly. Proceeded to Berlin in October 1936 to undergo an operation for tumour. Operation for tumour successful. Visited London January-February and returned to Kabul via India in March 1937. Still (1943) Prime Minister.

56. *Muhammad Hassan Jan* (W.W. 342).—Muhammadzai. Born 1902. Son of Sardar Muhammad Umar Khan (W.W. 648). A.D.C. to King Amanullah 1926. Created Sardar-i-Ala February 1926. Married to Nur-us-Siraj, Amanullah's sister, October 1927. Was well known to the British Legation at Kabul. Accompanied King Amanullah to Europe 1927-28 as Chamberlain. Also went with Amanullah to Kandahar after his abdication January 1929 and to Bombay May 1929. Sailed for Italy June 1929. Was in Rome from October 1931 to July 1932. Not definitely located between summer 1932 and December 1933, but said to be in Rome with Amanullah and to be verging on lunacy. Deprived of Afghan nationality November 1933. Accompanied Amanullah Khan to the Hejaz in 1935. In Rome with Amanullah during summer of 1935.

57. *Muhammad Ihsan Khan* (W.W. 363).—Tajik of Istalif, Koh-i-Daman, Firqa Mishar (major-general). Born about 1895, son of Ustad Yusuf, an iron-smith. Related to the late Bacha-i-Saqao. Received three years' aeronautical training in Italy. Appointed to command Afghan Air Force 1924. Visited Western Command manœuvres and carried out a tour in India at the invitation of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief November 1926. Was helpful to the Royal Air Force officers who landed at Shergarh in December 1928. Dismissed from his post by Bacha-i-Saqao January 1929, but was reappointed by Nadir Shah on his accession to the throne. Is keen on his profession and works hard and is keen on flying. Is very fat. Speaks Italian and a little French. Is always very friendly to members of the British Legation. Still (1943) Commandant of the Air Force. Proceeded on tour to India and Europe in September 1936 with a view to purchasing aircraft.

Visited India and Europe 1936-37 with view to purchasing aircraft for Afghan Government. Purchased eight aircraft in Great Britain and twenty-four in Italy. Returned to Kabul in October 1937. Was awarded decoration of "Grand Officer of the Crown of Italy." Received by Herr Hitler during his tour. Since 1937 the Afghan Air Force has achieved a modicum of efficiency mainly due to his drive, the assistance of British instructors, and the despatch of Air Force personnel to India for training, the latter being a policy he consistently supports. In 1942 he proceeded to India for medical treatment, returning in March 1943. After his return he gave out that he was in favour of retaining the British connexion with his Air Force, and asked for the supply of nine more Hind aircraft.

He resents the fact that the air force is under War Ministry control, and wishes to have it independent under the King.

57A. *Muhammad Ismail Khan* (W.W. 377A).—Wardaki, Totu Khel, Ghilzai. Son of Abdullah Khan (W.W. 63) and nephew of W.W. 4. At one time Director of the Eastern Branch, Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Governor (Hakim-i-Kalan) of the Northern District, Kabul Province. Officiating Governor, Kataghan and Badakhshan. Wali of Kabul 1939.

58. *Muhammad Khan, Mirza* (W.W. 450).—Sent to Merv on a special mission October 1919. Still in Merv June 1920. Later said to be in Tashkent. Left for Moscow July 1920. Afghan Minister at Moscow 1921 until relieved by the late Ghulam Nabi Khan. On return from Russia he was for a short time an Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Commerce. In 1924 was sent to Europe to negotiate the sale of certain Crown jewels. Appointed First Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office on return from Europe. Chief Afghan member of the Urta Tagai Boundary Commission, and proceeded to Badakhshan January 1926, returning in June 1926. Appointed Minister at Moscow October 1926, having first refused appointment of Minister at Rome. As Minister at Moscow he preserved a broad outlook and was not noticeably pro-Soviet. Under-Secretary in Foreign Office 1928. Remained at Foreign Office under Bacha-i-Saqao January 1929. Appointed Under-Secretary Foreign Office by King Nadir Shah November 1929. Appointed Minister of Trade September 1930. In May 1932 was complimented by the King for his work. Was put under secret surveillance as a result of the plot discovered in September 1933. Left Kabul in October, with the Prime Minister, to visit the north. Returned to Kabul in November and swore allegiance to Zahir Shah. Appointed Minister of Trade in 1937. A man of no great standing or marked ability. Is said to enjoy the confidence of the Prime Minister, but to be on bad terms with the War Minister. Since he has been in office, the customs revenue of the country has increased considerably. Was one of the prime movers in the formation of the Ashami Company. Is believed to be a heavy bribe taker. His sister, who was a widow of the late Ameer Habibullah, was given in



marriage to Abdul Qadir, Bacha-i-Saqao's Governor of Kandahar. Is inclined to be anti-British, but is lately believed to be less so than formerly. His son, Abdullah Khan, was one of six students who were sent to Japan January 1935. Appointed Minister of Revenue (1938). Still (1943) Minister of Revenue.

59. *Muhammad Naim Khan* (W.W. 464A).—Son of the late Muhammad Aziz Khan, Muhammadzai. Born 1911. Visited India in November 1929 with Asadullah Khan (W.W. 199). Appointed Under-Secretary, Foreign Office, October 1930. Appointed Minister, Rome, December 1932; recalled in 1934 and appointed extra secretary in the Foreign Office, Kabul. Appointed First Secretary 1935. Shy in manner, speaks French and is friendly to members of the British Legation. Does not appear to possess great force of character. Is a great favourite of his uncle Sardar Hashim Khan (W.W. 337). Married in 1934 the eldest sister of King Zahir Shah. His wife gave birth to a son in August 1935.

Officiating Foreign Minister December 1935 and again in 1936 during the absence of Faiz Muhammad in Europe.

Also acting as managing director, Afghan National Bank, during absence of Abdul Majid (W.W. 73) in Europe 1936-37. Appointed Minister of Education in 1937.

Appointed president of Kabul Literary Society June 1937.

Appointed Acting Foreign Minister during the Foreign Minister's absence in Tehran June 1937 and Jalalabad in January 1938. Still (1943) Minister of Education. Visited Khanabad as head of an investigation committee (1939).

Appointed assistant to the Prime Minister (September 1939), in addition to his duties as Minister of Education. In 1941 appointed officiating Minister of National Economy during absence of W.W. 73 in Europe in addition to his own duties. He is against the employment of foreigners in Afghanistan and considers the country should be developed without their assistance. Has no sympathy with the tribes who oppose his efforts to introduce education amongst them.

59A. *Muhammad Nauroz Khan* (W.W. 470).—Mirza of Logar. Appointed Chief Secretary to King Nadir, November 1929. Was on bad terms with Muhammad Yakub (W.W. 675). More inclined to friendship with Germany than with England and Russia. Accompanied late S. Muhammad Azim to Europe in January 1933 for medical treatment. Returned from Germany May 1933 and resumed appointment of Chief Secretary to King. Was appointed officiating Court Minister in 1936. Appointed Ambassador, Tehran, in 1939. Relieved of appointment of Ambassador at Tehran in 1942. Appointed Minister of Interior 1943.

Has influence in the Logar valley. Loyalty to present régime doubtful. Entertains Republican tendencies. Has ability and capacity and speaks a little English. Since his appointment as Minister of the Interior has become more influential and popular, the latter said to be due to his patience when investigating complaints.

60. *Muhammad Qasim Khan* (W.W. 506).—Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Muhammad Sarwar Khan Kaka. Nephew of the late Sardar Abdul Aziz. First cousin of Ghulam Faruq (W.W. 273). Born at Lahore about 1900. Served in various minor appointments in Afghan Foreign Office 1921-25. Was a secretary in the Afghan Legation, Rome, in 1926, and also served in a similar capacity in the Afghan Embassy, Tehran, during 1927 and 1928. In 1930 was mudir (assistant secretary) in the Prime Minister's office. Appointed officiating Hakim-i-Ala (Governor), Eastern Province, November 1932, where he found it difficult to get on with the General Officer Commanding, Daud Khan (W.W. 238). Appointed Minister in Rome in February 1934, and left to take up his appointment in March. Recalled in spring 1935 and in June again appointed Governor of the Eastern Province. Is said to be an efficient and capable man, but lacks presence and personality. Speaks English, Urdu, Persian and very good Pushtu. His father died January 1936.

Appointed Governor of Herat (1938). Appointed Governor of Kandahar 1941, a post he still holds (1943).

61. *Muhammad Sarwar Khan* (W.W. 560).—Barakzai, Naib Salar (general). Son of Muhammad Sidiq Khan. Brothers Ghulam Haidar (W.W. 276), Muhammad Shuaib (W.W. 611) and Juma Khan. First secretary in the Afghan Embassy in Tehran. Formerly a Ghulam Bacha. Was highly esteemed by Ameer Habibullah Khan. Promoted brigadier in 1906, owing to his success in the manufacture of guns, and appointed superintendent, Kabul Arsenal. Promoted major-general 1913. In March 1919 appointed Naib Salar by Ameer Amanullah Khan, and later

in the same month left for Mazar-i-Sharif to take up the appointment of Naib-ul-Hukmah (Governor), Turkestan. Granted both civil and military powers in his province. Relieved of appointment and proceeded to Kabul in January 1922, where he officiated as Minister of the Interior. Governor of Kandahar 1923, but the real power in the province was wielded by the Minister of the Interior, who, originally officiating as Governor of Kandahar, remained there on relief to deal with the disorders that were rife in the province during 1923. Muhammad Sarwar's jurisdiction seems to have been limited. Still Governor of Kandahar at the beginning of 1927. Described by the Ameer, during a visit of inspection to Kandahar, November 1925, as "honest and respectable, but slow and negligent." Summoned to Kabul June 1926, and well received by the King. Created Sardar-i-Ala November 1926. Appointed Governor of Badakhshan and Kataghan, 1928, but did not take up appointment. In Kandahar 1929. Appointed Governor of Kabul, February 1930, but relieved in 1931 and went on pilgrimage to Mecca. Returned via Meshed and Kandahar. Appointed a member of the Majlis-i-Aayan (Council of Nobles) December 1931. Reported to be pro-Amanullah. Visited his brother Ghulam Haidar (W.W. 276) at Maruf, Kandahar Province, in February 1932, but was recalled to Kabul in July. Has been unemployed since 1931. Still believed to be pro-Amanullah. Courteous and friendly, but Amanullah's description (above) fits him. Still (1942) a member of the Council of Nobles.

62. *Muhammad Umar Khan* (W.W. 652).—Firqa Mishar (major-general). Yusufzai of the "Topchi" family. Born 1898. Appointed Chief of Staff 1924. Visited Delhi manœuvres December 1924 at the invitation of the Commander-in-chief in India. Appointed head of Afghan Military Mission to Russia to select artillery for the Afghan army and study Soviet military methods October 1926. Left Kabul by air for Termez en route to Moscow the 3rd November, 1926. Visited Russia and Italy 1928. Was at one time military attaché in Berlin. Appointed chief of Afghan General Staff early in 1930. In 1932 proceeded to Europe to attend the Disarmament Conference, Geneva. Visited Paris December 1933. Returned to Kabul via India in January 1934; was a spectator of the 1st January parade at Peshawar. Lunched with the officers of the Gordon Highlanders in the Khyber on his way back. Resumed his duties as Chief of Staff, but left once more for Geneva in May 1934. A keen and intelligent officer, but said to have had little experience in the field or handling troops. Has been much in Europe and speaks English, Russian and German fluently. Is also said to speak French and Italian. His loyalty to the present régime is doubtful. It is said that he will probably be appointed to a diplomatic post in Europe. Has pleasant manners and is friendly. Afghan representative to the League of Nations Disarmament Committee June 1935. Said to have been recalled to Kabul (1936) owing to his immoral conduct in Europe. Still Chief of Staff (1943) and a close friend of W.W. 414. He has the confidence of the Royal Family except in matters of a very secret nature. He is not a forceful character or likely to prove a leader of troops in the field. He makes out that he is a great Nationalist, and neither anti- or pro-Russian, British or German.

63. *Muhammad Umar Khan* (W.W. 658).—Muhammadzai. Son of Muhammad Rafiq. Was born in India and was at one time a Naib-Tehsildar in the Punjab. Returned to Kabul in June 1916. Was appointed Hakim (Governor) of Charikar in 1926. In March 1932 appointed officiating Wali (Governor) of Kabul. Prior to his appointment as officiating Wali of Kabul was Mudir-i-Gumruk (assistant in charge of customs), Kabul. Toured Kohistan and Koh-i-Daman in 1932. Selected (1934) for the appointment of Minister, Berlin, in succession to the late Sardar Muhammad Aziz, but declined the post. Lacks personality and is neither particularly able nor strong. Speaks English and is believed to hold pro-British views.

Suspended (1939) and ordered to be kept under surveillance in his house in Kabul. Still unemployed but no longer under surveillance (1943).

63A. *Muhammad Usman Khan* (W.W. 661).—Sardar. In 1915 appointed to command at Asmar, where he adopted a friendly attitude towards the British and was taking security from "badmashes" to prevent raids into Chitral. In 1916 was appointed Brigadier and in 1919 was still Commandant at Asmar. Recalled to Jalalabad in August 1920, reason unknown. He, however, again returned to Asmar and went to Kabul in September 1920. Chief Staff Officer to Naib Salar Hashim Khan (W.W. 337). Commanding the Ningrahar Corps in December 1921. Served as Afghan Consul in Bombay in 1927 and as Consul-General, India, in 1928. In Kabul 1929. Counsellor to Afghan Embassy, Tehran,



in 1930. Appointed Muin II in the Foreign Ministry in 1931. Was a member of the Musabad Perso-Afghan Commission 1934-35. Pensioned and unemployed 1935. Member of the Republican Party. Was suspected of complicity in Afridi Amanish plot in 1939. President of the Municipal Committee, Kabul, since 1937. Relieved of this post, July 1942, for alleged mal-practice in the distribution of food supplies to the public. A capable man with pleasant manners, who is somewhat disgruntled because he has not been given more important appointments. Believed to be addicted to drink; and to be showing signs of disloyalty to the Yahya Khel.

64. *Muhammad Yunus Khan* (W.W. 685).—Comes from Jalalabad and is of Pathan stock. Secretary of Afghan Legation, London, from 1922-30. Always showed himself helpful and well disposed and was profuse with pro-British sentiments, which were probably sincere. Chargé d'Affaires from February 1929 to January 1930. Energetically opposed Shuja-ud-Daulah's (W.W. 612) attempts to dispose of Legation property July-September 1929. Left London for United States of America on Shah Wali's (W.W. 585) arrival as Minister in January 1930 owing to disappointment of non-recognition of his work and refusal of Shah Wali to appoint him counsellor. Reported to be in touch with Ghadr party in San Francisco. In June 1933 tried to obtain the assistance of British Foreign Office to return to Afghanistan. Believed to be (1936) in United States of America. Founded and became Director of the Afghan National Association in the United States of America.

65. *Muhammad Zahir Shah* (W.W. 688A).—Muhammadzai. Only surviving son of the late King Nadir Shah. Born 1914. Accompanied his father to France in 1924 and was educated in that country. Returned to Afghanistan in October 1930. In 1931 attended a year's course at the Infantry Officers' School, Kabul. Married (1931) a daughter of Ahmad Shah (W.W. 149). Appointed Assistant War Minister 1932. In September 1933 officiated as Education Minister in addition to his other duties. Was proclaimed King on the 8th November, 1933, immediately after his father's assassination. Quiet and unassuming with pleasant manners and a fair presence, he has so far had little share in the government of the country, the real power being wielded by his uncle H.R.H. Hashim Khan (W.W. 337), the Prime Minister. He is keen on shooting, tennis, riding and swimming. Up to 1933 he rarely left Kabul. Since 1938 he has made a few excursions into the country for a day or two, but is usually accompanied by a large number of officials. He spends two or three months each year at Paghman, the summer capital, to which the Government does not move. His birthday is celebrated on the 15th October each year. Has had three sons, Muhammad Akbar, born 1933, died 1942; Ahmad Shah, born 1934; Muhammad Nadir, born 1941; and two daughters born in 1932 and 1936. He is taking an increased interest in affairs, including the development of the army and air force, and has been known to express a desire to take a more active part in the direction of State business.

66. *Najibullah Khan* (W.W. 465B).—Director-General of the Political Section, Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Related to the late Amir Abdul Rahman through his mother. Educated at French school, Kabul. Speaks French fluently and has also a little English. Ambitious and very conceited. Has considerable ability and is believed to exercise a great deal of influence; appears to enjoy confidence of the Prime Minister, and seems closer to the centre of affairs in Kabul than the present Minister for Foreign Affairs himself (W.W. 179). His self-conceit is ministered to by the sedulous attention he receives from a certain type of foreign diplomatist in Kabul. Believed to be strongly anti-British and to maintain close contact with German and Italian Ministers. The atmosphere of intrigue usual in Kabul—and aggravated, of course, by war conditions—suits his particular type of talents, and he is a man who needs very careful watching.

67. *Nasrullah Khan* (W.W. 469A).—Born about 1900. Son of Haji Nawab Khan of Kulangar (W.W. 472). Served in various places as Ilaqadar during the reign of Amanullah. Joined Nadir Shah on his arrival in Afghanistan 1929. At the end of 1942 was appointed Commandant of Police, Mazar-i-Sharif. Appointed Hakim-i-Kalan (Governor) of Ghazni December 1930. Was appointed Governor of the Eastern Province in November 1932, but did not take over as he was engaged in touring his district dealing with repercussions from the Dare Khel rebellion. The appointment was then altered and he became Governor of the Southern Province in December 1932. In Matun in January 1933 attempting to obtain the arrest of the Lewanai Faqir. Relieved in July 1933 and appointed

Under-Secretary in Ministry of Public Works, an appointment he still (1942) holds. Is believed to be capable and energetic.

An elder brother of (W.W. 244).

68. *Nawab Khan* (W.W. 472).—Haji, Khawaja of Kulangar, Logar. Born about 1865. Was a Hakim (Governor) in Mangal country during the reign of Ameer Habibullah Khan. Dismissed by Amanullah on account of old age. Joined Shah Mahmud (W.W. 414) in Jaji country during the revolution, and then joined the late King Nadir Shah, becoming his private secretary. In November 1930 was sent to disperse lashkars said to be gathering on the Kurram border. In 1931 proceeded to Mecca as the representative of Nadir Shah. In November 1931 went to Ghazni in connexion with the efforts to effect the surrender of Abdur Rahman (W.W. 195). In late 1932 was attempting to secure the arrest of the Lewanai Faqir (W.W. 412A). Visited Matun during the Khost disturbances 1933 and spent the summer of that year in the Southern Province conciliating the tribes. Was chief delegate to the Turi-Jaji Commission, which met on the Kurram border in June 1933. Was awarded 60 jaribs of land for his service in connexion with Khost disturbances. A man of some influence in the Southern Province and has been useful to the Government. Is now very old. Appointed equerry to King Zahir Shah, whom he frequently accompanies on drives. Has two sons, Firqa Mishar (major-general) Faiz Muhammad Khan (W.W. 244), aide-de-camp to the King, and Nasrullah Khan (W.W. 469A), Muin (Under-Secretary) in the Ministry of Public Works. Abdul Jamil (W.W. 49) is his nephew.

69. *Obeidullah Khan* (W.W. 492).—Son of Ameer Habibullah Khan by the Ulya Hazrat; younger brother of ex-King Amanullah. Born 1915. Called Shah Agha. Carefully looked after by the Ulya Hazrat (W.W. 646), who employed a German tutor for him. Sent by Amanullah to Kandahar December 1928 with his family. Accompanied Amanullah to Bombay May 1929. Sailed for Italy with Amanullah June 1929. In Berlin with his mother 1930. Still in Berlin, living at the Afghan Legation November 1932. With Amanullah in Rome in December 1933. In October 1935 was living with his mother W.W. 646 in Ghulam Siddiq's (W.W. 309) villa in Berlin. Deprived of Afghan nationality November 1933.

70. *Qurban Hussain Shah* (W.W. 512).—Known locally as "Shahji," Indian. His real name is Saiyid Abdullah Shah. Naib Salar (general). Son of one Nadir Shah of village Moghal, Fatehjang, Campbellpore district. Was one of the accused in a note-forging case in India, and absconded to Afghanistan in 1923. Was at one time employed by the Deutsch-Afghanische Company in Kabul. Joined Nadir Shah in the Southern Province in 1929. Was appointed in charge of the State workshops in December 1929, and was made an equerry to the King in 1930. For a time commanded the troops in the Koh-i-Daman in the 1930 rebellion. In 1931 started a petrol business, and was one of the main importers; his company was closed down in 1933 owing to a petrol monopoly having been given to a new petrol company, which he joined. Was in touch with the Ghadr party in Kabul and also with the Soviet Embassy (1932). In November 1932 went to the Southern Province to assist in suppressing the Dare Khel Zadran revolt. In 1936 in charge of the State Arsenal, Kabul. He is one of the leading business men of Kabul and deals largely with the War Office, being on good terms with Shah Mahmud (W.W. 414). The Prime Minister (W.W. 337), however, dislikes him. Is said to be extremely able, but dishonest and unscrupulous. Reported to have been deprived of the control of the State Arsenal later in 1936.

Proceedings against him on the forgery charge have been suspended indefinitely by the Punjab Government. Visits India periodically in connexion with the transportation of goods to Kabul for the Afghan Government. Definitely deprived of the control of the State Arsenal in summer of 1942 and appointed A.D.C. to War Minister, an appointment he still holds (1943). He is known to have frequent contacts with the Axis Legations and agents of the Faqir of Ipi and other North-West Frontier "firebrands." He is a very rich man with many irons in the fire. Reports about his political activities are conflicting; some suggest that he is pro-Amanullah and anti-British, others that he is used by the Yahya Khel, particularly W.W. 414 and W.W. 337, as a super-intelligence agent and stool pigeon. Addicted to drink and gambling.

71. *Rahimullah Khan* (W.W. 518).—Tajik. Son of Ataullah. Native of Kabul. Was head clerk in the Russian section of the Foreign Ministry. Became



Foreign Agent in Mazar. Afterwards transferred to Moscow as secretary to the Afghan Legation, and later on in the same capacity to Berlin. Appointed assistant in charge Visa Section, Afghan Foreign Office, December 1930. Relieved July 1931. In July 1932 transferred to the Home Ministry as Director, Posts and Telegraphs. Appointment raised to a Ministry in June 1935.

Reported to be efficient and gets on well with Marconi's representative in Kabul. Stated to be keen on improvements and modern developments in his Department, but is slack and indifferent in carrying out his duties. His father died in 1936. Appointed Minister of Mines November 1939. Relieved of appointment of Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in 1940, and appointed Minister of Public Works in addition to Minister of Mines, both of which posts he still (1943) holds. Said to have pro-German sympathies.

72. *Rahmatullah Jan* (W.W. 519).—Muhammadzai. Eldest son of ex-King Amanullah and Queen Souriya. Born 1922. Proceeded to Europe with King 1928. Declared heir apparent 1928. Accompanied Amanullah to Chaman and Bombay the 23rd May, 1929. Sailed for Italy with ex-King the 22nd June, 1929. Was still with Amanullah in Italy 1931, and is believed to be there now (1943). Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933.

73. *Rasul Jan Agha (Fazl Rahim)* (W.W. 522).—Known as Fazl Rahim. Born about 1896. Son of the late Sher Agha, Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazaar. Also known as Masum Jan. His wife is a sister of Ghulam Faruq (W.W. 273). On the death of Sher Agha in June 1925 the title was assumed by his (Sher Agha's) half-brother, Muhammad Siddiq Agha (W.W. 613), although Rasul Jan Agha is the direct claimant by descent. Obtained signatures of 400 mullahs to a manifesto declaring King Amanullah's reforms contrary to Islam. Set out for Khost with Muhammad Siddiq Agha with intention of raising country against Amanullah. Both arrested and brought to Kabul, September 1928. Later released and Rasul Jan Agha was sent to Tagao to try and detach some of Bacha-i-Saqao's adherents December 1928. Was in touch with Bacha-i-Saqao during latter's second attack on Kabul in January 1929 and promised British Legation his protection during the attack. Later was intermediary between Sardar Inayatullah (W.W. 366), Bacha-i-Saqao and the British Legation for removal of Inayatullah to Peshawar by air. In Kabul, unemployed, December 1930. Went on pilgrimage to Mecca February 1933. Now calls himself Mian Jan and lived at Kandahar, where he has much influence, until transferred to Herat July 1935. Transferred to Kandahar 1936. Carries weight with the Ghilzais, especially the Suleiman Khel. Represents eldest branch of the family, but he lacks capacity. Now lives in Kabul (1943).

74. [Nil.]

75. *Saiyid Qasim* (W.W. 548).—Son of Ahmad Shah Khan, Saiyid of Kabul. Proceeded to Peshawar through the Khyber, December 1921, on his way to London as messenger from the Foreign Office. Married the third daughter of the late Mahmud Beg Tarzi. Member of the Afghan Legation in London 1924. Acted as Chargé d'Affaires in 1924 between departure of Abdul Hadi (W.W. 38) and arrival of Shuja-ud-Daulah (W.W. 612). Returned to Kabul May 1925, and appointed Under-Secretary in charge of Russia and Turkestan branch of Foreign Office to succeed Hafizullah (W.W. 327) February 1926. Appointed Afghan consul-general, Delhi, October 1926, *vice* Haji Muhammad Akbar (W.W. 153) and left Kabul for Delhi, the 20th November, 1926. Awarded Order of Astor, January 1927. Appointed Afghan Minister in Rome, 1928. Returned to India and left for Constantinople, June 1929. Said to be working as a translator in the Foreign Office, Kabul, the 7th January, 1930. In December 1933 was believed to be with Amanullah in Rome. Speaks excellent English, well educated. Used to be friendly to members of British Legation, Kabul. His sister is the wife of W.W. 686A.

75A. *Salah-ud-Din Khan* (W.W. 553).—Born about 1893. Son of Mufti Siraj-ud-Din of Herat; native of Herat.

Used to be the editor of *Ittihad-i-Islam*. Shuja-ud-Daulah (W.W. 612) brought him to Kabul and gave him the editorship of the paper *Tijarat (Commerce)*. Afterwards became personal diarist to Amanullah. Appointed consul in Bombay 1930. In March 1933 acted as consul, Jeddah, in addition to his Bombay duties. Appointed consul-general in India August 1933. Visited Dera Ismail Khan and Peshawar during the autumn of 1933, spreading pro-Nadir propaganda amongst the Ghilzais. His father, Mufti Siraj-ud-Din, left Delhi

for Herat in February 1934. Pays periodical visits to Kabul. Maintained one Nur Ahmad Khan in Lahore as propaganda and publicity agent. Took care to maintain his contact and popularity with editors and proprietors of Indian vernacular papers. In 1939 returned to Afghanistan. Appointed Controller of Broadcasting and Propaganda November 1939. Appointed Director of Press and Publicity in 1940, which post he still (1943) holds. Has at various times stated that, when consul and consul-general in India, he was neglected socially by British officials at Simla, Delhi and Bombay. Is believed to have attempted to introduce news on the Kabul Radio and in the press with an anti-British tone, but the strict censorship maintained by the Afghan Government prevented publication on most occasions.

Is a philosopher and poet. Speaks English intelligibly but not very well. Was once reported to be pro-Russian and pro-Republican, but appears to be trusted by Afghan Government. Has the reputation of entertaining anti-British sentiments.

76. *Sarbiland Khan* (W.W. 557).—Naib Salar (general). Ada Khel Jaji of Sargal, Hariob, son of Malik Azad Khan. Has only one eye. In Amanullah's reign was made a Kumandan (probably colonel) and for good work in the Khost rebellion was promoted brigadier. Assisted Nadir Shah in 1929, and for his good services was promoted Naib Salar (general). Was sent of Hariob in October 1930 to recruit for the regular army. Returned to Kabul early in December having failed to obtain any recruits. Collected 150 recruits from Bamian in September 1931. Went to his home via Peshawar and Parachinar in January 1932. Was employed to treat with the Suleiman Khel regarding customs dues in June 1932 and at Gardez suppressing the Dare Khel revolt in November 1932. Reported to have been granted property valued at over a lakh of Afghan rupees in 1933. Lives in Kabul. Has much influence with the Ada Khel Jajis, and is looked upon as their "Khan." Has a son, Niza Muhammad Khan, brigadier. Owing to financial difficulty was considering selling his Kabul houses in 1935. Reprimanded in the same year for smuggling silver into India. Left Kabul for Mecca via India December 1937. He visited Mecca in 1939 and India in 1941. Also believed to be in contact with Axis agents. In Kabul (1943).

77. *H.R.H. Shah Mahmud (Mahmud Jan)* (W.W. 414).—Sardar Muhammadzai. Youngest son of Muhammad Yusuf and uncle of King Zahir Shah. Half-brother of W.W. 337 and brother of W.W. 585. Appointed Sar Sar-i-Os, ranking as general, in 1917. Commanded the troops on the Peiwar front 1919. Was in great favour with the Ameer for never having suffered a defeat (he was never attacked). Appointed Civil and Military Governor of the Simat-i-Janubi (Southern Provinces) September 1919. In Khost February 1920. Arrived in Kabul from Gardez December 1920. Was married in Kabul during the same month to a step-sister of the Ameer. Returned to Gardez soon after. Shah Mahmud was in touch with Muhammad Hasan, B.A., at Makin and Haji Abdur Razaq at Shakin in 1920 and early 1921, and undoubtedly supplied them with frequent convoys of ammunition, rations and money for distribution to the hostile sections of the Wana Wazirs and Mahsuds. Arrived in Kabul in October 1921, accompanied by his family. General Officer Commanding, Badakhshan and Kataghan, from 1922 to 1925. Appointed Governor of Eastern Province April 1926. Interviewed Afridis at Jalalabad April 1926, and promised them similar treatment to that given by his brother, Nadir Khan. Toured Jalalabad Province and interviewed Afridis at Morgha July 1926. Visited Kabul to discuss Mohmand unrest with King November 1926. Interviewed Mohmands at Jalalabad January 1927; visited Pesh Bolak and distributed money amongst Shinwaris. Transferred from Jalalabad to Kabul February 1928. Appointed second secretary in the Ministry of Interior March 1928. In Kabul February 1929. Commissioned by Bacha-i-Saqao to go as his emissary to the tribes of the Eastern and Southern Provinces. Joined Nadir Khan on his arrival in Khost March 1929. Assisted Nadir Khan in his campaign against Bacha-i-Saqao. Appointed War Minister by Nadir Shah November 1929. Left Kabul for Northern Provinces and in January 1931 was appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator) of Northern Afghanistan. Succeeded in driving Ibrahim Beg across the Russian frontier and pacified the country sufficiently for him to be able to return to Kabul in August 1931. Awarded the Almar-i-Ala September 1931 and appointed a member of the Majlis-i-Aiyan (Council of Nobles). He suffered from goitre and hoped to take a cure for it in Germany in the autumn of 1932, but his visit to Europe was postponed owing to the Dare Khel outbreak in November 1932, during which he commanded



a force of about two divisions in addition to tribal levies. His success in this affair was perhaps due as much to money as to fighting. Up to December 1932 he was still engaged in settling affairs in the Southern Province and handing over control to Nasrullah (W.W. 469A), the new Governor. Spent the spring and summer of 1933 in the Southern Province, visiting Kabul on one occasion. On Nadir Shah's murder displayed great presence of mind dealing with the situation in Kabul. Proclaimed Zahir Shah King and swore allegiance to him. Appointed Commander-in-chief and Minister of War. Appears to possess considerable energy and force of character and is believed to be popular with the army. He is probably better fitted for the command of irregulars than of regular troops, having no real military education. He is vain, though at the same time shy and sensitive; is fond of sport and games and friendly to members of the British Legation. In addition to his military duties, is in charge of the Southern Province. He is said to be jealous of H.R.H. Hashim Khan (W.W. 337), his half-brother, and not always to agree with him in matters of policy.

Betrothed his two daughters to the two sons of the late Hayatullah, brother of ex-King Amanullah, December 1935. Sons were born to him in 1932 and 1936. Left for Europe March 1936 for medical treatment and has since been successfully operated upon for goitre in Berlin. Visited England, France, Italy, Germany, Russia, Turkey and Iran. Returned to Kabul December 1936. Now (1937) said to be taking less interest in his work. Still (1943) War Minister. Son born to him in January 1940. Developed heart trouble in 1943 and was unable to carry out his duties for some time, but his health is said to be improving.

78. *H.R.H. Shah Wali Khan* (W.W. 585).—Sardar, Muhammadzai. Born 1885. Son of Sardar Muhammad Yusuf Khan and brother of the late King Nadir Shah. Brother of W.W. 414 and half-brother of W.W. 337. Was Rikab Bashi (equerry) to Ameer Habibullah. Accompanied him to India in 1907. After the Ameer's murder in February 1919 was arrested and sent to Kabul, but was acquitted and released. Commanded troops on Kharlachi front July–October 1919. Promoted general for good services on the Tochi border. Married a sister of ex-King Amanullah in May 1920. Appointed to command 1st Division in Kabul April 1921. Was on intimate terms with ex-King Amanullah and seemed to be his greatest personal friend. Was one of the delegates at the British-Afghan Conference in Kabul 1921. Commanded 1st Cavalry Corps December 1921. Appointed to command the Kabul Corps 1923. Appointed Yawar Hazuri (equerry to the King) December 1924. Visited India in May 1925 and again in December 1925, when he persuaded Muhammad Umar (W.W. 648) to return to Afghanistan from Hyderabad. Commanded troops Logar during the Mangal rebellion 1924–25, and for his services was created "Taj-i-Afghan." Left Kabul for Paris September 1926, accompanying Afghan students returning from vacation. Was with his brother Nadir Khan at Grasse. Left Marseilles with Nadir Khan and Hashim Khan (W.W. 337) February 1929, and proceeded with Nadir Khan to Khost March 1929. Captured Kabul the 13th October, 1929. Appointed Regent October 1929. Appointed Minister at London November 1929. Reached England the 10th January, 1930. Transferred to Paris June 1931. Came to Kabul on leave September 1932, bringing with him, under safe conduct, the late Ghulam Nabi. Returned to Paris and resumed his appointment February 1933. Able and quick-witted. A friendly and pleasant man. Very popular in Kabul, and consequently reported to be regarded with jealousy by his brother, the Prime Minister, Hashim Khan (W.W. 337). His popularity has somewhat diminished owing to the execution of Ghulam Nabi. Returned to Kabul February 1935, and appointed Acting Minister of Defence during absence of Shah Mahmud in Europe. His wife refused to accompany him and is still in Paris. Objects to the monopoly system of the Ashami Company. Acting Prime Minister in the absence of Hashim Khan in Europe (1936). Left Kabul in March 1937 to resume his appointment of Minister at Paris. Represented King Zahir Shah at the Coronation of King George VI.

Visited Kabul March 1939, and returned to Paris June 1939. Still (1943) Minister in Vichy.

79. *Sher Agha* (see *Fazal-i-Umar*).

80. *Sher Ahmad Khan* (W.W. 598).—Sardar, Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Fateh Muhammad Khan. Born 1885. Acted in the appointment of Ishaq-Aghassi Nizami (Military Chamberlain) 1917. Appointed Hakim (Governor) of Andkhui 1920. Suspended and arrived Kabul May 1921. Appointed Afghan Envoy to Italy 1921, and arrived in Peshawar on the 10th October *en route* with

a large party of Afghan students who were proceeding to be educated in Europe. Afghan Minister at Rome during 1922, and was engaged in negotiations for the purchase of arms until the summer of 1923, when he returned to Kabul with an expressed distaste for his own country. Appointed President of the Shaura (National Council) 1924. Leader of the party in favour of peaceful tactics during Urta Tagai crisis, January 1926. Cordially detested the late Mahmud Tarzi. With King Amanullah in Europe 1928. Appointed to still-born post of Prime Minister September 1928, and subsequently to be head of the Public Service Bureau. Held Jalalabad for Amanullah November 1928. Was given full powers to settle the Shinwari rising, but failed and returned to Kabul December 1928. Fled with Amanullah to India May 1929. Returned to Kabul later and was appointed Privy Councillor by Nadir Shah December 1929. Appointed Ambassador at Tehran December 1930. A man of some ability, but indolent and corrupt. Said to entertain a profound contempt and dislike for the Persians, and to be very outspoken on the subject. Arrived in Kabul the 18th September, 1935, on a visit. Returned Tehran December 1935. Visited Kabul 1936, using a German aeroplane. Betrothed his nephew Muhammad Umar to Sultan, fourth sister of King Zahir Shah, October 1935.

Relieved by W.W. 140 as Ambassador at Tehran in April 1937. Appointed Minister of State October 1937. Still (1943) Minister of State.

81. *Shuja-ud-Daulah* (W.W. 612) of Ghorband.—Comes of a Trans-Oxus family. Born 1896. Was Ghulam Bacha (page) in 1916, and was employed looking after the German mission in Herat. Appointed Farash Bashi Hazuri (Head Chamberlain to the King) to Ameer Habibullah Khan January 1917. Appointed Kotwal of Kabul and Amin-i-Asas (chief of police) by Amanullah. Commanded 2nd Division in Kabul January 1921. One of the delegates at the British-Afghan Conference in Kabul 1921. Appointed Minister of Security, and appeared to be a man of considerable ability. In close confidence of the Ameer. Officiated as Governor of Herat January 1921. Relieved and returned to Kabul at the end of 1924. Was deputed to maintain order in the Southern Province during the Mangal rebellion (1924). Appointed Minister at London August 1924, and arrived in London April 1925. Carried through many rifle deals, out of which he is believed to have made a considerable fortune. Gave trouble by failing to settle debts due by the Afghan Legation for rent, &c. Summoned to Kandahar by Amanullah February 1929. Arrived Herat the 28th March, 1929, and assumed duties as Governor on behalf of Amanullah. Fled to Meshed on arrival of Abdur Rahim (W.W. 89), Bacha-i-Saqao's nominee, May 1929. Returned to London via Tashkent–Moscow, and arrived the 11th July, 1929. Attempted to dispose of Afghan Government property, and on this account was asked to leave the country. In Berlin September 1929. In Moscow November 1929. Accompanied Amanullah to Mecca in 1931, returning to Europe via Beirut. Was in Germany in 1933. One of Amanullah's most active supporters. Is believed to be the actual murderer of the late Ameer Habibullah. Proved himself on all occasions ill-mannered and anti-British. Deprived of Afghan nationality November 1933. Believed to be in pay of the Soviet. His wife is a sister of W.W. 289. In Russia February 1936.

82. *Siddiq Agha Muhammad (Gul Agha)* (W.W. 613).—Son of Qaiyum Jan Agha, the Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazar (W.W. 347), and half-brother of Fazl-i-Umar (Sher Agha) (W.W. 256). On the death of Qaiyum Jan Agha the title was assumed by the eldest son, Sher Agha. On the latter's death in June 1925 the title was assumed by Muhammad Siddiq Agha, in the absence of his half-brother, Sher Agha, then a political refugee in India. Was arrested, with Rasul Jan Agha (W.W. 522), for trying to stir up trouble in Khost, September 1928. Later released, and in February 1929 was reported to have accepted Bacha-i-Saqao's rule. In June 1929 was placed under surveillance in Kabul on account of his intrigues with Sher Agha in the Southern Province. Confined in the Arg, June 1929. Released, and joined Nadir Khan on his entry into Kabul, October 1929. Appointed Minister to Egypt, and passed through Peshawar, *en route*, February 1931. Proceeded to Mecca, April 1931, to watch Amanullah. In July 1932 visited Kabul on leave, and was received in a friendly manner by the King and the Prime Minister. Sher Agha (W.W. 256) was reported to be trying to persuade him to resign, but he returned to Egypt in September 1932. Visited Mecca for the Haj 1933. Appointed Minister, Hejaz, in addition to duties as Minister, Egypt, April 1935. Visited Mecca during pilgrimage (1935), but evinced no sympathy for Amanullah. Will in future reside permanently in Hejaz, relinquishing duties of Minister, Egypt. Still (1937) Minister in Hejaz. Reappointed (1939), in addition, Minister to Egypt,



and will reside at Cairo. Visited Kabul in July 1942. Returned to Cairo in 1942. Expressed anti-British views in connexion with the war situation and British attitude towards Egypt in 1942. Still Minister in Cairo (1943).

83. *Sultan Ahmad Khan* (W.W. 624).—Son of Colonel Sher Ahmad Khan (W.W. 600). Assistant to Mirza Muhammad Khan (W.W. 450). Ambassador at Moscow, August 1920. Head of the Afghan mission to Angora 1921. Arrived in Baku, March 1921. Arrived in Angora in April. Addressed a large crowd, including many prominent Turkish Nationalist Deputies, at the mosque of Namazie, Angora, in August 1921. The subject of the address was the necessity for unity throughout the whole Moslem world, in order that the encroachments and intrigues of European Powers might be successfully resisted. Prayers were offered for the victory of the Turkish arms, and Sultan Ahmad Khan gave a donation of 2,000 liras to the Red Crescent. The Bolshevik Envoy in Kabul, Raskolnikov, instructed his Government early in September 1921, at the request of the Afghan Government, to provide Sultan Ahmad Khan with 40,000 roubles in gold, payment to be adjusted in Kabul. Returned to Kabul, April 1926, and was appointed third secretary in Foreign Office. Officiated as first secretary during absence of Mirza Muhammad Khan (W.W. 450) on Urta Tagai Boundary Commission. Appointed second secretary, Foreign Office, June 1926, and first secretary, October 1926. Granted title of "Sardar-i-Ala," February 1927. Appointed Ambassador at Tehran, October 1928. Relieved November 1929 and returned to Kabul. Appointed to be in charge of State guests Kabul, January 1930. Went to Turkey as Ambassador, *vice* the late Ghulam Nabi, in December 1930. Took with him as secretary Faiz Muhammad Khan (W.W. 243). Suspected of pro-Amanullah tendencies. Was on intimate terms with the late Ghulam Nabi during his visit to Constantinople in December 1931. Visited Europe in 1933, and, as Afghan representative, concluded a Treaty of Friendship with Brazil through their Embassy 1933. Appointed as an Afghan delegate to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva in 1933. Still (1936) Ambassador in Turkey. Visited Kabul, August 1935. To be Minister, Egypt, in addition to his other duties. A conceited, dissolute man, but appears to possess some ability. Represented King of Afghanistan at the funeral of King George V, January 1936. Visited Afghanistan April 1937 and returned to Angora June 1937. Appointed Ambassador at Moscow (1938). Still (1943) Ambassador at Moscow. During 1941-42 stated to have shown some concern for his personal safety, and to have given depressing accounts of Russian ability to resist the Germans.

84. [Nil.]

85. *Ulya Hazrat* (W.W. 646).—Siraj-ul-Khawatin (Her Majesty the Sun of the Ladies). Step-sister of Luinab Khushdil Khan, daughter of the late Luinab Sherdil Khan, and step-daughter of Ishaq Aghassi Muhammad Sarwar Khan. Her name is Sarwar Sultan. Chief wife of Ameer Habibullah and mother of ex-King Amanullah Khan (W.W. 183). In 1915 said to be strongly in favour of neutrality. Very strong character and dabbled in politics. Said to have refused to help Turco-German mission in 1916. In 1917 and 1918 had numerous quarrels with Ameer Habibullah owing to her interference in political matters, and was eventually said to have been expelled from the Arq. After the murder of Habibullah, left for Kabul to negotiate with her son, Amanullah. Is believed by many to have been, with Amanullah, the organiser of the plot which resulted in the murder of Habibullah. Was said to have been of Tarzi's party, and in favour of a treaty of friendship with the British. Has one other son, Obeidullah, known as Sher Agha (W.W. 492), born 1915. Left for Kandahar with Queen Souriya, December 1928, and proceeded with energy to raise support for the Durrani Dynasty. Was not on good terms with Queen Souriya. Accompanied Amanullah to Bombay, May 1929. Sailed for Italy with Amanullah, June 1929. In Berlin 1930 intriguing against Nadir Khan in favour of Obeidullah. Has remained in Europe 1929-35, mostly at Amanullah's residence at Rome, but occasionally visits Montreux in Switzerland, and Berlin. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. Visited Mecca with ex-King Amanullah for 1935 pilgrimage.

In October 1935 was living with Obeidullah Khan (W.W. 492) in Ghulam Siddiq's (W.W. 309) villa in Berlin.

Still (1943), so far as is known, in Europe.

86. *Yakub Khan* (W.W. 675).—Mohmand. Son of Muhammad Yusuf Khan and brother of Agha Sami (W.W. 555). Born 1889. Was page to Ameer Habibullah. Numerous favours were conferred on him by Amanullah.

Appointed a Musahib-i-Khas (Privy Councillor) in 1920, and Shahgassi Huzuri 1927. Created Sardar-i-Ala, January 1927, and appointed Minister of Court. Accompanied Amanullah to Europe 1927-28. Accompanied Amanullah to Kandahar, January 1929, and to Bombay, May 1929. Left Bombay, June 1929, for Duzdap. Arrived Meshed, August 1929. Returned to Kabul 1929. Ordered to be deported for complicity in the Koh-i-Daman revolt 1930, but was detained in Jalalabad and later released. Said to be propagating in favour of Amanullah. Went to Mecca on pilgrimage, April 1931. Arrived at Tehran with his brother W.W. 555, December 1931. Has a son, Musa Jan, born in 1916, and a daughter, who joined him in Tehran in 1933. Probably still in Persia, May 1935. His property in Afghanistan was confiscated in 1933. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. Family deported from Kabul to Tehran, August 1935.

87. *Zalmi* (W.W. 691).—Musakhel, Mangal, Malik. A leader of rebels during Khost disturbances of 1924-25. Took refuge in Kurram valley, whence he was deported to Abbottabad 1925. Brought to Kabul with twenty other maliks, Zadrans and Mangals, October 1926; treated as a guest and stayed with Ghulam Nabi Khan. Pardoned by the King, and returned to Khost, November 1926. Assisted Nadir Shah in 1929, and appointed Naib Salar (general) in May 1930. In August sent word to his tribe not to interfere in British affairs. Left Kabul in November 1930 to raise recruits in Khost, but was badly received. In June 1932 went to Ghazni to treat with the Ghilzais about customs dues, and arrived at a successful solution. Suspected of being concerned in the murder of Malik Sanak Mangal, and Khan (W.W. 399A), son of Sanak, was said to be plotting his assassination. Accompanied Shah Mahmud (W.W. 414) to Gardez to put down the Dare Khel revolt in November 1932. Still an important figure in Mangal country. Usually lives in Kabul and is friendly to members of British Legation. Said, with W.W. 602A, to be trying to cause some unrest amongst the tribes in the Southern Province, January 1936. Still (1943) residing in Kabul and under surveillance. Suspected of having assisted the Faqir of Ipi in his contacts with the Axis Legations (1942-43) and to have passed money from Kabul to the Faqir. He is a friend of W.W. 414, who uses him as a medium for promoting relations between the Government and the tribes of the Southern Province.

88. *Zulfiqar Khan, Muhammad* (W.W. 697).—Muhammadzai. Of no important family. Educated at Habibia College, Kabul. Went to France with Afghan students to look after them, and became guardian to Hidayatullah Khan (W.W. 348), son of Amanullah Khan. Was recalled to Kabul by Amanullah, and for some time was unemployed. During the revolution joined Hashim Khan (W.W. 337) in the Eastern Province and became his private secretary. Went to Parachinar, where he joined Nadir Khan and Shah Wali (W.W. 585). Counsellor to the Afghan Legation in London 1931. Left London for Paris, with Shah Wali, in June 1931. Returned to Kabul, September 1931, and was appointed assistant to the Prime Minister. A talkative little man, speaks English fluently, and is very friendly towards members of the British Legation, Kabul. Visited Lahore in January and returned to Kabul, April 1936.

Appointed Minister at Tokyo, 1939. Still (1943) Minister at Tokyo.

[E 6154/1503/97]

No. 2

*Sir F. Wylie to Mr. Eden.—(Received 14th October.)*

(No. 35.)

Sir,

Kabul, 1st July, 1943.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a report on the heads of foreign missions in Kabul.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Secretary of State for India and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

F. V. WYLIE.



*Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Kabul.*

*Egypt:* Minister, M. Mohamed Amin Fouad Bey.

Presented his credentials on the 1st April, 1943. A career diplomatist. Very civilised after the French mode and seems to be well off financially. Has served among other places in Angora and Bucharest. In Bucharest he seems to have been Counsellor and later Minister. Professes extreme pro-Allied sentiments, but is almost certainly a good Egyptian Nationalist as well. Would like to be considered a politician but only succeeds in being naïve. A pleasant colleague, nevertheless, who with the assistance of a very busy little helpmeet has succeeded in sweeping out some of the more fearsome recesses of the Egyptian Legation in Kabul.

*France (Vichy).*

The legation has been closed, and since the 22nd May, 1943, Vichy French interests in Kabul have been transferred to the care of the Turkish Embassy.

*Germany:* Minister, Herr Hans Pilger.

Presented his credentials on the 28th August, 1937.

*Persia:* Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Djavad Ghadimi.

Mr. Ghadimi is one of the "characters" of the Diplomatic Corps in Kabul. A little mouse of a man with a strong resemblance to Mr. Robertson Hare of film fame. Entirely ineffectual for all serious purposes but is possessed of a very sly sense of humour and very little escapes him. An indefatigable host and very friendly with the British Legation.

*Iraq:* Minister, General Khalid Al Zahawi.

Presented his credentials on the 4th February, 1943. An officer of the Iraqi army who has received training at the Staff College at Camberley, where he enjoyed himself thoroughly and where he seems to have been very well treated. Is evidently a man of parts, as before being posted to Kabul he was Director-General of Irrigation in his own country. A gentle person and very well disposed to Great Britain.

*Italy:* Minister, Commendatore Pietro Quaroni.

Presented his credentials on the 9th December, 1936.

*Japan:* Minister, Motoharu Shichida.

Presented his credentials on the 3rd November, 1942.

*Turkey:* Ambassador, M. Kemal Köprulu.

Presented his credentials on the 1st June, 1942. Is something of a legal expert. Before the 1914-18 War was secretary to the legal adviser to the Ministry of the Interior in the Turkish Government. He served in the Turkish army as a reserve officer, 1914-18, after which he resumed his career of lawyer cum diplomatist. Was first secretary at the London Embassy in 1923. Acted as adviser to the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in connexion with the Arbitration Board appointed for the settlement of the frontier dispute between Afghanistan and Persia in 1934. It was then that he visited Afghanistan for the first time. In the next year he was made legal adviser to the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, a post which he continued to hold till his appointment to Kabul.

M. Köprulu has the prosperous appearance of a wine waiter at a really good London hotel. He uses certain lavatory gestures with his hands as well which are not out of keeping with this appearance. His whole manner, in fact, is so smooth, not to say slippery, that it is hard to know whether there is anything to him or not. On the whole it is thought that there is not. He certainly does not give the impression of being either a profound lawyer or an effective diplomatist. He has, however, succeeded in avoiding even the least intimacy with the various representatives of the United Nations in Kabul, though there is no evidence so far available to show that he is on any more intimate terms with the Axis representatives. Till we can be more certain of his quality, therefore, he is probably worth watching.

*Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:* Ambassador, M. C. Mikhailov.

\*Presented his credentials on the 23rd March, 1938. Before his appointment to Kabul held some sort of professorial post in Moscow University. A considerable reader in a rather uninspired way; an ardent Communist and very patriotic

The events of the last year have mellowed his attitude to the British Legation out of all recognition. He is now entirely friendly, and under pressure even discovers a not inconsiderable sense of humour. Is doyen of the Diplomatic Corps, a position which he holds in no light esteem but about the practical side of which he makes little or no effort. His English is adequate but very difficult to follow, which must be a handicap in his official dealings with Afghan Ministers. He carries a very suspicious air also, which does not help to make him popular in such society as can be said to exist in Kabul. A competent man, nevertheless, and very watchful. Although he has been four years in Kabul he has made no effort to improve his linguistic equipment and, *e.g.*, knows no Persian. Has a profound contempt for the Afghan Government and all its works. (Written in 1942.)

M. Mikhailov is now on extremely friendly terms with the British Legation. On occasion he evinces a candour which must be quite remarkable for a Soviet diplomatist and, *mirabile dictu*, has even been known to express gratitude for assistance given. In confidential talk he makes no secret of his intense desire to get out of Kabul.

*United States:* Minister, Mr. Cornelius Van H. Engert.

Presented his credentials on the 25th July, 1942. Mr. Engert is a professed Anglophile. During the war of 1914-18 he was secretary at the United States Embassy in Constantinople, where he rendered the British Government conspicuous assistance in the matter of British prisoners of war in the hands of the Turks. In the interval he has frequently visited London, where he is well known at the Foreign Office. At Tehran, and later at Beirut, he gave many further proofs of his anxiety to co-operate with his British colleagues and to further Anglo-American understanding in any way that was in his power. At Beirut in particular (1940-42) he made himself most useful as an intermediary between the British representatives and those of Vichy France. In Kabul he has continued this policy though in a somewhat uneven way. The rôle is, however, a difficult one to sustain if only because sooner or later it involves a conflict of loyalties. Performance then tends to lag behind profession, when the British representative concerned is liable to have difficulty in reconciling the facts and is inclined to wonder where exactly he stands. What is certain, however, is that Mr. Engert genuinely believes in Anglo-American solidarity. This being so, he has had assistance from the British Legation in Kabul on a scale which must be rare in the annals of diplomacy. Relations between the British and United States missions in Afghanistan have as a result been established on a basis of intimacy and cordiality. This fact may become very important later, and if it does a fair share of the credit should go to Mr. Engert.

[E 6207/1546/97]

No. 3

*Mr. Squire to Mr. Eden.—(Received 16th October.)*

(No. 42.)

Sir,

Kabul, 6th August, 1943.

I HAVE the honour to report that I was received in audience by His Majesty King Zahir Shah at 11.30 A.M. on the 5th August, when I presented His Majesty's letters accrediting me and announcing the recall of my predecessor, Sir Francis Wylie. The ceremonial proceedings differed only slightly from those followed in the case of my predecessor and described in his despatch No. 59 of the 18th September, 1941.

2. The assistant director of the Protocol Department called at the legation with three cars to conduct myself and my staff to the Dilkusha Palace where a guard of honour was drawn up. The Court Master of Ceremonies met the car at the foot of the steps and conducted us upstairs to an empty room, where the Minister of Court, the military secretary and adviser to the King, the chief aide-de-camp to the King, and a junior official of the Court Ministry were in attendance. The Director of the Protocol Department was not there as he was in attendance on the Persian Ambassador who had been received in audience half an hour earlier. The Minister of Court took me into the Audience Chamber, where His Majesty, who was attended by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was standing. After I had read my speech in Persian and His Majesty had replied, we shook hands, and I presented my letters.

[27557]

D 2



3. His Majesty then took his seat and invited me to sit on his left while the Minister of Court and Minister for Foreign Affairs also sat down in chairs that had been provided for them. His Majesty, who was most affable and quite informal, opened the conversation by commenting on the excellent Persian of my speech (I am afraid that I had cheated in this matter by having had the translation checked and corrected by a Persian friend). He then asked me where I had learnt Persian and if I was also interested in Persian literature. This gave me an opportunity of replying that I had had the good fortune of studying that language at Oxford at the same time, Sir, as yourself, a fact in which the King expressed much interest. He then asked me about my recent journey to England, enquired whether I had met Sir Kerr Fraser-Tytler there and asked whether I had had any previous connexion with the Government of India! Finally, he expressed his good wishes for my stay in the country, assured me that his officers would do all they could to make it pleasant and hoped that the cordial relations between our two countries would be maintained and strengthened.

4. I had been particularly asked that if His Majesty did not himself do so at the end of one or two minutes I should myself ask to introduce my staff and that in no case should the conversation exceed two or three minutes. As it turned out, however, it was not until nearly ten minutes had elapsed that a suitable pause in the conversation enabled me to make this request and so bring the ceremony to a close.

5. After introducing my staff individually to His Majesty, I myself took my leave and we all withdrew and returned to the legation via the tomb of His late Majesty King Nadir Shah on which I placed my wreath by the side of one left a short while before by the Persian Ambassador. The inclusion of my staff in the visit to the tomb was an innovation. I understand that, in the past, only the Minister has gone there.

6. I enclose the English (?) translation of my speech. The translation of His Majesty's reply, of which I have not yet received a copy, will follow.

7. A copy of this despatch with enclosure is being forwarded to the Secretary of State for India and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

G. F. SQUIRE.

(?) Not printed.

[E 6672/86/97]

No. 4

*Mr. Squire to Mr. Eden.—(Received 4th November.)*

(No. 60.)

Sir,

*Kabul, 23rd October, 1943.*

I HAVE just had another long interview with the Prime Minister, whom I went to thank for having agreed to the release of our two airmen and their plane. As at my previous interview, the Prime Minister was accompanied by Najibullah Khan, and started off by saying that as I had been good enough to acknowledge frankly to him the community of interests of our two countries he wished to be equally frank with me and to tell me exactly what was in his mind. For this reason he would prefer to talk to me in Persian, and in order that I might be quite sure of understanding correctly what he said he wished Najibullah Khan to translate for me.

2. He said that I should not think that the policy of friendliness towards the British Government was his personal policy only or confined to the members of the present Government. It was the wish of the whole country. Of course, there had been pro-German elements, but there were black sheep in every fold. The Afghans might not be well versed in world politics, but they were not fools. At the time of the Jirga and the expulsion of the Axis nationals (at least this was the occasion to which I understood him to refer) they had realised quite clearly that the Nazis were seeking for world domination. If Germany were to have defeated Russia and to have invaded India they were under no illusions as to what would have been the fate of Afghanistan. It could not possibly, in spite of German promises, have retained its independence, but would inevitably have been swallowed up like all the smaller European countries now under German

domination. It was for this reason that, though circumstances of course compelled them to maintain friendly relations with the Axis, they had then decided to hitch their wagon to the British star.

3. In 1937 the Prime Minister had gone to England expressly to try and arrange a clearer understanding with His Majesty's Government for the defence of Afghanistan. He had failed in his mission, as at that time His Majesty's Government seemed to have no idea of their danger and were taking no steps for the defence of India; much less were they interested in the defence of Afghanistan. Sir Richard Maconachie had, however, assured him that His Majesty's Government would consider an attack on Afghanistan by Soviet Russia as an attack on India. (This was obviously a reference to the penultimate sentence of paragraph 5 of Sir J. Simon's despatch No. 82 of the 17th October, 1932, which was communicated verbally to the Afghan Government by Sir R. Maconachie, as reported in paragraph 6 of his despatch No. 141 dated the 29th December, 1932.)

4. Well, the past was past, but he would not be doing his duty if he failed to look to the future. The policy of his country was the closest possible friendship and unity with India. Would India accept this friendship and reciprocate it in all sincerity? If so, Afghanistan might well become the arm of India for her defence should necessity arise. The Prime Minister expressed the greatest admiration for the genius of the British Empire and amazement that the far-off Dominions—New Zealand, Australia and Canada—should have come so readily and whole-heartedly to Britain's assistance in this struggle. This made our failure in the case of Ireland all the more remarkable.

5. The Prime Minister is of course obsessed by his fears of Russia, though he agreed that any such thing as an alliance or pact which might arouse Russian suspicion was out of the question. I had expected that the Prime Minister would raise this question and had taken with me a copy of the Atlantic Charter and the Allied Declaration of the 1st January, 1942, which I gave to the Prime Minister, and which I hoped might go some way towards allaying his anxieties. I added that the hope of the world lay in a real understanding between the United States, ourselves and Soviet Russia, and that I was hopeful that in spite of the tremendous difficulties involved we should succeed in laying the foundations of a new world order. Meanwhile I could assure him that His Majesty's Government had nothing but the most friendly feelings towards Afghanistan, and that this had been clearly demonstrated by India's constant endeavours to provide economic assistance in spite of her own difficulties due to the war. Differences among neighbours were bound to arise, but these were all capable of adjustment given goodwill on both sides. What was in my opinion necessary was that the goodwill on which I knew the Afghan Government had for the Government of India should be extended to all classes of the people. I had previously spoken to him on the subject of the teaching in Afghan schools and the importance of that being on the right lines. The Prime Minister agreed and said that they were already taking steps to increase the teaching of English throughout the country. This has been reported in a recent Kabul Intelligence Summary.

6. The conversation then passed to other subjects, with which I will deal separately. It was hardly to be expected that the Prime Minister should have made any reference to their attempts at reinsurance against a possible German victory, but in general I have no doubt that he was quite sincere, though it is clear that he is still hankering after some sort of guarantee against possible Soviet aggression. It is equally clear that the Afghans have little to offer us in exchange for all we do to help them. But we can, I think, at least secure their whole-hearted co-operation in maintaining peace on the border and in any other way we consider desirable. It is obviously not the time to reconsider or restate our policy towards Afghanistan, nor do I think that any formal communication in reply is either necessary or expected.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary of State for India and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

G. F. SQUIRE.



[E 7456/86/97]

No. 5

*Mr. Squire to the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department.—(Received in the Foreign Office, 29th November.)*

(No. 66.)

Sir,

Kabul, 11th November, 1943.

IT may be of interest if I attempt to sketch briefly the political developments in Afghanistan during the past months with particular reference to the Government's present and future attitude towards His Majesty's Government and the Government of India.

2. The administration of Afghanistan is entirely in the hands of the Yahya Khel, represented by the King, his two uncles, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence, and his two cousins, Naim Khan, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education, and Daud Khan, commanding the Kabul Army Corps. This does not, however, mean that the Prime Minister, who has for the past ten years been the real ruler of the country, is a complete autocrat as was Riza Shah Pahlavi. Religions and tribal customs are the principal factors governing conditions in Afghanistan. The present Government cannot afford to disregard public opinion, and any changes in the outlook of such a backward community must of necessity be very gradual. They have also to consider the younger element among their own people, whose opinions are perhaps to some extent shared by Daud Khan and with whom the King himself is inclined to join in opposition to his uncles. An added complication lies in the fact that Daud Khan has no love for or sympathy with the tribes, and that if he, instead of the Minister of Defence, was allowed to have his own way with them serious trouble would inevitably ensue.

3. Tribal communities tend to favour and to thrive on disorder and any form of ordered government is therefore bound to be unpopular. For this and other reasons the present Government has many enemies, who have no hesitation in attributing to them all the country's ills. This enmity also extends, as in so many other countries and with equally little justification, to the British Government, who are believed to support the present régime and its policy. Otherwise the Government might easily fall a prey to some temporary tribal combination.

4. The Afghans are also by tradition suspicious of Russia and Great Britain. Germany, on the other hand, had been ready to help them before the war; her rise to power had been spectacular; her speedy victory seemed assured. The tribesmen and young Afghans were not unnaturally impressed and were alike in welcoming the prospect of a German victory freeing them from a Russia which they hated and a Great Britain which they distrusted; but they were divided in their attitude to the no less certain result that such a victory would mean the end of the Yahya Khel régime and would produce chaos in the country.

5. The Prime Minister, whose belief in an ultimate British victory has remained unshaken, found himself increasingly in a minority among his advisers and in a very awkward position. The Government's main anxiety was, of course, for the survival of their own régime, which is always threatened by a possible combination of tribes in the eastern and southern provinces. In particular they have for many years been afraid of Pak Malang, who led the tribal gathering in Khost against them in 1932-33. They could not, therefore, afford at the same time to risk incurring the enmity of other elements such as the Faqir of Ipi, well aware though they were that he was intriguing with the Axis legations in Kabul in order to cause trouble on the Indian frontier. Nor did they dare openly to put a stop to Axis activities which were aimed at the British in India rather than against themselves. After all, in 1942 it still looked very much as if the Axis might win the war. In the circumstances it is not surprising that the Prime Minister temporised. Knowing his own people he realised that only a small portion of the funds sent from the Axis legations to Ipi would reach their destination, and he hoped that he would be able to fend off possible British protests by a plea of ignorance or at least by a denial of complicity. Ipi was therefore free to enlist Afghan subjects in his gangs for use against British India. He had made it plain that he would do nothing against the Afghan Government so long as they themselves did not oppose him, and there can be little doubt that responsible members of the Government, including, in particular, the Minister of Defence, have all along corresponded with him freely and have sent him presents from time to time. This double policy placed the Afghan Government in a difficult position when it was found that such a notorious Afghan subject as Abdul Habib Tahvildar was actually fighting against the British. Their

denials or pleas of ignorance could carry little weight, but they still feared to interfere when Gul Habib (who succeeded his brother, Abdul Habib) and Ghaizal, cousin of the Faqir of Ipi, came openly to Kabul to make further contact with the Axis legations.

6. Early in the summer of 1943, however, it became abundantly clear that the Germans would not after all win the war. This realisation much enhanced the Prime Minister's reputation and strengthened his position, especially *vis-à-vis* his two nephews, Muhammad Naim Khan and Daud Khan, the latter of whom in particular has been generally credited with pro-German leanings. The discovery of the plot in which Mubasher Tarazi was found to be intriguing against the Russians and our own *démarche* against those connected with the Axis intrigues on our own border coincided with the conviction in the minds of the Afghan Government that it was now safe to take action to put an end to all these activities. They have therefore done their best to satisfy the requirements of His Majesty's Government. Gul Habib, who came to Kabul with one of the usual letters from the Faqir of Ipi for the Minister of Defence, was detained in spite of protests from many of the leading Afghan Wazirs; orders were sent to the Southern Province that Ghaizal should similarly be arrested and sent to Kabul should he again enter Afghan territory; and Asal Mir, brother of Gul Habib, has been arrested in spite of the fact that the Afghan Government believe him to be entirely innocent. The Government have gone even further and, at an important Jirga of the leading tribesmen of Khost held in Kabul about two months ago, the Defence Minister warned them in no uncertain terms that they must sever their connexions with Ipi and refrain from sending him contributions in future. Such open opposition to Ipi is already reported to have had the effect of causing him to make approaches to Pak Malang with a view to mutual co-operation, a threat which the Afghan Government are now apparently prepared to view with equanimity.

7. But with the change in the war situation a new fear which has never been entirely absent from Afghan consciousness has risen to the surface, the fear of Russian intentions. Their only hope of defence against aggression from the north lies in the British Government, with the possible assistance of the United States. A guarantee against such aggression was, in fact, actually suggested to a member of the staff of the United States Legation. Further consideration, however, showed the Prime Minister that any overt attempt to reach an agreement with Great Britain or the United States against Russia would not only under present conditions be bound to fail, but would have the more dangerous consequence of arousing Russian suspicions and hostility. Their only course is, therefore, clearly shown to be a gradual rapprochement with His Majesty's Government provided that this can be brought about in such a way as not to affect Afghanistan's independence or to arouse hostility either among their own people or their neighbours.

8. These provisos require to be taken fully into account in shaping our own policy towards the Government. Afghan susceptibilities about their independence are even more pronounced than in the other small countries which have recently acquired independent status, and their resentment of anything that savours of dictatorship is clearly seen in their invariable rejection of any written demands that we may make. This is also in large measure attributable to their fear of the younger generation, and is particularly noticeable in their desire to leave nothing on record which may convict them before their critics of any form of subservience to the British Government. (The recent case of the two interned airmen furnished a striking instance of this. In a note sent to them at their request I had mentioned with gratitude their courtesy in releasing a platoon of Gurkhas who had unintentionally crossed the border as an argument showing that they themselves did not consider conditions on the Indian frontier as being on all fours with a European theatre of war. I was repeatedly asked if I could take back this note and substitute another omitting all reference to this incident, a request with which I eventually complied.) Their relations with the tribes have also to be taken into account, and the Government are still unwilling to do anything which their tribesmen can reasonably impute to subservience to the Government of India. Finally, we have to make allowances for their natural fear that any concession which may be given to us will also have to be given to Soviet Russia.

9. The trend of opinion which I have discussed above makes it incumbent on us to consider how we should react to the Afghan Government's readiness for greater friendship. There can be no question of any major change in our policy which has consistently been the maintenance of the stability of the present régime



and so of the country by affording such economic and other assistance as was conditions allow. If I may be permitted to make a suggestion it is that in rendering this assistance we should pay greater attention to Afghan susceptibilities and should try and secure a fair deal for our own traders by friendly negotiations rather than by *ex cathedra* decisions which do so much to nullify the favourable political effects of our assistance. We are already doing our best to supply the motor transport that is necessary to secure the movement of essential supplies throughout the country, and I hope that it may soon be possible to find means of providing the additional aircraft which the Afghan Government consider necessary for maintaining their control of the tribes. Material assistance in other important matters such as the improvement of communications and the supply of military equipment must of necessity wait till after the war.

10. The main problem of our relations with the country was, I think, well stated to me recently by the Italian Minister, Signor Quaroni, who said that as we had a staunch supporter in the Prime Minister, and so in the present Government which he controls, we need to do nothing in this direction; but the older generation would pass away and our chief task was now to secure the friendship of the younger and more progressive elements, particularly in the army, as well as of the tribes. This can at best be a slow process, but I have already expressed to the Prime Minister the opinion that the first step which should be taken in the interests of mutual friendship is the overhaul of their education, and especially of their teaching of Afghan history which hitherto has been used mainly to develop a national consciousness and has incidentally inculcated distrust of foreigners in general and of the British in particular. In this connexion it is of interest to record a statement recently made to me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that a picture of Dr. Brydon, the solitary British survivor of the disaster at Jagdalak in 1842, was being removed from school text books in which it had hitherto had a prominent place.

11. A recent order by the Minister of Education prescribing Hindustani, English and Russian as the principal languages to be taught in the schools and relegating French and German to a secondary position is also a step in the right direction. And here we have an opportunity for earning Afghan goodwill if we can make a special effort to supply the educational equipment of which all classes of schools, civil and military, stand in great need.

12. It is in fact in the field of cultural relations that our greatest task and our chief opportunity seems to lie. We shall have to move cautiously not only on account of Afghan susceptibilities, but also on account of their fear that any concession to us in this direction must also be granted to Soviet Russia. But the widespread desire for instruction in English may make it possible for the British Council to lend assistance, which if properly managed may have far-reaching results. This is a matter which I have already discussed on more than one occasion both with the Prime Minister and with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and which I propose to keep before them as opportunity offers. Their reactions have so far been most favourable, but I do not want to force the pace too much.

13. Another way in which we can help is by encouraging Afghans, students, military officers, &c., to visit India or other parts of the British Commonwealth, for courses of study or for other purposes, and by seeing that they are well treated during such visits. The six students who recently went to India for training in the production of salt are deeply grateful for all the kindness they received, and the importance of contacts of this nature cannot be too strongly emphasised. And here I would like to put in a plea for greater courtesy to Afghan officials at Indian frontier posts. Europeans visiting Afghanistan are almost invariably treated with very special politeness even to the offering of hospitality at the frontier customs posts. I do not suggest that that is either possible or desirable at British posts, but I do feel that there is scope for improvement in the treatment of those Afghans who unlike the ordinary tribesmen travel on regular passports with British visas, and especially of officials of some standing who have diplomatic visas.

14. The Afghans should also be encouraged to make their contribution to the establishment of a less suspicious atmosphere. The restrictions on social intercourse with the British Legation should be relaxed, and a greater willingness evinced to turn to India for the help and advice which they need in so many branches of the administration. It is for consideration whether we can usefully take any action or make any suggestion to the Afghan Government for the better control of the tribes on the Indian border or for closer collaboration in such matters. Afghan control of the tribes is based rather on religious sentiment than

on force, and it is hardly likely that any great improvement is possible under present conditions.

15. Finally it seems to me that the time has come for the Afghan Government to make more open acknowledgment of the community of interests, political and economic, between Afghanistan and India and to follow more consistently and honestly a policy of close collaboration in all spheres with India. No question of any treaty or any alliance with His Majesty's Government can arise because of the danger of arousing Russian suspicion. There is, of course, the alternative of a tripartite treaty of friendship between Great Britain, Soviet Russia and Afghanistan following the example of the recent Anglo-Soviet-Persian treaty; but at the moment such a treaty hardly comes within the bounds of possibility, if only for the reason of the Prime Minister's bitter and ineradicable hostility to the Soviet Union and all things Russian.

16. I am sending copies of this despatch to the India Office and the Foreign Office.

I have, &c.  
G. F. SQUIRE.



## CHAPTER II.—ARABIA.

[E 7618/3293/25]

No. 6

*Mr. Attlee to Mr. Jordan (Jedda).*

(No. 116.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, 6th December, 1943.*

IN the absence of the Secretary of State and the temporary indisposition of Mr. Law, His Royal Highness the Amir Feisal, accompanied by the Saudi Arabian Minister, called at the Foreign Office on the 30th November and saw Sir Maurice Peterson.

2. The Amir said that he had been instructed by his father to give us some account of his doings in the United States and of the present state of relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States.

3. On the question of supplies, the Amir explained that they had been disappointed. They had not been able to secure any further allocation of motor cars or lorries, although those already promised would be forthcoming.

4. On the question of arms the Saudi Arabian Government felt that they would require our assistance. Sir Maurice Peterson intervened to say that the previous uncertainty on this subject had been due to a difference of opinion between the State Department and the War Department in Washington. He thought the position was now cleared up and the Saudi Arabian Government might be assured that we should have cognisance of any orders for arms they might wish to place in the United States, or of any offers of arms they might receive from the United States Government, and that, provided these were within reasonable limits, we should give our support.

5. The Amir then turned to oil. He said that, as we knew, the Standard Oil Company of California had a concession in his country and they now wished to expand their operations and, in particular, to construct refineries. They had, however, found themselves unable to secure the necessary plant from their Government unless that Government itself were admitted into partnership with the company in the further development of oil installations in Saudi Arabia. The Amir did not know the precise degree of participation which the United States Government required, but the principle was clear. His father had made it plain that an undertaking must be given that there would be no interference in the administration of the country. But even so, His Majesty was not altogether happy and wanted to make sure he had our approval and to secure our advice.

6. Sir Maurice Peterson said that we had no objection at all to an expansion of the United States concession with a view to further development whether by way of exploration or by the establishment of refineries. But he could understand that the Saudi Arabian Government were a little uneasy at the direct intervention of the United States Government. He suggested, therefore, that they might think it well to insist that operations in Saudi Arabia should be carried on by a locally registered company, whatever the proportion of the shares which might be held in the background either by the United States Government or by private United States corporations.

7. The Amir took note of this suggestion.

8. His Royal Highness then said that he came to the most important point of all. His father was expecting to be invited within the next three or four months to participate in some form of Arab Congress in Cairo. Before he did so, His Majesty was very anxious to know our views so that he might conform his own attitude to them.

9. Sir Maurice Peterson said that our attitude towards Arab federation remained unchanged. We did not think it desirable to sponsor any particular scheme since, in our view, if federation were to succeed, it must be a spontaneous movement. But we were in no sense opposed. Nor, on the other hand, did we cherish any particular and favourite side-project of our own in connexion with federation, *e.g.*, we had no candidate for the throne of Syria and thought that Syria might very probably in the end decide to get along without a throne. We had made it plain to the French that whatever their post-war position in Syria and the Lebanon might be—and we thought they had to have some kind of special position—it was not to be allowed to interfere with Arab federation. Beyond this there was really nothing we could say, although our own feeling was that neither King Abdul Aziz nor Egypt had any intention of linking themselves with any

federation which might result, and the most probable outcome would be some kind of loose customs and cultural union embracing Iraq, Syria, the Lebanon and Transjordan. Within these limits it was open to Ibn Saud to adopt any attitude he might wish, and we should not complain if His Majesty did so. Sir Maurice Peterson added that there was, of course, the obvious omission of Palestine, and that this must still be regarded as a closed subject on which we could not as yet offer any guidance, based on our own intentions, to His Majesty.

10. The Amir manifested some dissatisfaction with this reply. He asked that it should be realised that the Arab Conference in Cairo, when it met, would probably be composed largely of extremists. There would be many people there who would wish to go much further than might be prudent, and his father did not think it unfair to ask that, if he were to use his influence to restrain such people, he might be given guidance in advance as to the intentions and wishes of His Majesty's Government.

11. Sir Maurice Peterson said that possibly we should know where we stood better than we did at present before the Cairo Conference met. He must make it plain that there was no question of decisions having been taken on the subject of Palestine as yet. But he could say that two aspects of the situation were beginning to be increasingly felt in London, and these were, firstly, that it was not practicable to use Palestine as a dumping-ground for the whole of world Jewry, and, secondly, that under whatever conditions Jews might be enabled to settle and to live in parts of the world other than Palestine, the Jews ought to have a special position at least in some part of Palestine which would serve as a centre for the whole world structure of post-war Jewry.

12. The Amir gave it as his personal view that he hoped His Majesty's Government would not again have recourse to the partition solution. This had been found impracticable at the time and would be no more practicable now. The right course was to set up and maintain a Palestine Government which would be neither Arab nor Jewish, but would rule the whole country in the interests of both.

I am, &amp;c.

C. R. ATTLEE.

[E 8031/707/25]

No. 7

*Mr. Jordan to Mr. Eden.—(Received 23rd December.)*

(No. 96.)

Sir,

*Jedda, 28th November, 1943.*

WITH reference to Foreign Office minute of the 22nd September, 1938, concerning the Oil Agreement between the Standard Oil Company of California and the Saudi Arabian Government, published in Part 43 of Foreign Office publication "Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs, July-December 1938," I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of the complete agreements as supplied to me confidentially by the Saudi Arabian Government.

2. The first agreement signed on the 29th May, 1933, as published in your minute, contains numerous inaccuracies and omits one article. In order to avoid a lengthy listing of these inaccuracies I have thought it better to send you copies of the complete agreement and the letter exchanged between the Saudi Minister of Finance and the representative of the Standard Oil Company of California, which forms an integral part of the first agreement.

3. With reference to the supplementary agreement signed at Riyadh on the 31st May, 1939, a copy of which was forwarded to you under cover of Mr. A. C. Trott's despatch No. 123 of the 23rd July, 1939, and published on page 51 of Part 45 of Foreign Office publication "Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs, July-December 1939," only one inaccuracy occurs, and that in paragraph 2 of Part 2 of the agreement, where after the word "bounded" in the first line the following should be inserted: "on the east, north, west and south by the following lines (a)."

I am sending a copy of this despatch and its enclosures to His Majesty's Minister of State at Cairo.

I have, &amp;c.

S. R. JORDAN.



Enclosure in No. 7.

THIS agreement made between his Excellency, Sheikh Abdulla Suleiman Al Hamdan, Minister of Finance of Saudi Arabia, acting on behalf of the Saudi Arab Government (hereinafter referred to as the "Government") of the one part, and L. N. Hamilton, acting on behalf of Standard Oil Company of California (hereinafter referred to as the "Company") of the other part.

It is hereby agreed between the Government and the Company in manner following:—

#### ARTICLE 1.

The Government hereby grants to the Company on the terms and conditions hereinafter mentioned, and with respect to the area defined below, the exclusive right, for a period of sixty years from the effective date hereof, to explore, prospect, drill for, extract, treat, manufacture, transport, deal with, carry away and export petroleum, asphalt, naphtha, natural greases, ozokerite and other hydrocarbons and the derivatives of all such products. It is understood, however, that such right does not include the exclusive right to sell crude or refined products within the area described below or within Saudi Arabia.

#### ARTICLE 2.

The area covered by the exclusive right referred to in article 1 hereof is all of Eastern Saudi Arabia, from its eastern boundary (including islands and territorial waters) westward to the westerly edge of the Dahana, and from the northern boundary to the southern boundary of Saudi Arabia, provided that from the northern end of the westerly edge of the Dahana the westerly boundary of the area in question shall continue in a straight line north 30° west to the northern boundary of Saudi Arabia, and from the southern end of the westerly edge of the Dahana such boundary shall continue in a straight line south 30° east to the southern boundary of Saudi Arabia.

For convenience this area may be referred to as the "exclusive area."

#### ARTICLE 3.

In addition to the grant of the exclusive area described in article 2 of this agreement, the Government also hereby grants to the company a preference right to acquire an oil concession covering the balance of eastern Saudi Arabia extending as far west of the westerly boundary of the exclusive area as the contact between the sedimentary and igneous formations. This preference right includes such rights as the Government may now have, or may hereafter acquire, in the so-called Neutral Zone bordering on the Persian Gulf to the south of Kuwait. The nature of this preference right is to be hereafter agreed upon. The term "oil concession" as used in this article means an exclusive concession covering the same products which are covered by the present agreement.

Furthermore, the Company's geologists shall have the right to examine the region covered by the preference right just referred to (excepting the Neutral Zone referred to above), in so far as such examination may be necessary or advisable for a better understanding of the geological character of the exclusive area.

#### ARTICLE 4.

Within the time agreed in article 18 of this agreement the Company shall make an initial loan to the Government of £30,000 gold, or its equivalent.

#### ARTICLE 5.

The Company shall pay the Government annually the sum of £5,000 gold, or its equivalent. For convenience this payment is termed an annual rental, and it is payable in advance. The first annual rental shall be paid within the time agreed in article 18 of this agreement; thereafter, so long as the contract is not terminated, the annual rental shall be due upon each anniversary of the effective date hereof and shall be payable within thirty days after such anniversary, provided that upon the commercial discovery of oil no further annual rental shall be due or payable.

#### ARTICLE 6.

If this contract has not been terminated within eighteen months from the effective date hereof, the Company shall make a second loan to the Government amounting to £20,000 gold, or its equivalent. The due date of such loan shall be eighteen months from the effective date hereof, but the Company shall have fifteen days from the due date within which to make the loan.

#### ARTICLE 7.

During the life of this agreement the Government shall be under no obligation to repay the initial loan of £30,000 gold (or its equivalent), or the second loan of £20,000 gold (or its equivalent). The Company shall have the right to recover the amount of these two loans by way of deductions from one-half of the royalties due the Government. If the amount of the two loans, in whole or in part, shall not have been so recovered by the Company upon the termination of this contract, the Government shall repay the unrecovered amount in four equal and consecutive annual instalments, the first instalment to be paid within one year from the date of the termination of this agreement. Furthermore, until such unrecovered amount has been repaid by the Government, the Company's preference right, referred to in article 3 hereof, shall continue in force.

#### ARTICLE 8.

Upon the effective date of this agreement the Company shall commence plans and preparations for geological work, so planning the work as to take advantage of the cooler season for more efficient work in the field, and of the hotter season for the necessary office work of compiling data and reports. In any event, the actual field work shall commence not later than the end of September 1933, and it shall be continued diligently until operations connected with drilling are commenced or until the contract is terminated.

#### ARTICLE 9.

Within ninety days after the commencement of drilling, the Company shall relinquish to the Government such portions of the exclusive area as the Company at that time may decide not to explore further, or to use otherwise in connexion with this enterprise. Similarly, from time to time during the life of this contract, the Company shall relinquish to the Government such further portions of the exclusive area as the Company may then decide not to explore or prospect further, or to use otherwise in connexion with the enterprise. The portions so relinquished shall thereupon be released from the terms and conditions of this contract, excepting only that during the life of this contract the Company shall continue to enjoy the right to use the portions so relinquished for transportation and communication facilities, which, however, shall interfere as little as practicable with any other use to which the relinquished portions may be put.

#### ARTICLE 10.

The Company shall commence operations connected with drilling as soon as a suitable structure has been found, and in any event if the Company does not commence such operations within three years from the end of September 1933 (subject to the provisions of article 27 hereof), the Government may terminate this contract. Once commenced, these operations shall be continued diligently until oil in commercial quantities has been discovered, or until this agreement is terminated. If the Company should fail to declare so sooner, the date of discovery of oil in commercial quantities shall be the date upon which the Company has completed and tested a well or wells capable of producing, in accordance with first-class oilfield practice, at least 2,000 tons of oil per day for a period of thirty consecutive days.

Operations connected with drilling include the ordering and shipping of materials and equipment to Saudi Arabia, the construction of roads, camps, buildings, structures, communication facilities, &c., and the installation and operation of the machinery, equipment and facilities for drilling wells.

#### ARTICLE 11.

Upon the discovery of oil in commercial quantities, the Company shall advance to the Government the sum of £50,000 gold, or its equivalent, and one year later the further sum of £50,000 gold, or its equivalent. The due



date of the first advance shall be the date of discovery of oil in commercial quantities, as provided in article 10 hereof, and the due date of the second advance shall be one year later. In each case the Company shall have sixty days following the due date within which to make the advance. Both of these advances are on account of royalties which may be due the Government and consequently the Company shall have the right to recover the amount of these advances by way of deductions from one-half of the royalties due the Government.

#### ARTICLE 12.

Since it has been agreed that the annual rental of £5,000 gold, or its equivalent, is payable to the date of the discovery of oil in commercial quantities, and since it has been agreed also that this annual rental is to be payable in advance, it may happen that the last annual rental paid prior to the date of discovery of oil in commercial quantities will cover a period beyond the date of such discovery. In case that this period should be equal to or greater than one-fifth of a year, the proportionate amount of the £5,000 pounds gold, or its equivalent, corresponding to such period shall be treated as an advance on account of royalties due the Government, and consequently it shall be recoverable by the Company by way of deductions from one-half of the royalties due the Government.

#### ARTICLE 13.

As soon as practicable (*i.e.*, allowing a reasonable time for ordering and shipping further materials and equipment to Saudi Arabia and commencing further work) after the date of discovery of oil in commercial quantities, the Company shall continue operations connected with drilling by using at least two strings of tools. These operations shall be continued diligently until the proven area has been drilled up in accordance with first-class oilfield practice, or until the contract is terminated.

#### ARTICLE 14.

The Company shall pay the Government a royalty on all net crude oil produced and saved and run from field storage, after first deducting—

- (1) Water and foreign substances; and
- (2) Oil required for the customary operations of the Company's installations within Saudi Arabia; and
- (3) The oil required for manufacturing the amounts of gasoline and kerosene to be provided free each year to the Government in accordance with article 19 hereof.

The rate of royalty per ton of such net crude oil shall be either—

- (a) Four shillings gold, or its equivalent; or
- (b) At the election of the Company at the time of making each royalty payment, 1 dollar, United States currency, plus the amount, if any, by which the average rate of exchange of 4 shillings gold, during the last half of the semester for which the royalty payment is due, may exceed 1 dollar and 10 cents, United States currency. Thus, for example, if such average rate should be 1 dollar and 14 cents, United States currency (that is to say, 5 dollars and 70 cents per gold pound), the royalty rate would be 1 dollar and 4 cents, United States currency, per ton of such net crude oil.

#### ARTICLE 15.

If the Company should produce, save and sell any natural gas, it will pay to the Government a royalty equal to one-eighth of the proceeds of the sale of such natural gas, it being understood, however, that the Company shall be under no obligation to produce, save, sell, or otherwise dispose of any natural gas. It is also understood that the Company is under no obligation to pay any royalty on such natural gas as it may use for the customary operations of its installations within Saudi Arabia.

#### ARTICLE 16.

The Government, through duly authorised representatives, may, during the usual hours of operations, inspect and examine the operations of the Company under this contract and may verify the amount of production. The Company shall measure in accordance with first-class oilfield practice the amount of oil produced and saved and run from field storage, and shall keep true and correct

accounts thereof, and of any natural gas it may produce and save and sell, and duly authorised representatives of the Government shall also have access at all reasonable times to such accounts. The Company shall, within three months after the end of each semester, commencing with the date of commercial discovery of oil, deliver to the Government an abstract of such accounts for the semester, and a statement of the amount of royalties due the Government for the semester. These accounts and statements shall be treated as confidential by the Government, with the exception of such items therein as the Government may be required to publish for fiscal purposes.

The royalties due the Government at the end of each semester, commencing with the date of commercial discovery of oil, shall be paid within three months after the end of the semester. In case of any question as to the amount of royalties due for any semester, such portion of the amount as may be unquestioned shall be tendered the Government within the period hereinabove provided, and thereupon the question shall be settled by agreement between the parties, or, failing that, by arbitration as provided in this contract. Any further sum which may be payable to the Government as a result of this settlement shall be paid within sixty days after the date of such settlement.

#### ARTICLE 17.

It is agreed that all gold payments provided in this contract, whether pounds gold or shillings gold, are to be based on the gold pound standard according to its weight and fineness at the time the payments may be due. It is also agreed that wherever it is stipulated in this contract that the equivalent of any sum or amount in pounds gold or in shillings gold may be paid, such equivalent may be dollars in United States currency, or pounds sterling.

It is agreed, furthermore, that the equivalent of pounds gold or shillings gold, for any payment which may be made hereunder in dollars, United States currency, or in pounds sterling (with the exception of the first payment provided for in article 18 hereof), shall be based on the average of the rate of exchange as computed over a period of three months immediately preceding the due date of the payment.

#### ARTICLE 18.

All payments provided in this contract to be made to the Government may be made by tendering such payments directly to the Government, or by depositing the amount due to the credit of the Government in some bank which the Government designates in writing and which the Government may change from time to time by giving written notice to the Company long enough in advance so that the Company will have sufficient time to make future payments to the new bank. It is agreed that the Government will designate such bank in Saudi Arabia, or in the United States of America, or in England, or in Holland, but that no bank in Saudi Arabia will be so designated unless such bank has a correspondent in United States of America, England or Holland through which bank transfers of money to Saudi Arabia may be made. Once the Company has made the proper payment to the Government, or has deposited the proper sum in any such bank, or has paid the sum to such correspondent for transfer to a bank in Saudi Arabia, the Company shall be free of all further responsibility in connexion with the payment.

It is agreed, however, that the first payment of £35,000 gold, or its equivalent (comprising the initial loan and the first annual rental), shall be made, within fifteen days after the effective date of this agreement, to a correspondent, in New York or in London, of Netherlands Trading Society (Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij) at Jedda, Saudi Arabia, to be transmitted without delay, and at the expense of the Company, to said society and to be delivered to the Government upon obtaining a proper receipt from the Government for such payment. If this first payment is not made in gold, it will be made in pounds sterling at the current rate of exchange at the time the Company makes the payment to such correspondent.

#### ARTICLE 19.

As soon as practicable after the date of discovery of oil in commercial quantities, the Company shall select some point within Saudi Arabia for the erection of a plant for manufacturing sufficient gasoline and kerosene to meet the ordinary requirements of the Government, providing, of course, that the character of the crude oil found will permit of the manufacture of such products



on a commercial basis by the use of ordinary refining methods, and provided, further, that the amount of oil developed is sufficient for the purpose. It is understood that the ordinary requirements of the Government shall not include resale inside or outside of the country. Upon the completion of the necessary preliminary arrangements, and as soon as the Company has obtained the Government's consent to the proposed location, the Company shall proceed with the erection of such plant. During each year following the date of completion of this plant the Company shall offer free to the Government in bulk, 200,000 American gallons of gasoline and 100,000 American gallons of kerosene, it being understood that the facilities provided by the Government for accepting these deliveries shall not impede or endanger the Company's operations.

#### ARTICLE 20.

The Company, at its own expense, will employ the necessary number of guards and guides to protect its representatives, its camps and installations. The Government promises to co-operate fully in supplying the best soldiers and men available for this responsibility, and in furnishing every reasonable protection, at rates not exceeding those customarily paid by the Government or others for similar services, it being understood that the expense for such services shall be paid by the Company through the Government.

#### ARTICLE 21.

In return for the obligations assumed by the Company under this contract, and for the payments required from the Company hereunder, the Company and enterprise shall be exempt from all direct and indirect taxes, imposts, charges, fees and duties (including, of course, import and export duties), it being understood that this privilege shall not extend to the sale of products within the country, nor shall it extend to the personal requirements of the individual employees of the Company. Any materials imported free of duty may not be sold within the country without first paying the corresponding import duty.

#### ARTICLE 22.

It is understood, of course, that the Company has the right to use all means and facilities it may deem necessary or advisable in order to exercise the rights granted under this contract, so as to carry out the purposes of this enterprise, including, among other things the right to construct and use roads, camps, buildings, structures and all systems of communication; to install and operate machinery, equipment and facilities in connexion with the drilling of wells, or in connexion with the transportation, storage, treatment, manufacture, dealing with, or exportation of petroleum or its derivatives, or in connexion with the camps, buildings and quarters of the personnel of the Company; to construct and use storage reservoirs, tanks and receptacles; to construct and operate wharves, piers, sea-loading lines and all other terminal and port facilities; and to use all forms of transportation of personnel or equipment, and of petroleum and its derivatives. It is understood, however, that the use of aeroplanes within the country shall be the subject of a separate agreement.

The Company shall also have the right to develop, carry away and use water. It likewise shall have the right to carry away and use any water belonging to the Government, for the operations of the enterprise, but so as not to prejudice irrigation or to deprive any lands, houses, or watering places for cattle, of a reasonable supply of water from time to time.

The Company may also take and use, but only to the extent necessary for the purposes of the enterprise, other national products belonging to the Government, such as surface soil, timber, stone, lime, gypsum, stone and similar substances.

Government officials and agents, in pursuance of official business, shall have the right to use such communication and transportation facilities as the Company may establish, provided that such use shall not obstruct or interfere with the Company's operations hereunder and shall not impose upon the Company any substantial burden of expense.

In times of national emergency, the use of the Company's transportation and communication facilities by the Government shall entitle the Company to fair compensation for any loss it may sustain thereby, whether through damages to the Company's facilities, equipment or installations or through the obstruction or interference with the Company's operations.

#### ARTICLE 23.

The enterprise under this contract shall be directed and supervised by Americans who shall employ Saudi Arab nationals as far as practicable, and in so far as the Company can find suitable Saudi Arab employees it will not employ other nationals.

In respect of the treatment of workers, the Company shall abide by the existing laws of the country applicable generally to workers of any other industrial enterprise.

#### ARTICLE 24.

The Government reserves the right to search for and obtain any substances or products, other than those exclusively granted by this contract, within the area covered by this agreement, except lands occupied by wells or other installations of the Company, provided always that the right thus reserved by the Government shall be exercised so as not to endanger the operations of the Company or interfere with its rights hereunder, and provided also that a fair compensation shall be paid the Company by the Government for all damage the Company may sustain through the exercise of the right so reserved by the Government. In any grant of such right so reserved by the Government, the concessionnaire shall be bound by the provisions of this Article.

#### ARTICLE 25.

The Company is hereby empowered by the Government to acquire from any occupant the surface rights of any land which the Company may find necessary to use in connexion with the enterprise, provided that the Company shall pay the occupant for depriving him of the use of the land. The payment shall be a fair one with respect to the customary use made of the land by the occupant. The Government will lend every reasonable assistance to the Company in case of any difficulties with respect to acquiring the rights of a surface occupant.

The Company, of course, shall have no right to acquire or to occupy Holy Places.

#### ARTICLE 26.

The Company shall supply the Government with copies of all topographical maps and geological reports (as finally made and approved by the Company) relating to the exploration and exploitation of the area covered by this contract. The Company shall also furnish the Government, within four months after the end of each year, commencing with the date of commercial discovery of oil, a report of the operations under this contract during the year. These maps and reports shall be treated as confidential by the Government.

#### ARTICLE 27.

No failure or omission on the part of the Company to carry out or to perform any of the terms or conditions of this contract shall give the Government any claim against the Company, or be deemed a breach of this contract, in so far as such failure or omission may arise from *force majeure*. If through *force majeure* the fulfilment of any term or condition of this contract should be delayed, the period of the delay, together with such period as may be required for the restoration of any damage done during such delay, shall be added to the terms or periods fixed in this contract.

#### ARTICLE 28.

The Company may terminate this contract at any time by giving the Government thirty days' advance notice in writing, whether by letter or by telegraph, provided that the telegraphic notice is promptly confirmed by letter. Upon the termination of this contract through such notice, or through any other cause, the Government and the Company shall thereafter be free of all further obligations under this contract, except as follows:—

- (1) The Company's immovable property, such as roads, water or oil wells with their casings, permanent buildings and structures, &c., shall become the property of the Government free of charge.



- (2) The Company shall afford the Government an opportunity to purchase the movable property of the enterprise in Saudi Arabia at a fair price equal to the replacement value of such property at the time less depreciation. Any controversy about this fair price shall be settled by arbitration in the same manner as provided in article 31 of this contract. If the Government declines or fails, within two months following the date of the termination of this contract, to purchase such movable property, or if the Government fails to tender the purchase price within thirty days after it has been decided upon, by agreement or by arbitration, the Company shall then have six months within which to remove such property.
- (3) If, in accordance with article 7 of this contract, there is any unrecovered amount still due the Company, the provisions of article 7 shall remain in force until the obligation therein mentioned has been satisfied.

## ARTICLE 29.

In case of the breach by the Company of its obligation to make the second loan of £20,000 gold, or its equivalent, as provided in article 6 hereof, or of its obligation to commence operations connected with drilling as set forth in article 10 hereof, or of its obligation to make the two advances each of £50,000 gold, or the equivalent, under the terms and conditions provided in article 11 hereof, or of its obligation under article 30 hereof to pay the amount of any damages which may be assessed upon the Company, the Government's remedy shall be the right to give the Company notice at once of such breach, and thereupon, if the Company does not take immediate steps to comply with the obligation so breached, the Government may terminate this contract.

## ARTICLE 30.

Except as otherwise provided in article 29 hereof, the penalty for the breach by the Company of any of its obligations under this contract shall be damages which shall be payable to the Government under the following conditions:—

The Government shall at once notify the Company of any alleged breach on the part of the Company, setting forth the nature of such breach. Any controversy which may arise as to whether or not the Company has committed the alleged breach shall be settled by arbitration in the manner provided in this agreement. Once that the fact of the commission of the breach has been established, the failure of the Company to take immediate steps to remedy the breach shall subject the Company to the payment of damages to the Government, and, if such damages cannot be agreed upon, they shall be determined by arbitration in the manner provided in this contract. The amount of any damages which may be so determined shall be paid to the Government by the Company within sixty days after such determination.

## ARTICLE 31.

If any doubt, difference or dispute shall arise between the Government and the Company concerning the interpretation or execution of this contract, or anything herein contained or in connexion herewith, or the rights and liabilities of the parties hereunder, it shall, failing any agreement to settle it in another way, be referred to two arbitrators, one of whom shall be chosen by each party, and a referee, who shall be chosen by the arbitrators before proceeding to arbitration. Each party shall nominate its arbitrator within thirty days of being requested in writing by the other party to do so. In the event of the arbitrators failing to agree upon a referee, the Government and the Company shall, in agreement, appoint a referee, and, in the event of their failing to agree, they shall request the president of the Permanent Court of International Justice to appoint a referee. The decision of the arbitrators, or, in the case of a difference of opinion between them, the decision of the referee, shall be final. The place of arbitration shall be such as may be agreed upon by the parties, and in default of agreement shall be The Hague, Holland.

## ARTICLE 32.

The Company may not, without the consent of the Government, assign its rights and obligations under this contract to anyone, but it is understood that the Company, upon notifying the Government, shall have the right to assign its

rights and obligations hereunder to a corporation it may organise exclusively for the purposes of this enterprise. The Company shall also have the right to create such other corporations and organisations as it may consider necessary or advisable for the purposes of this enterprise. Any such corporation or organisation, upon being invested with any or all of the rights and obligations under this contract, and upon notification thereof to the Government, shall thereupon be subject to the terms and conditions of this agreement.

In the event that the shares of stock issued by any such corporation or organisation should be offered for sale to the general public, the inhabitants of Saudi Arabia shall be allowed a reasonable time to subscribe (upon similar terms and conditions offered to others) for at least 20 per cent. of such shares of stock so issued and offered for sale to the general public.

## ARTICLE 33.

It is understood that the periods of time referred to in this agreement shall be reckoned on the basis of the solar calendar.

## ARTICLE 34.

The effective date of this contract shall be the date of its publication in Saudi Arabia, following the ratification of this contract by the Company.

## ARTICLE 35.

This contract has been drawn up in English and in Arabic. Inasmuch as most of the obligations hereunder are imposed upon the Company, and inasmuch as the interpretation of the English text, especially as regards technical obligations and requirements relating to the oil industry, has been fairly well established through long practice and experience in contracts such as the present one, it is agreed that, while both texts shall have equal validity, nevertheless in case of any divergence of interpretation as to the Company's obligations hereunder, the English text shall prevail.

## ARTICLE 36.

To avoid any doubt on the point, it is distinctly understood that the Company or anyone connected with it shall have no right to interfere with the administrative, political or religious affairs within Saudi Arabia.

## ARTICLE 37.

It is understood that this contract, after being signed in Saudi Arabia, shall be subject to ratification by the Company at its offices in San Francisco, California, before it shall become effective. After both texts of this contract have been signed in duplicate in Saudi Arabia, the signed copies shall be sent by registered mail in the next outgoing mail to the Company in San Francisco, California, and within fifteen days after receipt in San Francisco the Company shall transmit to the Government by telegraph whether or not it ratifies this contract. If the contract is not ratified by the Company within fifteen days after receipt of the document in San Francisco, it shall be null and void and of no further force or effect.

Likewise, if the amount of the initial loan and the first annual rental is not paid within the time agreed upon in article 18 hereof, the Government may declare this contract to be null and void and of no further force or effect.

Upon ratification of this contract by the Company, one signed copy of each text, together with the necessary evidence as to ratification by the Company, shall be returned to the Government. Also, upon ratification of this contract by the Company, the contract shall be published in Saudi Arabia in the usual manner.

Signed this 29th day of May, 1933 (corresponding to the 4th day of Safar, 1352, A.H.).

On behalf of Saudi Arab Government.  
(Signature and seal.)

(Signed) L. N. HAMILTON,  
On behalf of Standard Oil  
Company of California.



His Excellency,  
 Sheikh Abdulla Suleiman Al Hamdan,  
 Jedda, Saudi Arabia.  
 Dear Sheikh Abdulla,

Jedda, Saudi Arabia, 29th May, 1933  
 (corresponding to the 4th of Safar, 1352, A.H.).

Referring to the contract which has been signed to-day by you, on behalf of the Saudi Arab Government, and by the undersigned, on behalf of Standard Oil Company of California, relative to an oil concession covering a portion of eastern Saudi Arabia, I am setting forth below the agreement we have also reached on behalf of the two parties to the same contract, which agreement shall be considered as a part of the said contract. For convenience, the two parties in question shall be referred to below in the same manner as designated in the said contract, namely, the "Government" and the "Company," and the said contract shall be referred to as the "Saudi Arab Concession."

1. The Company is granted a preference right to an oil concession covering a certain area described in article 3 of the Saudi Arab Concession. The preference right so granted the Company shall be a right to acquire an oil concession covering such area, exclusive of the so-called neutral zone, also referred to in the same article 3, by equalling the terms of any offer for such concession that may be made the Government by others in good faith, and that the Government may be ready and willing to accept. Within thirty days after receiving from the Government written notice, setting forth in full the terms of such offer, the Company shall notify the Government whether or not the Company wishes to acquire the oil concession by equalling the terms so offered. If the Company does not wish to do so, the Government is free to accept the offer made, but if an oil concession should not be granted to others on the same terms as those so offered and so presented to the Company, the preference right of the Company shall continue, at least so long as the provisions of article 7 of the Saudi Arab Concession remain in force.

2. The Company's preference right to acquire an oil concession covering the so-called neutral zone referred to in article 3 of the Saudi Arab Concession shall be a right to equal, with respect to the rights of the Government in the neutral zone, the terms and conditions which may be obtained by the Sheikh of Kuwait for a concession covering his rights in the neutral zone. In the absence of any grant of an oil concession covering such rights of the Sheikh of Kuwait, the Government will endeavour to reach an agreement with the Sheikh of Kuwait whereby the company will be permitted to acquire an oil concession covering the rights of the Government and of the Sheikh of Kuwait in the neutral zone. In either of these two events, the company shall have a period of thirty days from the date it receives written notice setting forth in full the terms and conditions of the oil concession covering the rights of the Sheikh of Kuwait in the neutral zone, or covering the terms of the proposed concession embracing the rights of the Government and of the Sheikh of Kuwait in the neutral zone, as the case may be, within which to decide and to notify the Government whether or not the Company wishes to acquire the oil concession on such terms. If the Company does not wish to do so, the Government is free to negotiate with others, but if the oil concession should not be granted to others on the same terms as those offered to the Company, the preference right of the Company shall continue, at least so long as the provisions of article 7 of the Saudi Arab Concession remain in force.

3. Article 22 of the Saudi Arab Concession states that the use of aeroplanes shall be the subject of a separate agreement. One purpose of the present letter is to set forth the agreement as to this point. In view of the restrictions now prevailing in Saudi Arabia as to the use of aeroplanes within the country by anyone other than the Government, it is hereby agreed that so long as such restrictions remain in force, the Government will undertake to provide, at the request and at the expense of the Company, such aeroplane service as the Company may consider advisable for the purpose of its operations within the area covered by the Saudi Arab Concession. Such service shall be limited to the purposes of the enterprise. If any aeroplane photographs should be taken for geological or mapping purposes, the Government and the Company shall each receive copies, also at the expense of the Company.

4. The consent of the Government must be obtained before the Company shall have any right to examine the so-called neutral zone referred to in article 3 of the Saudi Arab Concession.

5. The provisions of article 33 of the Saudi Arab Concession shall also apply to this agreement.

In order to confirm the above agreement, will you be kind enough to sign below under the heading "Agreement Confirmed." I am sending this letter in triplicate, and upon the return of two copies signed by you, as well as the two signed copies of the Arabic text, they will be forwarded with the Saudi Arab Concession to the offices of the Company in San Francisco for ratification by the Company there, after which one signed and ratified copy of the English and Arabic text hereof will be returned to the Government.

Very truly yours,  
 (Signed) L. N. HAMILTON.  
 On behalf of Standard Oil Company  
 of California.

*Agreement Confirmed:*

(Signature and seal)

On behalf of the Saudi Arab Government.

This agreement is made between his Excellency Sheikh Abdulla Sulaiman Al Hamdan, Minister of Finance of Saudi Arabia, acting on behalf of the Saudi Arab Government (hereinafter referred to as the "Government") of the one part, and William J. Lenahan, acting on behalf of California Arabian Standard Oil Company (hereinafter referred to as the "Company") of the other part.

It is hereby agreed between the Government and the Company in manner following:—

#### ARTICLE 1.

This agreement, known as the Supplemental Agreement, is supplemental firstly to the agreement (hereinafter referred to as the "Saudi Arab Concession") made between the Government of the one part and the Standard Oil Company of California of the other part and signed on the 29th day of May, 1933 (corresponding to the 4th day of Safar, 1352, A.H.) and secondly to the Letter of Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the "Second Principal Agreement") addressed by L. N. Hamilton, on behalf of the Standard Oil Company of California, to and accepted by his Excellency, Sheikh Abdulla Sulaiman Al Hamdan, on behalf of the Government, and bearing the same date as the Saudi Arab Concession.

#### ARTICLE 2.

The Saudi Arab Concession and the Second Principal Agreement have been duly transferred to and vested in the "Company" (party hereto) after notification to and with the consent of the Government, all in accordance with article 32 of the Saudi Arab Concession, and the Company has duly undertaken and fulfilled to date the duties and obligations of the "Company" thereunder.

#### ARTICLE 3.

On the 16th day of October, 1938 (corresponding to the 22nd day of Shaaban, 1357, A.H.) the Company declared, under article 10 of the Saudi Arab Concession, that oil had been discovered in commercial quantities, and all the obligations of the Company attendant upon such declaration have been duly fulfilled to date.

#### ARTICLE 4.

Both the Government and the Company are now desirous of adding to and otherwise extending the territory granted to the Company by the Saudi Arab Concessions, and of making such other modifications and alterations to the Saudi Arab Concession and to the Second Principal Agreement as hereinafter appear, and the Company has undertaken to make and the Government have consented to



receive, the following payments to or for the benefit of the Government in manner hereinafter provided, namely:—

- (a) The sum of £140,000 English gold, or its equivalent, which sum shall become due upon the effective date of this Agreement;
- (b) The sum of £20,000 English gold, or its equivalent annually as rental. The first of such payments, being rental for the year next following the effective date of this agreement, shall become due upon the first anniversary of the effective date of this agreement, and subsequent payments shall become due upon each succeeding anniversary of the effective date of this agreement until the happening of any one of the following events, namely:—
  - (1) Discovery of oil in commercial quantities within the additional territories described and referred to in part Two and in part Three of the schedule to this agreement, and which additional territories are hereinafter called the "additional area." If the Company shall fail to declare so sooner, the date of discovery of oil in commercial quantities shall be the date of the completion and testing of a well or wells within the additional area capable of producing, in accordance with first-class oilfield practice, at least 2,000 tons of oil per day for a period of thirty consecutive days.
  - (2) The relinquishment by the Company of the whole of the additional area.

If either of the events mentioned in (1) and (2) above shall occur during the period intervening between any two anniversaries of the effective date of this agreement, the rental payable for the year in which such event occurs shall be only that proportion of the annual rental above mentioned as the number of days that have intervened between the preceding anniversary date and the date of the occurrence of the event mentioned above bears to a full year of 365 days.

- (c) The sum of £100,000 English gold, or its equivalent, upon discovery of oil in commercial quantities within the additional areas aforesaid.

Each of the foregoing payments shall be made within thirty days from the date upon which it becomes due and shall be made in accordance with and in the manner provided in articles 17 and 18 of the Saudi Arab Concession.

The foregoing payments are to be made by the Company in addition to any other payments by way of royalty or advance or otherwise already provided for by the Saudi Arab Concession and yet unpaid, and without prejudice to the right of the Company to recover advances already made under article 4, 6 and 11 and yet to be made under article 11 of the Saudi Arab Concession, and to recover overpaid rental under article 12 of the Saudi Arab Concession.

#### ARTICLE 5.

From the effective date of this agreement, the terms and provisions of the Saudi Arab Concession, as herein amended, shall include and extend to—

- (a) All lands, islands, waters, territories and interests included in article 2 of the Saudi Arab Concession, the description of which is repeated from the Saudi Arab Concession in Part One of the schedule to this agreement, and
- (b) All lands, territories and interests described and referred to in Part Two of the schedule to this agreement, and
- (c) All right, title and interest of the Government, now or hereafter, in or to the two territories described in Part Three of the schedule of this agreement and known respectively as the "Saudi Arab-Kuwait Neutral Zone" and the "Saudi Arab-Iraq Neutral Zone," and all rights and interests of a maritime or of a territorial nature now or hereafter appertaining to such two zones or either one of them. And the Saudi Arab Concession shall be and is hereby modified to include all the lands, islands, waters, territories and interests of the Government described and referred to in the foregoing provisions of this article, and henceforth the Saudi Arab Concession as modified by the Second Principal Agreement and by this agreement shall be read accordingly. And, for convenience, all such lands, islands, waters, territories and interests may be referred to as the "Exclusive area."

#### ARTICLE 6.

The following special provisions shall be applicable and shall have force and effect as from the effective date of this agreement in regard to the Saudi-Arab-Kuwait Neutral Zone and the Saudi Arab-Iraq Neutral Zone:—

- (a) Computation of royalty accruing to the Government on oil and natural gas obtained from the Saudi Arab-Kuwait Zone and from the Saudi Arab-Iraq Neutral Zone shall be governed by the royalty provisions of the Saudi Arab Concession; it being understood, however, that the royalty as provided therein shall be payable to the Government only on that proportion of the total oil and natural gas so obtained as is represented by the Government's interest in the said neutral zones, respectively.
- (b) The Company shall be entitled to enter into such agreement or agreements as it deems necessary or desirable to enable the Company alone or with another or others or through the medium of another company or other companies formed by it (either alone or in conjunction with others), to prospect for and develop and remove the petroleum and other hydrocarbon substances of and from the Saudi Arab-Kuwait Neutral Zone and the Saudi Arab-Iraq Neutral Zone or either one of them and to and from any point or points within the said zones from and to any point or points within Saudi Arabia. And the right in respect of the Saudi-Arab-Kuwait Neutral Zone to use any ports or waterways free of all fees, dues, assessments and charges of any nature or kind whatsoever, in accordance with article 21 of the Saudi Arab Concession.
- (c) The Company may promote a company or companies of a nationality acceptable to the Government to explore and prospect for and exploit, remove and export petroleum and other hydrocarbon substances in and from both or in and from each or in and from either of the said two neutral zones.

#### ARTICLE 7.

The provisions of article 9 of the Saudi Arab Concession shall henceforth be replaced by the following provisions, namely:—

For a period of ten years from the effective date of this agreement, the Company shall be under no obligation to relinquish to the Government any portion of the exclusive area covered by the Saudi Arab Concession, as modified by this agreement. Upon the expiration of this ten-year period, and from time to time thereafter, the Company shall relinquish to the Government such portions of the exclusive area as the Company may decide not to explore further, or to use otherwise in connexion with the enterprise. The portion so relinquished shall thereupon be released from the terms and conditions of the Saudi Arab Concession, as modified by this agreement; provided, however, that the Company shall, notwithstanding such relinquishment, continue to enjoy the right reserved by the Saudi Arab Concession to use the portions so relinquished for transportation and communication facilities, the Company interfering as little as practicable with any other use to which the Government may desire the relinquished portions to be put.

#### ARTICLE 8.

That portion of article 19 of the Saudi Arab Concession reading as follows: "during each year following the date of completion of this plant, the Company shall offer free to the Government, in bulk, 200,000 American gallons of gasoline and 100,000 American gallons of kerosene, it being understood that the facilities provided by the Government for accepting these deliveries shall not



impede or endanger the Company's operations" shall be and the same is hereby amended to read as follows:—

During the year following the first anniversary of the effective date of this agreement, and during each year thereafter, up to and including the year ending on the anniversary of the effective date of this agreement next following the discovery of oil in commercial quantities within the territories described and referred to in Part Two and Part Three of the schedule to this agreement, the Company shall offer free to the Government, in bulk, 1,300,000 American gallons of gasoline and 100,000 American gallons of kerosene.

During the year commencing on the anniversary of the effective date of this agreement next following such discovery of oil in commercial quantities, and during each subsequent year of the Saudi Arab Concession as amended by this agreement, the Company shall offer free to the Government, in bulk, 2,300,000 American gallons of gasoline and 100,000 American gallons of kerosene.

It is understood that, following the completion of the said plant, the gasoline and kerosene offered to the Government in bulk as aforesaid shall be delivered to the Government at or in the immediate vicinity of the said plant. The facilities provided by the Government for accepting deliveries shall not impede or endanger the Company operations.

#### ARTICLE 9.

From the effective date of this agreement, all the rights and privileges conferred by article 22 of the Saudi Arab Concession may be exercised by the Company (a) anywhere in the "exclusive area" described in article 5 of this agreement; (b) anywhere in the area covered by the concession granted on the 9th day of July, 1936, to the Petroleum Concessions (Limited) (it being understood that the exercise of these rights by the Company in the area covered by the concession granted to the Petroleum Concessions (Limited) does not include the right to exploit oil therein, nor will it damage the property of the Petroleum Concessions (Limited) or impede its operations and interests, or interfere therewith. The Government shall be the sole judge to determine this); (c) anywhere in the Saudi Arab-Kuwait Neutral Zone and in the Saudi Arab-Iraq Neutral Zone, to the full extent that the Government is entitled to grant such rights and privileges with respect to said two neutral zones.

The rights and privileges conferred by article 22 of the Saudi Arab Concession may not be exercised by the Company in any other portion of Saudi Arabia, however, except with the express consent and approval of the Government; but it is understood, of course, that should the Company, in order to exercise the rights and privileges conferred by article 22 of the Saudi Arab Concession, require rights of way from the territories described and referred to in Part Two of the schedule to this agreement to the area covered by the concession granted to the Petroleum Concessions (Limited) on the 9th day of July, 1936, the Government will not withhold approval of such rights of way.

#### ARTICLE 10.

The Saudi Arab Concession, as amended by this agreement, shall, with respect to the territories described and referred to in Part Two and in Part Three of the schedule to this agreement, continue in full force and effect for a period of six years from the expiration of the sixty-year period provided in article 1 of the Saudi Arab Concession.

#### ARTICLE 11.

The provisions of article 3 of the Saudi Arab Concession and of paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of the Second Principal Agreement, in so far only as said provisions relate to the Saudi Arab-Kuwait Neutral Zone, are superseded by the provisions of this agreement.

#### ARTICLE 12.

It is hereby declared that the preference right granted to the Company by article 3 of the Saudi Arab Concession and by the Second Principal Agreement, except as regards the "exclusive area" defined in article 5 of this agreement, shall remain in full force and effect during the term of sixty years from the effective date of this agreement.

#### ARTICLE 13.

As modified by the foregoing provisions of this agreement, the Saudi Arab Concession and the Second Principal Agreement shall continue in full force and effect (excepting to the extent to which certain provisions of the Saudi Arab Concession and the Second Principal Agreement shall have already been complied with and are therefore of no further validity) to the intent that, as from the effective date of this agreement, all three documents shall be read together as and shall form one agreement.

#### ARTICLE 14.

This agreement has been drawn up in English and in Arabic, and the provisions of article 35 of the Saudi Arab Concession shall apply to this agreement.

#### ARTICLE 15.

The effective date of this agreement shall be the date of its publication in Saudi Arabia, following the ratification of this agreement by the Company and by the Government.

#### ARTICLE 16.

It is understood that this agreement, after being signed in Saudi Arabia, shall be subject to ratification by the Company at its offices in San Francisco, California and by the Government in Saudi Arabia before it shall become effective. After both texts of this agreement have been signed in triplicate in Saudi Arabia, two signed copies of each text shall be sent by registered mail to the Company in San Francisco, California, and within fifteen days after receipt in San Francisco the Company shall notify the Government in writing whether or not it ratifies this agreement. If the agreement is not ratified by the Company within fifteen days after receipt of the document in San Francisco, it shall be null and void and of no further force or effect.

Upon ratification of this agreement by the Company, one signed copy of each text, together with the necessary evidence as to ratification by the Company, shall be returned to the Government. Also, upon ratification of this agreement by the Company, the Government shall issue a Royal decree announcing their ratification hereof and officially publish that decree and this agreement.

Signed this 31st day of May, 1939 (corresponding to the 12th day of Rabi Thani, 1358, A.H.).

*The Schedule above referred to.*

#### PART ONE.

All of Eastern Saudi Arabia, from its eastern boundary (including islands and territorial waters) westward to the westerly edge of the Dahana, and from the northern boundary to the southern boundary of Saudi Arabia, provided that from the northern end of the westerly edge of the Dahana, the westerly boundary of the area in question shall continue in a straight line north 30° west to the northern boundary of Saudi Arabia, and from the southern end of the westerly edge of the Dahana such boundary shall continue in a straight line south 30° east to the southern boundary of Saudi Arabia.

#### PART TWO.

The following two areas in Saudi Arabia:—

(1) All that portion of Northern Saudi Arabia south of Iraq and south and east of Transjordan which is bounded on the east, south, and west by the following lines: (a) on the east, by a line commencing at the northern end of the westerly edge of the Dahana and running in a straight line north 30° west to the northern boundary of Saudi Arabia; (b) on the south, by a line commencing at the northern end of the westerly edge of the Dahana and running in a westerly direction along the northern edge of the Great Nefud (leaving the Great Nefud outside) to the north-west corner thereof, and thence in a straight line passing through Tebuk, to the eastern boundary of the area covered by the concession granted on the 9th day of July, 1936, to the Petroleum Concessions (Limited); and (c) on the west, by a line commencing at the point where the straight



line mentioned above joins the eastern boundary of the area covered by the concession granted to the Petroleum Concessions (Limited), and thence running in a northerly direction, along the eastern boundary of the area covered by the concession granted to the Petroleum Concessions (Limited), until it reaches the present northern limits of the territory under the administration of Saudi Arabia, which adjoins the southern area end of Transjordan.

(2) All that southern portion of Saudi Arabia which is bounded on the east, north, west and south by the following lines: (a) on the east, by a line commencing at the southern end of the westerly edge of the Dahana and running in a straight line some 30° east to the southern boundary of Saudi Arabia; (b) on the north, by a line commencing at the southern end of the westerly edge of the Dahana and running in a westerly direction, 50 kilom. south of the most southerly branch of the Wadi Dawasir, to a point 50 kilom. south of the source of the Wadi Dawasir and thence continuing in a straight line to the north-east corner of the boundary line between Yemen and Saudi Arabia; (c) on the west, by a line commencing at the point where the straight line mentioned above joins the north-east corner of the boundary line between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, and thence running in a southerly direction, along the eastern boundary of the Kingdom of Yemen, until it reaches the southern boundary of Saudi Arabia; and (d) on the south, by a line running along the southern boundary of Saudi Arabia between the most southerly limits of the lines mentioned under (a) and (c) above.

### PART THREE.

All the territory known as the Saudi Arab-Kuwait Neutral Zone, including islands and territorial waters if any which are or may become a part thereof, and all the territory known as the Saudi Arab-Iraq Neutral Zone.

On behalf of the Saudi Arab Government.

On behalf of the California  
Arabian Standard Oil Company.

## CHAPTER III.—IRAQ.

[E 6333/489/93]

No. 8

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 21st October.)*

(No. 366.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, 12th October, 1943.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 942 of the 6th October, I have the honour to offer the following observations on the new chamber.

2. In approximate figures some sixty-five of the members of the last chamber have returned, thirty others have been in one or more previous parliaments and about twenty are new men. Most of the sixty-five Deputies who were in the last Parliament supported, under duress, Rashid Ali's dismissal of the Regent, but all of the vehement and convinced adherents of his anti-British policy have been eliminated. In its general character, the chamber is very much like most of its predecessors. It has no novel features and it may be relied upon to act in much the same way as other chambers have acted in the past.

3. There are one or two men with dubious personal records, a murder or two for which they escaped conviction, or perhaps an abuse of their official position for personal gain, for which they have not been brought to book, but such men have always found places in every Iraqi Parliament, and their presence in the new chamber gives no particular cause for political anxiety.

4. At the official opening of Parliament on the 9th October, the Speech from the Throne was short, and merely intimated that the chief work of the session would be to consider the amendments to the Organic Law passed by the last Parliament, and to prepare a new electoral law which would harmonise with the spirit of these amendments.

5. The Prime Minister thinks that the Organic Law will be passed without much difficulty in the chamber, because most of the members were nominated by the Regent, but he foresees that His Royal Highness's recent obstinate and unwarranted interference in the preparation of the lists of government candidates for the elections has perturbed many of the Senators, and that in consequence there may be some reluctance in the Upper House to agree to the new powers given to the Crown in this law.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister of State resident in the Middle East, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and the Governor-General of India.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

[E 7266/489/93]

No. 9

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 23rd November.)*

(No. 397.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, 6th November, 1943.*

IT will be within your recollection that, when in October 1942 Nuri Pasha reformed the then most recent of his many Cabinets, the most important of the new appointments was the transfer of Saleh Jabr, who had shown himself a courageous and determined Minister of the Interior during the difficult days of the previous summer, to the Ministry of Finance, which at that time was responsible for all supply questions. It was confidently hoped that the new Minister would display as much decision and enterprise in his new post as in his previous appointment, and it was anticipated that he would lose no time in applying the rigorous, and even drastic, measures which all thinking persons realised alone could cushion a backward and unprepared country against the impact of the economic difficulties which the war was increasingly bringing in its train. In particular, it was fondly believed that the relatively young and progressive Saleh Jabr would willingly avail himself of expert outside assistance in the discharge of his onerous responsibilities, and we, indeed, envisaged the early recruitment of experienced British personnel who would be granted executive powers and, in effect, function in the Ministry of Finance as a Directorate-General of Supply, controlling imports, applying rationing schemes,



directing the best use of home production, and the like. Unhappily, these optimistic expectations were soon to prove groundless. Saleh Jabr, who had lately married a lady of strong personality but local outlook from Hillah, displayed small enthusiasm towards the enlistment of foreign staff, and even failed to make any adequate use of such officers as Major Page, who was already at work in his Ministry. All too quickly it became apparent that the new Minister of Finance harboured a variety of preconceived notions about the problems of the hour, and, furthermore, that, while he was loud in his protestations about ruthless action against "economic fifth columnists," important vested interests anxious to profit from the rising tide of speculation and inflation would be enabled to do so with impunity.

2. As the remorseless weeks passed and the world entered upon the historic year 1943, the difficulties of the Minister of Finance increased, and in fairness it must be recorded that he sought to remedy some of his errors, though it gradually became more and more evident that the job was too big for him. At least, however, no one accused him of corruption. During the first quarter of the year a British officer, Colonel Le Blanc, was made Director-General of Transport with executive powers, and his appointment has proved an outstanding success. Then, following the enactment of the new "Law for the Regulation of the Economic Life of the Country," a variety of notifications aimed at hoarders and speculators and the better distribution of necessities were issued with Saleh Jabr's support. They led to a temporary drop in prices, but profiteers soon recovered courage when nothing was done to enforce the new regulations. Here Saleh Jabr suffered through the Cabinet reshuffle in June, which took him back to Interior, leaving the Ministry of Finance in the vicious hands of Jelal Baban, who, having previously loudly criticised the Government's enforcement policy, which, had it been applied, would have affected his personal interests, proceeded to sabotage everything that was being attempted. The few weeks Saleh Jabr spent in his new Ministry before proceeding on leave to Palestine in the latter half of July were primarily occupied by the last and most difficult stages of the barley negotiations. That in the end we were able to secure a written contract for 200,000 tons was largely due to his co-operation.

3. If I have dwelt in some detail on the disappointment that was Saleh Jabr, it is because, in the light of subsequent events, his early inability to rise to the occasion may be regarded as something of a turning-point in Iraq's war-time history. By his failure Saleh Jabr led the country down a twisting road that has grown more and more difficult for the rattletrap administrative machine to negotiate, and it is now painfully clear, even to local politicians, that it has neither the power nor the gearing to continue much farther without an effective readjustment of its Cabinet load and without extraneous help in the persons of skilled mechanics. It is unfortunate that in the twelve months that have elapsed since October 1942 the supply of the latter has been sharply reduced by other demands, and Iraqi Ministers, who are now reconciled to the enlistment of British executives, find them hard to get. Such, in general terms, is the position to-day. Until the end of July, by which date we had completed the arduous and wearisome barley negotiations, the politico-economic health of the country had deteriorated steadily, but not too rapidly. The sweltering heat of midsummer ushered in, however, a period of slackness and confusion which has increased the downward pace. There have been squabbles in the Cabinet, and recently some snarling between the Regent and his Ministers. Nuri Pasha has been unwell and valuable time has been wasted during his two absences. The elections—if, indeed, the selection of parliamentarians in this country can be so euphemistically described—were a further disturbing factor. And, finally, there was a good deal of pother over the arrangements for the Regent's visit to the United Kingdom. For all these and some other reasons, I have found it hard since my return from leave in September to pin any member of the Government down to harsh realities. It was only when the Regent was safely on his way that on the 30th October I at last managed to corner the Prime Minister for an interview that, I believe, attained an all-time high in its duration, for we conversed together without a break for four hours and twenty minutes.

4. I did not mince words. By his persistent preoccupation over his dreams of "haute politique," by his dislike of detail, and by his perhaps natural reluctance to offend powerful agricultural and mercantile vested interests, as well as by his tendency to let thorny domestic questions slide in the hope that something may turn up to solve them without any special or unpopular effort on his part, Nuri Pasha cannot escape blame for the existing state of affairs. I attacked his Excellency for the endless failure of his Governments to tackle the

economic problem honestly and boldly, for the manner in which they have tolerated dishonesty and inefficiency in the public services, for the resultant weakness and corruption in the police, the unreliability of the army, the mishandling of the Kurds, the shameless land-grabbing carried on by prominent personalities, the general lack of courageous leadership and the wide gulf between the Government and the people. I complained, too, of the harmful effects of widespread nepotism and about the low moral tone of public life. I emphasised that now was the time to improve the Administration and to carry out much-needed reforms and modernisation. And I expressed my fear that, if everything were allowed to drift on as at present, the eventual departure of the British forces would inevitably give rise to grave internal dangers. In this connexion I reminded the Prime Minister that there had been a radical change in the attitude of the people during the last twenty years. They were no longer as long-suffering as of yore. In the towns especially, education had brought about a new outlook, and I warned his Excellency that, unless account were taken of these facts, the old order might be very rudely disturbed at no very distant date. I urged that the time had come to act. He should have done with corrupt Ministers such as Jelal Baban. I could also, if pressed, name other politicians of like kidney. Steps to strengthen and cleanse the Administration should be put in hand without delay.

5. Nuri Pasha did not contest one of my statements. He confessed that the general deterioration in the politico-economic situation had been worrying him greatly. He was determined to do all in his power to halt the decline. To begin with, he would like to appoint a Deputy Prime Minister, and he had Ibrahim Kemal in mind as a candidate (the latter has since been sounded informally and has refused). He would act energetically to show speculators and profiteers that their field day was almost over, and, indeed, the Higher Supplies Committee had already taken certain decisions to that end. Moreover, I could rest assured that Colonel Bayliss—whose services have lately been secured from the Middle East Supply Centre and who will, I trust, in due course be appointed Director-General, Imports—would receive full support in his work. As regards the civil service, a draft law was in preparation to set up special courts for dealing with officials accused of malpractices, while at the same time he contemplated improving salaries (especially those of the police) and other conditions of service for public servants paid less than I.D. 20 per month. (In the case of the police, he has already made good his word.) I suggested that the administration of the provinces would improve if officials were subjected to constant inspection, and sounded his Excellency about his policy regarding the employment of British administrative inspectors. After some reflection, the Prime Minister observed that Iraq would be in need of this class of inspector for many years, and he thought that a few such officers—say, four—might be appointed in the near future. Nuri Pasha also expressed himself anxious to engage additional British police officers, but he made difficulties, as he has done before, about their pay, and no conclusion was reached beyond an agreement to discuss the matter further at an early date. In spite of his words, I doubt whether he wishes to employ either administrative or police inspectors. But he expressed his eagerness to secure the services of a British agricultural expert, a forestry officer, a specialist in co-operative societies and a geologist. His Excellency warned me to expect early official requests for suitable candidates.

6. You will have gathered that our conversation ranged over a wide field. I believe the Prime Minister is sincere in his desire to achieve results. Apart from any other consideration, he is astute enough to be convinced, albeit belatedly, that the tide of, at any rate urban, discontent is rising and that he is personally much criticised. This realisation on the part of Nuri Pasha is illustrated by the disposition he has displayed, in other talks with me recently on how best to realign and complete the Cabinet, to consider the appointment of men other than old political hacks. He hopes to reconstitute his Cabinet within the next fortnight, and one can only hope that his outlook will not change. Action in the economic sphere need not be delayed by the Regent's absence; and here I should like to add that Colonel Bayliss, while in no way underestimating the complexities of his task, told Mr. Thompson the other night that he was by no means pessimistic. Provided he continued to enjoy the goodwill and co-operation that the Acting Minister of Finance (Abdul Illah Hafidh) is at present extending to him, and assuming he secured the trained staff for whom he is at present negotiating with Persia-Iraq Force and the Middle East Supply Centre, he viewed the future with some confidence. This question of experienced staff is of paramount importance, and I have caused Colonel Bayliss to be assured that



in this and other directions he may count on my fullest support. For the rest, I will continue to do all that I can to galvanise the Government into renewed initiative and endeavour.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister of State Resident in the Middle East, the Governor-General of India, the Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East, and to His Majesty's Consular Officers at Basra and Mosul.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

[E 7407/489/93]

No. 10

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 26th November.)

(No. 401.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 12th November, 1943.

SOON after my return to Bagdad on the 16th September a political crisis developed which nearly led to the fall of the Cabinet. On the 18th September the Prime Minister's doctor informed me that his Excellency urgently needed rest as he was suffering from low blood-pressure combined with anemia. I discussed with Nuri Pasha what, in the circumstances, he had best do. With my encouragement he decided to go to Palestine for treatment until the opening of Parliament on the 9th October. He hoped that the choice of official candidates for the elections had been decided and that he could without difficulty absent himself for a fortnight from the country. He accordingly arranged to leave by British Airways on the 26th September. On the 25th September his Excellency was, however, confronted with unexpected difficulties. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had for some time been restive, resigned because he was dissatisfied generally with the manner in which candidates for election were being chosen, and sharp disagreements were found to exist among other Ministers concerning the claims of a number of individuals for inclusion in the official list. Nuri Pasha, deploying all his powers of cajolery, persuaded Nasrat al Farisi to remain at his post until after Parliament had met and, by juggling skilfully with men and places, contrived to satisfy the more pressing election demands of his other colleagues. But these measures brought only a very fleeting *détente*, for when his Excellency went to the Palace with his final list of candidates, the Regent blandly produced an entirely new selection which he urged the Prime Minister to accept. Hurried discussions and consultations followed and some measure of agreement was reached. The Cabinet (except the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who at this stage abruptly made his resignation final) were willing to approve a large number of the Regent's nominees, but His Royal Highness made two conditions which they found it hard to accept. He stipulated that no sons or brothers of ministers or prominent officials, such as mutessarifs, should be nominated, and insisted on the inclusion of five shiahs belonging to a group which for some time had been political enemies of Salih Jabr as well as strong critics of the Cabinet. Up to the evening of the 27th September the difficulty had not been resolved and on the following morning His Royal Highness asked me to go to see him.

2. I found him critical of his ministers and evidently resolved to sack the lot unless they accepted his list of candidates *nem. con.* His quaint plan was to make the Lord Mayor of Bagdad, Arshad al Umari, Prime Minister, with a team comprising Tashin Ali, Tahsin al Askari, Salman al Barraq and some others of even less consequence. The thoughtless and irresponsible way in which His Royal Highness had juggled these names together was revealed by his remarks that he had found Tashin Ali too stupid as Rais of the Royal Diwan and would be glad to get rid of him by making him Minister of Defence. His Royal Highness did not want to ask Ibrahim Kamal to form a Cabinet as it was not likely that he would accept the Palace list of candidates, whereas Arshad al Umari was prepared to swallow it whole. I advised the Regent that I thought it was unconstitutional for him to demand the acceptance of his list *in toto* and that it was unwise of him to precipitate an acute crisis because his ministers had shied at the names of the few shiahs for whose nomination he was pressing so strongly. If he wished to dismiss the Cabinet he should choose better ground than this on which to take a stand. I left His Royal Highness apparently in a good humour, but later in the day his mood darkened and in the afternoon he went off suddenly to his country house at Salah-ud-Din (near Arbil), though his original plan was to have remained in Bagdad until the following day. The Cabinet thereupon held a special meeting at which they agreed to accept ninety-one out of the Regent's

105 nominations, but raised objection to the remaining fourteen. Further negotiations conducted by courier during the three-day holiday of the Id al Fitr, which began on the 30th September, resulted in an offer by the Prime Minister to accept eight more of His Royal Highness's list, not including the five shiahs to whom he and his colleagues had taken exception. Salih Jabr and Jalal Baban refused, however, to agree to this solution and resigned. Thereafter, a few further adjustments having been made, a list of candidates acceptable to both the Regent and the remaining members of the Cabinet was drawn up and the elections took place throughout the country on the 5th and 6th October. The results showed that some sixty-five of the members of the last Chamber had been returned, and that of the remainder thirty had been in one or more previous Parliaments and about twenty were new men. All of the vehement and convinced supporters of Rashid Ali's anti-British policy were eliminated. In its general character the new Chamber is very much like most of its predecessors and it may be relied upon to act in much the same way as other Chambers have acted in the past.

3. At the official opening of Parliament on the 9th October the Speech from the Throne was short and merely intimated that the chief work of the session would be to consider the amendments to the Organic Law passed by the last Parliament and to prepare a new electoral law which would harmonise with the spirit of these amendments. Muhammad al Sadr and Hamdi al Pachachi were re-elected respectively President of the Senate and President of the Chamber.

4. Parliament having got to work the Prime Minister was at last able to snatch a bare fortnight's rest. He left by air for Palestine on the 11th October and returned on the 23rd October in time to supervise the constitutional arrangements made necessary by the Regent's impending absence on a visit to the United Kingdom and to deal with the opposition that was threatened in the Senate to the Law Amending the Constitution. This measure passed through the Chamber without difficulty, but in the Senate an attempt seems to have been made to make it the occasion for criticism of the elections. This trouble was, however, soon disposed of by the Prime Minister, and the Senate passed the law at their third meeting.

5. Early in September the Bagdad radio and press suddenly opened an attack on Zionism. Much of the matter used was historical and comment was on the whole reasonable, but there were also articles which employed highly emotive language and contained unmistakable threats of retaliatory violence against Jews in other Arab countries if the Zionists persisted in their endeavours to make Palestine a Jewish State. Such an outburst could only have occurred under official direction, and in my absence Mr. Thompson immediately made strong representations to the Prime Minister emphasising its several objectionable features.

6. Nuri Pasha took the line that the propaganda of the Zionist extremists had remained unanswered long enough; in America a strong anti-Arab campaign was in progress and he had therefore lifted the ban which in Iraq had for a long time been placed on all publicity about the Jewish problem in Palestine. He undertook, however, to insist on moderation and to consider calling off the campaign after a few days. Some improvement was noticeable after this interview, but on the 17th September, the day after my return from leave, two more articles appeared, one of which stressed in strong language the point that the policy of the extreme Zionists would react adversely on Jews living in Arab countries other than Palestine. I accordingly raised the subject myself in the course of a long conversation that I had that day with the Prime Minister and told him frankly that provocative tactics of this kind would in the long run do much harm to the Arabs themselves. Thereafter the articles ceased.

7. This anti-Zionist outburst much alarmed the large local Jewish population and many were apparently persuaded to believe that it had been encouraged by British influence. Among the Jews, and to a lesser extent among the Arabs, the idea was canvassed that the British were pro-Arab and the Americans pro-Jew, and care was taken by interested persons to see that suspicions that we were the real instigators of anti-Zionist feeling among the Arabs were brought to American notice. The American Legation were informed of the facts, but the arrival of Colonel Newcombe on the 13th September for a week's intense contacting of Arab Nationalists was pointed to by many as a further evidence of British sympathy for Arab nationalism. On the other hand, the colonel's outspoken condemnation to a press meeting of noisy clamour about Palestine as damaging to Arab reputation in the United Kingdom and the United States seems to have had a good effect.



8. The action taken by the French authorities on the 11th November against the Lebanese Government after the Lebanese Parliament had amended the Constitution deeply shocked public opinion in this country. It is too early yet to attempt to forecast what further reactions may result, but I fear that, unless the French find a more conciliatory method of dealing with the situation than that of keeping the members of the Lebanese Government under arrest, both the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi people will feel obliged to express openly their indignation and resentment. Meanwhile, what has occurred illustrates with brutal clarity the truth that the situation in Arab countries can change out of all recognition in the short space of a few hours.

9. During September Mulla Mustafa, the Barzani chieftain who escaped from detention in Sulaimani in July, was joined by a Turkish outlaw named Said Birokhi and several Iraqi fugitive criminals and towards the end of the month he successfully raided a number of police posts in the Mergasur area to the north-west of Rowanduz. Police reinforcements were sent to deal with the situation, but in a fight with Mustafa's forces in the hills about 30 miles north-west of Rowanduz they lost five men killed and a number of rifles and light automatics and withdrew in some confusion. The tribesmen's next move was to threaten the Nahiyah headquarters at Shirwan Mazin, where there was a police garrison of about twenty men with their families. The police station was not well sited for defence, food supplies were short, and on the 23rd October the garrison surrendered.

10. After this blow to the local prestige of the Government most of the small police posts in the Barzani area were evacuated and the Iraqi army took over the conduct of the operations against Mulla Mustafa. Orders were issued for the concentration of a force of about one mixed brigade in the disturbed area and the necessary movements had been finished by the end of October. In the meanwhile, Turkish forces had attacked Said Barokhi on the other side of the border, killing him and a number of his men. This event and the show of force by the Iraqi army apparently lowered Mulla Mustafa's morale considerably, and he sent in a conciliatory message to the officer commanding Iraqi troops. Further letters thereupon passed between him and the Iraqi authorities, concluding in an offer of pardon by the Iraqi Government provided that Mulla Mustafa surrendered without delay and gave up the arms taken from the police. Mulla Mustafa replied that he would accept if I gave an assurance that his life would be spared and the terms offered properly observed. After obtaining from the Prime Minister certain assurances which I considered necessary regarding the future treatment of the Barzani chiefs, I authorised the political adviser, Northern Area, to send a letter to Mulla Mustafa advising him to surrender on the terms offered to him. His reply, dated the 3rd November, was a categorical refusal to surrender to the Iraqi Government and further negotiation was evidently useless.

11. On the 6th November Iraqi troops and police made a reconnaissance in force from Margasur northwards in the direction of the Greater Zab River, the head of the British Military Mission and the Iraqi Deputy Chief of the General Staff being present with the troops. They soon met with spirited opposition and lost a number of men killed and wounded before abandoning the reconnaissance and returning to their base. Two days later a similar and equally ineffective operation was carried out and on the 10th November a convoy moving from Rowanduz to Mergasur was attacked by tribesmen and extricated with some difficulty from an uncomfortable situation. In these operations the Iraqi troops and police claim to have inflicted casualties on the tribesmen, but they themselves have shown a lamentable lack of training in mountain warfare. They have also lost three or four light automatics and many more rifles to the tribesmen. At the time of writing it seems doubtful whether there will be time before the onset of winter to attempt any further operations other than restricted patrolling.

12. A new mutessarif, Wafiq Habib, has been appointed to Sulaimani and Shaikh Mahmud's son, Baba Ali, has been allowed to return to his home. The internment order passed against Latif (Baba Ali's younger brother) has also been cancelled and there is hope that he may be persuaded to return from Sardasht, where he has been adding to the confusion already existing among the Kurdish tribes on the Persian border.

13. The Yezidi chieftains, Khalaf al Nasir and Khodaida Hamo Sharo, were detained in Mosul in early September and later sent to live in Halabja, in the Sulaimani Liwa. They had been giving trouble to the local authorities in the Sinjar, and it was considered that a short spell of enforced residence outside their own tribal area would make them more amenable.

14. M. Maisky arrived in Bagdad by the overland route in the early morning of the 6th October and left the following morning by car *en route* for Tehran. During his short stay he had an interview with Nuri Pasha, who told me that M. Maisky was obviously eager that diplomatic relations between Moscow and Bagdad should be established as soon as possible. He was, however, determined that the first official step towards this end should be taken by the Iraqi Government. Nuri Pasha agreed in principle to an exchange of diplomatic representatives, but, pleading the Cabinet difficulties and his own imminent departure on leave under doctor's orders, deferred further action to a later date. The Prime Minister explained to me that it was his intention to await the outcome of the then forthcoming Moscow Conference and of the subsequent conference which he thought would take place between Mr. Churchill, President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin.

15. The establishment of a Russian Legation in Bagdad would without doubt excite much interest and speculation not only in the capital itself but throughout Iraq. Russian military successes have won as much popular admiration here as they have elsewhere among the peoples of the United Nations, and the social and industrial achievements of the Soviet Government, though only dimly understood, have attracted wide attention. There is, moreover, in this country an old-established tradition of foreign interference, and among many of its people an inherited instinct for intrigue with foreign influences which will give to the advent of a Soviet diplomatic mission a special significance and importance. It is to be expected that many of the young men of the "left wing" will hasten to establish personal contact with the members of the Soviet Mission and that with customary oriental hyperbole they will pour out their enthusiasm in adulation and flattery. The habitual intriguers too will be well up in the running and will eagerly seek to entangle the legation in their plots and schemes. The rumour-mongers and political prophets will also find in the arcana of Soviet foreign policy a rich field for the cultivation of their peculiar ideals, and with the opening of diplomatic relations between Iraq and Russia there must come a flood of talk about what this event portends for Iraq.

16. Mr. Wilson, the Minister Resident of the United States, left Bagdad on the 18th September, and his successor is expected to arrive with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary before the end of November.

17. The Iraqi Minister at Washington was authorised in later October to sign, on behalf of the Iraqi Government, the United Nations Relief Rehabilitation Agreement.

18. The Iraqi Government accorded formal recognition to the new Lebanese Republic on the 13th October, and the Regent marked the occasion by sending him congratulations and good wishes to the President.

19. Daud al Haidari has taken up his post as Iraqi Minister in London.

20. The Regent left Bagdad by Royal Air Force aircraft on the 28th October to accept the invitation of His Majesty's Government to visit the United Kingdom. His uncle the Amir Zaid arrived two days later from Constantinople to act as Regent during the Amir Abdul Illah's absence. He was sworn in before Parliament on the following day.

21. Gratifying evidence of the goodwill of the people of this country towards Great Britain continues to come in from many quarters. Throughout September parties, official, semi-official and private, were given all over the country to celebrate the Allied victory over Italy, and I myself received nearly two hundred congratulatory telegrams. One shaikh of Amara expressed his pleasure in the event by purchasing £10,000 War Savings bonds and renouncing interest, and many others have bought smaller quantities of bonds on similar terms. In the provinces shaikhs and notables called in hundreds on the political advisory officers to tell them how delighted they were by the great success won by the Allied armies in the Mediterranean. In everyday life, too, practical co-operation is constantly being shown as may be seen from the following examples. On the 11th September the assistant provost marshal, 2nd Indian Division, reported of Bagdad that "there was noticeable improvement in the relations between the civil police and the British military police," and of Musaiyib that "the civil police were very obliging and always willing to assist." From Kirkuk, too, the report on the Iraqi police was that on all occasions requests for help had been met with courtesy and alacrity. On the morning of the 'Id al Fitr the Iraqi army officers gave a party at their club in Bagdad to Muslim officers of the Indian army, and in the afternoon the Indian officers entertained the Iraqi officers. The fund which I and my wife recently opened to provide Christmas presents for the British sailors, soldiers and airmen serving in this country provided another



opportunity to many to show their goodwill, and contributions have been received from all classes of the people and every part of the country.

22. I have refrained from commenting in this despatch upon the economic problems of the hour, feeling that for the moment the general "mise en scène" will have been sufficiently depicted in my despatch No. 397 of the 6th November, now on its way to you, Sir, by fast bag.

23. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Angora, Tehran, Jedda and Beirut, the Minister of State Resident in the Middle East, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan, the Governor-General of India, General Headquarters, India, General Headquarters, Middle East, Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Political Agent at Koweit, and to His Majesty's Consular Officers at Basra and Mosul.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

[E 7912/44/93]

No. 11

Mr. Eden to Sir K. Cornwallis (Bagdad).

(No. 265.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, 31st December, 1943.

ON Thursday, the 4th November, His Royal Highness the Regent of Iraq arrived in this country on a visit to Their Majesties The King and Queen. This visit was arranged for the 10th and 11th November. For the remainder of his stay, lasting until the 2nd December, His Royal Highness and the members of his suite were the guests of His Majesty's Government and, when in London, were accommodated at Claridge's Hotel.

2. Owing to the uncertainties of air travel it was arranged that His Royal Highness should reach England some days before the time of his visit to Their Majesties; and, his departure from the Middle East being considerably earlier than had been anticipated, it appeared at one time likely that he might be expected on the 31st October last. He was, however, delayed for four days in Gibraltar, during which time he was entertained by the Acting Governor and, I understand, took the opportunity to make an unofficial excursion into Spain. The airport at which His Royal Highness should have landed in England was fogbound on the day of his arrival, but it fortunately proved possible to bring him to an airport only some 80 miles distant. He was conveyed thence by car to Lyneham, where he was met by the Iraqi Minister, Colonel Sir Eric Crankshaw, Secretary of the Government Hospitality Fund, and Mr. John Chaplin, representing myself, and greeted by the Lord Lieutenant and the Assistant Chief Constable of the county. On arrival at Paddington Station, His Royal Highness was met by His Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester, on behalf of the King, and by representatives of His Majesty's Government and of the Foreign Office.

3. The Regent's Iraqi suite consisted of Lieutenant-General Ismail Namiq, Acting Chief of the Iraqi General Staff, and Lieutenant-Colonel Ubaid Abdullah Al Mudhaifi, aide-de-camp. He was also accompanied by Dr. H. C. Sinderson, who had been granted the temporary rank of brigadier in the Iraqi army for the duration of the visit. Mr. Chaplin was attached to His Royal Highness throughout his stay; for the period of his visit to The King, Lieutenant-Colonel T. E. G. Nugent, Comptroller of the Lord Chamberlain's Office, was also attached, and while His Royal Highness was the guest of His Majesty's Government Colonel Crankshaw was in attendance *ex officio*.

4. His Royal Highness was fetched from Claridge's Hotel to Buckingham Palace at 5.45 p.m. on Wednesday, the 10th November. The detailed programme of his visit, which, under war conditions, was shorn of all ceremonial, is given in two memoranda issued by the Lord Chamberlain's Office, of which copies are enclosed.<sup>(1)</sup> On the day of his arrival the Regent bestowed upon The King the Chain of the Hashimite Order, which is restricted to heads of States, and had also been conferred upon His late Majesty King George V by the late King Faisal I of Iraq; His Royal Highness himself received from His Majesty the insignia of honorary Knight Grand Cross of the Victorian Order, including, in view of his Royal status, the Collar of the Order. Otherwise, no

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

decorations were conferred in connexion with the visit. The Emir Abdullillah also made personal gifts of Iraqi silver and silks to Their Majesties and to Their Royal Highnesses the Princess Elizabeth and the Princess Margaret Rose, being given in return a pair of silver-gilt cups, by which he was much gratified. The visit ended at 10 a.m. on Friday, the 12th November, but before finally leaving the United Kingdom His Royal Highness called again to bid farewell to The King on the 1st December.

5. During the periods 4th-10th November and 12th November-2nd December the Regent, as the guest of His Majesty's Government, carried out an extensive programme, of which a copy forms the third enclosure to this despatch.<sup>(1)</sup> In accordance with your Excellency's suggestion arrangements were made for him not only to visit naval, military and air establishments and factories producing war equipment, but also to gain some impression of current activities in Great Britain unconnected, or only indirectly connected, with the prosecution of war. In the former period His Royal Highness remained in London—apart from single-day excursions to inspect the coastal defences and naval establishment at Dover and the College at Winchester. In London, he toured some of the worst bombed areas, and, on the reverse of the medal, was shown anti-aircraft batteries and the organisation of passive air defence, including a demonstration of fire-fighting. He also visited the Royal Mint, the Bank of England and the British Broadcasting Corporation.

6. On the 8th November the Emir was entertained by His Majesty's Government at a luncheon over which, in my absence, the Deputy Prime Minister presided. Copies of the speeches exchanged on this occasion are enclosed.<sup>(1)</sup>

7. For the greater part of his time, between the 12th and 26th November, His Royal Highness was outside London. After spending a week-end as the guest of Air Vice-Marshal Champion de Crespigny at Cranwell, where he inspected the Royal Air Force College and training establishments and spent an afternoon shooting, he left for a tour in the eastern counties. This comprised visits to a fighter station, to the University of Cambridge, to a bomber station and to Newmarket. Unhappily, on the night which he spent at the bomber station, operations, which it had hoped that he might witness, were impossible on account of bad weather. On the 17th November His Royal Highness was entertained to luncheon at the Mansion House by the Lord Mayor of London; no speeches were made. He left again for the Midlands on the 19th November to see the bomb damage at Coventry, an aircraft factory at Castle Bromwich, near Birmingham, and the General Electric Company's works at Stafford, which are engaged *inter alia* on the production of tanks. At Castle Bromwich the Emir made a flight with a test pilot in a "Lancaster" bombing aircraft (which he did not entirely relish), and at Stafford was driven over the test course in a tank of the latest model.

8. Returning to London on the 21st November the Regent left again the same evening for Scotland. On the following day in Glasgow he visited the docks and Messrs. John Brown and Company's shipyard, where a battleship and an aircraft-carrier were under construction, before being entertained to luncheon at the City Chambers by the Lord Provost; after luncheon he was shown over Messrs. William Beardmore and Company's steelworks and then left for Edinburgh by car. During his stay in that city, dinners were given for His Royal Highness by the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Lord Provost and a luncheon by the British Council; a number of speeches were made at these functions, but in accordance with his earnest desire the Emir was not called upon to make a formal reply, and a few words of thanks uttered impromptu were all the more warmly received.

9. The Regent left Edinburgh for the Home Fleet on the 23rd November, proceeding by air from Donibristle after an inspection of the Fleet Air Arm station there and a most sumptuous luncheon. He and his suite were the guests of the Commander-in-chief, Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, and spent the night on board the flagship. The weather was, unfortunately, wet and stormy, and deteriorating flying conditions necessitated some curtailment of the programme, but the Emir was able to go over not only the flagship but also a submarine, which had been brought alongside, and a destroyer depot-ship, where he was presented with souvenirs made during the brief time that he was on board. He had, further, the opportunity of seeing two recently completed destroyers, one of which conveyed him to, and the other from, the anchorage of the Home Fleet.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



10. In Edinburgh the Regent visited the principal places of interest and laid a wreath on the War Memorial Shrine at the Castle. He returned to London overnight, arriving on Friday, the 20th November. From then until his departure, the date of which could not be precisely determined until the last moment, his programme was restricted to social engagements, apart from a visit to the House of Commons on the 1st December. His Royal Highness displayed considerable interest in the proceedings of Parliament and was fortunate in being able to attend a debate of some general significance on the release of Sir Oswald Mosley; he was also entertained to tea, unofficially, by a group of members interested in Arab affairs, and the Speaker was presented to him.

11. It should also be recorded that on the 27th November the Regent was the guest of honour at a luncheon given by the President of Poland, prior to which M. Raczkiewicz, who had wished thereby to show his appreciation of the hospitality accorded to his countrymen in Iraq, bestowed upon His Royal Highness the First Class of the Order of Polonia Restituta; General Ismail Namiq received the Second Class and Dr. Sinderson and Colonel Ubaid Abdullah the Third Class of the same order.

12. On the 30th November Lord Portal, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, entertained His Royal Highness at a small farewell dinner at which His Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester was present.

13. For security reasons no ceremony was observed on the Regent's departure, and His Royal Highness left London incognito on the 2nd December. He embarked in a flying-boat at Poole harbour at noon on the same day and was seen off by M. Daud al Haidari, Colonel Crankshaw and Mr. Chaplin.

14. While in England His Royal Highness embarked upon no formal political discussions—nor had he, indeed, contemplated doing so—but the Prime Minister took the opportunity to speak to him informally and in general terms of Arab questions, and, at the Emir's request, the conversation was resumed in Cairo. In addition, the views which His Royal Highness expressed in regard to the future of the Iraqi army and of the constitution of the British advisory military mission form the subject of correspondence ending with my telegram No. 773 of the 4th December.

15. The Regent, frank and friendly, yet dignified of bearing, created an excellent impression in this country. The programme which had been planned for him was inevitably an arduous one, if only from the physical point of view; yet His Royal Highness accepted it *in toto* and accomplished it cheerfully without apparent signs of fatigue or loss of interest. The arrangements, which under the overriding control of the Government Hospitality Fund had in large part been made through the Ministry of Information (notably outside London), were highly satisfactory, and the Regent seemed genuinely to appreciate the efforts which were made to render his visit both instructive and entertaining. I understand that his tour is probably the most extensive which has been devised for a foreign visitor and I hope that, by reason both of the publicity which has been secured for it in the Middle East and of the impressions which His Royal Highness has carried away, it has, as I believe, served a useful purpose. The Regent himself, at all events, appeared to be deeply impressed by the welcome accorded to him by Their Majesties and to be suitably gratified not only by the programme arranged for him as the guest of His Majesty's Government but also by the considerable measure of private hospitality which he enjoyed.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

## CHAPTER IV.—PERSIA.

### (A) Miscellaneous.

[E 5992/269/34]

No. 12

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 7th October.)*

(No. 1042.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 7th October, 1943.*

THE Prime Minister informs me that he is being pressed hard by Soviet Chargé d'Affaires—

- (a) To authorise expenditure which the Persian Government cannot afford on capital works of reconstruction and extension on railway in Russian zone;
- (b) To comply fully with munitions factories contract (my despatch No. 38, 26th January). You are aware how onerous munitions contract is. Russians refuse to accept excuse that Persia cannot afford to execute contract and argue that, having been signed, it must be executed. It is doubtful whether contract would be enforceable between private persons, since it does not fix "consideration," and supplementary contract, which was to lay down prices of manufactured articles, has not been concluded. According to the Prime Minister, one rifle costs the Persian Government 2,400 krans, *i.e.*, nearly £19, and the Russians are offering 17 dollars. The Prime Minister may have over-estimated the cost, though I think he has probably under-estimated it, but we ourselves paid the Persian Government at the rate of £7 10s. for an imported rifle of similar pattern which we bought from them for ourselves and the Russians.

2. According to the Prime Minister, he told the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires that he would like to discuss munitions contract with the new Soviet Ambassador, whose arrival has been expected for some time, but the chargé d'affaires replied that there was no point in the ambassador coming while such questions were outstanding. I do not know how many questions the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires had in mind. He may include tobacco transaction, about which I have just been given the following details by Dr. Millspaugh: The Soviet trade representative here wants to buy from the Persian State monopoly 1,000 tons of common tobacco. The Persian Government have insufficient tobacco for their own needs, but are prepared to sell to the Soviet authorities at a reasonable price, but they can get 50 krans for a kilogramme of cigarettes, whereas the Russians refuse to give more than 10 krans for raw tobacco. To the argument that the Persian Government cannot afford so large a loss of revenue, the Russians argue that 10 krans represents 50 per cent. above the cost price. The Persian Government has refused to accept this price, and Dr. Millspaugh says that there are signs that the Russians are stopping export of tobacco to Tehran from the Russian zone and have begun to negotiate direct with growers.

3. The American Minister and I agree that it is highly desirable that the Soviet Ambassador should arrive as soon as possible, as he would have more authority than the chargé d'affaires, who is walking very circumspectly for fear of offending Moscow.

[E 5626/82/34]

No. 13

*Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).*

(No. 869.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, 10th October, 1943.*

YOUR telegram No. 1007 [of 19th September: Questions for discussion at Three-Power Conference].

We have carefully considered suggestion in your paragraph 1 and have decided that it would be better not to raise this question with the Soviet Government now. We see no chance of inducing Soviet Government to say exactly what part of Persia they could continue to occupy as set-off to our continued occupation of oil-fields. The most we could hope to obtain is Soviet concurrence in some

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resolution providing for re-examination of the position after defeat of Germany, with a view to withdrawal of Allied forces from those parts of Persia where their presence is no longer necessary. But such a resolution would not bind Soviet Government, who would merely note that we seem anxious to get them out of Persia.

2. Other points in your telegram under reference and your telegram No. 1008 have been noted in compiling brief for our delegation.

[E 6202/1/34]

No. 14

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 15th October.)*

(No. 1078.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 15th October, 1943.

DR. MILLSPAUGH yesterday handed his resignation to the Persian Government. All members of his staff who are in Tehran have also resigned. I gather that reason given is the failure of Persian authorities to support them.

2. Effect of blow will be the greater in that the United States Secretary of State as well as His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is about to arrive in Tehran.

[E 6202/1/34]

No. 15

*Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).*

(No. 926.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, 16th October, 1943.

YOUR telegram No. 1078 [of 15th October].

Resignation of Dr. Millspaugh is a most deplorable development and economic and financial repercussions seem likely to have very serious results on Persia and on Persian supply route to the Soviet Union.

2. We should ourselves favour strong concerted representations by British, United States and Soviet representatives, or even, if necessary, by British and United States representatives alone in order to induce Persian Government to carry out Dr. Millspaugh's recommendations in interests both of Persian people and of united war effort. We realise that, whatever promises may be obtained from Persian Government and Majlis, Millspaugh may be reluctant to withdraw his resignation; but we regard him, in view of his record in Persia, as irreplaceable and see no alternative which offers any hope of avoiding financial chaos in Persia. We therefore think that he should be very strongly pressed to continue at his post.

3. We should be glad to hear result of your discussions with Secretary of State.

4. Please repeat further telegrams to Washington.

[E 6265/1/34]

No. 16

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 18th October.)*

(No. 1095.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 18th October, 1943.

MILLSPAUGH'S grievance is not so much against the Persian Government as against the Majlis, and the condition for his remaining is that Deputies should pass the Income Tax Bill substantially as he drafted it and not as emasculated by Finance Commission of Majlis, and also Bill authorising engagement of up to sixty Americans without obligation to submit each name to the Majlis. Prime Minister fully understands the gravity of the situation and claims to have the support of his colleagues in wishing to retain Millspaugh's Mission. At secret session of the Majlis, 19th October, he will try to persuade the Deputies to pass two Bills and at present seems to be more optimistic than the probabilities warrant. This Majlis comes to an end automatically in about a month, and the Deputies, many of whom will not be re-elected, may well be unwilling to alienate the rich by passing the Income Tax Bill.

2. Before the arrival of the Secretary of State I had spoken strongly to the Prime Minister about the danger that would face Persia if the American Mission left. I had also given my support to the American Minister who was in constant touch with the Prime Minister and Millspaugh. The visit of the Secretary of State came at the most opportune moment. He saw Millspaugh and he spoke in strong terms to the Shah about the importance of [group undecipherable] need of Millspaugh's services and of duty of the rich in Persia to do as the rich in the United Kingdom have done and to impose heavy taxation upon themselves to avoid inflation and national ruin. The Shah promised to use his influence with the Majlis in order to secure the passage of the necessary legislation. Something the Shah said suggested that he would like to replace Millspaugh by some other American, so I reminded him that the reason why Millspaugh was here was because the Persian Government had insisted on his appointment. Secretary of State subsequently saw the Prime Minister and left him in no doubt either as to British support of Millspaugh or as to the disastrous consequence to Persia if Millspaugh and his assistants left. This will have made the Prime Minister realise that if Millspaugh and his mission leave the country Persia will [group undecipherable]: ?lose the] sympathy not only of the United States of America, but also of Great Britain. There is reason to believe that many Persians, perhaps including the Prime Minister, would like to replace Millspaugh by an American with advisory powers only. Persians would ignore such an official and [group undecipherable]: ?inclination] will, I trust, have been quashed by the remark of the Secretary of State.

3. I shall, of course, work closely with the United States Legation, but there is no hope of securing the support of the Soviet Embassy whose hostility to Millspaugh is hardly concealed. Apart from their general suspicion of the American Financial Mission, they are particularly opposed to Millspaugh because being an honest man he had not quickly furnished enormous sums of money to enable Persian factories to manufacture munitions for Russians at a huge loss.

4. I have seen two most important Persian merchants to-day. Both have promised to work for the retention of Millspaugh, though one maintains that many of his regulations are hasty and unworkable, and the other is critical of his management of the local problem. There is something in these criticisms, but they must not be allowed to outweigh the many and great advantages which [group undecipherable]: ?must be the] gain of Persia.

5. Millspaugh does not wish to abandon his task, and will not do so if he can secure conditions in which perhaps he feels he can do some good.

[E 6439/82/34]

No. 17

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 25th October.)*

(No. 1114.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 25th October, 1943.

PERSIANS in general regarded the Moscow Conference with apprehension as likely to include discussion of the fate of Persia. Even the Shah shared this feeling in spite of repeated assurances I have given him that the fate of Persia is settled by Tripartite Treaty and Atlantic Charter. However, the Shah informed me yesterday that he had received assurances of Soviet Government, through Persian Ambassador in Moscow, that Persia would not be discussed at the conference. I told His Majesty that if two counsellors of His Majesty's Legation had accompanied Secretary of State to Moscow, it was to discuss current problems such as financing of Persian railways.

2. Persians are always more grateful to the Russians for not doing them harm than to us for trying to do them good, and they will probably attribute to the Russians the virtue of the announcement that Persia is not to be discussed in Moscow, just as, when Minister of the Interior reported to Majlis that Russians were going to allow export of wheat and rice from the north, he represented it as a great favour.

3. Prime Minister's efforts on behalf of certain candidates whose election the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires recently requested him to secure (including editor of Tudeh party newspaper) have been sufficiently obvious to attract criticism, and he is telling people in private that he is acting on instructions of the Shah after his return from a visit to Meshed. The Shah informed me yesterday that the Russians had been much more conciliatory lately, and he may well have instructed

[27557]

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the Prime Minister to try to do something for the Russians in return. This is reasonable, but I do not like the sudden appointment of General Razmara, who has been much with Russian militarists recently as Chief of Shah's Military Cabinet. Substitution of Riazi, one of the few honest officers, for Razmara as Chief of Staff was greeted with general satisfaction, and even the Shah described Razmara as an intriguer whose replacement was a gain to Persia. Razmara showed strong anti-British feeling at the time of arrests, and what with that and his close association with Russian militarists, I cannot think his appointment will be good for the Shah, for American Military Mission or for us. The Shah admitted to Riazi pro-Russian leanings of Razmara and professed to have appointed him to court in the hope of keeping him under control.

[E 6515/38/34]

No. 18

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 27th October.)*

(No. 1117.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 27th October, 1943.

MY telegram No. 1095.

The Shah kept his promise to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to support Millspaugh Mission. He received some twenty Deputies with the President of the Majlis on 23rd October, and told them that pace of legislation must be hastened in order to keep the Government machine working. In particular, he pointed out that certain financial and other plans put forward by the Millspaugh Mission had been delayed, and that the mission, which had been engaged to serve Persians, could not work without the necessary tools. This admirable and quite constitutional action doubtless helped to secure the passage of the Bill for the engagement of more Americans the next day.

2. Unfortunately the Shah does not apply as much wisdom to the army. Without previous warning either to the Minister of War or to the Chief of Staff, he appointed Razmara Chief of his Military Cabinet and Yazdan Panah his chief aide-de-camp. Not only is Razmara in the pockets of the Russians (my telegram No. 1114), but he is an incorrigible intriguer with a party of his own in the army, and he resigned from the post of Chief of General Staff (my telegram No. 976) rather than work loyally with the Minister of War. During the last six weeks prospects of army reform had improved, for not only do the Chief of the General Staff and the Minister of War work loyally with the American Military Mission, but being highly respected as an honest and disinterested officer, Riazi, as Chief of the General Staff, has been able to get rid of several of the worst and most corrupt of the senior officers, including more than one friend of the Minister of War. Probably the Shah considers co-operation between the Minister of War and Chief of the General Staff as a threat to himself. Anyhow, he has insisted on the retention of one of the worst scoundrels, and by two military appointments at court he has set up an influence which will probably result in the ejection of the Minister of War and will certainly not help the American Military Mission. Yazdan Panah was on the Russian list of suspects, and if we persuaded the Soviet Embassy to remove his name it was because, although we suspected him of intriguing with Zahidi, our evidence hardly justified his arrest. He was therefore left free to his own surprise and that of the public. But the most important objection to his appointment at court is that he is notoriously hostile to the employment of foreigners in the army. In this he has the sympathy of the Shah, who is quite unable to realise the importance of honest and careful administration to a modern army. The Shah recently refused to admit to the British Military Attaché that General Ridley had accomplished anything. Even if this were true (and it is not) failure should be attributed to the fact that Ridley has had no powers and to the hostility of the Yazdan Panah and the Shah. It is unfortunate that the Shah has only one conception of the way to run an army, viz., to appoint intriguers to all posts so that they may counter-balance each other. The fact that in the meantime all other officers take sides to the detriment of good administration and discipline is hidden from him.

[E 6515/38/34]

No. 19

*Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).*

(No. 966.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, 31st October, 1943.

YOUR telegram No. 1117 [of 26th October: Shah's intervention on behalf of Millspaugh Mission and his relations with Persian army].

Shah's action, reported in your paragraph 1, marks welcome improvement and you might take a suitable opportunity to express approval of His Majesty's Government.

2. As to paragraph 2, we presumably cannot hope to obtain Razmara's removal if he has Russian backing. But since Yazdan Panah is objectionable to Russians and presumably also to Americans (in view of his opposition to General Ridley) as well as to ourselves, do you think that either or both of your colleagues would join you in advising the Shah to get rid of him? Progress with reform of Persian army has been disappointingly slow, and we must make it clear that we are no less interested in success of United States military mission than in that of the financial mission.

[E 6865/1/34]

No. 20

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 10th November.)*

(No. 1153.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 10th November, 1943.

AS the Majlis was showing some activity, Dr. Millspaugh, whose resignation otherwise would have taken effect on 3rd November, postponed his final decision for one week. The Majlis are now working on Income Tax Bill and have passed eight out of twenty-two articles but they have not yet reached scales of taxation, and yesterday afternoon it was impossible to collect a quorum. Nevertheless, Dr. Millspaugh is giving them two more days, i.e., until the night of 11th November.

2. The Prime Minister assures me he has used all his influence to secure the passage of the Bill. The Deputies, he says, excuse their delay first on account of Dr. Millspaugh's prolonged illness but mainly on the ground that Millspaugh has not reduced prices or guaranteed the bread supply. The accusations are largely unjustified, but they serve to show the mood of the Majlis, which is due to come to an end soon, and is not anxious to accept any responsibility.

[E 6865/1/34]

No. 21

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 11th November.)*

(No. 1160.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 11th November, 1943.

MY telegram No. 1153.

Income Tax Bill was passed by Majlis to-day. Final text, as amended, is not yet available but Millspaugh informs me that no amendment was incorporated which seriously jeopardised any of the principles of the Bill.

2. Millspaugh Mission will, therefore, remain.

3. Both the Prime Minister and Millspaugh have expressed to me their appreciation of the Shah whose help in the difficult situation was, they say, invaluable.

[E 7216/82/34]

No. 22

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 22nd November.)*

(No. 1194.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 22nd November, 1943.

YOUR telegram No. 1014.

I informed Shah of His Majesty's Government's appreciation of his admirable use of his constitutional influence. He was obviously pleased. Counsellor, who saw Shah later, repeated your message about Shah's support of Millspaugh. Shah said he realised the importance of M.'s measures, but spoke



of the possibility of replacing him by some other American. Mr. Holman deprecated the demand for the replacement as likely to offend the United States Government and as difficult to satisfy, in any case, given shortage of highly qualified men.

I conveyed your message to Dr. Millspaugh in writing. He has sent me a letter of thanks for Secretary of State's sympathetic interest in his efforts.

[E 7569/239/34]

No. 23

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 3rd December.)*

(No. 462.)

Sir,

*Tehran, 23rd November, 1943.*

THE following are the developments in Persia since I wrote my despatch No. 393 of the 15th September:—

2. The Soheily Cabinet has remained in office, with no changes of personnel. The Minister of Roads, Hajir, is still in England, whence he seems in no hurry to return. M. Soheily has managed to survive two major crises: the first being the interpellation of the Deputy Tehranchi, and the second, the Income Tax Bill. The interpellation had been in the air for some time, Tehranchi having been persuaded to postpone it more than once. He was supported by a number of disappointed Deputies, who knew that they would in all probability not be re-elected to the 14th Majlis; and the partisans of Seyyid Zia took the opportunity to do a good deal of lobbying in order to overthrow Soheily on the vote concerning the interpellation, so that Seyyid Zia might form a Cabinet before the Majlis came to an end. The Shah, however, sided with Soheily and against Seyyid Zia; there seemed no suitable alternative, and Soheily triumphed when the interpellation was finally put to the vote on the 31st October. Since then Seyyid Zia has faded away somewhat, but the closing days of the 13th Majlis have seen a good deal of discussion about Cabinet changes. Soheily himself is prepared to revise the personnel of his Cabinet, bringing in new men like Musharraf Naficy and Moosa Noury Esfandiary. The Shah, however, is thinking of a completely new team, without Soheily; only, Ala has refused to be "considered" for the premiership. Ali Mansur is in the bad books of the Russians for letting a man they disliked be elected to the Majlis and for not pushing in one or two of their nominees, and the Shah has realised that Sa'ed would not do. The Shah is now thinking of Hajir as a possible Prime Minister. Hajir is able and apparently honest, but he is very young, and that means that he has as yet no following.

3. The elections have taken their course, and results have been announced from a number of constituencies. About sixty-five Deputies had been elected by the 20th November, with some more results expected very soon, so that the necessary number of Deputies to secure the reopening of the new Majlis, viz., sixty-nine, should have been elected by now (the 23rd November). There ought, therefore, to be no need of an interval between the expiry of the present Chamber on the 24th November and the opening of the new one. Nevertheless, it is thought likely that the results of the Tehran, and possibly of the Tabriz, elections will be awaited before the new Majlis is convened, and, as voting has not yet commenced in either of those places, it seems likely that the new Majlis will not be summoned for some weeks. An opportunity would thus be afforded for a Government to rule without any interference from Deputies. Hence the Shah's wish to form a new Cabinet under a Prime Minister of his own choosing.

4. The boggy of Russian intervention in the elections in the north has proved to be a very small one. In only two of the constituencies have Communists, or persons holding views similar to communism, been elected, one being Darajez on the Russian frontier in Khorassan, where a certain Durri was elected; the other being Pahlevi, the Caspian port, where Dr. Feridun Kishavarz was successful. At Resht the Russians acquiesced in, or at any rate did not prevent, the election of Abol Ghassim Amini, who when in Government service was almost certainly guilty of peculation on a large scale; he is member of a family of wealthy reactionaries, and his newspaper, *Umid*, published severe criticisms of Dr. Millspaugh. In Sarab, where the prince-landowner Muhammad Vali Farman-Farmayan was thought to be in danger of defeat by a Russian nominee, the prince was elected almost unanimously. In Kazvin the Communist candidate, Abdul Samad Kambakhsh, was not successful, nor was a similar candidate in Talish, near the Russian frontier at Astara. In the south some unexpected results have

been announced, and it has frequently happened that the views of the Government about the suitability of a candidate have not been effective in securing or preventing his election; in fact, provincial Governors have usually shown themselves unable, or unwilling, to secure the election of the Deputies recommended by the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior.

5. The Majlis showed its usual lethargy and obstructiveness, except when presented with an ultimatum to resign from Dr. Millspaugh in connexion with the Income Tax Bill. (For details of incident see paragraph 23.) They, however, passed Bills authorising the selection of 60 American advisers, the engagement of two Americans for service as director-general in the Ministry of Health and managing director of the Pharmaceutical Institute, and the minting of coins of silver alloy.

#### *Tribal Situation.*

##### *(a) South Persia.*

6. In Fars the Persian Government have drifted into a policy of appeasement of the Qashgai tribes. It will be remembered that in their panic after the disaster to the Persian troops at Semirum in July they appointed Qavam ul Mulk to be Governor-General of Fars, with the intention that he should rally to the side of the Government certain tribes over whom he had influence with a view to reducing the power of Nasir Qashgai to an extent which would justify his being attacked by these tribes with the doubtful support of the Persian forces. However, as reported in my despatch under reference, the policy of appeasement had been begun by the military commander in Fars before Qavam ul Mulk reached Shiraz. Nasir's brother, Khosrow, came to Tehran, made promises of good behaviour, and undertook to return the arms of the Persian troops taken by the Qashgai and to arrest and surrender any Germans in Qashgai territory. In return the Government agreed to appoint him to be Governor of Firuzabad, to deal with the Qashgai tribes through him and not to oppose the election of Nasir Qashgai as a Deputy for Firuzabad. It must be said that there was an immediate improvement in the behaviour of the Qashgai tribes, which has been maintained to the present date. Beyond some looting of the villages of neutrals and their enemies there has been little lawlessness that can be definitely attributed to the Qashgai. But only a few arms, and those such as were of little use to the tribes, have been returned, nor have any Germans been arrested, although three or four are known to have been at times in Qashgai territory.

7. The Qavam ul Mulk reached Shiraz to find the military commander already in friendly relations with Nasir and Khosrow, and increasingly reluctant to support the Qavam's policy of arming and encouraging certain tribes to stand out against the Qashgai. Divergence of views soon led to strained relations. The Minister for War visited Shiraz with the intention of continuing the energetic support which he had consistently given to Qavam ul Mulk, but, influenced by certain defects of character which Qavam undoubtedly showed in the face of difficulties, and perhaps by other considerations, he came to the conclusion that Qavam could not be relied upon to carry through the policy which had been originally advocated by the Minister himself. Qavam returned to Tehran to seek a decision whether his policy or the military commander's, which was one of ill-disguised appeasement, should prevail.

8. The onus of making a decision did in fact devolve upon His Majesty's Minister. The Minister for War assured me that he was ready to give the Qavam full support if I had sufficient faith in him to insist that he should be allowed to attempt to carry out his policy, but as he made no secret of his own conviction that the Qavam had not the qualities necessary for success, I could not feel confident that this support would be really whole-hearted. His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz had also expressed grave doubts regarding the Qavam's ability to deal with the many real difficulties facing him. It was generally expected that if he were to begin to put into effect the measures required to build up a combination of tribes hostile to Nasir, the latter would immediately provoke disorder which the Qavam would be unable to control in view of the unreliability of the Persian forces. In the circumstances I came to the conclusion that the attitude for me to adopt was that it was for the Persian Government to decide what measures should be taken to establish their authority in Fars and that I was concerned mainly with the elimination of German and other hostile influences that might be directed towards damaging British interests. I made it plain that I expected the Persian Government to protect Qavam's prestige and that I would not be satisfied as long as Germans and the Deputy Nowbakht were being given asylum by the tribes of Fars. The plain truth, however, is that, the Qavam having



proved a disappointment, the Persian Government is for the present in no position to take a strong line against the tribes of the south.

9. The situation at the moment is that the Qavam is still Governor-General of Fars, though he has not returned to Shiraz, that Khosrow Qashgai has given solemn assurances to me that he will hand over the Germans—assurances which I find less reason to believe as time passes—and that the policy of appeasement is being pursued with consistency unusual in a Persian by the military commander of the south. At the same time, most tortuous intrigues, allegedly with the object of setting brother against brother and tribe against tribe are in train, all this with a view to splitting the tribes to such an extent that in the spring they will be unable to combine against disarmament by the Persian forces. But, on the other hand, the two principal tribal chiefs who have been in rebellion against the Government, Nasir Qashgai and Abdullah Zarghampur Boir Ahmadi, are making use of the liberty and the responsibility for the maintenance of order given to them by the Persian authorities to consolidate their position and to obtain the adherence of other tribes who had hitherto remained neutral or had supported the Government. I see little reason to hope that in the spring the relative strength of the Persian forces and the tribes will be more favourable to the Government than it is at present.

10. For the time being there is peace, and that is our principal immediate consideration. There is, I think, good reason to hope that in present circumstances no responsible tribal chief will abet any attempt to damage important British interests, such as the oilfields or the railway, but while Germans with money are still in tribal territory there will always be the possibility of their collecting a band of malcontents to assist them in sabotage. It is known that three Germans are now with the Boir Ahmadi tribe, and until they are apprehended there will be cause for anxiety.

11. The Persian Government intend shortly to carry out operations for the disarmament of certain small tribes living along the eastern flank of the oil-fields—the Taiyyibi, Bahmai and Western Janeki. These tribes inflicted a minor disaster on a garrison of Persian troops at Malamir (Izeh) in March last, for which they have not yet been punished, and they have been a constant cause of disorder, creating anxiety among employees of the oil company. The Persian Government hopes by these operations to re-establish some of their lost prestige in this area. Their troops will be assisted by some Bakhtiari levies.

12. A minor operation is also in progress for the disarmament of the small tribes of Dashti and Tangistan. The Royal Navy assisted with this operation by providing a ship to transport Persian troops from Bushire to Daiyir, enabling them to capture this town, the headquarters of the rebel chief, Ali Ismail, with little or no opposition.

13. In the Kerman Province long overdue operations have been undertaken against the notorious robber, Hussain Buchakchi, which resulted in his surrender and the capture of some at least of the arms of his tribe.

#### (b) Bakhtiari Region.

14. There are certain dissident elements and inter-clan dissensions in Bakhtiari, but on the whole Morteza Quli Khan, the Bakhtiari Governor, appears to be establishing his authority throughout the tribal area. Whether in the long run this will be to the advantage of the Persian Government is problematical, but for the time being there is a greater degree of order in Bakhtiari than has prevailed for some time past.

#### (c) Kurdistan.

15. As is usual when the Kurds are left to themselves there is inter-tribal squabbling leading sometimes to fighting, but in that part of Kurdistan adjacent to British lines of communication the situation is fairly satisfactory. In the Russian zone, where since their occupation the Russians have opposed any intervention by Persian forces in Kurdish territory, they are now pressing the Persian Government to re-establish gendarmerie garrisons along the Turkish frontier, presumably with the object of preventing the smuggling of food-stuffs from Persia.

#### Security.

16. Out of the 162 suspects whom the Persian Government were requested on the 29th August to arrest, 138 have been handed over at Sultanabad. The names of ten additional suspects were handed to the Prime Minister on the

10th October, of which eight have been arrested. Of the original 162 names, thirty-five had been proposed by the Russians. We have sufficient evidence of our own against six of these to warrant their being interrogated at Sultanabad, but against the remaining twenty-nine (of whom eleven are still at liberty) we have no evidence whatsoever. The Soviet Chargé d'Affaires asked the Prime Minister with my support to have eight of the thirty-five sent to Resht for joint Soviet and Persian interrogation, but in regard to the rest of the suspects on their list the Russians were doing nothing, although the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet security authorities have been repeatedly asked to take part in the enquiry at Sultanabad when suspects on their list come up for examination or to produce evidence against them. Finally I wrote to the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires on the 3rd November to the following effect. To bring suspects up for interrogation at Sultanabad without producing evidence would make a bad impression on the Persian authorities. We had our own evidence against six suspects on the Russian list, and the Soviet authorities were going to interrogate some at Resht. The remainder on the Russian list who were under detention at Sultanabad should, I suggested, be released on the 12th November unless the Soviet authorities could agree either to take part in their interrogation or take them over for such action as they might think fit. On the 10th November the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires promised me to do his best to solve the question to our mutual advantage, and asked me to take no action until the 20th November. On the 19th November he told me that the Soviet authorities agreed in principle, but wanted a few days' respite while the necessary premises at Resht were being got ready by the Persian Governor. I asked him to put this in writing and he said he would do so at once. I have, however, received no such communication at the time of closing this despatch. It is proposed to give M. Maximov a few days and then to inform him that action can no longer be delayed, since the reputation of His Majesty's Government for judicial fairness cannot be left dependent upon a Persian official, whose zeal His Majesty's Legation have no means of stimulating.

#### Economic and Financial.

17. Between the 25th August and the 23rd October, 1943, currency notes in circulation rose by Rials 527 millions to Rials 4,914.17. Allied military expenditure (still on a substantial scale, though less than a year ago) and Government borrowings to meet the cost of essential services (for example, the purchase of the wheat crop) have created the need for this "new money."

18. During the two months the Index of Wholesale Prices in Tehran rose from 600 (23rd August) to 669 (23rd October), and the Cost of Living Index for all Persia from 980 (23rd August) to 1,088 (23rd October). During the last two or three weeks, however, there are signs that bazaar commodity prices are weakening. Wholesale prices are tending downwards, although the relief has not yet been felt in the retail markets. To some extent this tendency can be attributed to the growing belief that the end of the war is now not far off; hoarders of stocks of consumers' goods are showing a disposition to unload, fearing that the existing stringency in the supply situation may shortly come to an end. The arrival in the interior of stocks of consumers' goods that have lain for months in the Gulf ports has caused some anxiety to the hoarders, and has contributed probably more than anything else to the downward tendency in prices. Approaches have actually been made by more than one prominent Tehran merchant to the British officer in charge of civil movements at Ahwaz, begging him not to display too much zeal in the discharge of his duties. Moreover, goods are now being railed up with increasing promptness and regularity at the recognised tariff rates, instead of having, as hitherto, to incur the exorbitant black-market charges for transport by road or to pay heavy bribes to Persian railway officials for priority.

19. While these signs and tendencies are encouraging, the situation nevertheless remains grave, and the internal price level is still to-day probably higher than in any other territory in the Middle East.

20. Meanwhile, Dr. Millspaugh continues to fight in face of much obstruction and with little effective help. His main general objectives are two: first, to make available in the markets such goods as there are in the country, and secondly, to do what he can to "mop up" the supply of excess purchasing power. The first is a problem as much of distribution as of supply; and the steps which are being taken are discussed in paragraphs 29 to 33 below.

21. With the second object in view, Dr. Millspaugh many months ago prepared and presented to the Majlis two Bills, one authorising an issue of Treasury Bonds to the amount of 500 million rials, and the other a measure to



reform the Persian Income Tax laws in the direction of exacting an equitable contribution to revenue from the wealthier sections of the community. Both Bills have now reached the Statute Book.

22. Although quite uncontroversial, the Treasury Bonds Bill was not passed by the Majlis until near the end of September. The Bonds have not yet been placed on offer, as the regulations with regard to maturity, rates of interest, &c., are still to be made.

23. The Income Tax Bill caused a crisis which all but led to the resignation of Dr. Millspaugh and the departure of the American Financial Mission. The Bill hung in the Financial Commission of the Chamber for many weeks, and went through a process of emasculation which destroyed much of its original purpose. Finally, during the first week of November, it came before the Deputies in full session for enactment. Amendment after amendment was proposed—all directed towards relieving the pockets of the rich from the incidence of the income tax. It seemed, indeed, that the purpose of the Deputies was to shelve such an unpopular measure anyhow during their term of office, which would so soon expire. Dr. Millspaugh, however, took up the challenge: he decided to make this issue a test of the sincerity and public spirit of the Deputies; and let it be known that unless the Bill was passed (amended only in such respects as he thought reasonable) he was not prepared to remain. On the 14th October, he had informed the Government that "as the Majlis had not provided me with the means of fulfilling my responsibilities, I considered that my contract had been terminated," and set the date of his resignation at the 2nd November. The Shah then let it be known that it was his desire that the two Bills to which Dr. Millspaugh attached primary importance should be passed, namely, the Income Tax Bill and the Bill providing for the engagement of sixty American advisers. The latter measure was immediately enacted; and negotiations with regard to the Income Tax Bill began. Dr. Millspaugh then undertook, at the urgent request of the Prime Minister, to postpone the date of his resignation until the 10th November, and later he agreed, on the personal request of the Shah, to a further postponement until the 12th November. On the 11th November the Deputies capitulated and the Bill was passed. An amended text of the Bill is not yet available. Dr. Millspaugh informs me that, while the measure as finally passed represents a substantial compromise on his original proposals, most of the points of principle on which he stood have been incorporated. I shall report on the measure in a special despatch in due course.

24. Dr. Millspaugh has spoken to me with appreciation of the support and encouragement which he obtained during the crisis from the Shah; and His Majesty's Legation has conveyed to His Imperial Majesty the gratification of His Majesty's Government that His Imperial Majesty's influence was exercised in support of the American Financial Mission, in this difficult situation.

25. The Budget Law for the current financial year has now been passed by the Majlis. As presented, the budget was divided into two parts—the ordinary budget, showing a deficit of about 1,400 million rials, and the extraordinary budget (covering the industrial and trading operations of the Government), which was self-balancing. Dr. Millspaugh had already indicated to the Deputies that he saw no means of meeting the deficit in the ordinary budget, except by recourse to foreign financial help; and negotiations were already well on the way for the conclusion of a Stabilisation Fund Agreement between Persia and the United States, under which, in effect, Persia would obtain a dollar credit of \$30 million, which she could use as backing for additional issues of currency. The proposal for foreign help has not, however, commended itself to the patriotic Deputies, who decided to produce a balanced budget by including as an item of revenue the value of stocks of commodities held by the various Government trading organisations at the beginning of the financial year.

26. Dr. Millspaugh is now inclined to take a more optimistic view of the Government's financial situation. Revenue is coming in beyond his expectations, and he thinks he can get through the next few months without foreign aid. He is unwilling, so soon after surmounting the crisis of the Income Tax Bill, to put a second major controversial measure before the Majlis, and accordingly he proposes to postpone for the present negotiations for the conclusion of the Stabilisation Fund Agreement.

27. Sales of gold on the open market on behalf of His Majesty's Government continue. Gold is sold in the form of pahlavis and 5-tola bars. Demand has been well maintained at the present official selling price of 540 rials for the pahlavi and 4,300 rials for the 5-tola bar. Since official sales of British sovereigns have ceased, the bazaar price of these coins has sharply increased.

On the 18th November the George V sovereign was quoted in the Tehran bazaar at 642 rials, or 100 rials higher than the pahlavi, notwithstanding that the two coins are exactly equivalent in fine-gold content. Between the 25th September and the 11th November gold sales on behalf of His Majesty's Government realised 71,636,065 rials, and were made at an average price of 2,211 rials (about £17 5s. sterling) per fine ounce.

28. The Persian Government has now decided to discontinue sales of gold on its own account and to leave the field to us. Gold which the Government is purchasing from the United States authorities is being placed in the Currency Reserve in exchange for silver, and the silver is being sold in the open market at a substantial profit on the price at which it stood in the Currency Reserve.

#### *Civil Supplies.*

29. Since the middle of September the civil supply position has deteriorated, and latent defects have become apparent. This is not the result of any failure on the part of the Anglo-American supply authorities to import enough essential goods, but has been caused by a breakdown of road transport and of the internal distribution of basic commodities. The situation holds the elements of a serious crisis this winter. The road transport situation is dealt with under the relevant section. The commodities essential to maintain the life of the population are cereals, fuel, clothing, sugar, tea and drugs. The supply of cereals and fuel is mainly a road transport problem. That of the other goods is a matter of administration, i.e., the organisation of efficient distribution. Dr. Millspaugh realises the need to concentrate on these essentials, and will be able to devote more of his time to these difficult problems now that the Income Tax Bill crisis has passed. Certain measures to improve the importation and distribution of cotton piece-goods, sugar and tea have already been taken. M. Allageh Saleh, a former Minister of Finance, has been sent to India to supervise purchases of tea, cotton piece-goods and other goods for the Persian Government; and his predecessor, who is said to have devoted his time to private speculations instead of to purchases for his Government, has been recalled. The distribution of drugs has been dealt with by a special sub-committee of the Medical Advisory Committee—an offshoot of the Allied Combined Supplies Committee. The British and American Legations, and other Allied authorities are now helping the Government Drug Monopoly Organisation to compile an inventory of the stocks of drugs in the country and to organise an efficient system of distribution throughout the country. The general untrustworthiness and ineffectiveness of the Persian Government and officials is the chief obstacle to the improvement of the supply position.

30. Pending the arrival of the additional advisers, to make up the sixty mentioned in paragraph 23, the Middle East Supply Centre are lending personnel to Dr. Millspaugh to assist him in dealing with the supply problem.

#### *Transport.*

The transport by rail of civil goods from the Gulf ports to Tehran has improved, thanks mainly to the appointment of a British movements officer to the Price Stabilisation Section, who has been able to supervise the loading of civil goods at Khorramshahr and Ahwaz. During September and October about 5,000-6,000 tons were despatched each month out of the allocation of 8,000 tons, oil not being included in these figures—the movement of oil by rail was also satisfactory, and adequate stocks have been built up at points on the railway. The arrival of these quantities of civil goods brought down prices in Tehran by about 10 per cent., much to the annoyance of certain merchants (as described in paragraph 18).

31. Road transport became seriously disorganised during the period under review because of the high rates paid on the "free" market and the almost entire absence of police control over civil motor lorries outside Tehran. In an attempt to correct the position the Persian Government Road Transport Department, by agreement with the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation and Iransovtrans, raised the rates paid to their contractors; but the new scales are still far below the rates paid for uncontrolled work. New regulations have been published by the Government, laying down stricter penalties for illegal work; and efforts are being made to devise some effective way to impose these regulations. Millspaugh proposes to set up a new committee to advise on transport matters, comprising members of the British, American and Russian diplomatic missions, the Middle East Supply Centre, Office of the Lease-Lend



Administration, United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, Paiforce, and the other authorities who might be able to contribute towards improving the situation. The existing Road Transport Board may in consequence disappear. The Road Transport Department needs further trustworthy staff; and various proposals in this connexion, including the seconding of Middle East Supply Centre personnel to that department, are under consideration. The consequence of this disorganisation of civil road transport has been that urgent requests for help have had to be sent to Paiforce and to the Government of India to provide transport for the movement of oil and cereals for civil needs. Paiforce have taken over the entire transport of oil for civil needs from Kermanshah to Tabriz; they have provided military vehicles for the movement of grain from Kermanshah to Sultanabad and Tehran; and may also have to assume the entire responsibility for providing transport for the anti-locust campaign. The total number of vehicles involved probably amounts to some 500-600. A similar appeal to the Government of India (who control the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation trucks in the Meshed area) to authorise these trucks to carry oil from Shahroud to Meshed has so far been unsuccessful, though a telegram has now been received from the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation in London granting authority for the purpose. The need for these trucks is urgent, as, unless sufficient stocks of oil for civil consumption are built up now in Khorassan, the bad state of the roads later in the year will make it impossible to supply these requirements. There will then be much distress amongst the civil population, and the security of this aid-to-Russia route may be disturbed.

32. The shortage of controlled transport has made it virtually impossible for the Government to supply vehicles for the collection of the sugar beet crop of over 200,000 tons. This will probably be lost entirely, except in those areas where the local authorities have diverted trucks for this purpose from the transport of products like grain and fuel, which should have higher priority.

33. Road transport conditions have been extremely unstable during the past year. At one moment they may be satisfactory: a number of privately-owned vehicles may be working more or less satisfactorily for the Government and essential goods may be transported to some extent according to plan. A few days later the situation may have changed: the inducements of the uncontrolled market may have attracted away many of these vehicles; and plans for the movement of vital commodities may be entirely disrupted. Until a proper system of control has been established this threat to the welfare of the country will remain. It is to be hoped therefore that the latest measures of the Persian Government to control civil road transport will be more effective than those hitherto enacted.

#### Cereals.

34. Although the situation is still not free from anxiety, considerable progress has been made in the last two months in collecting the surplus grain required to feed Tehran and the larger provincial towns until the next harvest. Over 150,000 tons of grain, or more than half the total requirements, is now in Government hands, and landlords' undertakings or contracts have been signed for a further 110,000 tons.

35. The ban on the private purchase and transport of grain has been enforced with some effectiveness in the south and west, particularly in Khuzistan and in the immediate vicinity of Tehran, thus enabling the Government to profit in these areas from this year's good harvest. In Khuzistan more than 14,000 tons have been collected so far, and cheap ration bread continues to be supplied to the public in Ahwaz and three other towns in the province. In the Tehran area total collections are already in the neighbourhood of 21,000 tons, and are expected to reach a figure of 26,000 tons, as compared with an average of only 11,000 tons for collections during the last four years.

36. Most of the wheat and barley collected in the Tehran area has already been brought in to the capital, where it is consumed as fast as it can be delivered, except for the barley, only 20 to 30 tons of which can be issued every day owing to inadequate milling facilities. No appreciable quantities of grain have yet been brought in from other areas, and stocks in the Tehran silo remain in the neighbourhood of 10,000 tons, of which little more than a third is wheat or wheat flour.

37. The requirements of Tehran from harvest to harvest are approximately 90,000 tons of grain. Allowing for the delivery of 25,000 tons from districts in the Tehran area, the intention is to bring in a further 25,000 tons from other areas in the south and west and 40,000 tons from the northern provinces. Most of the

25,000 tons expected from the south and west must come from the Sultanabad, Hamadan and Kermanshah districts, and in the course of October some 10,000 tons accumulated in these three districts for transport to Tehran. The surplus from Sultanabad began to be moved to Tehran by rail. Owing to a serious inadequacy of local road transport facilities, however, there appeared to be little prospect of moving any grain from Hamadan and Kermanshah. Arrangements were therefore made at the end of October for British army trucks to move 10,000 tons of grain in two months from Kermanshah, while the help of the Persian army was enlisted to carry grain from Hamadan.

38. The attitude of the Soviet authorities to the export of the vital grain surplus from the Soviet-occupied zone has recently been clarified, to the extent that they have promised to help in the transfer to Tehran of 40,000 tons of grain, thus formally recognising the capital's dependence on the northern provinces for assistance of this order. Prompted by Dr. Millspaugh after a conference on food supplies at which the American Minister and myself were present, the Persian Prime Minister made representations in October to the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires and was successful in obtaining his agreement for the provision of transport facilities, including rail facilities on the north-eastern and north-western lines and road transport from Tabriz to the north-western railhead, for the export of 18,000 tons of grain from Azerbaijan, 2,000 tons from Zinjan, 10,000 tons from Gorgan and 10,000 tons from Khorassan. In return the Russians have been promised 40,000 tons of rice, in exchange for manufactured goods (including 60 per cent. cotton piece-goods) and help in transporting 12,000 tons of rice to Tehran. So far, however, less than 600 tons of wheat and barley have reached Tehran from the northern provinces and how much more will come will depend as much on the actual availability of the necessary surplus as on the readiness of the Russians to supply the transport facilities they have promised. Although the Russians themselves are not asking for any wheat or barley this year, there is little enough prospect at present of any substantial surplus being available for Tehran. Collections in the south are nearly three times those in the northern provinces, where not even half the local requirements are yet in Government hands. The Soviet authorities are understood to have offered to instruct their local officials to assist the Persian grain collecting officials, and a proposal was made to them in October by the Persian Government for the appointment of Russian "cereals liaison officers" with duties comparable to those of our own "consular liaison officers." This valuable suggestion, however, has not yet borne fruit.

39. In view of the uncertainty of supplies from the northern provinces, the Middle East Supply Centre, Cairo, has been asked to establish a secret reserve of 10,000 tons of grain at some convenient place outside Persia, to be available at six weeks' call—from the 1st December, as a guarantee against a complete breakdown of the Tehran bread supply such as happened last winter. It is not impossible that a shortage of supplies from the north could be made good to some extent by additional deliveries from districts in the south and west. This will depend, however, partly on sufficient transport being available and partly on the extent to which the Government succeeds in enforcing its theoretical purchasing monopoly. There is the liveliest opposition to this monopoly from landowners, middlemen, and well-to-do householders, who demand a free market for grain regardless of the effect which this would have in impeding the purchases by Government on which the bread of the majority of the population of the towns depend. A campaign in the press and Majlis has compelled Dr. Millspaugh to agree to the issue of permits for the purchase of grain by private individuals, since, without this concession, he could see no prospect of obtaining an essential credit (not, in fact, yet granted) of 40 million rials for further grain purchases. The insertion, however, in the relevant decree of an ingenious clause providing that grain purchased privately should, nevertheless, be transported by Government, by seriously restricting the scope of private dealings has left the would-be dealers still unsatisfied and the Government still the principal grain purchaser. If this situation continues and if the results of the sugar barter scheme, which has been working successfully in Khuzistan and is expected to be introduced generally towards the end of November, are satisfactory, considerable additional surpluses may yet be forthcoming from areas in the southern zone.

40. Colonel Speaks arrived in Tehran from the United States towards the end of September, to take over the Cereals and Bread Section from Mr. Crawford, but, unfortunately, had to leave again for the United States almost immediately owing to ill-health. Mr. Crawford, therefore, continues to be in charge, under



Dr. Millsbaugh, of the work of grain collecting. Much of the detailed organisation has been entrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel Attaullah, Indian Medical Service, who is rendering invaluable service in supervising the work of provincial grain collecting centres, implementing the recommendations of our consular liaison officers and helping to plan the day-to-day policy of the Cereals and Bread Section.

#### *Persian Army and Gendarmerie.*

##### (a) *Army.*

41. Although little or no improvement is visible in the Persian forces, some preliminary measures towards reform have been taken. The Majlis has passed Bills authorising the engagement of thirty American military officers as advisers to the Persian army, of eight as advisers to the gendarmerie, and of the American police expert, Timmerman, as director-general of the police. It is understood that the United States Government is unwilling to provide the full number of military officers required. It is certain that no adequate measure of reform can be achieved in any reasonable time with much less than these numbers, and, as the reform of the forces is essential to the stability of Persia, it is to be hoped that the United States Government will be persuaded to extend the limit they have now imposed of eleven officers for the army and three for the gendarmerie.

42. There are now the Minister for War, the Under-Secretary for War, and the Chief of the Staff, officers who are not only friendly to us, but are prepared to co-operate loyally with the American advisers. In opposition, however, to the grant of any considerable measure of authority to the American advisers are the Russians, the Shah and certain Persian officers. The Shah not only dislikes to admit that any foreign control is necessary but fears that the American advisers may strengthen the authority of the Ministry for War over the army to the detriment of his own. He clings hard to his ambition to be commander-in-chief in fact as well as in name. Popular clamour forced him to sign, very reluctantly, a decree making clear that the Minister for War was responsible for the army, subordinating the Chief of the Staff, who had, until then, taken his orders direct from the Shah, to the Minister and limiting his own powers to certain prerogatives of approval, but he has never willingly accepted this position. He has recently appointed to his personal staff two senior officers, General Yazdan Panah as his Aide-de-Camp-General, and General Razmara as Chief of his Military Secretariat, both of whom have recently been Chief of Staff and resigned from that appointment owing to their unwillingness to subordinate themselves to the Minister of War. They are both notoriously hostile to foreign influence in the army. This has led to strained relations between himself and his Minister for War and Chief of Staff, since these officers realise that they have been displaced as the Shah's military advisers by Generals Yazdan Panah and Razmara. Yazdan Panah and Razmara have some following in the army among those who, for reasons of pride or profit, resent the advent of the American advisers. There is reason to believe that they are supported and encouraged by the Russians, who, for reasons of their own, object to the extension of American influence in Persia. The result of their appointment has been to increase disunion in the army, to diminish the authority of the Minister for War and to incline officers to look more to the Court than to the Ministry and the Chief of Staff. It is natural to see a close connexion between this renewed attempt by the Shah to control the army and his desire, to which reference was made in the second paragraph of this report, to set up a Cabinet of his own choosing in the interval between the dissolution of the present Majlis and the opening of its successor.

43. The Shah agreed that the Ministry for War should draft regulations to define the functions of his Military Secretariat in consultation with General Ridley and the Belgian Military Attaché, the latter, because the Persian Constitution follows the Belgian to some extent as regards the relation of the Crown to the army. General Ridley has given his opinion in writing that the Shah has no need of a military secretariat except for ceremonial duties. This has not disposed the Shah more kindly to the American advisers, though the Belgian Military Attaché is also understood to have said that Belgian experience was against such an institution.

44. General Ridley's contract has now been drafted by the Ministry for War. It is understood that it gives him satisfactory control over the administration of the army and some control over the appointment and promotion of officers

in administrative services. It has not yet been submitted to the Shah, who is not likely to accept it willingly in its present form.

45. As first step towards reform certain measures have been taken. The useless but costly Staff College has been abolished; some twenty-two officers of the rank of colonel and above, notorious for their inefficiency or corruption, have been put on the retired list; the training of recruits for the troops in the capital has been centralised under American supervision; supply, clothing and pay are also in process of being centralised under American control, but progress is slow, due to the prevailing corruption and the shortage of American staff. Some attempt is being made to check corruption, several notorious officers having been removed from their posts, but the disease is now so firmly established that military courts cannot be induced to convict even in flagrant cases.

46. Some handicaps from which the army was suffering have been removed by the arrival from America of 100,000 pairs of boots and 200 lorries. It is understood that a further 400 lorries are also available from consignments intended for Russia, which the Russians are unwilling to accept. These, if properly used, should greatly improve the mobility of the army, but the need for lighter vehicles, preferably armoured, for the patrolling of roads still remains. It is not known whether the remainder of the equipment demanded from America by General Ridley can be supplied or not.

##### (b) *Gendarmerie.*

47. No progress whatever has been made with the reform of the gendarmerie, in spite of the fact that in this force there is much less active opposition to the American advisers. The latter have so far limited themselves to paper schemes and have done little to remedy the obvious elementary defects of the force. Colonel Schwarzkopf, the senior American adviser, is now in America endeavouring to secure the shipment of the equipment he has demanded.

#### *Persian Air Force.*

48. Brigadier-General Prince Mohammed Hussein Firuz has been appointed to command the Persian Air Force. He is a cavalry man with no air experience, but he has taken up his duties with considerable vigour and is not only anxious to receive advice but willing to act on it. Under his direction the process of reorganisation is being accelerated, though much remains at the paper stage. The strength in officers and men appears to have been reduced by about one-third, largely by transfer to other branches of the army. It had been hoped to retain Colonel Mohanna in command of the technical branches of the air force, but he felt unable to accept the terms of reference proposed and is at present unemployed.

49. The twelve pilots selected for training in the United Kingdom on the terms of His Majesty's Government's later offer to provide their instruction free have left Tehran for Egypt *en route* to England.

50. The willingness of His Majesty's Government to provide Oxford aircraft in place of Hurricanes in repayment for the Mohawks taken over two years ago has been much appreciated by the Persian authorities and has whetted their appetite for more such equipment. They hope that the change of type will entitle them to more than ten Oxfords and profess themselves anxious to purchase more again, especially for early delivery.

#### *Rural Improvements.*

51. Dr. H. D. Allen, an American who has been touring the countryside for the purpose of advising the Persian Government on rural education, has completed his investigations. He informs me that, before the task of improving health, education, agriculture and social conditions in the villages can be begun, three things are necessary: (1) the authorities in Tehran must be made "country-minded": at present they know nothing about village life and they care as little; (2) more water must be provided for irrigation: one of the obstacles is that the officials do not wish for cheap schemes which are easy to carry out, but for large pretentious projects which will give a richer yield in bribes; (3) the feudal system, which at present prevents the peasant from enjoying the fruits of any improvements that he may effect, must be broken.



52. In its preoccupation with internal affairs the press was inclined to overlook the fact that Persia was at war and there was little evidence of any desire to increase the country's contribution to the common effort. Attention was concentrated rather on past services and the hope of rewards to come. A watchful eye was kept on the Moscow Conference and some anxiety was expressed lest internal disputes might prejudice the country's claim for consideration.

53. Innumerable articles were written exhorting the people of Persia to vote for honest and worthy candidates for the next Majlis, which, it was generally assumed, would be called on to deal with questions arising out of the Peace Conference. The present Deputies were accused of all manner of intrigues to secure their re-election, and the Government was frequently blamed for unlawful interference in the voting. On the whole, however, M. Soheily received more support and less abuse than he had done during previous months.

54. Sayyed Zia received a favourable welcome, but it was not long before the Tudeh party papers started to attack him and accuse him of being a reactionary. The popular belief that the British were responsible for his return was reflected in some mischievous articles which appeared in *Azad* (subsequently suppressed) suggesting that he had been brought here to counter Russian influence and the spread of progressive ideas.

55. Dr. Millspaugh was subjected to some irresponsible criticism, but his threatened resignation did much to subdue his critics and the eventual passing of the Income-Tax Bill was welcomed by the majority of the papers. Some of them, however, complained that it had been so whittled away in the process that it had lost most of its value.

56. The food situation and the high cost of living were constant subjects of discussion and the Government was repeatedly attacked for its inability to handle these problems. The slight drop in wholesale prices during recent weeks caused the press to look more optimistically upon the prospects for the coming winter.

#### British Council.

57. The winter teaching session of the Anglo-Persian Institute in Tehran opened on the 9th October, the number of club members and of students attending classes totalling over 1,200. British Council staff also gave English lessons in the Teachers' College at the Tehran University, in the Alborz College at Tehran (run by the Ministry of Education), and in the Technical Colleges at Tehran and Isfahan (run by the Ministry of Industry and Mines). An Anglo-Iranian Dramatic Society has been inaugurated in Tehran and three one-act plays will be produced in December. A very successful photographic exhibition portraying "The Beauty of Britain" was opened on the 15th November for a week. Weekly lectures included two at the University, one on "Samuel Johnson" by His Majesty's Minister, and one on "My Expeditions to the Karakoram," by Dr. Visser, Netherlands Minister in Angora; weekly gramophone concerts have been continued, varied by a recital by a living artist. Weekly film shows have also been continued, in spite of the shortage of suitable films and equipment. The opening of a book-shop is under consideration and publication has begun of a children's magazine in Persian, which is in wide demand; a woman's magazine and a cultural monthly journal are in preparation.

58. An Anglo-Persian Institute is being organised in Isfahan and English classes have been started there.

59. The Russians have paid the British Council in Persia the compliment of the sincerest form of flattery by proposing to organise a Russian Institute in Tehran on similar lines to the British Institute.

60. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister of State Resident in the Middle East, to His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department and to all consular officers in Persia.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

*Three-Power Text of Declaration concerning Iran (Persia), issued at Tehran on the 1st December, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office, 9th December, 1943).*

THE President of the United States, the Premier of the U.S.S.R. and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.

The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom recognise the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union.

The three Governments realise that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials and supplies for civilian consumption.

With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conferences or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have continued to subscribe.

WINSTON CHURCHILL.

J. V. STALIN.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

1st December, 1943.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 14th December.)*

(No. 1279.)  
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 14th December, 1943.

PRIME MINISTER resigned to-day. It is expected he will take office again 15th December with a reconstructed Cabinet. Comment will follow when new appointments have been announced officially.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 17th December.)*

(No. 1285.)  
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 17th December, 1943.

MY telegram No. 1284.

Reconstruction of the Cabinet has been forced on the Prime Minister by the Shah. Ministers of Finance and Agriculture, whom the Prime Minister brought into the Cabinet from the Majlis some months ago against all advice, were failures and would have had to be changed soon, but the main object of the Shah was to get rid of the only two Ministers of strong character, viz., Ahmedi and Tadayyun, and to bring in two subservient men from the Court: Zand, who is comptroller, and General Shafai, one of the aides-de-camp. Appointment of Zand has the specious justification that the Minister of War ought in theory to be a civilian independent of army intrigues, but Zand is one of the Shah's men and the Shah has openly announced his intention to go back on his recent undertaking to refrain



from interference in administration of the army and confine himself to approval or disapproval of appointments and promotions, so the Deputies and the Majlis will not be slow to regard the Cabinet reconstruction as an attempt by the Shah to gain control of the army and, through the army, of the State.

2. The Prime Minister had asked my advice beforehand and I had given opinion to the following effect: Since Deputies already elected exceed the quorum so that constitutionally the Majlis might meet at any time, it would be well to wait until then lest the reconstruction of the Cabinet during recess should be considered a trick and the new session should begin with a barren constitutional struggle. I had never had high opinion of the last Majlis, but it was both hampered by the fact that it was not properly elected and by fifteen years' coquetting with free discussion. The new Majlis would have an easier task, since there was no longer the need to worry about foreign affairs and several major questions, *e.g.*, income tax law, currency for Allies, engagement of American advisers, had been settled. It would be better to give the new Majlis a chance. The Prime Minister said he entirely agreed with me, but feared that the Shah was determined above all to get rid of Ahmedi.

3. Minister for Foreign Affairs was also in favour of postponement of reconstruction of the Cabinet until after the beginning of the new session, and he says that he advised the Shah to that effect. The Prime Minister also said he would recommend waiting. Whatever they said, the Shah has had his way. Ahmedi was offered the post of G.O.C. at Fars, but, fearing sabotage by Razmara or other supporters of personal rule by the Shah, he refused.

4. The Prime Minister now talks of postponing assembly of the Majlis until the end of January. This would not have mattered if the Cabinet had not been reconstructed, but in the circumstances delay will probably be given sinister interpretation.

#### (B) Tehran Intelligence Summaries.

[E 6122/110/34]

No. 27

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 13th October.)*

(No. 406.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary for the period the 21st to the 27th September, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 28th September, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 27.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 39 for the Period 21st to 27th September, 1943.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

IT can now be said that there is in Tehran and in some, at least, of the provincial towns a considerable improvement in public sentiment. There is less unrest, less subversive intrigue and more respect for the Government. This is due in some degree to the arrests recently made and in lesser degree to Persia's declaration of war. That a Persian Government, dependent on Majlis support, under the premiership of Soheili, should have had the courage to arrest prominent Persians came as a salutary surprise which has had a steadying effect on the public and has instilled some fear into the trouble-makers. Many of those arrested were widely known to be hostile to the Allies and to be opponents of the present régime, and their arrest, besides strengthening the Government, has made opposition to co-operation with the Allies less popular. The same result has followed from Persia's declaration of war. The Prime Minister has gained confidence and is beginning to regard himself as a strong and courageous man. He talks of remaking his Cabinet.

#### *Appointments—Civil.*

2.—(i) Mehdi Fatimi (F.O. 70; M.A. 92) to be Governor-General of the 8th (Kerman) Ustan.

(ii) Allahyar Saleh (F.O. 184; M.A. 253) to be governor of the Mortgage Bank.

#### *Persian Forces.*

##### *Army.*

3. Part of the equipment demanded by General Ridley from the United States for the Persian army—see Summary No. 12, paragraph 7—has now arrived in Persian Gulf ports. Full details are not yet available, but it is known to include 200 lorries, 100,000 pairs of boots, and some infantry field engineering equipment.

4. The text of the Bill for the engagement of thirty American military officers for the reform of the administration of the Persian army, referred to in Summary No. 37/43, paragraph 14, is attached as an appendix. It was laid before the Majlis on the 19th September.

5. A Bill has been laid before the Majlis transferring from military to civil courts jurisdiction over officers and men of the army for offences against the civil law. Hitherto civil courts have had no jurisdiction over personnel of the army. Henceforth military courts will try only the offences specified in the Military Penal Code.

6. 513 cadets were recently commissioned from the Officers' Training School and were distributed to arms as follows:—

Infantry ... ..	182	Quarter-Master - General's services ... ..	77
Cavalry ... ..	96	Air Force ... ..	34
Artillery ... ..	34	Medical ... ..	5
Engineers ... ..	18	Ordnance services ... ..	38
Signals ... ..	27		

The intake for the new term will be considerably less than formerly and will not exceed 200. Entrance will be by examination.

7. A copy of the decree referred to in Summary No. 35, paragraph 11, whereby the Shah ordained that the General Staff should in future be responsible to the Minister for War is attached as Appendix II.

#### *Internal Security.*

##### *Fars.*

8. There has been a meeting at Ardekan between the Minister for War and Nasir and Khosrow Qashgai, at which Abdullah Zarghampur of the Boir Ahmadi was present. Nasir handed over four machine guns captured from the Persian army and promised to surrender certain other Persian Government arms, but not rifles. Various promises were also made. Khosrow went to Shiraz after the meeting, but reports available up to the present do not indicate that Nasir showed any intention of leaving tribal territory. Since the Persian forces are still too demoralised to justify an ultimatum to Nasir, the negotiations on both sides were presumably of a temporising character. Meanwhile, discussions have also been taking place between the Minister for War and Qavam ul Mulk as regards future policy. For the immediate future and until the Persian forces are in a fit state to take action it does not amount to much more than that attempts should be made to undermine Nasir's influence among the tribes and to prevent other tribes from joining the hostile confederation. As it is Nasir's object that either he or his brother should be permanently retained as the official head of the Qashgai confederation or even of all the tribes of Fars, it is probable that for some time to come his aim will be to prove that he can control the tribes, and this may result in a decrease of lawlessness. A body of the Qashgai is said to be co-operating with a column of Persian troops who have been sent to act against brigands, reported to be Boir Ahmadi, who have been active in the neighbourhood of Dasht Arjin.

##### *Kuh i Galu.*

9. There is considerable unrest in Kuh i Galu territory from Janiki down to the Gach Saran area, mainly due to the fact that there is no Government or recognised tribal authority in the whole area.

[27557]

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*Russian Affairs.*

10. Between the 15th August and the 11th September 5,362 tons of Aid to Russia supplies were delivered to the Soviet authorities by the Meshed-Zahidan route.

11. Major-General Kargin has succeeded Major-General Koroliov as chief of the Soviet Transportation Directorate. He has been recently promoted.

*Chinese Affairs.*

12. Arrangements had been made for the despatch by the Zahidan-Meshed route of a limited quantity of lease-lend supplies for China, on the understanding that the Soviet authorities had agreed to the onward transport of these through Turkestan. Convoys amounting to 520 trucks had already been despatched from Zahidan to be handed over to the Soviet authorities at Meshed or Turbat i Haidari, but the Soviet Government has refused to take them over on the grounds that they have as yet come to no agreement with the Chinese Government. The convoys are to return to India.

*Tehran, 27th September, 1943.*

## Appendix I.

*Bill for the engagement of American Military Advisers.*

THE National Consultative Assembly authorises the Government to conclude an agreement with the Government of the United States for the engagement for the purpose of reforming the administration of the army of a mission of expert American military officers and non-commissioned officers in which the number of officers shall not exceed thirty. The agreement shall be made in accordance with the law of 1301 and with the conditions set forth below:—

(a) The first officers of this mission will be the following:—

Major-General C. S. Ridley.	Major R. F. Conly.
Colonel F. C. Dumont.	Captain V. E. Gidwitz.
Colonel T. E. Mahoney.	Captain R. Y. Sanders.
Lieut.-Colonel L. Solgard.	

The senior of the officers appointed to the mission will be designated the head of the mission. He will advise and assist the Minister of War as Military Adviser to the Ministry of War. The other members of the mission will be engaged in accordance with the terms of this law as required by the Ministry of War and as agreed between the two Governments.

(b) In principle the engagement of the mission will be for the duration of the war, but the Government will have the right, if it thinks fit, to cancel their contract of engagement before the expiry of this period or to prolong it after the war after obtaining the concurrence of the Government of the United States.

(c) The members of the mission will be paid their annual salaries in United States currency by the Iranian Government at the following rates:—

Head of mission: 4,207 dollars, assistant head: 3,907 dollars, other officers, 3,757 dollars, expert n.c.os. and men, 2,704 dollars.

These salaries must be paid in twelve monthly instalments, any portion of the salaries of any member of the mission may be paid in America or in rials in Persia at the official rate of exchange according to the request of the member concerned.

The salaries of the members of the mission will be exempt from all dues and taxes whatsoever which are at present or may in the future be imposed whether by the Government or by any administrative or political section depending from the Government, and if at this time or during the period of the agreement any new tax should be imposed, applicable to the salaries of the members of the mission, that tax must be paid by the Ministry of War, so that each member shall receive his appointed salary without deduction.

The travelling expenses of members of the mission from America to Iran and back will be the responsibility of the United States Government during the war and of the Iranian Government after the war if the agreement is prolonged.

However, if the members of the mission wish to bring their wives and children to Iran the Iranian Government will be responsible for payment of the travelling expenses of the wives and children.

(d) The Government is authorised to fix and put into effect, in consultation with the Ministry of War, and with the concurrence of the United States Government, the limits of the powers and duties of the members of the Military Mission and the other conditions of their engagement.

*Note by Military Attaché.*—It is understood that officers of the mission will continue to draw their pay of rank from the United States Government in addition to the amounts set forth in the above bill.

## Appendix II.

SINCE, by virtue of clause 50 of the fundamental laws, the command of the land and naval forces is vested in the person of the Shah and since, by virtue of clause 40 K and 42 of the fundamental laws, the Minister for War is responsible for the administration of all army affairs, we ordain that the General Staff and all departments of the Ministry for War shall consider themselves as directly under and responsible to the Minister for War.

The General Staff is responsible for carrying out the following duties:—

- The complete preparation of operational plans in accordance with military or defence measures which have been approved by the Government.
- The equipment of the army.
- The preparation of establishments.
- The execution of the Ministry's instructions regarding military education.
- Consideration of the steps necessary for the maintenance of order and general discipline in time of peace.
- The preparation of orders regarding the movement, reliefs and location of units in time of peace.
- The preparation of general tactical regulations, laws and regulations affecting the staff and departments.
- The preparation of plans of transport and intendance.
- Where questions of principle are involved, the letters and instructions prepared in the General Staff will issue with the sanction of and under the signature of the Minister for War.

(Signed) SOHEILI, Prime Minister.

(Tehran, 21st September, 1943.)

[E 6298/110/34]

No. 28

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.*—(Received 20th October.)

(No. 414.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 40 for the period of the 28th September to 4th October, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 5th October, 1943.*



Enclosure in No. 28.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 40 for the period  
28th September to 4th October, 1943.*

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

1. Seyyed Zia ed Din Tabatabai (F.O. 206; M.A. 286) arrived in Tehran on the 1st October after an absence of over twenty years. He was received by the Shah on the following day. He is standing for Parliament and will probably be elected. His supporters, who do not as yet include many men of importance, are making much of his arrival, but on the whole it does not appear to have made much public stir.

2. The Shah left Tehran on the 3rd October by train for Shahrud *en route* for Meshed.

*Appointments—Civil.*

- 3.—(i) Ahmad Khiradpishem, to be Farmandar of Shahsavar,
- (ii) Abbas Tabatabai, to be Farmandar of Shahabad.
- (iii) Fazlullah Bahrami (F.O. 47), to be Chief of the Tehran Municipality.
- (iv) Hussein Ali Gurgani, to be Farmandar of Bandar Abbas.
- (v) Ghulam Hussein Miftah, to be Farmandar of Gorgan.

*Economic.*

4. In his report for the months of June–August Dr. Millspaugh specifies eight conditions essential to the successful work of the American Financial Mission:—

- (1) Adequate powers;
- (2) Support from the Government;
- (3) Support from the Majlis;
- (4) The land-holders and the merchants must refrain from becoming the encouragers and instigators of opposition and unrest;
- (5) The newspapers must be honest with the American mission;
- (6) Order and security;
- (7) Co-operation and support from the Allied Governments;
- (8) The American Mission must be adequately manned.

In Dr. Millspaugh's opinion only the first of these approaches fulfilment. He complains of lack of support from the Government, of obstruction from the Majlis, land-holders, merchants and press, and of a lack of order and security. In the matter of co-operation and support from the Allied Governments he indicates three aspects where he thinks that co-operation might be better:—

- (i) In prompt payment of their legal debts to the Persian Government;
- (ii) In facilitating the collection and transportation of grain;
- (iii) In the maintenance of a strong and effective administration, which implies that the organisations and agents of the Persian Government must be free to function in all parts of the country in the collection of revenue, the purchase of grain, the supplying of food, and the execution generally of Persian laws.

It is understood that Dr. Millspaugh has no complaint against the British Government in these respects. It is, however, well known that the Russians offend in all of them.

5. It has been settled in principle that the United States Government will come to the rescue of the Persian Government in the matter of the current year's budget deficit. Some details remain to be settled, but Dr. Millspaugh is now confident that he will have the necessary funds to meet the Government's obligations.

6. The bread supply of the capital is still causing considerable anxiety. Arrivals of wheat are insufficient to meet current requirements and the small reserves of wheat are nearing exhaustion. With the approach of winter the difficulties of collecting from outlying districts will increase.

7. The Majlis has passed a law which authorises the Note Reserve Control Committee to bring to Persia part of the gold which has been obtained, or may in future be obtained, as part of the backing for the note issue to exchange it for the silver held in Tehran as backing for the note issue and to sell the silver so released. The object of the law is to withdraw notes from circulation.

*Internal Security.**Azerbaijan.*

8. It is reported that the Soviet Embassy has asked the Persian Government for five battalions of gendarmerie to be stationed along the Perso-Turkish-Iraq frontier for the prevention of the smuggling of grain. The report should not be accepted pending confirmation. It is, however, known that the Russians are anxious to prevent grain from leaving Azerbaijan.

9. Some anxiety is being caused in Government circles by the refusal of the dismissed Governor-General of Azerbaijan, General Muquaddam, to leave the province. For some time accusations have been made against him of being too closely allied with the Russians, and it is now being said that his continued stay in the province is due to a Russian intention to use him to lead a secessionist movement in Azerbaijan. There appear to be no good grounds for these suspicions.

*Fars.*

10. The visit of the Minister for War did not succeed in bringing about a reconciliation between the policy advocated by Qawam ul Mulk and the policy of conciliation being followed by General Jahanbani. The latter policy appears to be consolidating rather than undermining Nasir's influence among the tribes of the south. General Jahanbani justifies it on the grounds that he cannot now risk a fight, that in a few months his troops will be fit to challenge Nasir, and that by that time his diplomacy will have gained Khosrow and some of the Qashgai tribes as adherents to his side. There is little solid ground for this optimism. It is more probable that Nasir's strength will increase more rapidly than that of the Government forces. The Qawam has come to Tehran to seek a decision whether his policy or Jahanbani's is to prevail. The Qawam has shown certain weaknesses of character which have raised doubts of his ability to carry through successfully the policy he advocates. If he should attempt and fail the result would probably be widespread disorder in Fars. The alternative, however, seems to be the inevitable consolidation of Nasir's power and authority over the tribes of Fars. Meanwhile he is endeavouring to show that he can maintain order in the Qashgai tribes, but he continues to harbour and protect some half-dozen Germans and the Deputy Nowbakht. There is no real solution to this troublesome question except the intervention of British troops.

*Kuh-i-Galu.*

11. Khosrow Zarghampur has been promised a subsidy of 5,000 rials a month in the hope that this will retain his loyalty to Government and his support against his brother Abdullah. Operations are being planned by the Persian army against the Balmai and Taiyyibi tribes, who live south-east of Ram Hormuz.

*Bakhtiari.*

12. Morteza Quli Khan appears to be gradually establishing his authority in Bakhtiari, but small bands of robbers are still active. He has sent his son, Jahanshah Khan, with a body of armed Bakhtiaris, for the purpose of establishing his authority in the Eastern Janeki territory, where the tribesmen had refused to accept the Governor he had appointed. It is reported that he has now received the submission of the local chiefs.

[E 6303/110/34]

No. 29

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 20th October.)*

(No. 424.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 41 for the period of the 5th–11th October, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 12th October, 1943.*



Enclosure in No. 29.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 41, for the period 5th-11th October, 1943.*

### Persian Affairs.

#### Political.

1. A vigorous campaign against Seyyid Zia is being organised by Soviet supporters and by vested interests—strange partners. The Russians make no secret of their opposition, and their sentiments are reflected in the Tudeh party press and in the agitation engineered by Qawam-es-Sultaneh, who is now everywhere recognised as being their man. The vested interests are opposed to Seyyid Zia from fear of his alleged reforming zeal. It is too early to estimate the strength of the support rallying to Seyyid Zia. It includes some of the younger *intelligentsia* and, in spite of Tudeh agitation, a number of the lower classes. The Prime Minister sees in the conflict between the two parties a hope of maintaining his position, and in order to embitter the struggle he has ordered the release of three Soviet-supported papers which can be relied upon to attack Seyyid Zia.

2. The reason for the Russian opposition against Seyyid Zia is not clear, since he has never been associated with an anti-Soviet policy. Indeed, since it was during his short premiership that the Anglo-Persian 1919 Agreement was finally rejected by the Persian Government, he would seem to have some claim to Soviet appreciation. It can only be surmised that the Russians fear that he is likely to follow a too strongly pro-British policy.

3. The Shah arrived in Meshed on the 6th October. According to reports from His Majesty's Consul he has been well received.

#### Economic.

4. There has been some improvement in the wheat situation in the capital. Supplies are now coming in in excess of daily requirements. It has been officially announced that there are now 9,000 tons of grain in reserve in Tehran and a further 6,000 tons in subsidiary warehouses in the vicinity of Tehran. The total collections of wheat for all Persia are stated to be 72,101 tons and the undertakings 238,807 tons. It is the smallness of the collections in relation to the requirements of 300,000 tons until the next harvest that continues to cause public anxiety. Owing to corruption in the Road Transport Department lorries under contract to them which should be collecting wheat are being used for the transport of merchants' goods. Dr. Millspaugh, who three months ago assumed responsibility for the nation's bread supply, was recently severely heckled in a secret session of the Majlis. Few Persians are to be found to-day with faith in Dr. Millspaugh's power either to ensure the collection of the necessary quantities of grain or to bring down prices. The upward tendency of food and essential commodity prices continues. The cost-of-living index for August was 705 compared with 100 in 1939.

5. The sale of gold to the public on Persian Government and His Majesty's Government account, besides producing rials for British military expenditure without increasing the note issue or involving the sale of sterling, has had the following effects:—

- (a) Rials have been obtained more cheaply than by the sale of sterling.
- (b) Rials have been withdrawn from circulation, so contributing to check inflation.
- (c) There has been a considerable decrease in the value of real estate, which may later result in a reduction of rents.

The sales of gold on His Majesty's Government account have realised 77,028,371 rials, and on Persian Government account 22,216,092 rials. The average price was £19 8s. 3d. per fine ounce.

### Persian Forces.

#### Gendarmerie.

6. The strength of the gendarmerie on the 1st October was officially reported to be as follows:—

	Officers.	Men.
Central Headquarters ... ..	168	405
1st District (Tehran) ... ..	149	3,812
2nd District (Azerbaijan) ... ..	112	3,076
3rd District (Khorassan) ... ..	67	1,732
4th District (Kerman) ... ..	59	2,392
5th District (Fars) ... ..	93	3,046
6th District (Khuzestan) ... ..	69	1,805
7th District (Western) ... ..	88	2,962
8th District (Isfahan) ... ..	52	825
Ind. Regiment of Birjand ... ..	32	1,537
Traffic (Motor) Regiment ... ..	31	426
Railway Regiment ... ..	17	285
Totals ... ..	937	22,303

#### Appointments—Military.

- 7.—(i) Sarhang Gulshayan, to command the 4th (Kurdistan) Division.
- (ii) Sarhang Jawadi, to command the 3rd (Azerbaijan) Division.

### Internal Security.

#### Fars.

8. Except for the shoot-up of an Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's tanker on the outskirts of Shiraz, in which the driver and a passenger were killed, no incidents have been reported on the roads in Fars. Most of the tribes are now well on their way to their winter quarters, and they appear to be heaving with moderation. Nasir Qashgai has agreed to co-operate with the Government forces in suppressing banditry. He shows no intention of leaving Fars nor of handing over the Germans, who, although they may not actually be in Qashgai territory, are still under Qashgai protection. Khosrow has not yet taken up his appointment as Farmandar of Firuzabad. The Governor-General, Qawam-ul-Mulk, is still in Tehran and it now seems unlikely that he will return to Fars. The policy of conciliation of Nasir and Khosrow Qashgai and of Abdullah Zarghampur, initiated by General Jahanbani and approved by the Minister for War, who was impressed by the unfitness for operations of the troops in Fars, has now gone so far that to revert to the policy of disruption which the Qawam was intended to follow would probably precipitate a crisis with which the Qawam could not deal, especially as relations between him and the army have been severely strained by his openly-expressed lack of confidence in its officers. General Jahanbani can point to the establishment of some peace in Fars and may claim with justification that there is hope that it will last for some months, but it is a peace entirely at the mercy of Nasir. He has been summoned to Tehran and told to bring Khosrow with him.

#### Kuh-i-Galu.

9. General Jahanbani has written to Abdullah Zarghampur investing him with responsibility for keeping order in the Boir Ahmadi country and for assisting officials in the establishment of Government administration. Only Persian officials could reconcile this with the subsidy recently promised to Khosrow Zarghampur on condition that he supported Government against his brother Abdullah.

#### Kerman.

10. Minor operations have been carried out by the troops of the Kerman Division against the notorious robber tribe of Buchakchi living in the Sirjan district. They have been for months past pillaging widely under their old chief, Hussain Khan, and a younger rival, Murad Ali Murad. Preliminary operations have been successful in occupying some of their villages and in driving Hussain Khan with some 100 followers into hiding in the hills.



*Bakhtiari.*

11. Although Bakhtiari appears to be settling down under Morteza Quli Khan, there has been an outbreak of sheep stealing and pillaging on the northern limits in the district of Feraidun. The culprits are small tribes of Bakhtiari stock who are not now included in the Bakhtiari Governorship, notably the Zallaki and the Khajeh Mehdi Quli's tribe.

*Khorassan.*

12. Soulat-es-Sultaneh, the Hazara chief who rebelled against the Persian Government in January 1942 (see Summary No. 4/42, paragraph 9), has been killed while attempting to escape from a gendarmerie patrol who had been sent to summon him from his village to Meshed.

*Russian Affairs.*

13. In Summary No. 21/43, paragraph 13, it was reported that the Soviet authorities were establishing a hospital in Tehran for Persian patients. This hospital was opened on the 24th May and it is said to have treated 4,000 patients during the first two months of its operation. It is well equipped and well staffed by Russian doctors and is a good advertisement for the efficiency of Russian medical science. The fees are generally high and there are no special facilities for the poorer classes.

14. M. Maisky arrived in Tehran on the 10th October on his return journey from London to Moscow.

*Polish Affairs.*

15. The number of civilian Poles in Persia on the 30th September was:—

	Men.	Women.	Children.	Total.
In Tehran ...	1,108	4,799	2,000	7,907
Isfahan ...	81	553	1,594	2,228
Ahwaz ...	306	938	549	1,793
Total ...	1,495	6,290	4,143	11,928

Tehran, 11th October, 1943.

[E 6504/110/34]

No. 30

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 28th October.)

(No. 430.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 42 for the period of the 12th to 18th October, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 28th October, 1943.

Enclosure in No. 30.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 42 for the Period 12th to 18th October, 1943.

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

THE campaign against Seyyid Zia increases in vigour. The press and speakers of the Tudeh party openly accuse the British of having arranged his return to Persia and of intending to try to establish him as a dictator bound to British policy. It is more than hinted that his accession to power would ensure Russian hostility to Persia. There is little doubt that this line of propaganda is Russian inspired. In spite of the strictest neutrality on the part of all British officials, Seyyid Zia is regarded as a British candidate for power. His success will be regarded by Persians as a British victory over the Russians, and his failure as a Russian victory over the British.

2. Dr. Millspaugh and all his staff have sent in their resignations to the Prime Minister because they have failed to get sufficient support from the Government and the Majlis. Dr. Millspaugh's chief cause of complaint is the failure of the Majlis to pass the Income Tax Bill (see Summary No. 23/43, paragraphs 10 and 11), which he regards as essential to the rehabilitation of the country's economy. The Government is in a quandary. If Dr. Millspaugh's mission goes there will be no hope of obtaining financial assistance from America to make good the deficit in the budget, and the Government will be left to shoulder the responsibility, with which they have now saddled the American Mission, for meeting their financial obligations, for reducing the cost of living and for ensuring the country's bread supply. On the other hand, the members of the present Majlis, with only a few weeks of life to run, will not easily be persuaded to impose heavy taxation on themselves and their wealthy friends. While there are many Persians who realise that the departure of the American Mission would be disastrous not only to the economy of Persia and to the reform of the Administration, but also to Perso-American relations, and would give great satisfaction to the Russians, there are few who would not welcome the replacement of Dr. Millspaugh by someone less rigid and autocratic. It is understood that the only condition on which the mission will withdraw their resignation is the passage of the Income Tax Bill in the near future.

3. Hitherto military courts convened to try offences under the Military Governor Law have, with the exception of primary courts trying criminal charges, included officials of the Ministry of Justice both as members of the court and as prosecutor. In future all such courts will be composed of military officers only and the prosecutor will be a military officer.

4. The Law for Compulsory Primary Education which was approved by the Majlis in July provides that compulsory primary education shall be established throughout the country within ten years, that the course shall be for six years, that tuition and books shall be free for all, that children shall be inspected twice yearly by qualified doctors, and that medical treatment shall be free for poor children.

5. The Shah returned to Tehran from Meshed on the 16th October.

*Economic.*

6. A committee of prominent Persians has been formed in Tehran for the organisation of anti-typhus measures. The unfinished offices of the Ministry of Finance are being converted into a hospital of 300 beds and the British military authorities have released one of the buildings previously occupied by them as a hospital, which should accommodate another 200-300.

*Persian Forces.**Army.*

7. In addition to the 200 lorries mentioned in Summary No. 39/43, paragraph 3, the Persian army is also acquiring 400 10-ton Fords which were lease-lend supplies for the Russians and have been refused by them. This should give the Persian army ample second-line transport; but they are still almost entirely deficient in light vehicles.

*Gendarmerie.*

8. In the current year's budget the pay of the gendarme has been increased to 600 rials a month, from which he is supposed to feed himself. This increase has not brought forward a suitable type of volunteer and the gendarmerie remains at a very low ebb of efficiency and adds little to security. The current year's budget has been estimated for a force of 20,000.

*Appointments—Military.*

9. Sarhang Abbas Garzan, to be Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

*Internal Security.**Fars.*

10. General Jahanbani and Khosrow Qashgai have come to Tehran for discussions regarding future policy. There is not likely to be much change in that followed during recent weeks, but His Majesty's Legation will bring such pressure as is possible to secure the arrest of the Germans now in Fars. There the situation remains much as was described in last week's Summary.



*Bakhtiari.*

11. The operations in Janeki (see Summary No. 40/43, paragraph 12) for the establishment there of Morteza Quli Khan's authority, which are being carried out mainly by Bakhtiari tribesmen with a military column in shadowy support have progressed favourably and appear to be reaching a satisfactory conclusion.

*Western Azerbaijan.*

12. Some anxiety has been caused to the Persian authorities by the incursion into Persia of Sheikh Latif, one of the sons of Sheikh Mahmud of Suleimaniyeh. He is at present in Sardasht preaching Kurdish independence and is reported to be creating some unrest among the tribes.

*Russian Affairs.*

13. Soviet officials have for some time been showing an active interest in political and economic conditions in South-West Persia. Soviet consuls have recently toured through the Lur tribes and have visited the Beni Turuf and other Arab tribes in Khuzestan, meeting tribal leaders and collecting information about tribal organisation and sentiments. A branch of the Soviet State Insurance Department has been opened in Khorramshahr and is said to be accepting all kinds of insurance policies.

14. Officials of the Russian Embassy are reported to be showing particular favour to Sartip Razmara, who recently resigned from the post of Chief of the General Staff and who nurses a grudge against the British on account of the arrest by Indian troops of Persian officers at Isfahan (see Summary No. 36/43, paragraph 1). He has applied for leave to visit Russia and has informed the Ministry for War that the Russians have said that they will welcome him if he is given leave.

15. An Irano-Soviet Aid Society has been formed in Tehran under the patronage of Queen Fowzieh for the collection of funds for the relief of distress in Russia, not as reported in Summary No. 37/43, paragraph 8, especially for Russian wounded. The committee includes the Minister for War, General Yazdan Panah, some officials and several prominent merchants. It receives much publicity in the press and quite substantial amounts have been subscribed by Persian notables.

16. It has for some time been known that tyres obtained as lease-lend supplies have been sold on the black market in Tehran by official Soviet organisations. Reports have recently been received that spare parts for motor vehicles, for which there is a very active demand, are also being sold. The purpose is presumably to obtain rials. The black market price for tyres has been up to more than £400 each and has now dropped to £200, due, it is alleged, to Russian sales.

17. An interesting contract between Russian practice and propaganda is reported from Tabriz. There the Russians have a contract with a spinning mill which the owner was practically forced to accept on terms which allowed the barest margin of profit. There has recently been much justifiable discontent among factory workers in Tabriz arising from their low wages and general bad conditions. An official was deputed by the Persian Government to investigate and make recommendations. He recommended certain minimum wages, the reduction of hours of work, the provision of free bread, clothing and medical treatment. The owner of the spinning mill mentioned above stated to His Majesty's Consul-General that with his contract with the Russians he would lose over 6 million rials a year if he were to implement these recommendations. Shortly afterwards his employees with all factory workers in Tabriz struck for better conditions. The owner explained the position to them and, on his suggestion, they went to the Soviet Consulate-General to appeal for a relaxation of the terms of the contract, as the owner had himself done without success. The employees were not more successful than the owner.

[E 6696/110/34]

No. 31

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 5th November.)*

(No. 435.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary for the period of the 19th to 25th October, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 26th October, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 31.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 43 for the Period  
19th-25th October, 1943.*

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

THE threatened resignation of Dr. Millspaugh's mission was discussed in a secret session of the Majlis, where its consequences were sufficiently well realised to persuade a majority to decide in favour of collaboration with the mission. The Prime Minister was asked to convey to Dr. Millspaugh an assurance to this effect, and also to remind him that it was his duty to collaborate with the Majlis and to take into consideration the views of the Deputies and the amendments suggested by them to measures he proposed. It is understood that it was made plain to the Deputies that Dr. Millspaugh demanded, as a condition of the withdrawal of his resignation, the passage by the Majlis before the 1st November of three Bills: the Income Tax Bill, the Bill for the engagement of sixty American advisers for the financial mission and the Bill to sanction a further credit of 400 million rials for the financing of grain purchases. On the 23rd October the President of the Majlis and twenty Deputies were summoned to the Palace, where the Shah impressed on them the necessity for early approval of the proposals of the American mission and other legislation now before them. During subsequent sessions of the Majlis the Deputies showed an unusual complaisance and passed the first reading of Bills for the engagement of American advisers for the gendarmerie, the army and the financial mission, and the second reading of the Perso-American Commercial Agreement.

2. Dr. Millspaugh has also made some concessions. He has removed one cause of complaint and opposition by issuing orders that landowners living in Tehran may import from their villages a year's supply of wheat for themselves and their families (see paragraph 7 below). It is understood that he has also agreed to the reduction of the 80 per cent. tax he proposed to levy on incomes of over 500,000 rials a year to 70 per cent., and he has appointed a committee of relatively trusted Persians to report on the supply and distribution of bread in Tehran. Dr. Millspaugh is anxious to divest himself of responsibility for the baking and distribution of bread in Tehran and to hand it over to a Persian agency.

3. The Tudeh party, with quite clear evidences of Soviet encouragement, staged a demonstration in Tehran against Seyyid Zia. Some of the latter's supporters collected to break up the meeting. The resulting fracas was dispersed by the intervention of troops.

4. Some thirty Deputies, who despair of being re-elected and who have been agitating without success for an extension of the life of the present Majlis, have united in opposition to the Prime Minister and are working for his overthrow. For the present the Prime Minister, mainly because of the lack of any acceptable rival, can probably count on sufficient support to defeat the Opposition.

*Economic.*

5. The Ministry of Finance has laid before the Majlis a Bill for the grant to the Cereals and Bread Section of the Ministry of a credit of 400 million rials for the purchase of grain during the remainder of the current year, i.e., to the 20th March, 1944. In the preamble to the Bill it is stated that the amount estimated as required to pay for the 350,000 tons of grain it was hoped to buy



during the current year was 1,465 million rials. Against this it was expected that 520 million rials would have been recovered by the end of the financial year from the sale to the public of grain and flour, leaving a deficit of 945 million rials, which would be met by 500 million already borrowed from the National Bank, the 400 million now asked for and 45 million in hand. At the end of the current year, if the full amount of 350,000 tons were obtained, the Government would have grain in hand for sale to the public for consumption up to the next harvest, and in addition a reserve of 50,000 tons.

6. The Soviet authorities have agreed to facilitate the transport to Tehran from the provinces in their zone of 40,000 tons of wheat and barley and 12,000 tons of rice. Against this they demand 40,000 tons of rice (for which they will pay in imported goods—60 per cent. to be piece-goods) and the execution of certain works to complete the railway from Zinjan to Mianeh at an estimated cost of 40 million rials.

7. The Administrator-General of Finance has issued orders (see paragraph 2 above) that landowners living in Tehran who have delivered the whole of their surplus grain may now bring to Tehran the amount of the grain required for one year's consumption of their families, and, having delivered it to one of the Government depots, in sealed bags if they so wish, may then draw from the depot their own bags or an equivalent amount of grain. The approved scales for a year's consumption are—

	Kilog.
Working men ... ..	250
Other adults ... ..	150
Children ... ..	75

#### *Appointments—Civil.*

8.—(i) Hussein Sami'i (Adib-es-Sultaneh) (F.O. 185; M.A. 254) to be Governor-General of the 3rd Ustan (Eastern Azerbaijan).

(ii) Dr. Ali Quli Ardalan, younger brother of Ardalan, Amanullah (F.O. 27; M.A. 33), to be counsellor to the Persian Embassy at Angora.

#### *Persian Forces.*

##### *Army.*

9. Reports have previously been made in these summaries of the Shah's ambition to exercise the same control over the army as his father did, of the great reluctance with which he agreed to the subordination of the General Staff to the Ministry for War, and of his distrust of the ambitions of the present Minister for War. There is little doubt that the appointment to his personal staff of General Yazdan Panah as his principal A.D.C. and of Brigadier-General Razmara as Chief of his Military Secretariat was made with the object of establishing his own influence over the Army in opposition to that of the Minister of War. Both these officers are hostile to the Minister for War, are opposed to the grant of authority to the American advisers, and are now at heart unfriendly to the British. General Razmara, as was reported in Summary No. 42/43, paragraph 14, has recently established close relations with the Russians, whose opposition to the American advisers is well known. They have both within recent months held the post of Chief of the General Staff and have some influence in the Army, which is not likely to be used in support of the Minister for War. Indeed it may be the Shah's object to force his resignation. In any case these mutually antagonistic influences will hamper the re-establishment of discipline and unity in the army.

10. The Bill for the engagement of General Ridley and a mission of thirty American officers as advisers to the Persian Army—see Summary No. 39/43, paragraph 4—has been passed by the Majlis.

11. An error was made in paragraph 7 of Summary No. 42. The capacity of the 400 Ford trucks which the Persian army is acquiring is now stated to be 1½ tons and not 10 tons.

##### *Gendarmerie.*

12. The Bill for the engagement of up to eight American officers as advisers to the gendarmerie has passed the first reading in the Majlis. The Bill states that the senior of these officers shall be adviser to the Ministry of the Interior in gendarmerie matters, that the period of engagement shall be for two years and that the Government is authorised to define the powers of the advisers in agreement with the Government of the United States of America.

#### *Appointments—Military.*

13.—(i) Sipahbod Yazdan Panah (F.O. 216; M.A. 301) to be Aide-de-Camp General to the Shah.

(ii) Sartip Razmara to be Chief of the Shah's Military Secretariat.

(iii) Sartip Hassan Arfa (F.O. 30; M.A. 37) to command the 1st (Tehran) Division.

(iv) Colonel Ahmad Vossuq to command the Recruit Training Depot, Tehran.

(v) Colonel Muqaddam Alavi to command to Central Administrative Depot, Tehran.

(vi) Sartip Farajullah Keikavusi from command of the 1st Division to the unemployed list.

The following officers have been retired :—

Sipahbod Sharbakti (F.O. 191; M.A. 262).

Sarhangs Seyyid Ahmad Janpulad (Infantry), Ali Quli Abbasi (Cavalry), Hassan Nikman (Infantry), Mahmud Malik Khosrovi (Finance Department).

#### *Internal Security.*

##### *Fars.*

14. As a result of the visit to Tehran of General Jahanbani and Khosrow Qashgai the Government has decided to continue for the present the policy of appeasement which has for the time being produced a measure of peace. They hope that gestures of friendliness on the part of the Government will be more effective in producing dissension among the tribes than the threat of force, which gives the tribes an incentive to combine, and that by the spring the tribes will be sufficiently disunited to justify the Persian Army in undertaking piecemeal disarmament. That is an optimistic view.

15. Khosrow Qashgai has again given solemn assurances to His Majesty's Legation that he will immediately on his return to Fars take measures for the arrest and surrender to the British authorities of the Germans still in Fars. Much reliance cannot be put on these assurances.

16. The migration of the Khamseh and Qashgai tribes is now well on its way and some have already reached their winter quarters.

##### *Western Azerbaijan.*

17. It was reported in Summary No. 40/43, paragraph 8, that the Soviet authorities were pressing for the re-establishment of gendarmerie posts all along the Turco-Persian frontier for the prevention of smuggling. The reply of the Persian Government was that since all the Kurds along this frontier were well armed, it would be impossible to establish gendarmerie posts in Kurdish territory unless the Persian Government were allowed to maintain in the area military forces sufficiently strong to disarm or overawe the Kurds. It has so far been Russian policy to limit to a small and ineffective number the Persian garrisons in Western Azerbaijan and to discourage action by Persian forces against the Kurds. A conference is to be held in Tehran between a Russian general, who has come from Azerbaijan, and the Ministers of War and Interior to discuss the matter. In fact, the Persian budget does not allow the increase of gendarmerie or troops that appears necessary.

Tehran, 25th October, 1943.

[E 7027/110/34]

No. 32

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 16th November.)

(No. 441.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 44 for the period the 26th October to 1st November, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 2nd November, 1943.



(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 44 for the Period 26th October to 1st November, 1943.*

*Persian Affairs.*

*Political.*

THE Government survived an interpellation on the matter of the nation's bread supplies on the 31st October and obtained a vote of confidence from fifty of the eighty-one Deputies present. The Shah had previously sent a message to certain Deputies, who he believed were working for the overthrow of Soheily and the substitution of Seyyid Zia, in which he made it clear that in no circumstances would he accept Seyyid Zia as Prime Minister and that he expected them to support the present Government.

2. Persians are now convinced that they see clear evidence of strife between Russian and British policy in Persia. The British support the American advisers; the Russians oppose them. The British have the Minister for War and the Chief of the General Staff; the Russians have General Razmara as Chief of the Shah's Military Secretariat. Seyyid Zia is pro-British; the Russians are strongly opposed to Seyyid Zia. The British want the Central Government to establish its authority; the Russians encourage local autonomy. The Russians have their candidates for the elections; the British have theirs.

3. Dr. Millspaugh's ultimatum to the Persian Government expires on the 2nd November. As there is now no possibility of the Income Tax Bill being passed before that date, he and his mission will presumably cease work unless he receives from the Deputies some adequate guarantee that the Bill will be approved as soon as possible.

4. A Bill was laid before the Majlis on the 24th October to define the offences and punishments referred to in the Government's communiqué which was reported in Summary No. 38/43, paragraph 2. The offences are those connected with the wilful damage of communications, installations, factories, ports, &c., of importance to the Imperial Government or its Allies, the spreading of false or subversive news, the theft of arms, ammunition or military stores, subversive activities against the Government or concealing enemy agents. These offences will be tried by military courts. Details will be reported when the Bill becomes law.

*Economic.*

5. The Majlis has approved regulations governing the application of the law which granted a credit of 500 million rials for the assistance of underpaid Government employees (see Summary No. 38/43, paragraph 6). The regulations allow financial assistance from the 24th July, 1943, to all employees of the Court and all civilian employees of the Government, the Majlis and municipalities, including members of the police force, but not of the gendarmerie or army. Cabinet Ministers, Deputies of the Majlis, Governors-General and Governors are also eligible. Extra allowances will be paid on the following scale:—

	<i>Per cent.</i>
On the first 1,000 rials or less of monthly salary ...	80
On salary in excess of 1,000 rials up to 2,000 rials ...	50
On salary in excess of 2,000 rials ...	25

The minimum monthly wage will be 1,000 rials for a full day's work. In addition, Government employees will be entitled to purchase all commodities whose sale is a Government monopoly at favourable prices approved by the Government.

6. The Government is in considerable difficulties over transport. Theoretically, the Road Transport Department controls some 900 trucks supplied to the Persian Government on lease-lend terms and some 1,000 privately-owned trucks on contract. In practice, the drivers of these trucks find it more profitable to carry goods for merchants than for the Persian Government, with the result that they escape for long periods from the control of the Road Transport Department. Immediate transport requirements, among the more urgent of which are the collection of grain for the towns and of the beet harvest for the sugar factories, the anti-locust operations in South-East Persia and the supply of oil for civil needs, cannot be met, and appeal has had to be made to the British military

authorities for assistance. Tehran will be faced with a bread crisis within a month unless wheat is transported from Kermanshah and Hamadan.

7. The Majlis has passed a law which makes tradesmen, hotel and restaurant keepers and vendors of provisions convicted of selling their wares at prices above those fixed by Government or municipalities liable to punishment for the first offence of 50–100 lashes, three months' imprisonment and a fine of 200–1,000 rials. Several shopkeepers have already suffered corporal punishment.

*Persian Forces.*

*Army.*

8. There is reason to suspect that the Russians are now endeavouring to establish some influence in the Persian army, or at least to prevent the foundation of American and British influence. They regard the Minister for War and the Chief of Staff as pro-British, co-operative with the American advisers, and consequently anti-Russian. As previously reported, they have been paying some attention to Sartip Razmara, the leader of the Opposition party in the army, and may perhaps hope to be able, through him in his position as chief of the Shah's military cabinet, to influence the Shah in his capacity of Commander-in-chief of the Army. One of the Russian-supported papers has recently published articles addressed to the younger generation of officers heavily criticising their seniors. Some Persian officers are ready to believe that Russian influence will be paramount in Persia after the war and that servility to the Russians may be the best way of achieving their ambitions.

9. Relations between the Minister for War and the Shah are strained. The Shah accuses the Minister for War of trying to be commander-in-chief. The Minister for War greatly resents the Shah's action in consulting General Razmara before approving papers which he brings up to the Shah. He may resign.

*Police.*

10. Owing to the difficulty of obtaining recruits for the police force, in spite of their pay having been raised to 1,000 rials a month, the Government have submitted to the Majlis a Bill to make certain classes of persons who had been exempted from military service by the revised Military Service Law of the 20th March, 1943, liable to conscription for service in the police. These are unmarried men who are the only supporters of certain specified relatives.

*Air Force.*

11. Colonel Staudach, a Persian officer of Austrian descent, of the Persian air force, has left for Mid-East, where he is to be given opportunities to gain experience to qualify him to command the Persian air force.

*Appointments—Military.*

12. Sarhang Amidi to command the 8th (Khorassan) Division.

*Internal Security.*

*Azerbaijan.*

13. In Summary No. 43, paragraph 17, it was reported that a conference was to be held in Tehran between Russian and Persian authorities to discuss the policing of the Turco-Persian frontier by Persian gendarmerie. The Persians contended that gendarmerie posts could not be maintained among the armed Kurdish tribes without strong military backing. The Russians were unwilling to agree that the Persian army should be given liberty of action to operate against the Kurds with such forces as it considered necessary, but eventually agreed verbally that twelve companies of infantry might be posted in support of gendarmerie frontier posts on condition that any operations they carried out were under gendarmerie and not under army control. The gendarmerie on the frontier is to consist of six battalions. The Russians also agreed verbally that a brigade of Persian troops should be stationed at Mahabad, that south of a line from Ushniyeh to Mahabad the Persians could dispose their troops and carry out any operations they liked without reference to the Russians, but that north of that line the Russians must be kept informed of any redistribution of the four brigades—at Tabriz, Ardebil, Rezaieh, Mahabad—to which they have agreed, and of any troop movements. The decisions arrived at are to be put into writing, and, until they are signed by the Russians, they should not be accepted as definite.



*Bakhtiari.*

14. The operations carried out by Bakhtiari tribesmen in Eastern Janeki territory for the establishment of the authority of Morteza Quli Khan, Governor of Bakhtiari, which were referred to in Summary No. 42/43, paragraph 11, have been successfully concluded and Morteza Quli Khan's nominee has been installed as Governor.

*Kuhigalu.*

15. Plans have now been made for operations for the disarmament of the Bahmai and Taiyyibi tribes to begin on the 7th December. Columns are to operate southwards from the Isfahan Division and northwards from Ram Hormuz. It is considered unlikely that the Boir Ahmadi will come to the assistance of the Bahmai and Taiyyibi, as they are occupied with inter-clan dissensions.

*Fars.*

16. Only a few cases of minor looting have been reported during the past week.

Tehran, 1st November, 1943.

[E 7356/110/34]

No. 33

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 25th November.)  
(No. 447.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 45 for the period of the 2nd to 8th November, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 10th November, 1943.

Enclosure in No. 33.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 45 for the Period  
2nd November to 8th November, 1943.

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

IN order to avert the cessation of work by Dr. Millspaugh and his mission, which was due to take effect on the 3rd November, the Majlis agreed to shorten the normal procedure necessary for the consideration of the Income Tax Bill by allowing the Government to withdraw the original Bill and to substitute as a new Bill with double urgency the amended draft approved by the Government, the Majlis Commission and Dr. Millspaugh. This Bill is now before the Majlis, but, in spite of its double urgency, it makes slow progress. Dr. Millspaugh has postponed putting his resignation into effect for the time being.

2. Persians find comfort in the assurance given in the communiqué issued after the Moscow Conference that the three Powers would not employ their armed forces in other States after the war except for the purposes specified in the communiqué. They are also impressed by the apparent evidence of Allied solidarity.

*Economic.*

3. Speaking in the Majlis on the 31st October, the Prime Minister gave the following figures about the grain situation:—

	Tons.
Landlords' undertakings to deliver	265,581
Deliveries to the 28th October	113,446
Stocks in the Tehran stores on the 26th October—	
Flour	3,201
Wheat	534
Barley	4,578
Millet	10,719

In Khorassan collections of grain have fallen short of forecasts, and it is now estimated that the province may have a deficit of 2,500 tons instead of a surplus of 10,000.

4. The Russians are placing contracts for raisins in Rezaieh, and, in order to bring down the price, they have banned the export of raisins from the area. The result is a drop in price of 50 per cent., which is a serious matter for cultivators.

5. The Administrator-General of Finance has published regulations for the control of motor transport throughout the country except transport owned or controlled by the Persian army and gendarmerie, Allied military authorities, the U.K.C.C., the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and Iransovtrans. In future, no goods may be carried by any motor vehicle, other than those excepted above, unless they are covered by a permit issued by the proper authorities. Goods illicitly carried may be confiscated and the owner of the vehicle may be required to pay a fine or to suffer the confiscation of his vehicle. Lorry owners who refuse to carry goods for whose transport proper authority has been given may likewise have their vehicles confiscated. The sale of petrol or lubricants is forbidden to any motor vehicle whose load is not covered by the authorised permits.

*Persian Forces.**Army.*

6. In Summary No. 44/43, paragraph 9, it was reported that relations were strained between the Shah and the Minister for War, who was threatening to resign. The Shah, possibly because he realised that the British Legation would not at present welcome the resignation of the Minister, has yielded on the main point at issue, which was whether papers presented by the Minister to the Shah should be subject to scrutiny by the Chief of the Shah's Military Secretariat, General Razmara, before return to the Minister. The Shah has agreed not to insist on this and that regulations should be drafted by the Ministry for War to define the duties and responsibilities of his Military Secretariat. These will probably be on the Belgian model. It seems that the Shah has decided that for the time being he will not force the issue between himself and the Ministry of War for control of the army.

*Appointments—Military.*

7. *Army.*—(i) Sarhang Ehtisabian to be Head of the 1st Bureau, General Staff.  
(ii) Sarhang Ghulam Reza Shahin to be Head of the 3rd Bureau, General Staff.

(iii) Sarhang Saqafi to be Head of the General Staff Secretariat.

*Police.*—(iv) Colonel Abdullah Saif to be Director-General of Police.

The following officers have retired:—

*Sartips.*

Abdul Hussein Ghaffari (M.A. 96).  
Muhammad Nakchevan.  
Mustafa Asa (M.A. 39).

*Sarhangs.*

Jallal-ul-din Nikkah.  
Jallal Khaz.  
Rashid Aslani.  
Yusaf Sipahpur.  
Rohullah Vakshpur.

*Russian Affairs.*

8. The Minister for War, who a short time ago was reproached by the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires with being unfriendly to Russian interests and hostile to Persians who co-operated with the Soviet, states that in a recent interview he found M. Maximov in much more friendly mood. The latter went so far as to say that he had done the Minister an injustice in accusing him of unfriendliness, and he promised to intervene with the Soviet military authorities for the return to the Persian army of some of the barracks occupied by Soviet troops in Meshed.

Tehran, 8th November, 1943.



[E 7465/110/34]

No. 34

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 29th November, 1943.)*

(No. 455.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary, No. 46, for the period the 9th to 15th November, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 16th November, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 34.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary, No. 46, for the period 9th to 15th November, 1943.*

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

1. The Prime Minister's position grows weaker and there are many who prophesy that he cannot last much longer. He has lost the sympathy of the capitalists for allowing Dr. Millspaugh's Income Tax Bill to become law, of those ex-Deputies who have not been re-elected for allowing the new elections to be held and of the general public for failure to set Persia's house in order. There are rumours of Cabinet changes.

2. Seiyid Zia-ud-din, after forty days in Persia, states that he has made headway and gained many new adherents. To the neutral observer, however, the Russian refusal to have anything to do with him, his incompetent associates (with the exception of Zarin Kafsh and Ibtehaj) and his failure to produce a practical programme of reform, belie his statement.

3. Dr. Millspaugh's Income Tax Bill was passed by the Majlis on the 12th November and his mission have, therefore, withdrawn their resignations. Dr. Millspaugh pays tribute to the well-timed intervention of His Imperial Majesty The Shah, who interviewed certain Majlis Deputies and warned them of the evil consequences for Persia of further delay.

*Economic.*

4. The British army has come to the rescue of the Persian Road Transport Board and is to move 10,000 tons of grain during December and January from Kermanshah to Hamadan, Sultanabad (Arak) and Tehran.

*Persian Forces.*

5. Reference paragraph 6 of Summary No. 45/43, General Ridley, the American adviser to the Persian Ministry of War, has submitted a memorandum to the Shah pointing out that there is no necessity for a military secretariat on the Belgian or any other model and that the functions of the Shah's military secretary should be limited to ceremonial.

*Internal Security.**Kurdistan.*

6. In Sennah the situation is generally quiet. In Southern Kurdistan it is expected that the situation will improve owing to the detention under surveillance in Kermanshah of two prominent Guran chieftains who are believed to have had dealings with Naubakht, the pro-Axis politician.

*Kerman.*

7. Hussein Buchakchi has met the General Officer Commanding Kerman Division and has agreed to surrender the arms recently looted by his followers.

*Dashti.*

8. Operations against Ali Ismail were begun on the 11th November, when a force of one company was landed from H.M.S. *Seabelle* at Daiyir. The force landed at dawn and captured the town after slight opposition. Owing to leakage of information, Ali Ismail had fled the day before. A second force of two lorry-borne infantry companies has also started from Bushire.

*Fars.*

9. Khosrow Qashgai has been notified by telegram from the Minister of the Interior of his appointment as Governor of Firuzabad.

*Kuhigalu and Bakhtiari.*

10. Reference Intelligence Summary No. 44/43, paragraph 15, the northern column is to consist of one regiment of infantry and a contingent of about 500 Bakhtiari horsemen under Jehanshah s/o Morteza Quli Khan.

Two regiments of infantry are to move to Arak by road and thence by rail to Ahwaz where they will be joined by a third regiment and form the southern column, which is to move northward to disarm first the Bahmai and then the Taiyyibi. It is not thought that the Boir Ahmedi will come to the assistance of either of these two tribes but a regiment of infantry is to remain at Behbahan to deal with any uprising on their part. Sartip Qadr, General Officer Commanding Isfahan Division, is to be in command of the operations.

*Appointments—Civil.*

11. (i) Allyar Saleh (F.O. 184-M.A. 243) to be Persian Trade representative in India with headquarters at Bombay. His first task is to arrange for the purchase and shipment of tea and textiles.

(ii) Abul Fazl Shahrakhi, Director of the Statistical Section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to be Counsellor in the Persian Embassy at Moscow.

*Polish Affairs.*

12. The number of Poles in Persia on the 4th November, 1943, was:—

	Men.	Women.	Children.	Total.
In Tehran ...	1,114	4,269	1,865	7,248
Isfahan ...	80	552	1,550	2,191
Ahwaz ...	361	1,128	668	2,157
Total ...	1,555	5,949	4,092	11,596

*Tehran, 15th November, 1943.*

[E 7572/110/34]

No. 35

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 3rd December.)*

(No. 465.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 47 for the period of the 16th to 22nd November, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 23rd November, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 35.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 47 for the Period 16th to 22nd November, 1943.*

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

1. The life of the present Majlis ends on the 23rd November. The presence of sixty-nine members is necessary before the new Majlis can open. About sixty have already been elected, but it is not unlikely that the opening will be postponed



for some weeks on one pretext or another. It is understood that the Shah wishes in the interim to dismiss the present Prime Minister and to put in a Cabinet of his own choosing. As far as is known, he has not yet selected the new Prime Minister.

2. Relations are still strained between the Shah and the Minister for War and the latter suspects that the Shah is endeavouring to force him to resign or to find excuses for omitting him from the next Cabinet.

3. During the last fortnight of its life the Majlis passed the following Bills:—

The Budget Bill.

The Income Tax Bill—see Summary No. 23/43, paragraph 10.

The Bill for the engagement of sixty American advisers for the Millspaugh Mission.

The Bill authorising the Government to borrow 400 million rials for the purchase of drugs.

The Bill granting a credit of 20 million rials for the purchase of drugs.

The Workers' Insurance Bill—see Summary No. 1/43, paragraph 3.

The Bill making military personnel liable to the jurisdiction of civil courts for all except purely military offences.

4. Voting for the election of new Deputies for Tehran is about to begin. It is expected that the elections will not be completed for two or three weeks.

5. A letter from the President of the Iraqi Parliament addressed to the Persian Parliament protesting against the action of the French authorities in the Lebanon was read out in open session.

6. The Shah has given £500 to Earl Haig's Fund.

#### *Economic.*

7. The 1943-44 Budget Law was passed by the Majlis on the 16th November. As presented, the budget was divided into two parts: (a) the ordinary budget, showing revenue at approximately 1,891 million rials, and expenditure at 3,298 million rials, or a deficit of about 1,400 million rials, and (b) the "Extraordinary" budget (dealing with the trading and industrial enterprises of the Government) showing revenue at about 5,796 million rials, and expenditure at about 5,897 million rials, or approximately self-balancing.

Dr. Millspaugh had already indicated in one of his recent Monthly Reports the probability of a large budget deficit, which, he recommended, should be met by a foreign loan. The Majlis, however, are opposed to Persia asking for foreign financial help, and accordingly proceeded to balance the budget by bringing in as an item of revenue the value (approximately 1,500 million rials) of the stocks of commodities held by the various Government trading agencies at the beginning of the current financial year.

8. Dr. Millspaugh has made further concessions to the householder in the matter of obtaining flour in addition to that reported in Summary No. 43/43, paragraph 2. He has now issued a regulation which permits heads of families to purchase, but only from proprietors who have fulfilled their undertakings or from peasants, wheat for consumption by their families at the approved scale of 180 kilog. for each member. Licences to purchase will be issued by the Cereals and Bread Department, and the wheat purchased must pass through one of the warehouses of the department from which delivery may be taken on production of ration cards.

9. The Majlis has passed the Bill authorising the Government to borrow from the National Bank the amount of 400 million rials to finance the purchase of grain until the end of the current financial year—see Summary No. 43/43, paragraph 5—also a Bill granting a credit of 20 million rials to the Pharmaceutical Institute for the purchase of drugs.

10. The Majlis has passed a Bill sanctioning the engagement of two American experts for service with the Ministry of Hygiene. One is to be director-general of the Service of Hygiene and the other director of the Pharmaceutical Institute.

11. On the 16th November the Shah opened the Machine Gun factory, or rather that part of it which has been completed, to manufacture machine pistols for delivery to the Soviet authorities in accordance with the contract they made with the Persian Government—see Summaries No. 45/42, paragraph 11, and 49/42, paragraph 15. The contract was for the manufacture and supply by the Persian Government of 60,000 rifles, 42 million rounds of ammunition and 30,000 machine pistols. As regards machine pistols, the contract stipulated that 4,000

should be delivered in August 1943 and the remainder at intervals before December 1943. The delay in completing the factory is due to the failure of the Russians to provide certain machinery in time. At the official opening it was stated that the capacity of the factory was now 60,000 machine pistols a year and was capable of being increased to 100,000. It was expected that 30,000 would be completed by the 20th March, 1944. The Soviet authorities have not yet made any agreement regarding payment for these arms.

#### *Persian Forces.*

12. The Shah is incensed by the opposition in the Ministry for War and the General Staff to his military secretariat, and General Ridley's plain expression of opinion that such an institution was unnecessary and injurious has not disposed him more kindly to the American advisers. He vented his anger on General Riazi, the Chief of Staff, when the latter supported General Ridley's views, by accusing him of being an informant of the British Legation and disloyal to himself.

13. Twelve officers of the Persian Air Force left Tehran on the 21st November for training in England by the Royal Air Force.

#### *Appointments—Military.*

14.—(i) Sarhang Mahmud Sartipi to be second in command of the 2nd Division.

(ii) Sarhang Muqbeli to be Chief of Staff of the Forces of the South.

(iii) Sarhang Bahrani to command the 6th (Fars) Division.

(iv) Sarhang Dadsetan to command the 16th (Kazerun) Brigade (Fars Division).

(v) Sarhang Himmat to command the 17th (Jahrum) Brigade (Fars Division).

(vi) Sarhang Mustashiri to command the gendarmerie of the Khuzistan and Lurestan Gendarmerie District.

#### *Internal Security.*

15. Tribal migrations this year have been accompanied by very little disturbance, and generally throughout the country there is an unusual degree of peace, although much robbery. This is, no doubt, partly due to the fact that the Persian Government is being careful to avoid stirring up strife or interfering aggressively in tribal affairs. Kurds, Qashgai, Bakhtiari have all now achieved a very fair measure of autonomy. But peace rests on a very insecure basis. It is not in the nature of Persian tribesmen, plentifully supplied with arms and ammunition, to be good for long. In Khuzistan the Arabs cannot refrain from robbing friend and foe and they will probably continue to do so until their arms are taken from them. In Fars, although there is no serious tribal disturbance while Nasir Qashgai tries to consolidate his position and extend his influence over doubtful, neutral and hostile tribes, there is much robbery. During a tour made by the General Officer Commanding the Southern Forces a few minor brigands surrendered, but many notorious robbers are still active.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

16. Vishinsky, Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., has arrived in Tehran on his way to Algiers.

#### *Turkish Affairs.*

17. In Summary No. 35/43, paragraph 21, it was reported that the Turkish Government had offered 100 scholarships at Turkish colleges to Persian students. Twenty-five of the selected students have recently left Persia for Turkey.

*Tehran, 22nd November, 1943.*



*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 17th December.)*

(No. 478.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 48 for the period of the 23rd November to the 5th December, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 6th December, 1943.

Enclosure in No. 36.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 48 for the Period 23rd November to 5th December, 1943.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

1. Persians feel honoured that Tehran should have been selected for the meeting of Mr. Churchill, Mr. Roosevelt and Premier Stalin and have appropriated to themselves some glory from the presence in their capital of so many distinguished men. The Shah and the Government are greatly pleased that the representatives of the three Powers signed a declaration affirming their desire for the maintenance of the territorial integrity and independence of Persia. The Shah has declared himself to be highly delighted with the sentiments expressed by Stalin in a private audience, which had relieved him of anxiety regarding Russian intentions towards Persia and more particularly towards himself. He now felt confident of Stalin's personal goodwill and support. (See also paragraph 8 below.)

2. The closing down of all communications from and to Tehran during the conference created some anxiety in the provinces as to what was happening in the capital. The commonest supposition was that a revolutionary *coup d'Etat* had taken place and that a new dictator would be found to be installed in power.

3. The 13th Majlis held its last session on the 23rd November. Over seventy of the new Deputies have been elected and that number is sufficient for the opening of the new Majlis. The Shah, however, is in no hurry to see the new Majlis in operation as he hopes to have a Government of his own choosing in office before it opens. He has not yet been able to find a Prime Minister to his liking, and Soheily may continue. He tried, but failed, to persuade Hussein Ala (F.O. 7, M.A. 11), his Minister of Court, to accept the charge. He appears to be determined to get rid of Sipahbud Ahmadi from the Ministry of War, and in this determination he will find encouragement from the Russians, who regard General Ahmadi as being too pro-British. The Shah recently warned the Chief of Staff against being too openly co-operative with the British. That, he said, was not in the interests of Persia as it aroused Russian hostility and suspicion.

##### *Economic.*

4. A syndicate of Persian merchants has been formed for the purchase of 60,000 tons of rice in the Caspian provinces. Of this amount 36,000 tons will be sold to the Soviet authorities, who will pay in goods—sugar, piece-goods and glassware. The balance of 24,000 tons will be sold to the Persian Government. The rice crop in the Caspian provinces is estimated this year to be 250,000 tons.

5. The Majlis passed a law authorising the Government to mint and put into circulation silver coins of the denominations of 1, 2, 5 and 10 rials. The coins are to be 60 per cent. silver and 40 per cent. copper.

6. The press reports that the Council of Ministers has approved a decree forming a new Shahrstan (*i.e.*, a Farmandar's or Governor's district) to include the Bakshes of Saqqiz, Baneh and Sardasht.

##### *Appointments—Civil.*

7.—(i) Sultan Ahmad Rad (M.A. 234) to be Governor-General of Kerman Province.

(ii) Nasrullah Vasiq Kia to be Farmandar of Khoi.

#### *Persian Forces.*

##### *Army.*

8. The Shah has told the Minister for War and the Chief of Staff separately that Stalin during a private audience had promised the Shah Russian support in forming a large and strong Army in Persia. As evidence of goodwill Stalin was presenting twenty aircraft and twenty tanks to the Shah and would send instructors to train Persian crews. He proposed that the Russians should establish a flying school at Kazvin or some other place in North Persia for the training of Persian pilots. This will be claimed as a justification for their attitude by General Razmara and other officers who have recently been seeking Russian support against the allegedly pro-British Minister for War and Chief of Staff who have drawn no tanks or aircraft from the British.

##### *Appointments—Military.*

9.—(i) Sarlashkar Hadi Shaaqi (F.O. 196, M.A. 270) to be Director of the Military Tribunals Department of the War Office.

(ii) Sarhang Muhammad Hussein Amin to command the 8th (Rezaieh) Brigade.

(iii) Sarlashkar Abdul Majid Firuz to be an Inspector at the Ministry for War.

(iv) Sarhang Abdullah Qalehbegi to be Military Prosecutor-General.

(v) Sartip Ghulam Hussein Naqdi to be Commandant of the Secondary Military Cadet School.

(vi) Sarhang Azizullah Afkhami to command the Recruit Training Depot of the 3rd (Azerbaijan) Division.

(vii) Sarhang Jamshed Haidari to command the Recruit Training Depot of the 10th (Khuzestan) Division.

(viii) Sarhang Ghulam Hussein Afkhami to command the Recruit Training Centre of the 7th (Kerman) Division.

(ix) Sarhang Mustafa Nowtash to command the (Behbahan) Brigade of the 10th (Khuzestan) Division.

##### *Police.*

(x) Sarhang Parsa to be Chief of Police in Khorassan.

##### *Retirements.*

(i) Sarhang Ibrahim Bani Sadr.

(ii) Sarhang Farrukh.

#### *Internal Security.*

##### *Fars.*

10. There are indications that General Jahanbani is losing faith in the professions of goodwill of Nasir and Khosrow Qashgai. The Germans have not yet been handed over; Nasir is demanding that five of the Deputies of Fars should be his nominees and has threatened that he will not be able to prevent some Qashgais from going to the help of the Dashtis and Tangistanis, against whom Persian troops are now carrying out disarmament operations, unless the operations are stopped. General Jahanbani is now making some attempt to assure non-Qashgai tribes that Nasir is not the power in Fars that he claims to be. Abdullah Zarghampur of the Boir Ahmadi has reproached Nasir with deserting him and has informed him that he now considers himself free to act in his own interests alone.

##### *Kuh-i-Galu.*

11. The plans for the disarmament of the Taiyyibi, Bahmai and Western Janeki tribes, which were referred to in Summary No. 44-43, paragraph 15, have been considerably modified and the projected operation may in the end be abandoned. The change is due to the Minister for War's lack of confidence in Sartip Qadar, whose troops were to have taken part in the operations. The latter is involved in an elaborate intrigue to discredit the Minister for War of which the moving spirit is General Razmara, to whose party Sartip Qadar belongs. The Shah has refused to approve the Minister for War's proposal to relieve Sartip Qadar or his command. The Shah also would willingly see the Minister for War discredited.



*Russian Affairs.*

12. The amount of goods delivered to Russia by the Zahidan-Meshed route between the 3rd and 30th October was 5,623 tons. The U.K.C.C. now operate 1,037 trucks on this route.

*Addendum.*

Last Summary—No. 42/47/43 dated 22/11/43—paragraph 3, line 8, for "drugs" read "grain."

Tehran, 5th December, 1943.

[E 8164/110/34]

No. 37

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 31st December.)  
(No. 494.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 49 for the period of the 6th to the 19th December, 1943, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 20th December 1943.

Enclosure in No. 37.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 49, for the period 6th to 19th December, 1943.

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

1. Under strong pressure from the Shah, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet resigned on the 14th December. Soheily was immediately asked to form a new Cabinet and was obliged to include in it certain Ministers of the Shah's own choice and to exclude the only two strong men of the previous Cabinet—the Ministers for the Interior and for War. The elimination of these two was indeed the Shah's main object in insisting on a reorganisation of the Cabinet. His increasing hostility to General Ahmadi has been mentioned in these summaries and the latter's dismissal and replacement by Ibrahim Zand have been interpreted in some quarters as an indication of the Shah's desire to please the Russians at the expense of the British, for General Ahmadi was generally believed to be pro-British and anti-Russian while Ibrahim Zand, having been educated in Russia, is credited with being pro-Russian.

2. The new Cabinet is as follows:—

Prime Minister: Ali Soheily.<sup>(1)</sup>  
Justice: Muhsin Sadr.<sup>(1)</sup>  
Foreign Affairs: Muhammad Saed.<sup>(1)</sup>  
Finance: Amanullah Ardalan.<sup>(1)</sup>  
Interior: Abdul Hussein Hajir.<sup>(1)</sup>  
Roads and Communications: Nasrullah Intizam.<sup>(1)</sup>  
Agriculture: Nuri Isfandiari (Muvaffiq es Sultaneh) (F.O. 99).  
Education: Issa Saddiq (F.O. 178, M.A. 247).  
Posts and Telegraphs: Hamid Sayyah (F.O. 187, M.A. 258).  
War: Ibrahim Zand.  
Public Health: Dr. Ghani.  
Commerce and Industry: Sartip Shefahi (F.O. 190, M.A. 261).  
Without Portfolio: Mustafa Adl (F.O. 1, M.A. 1).

The only portfolios that remain in the same hands as in the previous Cabinet are those of Justice and Foreign Affairs. Of the new Ministers Saddiq, Sayyah and Adl have held office in previous Cabinets. Zand and Shafai have both recently been members of the Shah's personal staff, as was Intizam until he became

<sup>(1)</sup> Members of previous Cabinet.

a Cabinet Minister in February 1943. Nuri Isfandiari is also a Shah's nominee. It is generally thought that this is the Shah's first step in the experiment of governing the country through a subservient Cabinet as his father did.

The Cabinet resembles those approved by his father, in that it contains no man of strong character. It is, however, composed of men who, with the exception of the Prime Minister, have a relatively good reputation for honesty. In order to gain popular support much is likely to be made of professions of the Government's desire to improve the condition of the lower classes, for the mood of the new Majlis is likely to be critical and suspicious of the Shah's intentions. It is unlikely to have the docility of the Majlises selected by Reza Shah; nor has his youthful son his strength of character or singleness of purpose. It is rumoured that the Shah intends to postpone the opening of the new Majlis for as long as possible.

3. The Shah, the press and the politically-minded public continue to find cause for rejoicing in the results of the Tehran Conference, and particularly in the three-Power declaration concerning Persia. The latter has certainly greatly relieved public anxiety regarding the position of Persia *vis-à-vis* Russia after the war. The declaration does not in fact say anything that had not previously been said by Great Britain and Russia, and it is presumably the association of the United States with the assurances that has given such confidence to Persians. It is to be hoped that the result will be that they will now concern themselves less with speculations about the possible intentions of their neighbours and will devote themselves to putting their very untidy house in order.

4. Both the Shah and the Prime Minister have gained in public esteem, the latter's hitherto unsuspected statesmanship being given some credit for Persia having acquired the proud position of being the only country to have been given a public individual assurance of her post-war position by the three Powers.

5. To commemorate the conference the Tehran Municipality has decided that three streets in Tehran shall be named Roosevelt, Stalin and Winston Churchill.

6. Owing to complaints of irregularities and interference by Government officials, which led to the dismissal of Bahrami, the chief of the Tehran Municipality, voting in the Tehran elections was suspended for some days. It has now been resumed.

*Economic.*

7. In an interview with the press, Crawford, the American Director of the Cereals and Bread Department, gave the following figures:—

	At 15th December, 1943.	At 15th December, 1942.
	Tons.	Tons.
Undertakings	312,957	152,235
Deliveries	203,405	105,584
Stocks in Government stores	164,993	49,902
Stocks in Tehran—		
Wheat, 3,300 tons.		
Barley, 7,000 tons.		
Flour, 2,300 tons.		
Other grains, 2,300 tons.		
Daily consumption of Tehran, 250 tons.		

*Persian Forces.**Army.*

8. The Shah is reported by more than one reliable informant to have said that, having got rid of General Ahmadi from the Ministry for War and substituted for him a presumably tractable civilian of his own choice, he now intends to be Commander-in-chief of the Army in fact as well as in name and to limit the rôle of the Ministry for War to that of supplying the needs of the army. He has even been considering the cancellation of the decree whereby the subordination of the General Staff to the Ministry was made clear. He is still exalted by the belief that in this he will be supported by the Russians. His dismissal of General Ahmadi is being represented as a gesture to please the Russians, and the army is now expecting that the Shah will go a step further in this policy by substituting General Razmara for General Riazi as Chief of Staff (see also Summary No. 44, 1943, paragraph 8).



9. The Government has now issued regulations defining the duties and powers of the American military advisers to the Ministry for War. Their duties are to advise on all matters connected with the administration of the army and to prepare plans for administrative reform. Their responsibilities extend to those departments of the Ministry dealing with office work, finance, transport, supply, engineer, medical and veterinary services, recruiting, military justice and horse breeding. Of the eleven officers now available, seven are allotted to headquarters and four to provincial divisions, one to two divisions. The members of the American mission are responsible for supervising and assisting in the execution of the regulations governing administration issued by the Ministry for War on the advice of the head of the mission. They will be directly under the orders of the head of the mission, and will not exercise command of any unit of the Persian army unless authorised to do so by the Minister for War. The head of the mission has the right to demand that the Ministry for War shall make formal enquiry into any matter connected with administration which he may lay before him, and that he shall be provided with the information resulting from that enquiry. The head of the mission is authorised to make recommendations to the Ministry for War regarding the promotion, reduction, transfer or dismissal of officers employed in administrative services.

The regulations are vaguely framed and do not appear to give to the American advisers that definite authority, particularly over officers, which is necessary if their measures of reform are to be effective.

#### *Appointments—Military.*

##### 10. *Army.*

- (i) Sarhang Alp to be Commander of the Recruit Training Depot of the 6th (Fars) Division.

##### *Gendarmerie.*

- (ii) Sartip Setvati is confirmed as Chief of the Gendarmerie.  
(iii) Sarhang Humayun to be Director of Operations at Gendarmerie Headquarters.  
(iv) Sarhang Hussein Farzaneh to be Chief of Staff at Gendarmerie Headquarters.  
(v) Colonel Schwarzkopf (United States army) to be Director of Organisation of the Gendarmerie.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

11. It is reliably reported that Russian and Turkish generals met in conference on the 20th November at Bazirgan on the Perso-Turkish frontier. It is surmised that a subject discussed was raiding by Persian Kurds into Turkey of which there have in recent times been Turkish complaints.

#### *Afghan Affairs.*

12. Muhammad Haidar Khan Husseini has been appointed Afghan Ambassador to Persia. He is already on the way.

#### *Polish Affairs.*

13. The number of civilian Poles in Persia on the 15th December was:—

	Men.	Women.	Children.	Total.
In Tehran ...	944	3,635	1,364	5,943
In Isfahan ...	84	594	1,707	2,385
In Ahwaz ...	201	686	469	1,356
In Meshed ...	5	13	50	68
	1,234	4,928	3,590	9,752

*Tehran, 19th December, 1943.*

## CHAPTER V.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.

[E 5961/27/89]

No. 38

*Mr. Eden to Mr. Macmillan (Algiers).*

(No. 218.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, 5th October, 1943.*

WHEN M. Viénot came to see me this afternoon he gave me to read the message from M. Massigli complaining of our intervention in the Lebanon elections.

2. I said I knew nothing of this and so far as I was aware we had not taken any such action. M. Viénot, however, maintained that the facts were as stated and said that hitherto whenever we talked about Syria we always regarded the Lebanon as a territory where the French Committee had a special position. I would understand how deeply upset the French were to find that there also Sir Louis Spears was taking a part in a sense hostile to the French.

3. I repeated that I knew nothing of this and asked M. Viénot to give Sir Maurice Peterson his evidence. This he undertook to do.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

[E 5839/27/89]

No. 39

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary, No. 78, Syria and the Lebanon, 29th September, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office, 15th October.)*

#### 1. *General.*

The election of Beshara el-Khuri as President of the Lebanese Republic has given great satisfaction to all except those who, for their own reasons, wish to see the perpetuation of French domination in the Lebanon. It has especially pleased the Moslems and Nationalists in Syria. The promises of friendly and close relations between the Lebanon and its neighbours contained in the new President's speech, and the statement that a solidarity of political communities is essential, are regarded as a good augury for Lebanese participation in a future Arab Federation.

The new Lebanese Government, which has been formed under Riad es-Sulh, is regarded locally as the strongest and most progressive Cabinet which has so far held office, and it is felt that Lebanese aspirations to a greater degree of control of their own country have now a better chance of realisation than ever before. The new Prime Minister is expected to announce a strongly Nationalist policy.

#### 3. *Syria—Damascus.*

In a visit to the political officer recently, the Saudi Arabian consul-general stated that he had been the channel for correspondence between his Government and the Syrian Government on the subject of the exchange of diplomatic representatives between Saudi Arabia and Syria. Both Governments were now, he said, agreed in principle on such an exchange.

The local press reports that the Egyptian Government has decided to create a legation in Damascus, and to appoint a leading Egyptian personality, with an intimate knowledge of the country, as Minister.

In a statement to the press, the Prime Minister declared that Arab unity was the natural expression of a political, economic and cultural necessity, and added, that he hoped to go to Cairo in response to Nahas Pasha's invitation, to hear the views of the other Arab States and to put forward those of the Syrian Government.

A strike by the employees of the tobacco monopoly was ended on the 19th September, by Government intervention, after lasting for a week. In the opinion of the Minister for Foreign Affairs a precedent has thus been created for Government intervention in disputes between employers and employees of monopoly companies. The Government has appointed the Director-General of Finance as unofficial Inspector of Trade Disputes and Labour Conditions as a first step towards setting up a department for this purpose.

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6. *Jebel Druze.*

The more important Druze leaders, including Soltan Pasha Atrash and the Emir Hassan, have gone to Damascus, where they have been entertained by Jamil Mardam and the Prime Minister. The latter, in a speech at the banquet given in their honour, informed Soltan Pasha that he had been instructed by Shukri Quwatli to salute Soltan as "commander of the revolution" and to confer upon him the Insignia of the Medal of Honour. Soltan Pasha, in his reply, said that he was prepared to make every sacrifice to support and maintain Syrian unity and independence.

Soltan Pasha visited the political officer before his departure, and said that he regarded the affair of the Government's failure to include a Druze Minister as closed; but it is, nevertheless, generally believed in Soueida that the Atrash are still pressing their claims. Soltan Pasha informed the political officer that he would be greatly concerned if a Government in which the Druze were not represented should enter into any commitment with the British, the Americans or the French—particularly the latter, by whom, he added, the question of a Franco-Syrian treaty might be expected to be raised at any moment.

The more politically-minded in Soueida are showing great interest in recent events in the Lebanon in view of the large Druze population there.

11. *The Lebanon.*

Much political activity culminated on the 21st September in the formation of a Cabinet by Riad es-Sulh. Tradition demanded that the President of the Council should be a Sunni Moslem, and, apart from Riad es-Sulh, the only other candidate whom even the Moslem community regarded as in any way suitable was Saib Salam, a Deputy for Beirut. The latter was strongly backed, despite his youth and lack of experience, by Abdul Hamid Karami and Henri Pharaon, who acknowledged Sulh to be by far the abler of the two but distrusted him for his shifty past record. This threatened to split the Constitutionalists and their allies into two opposing camps and to rob both of their hard-won joint victory at the polls. Eventually, however, Sulh managed to win over several adherents of Karami and Pharaon to his side, and these two leaders were persuaded to accept the inevitable with a good grace. Sulh, at first, talked of forming a coalition Cabinet with the object of neutralising the opposition of Emile Eddé and thus ensuring a large vote in the Chamber. This, however, was opposed by the Constitutionalists, and, in the event, only one adherent of Eddé's (Habib Abi Shahla, who is known to hold considerably more progressive views on Arab unity than his ex-chief) was included. The Cabinet finally chosen was as follows:—

Prime Minister, Finance: Riad es-Sulh, Sunni (South Lebanon).  
 Vice-President, Justice, Education: Habib Abi Shahla, Greek Orthodox (Beirut).  
 Interior, Posts and Telegraphs: Camille Shamoun, Maronite (Mount Lebanon).  
 Minister for Foreign Affairs, Public Works: Selim Tacla, Greek Catholic (Mount Lebanon).  
 Agriculture, Defence, Health: Emir Majid Arslan, Druze (Mount Lebanon).  
 Ravitaillement, Economics, Commerce and Industry: Adil Usseyran, Shia (South Lebanon).

On the whole, this is a strong and homogeneous Cabinet. The appointment of Camille Shamoun to the Ministry of the Interior may be regarded as an excellent step and one which is well calculated, in view of his outstanding honesty, to break the system of favouritism which has led to so much administrative inefficiency in the past. The Prime Minister had originally earmarked the post for himself, but was dissuaded on the ground that Christian opinion would be seriously alarmed.

The chief weakness of the Cabinet is the absence of any representative from North Lebanon, and this may possibly lead to friction with Abdul Hamid Karami and his followers, who constitute a powerful political factor. The Prime Minister is, however, confident of being able to secure a majority in the Chamber, and is said to intend to announce a policy so strongly Nationalist that Karami will not be able to oppose it. The Bekaa is not represented either, but this omission is much less important since the Deputies from that region are, anyhow, divided amongst themselves on many issues.

It is indicative of the atmosphere produced by the elections that the new Prime Minister, in an interview before his appointment, declared that the Lebanese flag (which is the tricolour having a cedar of the Lebanon on the white band) should be replaced by the Arab colours, the cedar alone being retained from the old flag.

[E 6203/27/89]

No. 40

(Secret.)

*Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 80—Syria and the Lebanon. Issued by Spears Mission, 13th October, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office, 22nd October.)*

1. *General.*

THE Lebanese Prime Minister made his eagerly awaited declaration of policy at a special session of Parliament on the 7th October. As expected, he took up a strongly Nationalist attitude, announcing the Government's intention to make Lebanese independence a reality, but at the same time he avoided any suggestion of truculence, and dealt with the points at issue more by implication than by direct statement. The main points in his programme are as follows:—

(a) Revision of the Constitution with a view to the elimination of certain provisions incompatible with independence in that they recognise the right of authorities other than legitimate representatives of the Lebanese nation to participate in the Administration.

(b) Revision of a number of conventions and regulations which the Government consider to be prejudicial to Lebanese sovereignty, i.e., *Arrêtés* and *Décisions* issued by the French.

(c) Arabic to be the sole official language.

(d) Lebanese Government officials in future to look solely to their own duly constituted authorities, and to be punished if they fail to do so.

(e) Agreement to be negotiated with the Syrian Government for the joint control of the Funds of Common Interest.

(f) Reform of the present electoral law, and the holding of an early census.

(g) Elimination of the present harmful system of denominational and regional representation.

(h) Close collaboration with neighbouring Arab countries. In this connexion the Prime Minister pointed out that isolationism was nowadays out of the question for any State, whether large or small, and that the geographical and economic situation of the Lebanon obliged the Government to place in the forefront of its preoccupations the question of the country's relations with sister Arab States. He assured the Chamber that the Government would place these relations on a solid foundation, which would assure the respect by the Arab States of the total sovereignty and independence of the Lebanon and the integrity of her present frontiers. "Our brothers in the Arab world," he said, "want nothing for the Lebanon which she does not want herself. We do not wish the Lebanon to be a colony, nor do they (the Arab States) wish her to be a channel through which they themselves might be colonised." This passage, which was greeted with great applause, was omitted from the official French text of the speech. The usual complimentary references were made to France and "the Allied Powers, Great Britain and the United States."

In conclusion, the Prime Minister spoke of the need for placing Lebanese diplomatic representation abroad on a satisfactory basis, and for "vast administrative reforms," consisting chiefly of the widening of the powers of the Mohafezin and Kaimakams. He made no reference to the *Sûreté*, the new flag, the French S.S.Os., the Mixed Courts or the concessionary companies, some of which his less cautious supporters had hoped would be mentioned.

Announcing the recognition of Lebanese independence by Egyptian Government, the Prime expressed his appreciation of this gesture and stated his conviction that the other Arab Governments would soon follow the Egyptian example, as a result of which the Lebanon would enjoy absolute security for her independence and respect for her frontiers.

A prolonged debate then followed, in which the Opposition, inspired by Emile Eddié (who did not, however, speak himself), urged that the Government's programme should not be put to the vote until it had been discussed point by



point. This motion was defeated, and the Prime Minister's declaration, on being put to the House, was approved by an overwhelming vote of confidence, supported by 52 Deputies. Only Dr. Ayoub Tabet voted against the motion and ex-President Naccache abstained from voting. The latter has since sought to assure Riad Sulh that he was misunderstood and did not mean to abstain.

Scenes of great enthusiasm took place outside the Parliament during and after the session. As a result of these developments the Lebanese population has been profoundly stirred and has become really conscious, for the first time, of its national entity. This result, which has dismayed the French, is attributable to the general realisation that they attempted blatantly to rig the elections and failed in the attempt.

With the new Lebanese Government thus firmly in saddle, it is expected that the Syrian Government will very shortly make their demands for the cession of certain of the powers at present in French hands. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has postponed his journey to Cairo to discuss Arab Federation with Nahas Pasha, which has been fixed for the 10th October, and it is generally believed that the Government intend to profit by the presence of the French Delegate-General, who is now in Damascus, to begin discussions. In this the Government will almost certainly act in concert with the Lebanese, whose agreement with the Minister for Foreign Affairs probably secured when he visited Beirut on the 4th October to congratulate the Lebanese Government on its accession to office.

The only direct indication so far received of the attitude likely to be adopted by the French has been provided by Colonel Oliva-Roget, the Délégué Adjoint in Damascus, with whom the political officer discussed the position recently. The délégué, who appeared to be very despondent, said he realised that it was inevitable that French political influence should diminish with the implementation of Syrian independence, but agreed that France could maintain her "special position" in the Levant States by abandoning attempts at political domination and doing her best to establish a strong cultural and spiritual position. For this, he said, it was necessary that France should be represented in Syria by officers and officials whose character and abilities were such as they could gain the respect and admiration of the population. He deplored the lack of any such officials in Syria at the present time, and said he was doubtful whether any could be obtained from North Africa. The political officer pointed out that it would be most undesirable to bring back any personnel who were in Syria during the period immediately preceding the Allied occupation. The délégué agreed, and said that only persons who had left the country before the Franco-German Armistice, or personnel with experience in Algeria who had never been stationed in Syria before, would be considered.

It should be added that the délégué's present entourage contains no persons of ability or character such as he described. His own views, moreover, are believed to be far more progressive than those of the Délégation Générale in Beirut.

Meanwhile, the French authorities have seized the opportunity provided by the occupation of Corsica to attempt to enhance their waning prestige. Throughout the country celebrations were staged; all French administrations were beflagged, guns were fired, bells rung and drums beaten, and messages of congratulation, some of them almost hysterical in tone, were published in the local press. Visits and messages were exchanged between the French and Syrian and Lebanese Governments, although the Syrian Government showed some initial hesitation.

On the 13th October Tashin Bey Qadri, the Iraqi Consul-General at Beirut, was instructed to inform the Lebanese authorities of his Government's recognition. He will become chargé d'affaires *ad interim* at Beirut, as he already is at Damascus.

#### 4. Aleppo.

The arrest of the French head of the Office des Changes, reported last week, has still further damaged French prestige in this area, where, during the past year, the French head of the Contrôle Postal and his assistant, the Director of the Service de la Presse and the Chief of the Séquestre Général have all been dismissed for malpractices. In three cases, British complaints hastened the removal of the offenders. The impression thus created is not likely to be mitigated by the announcement that a former local head of the Sûreté Générale, who was convicted of bribery nearly two years ago, has now been acquitted, following an appeal, on a point of procedure.

#### 11. The Lebanon.

See under "General" above.

The new Ministers are now getting down to work, and are drawing up programmes of reform in their different spheres. There are signs that they intend to take a very strong line with the French over purely local matters, matters, but that they are well aware that some of the points at issue involve considerations of military necessity and therefore cannot be settled at present. Both the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Justice (who is preparing a project for the removal of French officials from judicial posts and the abolition of mixed courts) have, however, emphasised in conversation with the political officer that the Government are really in earnest, even going so far as to say that if the French refuse their demands they will resort to force. It would appear that they hope that the French may cave in before a threatening attitude.

It is this belief which would appear to have animated Camille Shamoun, the Minister of the Interior, in dealing with a complaint received from a village in the Bekaa concerning the misconduct of a detachment of troupes spéciales (from Syria), stationed there to assist the O.C.P. in wheat collection. After consultation with the President of the Republic, and the Prime Minister, Camille Shamoun telephoned to M. David, the French délégué, demanding the withdrawal of the detachment to Syria, failing which he threatened to evict them by force. (For this purpose he had already arranged for a detachment of 500 Lebanese gendarmes to be standing by.) The detachment was withdrawn to Syria two hours later, and although it was subsequently replaced by a fresh detachment, the Minister did gain his point by securing the removal of the soldiers who had been accused of molesting the villagers.

[E 6293/27/89]

No. 41

*Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 81—Syria and the Lebanon, 20th October, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office, 2nd November.)*

#### 1. General.

THE emergence of Nationalist Governments in the Levant States has been a severe blow to the French authorities, and it is clear that, so far from accepting the situation and resolving to assist the new Governments to achieve their independence, in accordance with the repeated pledges of General de Gaulle and General Catroux, they are determined to oppose the aspirations of the Nationalist leaders by every means in their power. On the other hand, the Governments have the backing of public opinion, they are acting in close concert and, for the first time in the history of these States, the Lebanon has ceased to be a pawn to be played off by the French against the Syrians.

The first sparrings have already taken place. At a dinner-party given by the Lebanese President and the Government on the 12th October for the Delegate-General and his principal political advisers, including M. Chataigneau, the Secretary-General, who had just returned from Algiers, M. Helleu told the President plainly that no concessions whatever would be made until the mandate had been terminated by the conclusion of a treaty. He made no attempt to meet the Prime Minister's argument that independence had already been proclaimed by the French, and said that there could be no transfer of powers while the war lasted, though the French were prepared to sign a treaty at once. When Riad Sulh pointed out that the position of the Lebanon in relation to the war effort would in no way be altered by the conclusion of a treaty, the Delegate-General said nothing and showed acute embarrassment. When the Prime Minister contested the competence of the French National Committee to conclude treaties in the name of France, M. Helleu said that he and General de Gaulle would pledge their word of honour that any instrument signed now would later be ratified by the French Government. The Prime Minister pointed out that the 1936 treaty, though negotiated by a normal French Government, had not been ratified by the French Chamber, and asked how members of the Committee of Liberation could guarantee that a Government which was not yet in being would ratify a treaty concluded at the present time. M. Helleu was unable to reply, and the conversation ended in a deadlock, both the President and the Prime Minister leaving M. Helleu in no doubt that under no circumstances would they sign any treaty with the French National Committee.

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The Prime Minister is naturally rather despondent over the *impasse* thus reached, but has decided, for the present, only to press for concessions not likely to lead to a further head-on clash. It is expected that the first of these demands will be for the cession of the Funds of Common Interest, regarding which complete agreement appears to have been reached with the Syrian Government; and a joint request to the French for the handing over of these funds will be made within the next few days. A beginning is also likely to be made shortly on the revision of the Constitution, by the elimination of those of its clauses which are incompatible with full sovereignty. It has already been announced that Arabic will be the sole official language.

At a dinner-party given by the Syrian Government to M. Helleu and his associates a few days later the same questions were discussed and the same deadlock was reached. M. Helleu, who is leaving about the 26th October on a short visit to Algiers, did, however, ask the Syrians to provide him with a memorandum, which he would take with him, on certain specific grievances which they had discussed on this occasion.

Nothing has yet occurred to disrupt the internal front of the Lebanese Government, although the danger still exists that the disappointment felt in North Lebanon that no local deputy has been invited to participate in the Cabinet may eventually upset the political balance. From Saida and South Lebanon, too, come indications that the corrosive influences of nepotism and place-seeking have still to be reckoned with. Minor notables from this predominantly Shia region, disappointed in their hopes of seeing their friends advanced to higher administrative posts, are already criticising Riad es-Sulh, whom they describe as the "Sunni Dictator."

#### 7. Alaouite Territory.

The Political Officer has discussed with the French Délégué and the Mohafez the question of rumours concerning demands for the retention of administrative autonomy in this province, to which reference was made in last week's Summary. The Délégué, who informed the Political Officer that he had learned that he was himself suspected by the Syrian Government of furthering separatist tendencies, said he regarded these as folly and would take immediate steps to remove any of his subordinates, especially Special Service Officers, who might be proved to act in any way contrary to the concept of Syrian independence.

The Mohafez, Shauqat Abbas, was equally emphatic in his disavowal of separatism, which, he said, he regarded as dead, though he also said that he did not believe that the Syrian Government intended to make any fundamental changes at present. As stated above under "Damascus," one radical change which the Syrian Government have decided upon since this opinion was expressed is the removal of Shauqat Abbas himself and his replacement by a non-Alaouite.

In both instances, and also in other interviews with leading Alaouite and Christian notables, the Political Officer stressed the undesirability of any movement aimed at the separation of the Alaouite Province from the rest of the Syrian State, which would be calculated to provoke unrest and so embarrass the Allied war effort.

It is hoped that this timely warning, coupled with the appointment of the Emir Mustafa Shehabi as Mohafez, will have the desired effect, for there is reason to believe that French officials in the Alaouite territory are not entirely free from the suspicion of having instigated these rumours. Suleiman Murshid, who has been summoned to Damascus to answer numerous complaints made against him by villagers whom he has dispossessed of their land, informed the Political Officer before his departure that the S.S.O. called upon him recently to discuss the possibility of a rapprochement between himself and the Abbas and Kinj families. This proposal, as Suleiman Murshid himself pointed out, is strongly reminiscent of the policy adopted by the French after the Syrian elections of 1936-37, when, by forming a *bloc* consisting of these three families and their supporters, the "Republic of Lattakia" was brought into being. Suleiman Murshid alleged that he told the Inspecteur des S.S. that he would take no part in any movement directed against the Syrian Government. Although no reliance can usually be placed on any statement made by him, his story has, this time, been corroborated by another source, according to which Ibrahim Kinj has rejected proposals made to him to settle his differences with Shauqat al-Abbas and return to the French fold.

The fear expressed shortly after the elections that the Kinjs might expect to suffer for their defection from the pro-French Mohafez's party (see Summary No. 74 of the 1st September) seems to have been justified, as Aly Kinj and his wife have now been arraigned before a military tribunal in Aleppo on a charge of having threatened personal violence to a French officer of the O.C.P., who searched their house for hidden grain in June. It is difficult to determine whether this accusation is true or not, but it is significant that shortly after the incident took place the officer in question, regarding whom the Délégué has spoken very disparagingly to the Political Officer, was dismissed, but was subsequently reinstated by General Collet. It was only after his return to this area that proceedings were instituted against Aly Kinj and his wife.

[E 6293/27/89]

No. 42

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 82, Syria and the Lebanon, 27th October, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office, 8th November.)*

#### 1. General.

ON the 21st October, in a letter referring to the Lebanese Prime Minister's declaration of policy, M. Helleu informed the President of the Republic that the French National Committee of Liberation regarded the Government's intention to revise the Constitution, and in particular to adopt Arabic as the sole official language, as incompatible with the provisions of the mandate. He asserted that the mandate still existed and that "France" would continue to assume the responsibilities conferred upon her by it until she could render account of the fulfilment of her mission to the League of Nations, or to such other international body as might eventually replace the league. Consequently, the Committee of Liberation could not admit the validity of any constitutional amendments which might be made unilaterally by the Lebanese Government. While deprecating any debate in the Chamber on this subject, M. Helleu stated that the French National Committee was ready to examine with the Lebanese Government certain arrangements which would facilitate the progress of the Lebanon towards a status of full and complete independence—which, he declared, "France" was still determined to accord to the country "on the basis of a general settlement of Franco-Lebanese relations" (i.e., the conclusion of a treaty).

This thesis of the continued existence of the mandate in law (which is correct) is, of course, logically incompatible with the implied promise that if a treaty were concluded the mandate would be brought to an end without consulting the League of Nations. The fact that the French should have singled out for special protest the adoption of Arabic as the sole official language, although this question has no bearing on the war effort, is also highly significant.

The Lebanese Government have been under strong pressure from the Chamber to open a debate on constitutional reform on the 28th October, and the Prime Minister made it clear that he could not possibly face the Chamber with a request for the postponement of this discussion for any appreciable period on the grounds of M. Helleu's letter, apart from the fact that he had no wish to do so. The only result would be the immediate overthrow of the Government: in its present mood, the Chamber would not admit for a moment that it could be prevented from exercising the right of every legally constituted legislative Assembly to modify its own Constitution. The Prime Minister therefore attempted to induce the French to withdraw their letter by threatening that if this was not done before the session opened he would read in the Chamber both the letter and his Government's official reply—which, he believed, would completely demolish M. Helleu's arguments. After some delay, however, M. Chataigneau, who had apparently consulted M. Helleu before the latter left for Algiers, informed Riad Sulh that the letter could not be withdrawn. The Lebanese Government therefore intend to implement their threat and ventilate the whole question in public debate.

#### 3. Syria-Damascus.

The Syrian Government have submitted their memorandum on the subject of the transfer of powers which was called for by M. Helleu last week, and



are now taking stock of their position. They are in no doubt as to the hostility of the French authorities towards their aim of making Syrian independence a reality, but they hope that in their efforts to this end they will receive the support of the other Arab States. The delegation which has gone to Cairo to discuss the question of Arab Unity may therefore be expected to seek the aid of the Egyptian Government in the coming struggle, and will probably also canvass for support from other Arab rulers.

More than thirty Deputies failed to attend the parliamentary session held on the 17th October. In general their absence is regarded as due rather to slackness—and, possibly, in some cases, to lack of transport facilities—than to disapproval of the Government's policy. It is suspected, however, that some of the absentees from Northern Syria may have been subjected to French pressure.

Bahij Bey el-Khatib, whose transfer from the Ministry of Interior to the post of Mohafez of the Damascus country districts was reported last week, has, as anticipated, been dismissed from the Government service. His successor in the Ministry of the Interior is Taufiq Hayali, ex-Mohafez of Damascus. In conversation with His Majesty's Minister, the Syrian President has stated that Bahij Bey's dismissal was fully justified by his past record and by the fact that he had been maintaining disloyal contacts with the Sûreté.

#### 4. Aleppo.

Political interest is centred upon the reopening of Parliament and the departure of Saadullah Jabri and his mission for Egypt.

It is rumoured that the Mohafez, Abdullatif Chatti, may shortly be removed. As this official has always been in close touch with Bahij el-Khatib and has never supported the Nationalist *Bloc*, these rumours, which have been referred to in the local press, may well prove to be true.

The Moscow Conference is arousing much speculation, particularly amongst the large Armenian community.

#### 5. Homs and Hama.

The dismissal of the Mohafez of Hama, added to that of Bahij Bey el-Khatib and other less commendable officials, has caused some perturbation locally. It is felt that the new Government are adopting a policy of discrimination against non-Nationalists which is dangerously reminiscent of that followed by Jamil Mardam in 1936, and that now, as then, the Government will play into the hands of the French by themselves creating an Opposition sufficiently powerful to bring about their own downfall. Though these gloomy forebodings may be exaggerated, it is clear that the implications of the situation have not been lost on the French.

#### 6. Jebel Druze.

Soltan Pasha Atrash now claims that, in addition to receiving the title of "Commander of the Revolution" when he visited Damascus recently, the Government agreed to regard him as a Minister without portfolio and promised to take no important decisions of policy without consulting him. His prestige is consequently very high, in contrast to that of the Emir Hassan, who, after all his petulant behaviour, is still on the same level as any other Druze Deputy.

#### 7. Alaouite Territory.

The replacement of Shauqat Abbas as Mohafez by the Emir Muttafa Shehabi has aroused intense excitement. It has dealt a severe blow to the influence of the Abbas clan, which has for so long permeated all branches of the local administration, including the Courts of Justice, and is also regarded as bringing to an end the policy of decentralisation which, in the past, placed this province under direct French rule.

The new Mohafez, who received a tremendous welcome on his arrival in the area, has already got down to business. One of his first acts was to announce a reduction in the price of cereals, which had recently been increased by his predecessor. There had been serious discontent on this score, and in Lattakia the supply depots were being boycotted.

#### 11. The Lebanon.

On the 25th October, despite the political crisis precipitated by the French in a desperate attempt to counter the Lebanese Government's efforts to achieve

independence (see under "General" above), the Government presented a memorandum on the subject of the transfer of powers to M. Chataigneau, secretary-general of the *délégation*. The note contains four demands:—

- (i) That the French *Délégation Générale* should be transformed into a diplomatic mission.
- (ii) That the Lebanon should acquire all the attributes of true sovereignty.
- (iii) That all the interests and services now controlled by the *délégation* should be transferred to the Lebanese Government.
- (iv) That the Funds of Common Interest should be made over to the Lebanese and Syrian Governments jointly.

A copy of an agreement with the Syrian Government on the handling of these revenues was attached to the note.

The Government would appear to have recognised the threat to their stability inherent in the disappointment of the Deputies from North Lebanon at their exclusion from the Administration, and are understood to have agreed to appoint Mohamed Kerami, brother of Abdul Hamid Kerami, to the post of Director of the Tripoli Municipality. This appointment, which is expected to be announced shortly, is likely to please not only Abdul Hamid Kerami and his Moslem supporters, but also the Christian Deputies in this area, who were afraid that Abdul Hamid might begin to agitate for the return of the Northern cazas to Syria, a policy which he has favoured in the past.

[E 6713/27/89]

No. 43

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 83, Syria and the Lebanon, 3rd November, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office, 12th November.)*

#### 1. General.

THE Lebanese Government whilst maintaining a firm attitude towards the French, are so far displaying a praiseworthy degree of calmness. They are, however, certain to react very strongly if the French continue to block their justified demands by invoking the mandate. While they realise that for the time being their independence must necessarily be limited by genuine war necessities, they maintain that an end must be put to the abuse by the French of the powers conferred on them for these purposes, and they have no intention of allowing the French to fob them off with trifling concessions on unimportant points.

The Government's official reply of the 30th October to M. Hellen's letter was couched in comparatively mild terms—though more forceful language will certainly be used later if the French continue obdurate. It pointed out that in the conversations which M. Hellen had had with the Government recently (see Summary No. 81 of the 20th October), the Ambassador had said that the legal existence of the mandate was no bar to the practical exercise of independence. The Committee of Liberation's present denial of the Government's right to act independently was therefore a new departure, and, moreover, a repudiation of promises made as far back as June 1941 "in the solemn proclamations announcing the end of the mandate." In addition, the principal Powers still interested in the League of Nations had recognised Lebanese independence, and *de facto* recognition had been accorded by the United States Government. If, therefore, independence were now made conditional on the official abolition of the mandate by an international body which for all practical purposes has ceased to exist, it would be rendered illusory, which would be repugnant to the liberal spirit which had always inspired France and the United Nations. The Government therefore suggested that it would be better to take present realities into account and seek a solution of existing problems in a spirit of mutual understanding, rather than subordinate the exercise of complete independence to a general settlement. Meanwhile it was for the Government to take the initiative with regard to the proposed amendment of the Constitution, and this was only one aspect—though logically the first—of the practical exercise of sovereignty. The letter concluded by expressing the hope that the Committee of Liberation would understand the legitimate desire of the Government to get down to realities and practical progress at long last.



The statement made by Mr. Law in the House of Commons on the 29th October concerning Syria and the Lebanon came as something of a shock to the Lebanese Government. They themselves, knowing the legal position, do not dispute the undoubted fact that technically speaking the mandate continues to exist. At the same time they are well aware that the Lebanese Chamber and public opinion as a whole are ignorant of the position and believe, not unnaturally, that General Catroux's proclamation of Lebanese independence signified the termination not only of the mandatory régime but also of the mandate itself. In these circumstances the Government feared that Mr. Law's statement would have a chilling effect on public opinion and would also be exploited by the French. These fears have proved not altogether unfounded. On further reflection, however, the Government themselves have come to realise the value of the statement in question as an indication of the interest taken in Lebanese affairs by His Majesty's Government and the British public. It is up to them to educate public opinion and the Chamber in this sense. While, however, the Prime Minister is too intelligent to deny the technical existence of the mandate, he and his colleagues are convinced that the French Committee of Liberation has no right to exercise it, in view of the facts that it is not a Government and that there was a complete break of continuity between the end of the Third Republic and the emergence of the Free French Movement. This is at least an arguable case, which the Lebanese Government are perfectly entitled to maintain; and the Prime Minister has in fact intimated that he will maintain it in the Chamber if questioned by Deputies on the subject of Mr. Law's statement.

A vigorous campaign of rumours has been launched by the French with a view to regaining lost ground. The gist of all of them is that the French will shortly resort to the use of force in one form or another, *e.g.*, by bringing large numbers of French troops into the country from North Africa, by forcibly closing the Chamber, &c. The Government themselves, on some members of which high French officials have actually tried out these rumours, are inclined to discount them, and show no signs of being seriously intimidated thereby. The Lebanese public, on the other hand, has been evincing some signs of nervousness. The ordinary Lebanese citizen is politically immature, and fails to realise how disastrous to the French themselves any such high-handed action would inevitably prove in the long run.

### 3. Syria-Damascus.

As a result of the deadlock which has been reached in negotiations with the French, and owing partly also to the absence of the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who have gone to Egypt to take part in discussions on Arab unity, political activity is almost at a standstill.

Parliament met on the 26th, 28th and 30th October to debate a number of draft Bills. Proposals were adopted to advance a month's extra pay to civil servants (at a cost of £Syr. 1,800,000 to the Treasury), and to allocate a credit for £Syr. 50,000 for the expenses of the official Syrian delegation which will take part in this year's pilgrimage to Mecca.

A draft Bill containing proposals for the creation and administration of municipalities in the Alaouite territory aroused great interest, and was sharply attacked, as its provisions differed from those applicable to municipalities in other parts of Syria.

Two Deputies referred to the Lebanese Prime Minister's statement on the subject of the Funds of Common Interest (see under "General" above), and asked why no similar statement had been made by the Syrian Government. The acting Prime Minister confirmed that perfect agreement had in fact been reached on this subject with the Lebanese Government, and assured the House that full details would be laid before them in due course. In the meantime, he asked that, in the interests of the country, the Government should not be pressed to disclose more at the present time.

### 11. The Lebanon.

On the 28th October the Prime Minister faced the Chamber to answer criticisms that his Government had not as yet accomplished anything of importance. He did not make public the fact that the Government were at variance with the French on the issue of constitutional reform, nor close the door on further negotiations by announcing any changes which would face the

French authorities with a *fait accompli*, but contented himself with informing the House that the subject was being studied and that the projected amendments would be submitted to it in a few days' time. He also referred to the request which the Government had made to the French for the cession of the Funds of Common Interest (see last week's Summary), and revealed that the Delegate-General had asked for a delay of ten to fifteen days to enable him to discuss the matter in Algiers. He promised to submit the agreement made with the Syrian Government on the subject to Parliament for ratification as soon as the French reply had been received.

The same evening, at a banquet of Moslem and Christian youth organisations held in Beirut, the Prime Minister repeated amidst enthusiastic applause the speech which he had made in the Chamber earlier in the day.

Widespread reforms and administrative changes have again been promised by the various Ministries, but so far no outstanding concrete results have been achieved.

### 12. Press and Propaganda.

*Internal.*—The Lebanese Prime Minister's statements to the Chamber about constitutional reform and the transfer of the Funds of Common Interest were reported objectively, all suggestion of controversy on these issues being avoided. A more lively reaction has been provoked by the discussions regarding Arab unity at present taking place in Cairo. The French have clearly encouraged, if not inspired, a number of innuendoes to the effect that, at a time when there is so much talk of Syrian and Lebanese independence, not only the Palestine Arabs, but also the Iraqis and Egyptians should set about achieving theirs.

Complaints regarding the high cost of living, and demands for the immediate application of the long-suspended War Profits Tax also figure prominently in the Lebanese papers.

The Allied declaration made at the conclusion of the Moscow Conference has been given wide publicity. Unfortunately, the good impression made by recent events in Russia had been marred by mischievous articles which have appeared in two French papers suggesting the existence of dissension between Russia and Britain and America. In view of the rigid censorship exercised by the French on any utterances which might damage their own prestige, these articles can only be regarded as deliberately provocative.

*Enemy Wireless Propaganda.*—Nothing of importance to report.

[E 6713/27/89]

No. 44

Extract from *Weekly Political Summary No. 84, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon*.  
10th November, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office 25th November.)

### 1. General.

On the 5th November, the representatives of the Lebanese press were summoned to the press bureau of the *Délégation Générale* and ordered to publish a communiqué in which it was stated that the French Committee of National Liberation refused to recognise the validity of any revision of the Lebanese Constitution made without their consent. Simultaneously, the French *Délégué* presented a copy of the communiqué to the President of the Republic. Thus, the rupture which the Lebanese, with exemplary forbearance, had striven to avoid, was brought about by the French authorities' own impetuous action. In the main, the Government were pleased that the French had given them a valid reason for ventilating the whole issue, and their reaction to this public challenge was prompt and firm.

Within the hour, the journalists were again summoned, this time by the Lebanese Prime Minister, who handed them a communiqué drawn up by the President of the Republic. In it the Government pointed out that Article 76 of the existing Constitution conferred the right of amendment upon the Lebanese Chamber, and stated that the Government was therefore submitting the draft of the proposed amendments to that body.

Intense excitement was aroused by these developments, and as soon as the French communiqué was published, there were threats of a general strike, and of demonstrations and attacks on the few Deputies suspected of being under French influence. The Government managed, however, to prevent all unrest, despite the fact that the French were doing their best by circulating alarming rumours and by venomous attacks on the Government in French-controlled papers to incite the



population to disorder. Some shops in the centre of the town were closed on the morning of the 7th, but reopened after the Prime Minister had visited the souks in person.

A last-minute effort was made by the French to persuade the Government to postpone the debate on their proposals, which had been fixed for 3 p.m. on the 8th November. Less than two hours before the session was due to begin, the Secretary-General of the *Délégation Générale* sent a message to the President of the Republic informing him that M. Helleu would be arriving early on the 10th November, bringing with him messages from the Committee of Liberation, and had requested the postponement of the vote until after his return. M. Helleu had asked, it was stated, that he should not be confronted with a *fait accompli*; otherwise, he would be obliged to reserve his entire liberty of judgment and of action—though this must not be regarded as a threat, but as the expression of his desire to define his attitude frankly.

The Lebanese President immediately objected that the words "and of action" in this message did, in fact, imply a threat; and the *délégué*, who had been charged with the duty of conveying the message to him, telephoned to the secretary-general in the presence of the President, and secured their deletion.

After a very brief discussion, the Government replied expressing their regret at being unable to accede to the *Délégué-Général's* request, and proceeded to the Parliament House.

The debate was brief. After rejection by a large majority of a proposal to refer the amendment of the Constitution to a select committee, the Bill was passed by 48 votes to nil. Two members abstained from voting and two others were absent. Arabic thus becomes the sole official language of the Lebanon, and all references to the exercise of the mandate have been deleted from the Constitution. The question of the national flag, which the Government are pledged to change, was not debated, but was held over for later consideration. No other questions were put to the vote. Deputies of all shades of political opinion, including the influential Abdul Hamid Kerami, from Tripoli, spoke in favour of the Government. There were boos and hisses when Emile Eddé withdrew from the Chamber before the count was taken, otherwise the session was entirely orderly. The crowds assembled outside the Chamber were strictly controlled by the Lebanese police, and no incidents have been reported. The French had stationed black troops in readiness near the Parliament House, but refrained from parading them in a provocative manner—though they had been used earlier in the day for searching incoming cars.

Any hopes which might have been entertained that a dangerous situation had been successfully overcome and that the French would bow before the inevitable were, however, speedily dashed, for the French censorship authorities immediately forbade all mention of the debate or even of the result of the vote in the local press, and put a "stop" on all outgoing telegrams on the subject. A few editors disobeyed this ban and published reports of the proceedings on the following morning. These papers were promptly seized on the streets and their printing presses sealed. One opposition paper published in French has been allowed to publish hostile comments on the debate.

For the moment, Beirut is quiet; but the Government is seriously concerned, since public resentment at this high-handed action on the part of the French is now so strong that they fear they may be unable to prevent serious disturbances if the ban is not soon lifted. It is not at all unlikely that the French would welcome such an explosion, and the Government are therefore being urged to do everything in their power to prevent any occurrences which could be seized upon by the French as a pretext for the use of force.

### 3. Syria-Damascus.

As a result of the crisis in the Lebanon, feeling against the French has been running high, as Syrian sympathies have naturally been with the Lebanese Prime Minister. The Syrian Government was very much disturbed by the publication of the French communiqué and the Prime Minister informed the *délégué* that the Government would give their full support to the Lebanese. The two Governments have since been in close contact and are in complete agreement. In conversation with certain ministers, the political officer has, however, detected a note of regret that a major crisis should have been precipitated so soon, and French-inspired rumours of troop movements and the appointment of a general as *Délégué-Général* have not been without effect.

Nevertheless, the Government are displaying no signs of wavering, but have, in fact, shown defiance of the French, though on a minor scale, by introducing into the Chamber two Bills involving important questions of principle. The first is a proposal to abolish a special land settlement commission for the Jezireh which was set up in 1939 by an *arrêté* of the then French High Commissioner. In itself, this Bill is unimportant, since the commission in question is now superfluous, but the principle involved is interesting in that the Government did not consult the French *Délégué* before presenting the Bill to the House. The *délégué* has therefore asked his superiors in Beirut for instructions as to the attitude which he should adopt. His own view of the matter, as expressed to the political officer, is that it would be wise to let pass any Bill which did not impinge on French international obligations on behalf of Syria, or prejudice the status of minorities in the country.

The second project which has been laid before the Chamber may, however, come within this latter category, since it provides for a revision of the judiciary establishment throughout the country, and for the abolition of the immunity of judges. The Minister of Justice is to be granted full powers to change or dismiss judges, and to modify judicial procedure. This proposal to raise judicial immunity aroused considerable protest in the Chamber, but it is considered that the Minister of Justice will, nevertheless, obtain the powers which he has demanded, though probably only for three or four months. No mention was made during the reading of the Bill of any proposals to revise the procedure of the mixed courts, which would, of course, affect foreign interests. The text of the Bill is not yet available.

This project, and a proposal to set up a commission to examine the establishments of Government departments, have caused some alarm; and fears are being expressed that once again, as when the Nationalists were in power in 1936-37, party loyalty rather than competence will be the yardstick by which civil servants will be measured.

After only a week's absence the Syrian delegation, which went to Egypt to take part in discussions regarding Arab unity, have returned to Damascus, well satisfied with their reception in Cairo and Alexandria. They do not appear to have achieved anything of practical importance; but the Prime Minister has, nevertheless, informed the House that he is most satisfied with the results of his visit, though the nature of the discussions which took place must remain secret for the time being.

Colonel T. V. Brennan, until recently His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz, took over His Majesty's Consulate and the political office in Damascus on the 5th November.

### 4. Aleppo.

There have been no local developments of importance, and interest is therefore centred on issues which are being decided elsewhere. Unfortunately, between the Syrian and French censorship authorities and their conflicting points of view, the population is being deprived of objective information on current events, and is therefore at the mercy of disquieting rumours. The report referred to in last week's Summary that French troops are being despatched to the Levant is particularly persistent. There is also considerable apprehension, felt by Moslems and Christians alike, of a possible change in Turkish policy, which might bring this area under Turkish rule again; whilst the Christians, who are being worked upon by opponents of Syrian independence, are openly suggesting the desirability of Russian protection. Finally, local French officials are most disappointed that the Committee of Liberation has not been invited to send a representative to the European Council which is to be set up as a result of the Moscow Conference, and are nursing grievances against the British for their alleged support of the Lebanese. There is thus a general atmosphere of tension, and though the situation is not at present dangerous, it might easily become so were anything to happen to arouse popular feeling still further.

### 12. Press and Propaganda.

*Internal.*—The continued and flagrant abuse by the French for political ends of their powers of censorship threatens to create a serious security problem. In addition to their provocative action in banning all reference to the recent debate in the Lebanese Chamber, the French have also within the last few days



deliberately disregarded a "stop" ordered by G.H.Q., M.E. The British authorities were therefore obliged to inform editors direct that the news item in question had been forbidden on military grounds, and that publication might be followed by serious consequences. No newspapers ventured to disregard this warning, but the item was broadcast from Radio Levant. Reference has been made in previous Summaries to tendentious articles which have appeared recently suggesting the existence of dissension among the Allies, and others calculated to stir up Arab grievances on the subject of Palestine; these, if not directly inspired by the French have at least been allowed to pass. The whole question of censorship is therefore being re-examined.

*Enemy Wireless Propaganda.*—Stated that Radio-Beirut is under the control of the "Jew, Sinclair," who puts out propaganda for his American masters. Attacks from the Berlin "Free Arab" station have for some time been directed against the Gaullists and this week's talk consisted of a résumé of the anti-Syrian actions of the French from the time of the Hashem el Atassi régime.

[E 7111/27/89]

No. 45

*Weekly Political Summary, No. 85, Syria and the Lebanon, 17th November, 1943.*  
—(Received in Foreign Office, 29th November.)

#### *The Lebanon.*

The political crisis in the Lebanon has suddenly developed, thanks to the use of violent methods by the French, into an incident of major importance, which threatens to affect the relations between His Majesty's Government and the French National Committee and the whole position of France in the Levant. Events are being followed with anxious attention by the Arabs, who regard the Lebanon as a test case of British good faith and the principles set forth in the Atlantic Charter.

The clash came with unexpected rapidity. On the 11th November, at 4.30 a.m., the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and all but three members of the Government were arrested on the order of M. Helleu. Later in the morning the Minister of Ravitaillement (Adel Osseyran) was also arrested, but two ministers—Habib Abu Shahla (Justice and Education), and the Emir Mejid Arslan (Agriculture, Defence and Health)—succeeded in making their escape. Abdul Hamid Kerami, the influential Deputy from the North Lebanon, was also arrested. These events took place only a few hours after the French Delegate General had given His Majesty's Minister his solemn word of honour, repeating what he said several times, that no measures were in contemplation which were liable to disturb public order or in any way interfere with the war effort.

At 8 a.m. the same morning M. Helleu announced on the wireless the suspension of the Constitution and the dissolution of the Chamber, and nominated the notorious Emil Eddé as temporary *Chef d'Etat*. The Chamber was closed and surrounded by black troops, leaving a number of deputies inside, who refused to leave until compelled to do so. A strict curfew was imposed and French troops apparently received orders to disperse all crowds.

These dictatorial measures provoked violent indignation. Demonstrations were held in various parts of Beirut, but crowds were dispersed and even fired on by detachments of French marines and Senegalese troops, although in no cases do demonstrators appear to have been armed or to have intended a serious threat to security. Amongst other incidents, a peaceful deputation of students mainly from the American University, who had called to see His Majesty's Minister, were fired on outside the British Legation. Similar incidents took place in Saida and Tripoli; in the latter town Bren-carriers were driven into a defenceless crowd, killing and wounding a number of people, including some small children. The French authorities have so far refused to give any information as to the total number of casualties, but the number known to the British military authorities is eighty-two, of whom sixteen have died. Blenheim bombers were flown at low level over Beirut to intimidate the population, until a demand was made by the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Middle East, to the Officer Commanding the French Air Force in the Levant to cease this senseless and provocative gesture.

Official protests were at once addressed to the French authorities by His Majesty's Minister, King Ibn Saud, the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires (and, subsequently, his Government), and the Egyptian King and Prime Minister. In addition, protests have been lodged with His Majesty's Minister and other heads

of Diplomatic Missions by all local Moslem and Christian religious dignitaries and notables, and by public bodies and associations representing every creed, class and profession.

His Majesty's Minister promptly made known that His Majesty's Government did not recognise the puppet régime under Emil Eddé set up by M. Helleu, but that, on the contrary, the two Ministers who were still at liberty were regarded, together with the Chamber of Deputies, as constituting the sole legal Lebanese authority. Meanwhile the facts were being fully reported to London.

After a debate in the House of Commons His Majesty's Government announced that they stood firmly by the declaration made in 1941 by His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo, that he associated himself with the assurances of independence given to the Lebanon by General Catroux.

His Majesty's Resident Minister in Algiers was at once instructed to take the matter up very strongly with the French National Committee, and the Minister of State Resident in the Middle East came to Beirut on the 13th November to examine the situation. During his visit he received religious dignitaries and notables and several deputies, who left him in no doubt as to the deep indignation which is felt throughout the country, and of the solidarity of the Lebanese regardless of race or creed which has been achieved by the French action.

The two ministers who are still at liberty remained in Beirut for a few days, during which time they attended sessions of the Chamber, which has been meeting daily. They then took refuge in the hills with some of their followers as the French were seeking to arrest them. Meanwhile the Chamber has continued to meet daily, changing its meeting place, and has adopted a number of motions. Amongst other measures, the two remaining ministers have been authorised, in accordance with the Constitution, to act for the President and Parliament; Emil Eddé has been declared guilty of high treason; and the population has been urged not to pay taxes to the puppet régime. The Ministers acting for the Government have also issued instructions to Government officials and employees not to obey the orders of the Eddé régime, and nominated their own successors, chosen from the deputies, in case they themselves are arrested.

French propaganda services are engaged in playing down the gravity of the situation. In addition, every effort has been made by the Délégué Général to convince the whole population that the crisis was brought about by the British. It is being put about that the British are seeking to foment a quarrel between Christians and Moslems in order to further their general Arab policy; and that the British wish to steal the Levant States from the French. The pamphlet (referred to under "Press and Propaganda" below), which is almost certainly being distributed by the French authority, quotes the Prime Minister's declaration of the 15th July, 1941, that, "We look for no privileges in Syria. We have safeguarded the historical interest of France in Syria and their pre-eminence over the interest of other powers" in such a manner as to imply that the Prime Minister has now broken his pledge.

Serious as is the present state of affairs, a much worse situation is likely to develop if the French do not soon release the President and his Ministers. So far, in the knowledge that they have the sympathy of His Majesty's Government and of the entire Arab world, the population have responded to the exhortations to calm made by the British authorities and have shown exemplary patience; but unless a speedy end is made to the present state of affairs, a widespread revolt may start. Responsible leaders have assured His Majesty's Legation again and again that they are resolved to do nothing which might embarrass His Majesty's Government or hamper the war effort in any way, but that they can hardly be expected to refrain from defending what they hold to be their lawful rights. Feeling is running very high, and the bitterness against the French—the accumulation of twenty years of misgovernment—has come into the open. This sudden revelation of the hatred which is felt for the French in the Levant may have come as a shock to the French authorities, whose reaction to the crisis has been correspondingly violent. General Catroux has been sent to Beirut, with full powers to arrange a settlement, but it is not yet known what solution he has in mind, nor whether his proposals are likely to be satisfactory to His Majesty's Government.

#### *Syria: Damascus.*

The events which have been taking place in the Lebanon have occupied the attention of the Syrian public for the last week to the exclusion of all other topics. The calm atmosphere in which the debate over the change in the Constitution took place in the Lebanese Chamber on the 8th November greatly



relieved the Syrian Government, who thought that the matter was well on the way to settlement, since the French would have every opportunity to discuss matters with the Lebanese President before he promulgated the changes voted by the Chamber. The events of the morning of the 11th November, therefore, came as a complete surprise.

Both the Syrian Government and population were deeply incensed, especially at the manner in which the President and Ministers were arrested. On the 12th November the Government sent a protest to M. Helleu, and on the 15th November the question was debated in the Chamber. Some twenty speakers attacked the French, to the manifest approval of the Prime Minister, the members of the Government and the House as a whole; and on being put to the vote, a motion condemning the actions of the French and demanding the reinstatement of the Lebanese President and Government was passed unanimously.

There has as yet been no resort to violence, but there are many indications that the temper of the populace is rising. It is unlikely that the Government would or could make any serious effort to deal with disorders, which might, therefore, quickly become uncontrollable. There is reason to believe that the French are becoming nervous on this score and that they are already making preliminary troop dispositions.

Throughout the rest of the country, feeling has been running high. Shops have been closed in most towns, and protests have been made, but so far there have been no disorders. The announcement that His Majesty's Government stood by the endorsement of the declarations of Syrian and Lebanese independence has made a very favourable impression, and British pleas for patience have so far restrained political leaders from inciting the masses to violence. The situation is, however, fraught with danger.

#### *Press and Propaganda.*

With the suppression of the press, all objective reporting of news has ceased. The French-controlled Radio Levant has been putting out distorted accounts of recent events, and ridiculing the idea that anything in the way of serious incidents has occurred. This has had a most provocative effect; in fact, one deputation which visited His Majesty's Legation to protest against the action of the French also made a strong additional protest at the insult to their intelligence of these wireless denials of events which were taking place before the eyes of the whole population. Broadcasts from neighbouring countries have been denounced as tendentious, and have, in fact, been coupled with those of the enemy. Pamphlets purporting to be clandestine, but clearly sponsored by the French, have been circulating, denying some obvious facts, and warning the population to be on their guard against the machinations of foreign Arab States and those who support them. M. Helleu is pictured as the benevolent saviour of the country.

The legal Government, for their part, have been represented by a clandestine newspaper, in which decrees and the true facts about recent events have been published.

To meet the needs of British military personnel, the army authorities have made temporary arrangements for the publication of a broadsheet called the *Ninth Army News*, giving news of the war only.

The enemy wireless has, not unnaturally, made the most of the crisis, and has seized upon the opportunity to point sardonically to the manner in which the French and British implement their promises and justify their claims to be fighting the war for the independence of small peoples.

[E 7271/27/89]

No. 46

*Note on a Conversation between the Minister of State in the Middle East and Saadullah Jabri (Prime Minister of Syria) and Jamil Mardam (Minister for Foreign Affairs, Syria), on 3rd November, 1943.—(Received from the Office of the Minister of State, Cairo; Received in Foreign Office 23rd November.)*

I ADVISED them to go slow, pointing out that the French had received rather a shock in the results of the recent elections and were in a touchy frame of mind.

The Syrian Ministers accepted this with some reserve, especially on the part of Saadullah. In fact his motif throughout was, "You must rid us of these

people": I advised them not to push the "Intérêts Communs" question into the foreground. There must be many less contentious questions which might be tackled first. I suggested that it would be wiser to proceed on the principle of the thin end of the wedge. Jamil finally more or less agreed to postpone action on this question for two or three months, though Saadullah was obviously reluctant. "However," he remarked, "I have my convictions only but am no diplomat. I leave that to Jamil."

As regards the treaty they reiterated their determination not to conclude a treaty with the present French authorities but asked for our support. They said that the French authorities were continually insisting that the French would concede none of the Syrian demands until the Syrians agreed to sign a treaty.

They asked what our (British) attitude was towards the Middle East generally. I said that we had no territorial or political ambitions but that we had, of course, great interests in the Middle East—if only to mention oil and communications. To secure these we wanted to see a calm Arab world—economically and politically contented—and Syria was part of the Arab world. They said there could be no possible objection to what I had said from the Syrian side and further that anything we required to help our war effort and for the security of our troops they would gladly concede.

Jamil Mardam mentioned the granting of visas as one of the attributes of sovereignty which he thought should be in their hands at once and said that any security modifications necessary could easily be arranged with us, but they must have a share in the control of their own frontiers.

He also raised the question of the O.C.P. though he did not make it clear to what extent he wished the Syrian Government to increase its participation. His criticisms appeared to be that at present there were too many different authorities concerned.

The attitude disclosed in the talk was one of great reasonableness so far as we are concerned but a quite unyielding one as regards the French; though they did appear to accept the advice to go slow. They wanted quite definitely to be linked up with Great Britain and not with France.

R. G. C.

[E 7323/27/89]

No. 47

*Mr. Eden to Sir K. Cornwallis (Bagdad).*

(No. 233.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, 24th November, 1943.*

I TRANSMIT herewith a copy of an aide-mémoire<sup>(1)</sup> left by his Excellency Daoud Al Haidari, the Iraqi Minister in London, with Sir Alexander Cadogan, on the 15th November, 1943.

2. Sir Alexander Cadogan said in reply that undoubtedly an unpleasant situation existed, though he cautioned the Iraqi Minister not to accept without question all the press reports. He also said that His Majesty's Government were in close touch with the French in the matter. General Catroux was due at Beirut that morning and he had hopes that he might bring with him proposals that would lead to a *détente* in a very short period. The best hope for that would be that disorder should not spread.

3. When the minister began to discuss the causes of the dispute, Sir Alexander Cadogan said that while he was not going to defend the action which the French had taken, it must be remembered that the Lebanese had not conducted their case wisely. They had ignored, apparently, the French offer to negotiate on the basis of the 1936 treaty and had proceeded to certain unilateral acts which might be regarded as the beginning, at least, of the elimination of French authority. The French had doubtless felt that they must act at once if they were not to let the case go by default. He repeated that he did not defend their action.

4. Sir Alexander Cadogan went on to observe that the Iraqi note went rather far in demanding that the intervention of the French in Syria and the Lebanon should cease. He concluded by saying that if the present situation could be remedied and if feelings subsided, he hoped that the present regrettable incident might result in a satisfactory general settlement.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

[27557]

K



[E 7514/27/59]

No. 48

*Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received 1st December.)*

(No. 75.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Beirut presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and, with reference to Beirut telegram No. 602 to Foreign Office of 27th October, 1943, has the honour to transmit to him a copy of letter addressed by the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Hellen.

*Beirut, 21st November, 1943.*

Enclosure in No. 48.

*Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Hellen.*

M. l'Ambassadeur,

LE premier Gouvernement constitutionnel du Liban indépendant estime que son devoir est de parfaire cette indépendance et de l'organiser dans l'intérêt du peuple libanais.

La France et ses alliés combattent aujourd'hui pour la liberté des individus et des peuples. Après plusieurs années d'une guerre acharnée, le monde est entré dans la voie des réalisations. L'indépendance du Liban est un des premiers effets de ce combat glorieux.

Cette indépendance, qui est un droit naturel pour le peuple libanais, a été reconnue par les Nations Unies et Amies. Et en envoyant au Liban des agents diplomatiques accrédités auprès du Gouvernement libanais, ces nations ont donné à notre indépendance une consécration officielle.

Dans ces conditions, nous sommes heureux de constater que l'accession du Liban à la complète souveraineté répond, non seulement aux vœux de la population libanaise, mais aussi au désir de la France amie et de ses représentants.

Cependant, l'ancien régime, qui a duré plus de vingt ans, comportait la privation du Gouvernement libanais d'une partie des attributs de la souveraineté et des intérêts propres au Liban.

Cette situation n'est plus compatible avec notre indépendance.

Il nous incombe aujourd'hui, au début de cette nouvelle ère, de faire tout ce qui est nécessaire pour rendre cette indépendance effective et totale.

C'est dans ce but que le Gouvernement libanais a l'honneur d'attirer l'attention de votre Excellence sur les points suivants :

1. Nous souhaitons que la Délégation Générale se transforme en une représentation diplomatique, compatible avec l'indépendance du Liban.
2. Tous les attributs de la souveraineté sur le territoire libanais seront désormais exercés par les autorités constitutionnelles libanaises.
3. Nous demandons que le Gouvernement libanais prenne en main tous les intérêts et services que gère actuellement la Délégation Générale pour le compte du Liban.
4. Quant aux intérêts communs entre le Liban et la Syrie, nous avons l'honneur de vous informer que nous sommes d'accord avec le Gouvernement syrien pour les gérer en commun.

Telles sont les conditions essentielles et indispensables à la réalisation effective de notre indépendance.

Nous avons la conviction que notre appel sera entendu par la France et ses représentants. La France a toujours été le champion de la liberté et de l'indépendance des peuples. Elle est liée par une vieille amitié à ce Liban dont les aspirations nationales sont conformes aux plus belles traditions françaises. Les efforts que la France a déployés en faveur de ce pays devront aujourd'hui trouver non seulement une consécration théorique mais une réalisation pratique et réelle. C'est en permettant au Liban et à son Gouvernement d'exercer tous

les attributs de la souveraineté et de gérer tous les intérêts du pays, que cette indépendance sera une réalité. Nous sommes certains que la France ne faillira pas à sa mission historique. C'est ce que le peuple libanais attend du grand pays qui a été toujours son ami.

Veuillez agréer, &amp;c.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères :

*Beyrouth, le 25 octobre 1943.*

[E 7682/27/89]

No. 49

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 86—Syria and the Lebanon, 24th November, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office, 8th December.)*

## 1. General.

HOPES that the arrival of General Catroux would be followed by a prompt and satisfactory settlement of the political crisis were soon dashed. It was apparent from the outset that he intended to temporise, in the hope, doubtless, that he would be able to alienate support from the legal Government, and that, in the meantime, international interest in the question would die down. He resented British promptings to deal with the situation urgently, and it was not until much later, when he realised the strength of public feeling in the Lebanon and the fact that the British were in earnest, that he decided to abandon his delaying tactics.

After discussing the situation with His Majesty's Minister, who explained the point of view of His Majesty's Government, General Catroux began consultations with such of the local religious dignitaries and notables as could be induced to meet him. He was, however, unable to find a single person of note who was prepared to support Eddé, or declare himself in favour of the action taken by Hellen. Even the senile Maronite Patriarch, who has hitherto been one of the staunchest supporters of the French authorities, refused to take up position against the Government. Meanwhile, every effort was made by the British authorities to make General Catroux and the Algiers Committee realise the gravity of the situation.

The prolongation of the crisis caused by these consultations had a very serious effect on the local situation. Despite the efforts of the British authorities to persuade the political leaders to remain calm, impatience grew and preparations for open revolt began to be made. Leaders of rural communities, especially in the Bekaa, began to arm and organise their retainers and co-ordinated uprisings were being planned. Their purpose was to create a state of affairs which would force the British authorities to take over armed control. The two Ministers still at liberty gathered together a steadily increasing number of followers in the mountain village in which they had taken refuge, and by the 16th November had already had a brush with the French. Reports of the encounter are conflicting, but it is certain that the French used armoured cars in what may have been an attempt to take the village, before their troops were withdrawn on urgent representations being made by the British military authorities. Indications were not wanting that outbreaks of violence were imminent in Syria, especially in the Jebel Druze, and neighbouring Arab countries became increasingly restive.

By the 19th November the situation had become so grave that the Minister of State Resident in the Middle East was instructed by His Majesty's Government to fly to Beirut for the second time since the crisis began. He informed General Catroux of the grave apprehension felt in London, and insisted upon the necessity for a prompt and acceptable settlement. At the same time pressure was again brought to bear on the French National Committee in Algiers, who were informed that His Majesty's Government could not allow a threat to military security to develop in this area without taking appropriate measures.

On the 20th November the French authorities attempted to make more arrests, fortunately without success; but excitement in Beirut grew to such an extent that it was feared that the outbreak of widespread disorders could not be delayed more than a few hours.

Fortunately the firm insistence of His Majesty's Government began to produce the desired effect, and on the 21st November the French National Committee issued instructions for the release of the President of the Republic



and all the imprisoned Ministers. Abdul Hamid Kerami, the Moslem leader from North Lebanon, was also released. Emil Eddé relapsed into well-guarded obscurity. At the same time it was announced that M. Helleu was to be recalled.

This news, which became known late in the evening, was received with wild rejoicing. Despite the curfew, large crowds soon assembled in the streets and began shouting and firing into the air. Similar scenes of wild enthusiasm took place when the President and Ministers were released on the following day; but the joy of the populace was quickly tempered when it was realised that the decision of the Committee of Liberation, whilst reinstating the President of the Republic in his functions, had not provided for the return to office of the Government. The character of the popular demonstrations immediately changed, and once again there was danger of disorders, threatening security. The French flag was torn down and trampled upon, as were all pictures of General de Gaulle within the reach of the crowd, and a number of bombs were thrown (one at the offices of a Jesuit-controlled Arabic newspaper), fortunately without serious results. Luckily the French withdrew their troops from the streets, otherwise most violent clashes would certainly have occurred, since the crowds were fully armed, as was indicated by the heavy firing into the air which took place. The shops remained closed and the general strike continued.

Faced with this ugly situation, and subjected to uncompromising pressure by His Majesty's Government, the Algiers Committee at last gave way. On General Catroux's instructions M. Chataigneau (hitherto Secretary-General of the Délégation Générale), who was appointed Délégué Général *ad interim*, cancelled all the measures decreed by M. Helleu on the 11th November with the exception of the annulment of the Constitutional Reform Bill, and the statement contained in the preamble to M. Helleu's decrees, that new general elections would be necessary. This decision was announced on the wireless on the evening of the 22nd November.

General Catroux did not, however, even then make the gesture of formally recognising the Government, who, nevertheless, decided to resume their functions. Accordingly, the Minister of the Interior and the Minister for Foreign Affairs went to their offices on the day following their release, and the President of the Republic visited the Petit Sérail accompanied by the Prime Minister. The latter addressed the huge crowds (who were perfectly orderly), congratulating them on the restoration of their President, and announcing the return of the country to constitutional life. He declared the city open as from the 24th November.

There was thus, for a short space of time, a state of deadlock, with the Lebanese Government resolved to exercise their functions, and the French authorities refusing to recognise their legality. The situation was still fraught with danger, and His Majesty's Government continued to bring strong pressure to bear on the French National Committee to give formal recognition to the Government. On the strong recommendation of General Catroux, the Committee yielded to the necessities of the situation, and late in the evening of the 23rd November the general received authority to inform the President of the Republic that the Committee recognised the legality of the Government. This decision was communicated to the President on the morning of the 24th November, and later in the day General Catroux and the President paid one another formal calls.

The only point which the French have not yet conceded is therefore the revocation of the veto proclaimed by Helleu on the Constitutional Reform Bill, which was the immediate cause of the whole crisis. There are indications that General Catroux is in favour of yielding on this point also, but in view of the mentality of the French civilians and officers here, does not feel able to take this step until he has obtained the authority of Algiers. The question of the application of the Bill is likely to be merged into the wider one of the adjustment of future Franco-Lebanese and Franco-Syrian relations, foreshadowed in the Algiers Committee's communiqué of the 21st November.

The manner in which the crisis has been settled has greatly increased British prestige. Some credit for the solution will justly fall on General Catroux who, when he realised the gravity of the situation, adopted a most praiseworthy attitude. But it is fully realised that but for the firm stand taken by the British authorities, the cause of Lebanese independence could not have been won without serious loss of life and widespread revolt, which might have spread to neighbouring countries, and both the Government and people are deeply grateful for the assistance which has been given to them. The courage, restraint and discipline shown by the Lebanese themselves are beyond praise. Despite the most violent

provocation they have throughout obeyed British exhortations to calm and subordinated their justifiable desire for forceful and revengeful action to the need, which they fully understood, to avoid anything liable to interfere with the Allied war effort. Though the strike was maintained with surprising efficiency, no work of military importance was held up; in fact, in one instance strikers immediately returned to duty when it was pointed out to them that they were engaged on important war work.

Of the effects of this crisis upon the future position of France in the Levant, it is too early to judge. It appears now to have been precipitated by the hot-headed action of a small group in the Grand Sérail, aided by the intransigent policy of General de Gaulle. The French National Committee were evidently ill-informed about the whole affair, and General Catroux has admitted his surprise at the fervour of the new patriotic feeling which this incident has revealed. Many problems remain to be solved, and agreement on some form of *modus vivendi* is urgently necessary, but may be difficult to reach, since the political atmosphere has been seriously embittered. The Moslems especially are still seething with indignation at the manner in which the Prime Minister was arrested, and at having been prevented from going to the mosques on Friday last. Flushed with their victory, the Lebanese Government will be difficult to handle, whilst the French, who are smarting under a sense of defeat, are not in the mood to make concessions. Much will depend upon the personality of the new Délégué Général, who has not yet been nominated. In the meantime, a not unimportant result of General Catroux's mission is that MM. Boegner and Baelen, who have for long been the cause of many of the incidents which have produced friction between the French and British authorities, and who undoubtedly had a large share in this latest crisis, have resigned. In addition, M. Gautier, head of the Sûreté Générale, whose conduct during the elections should have been sufficient to ensure his removal, has been dismissed.

## 2. Wheat.

The crisis did not adversely affect the collection of cereals in the Lebanon. On the contrary, average daily collections actually increased. For the period the 29th October to the 10th November, daily purchases amounted to 17 tons; between the 11th and the 18th November they rose sharply to 48 tons; and although this figure was not maintained, the daily average for the 19th, 20th and the 21st November was 30 tons. These figures seem to show that the farmers wanted money urgently to support the national movement of resistance.

At the outbreak of the crisis, the Lebanese towns were well stocked with grain; but in Beirut, where flour is distributed, there was some fear that the mills would have to close down on account of lack of the transport necessary to clear the storage space. Throughout the Lebanon, distribution is made monthly, and was due to commence on the 15th November, but the shops employed by the *Ravitaillement* as distributing agents were closed. A shadow plan was therefore devised by the British military authorities for distribution of flour from centres to be set up in the streets. However, on the 19th November, the legal Government instructed the shops to open, and the army scheme was not therefore necessary. It is interesting to note that the population, though hungry, at first boycotted the shops because the French authorities placed Senegalese guards over them and the distributing lorries. These guards were subsequently withdrawn, and the French claimed that their employment had been due to a mistake since they had intended to use Lebanese gendarmes and troupes spéciales for this purpose.

When purchasing did commence, the demand was about thrice its normal volume, which would seem to indicate an intention on the part of the population to secure as large a stock of flour as possible, so as to be able to maintain resistance over a long period.

## 3. Syria-Damascus.

There have been no important developments. Public feeling has followed closely the fluctuations of the situation in the Lebanon, and signs have not been wanting that any further delay in reaching a settlement would have proved too much for the patience of the Damascenes. In fact, public opinion has been well ahead of the Government who, towards the end of the crisis were becoming seriously afraid that they would soon be unable to control the masses. On the eve of the release of the Lebanese President and Ministers, the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the French authorities that the Government could not hold the country for another forty-eight hours; and there seems to be little



doubt that if the solution had been delayed any longer, an explosion would have occurred. It is not yet possible to predict what effect these events will have upon the position of the Syrian Government.

#### 4. Aleppo.

Popular feeling in this area has been intense, as elsewhere. The lack of reliable news, due to French censorship and the activities of French propagandists, caused a slight feeling of despondency during the first few days of the crisis, but confidence quickly revived when it became known that the British authorities were making a firm stand. The incident has been regarded as the first real clash between long-repressed Arab nationalism and French imperialism and, as British interests and promises are involved, has been realised to be much more important than any of the efforts previously made towards independence. The apparent inactivity of the Syrian Government has therefore caused surprise.

There have been temporary strikes of shops in Aleppo and neighbouring villages, but no incidents have occurred.

The French have worked hard to spread their version of the affair, which they tried to class as a minor incident, and have sought to enlist Christian and Jewish sympathies by resurrecting the old bogey of Moslem fanaticism. On the whole, however, the population have not been deceived, but have remained angry and disdainful.

#### 5. Homs and Hama.

The tense atmosphere occasioned by the Lebanese crisis continued throughout the week, which started with interest concentrated on the meeting of the Syrian Parliament to debate the question. Although the six Deputies from Homs and Hama were regarded locally as having acquitted themselves well, there was general disappointment that the Government had not adopted a stronger line and accepted the proposition of one of the local Deputies to annul Article 116 of the Constitution (a measure similar to that which provoked the crisis in the Lebanon).

The bazaars in both Homs and Hama, which had been closed on the 14th November, reopened the following day, but in Homs closed again on the 16th November. A peaceful demonstration led by students and numbering about 1,000, assembled outside the Sérail where a deputation was received by the Mohafez. After repeated requests the Mohafez addressed the crowd, congratulating them on their orderly conduct, and promising to convey their protests to the Government.

The deputation then went to the office of the Political Officer, accompanied by local police, who had been instructed by the Mohafez not to oppose the demonstration unnecessarily. The students protested to the Political Officer against the action of the French, and asked that the British authorities should take strong measures to prevent further bloodshed. The Political Officer promised to convey their protests to His Majesty's Minister, and assured them of British support, at the same time asking them not to do anything which would alienate the sympathy which was felt for them. It was observed that both Moslem and Christian students were represented, even students of the Jesuit College being included. The crowd then dispersed quietly.

On the 17th November the town of Homs reopened, but closed again on the following day. On the 18th November the students, who appeared dissatisfied with the relative inactivity of the Syrian Government, assembled outside the post office, and sent a telegram to the Speaker of the Syrian Chamber and to the Damascus press, affirming their support for the Lebanese. They then dispersed quietly, and no further demonstrations took place. Certain agitators had intended to hold a mass meeting in the principal mosque during the afternoon of the 18th but the Mohafez succeeded in preventing this demonstration. The town reopened on the 19th November.

French propaganda in this area has been extraordinarily inept, having consisted in accusing the British of distributing arms to the population of Beirut and of having bribed the Lebanese President and Prime Minister to oppose the French. This propaganda has, however, discredited itself and official statements made by the French that the Lebanon was calm and that the shops were open in Beirut were known by the local population to be untrue.

#### 6. Jebel Druze.

The Lebanese crisis had immediate repercussions in this area. The Druzes, of course, had an obvious interest in the crisis, as the Lebanese Minister of Defence, who was organising resistance from his mountain refuge, is himself a

Druze, and had gathered round him numbers of armed Druze followers. The French made attempts to take advantage of local family feuds to sway opinion in their favour, and also tried to persuade certain Druze chieftains with connexions in the Lebanon to use their influence to the same end there. They met, however, with little success; and the political officer reports that the majority of the Druzes were quick to disown the actions of those whom the French induced to support them.

Soltan Pasha, head of the Atrash family, is reported to have offered the support of armed tribesmen to the Syrian President; and only forty-eight hours before the announcement of the release of the Lebanese President and Ministers, emissaries were sent to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the whole Jebel was on the point of rising.

#### 7. Alaouite territory.

The tension produced by the Lebanese crisis has been as high here as in other parts of the country. The action taken by the French in the Lebanon has been regarded as indicative of the same intolerance of independence as has marked French rule in the Levant from the outset; and as proof that French policy, whether pre-war, Vichy or de Gaullist, is always the same, viz., to install an apparently constitutional régime, but to oppose any attempts at real freedom by the rule of *arrêts* and force. Of the nineteen Deputies who made speeches expressing their disapproval of the action of the French at the parliamentary sitting of the 15th November, four were Alaouite.

Fortunately, however, British counsels of restraint prevailed, and whilst there were temporary strikes, and one demonstration (in Tartous) no disorders occurred. The crowds who demonstrated in Tartous were dispersed by the local British Field Security sergeant, who urged them to keep the peace. The French *délégué* subsequently expressed his appreciation of this action.

As the crisis dragged on, however, grave misgivings began to be felt; and any outbreak of trouble elsewhere, especially in Damascus, would undoubtedly have been followed by the most violent disorders here.

#### 12. Press and Propaganda.

One of the greatest difficulties encountered during the Lebanese crisis has been that of providing objective and unsensational news, in the absence of which the population have been at the mercy of wild rumour and insidious propaganda. The legal Government continued to publish its clandestine newspaper, but this had only a limited circulation, and had to contend with the French-inspired *L'Orient* and the French wireless. The B.B.C. comments on the situation, where heard, had a steadying effect and every effort was made to disseminate them by word of mouth. In addition, extracts from *The Times*, which were of course suppressed by French censorship, were circulated through the medium of political officers, who were provided with a daily directive and news telegram by these headquarters. This material was of very considerable assistance to them in backing up their exhortations to calm and patience; while the part played by the political officers themselves was of the greatest value. They were regarded, especially in the more remote districts, as the only source of reliable news, and the information which they were able to give was eagerly awaited. Their position became very difficult in the middle of the crisis, when for forty-eight hours there was complete absence of any reference to the situation in broadcasts from the B.B.C. and Cairo. This omission had a most depressing effect, especially as the French wireless was taking the line that the crisis was past and the situation was almost normal; it was feared that the British attitude was weakening, and the greatest efforts were necessary to restrain the political leaders from taking matters into their own hands.

[E 7963/27/89]

No. 50

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 87—Syria and the Lebanon,  
1st December, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office, 20th December.)

#### 1. General.

THOUGH outwardly the situation is now normal, the political atmosphere is still very troubled. The Lebanese President and Government have shown themselves willing to be conciliatory, avoiding on the whole in their public utterances



anything which could be construed as recrimination or provocation; but it is clear that they are conscious that their position has been strengthened by recent events.

At a meeting which took place on the 29th November between the President, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the one hand, and General Catroux and M. Bart (the new Délégué for the Lebanon), on the other, the General accepted without much difficulty the Lebanese contention that there could be no question of negotiating a Franco-Lebanese treaty at the present stage and that the various outstanding matters would have to be discussed and dealt with piecemeal. In accepting this point of view, the General was probably influenced by the firmness which had already been displayed by the Syrian Government, with whom he had had a similar discussion a few days previously (see under "Damascus" below). He pressed, however, for a general covering preamble in which the Lebanese would recognise the pre-eminent position of France, "as already recognised by the British." The President and the two Ministers did not commit themselves on this, and after discussion with their Cabinet colleagues came to the conclusion that any such admission would sooner or later be exploited by the French. They see no reason to regard themselves as committed in this matter by the action of His Majesty's Government, especially as no other State has conceded any special position to France in the Levant States. On the contrary, they know that this is a point on which the United States Government hold different views from those of His Majesty's Government. They are, moreover, merely following here the lead of the Syrians, who have always fought shy of the ambiguous phrase "pre-eminent position," though willing to concede that France has a special cultural position in the Levant.

At a press conference on the 29th November the Prime Minister reaffirmed his faith in the independence of the Lebanon "within its present frontiers," and threatened severe punishment to all who might endeavour to sow discord amongst the population. Questioned on the subject of future Franco-Lebanese relations, the Prime Minister declared that the Government were not prepared to negotiate on the basis of the mandate, but only on a footing of equality and independence; at the same time, nothing in their activities should be regarded as inimical to France. Referring to the Constitutional Reform Bill passed on the 8th November, the Prime Minister stated that the revisions voted were to be regarded as in force. He also referred to, and indignantly denied, rumours that the Government proposed to deprive the Armenians of their Lebanese nationality.

These and other reports that certain sections of the population, notably Armenians, alarmed at the increasing power of the Moslems, are preparing for a strike to show their disapproval of the Government, are causing a certain nervousness. Whilst they may be due to some extent to the general upheaval of opinion brought about by the crisis, there is, unfortunately, ample evidence that such stories are being propagated by the French as part of a widespread and co-ordinated campaign intended to stir up confessional antagonism. The method employed seems to be to bribe a few Moslems to make provocative anti-Christian utterances, and then draw the attention of the Christian community (especially the Maronites) to these "portents." At least one of the Maronite archbishops is undoubtedly supporting this campaign. At Zahle there has actually been canvassing for demonstrations against the settlement reached by General Catroux, on the grounds that the British authorities are working for Arab union; and in the same area Sûreté officials have been seeking support for a petition to the Government for the reinstatement of the Mohafez of the Mount Lebanon district, who has been dismissed for having supported Emil Eddé. It should be added, however, that the Bekaa as a whole is not following the lead of Zahle, which was always a stronghold of reactionary Maronite sentiment.

The reactions of the French themselves towards the settlement of the crisis have been violent and more uniform than might have been expected at an earlier stage. While, during the first few days of the crisis, many Frenchmen were outspoken in their condemnation of those who had been primarily responsible for it, i.e., MM. Helleu, Boegner and Gautier, knowledge of the fact that the settlement was only arrived at under the strongest British pressure, and that French prestige had suffered an extremely heavy blow, seems to have hardened and unified French opinion. General Catroux addressed three separate meetings of local Frenchmen, and at one of them he is reliably reported to have talked of "a second Fashoda." This was in direct contradiction with the line which he had hitherto taken in claiming that the settlement was of his own devising and had been uninfluenced by third parties. It seems likely, however, that the violence of local French reactions convinced him of the need for changing his tune.

So violent, indeed, was that reaction that there have been many rumours of an impending "Putsch" against the Government by French malcontents; and the President and Ministers have provided themselves with a heavy guard of gendarmes.

General Catroux has now returned to Algiers to report upon the situation, but is expected to return in about a week's time to begin negotiations for a Franco-Lebanese and Franco-Syrian *modus vivendi*.

Outside the Lebanon, the excitement aroused by the crisis has died down, but it is realised that a severe struggle still lies ahead.

## 2. Wheat.

Purchases for the nine days ending the 28th November have been 4,465 tons, a daily average of 496 tons.

The French Caisse Centrale is alarmed at the large total of its loans to the O.C.P. and has refused to make any more advances. It has therefore not been possible to buy all available cereals. Orders for sacks necessary for 1944 have also had to be held up. It seems unlikely that the Caisse Centrale will reverse its decision and unless the cereals offered to London on the 11th November are bought the monopoly power of the O.C.P. are threatened. The Syrian Government are already making suggestions for the relaxation of controls on cereals and if purchases are not resumed very quickly will probably suggest a return to a free market.

## 3. Syria-Damascus.

The end of the Lebanese crisis was received in Syria with relief tinged with a certain reserve. It was generally realised that the release and reinstatement of the Lebanese President and Ministers was almost entirely the result of British pressure; confidence in the sincerity of the British guarantee of Syrian independence has therefore increased, and both the President and Government are now more than ever eager to identify themselves with British policy. The reason for the reserve which is felt is the fear that the constitutional battle may have to be fought all over again; though it is admitted that the Lebanese are now in a better position than before, since the likelihood of the renewed use of force by the French is comparatively slight.

On the 20th and 21st November, when the crisis was nearing a solution and it was obvious that the position of the French was going to be seriously weakened, the Syrians thought of profiting by the occasion to strike a blow for themselves and press for the surrender of the funds of common interest, public security (i.e., the hated Sûreté Générale), the Bedouin Control, the Censorship and other powers at present in French hands. However, according to Government circles, their "better nature" prevailed, and they decided that it would not be noble of them to profit by the French defeat. They therefore confined themselves to urging the return to the *status quo ante* in the Lebanon.

Syrian aspirations are in fact by no means quiescent, and the ground is being busily cleared for a diplomatic contest with the French. The first preparatory step on the Syrian side is to establish themselves in a position in which they can negotiate with the French on an equal footing. The statement by the French National Committee that it was intended to harmonise Syrian independence with the terms of the mandate provoked the inevitable reaction, namely, the repudiation by the Syrians of the mandate. This has always been a cardinal point of policy of the Syrian Nationalists, who assert that they have never at any stage admitted the validity of the mandate. Their position was strongly asserted by the Prime Minister in a speech in Aleppo on the 23rd November (see under "Aleppo" below).

The same line was taken by a number of Deputies at a sitting of the Syrian Parliament on the 27th November. Various speakers emphasised that the mandate was unacceptable as a basis of negotiation, and the Government was urged to take over the powers mentioned above and "the national forces." Iraq and Egypt were instanced as examples of independent countries collaborating with the Allies.

A report by the Foreign Affairs Committee, read at the same session, recommended that article 116 of the Constitution should be ignored, on the grounds that it did not form part of the Constitution drawn up by the Constituent Assembly of 1928, but was merely a reserve added unilaterally by the then French High Commissioner. It was proposed, therefore, that the President of the Republic and the Parliament should take an oath to observe the first 115 articles of the Constitution only. The Minister for Foreign Affairs announced that the



opinions which had been expressed in the Chamber were in conformity with the Government's policy. The Constitution is being reprinted without article 116.

The Syrian President, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs made their point of view regarding the mandate clear to General Catroux before his departure for Algiers. They left the General in no doubt that they had no intention of negotiating a treaty on any basis; and also insisted that they should be given, in the near future, all the rights and powers of a sovereign State. They also renewed their demand for the handing over of the funds of common interest.

General Catroux is reported to have expressed sympathy with Syrian aspirations, and to have promised to put the Government's views to the French National Committee.

#### 4. Aleppo.

News of the release of the Lebanese President and Ministers and of their resumption of office gave great satisfaction. In general, the crisis is regarded as having strengthened the hand of the Syrian Government, owing to the support for Lebanese and Syrian aspirations which has been evoked in neighbouring Arab countries. Manifestations of joy were, however, discouraged, and no demonstrations took place.

There was a large audience at the meeting held on the 23rd November to commemorate the death of the local patriot, Ibrahim Hanano (a former prominent Syrian Nationalist), but the gathering remained orderly throughout. The Greek Orthodox Bishop of Hama (to whom reference has been made in previous summaries) made one of his political speeches, identifying the minorities with Nationalist aspirations and, alone amongst other speakers, acknowledging the help given to the Levant States by the Allies. The most important address was, however, that made by the Prime Minister, who, as already reported under "Damascus" above, strongly asserted the point of view of the Government regarding the mandate. "We have never," he said, "admitted the use of this term and we do not admit it now." He referred to the Atlantic Charter, and expressed the hope that "the authorities" would realise that they could no longer deal roughly with small nations. Concerning the demands made by the Government for the transfer of powers, the Prime Minister said, "We have asked the French to hand over the exercise of our own political privileges. We have got some of them already, and soon shall have them all."

The French délégué was amongst the officials who attended this meeting. Others, who at times listened with some apprehension, were the numerous local Christian church dignitaries, who have been encouraged by the French to dread any strengthening of Arab unity, and not all of whom have yet accepted the view of their colleague from Hama as to the inevitability of this development.

The population generally realise the importance of the efforts made by the British authorities to bring about the settlement which has been achieved, and despite French insinuations, understand that peace and fairness were the real aims.

#### 5. Homs and Hama.

The news of the release of the arrested members of the Lebanese Government was received with reserve, and there was little slackening of the tension until it was known that Riad Sulh and his Ministers had resumed their functions. The credit for the successful solution of the crisis is given to the British by all sections of the population excepting only the employees of the French, whose livelihood depends on their faithfulness to their employers. Even the most rabid xenophobes were unstinting in their praise and gratitude, and for the time being the "misdeeds" of the British in Palestine have been forgotten.

On the 27th November a deputation of Nationalists, led by Haj Sleiman Maasarani, called on the political officer to express their gratitude and their hope that Syria would also enjoy the benefits which had accrued to the Lebanon.

Tewfiq Shamieh, who passed through Homs on his way to Aleppo to attend the celebrations held in memory of Ibrahim Hanano, took the opportunity of making known the Syrian Government's refusal to recognise the mandate or to negotiate with the French on the basis of it. He revealed that the Government had previously feared that their demands for the transfer of powers would give rise to difficulties, but that they now regarded their task as easier.

#### 7. Alaouite Territory.

There is much relief that the Lebanese crisis is over. Of the three main groups inhabiting the territory, the Sunni Nationalists have been wholeheartedly in sympathy with the Lebanese; the Christians, realising that in a united Syria they cannot expect to retain the privileged position which they enjoyed when this area was directly under French rule, have, in the main, supported the French; the Nosairis (Alaouites), who represent roughly 70 per cent. of the total population, have been waiting on their religious and tribal leaders. This latter group represent the greatest danger to security in any upheaval, especially in view of the influence wielded by unscrupulous chieftains such as Suleiman Murshid. This brigand, who has in the past more than once been used by the French as a tool to threaten and humiliate the Administration of the Syrian Government, remains a potential danger both to the Syrian State, which is now struggling to assert its authority in the face of the opposition of the S.S.Os., and—in any abnormal circumstances or sudden crisis—to the British authorities.

Since he assumed office, the new Mohafez has been compiling a record of the crimes committed by Suleiman Murshid. Over forty cases of looting, robbery, filching of land and other similar crimes have been collected; and armed with this weighty mass of evidence, the Mohafez has gone to Damascus to make his recommendation to the Syrian Government.

#### 12. Press and Propaganda.

All newspapers have now reappeared. There has been no sign of recrimination, bitterness or provocation in any pro-Government paper, or comment to which any fair-minded person could take exception. In fact, the most important pro-Government French-language daily has shown a dignity and restraint worthy of the best traditions of a Conservative English newspaper. The *Orient*, which was anti-Government before the crisis, has for the moment changed sides; but the *Bashir*, produced by the Jesuits, continues to propagate anti-Government and anti-British views.

The only French paper which at first persisted in a provocative attitude was *La Syrie*, which is recognised as the organ of the délégation. On the 25th November this paper published a most impertinent attack on British intervention in the crisis, containing an offensive reference to the Minister of State's press conference of the 19th November. A strong protest was lodged with General Catroux, and subsequent articles have been much more restrained.

[E 8000/27/89]

No. 51

Weekly Political Summary No. 88, Syria and the Lebanon, 8th December, 1943.—  
(Received in Foreign Office, 22nd December.)

#### 1. General.

THE attitude of the Lebanese and Syrian Governments towards the coming negotiations with the French has been firmly defined by the formal declarations of policy which have been made by the Syrian and Lebanese Prime Ministers in their respective Chambers. Following the line which they had previously adopted in their public utterances, both Ministers repudiated the mandate and insisted upon the immediate transfer of the powers at present in French hands. Both emphasised the right of the Levant States to complete independence, in accordance with Allied pledges and the Atlantic Charter, and subject only to the exigencies of the war.

These declarations have so far provoked no open reactions on the part of the French authorities, who are indeed showing signs of readiness to proceed with a progressive "passation de pouvoirs," but their efforts to stir up confessional antagonism continue, and in Syria are causing some anxiety.

#### 2. Wheat.

Purchases for the period the 29th November to the 4th December have been 963 tons, a daily average of 160 tons.

The O.C.P. is still unable to buy all cereals offered on account of lack of funds. No further funds are to be expected unless the British Government decide to buy the surpluses offered them.

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The autumn rains have not yet begun and are in fact abnormally late. Farmers are already getting nervous about prospects for next year's harvest, and this will still further increase the difficulty of resuming purchases when funds are again received.

### 3. Syria-Damascus.

On the 1st December the Prime Minister amplified in the Chamber the declaration of policy which he had already made in a public speech at Aleppo on the 23rd November. He declared that Syria did not recognise the mandate; that the Government were not prepared to conclude a treaty with the French in exchange for the transfer of rights which properly belonged to Syria; and demanded the complete surrender to Syria of all the attributes of sovereignty, except those which it was necessary for the Allied military authorities to retain for the conduct of the war. These restrictions, he said, should be regarded as military obligations, gladly shouldered by Syria as a contribution to the war effort. The Prime Minister stated that the Government were in agreement with their Lebanese colleagues as to the acquisition and administration of the funds of common interest. He added that General Catroux had agreed that all that remained to be done in this connexion was to carry out the actual transfer of powers. In reply to a question, the Prime Minister stated that the Government were taking steps to secure the dissolution of the Gardes Mobiles and to set on foot a Syrian army.

Considerable publicity has been given in the local press to a speech delivered by the President of the Republic at a reception given on the 4th December by the Damascus Catholic Club. The President's object in accepting an invitation to this gathering was to counteract the palpable intrigues of the French authorities directed towards disturbing the Christian minorities; and in his address he stressed the fact that the Christians were part of a wider Syrian community formed of essentially Syrian elements, feeling and thinking as Syrians.

The law raising judicial immunity and giving power to the Minister of Justice to revise the judiciary establishment, which was referred to in Summary No. 84 of the 10th November, has been passed by the Chamber. It is to remain in force for one year only.

The proposal, put forward at the same time as this Bill, for the setting up of a commission to revise the establishment of Government Departments, has been withdrawn. The political officer is, however, informed that the Government are likely to persist in their intentions to reform the civil service. They now believe, however, that they can achieve their object more discreetly by non-parliamentary means. A draft law to increase stamp duties has also been withdrawn, as a result of objections by a large number of Deputies.

### 4. Aleppo.

There have been no political developments.

The anniversary of the foundation of the Armenian Soviet was celebrated on the 28th November. There was no excitement. At the request of members of the Syrian Nationalist Bloc, Tashnag leaders have been visiting the Armenian quarter to give reassurances about the intentions of the Syrian Government.

### 5. Homs and Hama.

No detailed reports received from this area.

### 6. Jebel Druze.

The settlement of the Lebanese crisis has aroused great popular enthusiasm, and many telegrams of congratulation have been sent to the Lebanese Government. None, however, was sent by the leaders of the Atrash family, owing probably to the influence of the Emir Hassan and Yusuf Pasha, whose attitude during the crisis was equivocal.

### 7. Alaouite Territory.

Nothing of political importance to report.

### 8. Euphrates and Jezireh.

*Euphrates*.—No reports received.

*Jezireh*.—The Lebanese crisis has had few repercussions in this area. Some local government officials have expressed gratification at the outcome of the affair.

### 9. Tribal.

Tribal migration has stopped temporarily as a result of the lateness of rains and the consequent lack of pasturage in the desert. It is reported that tribal sheikhs are apprehensive that their interests may be neglected by the independent Syrian Government, and are agitating for the appointment of a tribal committee. Possibly as a result of this agitation, the Syrian Minister of the Interior has, it is reported, sent a circular to the Mohafezin in all the Syrian provinces asking for detailed reports on the tribes and their movements.

### 10. Frontier.

Nothing of political importance to report.

### 11. The Lebanon.

The Lebanese Government are still preoccupied with the question of the forthcoming negotiations with General Catroux on his return from Algiers. The President and Ministers, when visited by the Political Officer on the 6th December, all expressed determination to take a firm line and to refuse to discuss a treaty. The Ministers seemed ready to hear what General Catroux had to say, but their attitude was one of suspicion of French intentions and mistrust of General Catroux's powers of cajolery. Riad Sulh and his Foreign Minister had been to Chtaura on the 4th December and concerted future plans with the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who, they stated, had assured them that the Syrian Government would take a similar attitude.

The Lebanese Chamber met on the 1st December for the first time since the crisis. Forty-four Deputies attended (including the Cabinet and Speaker). After reading the minutes of the sittings held outside the Chamber during the crisis and observing five minutes' silence in honour of those who lost their lives, the House acclaimed the Prime Minister, who made a speech reviewing the crisis and defining his Government's attitude towards the future. He repeated what he had said at his press conference a few days earlier (see last week's Summary), emphasising that the Government did not recognise the mandate and would never recognise it. He declared that the Lebanon had the right to be free, and pointed out that its independence had been guaranteed by Allied pledges and the Atlantic Charter. He reiterated that the activities of the Government were not inimical to France. A motion by Hamid Frangieh asking the Government to prepare a law dealing with crimes against the State was passed. A motion by Henri Pharaon asking the Government to apply severe punishment to Emil Eddé, whose actions during the crisis had endangered the Lebanon, was approved by all but six of the Deputies (three others who might have been expected to support Eddé, namely, Naccache, Tabet and Ashkar, were absent). These Deputies were booed from the gallery, but the Speaker restored calm. Several Deputies praised the attitude of the Lebanese people during the crisis and thanked Great Britain, the United States, the Allied Nations and the Arab States for their support; a motion in this sense, naming General Spears and Mr. Wadsworth, was proposed by six Deputies and carried unanimously.

General Smuts's speech, with its reference to the future status of France, has made a wide impression in Lebanese circles and reinforced their hopes as to changed post-war conditions.

The difficult question of the appointment to the post of Commander-in-chief of the Internal Security Forces (see last week's Summary) has been settled for the moment by the appointment of Lieutenant-Colonel Fauzi Trabulsi to that post in an acting capacity in place of Colonel Naufal, whose ultimate fate is not yet known. This decision upholds the decree made at Bshamoun by the Government of Habib Abi Shahla and the Emir Majid Arslan. Other administrative changes may be expected shortly.

The Minister of Food, Industry and Commerce, Adil Usseyran, has left for Egypt on leave over the greater Bairam Feast (Id al Adha).

It is of interest that at the Festival of Trees, a specifically Lebanese ceremony to encourage afforestation, held on the 5th December, both Moslem and Christian Youth organisations (Najjadis and Phalanges) participated together officially for the first time.

### 12. Press and Propaganda.

Whilst continuing to show restraint in the matter of comment, the press is now reporting political speeches and developments with an openness which would have appeared astonishing even a few months ago. The speeches of the Syrian and Lebanese Prime Ministers, to which reference has been made above,



have been reproduced verbatim, and announcements have been published that the Levant Governments will shortly be taking over powers at present in the hands of the French, in such a manner as to give the impression to the uninformed that nothing further remains to be done but to fix the date for the transfer.

The French-inspired press has refrained from polemics; in fact, one article in *La Syrie*, commenting on the Syrian Prime Minister's speech, so far from attacking the Prime Minister for his refusal to negotiate a treaty with the French, pointed out that this refusal applied to other Powers also.

In regard to international affairs, however, the French press clearly reflects the sense of grievance under which local French officials are smarting. General Smuts's recent speech—which was not reproduced in the French-language press—came in for very severe criticism; and one article suggests that, if France is abandoned by England, the United States and Russia, she may still assemble the smaller European Powers under her leadership. Concurrently with this trend of thought is expressed the more or less open disparagement of the Anglo-Saxon war effort, especially as compared with Russian achievements.

[E 8103/27/89]

No. 52

*Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received 29th December.)*

(No. 82.)

Sir,

Beirut, 10th December, 1943.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 805 of the 4th December containing a summary of the speech delivered by Saadullah Jabri, the Syrian Prime Minister, in the Chamber of Deputies in the course of the session on the 1st December, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a complete French version of the speech as reproduced in the Damascus newspaper *Les Echos de Syrie*.

2. In communicating this text to me His Majesty's Consul at Damascus has explained that this text has been compared with an original Arabic text taken down as the Prime Minister was speaking and appears substantially correct, except for the following sentences which are missing:—

- (1) Speaking about legislation, Saadullah Jabri said that Syria will make its own laws "without there being any influence by any foreigner."
- (2) On the subject of Arab unity he said: "Syria was the first to rouse the Arab cause from its sleep," and that "Arab consultations were described as consultations lest they be obstructed by obstacles impossible to overcome," and that "Naturally, when consultations take place, that does not mean that decisions have been reached."
- (3) About the independence of Syria he said: "When war necessities are removed Syria will then have great influence on the situation."
- (4) Speaking on the treaty question and about the interests of the country, he said: "We do not want to be bound by anything."

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister of State Resident in the Middle East and to the Minister Resident at Algiers.

I have, &amp;c.

E. L. SPEARS.

Enclosure in No. 52.

*Extract from the Echos de Syrie of the 4th December, 1943.*

*Dans un grand Discours de Circonstance le Président du Conseil expose tous les Problèmes intérieurs et extérieurs.*

#### *Le Mandat.*

APRES un préambule assurant que le Chef du Gouvernement syrien avait été surpris par l'objet de cette interpellation, le Président déclare :

La Syrie n'a reconnu en aucun moment le mandat : lequel mandat, sous différents aspects, s'est emparé des pouvoirs et attributions qu'exerçait l'étranger. Lorsque la Chambre fonctionnait avec un Gouvernement parlementaire, ce mandat était négligé. Et si, à l'aide des forces dont il disposait dans le passé, il exécutait ses volontés ou ses prétentions, ce n'était pas en s'appuyant sur la force du droit ou ce que présume ce droit.

#### *Les Bases de la Politique du Pays.*

Les bases de la politique du pays, poursuit le Président, si nous voulions les définir, peuvent se délimiter dans les points suivants :

##### *La reconnaissance alliée de notre indépendance.*

Il y a d'abord l'état de fait qui prend sa source dans la reconnaissance de notre indépendance de la part des Nations Unies, lesquelles, suivant les assurances et les engagements officiels que nous avons ouïs de leurs représentants, sont désireuses de nous voir exercer cette indépendance.

Ces Nations Unies voudraient nous voir contribuer, dans la mesure de nos possibilités, à leur effort de guerre, en leur facilitant les moyens de transport et de communications et autres. Et nous sommes désireux d'apporter cette contribution à l'effort de guerre des Nations Unies.

##### *Les contingences de la guerre.*

La seconde base est issue des contingences de la guerre qu'il faut prendre en considérations et apprécier à leur juste valeur.

##### *Les attributions issues de l'indépendance.*

La troisième base, ce sont les droits résultant naturellement de notre indépendance. Et ici le Président souligne qu'il ne s'agit pas là de concessions ou de gratifications que nous n'acceptons de personne, mais de droits issus de l'indépendance reconnue par les Nations Unies, et qui présument le transfert des attributions à l'autorité nationale indépendante.

Ces attributions, déclare le Président Djabri, se divisent en deux catégories :

La première nous est exclusive et n'est pas partagée avec le Liban.

La seconde est en participation avec le Liban.

Dans la première catégorie se trouvent les pouvoirs législatifs exercés par la Chambre, à l'exclusion de toute autre autorité. Les autorités intéressées ont reçu due notification que la Syrie n'admet aucune législation ou arrêté non émis par le Gouvernement issu du Parlement. Cette notification est en bonne voie depuis quelques jours. Quant aux activités exercées par les Français pour la protection des frontières, la légalisation des passeports, la gestion des affaires des tribus, la question de la sûreté générale, la censure sur la presse et autres activités de même nature, nous avons, déclare le Président du Conseil, commencé, en fait, l'exercice de ces droits, et en avons donné acte aux intéressés. Nous sommes en train de préparer les cadres des fonctionnaires nécessaires à de telles activités pour les mettre en état de remplir aussitôt leurs devoirs. De sorte que, à l'arrivée d'un voyageur venant de l'étranger, il puisse voir notre pavillon hissé et le fonctionnaire syrien présent pour apposer sa signature, tandis que le fonctionnaire de la "Sûreté" examine si l'entrée d'un tel voyageur est ou n'est pas autorisée.

Quant à la question des frontières, le Président rappelle que leur protection est exercée non pas seulement pour sa sécurité "civile," mais également militaire. Et cela du fait de la présence de troupes des Nations Unies sur nos territoires. Aussi des démarches sont-elles entreprises pour aboutir à ce qui est de nature à assurer la sécurité de ces troupes et également à la préservation de notre souveraineté, ainsi qu'il en est dans les autres pays arabes.

Passant à la question de la censure sur la presse, le Président déclare qu'il a été donné acte à la partie intéressée que cette censure doit être essentiellement syrienne, compte tenu des considérations militaires. De même que nous nous efforcerons d'assurer à la presse ses besoins en papier, ce qui fera que nous deviendrons la seule autorité à laquelle la presse aura à s'adresser.

La seconde catégorie d'attributions est celle en participation avec le Liban.

Cette catégorie, au cas même où le mandat avait un caractère légal, l'application de ce mandat ne lui donne pas le droit d'assumer la gestion des "intérêts communs." Comment l'admettrions-nous lorsque ce mandat est non reconnu et ne repose sur aucune base juridique? Cette gestion a été exercée de force sous prétexte qu'il n'y a pas accord entre la Syrie et le Liban. Mais maintenant que l'accord est intervenu pour la prise en charges des intérêts communs dont les douanes et les sociétés concessionnaires et autres, il ne reste plus aucune raison pour que l'étranger continue à y exercer sa gestion.

Le Président précise qu'il n'y a pas eu à ce sujet de négociations proprement dites avec les Français. Lorsque l'entretien a été ouvert à ce sujet avec le



Général Catroux, ce dernier a reconnu que nous sommes là dans nos droits. Après que nous nous sommes mis d'accord avec le Liban, il ne leur restait qu'à céder. Nous espérons nous réunir prochainement avec le Gouvernement libanais pour fonder l'organisme qui pourra entreprendre l'action entreprise jusqu'ici par les Français, comme eux, ou même mieux. Nous demandons à Dieu de nous permettre de soumettre bientôt à la Chambre ce qui est de nature à lui donner toute cette satisfaction sur ce chapitre.

#### *L'Union arabe.*

Répondant ensuite au sujet de l'Union arabe, le Président déclare que maintenant que le Premier Ministre égyptien, Nahas Pacha, a fait à ce sujet des déclarations à la presse, il se considérerait en état de donner des éclaircissements à cet effet.

Le Président évoque le rôle prépondérant joué par la Syrie dans la cause arabe, ce qui présuppose qu'elle ne pouvait rester en marge du mouvement national entrepris par les Arabes, et assure qu'elle est prête à affronter tous les sacrifices pour la réalisation du projet de consolidation des rapports des pays arabes entre eux.

Après avoir rendu hommage à l'Egypte et à ses dirigeants pour avoir "patronné" ce mouvement, le Président déclare que ce qui est survenu dernièrement ce sont des "consultations." Une fois que Nahas Pacha aura estimé que ces consultations ont abouti aux résultats désirables, il invitera les pays intéressés à constituer "une Commission internationale arabe" qui tiendra ses réunions à tour de rôle dans chacun de ces pays, en Egypte, en Arabie séoudite, en Irak, en Syrie. Une fois les bases sur lesquelles on se sera mis d'accord seront consolidées, Nahas Pacha invitera à un "congrès" qui se tiendra au Caire, et auquel participeront tous les Gouvernements arabes. Il appartiendra à ce congrès d'indiquer la forme dont seront reliés ces pays. C'est à cela, ajoute le Président, que tous aspirent, notamment en matière politique.

#### *L'Indépendance et le Traité.*

Evoquant à cette occasion la position particulière de la Syrie au sein de ces pays arabes, le Président est ramené à entretenir la Chambre des attributions résultant de l'indépendance.

Il déclare à ce sujet que ce que demande la seconde partie en compensation du transfert des attributions et autres, soit la conclusion d'un traité, il ne trouve pour sa part aucune nécessité de conclure un traité pour régler ces questions. Car, en toute franchise, dit-il, de tels traités impliquent de nombreuses conséquences en relation avec des questions telles qu'une garantie territoriale, des obligations de guerre, la présence de troupes des Nations Unies, le pacte de l'Atlantique. De même qu'il s'y trouve des considérations qui ne donnent pas à la seconde partie un droit juridique de conclure un accord, ainsi que des questions d'intérêts du pays qui ne peuvent être liés en les circonstances actuelles.

Je ne puis supposer, déclare le Président, ou même imaginer que les attributions dont nous commençons à exercer une partie puissent être considérées comme un gage tenu en main jusqu'à la réalisation d'un traité. Je ne puis croire que l'autre partie pense cela ou le dise. Et tout ce que nous avons constaté de l'autre côté c'est la reconnaissance que le transfert est obligatoire et qu'il sera réalisé.

#### *Sommaire des Questions en cours.*

Le Président du Conseil, résumant ensuite l'ensemble de ses déclarations, dit que toutes les questions soumises à l'appréciation de la Chambre se condensent comme suit :

- (1) Il n'y a pas de mandat.
- (2) Il n'y a pas de traité.
- (3) Les attributions seront transférées et celles déjà transférées seront "complétées."
- (4) Des pays arabes cherchent à s'unir et leurs efforts dans ce sens sont en bonne voie.
- (5) Des obligations militaires existent et qui sont la conséquence de la contribution aux efforts des Nations Unies pour la victoire.
- (6) Des circonstances militaires sont provoquées par la sécurité des troupes des Nations Unies.

Le Président achève en disant qu'il ne fait pas état de ces questions pour profiter des circonstances actuelles, mais qu'elles ont été déjà dites auparavant et communiquées officiellement aux parties intéressées.

#### *Déclarations complémentaires.*

L'intervention de M. Adnan el Atassi, Président de la Commission des Affaires étrangères, amène le Chef du Gouvernement à déclarer au sujet de la garde mobile que des dispositions sont en vue pour sa dissolution, tandis que la question de la constitution d'une armée demande beaucoup d'attention et d'études, notamment en les circonstances actuelles de la guerre.

M. Fakhri el Baroudi évoque la question des "conseillers," et M. Joseph Liane celle des déportés politiques. A cette dernière question, le Président répond que la difficulté de leur mise en liberté provient de la diversité des camps et des raisons des détentions ainsi que du grand nombre de détenus. Il conclut en déclarant néanmoins qu'il ne se passera pas trop de temps sans qu'ils ne soient ramenés tous chez eux en bonne santé pour jouir de toute leur liberté.

[E 8104/27/89]

No. 53

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 89, Syria and the Lebanon, 15th December, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office, 29th December.)*

#### *\*1. General.*

THE Acting French Délégué Général is reliably reported to have informed the Lebanese President on the 8th December that the French Committee of Liberation had agreed to—

- (a) the immediate transfer to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments of the services of common interest, subject to discussions on ways and means; and
- (b) tripartite discussions (French, British and Lebanese) on the transfer to the Lebanese Government of certain of the functions of the Sûreté Générale.

M. Chataigneau is reported to have made a similar communication to the Syrian Government.

Following this communication, the Lebanese Prime Minister met the Syrian President at Zebdani on the 10th December, and is said to have agreed with him that the Syrian and Lebanese Governments should each appoint three members to a joint committee charged with discussing with the French the transfer of the *Intérêts Communs*.

The political atmosphere is, however, still troubled. From the many wild rumours which are circulating, it is clear that the campaign designed to arouse confessional antagonism, to which reference has been made in previous summaries, has by no means abated. Efforts are now also being made to persuade the merchant class that they will be the losers under the new régime of independence, which will have to be supported by heavy taxation (the French having, in the past, with great philanthropy, paid all the expenses of administration themselves); and it is being suggested that the recent discussions in Cairo herald the cession of the Levant States to Turkey. The reason for British intervention in the recent crisis is now clear: the British wished to get rid of the French so that they could sell the Levant States to Turkey.

The arrival of General Catroux is therefore anxiously awaited.

The Moslem feast of the "Id al Adha" has been celebrated throughout the country in joyful mood. There has been a complete absence of speeches and demonstrations by religious leaders and Moslem communities which could be regarded as recriminatory or provocative.

#### *\*2. Wheat.*

Purchases for the period the 5th–12th December have been 568 tons, a daily average of 71 tons.

Purchases of cereals are still seriously hampered by the lack of funds. The decision of His Majesty's Government regarding the purchase of surpluses is still awaited.



The autumn rains have not yet commenced and farmers predict a poor crop in 1944. If the drought continues much longer, there will be need of second sowings on an extensive scale.

All these factors point to the necessity of purchases on the largest scale being resumed immediately.

\*10. *Frontier.*

Refugees continue to pour in from Turkey, and a high proportion this week have been Italians, among whom was a general who had escaped from Samos. Other notable arrivals were the Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Samos and a party of eleven Italian diplomats from the Italian Embassy at Angora.

Although there is no marked increase in smuggling from Turkey in general, pharmaceutical products seem to be popular as contraband goods. Three cases of smuggling in these products have been reported.

\*11. *The Lebanon.*

M. Chataigneau's communication to the Lebanese Government (referred to under "General" above), and the general atmosphere engendered by the French defeat in the recent crisis, have induced a feeling of optimism amongst the Lebanese Ministers as regards the outcome of the forthcoming discussions with General Catroux, and they have been encouraged by the attitude and declarations of the Syrian Government on this subject. Both Governments are therefore expected to adopt a firm attitude, and to resist any attempts which General Catroux might make to strike a political bargain in return for concessions which they regard as their right.

The Lebanese Government have set up an internal press censorship. Discussions are also proceeding regarding the method of controlling the supply and distribution of tyres and newsprint, the French having announced their intention of withdrawing from the control of both these commodities.

In the sphere of administration the position of the Lebanese Government is unsatisfactory. Partly, no doubt, owing to the Moslem Feast of the 8th-10th December, but more to the inexperience of several of the Ministers, the Government have still shown no signs of making a serious attempt to tackle the numerous and difficult problems which await solution. Riad es Sulh is handicapped by having spent most of his life in opposition, and is somewhat naturally finding it difficult to get down to the business of positive administration, especially as congratulations on his recent triumph continue to be showered upon him. He has, however, in his capacity as Minister of Finance, put out the budget for discussion by a committee, but the urgent question of the reorganisation of the Finance Departments, the collection of the war profits tax and the institution of an income tax still remain to be dealt with. The Minister of the Interior, fired by a sincere desire to improve the standard of efficiency of the administration, has now succeeded in bringing about a large-scale reshuffle of the *kaimakams*, in addition to his gendarmerie and police appointments, but is having trouble with the Prime Minister about the *Mohafezin*, owing to the continuous pressure exerted on him by Deputies in favour of their relatives and protégés. The Minister of Justice has prepared a project of judicial reform; it is understood to advocate the re-establishment of a Court of Cassation, an institution which has appeared and disappeared at intervals in the last few years.

This inertia on the part of the Government is providing material for those elements, both French and Lebanese, who are anxious for various reasons to create opposition to it. Amongst the Deputies, Emil Eddé is still remaining prudently in the background, where he is said to be expressing extreme bitterness against the French for having let him down; but Messrs. Naccache and Ayoub Tabet are working to create a group of Deputies who will support them in criticising and obstructing the Government. Neither of these men is, however, of the stuff of which a successful leader of the Opposition is made, and it is probable that the Opposition will remain ineffective unless the Government make some specific blunder which will unite a majority of malcontent Deputies against them. Meantime, reports continue to be received of French efforts to play on Christian (particularly Maronite) susceptibilities on the familiar lines that the Government, under British pressure, is adopting a Moslem policy and that the Christians must oppose it and cling to the French if they are to avoid absorption into a Moslem *bloc*.

The members of the Government are also divided amongst themselves on the question of the sanctions to be applied to those who acted with the French against

them in the crisis, notably Emil Eddé, the Chief of the Gendarmerie and the *Mohafez* of Baabda. The Prime Minister is in favour of clemency, so as not to create enemies for himself; and the President and the four Ministers, who wish at least to unseat Eddé, are finding Riad es Sulh difficult to move. Opinions in the country are divided on the subject.

The Fighting French authorities appear to have instituted a new policy as regards provincial *Conseillers*. The *Conseiller* at Tripoli has been transferred (it is believed to Aleppo), and his colleague at Sidon is also leaving. At Tripoli Colonel Gennardi, one of the better French elements (who was put under house arrest by M. Hellen during the recent crisis), is to open a "French agency," in which will be grouped the local branch of the *Sûreté Générale*, the S.S.O. and other French organisations; he will not occupy an office in the *Sérail*, and has expressed his intention to abstain altogether from interfering in the local administration. A similar report as regards French intentions has been received from Sidon.

The absence of autumn rains this year is causing anxiety as to the cereal crop. Rumours of Turkey's forthcoming participation in the war appear to have been the principal cause of a marked rise in gold and textile prices last week. The cost of living continues to be a constant subject of complaint, and the Government's failure so far to produce any counter-measures is being freely criticised.